Unit 15 the New Land Revenue Settlements

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Unit 15 the New Land Revenue Settlements UNIT 15 THE NEW LAND REVENUE I SETTLEMENTS Structure 15.0 Objectives 15. I Introduction 15.2 First Experiments in Land Revenue Management 15.3 The Permanent Settlement in Bengal 15.3.1 A Settlement with Zamindars 15.3.2 The Position of the Cultivators 15.3.3 Effects of the Permanent Settlement 15.4 Disillusionment with Permanent Settlement 15.5 The Emergence of Alternative Systems 15.5.1 Land Assessment Under Ryotwari 15.5.2 The Adoption of Ryotwari in Madras 15.5.3 Ryotwari Theory and Practice 15.5.4 Effects of the Ryotwari System in Madras 15.5.5 The Ryotwari Settlement in Bombay 15.5,6 Effects of the Ryotwari System in Madras and Bombay 15.6 The Other Alternative Settlement: The Mahalwari System 15.63 Mahalwari Theory and Practice 15.6.2 Effects of the Mahalwari Settlement 15.7 Let Us Sum Up 15.8 Andwers To Check.Your Progress Exercises - 15.0 OBJECTIVES In this Unit we shall study the land revenue settlements made by the British in different parts of India up to 1857. After studying this Unit you will be able to undetstanki: the' 3eaning of the term 'revenue settlement', 0 the aknis of the British in their various 'settlements', the Important features of the three main types of settlement. and the important effects of each settlement on the rural economy and on the relatilon of different classes in the country side. 15.1 INTRODUCTION Agriculture has been the most important economic activity of the Indian people for many centuries. Naturally, therefore, kings and rulers have always drawn a large part of their taxes from agriculture. The British government, as it established itself in variou,~parts of India also imposed very heavy taxes on agriculture. In order to assess and collect these taxes, it instituted various land revenue settlements. Let us try and understand what this means. Imagine that the British East India Company has just defeated some Indian ruler, and annexed his territories. Now they wanlt to collect taxes from these lands. You may think that this could be done by lootiqg and plundering-and this was in fact often the first thing that was done in newly conquered territory. But it is not possible to continue like this: F~rstof all, because loot is usually kept by the looter, and does not find its way into the government treasury, and secordly, because this sort of activity is likely to cause The New Land people to flee to other areas, or to so impoverish them that nothing can be got Rr>c,~ueSettlemen's later on. So it is necessary to institute some regular system of taxation. such a system has two requirements: the government has to fix what or how much will be paid - this amount is called the 'assessment; and it has to fix who will have to pay. Now the person who is called on to pay a certain amount must have some connection with, some control over the land from which the tax is to be collected' because he will otherwise be incapable of paying anything from it. So when the government places the burden of payment on somebody, it must also see that ne has some control over the land so that he gets an income from which the tax can be paid. If, ,he does not get anything from the land, he can obviously not pay anything to the government. Now, when the government had fixed (or 'settled') how the land tax (or land ievenue) 'was to be 'assessed', and who was to pay it, and what was to be paid. the essential steps in a land revenue settlement were complete. In this Unit our focus is on the various land revenue settlements introduced by the British in India, their features and the impact they had on Indian economy and society. 15.2 FIRST EXPERIMENTS IN LAND REVENUE MANAGEMENT After gaining control of Bengal in 1757, the British thought that they would retain I the administration established by the Nawabs of Bengal. but would use it to collect an ever-growing amount for themselves. However, the rapacity and corruption of the Company's employees, and their continua1 interference in the administration led to complete disorganisation, and was one of the causes of the terrible famine of 1769-70, in which it was estimated that one-third of the people of Bengal died. i From 1772 therefore, a new system was introduced: this was the farming system. Under this system the government gave out the collection of land revenue on a contract basis. The contractor who offered to pay the largest adount from a certain district or sub-division was given full powers for a certain number of years. Obviously, such contractors (they were called 'farmers' in those days), would try and extort as much as possible during the period that they held the contract; it would not matter to them if the people were ruined and the production in the later years declined. After all, they would have made their profit. Extortion and opprcssion were the obvious results of such a system. Furthermore, many of the contractors had offered to pay very large amounts, and later found that they could not collect so much, even with great qpression. Finally, the system also led to corruption. As with many government contracts even today, profitable contracts on very easy terms were given to the friends and favourites and 'benamidars' of men in power, leading to loss to the government. In 1786 Lord Cornwallis was sent out to India with orders to clean up and reorganise the administration. 15.3 THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT IN BENGAL Cornwallis realised that the existing system was impoverishing the country -its agriculture was in decline. Furthermore, it was failing to produce the large and regular surplus that the Company hoped for. And it was also becoming difficult for the Company to get the large quantities of Indian goods that it planned to export to Europe, because, as Cornwallis observed, the production of silk, cotton. etc. all depended on agriculture. When agriculture was decaying, handicrafts could hardly be prosperous. And both the London authorities and Cornwallis were agreed that much of the corruption and oppression originated in the fact that the taxation had the character of an 'uncertain, arbitrary imposition'. It was decided therefore, that the laridltax would now be permanently fixed: the government would promise never to increase it in future. Several effects were expected from this measure. It would reduce the scope for corruption that existad when officials could alter the assessment at will. Furthermore, now that the state! would not demand anything extra if the production increased it was hoped that landholders would invest money in improving the land as the whole of the benefit would come to them. Production and trade would increase, and the government would also get its taxes regularly. Finally, Cornwallis believed that even if the Ian4 tax was fixed, government could always levy taxes on trade and commerce in order to raise more money if it was needed. In any case, the land revenue was now fixed at a very high level - an absolute maximum -of Rs. 2 crore and 65 lakhs. 15.3.1 A Settlement With Zamindars So we see that the land revenue was fixed permanently. But from whom was it to be collected? The Nawabs of Bengal had collected taxes from the zamindars. These zamindars were usually in control of large areas: sometimes entire districts. They had their own armed forces, and were termed Rajas. But there were also zamindars who held smaller areas, and either paid directly to the State, or paid through some big zamindar. The actual cultivation was carried on by peasants who paid the zamindars at customary rates fixed in every sub-division (or pargana). Oppressive zamindars often added extra charges called 'abwabs' on top of the regular land revenue rates, By 1730 British rule had greatly confused this picture. Some Zamindars were retained - others were replaced by contractors or officials. The old customary rates were ignored, and every abuse permitted, if it led to an increase in the revenues. By the time Cornwallis arrived on the scene, the situation was one of the complete confusion. The new Governor-General belonged to the landed aristocracy of Britain and was in favour of a settlement that gave the right of ownership to the zamindars, who, he hoped, would improve the land as English landlords did. But apart from this perference on his part, it was difficult for the government to make the settlement with any other class. To understand this you must bear in mind that there must have been about four or five million cultivating families in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa at that time. CoUecting from them would have involved the preparation of detailed records of all their holdings, and the calculation of a tax on this basis. This would take several years and a large staff to execute. In addition it would give great opportunities for corruption. It was obviously much simpler to collect the revenue from a small ' number of big zamindars- and this was the arrangement made under the Permanent Settlement that was introduced in Bengal and Bihar in 1793. Every bit of agricultural land in these provinces therefore became part of some zamindari. The zamindar had to pay the tax fixed upon it: if he did so then he was the pwprietor, the owner of his zamindari. He could sell, mortgage or transfer it. The land would be inherited by heirs in due course.
Recommended publications
  • Objective Type Questions (1 Mark Each)
    Grade VIII - History Lesson 3.Ruling the Countryside Objective Type Questions (1 Mark each) I. Multiple choice questions 1. The Mughal emperor appointed the East India company as the Diwan of _____________. a. Bihar b. Bengal c. Odisha d. Mumbai 2. Company purchased goods in India by importing _____________ and _____________ from Britain. a. gold and copper b. silver and tin c. gold and silver d. silver and copper 3. In 1770 a terrible famine killed _____________ million people in Bengal. a. five b. nine c. seven d. ten 4. The Rajas and taluqdars were recognised as _____________. a. lohar b. Zamindars c. sonar d. ryots 5. The Mahalwari system was devisd by an Englishman called _____________. a. Thomas Munro b. Charles Cornwallis c. Holt Mackenzie d. Wellesley 6. The company was trying to expand the cultivation of _____________ and _____________. a. wheat and rice b. opium and indigo c. tea and sugarcane d. jute and cotton 7. By 1810, the indigo imported to Britain from India was _____________ percent. a. 90 b. 95 c. 92 d. 100 8. _____________ is a unit of measurement of land. a.Litre b. Bigha c. Kilogram d.Millilitre 1. b 2. c 3. d 4. b 5. c 6. b 7. b 8. b II. Multiple choice questions 1. One-third of the population was wiped out from Bengal because a. a terrible famine occurred there b. a civil war broke out c. An epidemic broke out d. none of the above 2. The Mahalwari System was devised by 1 Created by Pinkz a.
    [Show full text]
  • Post Graduate Courses (Semester – I &
    Iswar Saran P. G. College ( University Of Allahabad) Department of Med And Mod History Post Graduate Courses (Semester – I & II) CORE COURSES:- S.No Course Code Title of the Course 1. HIS 501 Development of Historiography in Non-Indian Context 2. HIS 502 Development of Historiography in India 3. HIS 503 History of the Contemporary World (1919-1962) 4. HIS 504 History of the Contemporary World (1963-2000) ELECTIVE/OPTIONAL COURSES:- Sl.No Course Code Title of the Course 1. HIS555 History of Modern Europe (1789-1870) 2. HIS556 History of Modern Europe (1870-1919) 3. HIS557 History of South Asia-I 4. HIS 558 History of South Asia-II 5. HIS 561 History of United States of America (1776-1898) 6. HIS 562 History of United States of America (1898-1976) Semester - I Development of Historiography in Non-Indian Context (Code: HIS 501) UNIT - I Philosophy of History: 1. Definition of History. 2. History and its relation with the other branches of knowledge. 3. Challenges before the Historian. UNIT - II Evolution of non-Indian Historiography through the Ages-Ancient to Early Modern: 1. Earlier Traditions of Europe. 2. Developments during Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and Romanticism. 3. Developments of Historiography in Middle East and China UNIT - III Evolution of European Historiography through the Ages- I 1. Positivist school 2. Whig School 3. Others UNIT - IV Evolution of European Historiography through the Ages- II 1. Karl Marx and Historical Materialism 2. Antonio Gramsci, Hegemony and Cultural Marxism 3. Louis Althusser and Structural Marxism UNIT - V Evolution of European Historiography through the Ages- III 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Land Tenure Systems in the Late 18 and 19 Century in Colonial India
    American International Journal of Available online at http://www.iasir.net Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences ISSN (Print): 2328-3734, ISSN (Online): 2328-3696, ISSN (CD-ROM): 2328-3688 AIJRHASS is a refereed, indexed, peer-reviewed, multidisciplinary and open access journal published by International Association of Scientific Innovation and Research (IASIR), USA (An Association Unifying the Sciences, Engineering, and Applied Research) Land Tenure Systems in the late 18th and 19th century in Colonial India Dr. Hareet Kumar Meena Assistant Professor, Department of History Indira Gandhi National Tribal University Madhya Pradesh, INDIA Abstract: Tax from the land remained a primary source of revenue for the kings and emperors since time immemorial. Nevertheless, the ownership pattern of land had witnessed changes over centuries. In the pre- capitalist stage of Indian economy, the idea of absolute ownership did not exist. All classes connected with land possessed certain rights. Unlike, the ancient and medieval period, the British imperial rule unleashed far-reaching changes in Indian agrarian structure. New land tenures, new land ownership concepts, tenancy changes and heavier demand for land revenue brought havoc changes, both in rural economy and social web. From their beginning, as political masters, the English Company relied on land revenue as the principal source of income for the functioning of state. Up to a first approximation, all cultivable land in British India fell under one of the following three alternative systems- (a) landlord based system (zamindari), (b) an individual cultivator-based system (raiytwari), and (c) village-based system (mahalwari). British mercantile interests coupled with Free Trade principles sought to derive the maximum economic advantage from their rule in India.
    [Show full text]
  • Land Revenue Systems in British India
    Land Revenue Systems in British India drishtiias.com/printpdf/land-revenue-systems-in-british-india Land revenue was one of the major sources of income for Britishers in India. There were broadly three types of land revenue policies in existence during the British rule in India. Before independence, there were three major types of land tenure systems prevailing in the country: The Zamindari System The Mahalwari System The Ryotwari System The basic difference in these systems was regarding the mode of payment of land revenue. The Zamindari System The zamindari system was introduced by Lord Cornwallis in 1793 through Permanent Settlement that fixed the land rights of the members in perpetuity without any provision for fixed rent or occupancy right for actual cultivators. Under the Zamindari system, the land revenue was collected from the farmers by the intermediaries known as Zamindars. The share of the government in the total land revenue collected by the zamindars was kept at 10/11th, and the remainder going to zamindars. The system was most prevalent in West Bengal, Bihar, Odisha, UP, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. The Permanent Settlement Agreement According to the Permanent Land revenue settlement the Zamindars were recognised as the permanent owners of the land. They were given instruction to pay 89% of the annual revenue to the state and were permitted to enjoy 11% of the revenue as their share. The Zamindars were left independent in the internal affairs of their respective districts. Issues with the Zamindari System 1/4 For the Cultivators: In villages, the cultivators found the system oppressive and exploitative as the rent they paid to the zamindar was very high while his right on the land was quite insecure.
    [Show full text]
  • A Comparative Study of Zamindari, Raiyatwari and Mahalwari Land Revenue Settlements: the Colonial Mechanisms of Surplus Extraction in 19Th Century British India
    IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (JHSS) ISSN: 2279-0837, ISBN: 2279-0845. Volume 2, Issue 4 (Sep-Oct. 2012), PP 16-26 www.iosrjournals.org A Comparative Study of Zamindari, Raiyatwari and Mahalwari Land Revenue Settlements: The Colonial Mechanisms of Surplus Extraction in 19th Century British India Dr. Md Hamid Husain Guest Faculty, Zakir Husain Delhi College, University of Delhi, India Firoj High Sarwar Research Scholar, Department of History (CAS), AMU, Aligarh, India Abstract: As a colonial mechanism of exploitation the British under East India Company invented and experimented different land revenue settlements in colonized India. Historically, this becomes a major issue of discussion among the scholars in the context of exploitation versus progressive mission in British India. Here, in this paper an attempt has been made to analyze and to interpret the prototype, methods, magnitudes, and far- reaching effects of the three major (Zamindari, Raiytwari and Mahalwari) land revenue settlements in a comparative way. And eventually this paper has tried to show the cause-effects relationship of different modes of revenue assessments, which in turn, how it facilitated Englishmen to provide huge economic vertebrae to the Imperial Home Country, and how it succors in altering Indian traditional society and economic set up. Keywords: Diwani (revenue collection right), Mahal (estate), Potta (lease), Raiyat (peasant), Zamindar (land lord) I. Introduction As agriculture has been the most important economic activity of the Indian people for many centuries and it is the main source of income. Naturally, land revenue management and administration needs a proper care to handle because it was the most important source of income for the state too.
    [Show full text]
  • Economic Hist of India Under Early British Rule
    The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule FROM THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER IN 1757 TO THE ACCESSION OF QUEEN VICTORIA IN 1837 ROMESH DUTT, C.I.E. VOLUME 1 First published in Great Britain by Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner, 1902 CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE . r . vii CHAP. I. GROWTH OF THE EMPIRE I I e ocI 111. LORD CLlVE AND RIS SUCCESSORS IN BEXGAL, 1765-72 . 35 V. LORD CORNWALLIS AND THE ZEMINDARI SETTLEMENT IN BENGAL, 1785-93 . 81 VI. FARMING OF REVESUES IN MADRAS, 1763-85 . VJI. OLD AND NEW POSSESSIONS IN MADRAS, I 785-1807 VIII. VILLAGE COMMUNITIES OR INDIVIDUAL TENANTS? A DEBATE IN MADRAS, 1807-20. IX. MUNRO AND THE RYOTWARI SETTLEMENT IN MADRAS, 1820-27 . X. LORD WELLESLEY AND CONQUESTS IN NORTHERN INDIA, 1795-1815 . XI. LORD HASTINGS AND THE MAHALWARI SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN INDIA, 1815-22 . XII. ECONOMIC CONDITIOR OF SOUTHERN INDIA, 1800 . X~II. ECONOMlC CONDITION OF KORTHERN INDIA, 1808-15 Printed in Great Britain XIv. DECLINE OF INDUSTRIES, 1793-1813 . xv. STATE OF INDUSTRIE~, 1813-35 . • ~VI.EXTERNAL TRADE, 1813-35 a . vi CONTENTS PAGE CHAP. XVII. INTERNAL TRADE, CANALS AND RAILROADS, 1813-35 . 303 XVIII. ADMINISTRATIVE FAILURES,I 793-18 15 . 313 XIX. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND LORD WILLIAM DENTINCK, 1815-35 . 326 PREFACE XX. ELPHINSTONE IN BOMBAT, 1817-27 344 EXCELLENTworks on the military and political transac- XXI. WINGATE AXD THE RYOTIVARI SETTLEMENT IN tions of the British in India have been written by BOMBAY,1827-35 368 . eminent hi~t~orians.No history of the people of India, XXII.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of the Professional Structure in Modern India : Older and New Professions in a Changing
    C/83-5 THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROFESSIONAL STRUCTURE IN MODERN INDIA: OLDER AND NEW PROFESSIONS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY Rajat Kanta Ray Professor and Head Department of History Presidency College Calcutta, India Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 August 1983 ,At Foreword This historical study by Professor Rajat Ray is one of a series which examines the development of professions as a key to understanding the different patterns in the modernization of Asia. In recent years there has been much glib talk about "technology transfers" to the Third World, as though knowledge and skills could be easily packaged and delivered. Profound historical processes were thus made analogous to shopping expeditions for selecting the "appropriate technology" for the country's resources. The MIT Center for International Studies's project on the Modernization of Asia is premised on a different sociology of knowledge. Our assumption is that the knowledge and skills inherent in the modernization processes take on meaningful historical significance only in the context of the emergence of recognizable professions, which are communities of people that share specialized knowledge and skills and seek to uphold standards. It would seem that much that is distinctive in the various ways in which the different Asian societies have modernized can be found by seeking answers to such questions as: which were the earlier professions to be established, and which ones came later? What were the political, social
    [Show full text]
  • Land Tenure and Missing Women: Evidence from North India ∗
    Land Tenure and Missing Women: Evidence from North India ∗ Apoorva Lal Stanford University This paper examines the effects of colonial era land tenure institutions on modern dayde- mographic outcomes in villages in North India. I exploit the staggered annexation of the kingdom of Awadh in North India by the British East India company in 1803 and 1856 and as a source of exogenous variation in land-tenure (as classified in Banerjee and Iyer 2005) to evaluate the effects of different property-rights systems on modern-day outcomes usinga spatial regression discontinuity design on the 2001 village level census. I find that villages where property rights were granted to the cultivators (mahalwari villages) have more skewed sex-ratios, lower female literacy, and lower female labour force participation rate than vil- lages where property rights were granted to the landlord (zamindari villages). I hypothesise that the likely mechanism is that farmers who have property to pass on to future generations have a stronger preference for male children. These property rights may also grant the men more bargaining power in the household, thereby entrenching intra-household inequalities and manifesting in worse educational and labour market outcomes for women. ∗I thank Anand Swamy, Thorsten Rogall, Josh Gottlieb, Thomas Lemieux, Siwan Anderson, Avi Acharya, Saad Gulzar, Saumitra Jha, Vicki Fouka, Steve Haber, David Laitin, Alexander Lee, Dan Thompson, Jayash Paudel, Toby Nowacki, Jared Rubin, and seminar participants at UBC, UCLA, S for valuable comments. Current version: June 3, 2019; Corresponding author: [email protected] 1 1. INTRODUCTION 1 Introduction A stark demographic imbalance exists in the two largest countries in the world: men out- number women by 70 million in China and India (Denyer and Gowen 2018).
    [Show full text]
  • 2123 Public Disclosure Authorized
    POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2123 Public Disclosure Authorized To reduce poverty in India through a strategy of rural growth, by increasing the share of farmland operated in smail units, requires making Access to Land land distribution more in RuralIndia equitable.Among policy measures recommended: Selectively deregulating land- Public Disclosure Authorized Robin Mearns lease {rental) markets reducing transaction costs In land markets, critically reassessing land administration and findinc ways to make it more transparent and to improve land administration incentive structures, promoting Public Disclosure Authorized women's independent land rights through policy measures to increase women's bargaining power, and strengthening institutions in civil society to improve awareness, monitoring, ana pressure for reform of policies and procedures that limit access to land. Public Disclosure Authorized The World Bank South Asia Region Rural Development Sector Unit May 1999 POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2123 Summary findings Access to land is deeply important in rural India, where Reduce tranisaction costs In land markets, including the incidence of poverty is highly correlated with lack of both official costs and inforonal costs (such as bribes to access to land. Mearns provides a framework for expedite transactions), partly by improving svstems for assessing alternative approaches to improving access to land registration and management of land records. land bv India's rural poor. He considers India's record Critically reassess land administration agrCnciesand implementing land reform and identifies an approach find ways to improve incLentive structures, to reduce rent- that includes incremental reforms in public land seeking and base promotions on pnrfoitauce. administration to reduce transaction costs in land Promote womien's independcint land rights through markets (thereby facilitating land transfers) and to policy measures to increase wornen's bargaining power increase transparency, making information accessible to within the household and in society geneu-ly.
    [Show full text]
  • 2 Colonization of Indian from Trade to Territory Growth of British Influence
    History Class VIII Lesson -2 Colonization of Indian from Trade to Territory Anglo-French Rivalry:- 1. 18th century, English and French trade interests clashed that resulted in the three Anglo-French wars. These are referred to as the Carnatic Wars (1744-1763). 2. Present State of Tamil Nadu. The Battle of Plessey (1757):- Clive conspired with Mir Jafar (commander in chief), Jagat Seth (richest banker) and Omichand(a rich merchant) to overthrow Siraj-ud-daulah. On 23 June 1757, the armies of Siraj-ud-daulah and English east india company met at plassey. Siraj-ud-daulah was killed and Mir Jafar was made the nawab of Bengal. The battle of buxar (1764):- 1. Mir Qasim fled to Awadh and entered into an alliance with the Nawab of awadh, siraj-ud-daulah, and the Mughal Emperor, shah alam II their combined forces fought with the british army at Buxar on 22 October 1764. 2. With this victory, the company became the real master of Bengal. Growth of British Influence:- Mysore:- 1. Mysore emerged as a powerful state under the outstanding leadership of Haider Ali (1761-1782) and his son Tipu sultan (1782-1799). 2. Fourth Anglo-Mysore War. Tipu Sultan died, in 1799, defending his capital Seringapatam. Marathas:- 1. The First Anglo- Maratha War (1775-1782) 2. The second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-1805) 3. The third Anglo-Maratha War (1817-1819) 1 |Page History Class VIII British Expansion under Lord Wellesley (1798-1805) Subsidiary Alliance 1. Disband his own army and maintain British troops permanently at their cost or cede some territory in lieu of it.
    [Show full text]
  • Common Lands Made 'Wastelands'– Making of the 'Wastelands' Into
    Common lands made ‘Wastelands’ – Making of the ‘Wastelands’ into Common lands To be presented at the 14th Global Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons June 03-07, 2013 By Subrata Singh Foundation for Ecological Security Common lands made ‘Wastelands’ - Making of the ‘Wastelands’ into Common lands1 Subrata Singh2 Abstract This paper explores the evolution of the discourse on “wastelands” in India – from the colonial time to the present – and how it has shaped India’s land related policies. This paper is an attempt to understand the changing rights of the communities to use the resources over the past two centuries. The concept of wastelands in India originated during the colonial period and included all lands that were not under cultivation through the process of settlement for all land held under different property regimes. While the state took all the wastelands under its purview through the principle of Eminent Domain, these lands were supposed to be managed with the principle of Public Trust Doctrine – where the State is not an absolute owner, but a trustee of all natural resources. With the competing demands over the wastelands, the discussions and discourse have emerged on the relevance of the common lands (wastelands) in ecological and economic terms and against the use of such wastelands for commercial purposes. This has further been strengthened by the enactment of the Forest Rights Act in 2006 and the recent judgments by the Supreme Court of India on the protection of the common lands. This has brought in a discourse on the Communitization of the wastelands as Commons.
    [Show full text]
  • 2-Change-In-Land-System.Pdf
    Chapter -2 Change in land system This article throws light upon the top three land tenure systems during the British rule in India. The tenure systems are: 1. The Zamindari System: The Permanent Settlement 2. The Ryotwari System 3. The Mahalwari System or the Communal System. 1. The Zamindary System: The Permanent Settlement: Early revenue experiments of the EIC brought tremendous sufferings to the royts and the land revenue administration was thus subverted. The entire period 1769-93 witnessed a continuous opposition from the ryots leading even to sporadic revolts. Immediately after putting his legs in India, Lord Cornwallis in 1786 opined once-for-all settlement with the zamindars for the collection of land revenue. In fact, Lord Cornwallis cut the Gordian knot in 1790 when the decennial permanent settlement system was decided to be introduced in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. On March 22, 1793, the settlement with the zamindars, and not with the cultivators, was declared permanent which made the land revenue ‘fixed in perpetuity’. Hence the name Permanent Settlement (PS). Under this arrangement, property rights in land were conferred upon the landed aristocracy, subject to the punctual payment of revenue to the government at a fixed rate. The system thus created a kind of landlordism in the areas where it had been planted by Cornwallis. The landlords, in their turn, were entrusted with the responsibility of collecting rent from the cultivators. Thus the zamindars were used to act as intermediaries between the cultivators and the state. On any failure to discharge their obligations, the estates of the zamindars were liable to be sold by the government for the realization of their dues so as to establish the principle of survival of the fittest through the active market in land.
    [Show full text]