2-Change-In-Land-System.Pdf
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Chapter -2 Change in land system This article throws light upon the top three land tenure systems during the British rule in India. The tenure systems are: 1. The Zamindari System: The Permanent Settlement 2. The Ryotwari System 3. The Mahalwari System or the Communal System. 1. The Zamindary System: The Permanent Settlement: Early revenue experiments of the EIC brought tremendous sufferings to the royts and the land revenue administration was thus subverted. The entire period 1769-93 witnessed a continuous opposition from the ryots leading even to sporadic revolts. Immediately after putting his legs in India, Lord Cornwallis in 1786 opined once-for-all settlement with the zamindars for the collection of land revenue. In fact, Lord Cornwallis cut the Gordian knot in 1790 when the decennial permanent settlement system was decided to be introduced in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. On March 22, 1793, the settlement with the zamindars, and not with the cultivators, was declared permanent which made the land revenue ‘fixed in perpetuity’. Hence the name Permanent Settlement (PS). Under this arrangement, property rights in land were conferred upon the landed aristocracy, subject to the punctual payment of revenue to the government at a fixed rate. The system thus created a kind of landlordism in the areas where it had been planted by Cornwallis. The landlords, in their turn, were entrusted with the responsibility of collecting rent from the cultivators. Thus the zamindars were used to act as intermediaries between the cultivators and the state. On any failure to discharge their obligations, the estates of the zamindars were liable to be sold by the government for the realization of their dues so as to establish the principle of survival of the fittest through the active market in land. To protect themselves against revenue defaults, the zamindars leased their estates to a large number of sub-landlords who, in turn, leased their lands to middlemen like patnidar, dur patnidar, and so on. By making revenue payments punctually, zamindars were assured of no-enhancement of revenue and, hence, no resumption of land by the government. Hence the expression “PS”. The government demand for land revenue was fixed at ten-elevenths of the total payments collected from tenants and the remainder, i.e., one-eleventh, was left to the zamindars as their remuneration. The PS introduced three interests on land—the government, the owners of the estates, and the tenant-cultivators—and two payments—the payment of rent by the cultivators to the revenue collectors who overnight (by the proclamation issued on 22nd March 1793) became landlords, and the payment of land revenue by the zamindars to the Government. Motives behind the Introduction of PS: The chief architect of PS, Lord Cornwallis, had some definite motives for its introduction: Firstly, the ideological basis of PS was that the zamindars that had “complete command over the mass of the people” should play their assigned role by becoming the agent of progress in the way as British landlords were doing the same in England at that time. It was possibly envisaged by Cornwallis that the arrangement of fixed land revenue would address the issue of revitalization of Indian agriculture. Its twin purposes were: first, security of revenue, and, most importantly, the prosperity of Company’s commerce. Above all, this land revenue arrangement would boost the confidence of people in property. Once landed property ownership psychology starts working, people would be induced to make larger capital investment in agriculture. It was believed by the ideologues of PS that this would usher in an agricultural revolution in India. And agrarian revolution in India meant fanning out of an industrial revolution in England. This motive has been corroborated by the Census Report of 1951. The Report remarked that Cornwallis trusted the zamindars “to reduce the country to an agricultural land, to draw more and more away from indigenous trade commerce and industry, and have the sphere so abandoned to be filled up by manufactured imports from England and abroad.” Secondly, the purpose of PS was to create a new loyal stable body of landowners after the English model as the social buttress of English rule. The newly created “hereditary owners” of land were conceived as the native agents of the alien government. Lord William Bentinck—the Governor General of India from 1828 to 1835—remarked that PS wanted to make the zamindars a bulwark against any social revolution. Ironically, these landed proprietors were “deeply interested in the continuance of British Dominion”. That is to say, in the race for empire-building in India by the foreign ruler, the native zamindars would show interest if they were bribed. And the PS did it very smartly. Thirdly, it was hoped that “the magic touch of property … would set a certain productive principle in operation” that would serve as an engine of agrarian prosperity in India. And, agrarian prosperity would, in turn, serve the British interest in various interconnected ways. Firstly, it would secure a guaranteed income for the Company and the attention of the Government would be devoted to the establishment of good laws and good administration. Such a Cornwallis system, in the opinion of N. K. Sinha, was to mark the transition from ‘unregulated imperialism’ to ‘regulated imperialism’. Secondly, agricultural prosperity could be deemed as a safety valve against sporadic revolts and zamindars were assumed to be permanent improvers of land. Thirdly, prosperous agriculture would set in a chain of improvements in trade and commerce since the principal articles of exports were the produce of the land. Frankly speaking, England’s prosperity depended on “one of the richest regions of the earth”. Knowing this, Cornwallis engineered the scheme of PS as an important institution to sub-serve the British interests. Finally, the PS arrangement would save the foreign Government from the nightmare of uncertainty in the realm of revenue collection. And the land revenue that had been fixed could not be regarded as a moderate jumma (i.e., land revenue assessment). This was strengthened by the notorious “Sunset Law”—the law that revenue must be deposited in the government treasury before sunset of the last date fixed for such payment. The policy of earning stable revenue necessitated such institutional innovations. Land Revenue Arrangements under PS: Land revenue was fixed at nine-tenth of the rent, which was “fixed in perpetuity”. Zamindars were strictly required to pay their revenues punctually to the government, without any claim for remission and reduction. In default, the estates of zamindars were liable to be auctioned to realise the revenue dues. Hence the name “revenue-sale” system. Gifting the hereditary proprietary rights in the soil, the Cornwallis system retained the full power for protection and welfare of the tenants into the hands of the government. Cornwallis anticipated that such unilateral proprietary rights might induce zamindars to enhance rents thereby causing tremendous hardship to the tenants. At that time, few had .proper documents or deeds of occupancy rights, i.e., ‘pattas’, and the illiterate attendants could be cheated easily with unfair pattas. Truly speaking, zamindars were unwilling to grant pattas. Cornwallis insisted that zamindars could be made to grant a written patta to every cultivator specifying clearly the terms of tenure, the exact amount of rent payable by them. However, the terms and conditions laid down in the pattas were so harsh that the ryots showed an aversion to receive pattas. The rate of land revenue being very high, many of the zamindari estates were sold out for revenue falling into arrear. Seeing the dangers of proprietary rights in land, zamindars sharpened their weapons and demanded that they should be empowered in the realisation of rent as was used by the Government for the realisation of revenue dues. The Government stepped in and introduced Regulation XVII (Sec. II) of 1793 which authorised zamindars and talukdars to distain for arrears the tenants’ crops, grain, cattle, and all personal properties. As this was considered to be inadequate, another arm was attached through Regulation VII of 1799 which gave wide powers of distraint against the ryots. However, in 1812, the working of the system of distraint experienced some sort of palliatives. Still, it was insufficient. Actually, the laws of distraint gave a blank cheque to the zamindars to defeat the ends of justice. Another concomitant feature of the revenue-sale system was the encouragement of the process of sub-infeudation which brought into existence a chain of intermediaries. Under the process of sub-infeudation, zamindars sublet portion of their lands to innumerable tenure-holders, who grant temporary lease to ‘under-rentiers’. However, sub-infeudation, as opposed to the spirit of the Cornwallis system, became legally recognised by the Patni (subordinate land tenure in Bengal) Regulations in 1819. Seeing the land revenue assessment heavy, these Patni Regulations aimed at relieving the difficulties of collecting land revenue by patni selling or leasing taluks. Those who took such lease came to be known as dur-patni talukdars. This process went unabated. There were patnidars, dur-patnidars, dur-dur-patnidars, and so on. However, the Cornwallis system did contemplate only one or two intermediaries between the government and the ryot. Critical Assessment of the PS System: British land revenue and tenancy policies were moulded basically by a combination of greed for an increasing revenue and the desire for conversion of cultivated lands into a form of business investment. Cornwallis anticipated that the PS would encourage allegiance of zamindars to the British rule, efficiency in revenue collection, and the extension of agricultural activities. But the PS was condemned even by imperialists. The modern apologists of imperialism like Vera Anstey offered an explanation that its introduction in India was an innocent mistake, made through simple ingenuous ignorance of the fact that the zamindars were not the landlords.