Who Are the Spaniards? Nationalism and Identification in Spain*

KENNETH BOLLEN, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill JUAN DIEZ MEDRANO, University of California, San Diego Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021

Abstract

National and ethnic identity are the subject of a wide range of sociological theories. Our analysis focuses on nationalism and identity in Spain. Our data come from a probability sample of respondents in a 1992 survey. We employ measures of individual attachment to Spain that tap two dimensions: sense of belonging to Spain and feelings of morale associated with this identity. We estimate a measurement model that substantiates these two dimensions. We also present and test different hypotheses about the roles of ethnic origin, economic development, economic specialization, and education on attachment to Spain. Our statistical analyses reveal that respondent's ethnic origin (birth and residence in a culturally distinct region) and education have the strongest negative influences on attachment. Among the macro structural conditions, economic specialization ofa region has the greatest negative impact on attachment. Furthermore, our descriptive analysis of the regional patterns of sense of belonging and feelings of morale with respect to Spain reveal some predictable patterns and some surprises in the regional rankings.

Social scientists have proposed a wide range of theories to explain national identity and ethnic or nationalist political mobilization. These efforts respond in part to the intensity that ethnic and nationalist conflict has reached in states that formed at the conclusion of the two world wars (e.g., Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union), in states that emerged out of the decolonization process (e.g., Rwanda), and, more surprisingly, in old Western European states such as Great Britain, Spain, and France.

* Authors names are listed alphabetically. Direct correspondence to Kenneth Boller, CB #3210, Dept. of Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3210. E-mail: [email protected].

© The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, December 1998, 77(2):587-622 588 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 The scope of application and the relative merits of these theories are hard to determine, however, because empirical tests are infrequent. Also, those that are conducted tend to analyze. only local or individual variation in regions where nationalism or ethnic conflict is relatively intense and often use inadequate measures of the variables under examination. This article analyzes individual variation in the degree of attachment to the nation-state. Scholarly interest in this topic has run parallel to interest in the factors leading to ethnic political Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 mobilization. In fact, the complexity of core concepts in the field of ethnicity — such as group solidarity, which evokes both an identity and a political action dimension — and frequent compromises related to the dependent variables used in empirical tests make it difficult to distinguish empirical tests of explanations of national identity from those concerned with explanations of ethnic political mobilization. Despite these problems, a close reading of various theoretical arguments allows for the formulation and testing of a series of hypotheses directly concerned with attachment to the nation-state, which we have tested with survey data collected in Spain in 1992. Despite being one of the oldest European states, Spain is an example of incomplete nation-building, as attested by the strength of Basque and Catalan nationalism. Moreover, its regional ethnic and economic diversity make it an excellent case to assess the roles of education, economic development, economic specialization, and ethnic origin in the development of attachment to the nation- state. Our analysis focuses on an entire state, Spain, rather than follow the traditional approach of focusing on culturally distinct regions with strong nationalist movements (Belanger & Pinard 1991; Hechter 1975; Leifer 1981). The traditional approach may have in fact introduced a truncation bias in the empirical findings. Moreover, the examination of single regions has forced researchers to use within- region contextual units of analysis (e.g., counties or municipalities) that are too small to reflect the socioeconomic, political, and cultural forces that shape people's attitudes and political behavior. A second methodological feature of our article is that the statistical models we estimate use individual and contextual variables to predict individual attitudes. This approach contrasts with the majority of previous studies of ethnic conflict and nationalism, which have relied on aggregate data to test what are in fact contextual-level theoretical arguments (e.g., Nielsen 1980; Olzak 1982, 1992; Ragin 1977, 1979). The aggregate-level approach precludes the analytical distinction between individual and contextual effects and thus complicates interpretations of empirical findings (see Quillian 1995). Finally, this investigation uses direct measures of attachment to the nation-state. Attachment to the nation-state represents the attitudinal dimension of the complex attitudinal and behavioral problem of nation-building and group solidarity that scholars have been studying for more than forty years. We distinguish two dimensions of group attachment — sense of belonging and feelings of morale — which have been Nationalism and Identification in Spain 1589 discussed in the social psychological literature but not in the literature on nationalism and ethnic conflict. In the first part of the article we outline several major hypotheses that explain attachment to the nation-state. In the second part we test these propositions. We have left out theories that are exclusively concerned with ethnic conflict (e.g., Ethnic Competition theory) and theories of group attachment that we cannot address with the data at hand (e.g., Lawler 1992). Furthermore, there is not a one-to-one Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 correspondence between the hypotheses that we discuss and test and particular theoretical schools: some hypotheses have been proposed by otherwise contrasting sociological traditions, different but complementary hypotheses have been proposed by members of the same sociological tradition, and some authors have formulated different but related hypotheses in the course of their intellectual careers. Finally, the goal of the article is to evaluate, in the context of Spain, hypotheses about identification with one's nation-state rather than to develop new hypotheses based on a historical analysis of national identity in Spain.

The Case Study: Spain

Linz (1973) once said that "Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities" (99). The Spanish state's current division into 17 autonomous communities with broad political powers and the strength of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements reflect Spain's cultural and historical diversity and demonstrate that Linz's statement is as true today as it was in 1973. Spain is a multicultural state in which at least four distinct languages coexist. Although Castilian is the Spanish state's official language, the 1978 Constitution recognizes the right of the autonomous communities of the Basque Country, Galicia, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and the Community of Valencia to use their own languages, as long as this use does not jeopardize the use of Castilian. Thus, during the 1980s, the autonomous governments of these regions have promoted the use of Euskera in the Basque Country, Galician in Galicia, Catalan in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, and Valencian in the Community of Valencia. Spain's cultural diversity has historically been matched by an equally dramatic diversity in levels of development and productive structures. At the turn of the centurythe only industrialized areas of Spain were Catalonia, the Basque Country, and to some extent Madrid, whereas the rest of Spain remained anchored in subsistence agriculture. At that time, Galicia, which was the poorest Spanish region, had a GDP that was half of Catalonia's, despite the fact that the sizes of their populations were almost the same (Carreras 1990). This diversity has diminished significantly overtime, however, as poorer regions have industrialized and as the state has institutionalized mechanisms for the redistribution of wealth across 590 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 regions (Raymond 1990). The cultural and economic diversity prevailing in Spain makes it an ideal case for the analysis of regional differences in attachment to Spain.

Attachment to the Nation-State in the Literature on Ethnic Identity and Conflict Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 The data that we have available suggest that we can analyze the role of a major subset of factors proposed in the literature for the explanation of attachment to the nation-state. These factors are ethnic origin, economic development, economic specialization, and cognitive skills.

ETHNIC ORIGIN The role of ethnic origin in the explanation of attachment to the nation-state has been taken for granted by most theories of national identity and nationalism and has been given its more formal expression by proponents of primordialist views of national identity and nationalism. Essentialist positions within this perspective, which are implicitly repeated in most journalistic explanations of ethnic conflict, attribute an irresistible force to the "assumed givens" of social existence, such as religion, language, and particular social practices. On the other hand, constructionist versions of the primordialist perspective simply say that individuals tend to develop a strong affinity to those whom they see as extended kin. Although they emphasize the power of the traditional identity markers mentioned above, these interpretations recognize that historical and political processes determine what traits are taken to symbolize kinship, how successful they are in being taken as such and in competing with other identities, and under what conditions they gain political significance (Geertz 1963; Shils 1957; Smith 1985; Van den Berghe 1981). Previous empirical work has tested this hypothesis by using variables such as religious denomination, language, or place of birth as predictors of political attitudes and behavior related to ethnic and national identity. In this article we follow the same strategy, although adapted to the specific cultural cleavages prevailing in Spain. As stated above, aside from broad cultural variation, the main cultural trait that singles out some Spanish regions and hinders the development of feelings of attachment to Spain is the use of another language in addition to Castilian. The defense of regional languages is indeed a key element in all the ethno- nationalist regionalist movements that have developed in Spain in the last century. Consequently, the empirical predictions that follow from the primordialist approach in connection to the Spanish case are the following: Prediction M. The population born and resident in regions where, in addition to Castilian, an officially recognized regional language is spoken express a lower degree of attachment to Spain than do the rest of the population. Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 591 Prediction lb. People who speak a regional language other than Castilian express a lower degree of attachment to Spain than do the rest of the people.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Theories of national identity and ethnic conflict generally accept the premise that state-national identities are slower to develop among groups whose culture differs Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 from the dominant culture. Some of them, however, have explained the persistence of ethnic attachments and the unequal spread of nation-state identities in complex societies by focusing on the impact of contrasting levels of regional development. They were formulated in the 1960s and 1970s in the context of debates about the transformation of states characterized by "sectional, or otherwise competing economies, polities, and cultures, within a given territory" into societies "composed of a single, all-pervasive, and in this sense `national' economy, polity, and culture" (Hechter [1975] 1994:488). Empirical analyses based on this debate have often used vote for parties representing peripheral ethnic groups as the dependent variable, but the theoretical discussions center as much on nation-state identity and solidarity as on ethnic political mobilization. The ambiguity of the concept of group solidarity on which many of these discussions centered, as well as the constant argumentative reference to issues of identity in these discussions, indicate that authors were not especially concerned with the development of distinct theories for the explanations of ethnic or nation-state attachment and ethnic political mobilization (Ethnic competition theory is one significant exception, where the focus is clearly on ethnic political mobilization; see Hannan 1979.) Indeed, until the 1980s, when resource mobilization and rational choice approaches seriously tackled the analytical distinction between the potential for action — of which a weak attachment to the nation-state could be seen as an indication — and actual action, data on vote for parties representing peripheral ethnic groups were used both as a measure of ethnic political mobilization and as a convenient proxy indicator of the lack of emergence of a nation-state identity. Two arguments can be distinguished in this debate about the effects of uneven levels of regional development on attachment to the nation-state. The first argument is found among some proponents of modernization theory (Parsons & Smelser 1956) and of the theory of internal colonialism (Hechter 1975). Scholars from these two quite different schools reacted similarly to the persistence of ethnic attachments in complex societies, which upset previously held assumptions about the inevitable emergence of a universally accepted national identity resulting from the development of national markets and polities. They concluded that regional underdevelopment in culturally distinct regions hinders the transition from ascriptive to functional/class identities and the development of strong attachments to the nation-state (e.g., Gellner 1983; Hechter 1975; Smelser 1969). This is because underdevelopment relative to other regions indicates limited structural 592 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 differentiation and a failed implementation of universalistic principles. Limited structural differentiation prevents the development of class identities that would undermine internal ethnic group solidarity and that would facilitate the development of cross-ethnic group class alliances at the state level. A failed implementation of universalistic principles generates feelings of ethnic discrimination and therefore undermines the legitimacy of the state-national identity. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 To be sure, the modernization theory and the theory of internal colonialism differ in important ways, which could lead to the erroneous perception that their theoretical positions concerning the development of strong ties to the nation-state are radically different. When first formulated, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the modernization theory predicted that the process of structural differentiation and the diffusion of the universalistic principle would ultimately eliminate overlaps between ethnicity and social position and, therefore, the existence of competing identities within nation-states. The internal colonialist theory was formulated in the 1970s, in reaction to the persistence of ethnic conflict in several economically advanced societies. Its theoretical contribution was not to propose entirely new causal mechanisms to explain the relative success of nation-building processes, but rather to outline a new theory of economic development, which undermined modernization theory's optimism with regard to the process of structural differentiation and the diffusion of universalistic principles. According to the internal colonialism theory, the process of structural differentiation at the state level is compatible with the structural integration of ethnically distinct regions as internal colonies that are subject to conditions of economic exploitation by the dominant core. Regional underdevelopment in such regions is not an anomaly but, rather, a permanent feature, actively reproduced by the dominant core. Despite the contrast between their predictions about the generalization of the structural differentiation and universalistic principles over time, authors from the modernization and internal colonialism theories have made, however, the same prediction about the role of development in the explanation of attachment to a nation-state. This prediction, applied to the Spanish case, would be the following: Prediction 2. The level of attachment to Spain among the autochthonous population of culturally distinct Spanish regions is lower in the less developed regions than in the more developed ones. In contrast with authors in the modernization and internal colonialism traditions, a number of authors have emphasized the role of regional overdevelopment in preventing the diffusion of strong nation-state identities (Gourevitch 1979; Laitin 1991; Nairn 1977). These authors are undoubtedly more concerned with ethnic political mobilization than with issues of national identity and indeed ground peripheral ethnic political mobilization on core-periphery conflict of economic interests; they also predict, however, that regional overdevelopment generates, directly or indirectly, through the political mobilization Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 593 of peripheral elites, a reduction in the level of attachment to the nation-state of the population of ethnically distinct peripheral areas. Thus, says Laitin, when the political and economic centers of economic dynamism do not coincide, the bourgeoisie of the more dynamic regions "will want rapid changes in tariff policies, capital markets, and corporate laws — changes that will not strike a responsive chord at the center. This dynamic class will patronize and promote the regional poets and philologists, as their symbols will help mobilize the rural folk, whose interests Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 complement those of the bourgeoisie. Although the rural population will not be concerned about capital markets, it will see regional independence as a way to protect its communities from `foreign encroachment" (Laitin 1991:144-45). In other words, although this theory stresses that conflict between economic interests is the main cause of peripheral ethnic political mobilization, it also posits that the political process that follows this conflict of interests contributes to undermining the attachment of the population of these overdeveloped regions to the nation-state. This argument also states that higher-status groups are more sensitive to the lack of coincidence between the center of political power and the center of economic dynamism than are other social groups. The extent to which this social contrast persists over time rather than diminishing, as higher-status groups mobilize the rural population, depends on the mobilization capacity of higher-status groups in these overdeveloped regions. Work in the overdevelopment tradition has focused primarily on culturally distinct regions. Indeed, the influence of overdevelopment in promoting a relatively low attachment to the state should be greater in these regions than in regions that are not culturally distinct, because of the availability of an alternative source of identity. Gourevitch (1979) makes it clear, however, that disaffection with the national state should also emerge in overdeveloped regions that are not culturally distinct. Therefore, when applied to Spain, the macro and micro predictions drawn from the overdevelopment hypothesis are the following: Prediction 3a. Attachment to Spain is weaker in relatively more developed regions than in less developed regions. Prediction 3b. This contrast in attachment to Spain between residents of more developed and less developed regions is greater among the autochthonous population of culturally distinct regions than among other segments of the population. Prediction 3c. The difference in attachment to Spain between more developed and less developed regions is greater among higher-status groups than among other segments of the population. 594 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 ECONOMIC SPECIALIZATION One premise underlying the above hypotheses is that uneven development leads to failures in nation building because it creates conflict based on the overlap between geographical location and economic position. As Hechter ([ 1975] 1994) put it, "the greater the economic inequalities between collectivities, the greater the probability that the less advantaged collectivity will be status solidary, and hence, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 will resist political integration" (497). A few years after developing his theory of ethnic change, Hechter developed a more general hypothesis, in which he moved beyond the focus on hierarchical economic specialization to highlight the role of economic specialization tout court (Hechter 1978; see also Nielsen 1985; Olzak 1992). This expanded theory of group solidarity, which he tested this time by using ethnic homogamy rather than votes for political parties representing peripheral ethnic groups as the measure of ethnic group solidarity, states that any form of economic specialization is bound to increase group solidarity and hinder the development of broader identifications. This is because members of groups that are economically specialized tend to interact more and to share more interests with other members of the group than with members of other groups (Hechter 1978). Hechter's argument leads to the prediction that the obstacle represented by regional economic specialization to the development of identification with the nation-state is greater in culturally distinct regions than in regions that share the dominant culture. This is because cultural distinctiveness, especially if based on language, creates barriers to communication between the population of culturally distinct regions and that from the rest of the state, which in turn increase the salience of economic specialization. The hypothesis that follows from this argument is therefore the following: Prediction 4. The level of attachment to the nation-state among the autochthonous population of culturally distinct regions is weaker in those regions with relatively high levels of economic specialization than in those with low levels of economic specialization.

COGNITIVE SKILLS MODEL

All the hypotheses discussed above, except the ethnic origin hypothesis, have a predominant macro-character and focus mostly on the conditions that favor or hinder the development of attachment to the nation-state among autochthonous residents of culturally distinct regions. Deutsch (1961) and Inglehart (1970), otherwise closely connected to the modernization theory, propose, however, a general model that emphasizes the role of micro variables, in particular that of cognitive skills, in the explanation of attachment to a group. Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 595 The theory is simple: The greater an individual's cognitive skills, the greater his or her ability to identify with ever larger communities. The theory is time dependent to the extent that attachments to certain groups may be seen as revealing cosmopolitan views today and parochial views tomorrow. Deutsch and Inglehart discuss their hypothesis in the context of the post-World War II emergence of the European Community as an alternative to nation-states and other smaller

communities. In this sense, in today's Europe, identification with regions or with Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 the nation-state reflects a relatively parochial identity orientation, whereas identification with Europe reflects a relatively cosmopolitan identity orientation. Therefore, in the Spanish context, the prediction derived from the cognitive skills model is the following: Prediction 5: The greater individuals' cognitive skills, the weaker are their degrees of identification with Spain. This survey of hypotheses concerning variation in the degree of attachment to the nation-state reveals that they are potentially compatible, since regional culture, regional levels of economic development, regional economic specialization, and cognitive skills can all contribute to the success or failure of nation-building efforts. The only disagreement is between those who predict a positive relationship between levels of development and attachment to Spain and those who predict a negative relationship. 1

Data and Methods Our data come from a national representative survey conducted in Spain in January 1992 in order to analyze issues of local and national identification. 2 The inclusion of items on group cohesion in the questionnaire did not affect the general flow of the personal interviews.

ATTACHMENT TO SPAIN

The main construct in the empirical analysis will be the respondents' attachment to Spain. We follow Anderson (1983) in conceptualizing ethnic and national groups as "imagined communities;' that is, as communities whose cohesiveness is independent of interpersonal contact between their members. The literature on ethnic identity and nationalism does not provide clear definitions and operationalizations of group attachment. This led us to consider definitions of group cohesion in the social psychological literature, and more specifically, to a definition and operationalization of group cohesion provided by Bollen and Hoyle (1990), which emphasizes the subjective element that characterizes Anderson's definition of ethnic and national groups. Although the term cohesion is widely used in the social psychological literature, there is disagreement about its precise meaning. Moreover, those who provide clear 596 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 definitions of group cohesion generally appear to give little thought to making an explicit connection between their definition and their eventual measurement or operationalization of group cohesion (Mudrack 1989). Bollen and Hoyle (1990) propose the following definition: "perceived group cohesion.. . encompasses an individual's sense of belonging to a particular group and his or her feelings of morale associated with it" (482). While retaining this definition, we use the term attachment to group rather than the term perceived group cohesion. One reason is that cohesion Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 often connotes a group property, not an individual one. In Bollen and Hoyle (1990) the term perceived cohesion refers to individual ties to the group. The term perceived cohesion also runs the risk of being interpreted as the individual's judgment of the cohesion of the group as a whole rather than his or her attachment to the group. Bollen and Hoyle treat sense of belonging and feelings of morale as separate dimensions of group attachment. Sense of belonging comprises both cognitive and affective elements. The former result from an individual's processing of information about his or her experiences with the group as a whole and other group members. The latter reflect the individual's appraisal of these experiences. Feelings of morale, on the other hand, "stem from a global affective response associated with belonging to the group.... They provide motivation to evaluate one's relationship to the group, to engage in social and task-related activities and to value one's membership to the group" (483). Bollen and Hoyle, following theory and research on the relationship between cognition and affect (Zajonc & Markus 1984), expect a positive relationship between sense of belonging and feelings of morale. Nevertheless, they are distinct constructs. Academics may experience strong feelings of morale connected to the universities in which they teach, yet maintain a low sense of belonging, either because other kinds of groups in whose activities they participate have greater salience for them or because they still feel part of the university community to which they attended as graduate or college students. Basketball team members may have a strong sense of belonging to a team in which they have played for many years, yet have low feelings of morale connected to the team if the group has performed badly for several consecutive seasons. The definition of attachment to group proposed by Bollen and Hoyle is similar to other definitions of group cohesion found in the literature (Frank 1957; Hare 1976; Liebermann, Yalam & Miles 1973; Zander 1979). Bollen and Hoyle's definition differs, however, in simultaneously including Belonging and Morale dimensions as part of group attachment and in constructing separate measures of each dimension. The indicators of sense of belonging were "I feel a sense of belonging to [name of group]." "I feel that I am a member of the [name of group] community." "I see myself as part of the [name of group] community." The three indicators of feelings of morale were Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 597 "I am enthusiastic about [name of group]." "I am happy to be at [live at] [name of group]:" "[name of the group] is one of the best schools [cities] in the nation:" The responses were recorded on Likert scales ranging from 0 ("strongly disagree") to 5 ("neutral"), to 10 ("strongly agree"). Bollen and Hoyle prefer these indicators to other similar scales (Buckner 1988; Dailey 1977; Seashore 1954; Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 Wheeless, Wheeless & Dickson-Markham 1982) because they correspond better to their own theoretical definition of perceived cohesion and reflect the individuals' experiences in the group rather than their perceptions of the group as a whole as some other scales do.3 In our investigation we translated the Bollen and Hoyle's items into Spanish in a way that preserved the wording of questions and sounded well in Spanish.4 After a long series of pretests, the final items chosen to represent sense of belonging were "Espana es mi naci6n:' (Spain is my nation.) "Me siento Espanol:' (I feel Spanish.) "Espana es el pals del que me siento miembro:' (Spain is the country to which I belong.) Those chosen to represent feelings of morale were "Espana es fenomenal:' (Spain is great.) "Me encanta Espana" (I love Spain.) "Espana es un gran pals." (Spain is a great country.) The theories described in the literature review section do not provide clear definitions or operationalizations of group identity that would allow us to make clear predictions about the relative size of the effects that different variables have on sense of belonging and feelings of morale. Moreover, the estimation of a nonrecursive model for the reciprocal relationship between sense of belonging and feelings of morale presents methodological and theoretical problems that we have not been able to resolve in an entirely satisfactory way. We can tentatively, however, outline some predictions based on the arguments developed by the theories, which will make our statistical tests stricter. We can say, for instance, that the hypotheses concerning the effects of economic specialization, cultural distinctiveness, and cognitive skills predict greater effects on sense of belonging than on feelings of morale, either because specialization and cultural distinctiveness create more intense communication and shared economic interests among group members, which prevent the development of broader group attachments, or because higher cognitive skills facilitate the individuals' identification with abstract entities of a supranational character. On the other hand, the hypotheses that stress the role of levels of development in generating either perceived discrimination 598 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 (underdevelopment hypothesis) or grievances against the state (overdevelopment hypothesis) predict a simultaneous effect of level of development on both the sense of belonging and feelings of morale dimensions. For instance, the autochthonous population of underdeveloped regions may be unenthusiastic about Spain and also have a low sense of belonging because it does not provide for their needs; similarly, the population of overdeveloped regions may be unenthusiastic about Spain and also have a low sense of belonging because the state's general backwardness is an Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 obstacle to further regional development and requires the transfer of large sums of money from overdeveloped regions to underdeveloped regions.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES To measure primordial attachments, the analysis uses two variables. One is a dummy variable coded 1 when the respondents were born and live in a culturally distinct region (Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Valencia), and coded 0 otherwise. We opted not to make finer distinctions among the respondents coded 0, in particular between immigrants to culturally distinct regions and emigrants from culturally distinct regions to "Castilianized" regions, because the coefficients obtained would not be interpretable in a straightforward way as denoting the effects of migration. For instance, we would not be able to say whether immigrants to culturally distinct areas are more attached to Spain because they react to their daily experiences in a community (e.g., Catalonia) where peripheral nationalism is strong or because they come from regions where attachment to Spain is very strong (e.g., Andalucia). The second variable measuring primordial attachments is a variable that is coded 1 when the respondent speaks the language of his or her region of origin and 0 when he or she speaks only Castilian. Since, until the death of Franco in 1975, regional languages could not be used in public or taught at school, this variable should indicate to what extent the respondent has grown up in an environment strongly bound to the local culture. To measure levels of economic development, the analysis uses the logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita in the region where the respondent lives. To measure the level of regional economic specialization, we use an index of economic specialization (Raymond 1990), which compares each region's economic structure with the Spanish economic structure. The formula for this index is 12 SI= [((i-n2 + (s-S)2 + (c-C)2 + ( a-A)2)/4]' where i, s, c, and a represent the proportional contribution of the industrial, the service, the construction, and the agricultural sector, respectively, to a region's GDP, and I, S, C, and A represent the proportional contribution of each of these sectors to the national GDP. Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 599 TABLE 1: Regional Differences in Gross Domestic Product per Capita and in Level of Economic Specialization

Gross Domestic Product Index of per Capita Economic

(Pesetas) Specialization Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021

Andalucia 826,392 4.74 Arag6n 1,300,949 5.00 Asturias 1,106,774 8.43 Balearic Islands 1,643,398 11.86 Basque Country 1,280,234 9.87 CanaryIslands 1,131,489 8.95 Cantabria 1,115,731 .51 Castile-Le6n 1,044,745 4.28 Castile-Mancha 916,987 7.19 Catalonia 1,448,975 3.81 Extremadura 754,596 6.20 Galicia 930,783 3.16 Madrid 1,473,307 8.01 Murcia 991,489 4.14 Navarre 1,314,602 7.68 Rioja 1,267,385 5.32 Valencia 1,250,774 1.14

The distribution of the Spanish autonomous communities according to their gross domestic product and their level of economic specialization is presented in Table 1. Today, the wealthiest Spanish regions are Madrid and the northeast regions of Catalonia, Balearic Islands, and Arag6n, whereas the poorest are Galicia and the southern regions of Extremadura, Andalucia, and Murcia. Since the 1970s, the Basque Country has been severely hit by the crisis in the capital goods sector and today is ranked only sixth in GDP per capita (Alcaide Inchausti et al. 1990). It is, however, together with Asturias, the Balearic Islands, and the Canary Islands, the region with the highest degree of economic specialization. Whereas the Basque Country and Asturias are specialized in declining industries, the Balearic and the Canary Islands are specialized in the service sector (Raymond 1990). The analysis also includes a measure of the respondents' level of education. There are three main reasons for this inclusion. First, it is used as a control variable that will allow us to better interpret the effect of levels of economic development. The overdevelopment hypothesis emphasizes that regional overdevelopment generates grievances against the state that can diminish people's attachment to Spain. For this hypothesis to be correct, one should observe a negative relationship between regional levels of development and attachment to Spain, even after 600 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 TABLE 2: Expected Effects on Attachment to Spain, According to Different Theories of Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism

Sense Feelings of Belonging of Morale Primordialistmodel

Born and resident in Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 culturally distinct region — - Speaks regionallanguage — -

Underdevelopment model Economic development + + Economic development* Born and resident in culturally distinct region + +

Overdevelopment model Economic development - - Economic development * Education - - Economic development* Born and resident in culturally distinct region - -

Economic specialization model Economic specialization — - Economic specialization Born and resident in culturally distinct region — -

Cognitive skills model — - Note: We use a double ++ or double -- when the arguments used byatheoryleadto the expectation that the effects should be greater on sense of belonging than on feelings of morale. controlling for education. Second, if we accept Laitin's (1991) argument that the educated elite of overdeveloped regions is the social group that perceives in a most acute manner the problems linked to overdevelopment, then we should also observe a negative interaction effect between levels of development and education that shows that overdevelopment has a greater impact on more educated respondents than on less educated respondents. The size of this interaction effect should depend on how much success the educated elites have had in mobilizing the rural population. If the effect of development disappears after controlling for education or if the predicted interactive effect is not present, then one needs to think of alternative Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 601 explanations for the role of levels of economic development. Third, we use education as a variable to test Deutsch's (1961) and Inglehart's (1970, 1977) hypothesis about the role of cognitive skills in the development of less parochial identity orientations. If their hypothesis is valid in the Spanish context, we would find that more educated respondents identify less with Spain than do less educated respondents. We present the empirical predictions of the theoretical models in

Table 2. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021

Results We present the results in two subsections. The first presents the measurement model, that is, the relation between the latent variables of sense of belonging and feelings of morale to their indicators. The second subsection examines regional differences in sense of belonging and feelings of morale and the relationships between the independent variables described above and the two constructs.

MEASUREMENT MODEL Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the indicators of sense of belonging and feelings of morale included in the analysis. It shows that the correlations between the scale's items are moderately high (between .641 and .872), and that they are higher between the items that measure the two dimensions of group attachment. It also shows very high average values for all the items (between 8 and 9) and very similar standard deviations (between 2 and 3). Figure 1 minus the straight arrows between indicators corresponds to the path diagram that Bollen and Hoyle (1990) estimated. Table 4 presents the results of estimating a baseline model, a one-factor, and two two-factor models to represent the structure of the relationships between the indicators of sense of belonging and feelings of morale and their respective constructs. For each model, Table 4 displays goodness-of-fit measures that reflect how close the implied population covariance matrix predicted by the model is to the sample covariance matrix. The chi-square test tests the null hypothesis that the population covariance matrix of the observed variables is equal to the covariance matrix implied by a particular model. If the model is valid, the chi-square estimate should not be statistically significant. The chi-square test statistics are particularly useful to compare models, since one can subtract these chi-square estimates to determine whether the difference in fit between two nested models is statistically significant. Reliance should not be placed totally, however, on the chi-square tests. The underlying null hypothesis, that the model is exactly correct, is too extreme for most situations; the accuracy of the test statistic behavior depends on the distribution from which the observed variables derive, and the power of the test statistic generally increases with N. For these reasons, additional fit indices are helpful in evaluating the adequacy of a model 602 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 FIGURE 1: Measvirement Model of Group Cohesion

jr( Sense of Belonging j Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021

/ (§1) / Z^-N \ / VC lp \ j§) B1 B2 B3

\ M1 M2 M3 \\ x^—S\ ~ ' t1 ^JL I 7—v. \(£) \ ® / ®

^^ FeelingsofMorale j Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 603 TABLE 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for the Indicators of Sense of Belonging and Feelings of Morale

• Sense of Belonging ^elop t'4^ $e^oog^^ ^, i' sa^e ot4e 'o e3 Espana es mi nacibn (Spain is my nation) Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 Me siento espanol .823 (I feel Spanish) Espana es el pals del que me siento miembro .788 .872 (Spain is the country to whichIbelong) Feelings of Morale: Espana es fenomenal .649 .660 .645 (Spain is great) Me encanta Espana .690 .753 .762. .772 (I love Spain) Espafia es un gran pals .641 .687 .709 .798 .808 (Spain is a great country)

Mean 8.509 8.583 8.644 7.559 8.309 7.875 Standard deviation 2.469 2.485 2.351 2.684 2.371 2.550

(see Bollen 1989; Bollen & Long 1993). Except for the chi-square statistic and the root mean square error, the remaining indices have an upper bound around 1 such that the closer to 1 they are, the better is a model's fit. The one-factor model and the first two-factor model referred to in Table 4 are the same models estimated by Bollen and Hoyle. The one-factor model corresponds to the hypothesis that the two dimensions of morale and belonging really are a single factor so that the two dimensions are perfectly correlated. It specifies that the six items are direct measures of group attachment and that there are no correlated errors of measurement. The first two-factor model specifies that sense of belonging and feelings of morale are two separate but correlated constructs, each measured by three indicators. Each indicator measures either sense of belonging or feelings of morale and there are no correlated errors of measurement. Table 4 indicates that the two-factor model has a reasonably good fit, that it is better than the one-factor model, and that the difference in fit between the two models is statistically significant (754.51-111.26 with 9-8 degrees of freedom). This confirms Bollen and Hoyle's findings. 604 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 TABLE 4: Alternative Models for the Measurement of Group Attachment

DF x2 p GFI AGFI Al A2 pl p2 RMR Baseline 15 6,765.82 0.0 One factor 9 754.51 0.0 .78 .50 .89 .89 .81 .82 .36 Two factor 8 111.26 0.0 .97 .92 .98 .98 .97 .97 .12 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 Two factors 3 17.13 0.0 1.00 .97 1.00 1.00 .99 .99 .06

(N=1,146) a Including direct relationships between adjacent indicators.

We consider one modification of the two-factor model. We were concerned that the clustering of the morale and belonging items in the questionnaire could have created a response bias in that the response to one item might have some impact on the response to the item that followed it. When respondents face very similar items they may try to be consistent with previous answers to similar items. 5 To test this idea we estimated another two-factor model that modifies Bollen and Hoyle's formulation by including regression effects between adjacent indicators. We show the new model as the previous model in Figure 1 that includes the lines between adjacent indicators. This model has a statistically significant better fit than the standard two-factor model (chi-square difference of 94.13 with 5 degrees of freedom, p < .01) and the goodness-of-fit indices indicate a very good fit. Table 5 includes the regression coefficients for the relationships between each of the two latent variables and their indicators, as well as the square multiple correlation coefficients for each of the indicators. Very high squared multiple correlation coefficients indicate high reliabilities for each of the indicators, while the magnitudes and statistical significance of all the regression coefficients linking the latent factors to their indicators support the validity of these measures.6 Table 5 also shows a moderately strong positive correlation (0.74) between the latent factor measuring sense of belonging and the latent construct measuring feelings of morale. Finally, all the direct relationships between indicators, except for one, are statistically significant 7 The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with Bollen and Hoyle's theoretical and measurement models of sense of belonging and feelings of morale and, in addition, reveal the existence of a response set effect for the indicators. 8

REGIONAL VARIATION IN SENSE OF BELONGING AND FEELINGS OF MORALE

Table 6 reports differences in sense of belonging and feelings of morale as a function of the respondents' region of residence, which Figure 2 presents graphically. Regions of residence are coded as dummy variables with Madrid serving as the omitted Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 605 TABLE 5: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates for Two-Factor Model with Causal Effects between Adjacent Indicators

Standard Lambda Errors R2

Spain is my nation (Belonging 1) 1.00t .75 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 I feel Spanish (Belonging 2) 1.10 .03 .91 Spain is the country to which I belong (Belonging 3) .87 .03 .84 Spain is great (Morale 1) 1.00t .77 I love Spain (Morale 2) .76 .03 .79 Spain is a great country (Morale 3) 1.00 .05 .84 tFixed parameter All coefficients are significant at .05 level. The correlation coefficient between sense of belonging and feelings of morale is equal to .738.

Regression Coefficients between Adjacent Indicators

Standard Coefficient Error

Belonging 1 to Morale 1 .14* .03 Morale 1 to Belonging 2 .01 .02 Belonging 2 to Morale 2 .27* .03 Morale 2 to Belonging 3 .15* .02 Belonging 3 to Morale 3 .14* .04

*p<.05 category. Therefore, the coefficients of the regional variables estimate the differences in morale and belonging relative to the average respondent born in Madrid. The largest negative coefficients indicate the regions with the lowest levels of feelings of morale or sense of belonging. Similarly, the biggest positive ones are for regions with the highest levels. Basques, Catalans, and Balears have the largest negative coefficients and therefore the lowest average scores on the sense of belonging and feelings of morale dimensions. Respondents who live in Andalucia, Extremadura, Castile-Mancha, and Navarre have the highest positive coefficients and therefore the highest average scores on the sense of belonging and feelings of morale dimensions. It is worth noting that Galicians and Valencians, two culturally distinct regions, express equivalent degrees of sense of belonging and feelings of morale as the average respondent from Madrid. 606 Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 TABLE 6: Regional Differences in Feelings of Morale and Sense of Belonging

Belonging Morale Region of Residence Andalucia .66* .83* Arag6n .41 .65 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 Asturias .58 .13 Baleariclslands -1.13* -1.07* Basque Country -2.92* -1.18* Canary islands -.22 -.14 Cantabria .98 .56 Castile-Le6n .09 .41 Castile-Mancha .99* 1.47* Catalonia -.73* -.13* Extremadura 1.00* .90* Galicia -.14 -.13 Murcia .34 .34 Navarre 1.21* 2.17*

Rioja . .71 -.75 Valencia -.08 .21

Intercept 8.60 6.19 R2 .17 .09

(N =1,146) Note. Omitted region: Madrid *p<.05

CULTURE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC SPECIALIZATION, AND EDUCATION AND ATTACHMENT TO SPAIN The regional distribution of morale and belonging is interesting in a descriptive sense and it provides some validation of the measures. We wish, however, to provide evidence on the impact of ethnic origin, economic development, economic specialization, and cognitive skills on attachment to Spain. To do so, we develop models that include indicators of these traits. Most of these models include a mixture of macro variables of regions as well as individual traits of the respondent that predict an individual's sense of belonging and feelings of morale. The nesting of individuals within the regions leads to a more complex error structure than is standard for OLS in multiple regression or the usual maximum likelihood estimator in structural equation models (SEM) with latent variables. We use Huber- corrected standard errors to address the problems inherent to this type of model. The Appendix provides further information on the rationale behind the estimation. Also, to facilitate the interpretation of the results, the indicators of economic Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 607 TABLE 7: The Effects of Regional Economic Specialization, Regional Economic Development, Cognitive Skills, Place of Birth, and Place of Residence, and Fluency in Regional Language on Sense of Belonging and Feelings of Morale

Development All Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 Culture Cognitive Skills Specialization Variables Bel. Mor. Bel. Mor. Bel. Mor. Bel. Mor. Bel. Mor.

1. Economic specialization -.07* -.05 -.06* -.05 2. Economic

development -.81* -.48 -.62* -.26

3.Level of education -.34* -.39* -.20* -.34* -.21* -.34* 4. Born and resident in culturally distinct distinct region -1.91*-1.02* -1.28* -.72* -2.03* -1.24* -1.55* -.69* 5.Born and resident in culturally distinct region * Economic specialization -.23* -.13* -.17* -.08* 6.Born and resident in culturally distinct region * Economic development -2.07*-1.35* -1.02 -.88* 7.Born and resident in culturally distinct region * Education -.24* -.11* -.22* -.09 8.Education* Economic development -.07 -.16* -.05 -.14* 9. Speaks regional language -.39 -.05 -1.17 -.48

Intercept 8.96* 6.66* 8.51* 6.37* 8.95* 6.60* 8.98* 6.67* 8.96* 6.65*

R2 .10 .03 .10 .14 .21 .17 .14 .05 .24 .19 (N=1,146) Note: Omitted origin and place of residence: People born or resident in Castilianized regions. OLS coefficient estimates, Huber-corrected standard errors. * p < .05, two-tailed test 608 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 FIGURE 2: Regional Variation in Sense of Belonging and Feelings of Morale Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021

Less than Madrid ® Like Madridab n More than Madrid a Belonging. Madrid = 8.60 b Morale. Madrid = 6.19 specialization, economic development, and education have been centered on their mean.

CULTURE

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 show the effects of cultural factors on sense of belonging and feelings of morale. These models test the validity of the ethnic origins hypothesis before controlling for other factors. As hypothesized, respondents who are born and reside in culturally distinct regions express a lower sense of belonging and lower feelings of morale than do other respondents. The average score for sense of belonging is about 2 points lower and the average score for feelings of morale is about 1 point lower. The stronger effect on sense of belonging than on feelings of morale is what one would expect, based on the discussion above. The effects of Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 609 speaking a regional language on sense of belonging and feelings of morale are, however, not statistically significant. Speaking a distinct regional language in addition to Castilian does not seem to be an obstacle to the development of strong attachments to Spain.

COGNITIVE SKILLS Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 Columns 3 and 4 show the results of testing the cognitive skills hypothesis with the use of education as the independent variable. As expected by the cognitive skills hypothesis, more-educated respondents express a lower sense of belonging. Moreover, they also express weaker feelings of morale, a finding for which neither the cognitive skills hypothesis nor the other hypotheses discussed in this text provide explanatory guidance. The variable level of education explains 10% of the variance in sense of belonging and 14% of the variance in feelings of morale.

LEVELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Columns 5 and 6 show the effects on sense of belonging and feelings of morale of the variables emphasized by the underdevelopment and overdevelopment hypotheses discussed above. Because of the presence of interaction terms in the statistical models, the effects of some of the independent variables depend on the values of other independent variables. When we look at the main effects, we see that among respondents who were not born in or do not reside in culturally distinct regions (born and resident in culturally distinct region = 0) and who have average levels of education (education [centered]= 0), as levels of economic development increase, sense of belonging and feelings of morale also decrease (the coefficients are -.81 and -.48 respectively), although only the effects on belonging are statistically significant. Also, among respondents who were not born in or do not reside in culturally distinct regions and who live in regions with average levels of development (level of economic development [centered] = 0), as the respondent's level of education increases, both sense of belonging and feelings of morale decrease (the coefficients are -.20 and -.34 respectively). When we then look at the interaction effects, we observe that the negative effects of both economic development and education are stronger among respondents born and resident in culturally distinct regions. Among these respondents, the effects of economic development on sense of belonging and feelings of morale at average levels of education are -2.88 and -2.83 respectively (-.81-2.07; -.48-1.35), and the effects of education on sense of belonging and feelings of morale at average levels of economic development are -0.44 and -0.45 respectively (-.20-.24; -.34- .11) . Therefore, these findings mean that the more developed a region is, the lower are the sense of belonging and the feelings of morale, especially among people born and resident in culturally distinct regions; they also mean that the higher the 610 I Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 level of education people have, the lower their sense of belonging and feelings of morale are, especially if they are born and reside in culturally distinct regions. Finally, we observe a statistically significant negative interaction effect of education and levels of economic development on feelings of morale (the interaction coefficient is -.16). This means that the greater the level of economic development in the region where respondents live, the stronger the negative relationship between education and feelings of morale. It also means that the higher Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 the level of education of the respondents, the stronger the negative relationship between regional levels of economic development and feelings of morale. Previously, we stated that because of its emphasis on the causal role of grievances, the overdevelopment hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between level of regional development and both feelings of morale and sense of belonging. This appears to be the case. Indeed, we have observed that levels of economic development have statistically significant negative effects on the sense of belonging of all respondents and on the feelings of morale of at least a specific subset of the respondents. Only the finding that the feelings of morale of respondents who are not born in or who do not reside in culturally distinct regions does not decrease in a statistically significant way as levels of development increase deviates from theoretical expectations. We find that among these respondents only the effect of development on sense of belonging is statistically significant. The surprising character of the findings comes from the fact that among these respondents one would expect a stronger negative effect of development on feelings of morale than on sense of belonging since, contrary to respondents born and resident in culturally distinct regions, they do not have an alternative identity available. We modeled other functional forms for the effect of levels of economic development on sense of belonging and feelings of morale, to see whether sense of belonging and feelings of morale were lower in both underdeveloped and overdeveloped regions. None of these models showed such a parabolic relationship.

LEVELS OF ECONOMIC SPECIALIZATION

Columns 7 and 8 report the effects of regional levels of economic specialization in the regions where respondents live on sense of belonging and feelings of morale. The results largely confirm the predictions of the economic specialization hypothesis in showing that there is a negative association between regional economic specialization and attachment to Spain. The main coefficient for economic specialization (Line 1, column 5) shows that among respondents who are not born or do not reside in culturally distinct regions (born and resident in culturally distinct region = 0), as levels of economic specialization increase, sense of belonging decreases (the coefficient is -.07). Confirmation of the hypothesis is further provided by the interaction coefficients in columns 7 and 8 (Line 5: -.23 and -.13), which express the difference in the effects of economic specialization when one Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 611 compares respondents born and resident in a culturally distinct region with other respondents. These interaction coefficients indicate that the negative effects of economic specialization on sense of belonging and feelings of morale is stronger among respondents born and resident in culturally distinct regions than among other respondents (-. 30 = -.07-.23; -.18 = -.05-.13). Finally, columns 7 and 8 also show that, as expected by the economic specialization hypothesis, the effects on sense on belonging are stronger than the effects on feelings of morale. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021

NET EFFECTS OF CULTURE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC SPECIALIZATION, AND EDUCATION

Columns 9 and 10 report the net effects of all the independent variables included in the analysis. The sign and statistical significance of the coefficients are almost identical to those already reported. The only two exceptions are the interaction effect between birth and place of residence and economic development on sense of belonging (line 6, column 9) and the interaction effect between birth and place of residence and education on feelings of morale (line 7, column 10), which are no longer statistically significant. 9 The lack of statistical significance of these coefficients somewhat undermines the support for the overdevelopment hypothesis. Overall, the variables included in the models help to explain 24% of the variance in sense of belonging and 19% of the variance feelings of morale. These are moderately high percentages in the context of individual-level statistical models. Most of this variance is explained, however, by the origin and residence of the respondents and by their education. A model including only these two variables (not reported here) explains 18% of the variance in sense of belonging and 16% in feelings of morale. In fact, most of the explained variance in feelings of morale can be accounted by the respondents' degree of education. (Compare columns 4 and 10.) 10 To further test the sensitivity of our empirical results, we tested additional models (tables available upon request) that included additional control variables and a different dependent variable. The three additional control variables were gender, age, and subjective class membership. The alternative dependent variable measured the degree to which respondents identify more strongly with Spain or with their autonomous community (a five-step indicator ranging from "identifies only with Spain" to "identifies only with the autonomous community"). None of the results altered significantly the findings reported above, although the variable age was found to have a statistically significant positive effect on attachment to Spain. This effect of age may be explained by the fact that older people have been more exposed to the nationalistic ideology that characterized the Franco dictatorship (1939-75).11 612 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 Discussion and Conclusion A major problem in the study of ethnicity has been the shortage of adequate empirical tests of hypotheses drawn from alternative theories. In this article we have tested hypotheses about the roles of ethnic origin, economic development, economic specialization, and cognitive skills on the degree of attachment to the nation-state through a multiregional comparison within Spain and with help from Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 sophisticated measures and methods, which accurately measure group attachment and distinguish contextual-level from individual-level effects. Our analysis has focused on group attachment, that is, the attitudinal dimension of nation-building and group solidarity. The extent to which our results apply to the explanation of behavioral patterns is something that future research will need to determine. The results discussed above clarify and offer interesting insights on the process of national identity formation in Spain. The observed regional differences reveal the image of a country where nation building has been successful but uneven, despite democratization and the significant amount of political and administrative decentralization that has been achieved since the approval of the 1978 constitution. Some of the results confirm what is generally known about Spain. For instance, respondents who live in the Basque Country and Catalonia express lower levels of belonging and feelings of morale than do respondents from other regions. This was to be expected given the strength of nationalist parties in these regions. At the same time, respondents from Andalucia, Extremadura, and Castile-Mancha express greater sense of belonging and feelings of morale than do respondents from other regions. Some other findings, although already known by specialists on Spain, challenge commonsense perspectives on national identity and nationalism. For instance, we see that sense of belonging and feelings of morale among respondents from Galicia, an underdeveloped region that has a very rich Celtic heritage and where usage of the regional language is even more widespread than in Catalonia and the Basque Country, are not lower than those prevailing in the majority of the Spanish autonomous communities. Equally puzzling from the perspective of theories of national identity is the finding that respondents from the region of Navarre are the ones who express the highest degree of sense of belonging and feelings of morale. What makes this result puzzling is that Basque nationalists have always claimed that neighboring Navarre is a central part of the Basque Country. How is it that the Navarrese have developed such a strong Spanish identity, when historically the Kingdom of Navarre was, together with the Kingdom of Aragon, the main competitor challenging the Kingdom of Castile in the struggle for hegemony over the Spanish territory? Studies of nationalism have generally avoided investigating anomalous cases such as the Galician or the Navarrese, despite the fact that they probably offer more clues for the development of an explanation of the emergence and success of nationalist movements than do many studies of regions where nationalist movements have developed. Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 613 Although at this point we cannot give a historically grounded answer to the questions just raised, this article's findings help us clarify the role of several factors emphasized by the literature on nation building. First, these results have shown that sense of belonging and feelings of morale are two different but correlated dimensions of attachment to the nation-state. By distinguishing them, we have been able to show for the first time that feelings of morale in Spain are lower than sense of belonging and that there is less regional variation with respect to the former Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 than to the latter. Future research will have to determine the independent role that each of these two dimensions of group attachment play in the development of support for nationalist and separatist movements in a particular region. Second, these results show that variation in the degree of attachment to Spain is related to ethnic origins, economic development, economic specialization, and people's cognitive skills. We find that the lowest sense of belonging and feelings of morale are observed among highly educated respondents who were born and reside in culturally distinct, highly developed, and highly economically specialized regions. All the hypotheses are largely and consistently supported by the statistical analysis, except for the underdevelopment hypothesis. Support for the overdevelopment hypothesis is only partial, however. Its validity is undermined, for instance, by the finding that the effect of levels of development on sense of belonging is the same for all respondents. One would expect this effect to be stronger among respondents born and resident in culturally distinct regions. Moreover, the finding that among respondents who are not born in or who do not reside in culturally distinct regions the effect of development is stronger on sense of belonging than on feelings of morale is also inconsistent with the overdevelopment hypothesis. If anything, one would expect the effect of development among these respondents to be stronger on their feelings of morale than on their sense of belonging. Of all the macrostructural hypotheses, the economic specialization hypothesis is the one most consistently supported by the data. It explains, however, as does the overdevelopment hypothesis, a very small percentage of the variance in sense of belonging and feelings of morale. Several interpretations of these findings are possible. One of them is that neither the regional economic specialization nor regional development plays a major role in the explanation of the degree of attachment to the nation-state. Another possible interpretation is that these variables play a greater role than that shown by the statistical results, but that this effect is attenuated by diffusion processes taking place across Spanish regions or by other political processes connected to the fact that all these regions belong to the same state. Our statistical analysis shows, on the other hand, that the most important explanatory variables are birth and residence in a culturally distinct region and education. They are responsible for most of the explained variance in sense of belonging, and education alone is responsible for most of the explained variance 614 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 in feelings of morale. This suggests that the ethnic origin and cognitive skills hypotheses are more appropriate to explain group attachment in Spain than are the overdevelopment and economic specialization hypotheses. The cognitive skills hypothesis is somewhat weakened, however, by the fact that the effect of education on feelings of morale is greater than its effect on sense of belonging, which is the opposite of what it predicts. In sum, our statistical findings are consistent with the following story about Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 attachment to Spain, with potential theoretical implications for other cases. Spain reaches the end of the millennium as a multicultural nation-state. This multicultural character has long historicopolitical roots, which scholars have tried for a long time to unveil. We find that attachment to Spain tends to be lower in economically specialized and overdeveloped regions. Of greater significance, however, is the role played by culture and cognitive skills. 12 The results of our analysis show that the multicultural character of the Spanish state has slightly weakened the development of a Spanish national identity by providing its citizens with competing sources of identity. Competence in a regional language does not have a statistically significant effect on group attachment. This finding, which contrasts with the important role that the defense of language plays in political discourse in Spain's culturally distinct regions, suggests that language has, if anything, a complex relationship to identity. It may rather operate as a symbol that bestows cultural distinctiveness on particular regions, so that particularly people born and residing in them have an alternative identity to the Spanish identity. This indirect role of language has probably a lot to do with the fact that the use of languages other than Castilian was forbidden during Franco's dictatorship (1939- 75). Beyond showing the important role that birth and residence in culturally distinct regions plays in explaining variation in attachment to Spain, the statistical results cannot tell us, however, whether an essentialist or a constructionist version of the primordialist model is more valid. Scholarly evidence tends, however, to support a constructionist hypothesis, by pointing out that language began only in the late nineteenth century to play a role in nationalist ideology and politics (Hobsbawm 1989), that identification with Spain has fluctuated widely during the last thirty years, as monitored by public opinion surveys, and that political mobilization is largely responsible for the institutionalization and legitimization of languages other than Castilian and of alternative ethnic identities. The ultimate legitimization of Spain's multicultural character and of language as the main cultural marker is, of course, provided by the 1978 Spanish constitution itself, which distinguishes so- called historical regions (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia) from other Spanish regions and which recognizes the co-official character of languages other than Castilian in the regions where they are spoken. In other words, ethnic political mobilization, which as the literature shows is not exclusively rooted in the defense of ethnic identity (Breuilly 1993; Hobsbawm 1989; Mann 1993) , has greatly Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 615 contributed to the construction of regional identities that compete with the Spanish identity. It is in light of the theoretical and analytical observations above that we can illuminate our findings on the effects of overdevelopment and specialization on attachment to Spain. For although we cannot rule out that the effect of these variables is significant but small, one could also postulate alternative interpretations. It may be argued, for instance, that overdevelopment and specialization play a strong role Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 in the explanation of attachment to Spain, but that this effect has become smaller over time because of the impact that ethnic political mobilization in overdeveloped and highly specialized regions has had on the salience (political and institutional) of cultural distinctiveness throughout Spain. In this sense, the strong effect of ethnic origin on attachment to Spain observed in our data could be capturing part of the effect that overdevelopment and economic specialization have historically had. This is, of course, an interpretation that to be tested would demand different data and another methodology, but that is consistent with the fact that the original centers of ethnic political mobilization in nineteenth-century Spain were the Basque Country and Catalonia, the most developed Spanish regions at the time and, especially in the case of the former, highly economically specialized ones. Overdevelopment, economic specialization, and geographic origin and residence, however, are not the only factors explaining attachment to Spain. Education has been shown to play a very large role, especially with respect to feelings of morale. The negative association between education and sense of belonging is consistent with the idea that the European unification process is contributing to the erosion of nation-state identities and that this process is affecting most of all the most educated segments of the population, that is, those who according to Deutsch (1961) and Inglehart (1970) are more likely to be informed about European integration and to have the necessary cognitive skills to identify with supranational organizations such as the European Union. In fact, a recent publication based on a different survey shows that, indeed, more-educated respondents identify more strongly with Europe than do less-educated respondents (Diez Medrano 1995). The cognitive skills model cannot adequately explain, however, the strong negative association between education and feelings of morale. More research is needed to explain this finding, but one can venture an interpretation linked to the relative underdevelopment of Spain when compared to the average European Union member state. This interpretation says that more- educated Spaniards have more information about Europe and are therefore more sensitive to the differences in living standards between Spain and the rest of Europe. In view of this unfavorable comparison, they may be less enthusiastic about Spain than are other, less-educated Spaniards. One can then generalize from the Spanish example and suggest that the advent of the European Union and the inviability of nationalist-autarchic models of economic development have led to a radical transformation of the modernization strategy that, since the nineteenth century, 616 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 educated elites have pursued in the relatively underdeveloped countries of Europe. We may be witnessing how the educated elites of the late twentieth century abdicate their traditional role as modernization leaders, which they fulfilled through state- and nation-building policies, and decide to bet instead, with great risk to their leadership role, on the achievement of modernization through the destruction of the nation-state and concomitant nationalist symbols and integration in a larger supranational entity such as the European Union. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021

Notes 1. Laitin (1991) also contemplates the possibility that underdevelopment fosters nationalism. This hinges, however, on the existence of overt discrimination. Reciprocally, Hechter (1992) has also recently conceded that to the extent that regional overdevelopment means economic specialization it could also hinder the development of attachments to the nation-state. 2. This survey was conducted by CIRES (Centro para la Investigacibn sobre la Realidad Social), a major Spanish survey research institute, which since 1991 has been conducting monthly surveys on various sociological themes. The questions used in the statistical analysis were provided by the authors of the article. Twelve hundred interviews were conducted face to face on a random probability sample of the Spanish population eighteen years old and older, stratified at the regional and municipal levels. The interviews were always conducted in Castilian, which is perfectly understood and spoken by every Spanish citizen. Although many of the interviewers may have been fluent in any of the other languages spoken in some of the regions, which may be related to a weaker identification with Spain, there were not rules about how to assign interviewers to respondents. It is then possible that some respondents who do not identify with Spain may have been somewhat reluctant to express their anti-Spanish feelings when asked by a Castilian-speaking interviewer or that, vice versa, some respondents who identify strongly with Spain may have been reluctant to express their feelings when asked by an interviewer who clearly speaks the regional language on a regular basis. This could create problems in the Basque Country and Catalonia, where language use has greater political meaning because of the strength of the nationalist movements. Our empirical findings on regional differences agree, however, with our expectations and we therefore believe that interviewer effects may have been minor or compensated for each other. 3. The measures used in empirical studies of group identity have usually privileged the sense-of-belonging dimension. In Spain, for instance, the standard measure of ethnic identification asks respondents to say whether they identify as `only Spaniard;' "more Spaniard than [region of residence];' "as Spaniard as [region of residence]," "more [region of residence] than Spaniard;' or "only [region of residence]." This measure has traditionally shown Basques and Catalans to identify less with Spain than do other Spaniards (see Gunther, Sani & Shabad 1986). Although the use of Bollen and Hoyle's scale of attachment to a single group obscures the fact that people have multiple identities, it allows us to obtain a fuller measurement of individual attachment to Spain by Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 617 APPENDIX: A Method for the Estimation of Models Involving Latent Dependent Variables and Both Contextual and Individual Independent Variables

Though general hierarchical models for SEMs are beginning to emerge (e.g., McDonald 1989; Muthen 1994), they are complex and not always readily available. We pursue a simpler alternative that is customized to our models.

To explain the method, consider an equation to explain sense of belonging. To simplify the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 presentation, we use a model with a single micro-level variable and a single macro-level variable: LI=J =aI +XY-b1 +Z.g1 +m11 +z,. (1) where i indexes individual observations andj indexes regiona'variables, L 1, is the latent sense of belonging variable, Xl, is an individual characteristic that influences belonging for the ith indi- vidual, b, is the corresponding coefficient, Z3 a regional trait that affects belonging for the ith individual with gi being its coefficient, m l, is a disturbance term that is common across all individuals from thejth region, and z 11 is a disturbance term that differs across individuals, has a mean of zero, is uncorrelated with m 11, ZJ, and X=1, is homoscedastic, and is nonautocorrelated. The explanatory variables have negligible measurement error, but belonging, L 1 , is measured with error. From the confirmatory factor analysis model in the earlier section, the measurement equation for the first belonging item, say y1,, is y1 =L1=j +e1 (2) where e11, is a random measurement error that is homoscedastic and nonautocorrelated, has a mean of zero, and is uncorrelated with L 1i1, Xis, Z^, m1 and z1,. After solving for L, ij, we have Li^j = Yitj - eu^, (3) which we substitute into equation (1) to get

y11,=aI +Xqb1 +Z1g1 +m 1j +z1,,+e1 . (4) The advantage of this form is that with the exceptions of the disturbances all variables are observed variables. OLS is a consistent estimator of equation (4), but the standard errors and significance tests may not be accurate due to the m 1 We use Huber-corrected standard errors as implemented in the hreg procedure of the statistical program Stata to correct the standard errors for the presence of this regional disturbance term. The situation for the morale equation is slightly more complicated. The equation with the latent variable for morale has the same form as equation (1): LLtJ=a2+Xyb2+Z,g2+m2j+z2,. (5) where analogous assumptions are made. The measurement equation for the morale measure, however, differs: y2i^ = L2=i + b2iyitq + e2y (6) where y2 is the first morale measure, e2 the error of measurement that has a mean of zero, is uncorrelated with L 11 with L2i^, with y111, and with all the other disturbances and errors in other equations. The yl variable in equation (6) captures the response bias effect as we described earlier. Based on equation (6), L2tq=y2ij-b21y1t1-e2i^, and substituting into equation (5), we get y2i^ - b2lyl;^ = a2 + Xt^b2 + Z1 + m4 + z2=. + e2 . (7) The left side is the morale measure subtracting the response set effect from y1 (7). This difference can then be regressed on the right side variables using OLS with Huber-corrected standard errors. We use this procedure, taking the coefficient of 0.14 from the confirmatory factor analysis in Table 4 as our value of b21. All the equations in Table 6 use OLS regression with the Huber-corrected standard errors to estimate the effects on the latent variables of morale and belonging, taking account of the regional disturbances. 618 / Social Forces 77:2, December 1998 distinguishing the sense-of-belonging and feelings-of-morale dimensions. Moreover, what is at stake in the nation-building literature is the development of an identification with the nation-state, rather than the strength of local ties, although the two may be somewhat related. (See also discussion of alternative indicators for the dependent variable below.) 4. E.g., "Me siento feliz de vivir en Espana." In agreement with Bollen and Hoyle's approach, these items were bundled together in the questionnaire, alternating items on

sense of belonging with items on feelings of morale. In the pretests, other alternative Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 wordings and their translations were used before settling on the ones used here. 5. Obviously, one could argue for an even more complicated model based on the assumption that what the respondent does is to guide himself or herself by some form of weighted average of the answers to the previous items. 6. See Bollen (1989) for a justification for using lambda coefficients and square multiple correlation coefficients as measures of validity and reliability respectively. 7.We tested alternative models specifying randomly selected direct relationships between the group attachment's scale indicators. The goodness-of-fit indices for these models were always worse than the one obtained when specifying direct relationships between consecutive indicators. Moreover, the coefficients for the direct relationships between indicators were hardly ever significant (except when the indicators were contiguous). 8. It is possible that skewness in the attitude variables and response-set bias could have affected our results. As shown in the text, we have addressed response bias by explicitly modeling the possibility that a respondent's answer to one question has a direct influence on the response to the next question. We have found support for a response bias and controlled for it in the analysis. Though statistically significant, the magnitudes of the response-set effects are far smaller than the effects of belonging and morale on the indicators. To further investigate the skewness issue, we checked the distributions of the residuals from the reduced-form model for each indicator regressed on the independent variables included in the models. The skewness of the residuals generally was less than 1. We also thought about whether our findings could be explained by any remaining methodological artifacts. The only effects we could imagine are counter to what we found. For instance, excessive skewness and response-set bias would likely lead to regional homogeneity rather that the regional differences we found. Similarly, such artifacts would make it difficult to separate the belonging and morale dimensions. 9. We have tested other models in order to evaluate overdevelopment hypothesis. These models take into account that one of the most developed regions in Spain is Madrid, the political center, where attachment to Spain should be high. The results of these alternative formulations support the hypotheses of overdevelopment hypothesis, especially the prediction that the effect of overdevelopment is greater among the educated elites. 10. The approach we took does not distinguish error variance due to measurement error from that due to equation error. If the measurement error variance were removed, these R2 coefficients could be even larger. We have reestimated the models using an alternative method, the xtreg procedure in the statistical package Stata, to take into account the multilevel character of our data. The results obtained through this alternative test differ only in the significance of some coefficients (some that were significant are no longer Nationalism and Identification in Spain / 619 significant and vice versa). Overall, however, these changes do not alter the conclusions reached above but suggest the need for further tests. 11.Subjective class membership, a five-item scale going from lower class to upper class, was used as an indicator of class membership in order to control for the effects of education, and because the overdevelopment hypothesis concerning the attitudes of educated segments of overdeveloped regions may also apply to the attitudes of the upper

classes. Other objective measures of social class, such as income or occupation, were Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/77/2/587/2233702 by guest on 28 September 2021 considered but not used because of large gaps in such data. In the case of occupation, the large gaps in the data are due to high rates of unemployment (around 20% in general and over 40% among young men and women less than thirty years old — most of these young people have never worked) and to the very low rates of female economic activity outside the household, especially among women over thirty years of age. 12.To further test the validity of the cognitive skills hypothesis, we tested the same models reported in the text, this time using a dependent variable that measured the degree of identification of respondents with their autonomous community. The statistical analysis showed a small negative relationship between education and identification with the autonomous community, which is what the cognitive hypothesis would predict. The tables representing these results are available on request.

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