Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (In Compliance with Executive Order 12546 of February 3, 1986)
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Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (In compliance with Executive Order 12546 of February 3, 1986) Table of Contents Volume I Preface...........................................1 Chapter I - Introduction......................................2 Chapter II - Events Leading Up to the Challenger Mission......10 Chapter III - The Accident.....................................19 Chapter IV - The Cause of the Accident........................40 Chapter V - The Contributing Cause of the Accident...........82 Chapter VI - An accident Rooted in History...................120 Chapter VII - The Silent Safety Program.......................152 Chapter VIII - Pressures on the System.........................164 Chapter IX - Other Safety Considerations.....................178 Recommendations.................................198 The Commission..................................202 The Staff.......................................204 Appendix A - Commission Activities...........................206 Appendix B - Commission Documentation System.................214 Appendix C - Observations Concerning the Processing And Assembly of Flight 51-l.........................219 Appendix D - Supporting Charts and Documents.................225 Volume II Appendix E - Independent Test Team Report to the Commission Appendix F - Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle Appendix G - Human Factors Analysis Appendix H - Flight Readiness Review Treatment of O-ring Problems Appendix I - NASA Pre-Launch Activities Team Report Appendix J - NASA Mission Planning and Operations Team Report Appendix K - NASA Development and Production Team Report Appendix L - NASA Accident Analysis Team Report Appendix M - Comments by Morton Thiokol on NASA Report Volume III Appendix N - NASA Photo and TV Support Team Report Appendix O - NASA Search, Recovery and Reconstruction Task Force Team Report Volume IV Hearings of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident: February 6, 1986 to February 25, 1986 Volume V Hearings of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident: February 26, 1986 to May 2, 1986. PREFACE The accident of Space Shuttle Challenger, mission 51-L, interrupting for a time one of the most productive engineering, scientific and exploratory programs in history, evoked a wide range of deeply felt public responses. There was grief and sadness for the loss of seven brave members of the crew; firm national resolve that those men and women be forever enshrined in the annals of American heroes, and a determination, based on that resolve and in their memory to strengthen the Space Shuttle program so that this tragic event will become a milestone on the way to achieving the full potential that space offers to mankind. The President, who was moved and troubled by this accident in a very personal way, appointed an independent Commission made up of persons not connected with the mission to investigate it. The mandate of the Commission was to: 1. Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident; and 2. Develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon the Commission's findings and determinations. Immediately after being appointed, the Commission moved forward with its investigation and, with the full support of the White House, held public hearings dealing with the facts leading up to the accident. In a closed society other options are available; in an open society -- unless classified matters are involved -- other options are not, either as matter of law or as a practical matter. In this case a vigorous investigation and full disclosure of the facts were necessary. The way to deal with a failure of this magnitude is to disclose all the facts fully and openly; to take immediate steps to correct mistakes that led to the failure; and to continue the program with renewed confidence and determination. The Commission construed its mandate somewhat broadly to include recommendations on safety matters not necessarily involved in this accident but which require attention to make future flights safer. Careful attention was given to concerns expressed by astronauts because the Space Shuttle program will only succeed if the highly qualified men and women who fly the Shuttle have confidence in the system. However, the Commission did not construe its mandate to require a detailed investigation of all aspects of the Space Shuttle program; to review budgetary matters; or to interfere with or supersede Congress in any way in the performance of its duties. Rather, the Commission focused its attention on the safety aspects of future flights based on the lessons learned from the investigation with the objective being to return to safe flight. Congress recognized the desirability, in the first instance, of having a single investigation of this national tragedy. It very responsibly agreed to await the Commission's findings before deciding what further action might be necessary to carry out its responsibilities. For the first several days after the accident -- possibly because of the trauma resulting from the accident -- NASA appeared to be withholding information about the accident from the public. After the Commission began its work, and at its suggestion, NASA began releasing a great deal of information that helped to reassure the public that all aspects of the accident were being investigated and that the full story was being told in an orderly and thorough manner. Following the suggestion of the Commission, NASA established several teams of persons not involved in the mission 51-L launch process to support the Commission and its panels. These NASA teams have cooperated with the Commission in every aspect of its work. The result has been a comprehensive and complete investigation. The Commission believes that its investigation and report have been responsive to the request of the President and hopes that they will serve the best interests of the nation in restoring the United States space program to its preeminent position in the world. Chapter I - Introduction The Space Shuttle concept had its genesis in the 1960s, when the Apollo lunar landing spacecraft was in full development but had not yet flown. From the earliest days of the space program, it seemed logical that the goal of frequent, economical access to space might best be served by a resuable launch system. In February, 1967, the President's Science Advisory Committee lent weight to the idea of a reusable spacecraft by recommending that studies be made "of more economical ferrying systems, presumably involving partial or total recovery and use." In September, 1969, two months after the initial lunar landing, a Space Task Group chaired by the Vice President offered a choice of three long-range plans: A $8-$10 billion per year program involving a manned Mars expedition, a space station in lunar orbit and a 50-person Earth-orbiting station serviced by a reusable ferry, or Space Shuttle. An intermediate program, costing less than $8 billion annually, that would include the Mars mission. A relatively modest $4-$5.7 billion a year program that would embrace an Earth-orbiting space station and the Space Shuttle as its link to Earth. In March, 1970, President Nixon made it clear that, while he favored a continuing active space program, funding on the order of Apollo was not in the cards. He opted for the shuttle-tended space base as a long-range goal but deferred going ahead with the space station pending development of the shuttle vehicle. Thus the reusable Space Shuttle, earlier considered only the transport element of a broad, multi-objective space plan, became the focus of NASA's near-term future. Chapter II - Events Leading up to the Challenger Mission Preparations for the launch of mission 51-L were not unusual, though they were complicated by changes in the launch schedule. The sequence of complex, interrelated steps involved in producing the detailed schedule and supporting logistics necessary for a successful mission always requires intense effort and close coordination. Flight 51-L of the Challenger was originally scheduled for July, 1985, but by the time the crew was assigned in January, 1985, launch had been postponed to late November to accommodate changes in payloads. The launch was subsequently delayed further and finally rescheduled for late January, 1986. After a series of payload changes, the Challenger cargo included two satellites in the cargo bay and equipment in the crew compartment for experimetns that would be carried out during the mission. The payloads flown on mission 51-L are listed in this table: Mission 51-L Payloads Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-B Spartan-Halley Satellite Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program Fluid Dynamics Experiment Phase Partitioning Experiment Teacher in Space Project Shuttle Student Involvement Program Radiation Monitoring Experiment The primary payloads were the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (a NASA communications satellite0 and the Spartan satellite that would be deployed into orbit carrying special instruments for the observation of Halley's Comet. The NASA communications satellite was to have been placed in a geosynchronous orbit with the aid of a booster called the Inertial Upper Stage. The satellite would have supported communications with the Space Shuttle and up to 23 other spacecraft. The Spartan satellite was to have been deployed into low Earth orbit using the remote manipulator system. The Spartan instruments