A Stillborn Revolution the Diverse 2
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“A STILLBORN REVOLUTION”: THE DIVERSE CAUSES OF SOUTH KOREA’S 5.16 MILITARY COUP Yongjun Lee, Chadwick International School, Republic of Korea [email protected] Introduction On May 16, 1961, Major General Park Chung-Hee and his Special Forces Command stormed the Blue House, seizing full control of the South Korean government and its legislative functions.1 The conductors of the coup quickly established a military junta, which in turn rapidly coalesced into a one-person dictatorship headed by Park. Traditionally, the chief cause of the takeover is considered to be the “dysfunctional and corrupt government” of the Second Republic, which failed to reform the civil administration in an effective and timely manner.2 Following the revolutionary atmosphere created by the April Revolution, the internal strife and ineptitude of the Second Republic prompted further calls for reform from the young colonels of the military, who would eventually launch the “5.16 Revolution” in order to restore the competence and moral integrity of the government. However, some have chosen to label the coup as the “5.16 Mutiny” instead, pointing out that the coup was motivated by factors outside the Second Republic. Specifically, they point to evidence of Park’s militarist ideology, which was developed during his earlier days as a Japanese military officer and continued throughout his career as a junior general. Furthermore, at the time of the coup, much of Park’s coalition was motivated by resentment regarding the lack of promotions and eagerly seized the opportunity to silence the military establishment. Finally, the way in which Park systematically purged rivals within the military and subverted the concept of a “civilian transition” to cement his one-person dictatorship clearly points to the fulfillment of Park's personal ambitions rather than a representation of South Korea’s best interests. In the interest of neutrality, this paper will refer to the event as the “5.16 coup” following the nomenclature adopted by modern historians. For the majority of Koreans, Park nevertheless remains a revered if slightly controversial figure whose “can-do” spirit galvanized the nation and emboldened the Korean people to lift themselves out of poverty. His political legacy continues to shape Korean politics today - in 2017, the impeachment of Park’s first daughter (President Park Geun-Hye) for abuse of power marked yet another point in the assessment of his historical significance.3 In particular, as the foundational event of Park’s subsequent rule, the 5.16 coup is an instructive event in analyzing Park’s motivations and the impact of his ascension to power on Korean democracy. Understanding the causes of the 5.16 coup d’etat is crucial to understanding democracy in South Korea as a whole as the nation continues to grapple with the long-lasting controversies of the event. The Second Republic Until the establishment of the Second Republic, democracy in Korea had existed more as an ideal rather than a political reality. Almost immediately upon the creation of the First Republic with the end of the American occupation in 1948, the country was hit by the economic catastrophe of the Korean War (1950-1953). President Syngman Rhee attempted to use the political chaos to seize permanent power; in November 1954, he and his Liberal Party became infamous for using the “Rounding Rule” to forcibly enact a constitutional amendment wherein he abolished the two-term limit for presidents and declared his intention to run for a third term.4 In 1960, Rhee was elected to a fourth term on March 15, 1960 amidst widespread and overt electorate fraud, but was immediately confronted by a popular civilian uprising on April 19 (the “April Revolution”). During the protests, Rhee’s government declared martial law and ordered police forces to fire on the marchers, killing nearly 180; this proved the final straw for Rhee, who was forced to resign, flee the country and seek asylum in Hawaii.5 In Rhee’s place, Ho Chong, the prime minister, assembled the post of interim president and assembled a cabinet of ministers from the opposing Democratic Party, putting an end to the Rhee era for good. After a brief deliberation, Ho’s government immediately enacted a complete constitutional reform on June 15, thereby ending the First Republic and creating the Second Republic. The principal aim of this new governmental system was to avoid dictatorship through the decentralization of power; therefore, the previous powerful executive branch was dismantled, in favor of a parliamentary democracy with power concentrated in the bicameral Congress and its chair, the prime minister, rather than the president, who was to remain largely a figurehead. 6 The United States also expressed favorable opinions concerning the democratic transition, recognizing the sovereign authority of the Second Republic without significant concerns; it seemed that free government had taken root in Korea at last.7 Ineffectual “Democracy” Unfortunately, the Democratic Party itself had been a coalition against the Rhee regime more than a single unified political organization. Upon its ascension to power, the Party quickly fractured into the “New Faction” led by former Vice President Chang Myon and the “Old Faction” led by Party Secretary Yun Bo-Sun.8 Despite the lack of visible ideological differences among the factions - both being moderately conservative - the enmity between the factions quickly developed, with relations between them being described as worse than the Liberal- Democratic conflicts of the Rhee presidency.9 Hence, although the Democratic Party nominally won 199 of 220 seats in the General Assembly - a position that granted the party absolute control of the government - in the new July elections, in reality, this number was essentially the sum of two separate parties, which campaigned separately and often in competition against each other.10 After the elections, although both Chang and Yun assumed prominent roles within the new Republic - Chang as Prime Minister and Yun as President - they continued to clash on multiple fronts along issues exacerbated by the previous regime. The political hostilities first started with the breakdown of negotiations on the makeup of Chang’s new cabinet; despite his initial promise guaranteeing an even split of Old and New Faction members, Chang eventually selected 10 New Faction members among a total of 13 open cabinet positions. The decision triggered widespread outrage from Old Faction members and even some parts of the New Faction, forcing Chang to release another cabinet lineup in less than two weeks. However, this second proposal too was rejected by the majority of Old Faction members, who further escalated tensions by leaving the party en masse on October 13 to create the New Democratic Party. This disintegrated the previous Democratic majority and leaving Chang with only a plurality of members in the General Assembly.11 Hence, the Chang government was further destabilized and hampered in its ability to make effective policy decisions; it would take yet another new cabinet proposal on January 30 for all parties to agree that they had been fairly represented.12 In response to what they perceived as Chang’s overt declaration of partisanship, the New Democrats also attempted to use President Yun’s status as official head of state to wrest back control of the government. Despite being relegated to a mostly ceremonial role, Yun made several moves that bordered on executive overreach; during the aforementioned cabinet debacle, he publicly and aggressively criticized Chang’s cabinet appointments and social policies as part of the New Democrats’ plan to sabotage Chang’s legislative agenda.13 Chang recounts that Yun openly hinted at the possibility of his resignation and even encouraged it multiple times; for instance, during a particularly controversial private meeting on March 23, Yun asked Chang whether he was “confident he could maintain the government in these turbulent times”.14 On a political level, the New Democrats’ leg-pulling was largely effective, as evidenced by the abysmal legislative record of the Chang administration; of the 159 bills drafted and submitted by Chang’s government, only 39 were passed by the General Assembly, resulting in a record low passage rate of 24.5%.15 As Park argued in his critique of the Second Republic in 1960, “the Chang Myon administration could not sort out its own cabinet...how on earth could it even attempt to conduct responsible politics?”16 Furthermore, the New Democrats also impeded effective governance by contesting the Prime Minister’s sole access to executive military powers. They asserted that President Yun should have command over the military, while Chang’s control over the military only pertained to its administrative functions.17 The resulting constitutional debate was never effectively resolved, thrusting the actual authority of the government over the army into legal limbo and allowing high-ranking military officials to plan and execute the May 16 coup in the near- complete absence of government oversight. Public Disorder With its ruling coalition in tatters, the Chang Myon government was unable to maintain law and order in the nationwide civilian protests which were continuing in the wake of the April 19 Revolution. In a conscious effort to step away from the repression of the Rhee regime, the administration had removed all regulations on press freedoms and completely renounced the use of military force against civilians; although both policies were ideologically democratic, they made it near impossible to calm an increasingly demanding public fueled by widely critical mainstream media. Consequently, during the 10 months of the Chang administration, there were a total of 2000 demonstrations totaling a combined turnout of approximately 1 million protesters. 18 Often, protesters simply took the opportunity to protest for the sake of doing so; ironically, some secondary students were even seen demonstrating against the continuation of the protests.