“A STILLBORN REVOLUTION”: THE DIVERSE CAUSES OF ’S 5.16 MILITARY COUP

Yongjun Lee, Chadwick International School, Republic of Korea [email protected]

Introduction

On May 16, 1961, Major General Park Chung-Hee and his Special Forces Command stormed the , seizing full control of the South Korean government and its legislative functions.1 The conductors of the coup quickly established a , which in turn rapidly coalesced into a one-person dictatorship headed by Park. Traditionally, the chief cause of the takeover is considered to be the “dysfunctional and corrupt government” of the Second Republic, which failed to reform the civil administration in an effective and timely manner.2 Following the revolutionary atmosphere created by the , the internal strife and ineptitude of the Second Republic prompted further calls for reform from the young colonels of the military, who would eventually launch the “5.16 Revolution” in order to restore the competence and moral integrity of the government. However, some have chosen to label the coup as the “5.16 Mutiny” instead, pointing out that the coup was motivated by factors outside the Second Republic. Specifically, they point to evidence of Park’s militarist ideology, which was developed during his earlier days as a Japanese military officer and continued throughout his career as a junior general. Furthermore, at the time of the coup, much of Park’s coalition was motivated by resentment regarding the lack of promotions and eagerly seized the opportunity to silence the military establishment. Finally, the way in which Park systematically purged rivals within the military and subverted the concept of a “civilian transition” to cement his one-person dictatorship clearly points to the fulfillment of Park's personal ambitions rather than a representation of South Korea’s best interests. In the interest of neutrality, this paper will refer to the event as the “5.16 coup” following the nomenclature adopted by modern historians. For the majority of Koreans, Park nevertheless remains a revered if slightly controversial figure whose “can-do” spirit galvanized the nation and emboldened the Korean people to lift themselves out of poverty. His political legacy continues to shape Korean politics today - in 2017, the impeachment of Park’s first daughter (President Park Geun-Hye) for abuse of power marked yet another point in the assessment of his historical significance.3 In particular, as the foundational event of Park’s subsequent rule, the 5.16 coup is an instructive event in analyzing Park’s motivations and the impact of his ascension to power on Korean democracy. Understanding the causes of the 5.16 coup d’etat is crucial to understanding democracy in South Korea as a whole as the nation continues to grapple with the long-lasting controversies of the event.

The Second Republic

Until the establishment of the Second Republic, democracy in Korea had existed more as an ideal rather than a political reality. Almost immediately upon the creation of the First Republic with the end of the American occupation in 1948, the country was hit by the economic catastrophe of the (1950-1953). President attempted to use the political chaos to seize permanent power; in November 1954, he and his Liberal Party became infamous for using the “Rounding Rule” to forcibly enact a constitutional amendment wherein he abolished the two-term limit for presidents and declared his intention to run for a third term.4 In 1960, Rhee was elected to a fourth term on March 15, 1960 amidst widespread and overt electorate fraud, but was immediately confronted by a popular civilian uprising on April 19 (the “April Revolution”). During the protests, Rhee’s government declared and ordered police forces to fire on the marchers, killing nearly 180; this proved the final straw for Rhee, who was forced to resign, flee the country and seek asylum in Hawaii.5 In Rhee’s place, Ho Chong, the prime minister, assembled the post of interim president and assembled a cabinet of ministers from the opposing Democratic Party, putting an end to the Rhee era for good. After a brief deliberation, Ho’s government immediately enacted a complete constitutional reform on June 15, thereby ending the First Republic and creating the Second Republic. The principal aim of this new governmental system was to avoid dictatorship through the decentralization of power; therefore, the previous powerful executive branch was dismantled, in favor of a parliamentary democracy with power concentrated in the bicameral Congress and its chair, the prime minister, rather than the president, who was to remain largely a figurehead. 6 The United States also expressed favorable opinions concerning the democratic transition, recognizing the sovereign authority of the Second Republic without significant concerns; it seemed that free government had taken root in Korea at last.7

Ineffectual “Democracy”

Unfortunately, the Democratic Party itself had been a coalition against the Rhee regime more than a single unified political organization. Upon its ascension to power, the Party quickly fractured into the “New Faction” led by former Vice President and the “Old Faction” led by Party Secretary Yun Bo-Sun.8 Despite the lack of visible ideological differences among the factions - both being moderately conservative - the enmity between the factions quickly developed, with relations between them being described as worse than the Liberal- Democratic conflicts of the Rhee presidency.9 Hence, although the Democratic Party nominally won 199 of 220 seats in the General Assembly - a position that granted the party absolute control of the government - in the new July elections, in reality, this number was essentially the sum of two separate parties, which campaigned separately and often in competition against each other.10 After the elections, although both Chang and Yun assumed prominent roles within the new Republic - Chang as Prime Minister and Yun as President - they continued to clash on multiple fronts along issues exacerbated by the previous regime. The political hostilities first started with the breakdown of negotiations on the makeup of Chang’s new cabinet; despite his initial promise guaranteeing an even split of Old and New Faction members, Chang eventually selected 10 New Faction members among a total of 13 open cabinet positions. The decision triggered widespread outrage from Old Faction members and even some parts of the New Faction, forcing Chang to release another cabinet lineup in less than two weeks. However, this second proposal too was rejected by the majority of Old Faction members, who further escalated tensions by leaving the party en masse on October 13 to create the New Democratic Party. This disintegrated the previous Democratic majority and leaving Chang with only a plurality of members in the General Assembly.11 Hence, the Chang government was further destabilized and hampered in its ability to make effective policy decisions; it would take yet another new cabinet proposal on January 30 for all parties to agree that they had been fairly represented.12 In response to what they perceived as Chang’s overt declaration of partisanship, the New Democrats also attempted to use President Yun’s status as official to wrest back control of the government. Despite being relegated to a mostly ceremonial role, Yun made several moves that bordered on executive overreach; during the aforementioned cabinet debacle, he publicly and aggressively criticized Chang’s cabinet appointments and social policies as part of the New Democrats’ plan to sabotage Chang’s legislative agenda.13 Chang recounts that Yun openly hinted at the possibility of his resignation and even encouraged it multiple times; for instance, during a particularly controversial private meeting on March 23, Yun asked Chang whether he was “confident he could maintain the government in these turbulent times”.14 On a political level, the New Democrats’ leg-pulling was largely effective, as evidenced by the abysmal legislative record of the Chang administration; of the 159 bills drafted and submitted by Chang’s government, only 39 were passed by the General Assembly, resulting in a record low passage rate of 24.5%.15 As Park argued in his critique of the Second Republic in 1960, “the Chang Myon administration could not sort out its own cabinet...how on earth could it even attempt to conduct responsible politics?”16 Furthermore, the New Democrats also impeded effective governance by contesting the Prime Minister’s sole access to executive military powers. They asserted that President Yun should have command over the military, while Chang’s control over the military only pertained to its administrative functions.17 The resulting constitutional debate was never effectively resolved, thrusting the actual authority of the government over the army into legal limbo and allowing high-ranking military officials to plan and execute the May 16 coup in the near- complete absence of government oversight.

Public Disorder

With its ruling coalition in tatters, the Chang Myon government was unable to maintain law and order in the nationwide civilian protests which were continuing in the wake of the April 19 Revolution. In a conscious effort to step away from the repression of the Rhee regime, the administration had removed all regulations on press freedoms and completely renounced the use of military force against civilians; although both policies were ideologically democratic, they made it near impossible to calm an increasingly demanding public fueled by widely critical mainstream media. Consequently, during the 10 months of the Chang administration, there were a total of 2000 demonstrations totaling a combined turnout of approximately 1 million protesters. 18 Often, protesters simply took the opportunity to protest for the sake of doing so; ironically, some secondary students were even seen demonstrating against the continuation of the protests. Predictably, these protests caused widespread mayhem in the streets and negatively impacted the livelihoods of citizens; a popular saying at the time was that “the sun rose with demo (demonstrations) and set with demo”.19 Park asserted that the situation was directly caused by the “lack of leadership from the Democrats… and their inaction and incompetence”.20 In particular, he cited Second Republic’s repeated failure to enact appropriate legislation to quell the protests. The most notable of these fiascos occurred in March 1961, when the Chang government proposed two bills - the Act on Assembly and Protest and the Anti-Communist Act - but promptly faced widespread resistance from the protesters, who decried the “Two Evil Acts” and accused the government of violating civil rights. After the New Democrats reversed their stance on the bills citing overwhelming public opinion, the laws predictably failed to pass the General Assembly, leaving the government without effective means to mitigate the chaos.21 As for the dysfunctional police department, it also found itself increasingly unable to contain the riots, with 17,000 policemen dismissed from the forces and five different Interior Ministers in command at various times throughout the administration.22 In his memoirs, Chang also acknowledged that “the police...as the scapegoat for the violence of the April Revolution...found it difficult to exercise the force required to maintain the public peace”. Nevertheless, he argued that “any government in the wake of the April Revolution would have been unable to avoid such disorder...unless they resorted to armed repression”.23 Specifically, he criticized the military’s tendency to blame the Second Republic for all vices of Korean society, arguing that “economic and social stability would have followed in a number of months...what is there to say to those who denied the Republic this opportunity in favour of plotting and subterfuge?”24 Regardless, the widespread chaos was devastating to the Chang government’s public image. People’s opinions of the Republic fell to an all-time low - a cabinet sponsored poll found that only 3.7% of Koreans expressed “unreserved support” for the Chang government - while the military regime was able to solidify its self-portrayal as a reliable ruling power.25

Gamgun Policy and Civil Control

From the beginning of the Second Republic, it was clear that one of the Chang government’s key goals was to curb the political influence of the military. Despite its otherwise catastrophic effects, one result of the Korean War was the modernization of the ROKA and improvement of its logistical capabilities to the extent that military commanders’ managerial know-how was “ten years ahead of the private sector”.26 Combined with the uniquely Japanese militarist ethos of the ROKA, this naturally formed a common consensus among army officers that intervention in the nation’s political and economic affairs was part of the military’s duty as protector of the people.27 As Park put it, “the army is the shield of the state, and the mission of our army on behalf of the state is greater than that of any other army in the world”.28 Initially, the Chang administration attempted to achieve its goals by simply reducing the size of the military via its gamgun (reduction of the military) policy; as early as the 1960 elections, the government promised that it would cut a total of 100,000 personnel from the 600,000-strong ROKA as part of its new focus on national economic growth.29 After staunch top- level opposition from both the ROKA as well as the American forces stationed in Korea regarding the continued threat of another invasion by North Korea, the initially planned reduction of 100,000 soldiers was first reduced to 50,000 and completely written off by early November.30 Furthermore, the government also angered senior military commanders by refusing to appoint them to security-related governmental posts, including the ministry of defence, as was customary during the First Republic. While administrative officials saw this as a necessary step in restoring the democratic principle of civilian control over the military, the overt motive of reducing the military’s political influence and the subsequent incompetence of the civilian ministers only served to deepen the military’s distaste for the Chang Myon government.31

Corruption and Economic Stagnation

The Second Republic had inherited a completely “backward, desolate economy” devastated by the catastrophe of the Korean War and the rampant corruption of the Rhee regime. In 1960, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income lower than those of Yemen, Ethiopia and Haiti, and 40% of the population suffering from absolute poverty.32 However, rather than guiding the country towards modernization, the Chang government’s factionalist infighting and policy errors exacerbated South Korea’s economic difficulties. In particular, the Chang government continued the disastrous import substitution policies of the Rhee regime, which inefficiently allocated resources and slowed economic growth to 3.4% compared to the 10-12% growth margin common in other developing countries.33 The economic stagnation also had a devastating impact on exchange rates; in the 9 months of the Second Republic alone, the value of the Korean hwan against the US dollar fell by half (corresponding to a doubling in the exchange rate from 650:1 to 1300:1).34 The economic meltdown was further compounded by the reluctance of the Chang government to completely purge the corrupt officials of the Rhee era. Consequently, despite Chang himself being widely recognized as a man of moral integrity, the Second Republic was plagued by a systematic web of fraud and embezzlement much like that of the First Republic.35 In his critiques, Park clearly outlined this parallel between the two Republics, declaring that “the excesses of the Liberal Party were echoed by the Democrats upon their rise to power. The two republics conducted exactly the same business in all but name”.36 He supported his accusations with data from state-owned enterprises, which supplied much of the political funding: as a result of unchecked capital outflow, these “mainstays of the economy” recorded a total of 84.5 billion hwan in losses in the second half of 1960 alone.37 The network of corruption extended to military commanders as well, as members of the Democratic Party often embezzled funding from the armed forces to buy the agreement of opposition politicians on the yearly budget bill. In February 1936, for example, Army Chief of Staff Choi Kyoung-rok was fired for refusing to misappropriate 1.7 billion hwan from the military budget as political funding for the Chang government.38 He was then replaced with Chang To-yong, who not only abruptly concluded all internal military investigations into acts of corruption but would also go on to play a crucial role in the 5.16 military takeover.39 In this way, the Second Republic sealed its own doom, too blinded by internal power struggles and the greed of its officials to see the caricature of democracy that it had become.

Japanese Influence and Military Career

However, it is also important to examine the circumstances that shaped Park Chung Hee, the man who would eventually take power after the 5.16 coup, and allowed him to take advantage of the Second Republic’s inaction. The earliest formal records of Park originate from his time as a cadet in the MMA (Manchukuo Military Academy), the official training center of all would-be Manchukuo Army officers who would go on to fight for the Japanese Empire in the Second World War. Earlier records show that Park had long harbored a fascination for the upright discipline of the Japanese military, having previously been attracted to the various aspects of Japanese military culture at Taegu Normal School (TNS).40 Despite being appointed to a coveted high-income post as an elementary school teacher, Park attracted public attention in April 1936 by abandoning his job and writing a hyulseo or “blood pledge” to the Manchukuo Ministry of War in search of admission to the MMA. In said pledge, he made pro-Japanese remarks that would later be harshly condemned by independence activists, vowing to serve “[the Japanese empire] with my life….to die with the spirit worthy of a Japanese in service of my country.”41 Although the MMA initially rejected Park due to him being above the age of admission, his mentors at TNS successfully lobbied for an exception to the admission requirements; after passing the entrance examinations with flying colors, Park officially entered the 2nd class of the MMA (MMA 2) in early 1940.42 During his period as an MMA cadet, Park’s worldview and personal approach to government was further developed and influenced by the militaristic doctrine of the Academy; many of his policies would continue to reflect the “samurai spirit” and its central principles of militarism and central authority.43 As a cadet, Park quickly rose to the top of his class; his zealousness and determination were not only lauded by his instructors but used as a model - known as gomin - for his peers and lowerclassmen. Although his academic transcripts or exact class rankings are not available for analysis, Park’s academic excellence is obvious throughout what remains of his record; most notably, at the MMA 2 graduation on March 23, 1942, he received an imperial prize and the distinction of honor cadet with four other outstanding peers among a combined class of 418 trainees.44 After graduating, Park briefly served as part of the Eighth Division of the Manchurian Army as a second lieutenant starting in July 1944. After the end of World War II, despite Park’s record of military service for the Japanese Empire, he and several other cadets were able to make their way back via Beijing into the American occupation forces, which were “more concerned with building up a native force for maintaining order….than with arresting or punishing men who had served a now utterly defeated enemy”.45 With their track records effectively cleaned up, the former Manchurian Army officers naturally gravitated towards the newly formed (ROKA). With the refusal of former Independence Army soldiers to join them, the new Korean Military Academy (KMA) largely fell under the control of these former Japanese Army officials, who hailed from both the MMA and the Japanese Military Academy (JMA).46 As for Park, he too was able to join the second class of the KMA (KMA 2) without much ado. The military culture and practices of the KMA were remarkably similar to those of the MMA, with the same focus on leadership, willpower and authority; naturally, Park found himself at home and befriended many of the promising young officers who would go on to play critical roles of their own in the coming times, including Kim Jae-gyu (KMA 2) and Kim Jong-pil (KMA 8).47 After Park’s graduation from the KMA, Park’s career constantly hovered in the balance between complete disgrace and remarkable success. For a time, his military ambitions seemed extinguished after he was arrested as a “card-carrying member of the South Korea Workers’ Party” in 1948 - another red line that would go on to plague his political career - only to be miraculously resuscitated by the military upheaval of the Korean War (1950-1953), when he was immediately cleared of all charges and returned to the front lines as a lieutenant.48 His reinstatement was thanks largely to the efforts of General Paek Son-yop (MMA 1), who saw it as his duty to look out for fellow MMA graduates. During the war, like many other young officers of his time, Park rose rapidly through the ranks as the army’s demand for commanding personnel rose. By the end of the war, he had already been promoted to brigadier general; at the time of the May 16 coup, Park was Major General and deputy commander of the Second Army.49

Internal Factionalism and Military Reform

Part of Park’s meteoric rise was also thanks to the fierce rivalry between factions of the ROKA; ironically, while criticizing the infighting of the Chang Myon government, the military found itself increasingly divided into competing subgroups. These groups were based predominantly on regional divides; the Northwest Group, which held most senior positions within the military, was based loosely in the Pyong-an Provinces and led by Paek Son-yop and Chang To-yong.50 Meanwhile, other prominent factions included the Northeast Group, which was based in the Hamgyong provinces, and the Mid-South or Southeast Group, included a mix of the middle-south provinces, including Park’s native Kyungsang-do.51 Such factionalism within the military was an important barrier Park would have to overcome in his effort to form a united military coalition capable of conducting a coup. Another key divide between military officers was their seniority within the KMA. During the earlier days of the Academy, when the military was undergoing an unprecedented expansion both during and after the Korean War, upcoming cadets were often promoted quickly as the army required more colonels to take command along the 38th parallel. However, by 1960, this need had mostly been fulfilled, causing a sudden stop in further promotions for lower-level officers.52 This caused a huge disparity between the KMA 8 class, which had to wait for 8 years to be promoted from major to colonel, and the KMA 5 class, many of whom by this point had already become junior one-star or two-star generals.53 Consequently, resentment towards the military establishment was common amongst the colonels and lieutenant colonels of the ROKA. Within the advent of the April Revolution and the incrimination of those in power, the KMA 8 class found an opportunity to vent its frustration towards the senior generals in the so- called “Military Purification” (Chunggun) Movement. The Movement’s most prominent target was Song Yo-chan, then military chief of staff, who had been implicated in voter fraud and coercion of voters during the March 15 election.54 On May 8th, eight KMA 8 colonels led by Kim Jong-Pil boldly began a petition declaring that all major and lieutenant generals, including Song, should step down in order to take responsibility for the corruption within the military leadership.55 Park immediately echoed their calls with a private letter to Song, which echoed the colonels’ rationale and urged Song to resign. In doing so, he underwent a transformation from an unremarkable junior general to the leader of the reformists; this perceived status would be crucial in later attracting Park’s fellow conspirators and shaping the coalition around him. Although the colonels were briefly arrested, they were soon released by Song himself, who was forced to submit a letter of resignation on May 20 after being condemned by most of the military rank and file.56 Nevertheless, after Song’s resignation, the KMA 8 class remained dissatisfied with the continued prominence of “corrupt” senior generals within the military while also having been emboldened by the government’s failure to effectively chastise them; it was a potent mixture, and one that Park would effectively harness in his personal journey for power.

The Coup Coalition

The coup coalition officially began to take shape when Park reached out to members of the KMA 8 class in search of support for a possible coup following their successful ousting of Song Yo-chan. Park needed to do so primarily because his then position as head of Military Logistics placed nearly no actual military personnel under his personal command.57 Furthermore, in doing so, Park was able to exploit his position as a junior general, which placed him farther from official and legitimate centers of political power but closer to the colonels and lieutenant colonels who commanded much of the actual manpower of the ROKA. Initially, the colonels toyed with the idea of continuing to pursue the Chunggun Movement using the internal institutions of the military; however, their hopes were dashed when General Carter B. Magruder, commander of the United Nations forces in Korea, voiced his strong opposition to what he saw as clear evidence of insubordination within the military.58 Magruder had staunchly opposed the resignation of Song on the same grounds, but now he posed what was essentially an ultimatum to Chang Myon, warning him that further breaches of the chain of command could not be tolerated.59 On September 24, the issue came to a head when sixteen members of the KMA 8 class approached Choi Young-Hee, Song’s replacement as chief of staff, to protest the overreach of the American forces in matters of the Korean military. It was a bold move, but also an insubordinate one, and the colonels received an official rebuke at Magruder’s insistence.60 Shortly after, the colonels met Park Chung Hee to formulate a possible overthrow of the military establishment. Combined with the innate contempt all of them possessed for the ineptitude of the Chang Myon government, this idea soon blossomed into plans for a full-fledged military coup d’etat. By the end of the meeting, all of them had sworn to take part in the coup in an agreement known as the “Chungmujang Pledge”.61 Meanwhile, on October 4, the United States Military Command and the Chang government jointly announced that the internal military reform would be strictly limited to the removal of 5 controversial major generals, which only served to solidify the resolve of the coup coalition in its now clandestine efforts to topple the military establishment.62 It was here that Park’s connections from the MMA and KMA fully came into play. In order to build up the actual manpower at the service of his operation, Park recruited Major Generals Kim Tong-Ha (MMA 1), Lee Chu-Il (MMA 1) and Park Im-Hang (MMA 1), all of whom were in command positions at the military bases surrounding .63 On April 10th, Park took the bold step of revealing the plot to Chang To-yong and offered him the leadership position of the coup.64 This was in order to legitimize the revolutionaries and broaden their basis of support; with Chang seemingly at the lead, the coup would be able to draw support from his Northwest Faction as well as many senior generals who had previously been opposed to the Chunggun Movement. Though Chang To-yong rejected the offer of leadership, he refused to report it either; although Chang himself continued to claim that he was not aware of the coup beforehand, cross- examination of other sources indicates that he deliberately adopted a nondeclarative stance in order to avoid blame for the result of the mutiny.65 In fact, Chang To-yong would also later dismiss multiple intelligence reports concerning leaked information about the planned coup on May 12, keeping Chang Myon’s administration in the dark and giving Park’s coalition critical time to solidify their plans and delay the coup to May 16.66 Regardless of Chang’s true intentions, the conspirators saw his silence as tacit approval for the coup and exploited Chang’s inaction to recruit others in his name. In particular, many lieutenant generals of the KMA 5 class, including Generals Mun Chae-jun and Park Chi-ok - who would lead their troops into the capital as vanguards of the coup - joined the coup out of loyalty to Chang and the belief that he would lead the post-coup government.67 By cleverly exploiting such factional loyalties and class ties, Park was able to build a rapidly expanding cross-factional network of junior officers, generals, and military units with himself at its communicational and functional center.

The Coup

On May 16, the plan was leaked again to the Military Command, but instead of calling off the operation, Park immediately rushed to the barracks of the Sixth District Army and directly urged the troops to revolt, telling them that “we have been waiting for the civilian government to bring order….but the Ministers are mired in corruption…..let us join this Revolutionary Army to save the country”.68 Park’s rhetoric and the military’s general discontent with the Second Republic successfully won over the troops, who mutinied en masse and began organizing for a march on the capital. Meanwhile, Park personally approached the Special Forces Command, took control of the marine corps and paratroopers, and crossed the at dawn under friendly artillery cover from the Sixth Army Headquarters. By 4:15 AM, Park’s troops had seized all three buildings of government, and a Military Revolutionary Committee was installed with Chang To-yong as chairman and Park as vice chair.69 Upon its formal ascension to power, the Revolutionary Committee - which was quickly renamed the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) - immediately issued a six- point declaration; these principles lay at the heart of Park’s vision for a rejuvenated nation and constituted his antithesis to the Second Republic.70

1. Oppose Communism and strengthen anti-Communist readiness. 2. Strengthen ties with the United States and free-world allies. 3. Root out corruption and instill national spirit among the people. 4. Construct an independent national economy. 5. Increase the national capacity to achieve unification and to oppose Communism. 6. Transfer power to new conscientious politicians and return to military duties once the Committee’s mission has been completed.

Centralizing Power

Thanks in part to the widespread dysfunction of the Chang Myon government, resistance to the Committee was short-lived. On the day of the coup, Chang Myon himself fled to the Carmel Catholic convent to seek shelter, while President Yun Bo-Sun accepted the overthrow as a fait accompli partly due to his own distaste for Chang’s rule.71 Rather than immediately removing Yun, however, the committee decided to keep him in place as a source of legitimacy and an internationally acceptable figurehead.72 Meanwhile, Chang and his cabinet were forced to officially resign on May 21 and cede full control to the military. Privately, Chang remained bitter about what he perceived as Yun Bo-sun’s betrayal and the military’s scapegoating of him as a corrupt old-timer; he wrote, “Maybe this is the will of God….but the only crime I have committed is trying to do democracy the way it should be done”.73 However, Park remained dissatisfied with the current oligarchic style of rule. Using his leverage as de facto leader of the coup, he further centralized political power around himself on June 10 by creating the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Despite being theoretically modeled upon the United States CIA, the KCIA was designed to be a much more powerful institution designed specifically as a personal political tool for Park. Decree No. 619, upon which the KCIA was founded, specifically stipulated that “the activities of the KCIA are immune to prosecution”, placing the KCIA - and its machinations directed by Park - above the law.74 The Decree also stated that “the SCNR members will designate the director of the KCIA”; to this post, Park appointed Kim Jong-pil, leader of the MMA 8 coalition and logistical mastermind of the May 16 coup. From then on, the position would be widely considered the equivalent of Park’s second-in-command.75 The Park-Kim axis quickly began purging rivals within the SCNR, chiefly among them Chang To-yong. Not only had Chang ceased to be useful as a figurehead now that the loyalty of the military had been secured, but junior generals of his native Northwest Faction were continuing to report directly to him rather than through Park. With the backing of the army, Park arrested Chang and the forty-four other generals of his faction on counterrevolutionary charges on July 3, declaring himself chairman of the SCNR soon after.76

The “Civilian Transition”

With the SCNR now firmly under his control, Park turned his attention to the remnants of the democratic government. Previously, the junta had arrested almost all civilian politicians on communist charges and banned all political activities through its Law No. 6 on May 22, 1960, but pressure on the coup coalition to restore democratic government was mounting from the U.S. government.77 On June 23, the United States appointed a new ambassador, Samuel Berger, who immediately met Park on July 16 and emphasized the importance of returning to civilian rule as per the original six-point declaration released by the SCNR. Surprisingly, Park yielded to Berger’s demands, promising to transfer power to a democratically elected government by the middle of 1963 through his “August 12 Declaration”.78 Afterwards, relations between Park and Berger became “relatively cordial”; after Park visited Washington D.C. in November, Berger advocated for the U.S. to continue bolstering his interim government, describing Park as a “forceful, fair and intelligent leader who can be trusted with power”.79 However, it soon became clear that Park was preparing to enter the impending civilian race himself, beginning with the passage of the Political Purification Act on March 16, 1962. This law barred all members of the previous civilian government from running for political office unless they had received approval from the newly formed Council for Political Purification headed by Park.80 Upon the passage of the Political Purification Act, President Yun Bo-Sun resigned in protest; although this allowed Park to assume formal control of the government as interim president, it also led to the revitalization of the civilian opposition, which was galvanized by Yun’s fiery rhetoric and his subsequent labelling of the SCNR as a “group of self-interested traitors”.81 Interim Presidency and the DRP

Nevertheless, Park publicly maintained that he would obey the terms of the August Declaration and restore rule back to a democratically elected government by mid-1963. With input from United States legal experts, the SCNR officially published a new constitution - based on a presidential system similar to that of the First Republic - which was voted into law in December 1962 through a national referendum.82 Meanwhile, as early as the summer of 1962, Park had tasked Kim Jong-Pil and the KCIA to covertly create and fund a civilian political party to serve as a vehicle for the Park-Kim faction of the military government.83 On February 27, 1963, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) was officially founded with Park as its presumptive presidential nominee, unveiling Park’s political ambitions to all. However, the founding of the DRP met with fierce resistance. Former civilian politicians led by Yun Bo-sun launched a series of “street protests” in which they condemned Park’s hunger for power and publicly called for his resignation.84 Many of the senior generals within the SCNR also opposed the DRP as “Kim Jong-pil’s private party”.85 In particular, they cited the abuses of power Kim had committed in his attempts to secure funding for the formation of the Party, which were termed the “Four Scandals”; specifically, Kim was accused of rigging the stock exchange, authorizing special duty-free imports in return for political bribes, and even collecting funds from U.S. soldiers in South Korea in return for the construction of a holiday resort.86 This anti- Kim axis consisted of the KMA 5 class, led by Kim Chae-chun, and the Northeast Faction, led by Major Generals Kim Tong-ha and Park Im-Hang.87 The two groups actively joined forces in calling for Kim’s removal from the DRP and a formal statement from Park announcing that he would not run for president in the upcoming election. Surprisingly, Park acquiesced to their demands, publicly withdrawing his candidacy on February 28 given that he and other coup coalition members would not be subject to retaliation. He also persuaded Kim Jong-Pil to step down from the position of KCIA director and sent him abroad to “exile” nominally as ambassador to the United States.88 In Kim’s place, Park appointed Kim Chae-chun, further indicating that a true civilian transition might occur in the near future. In his memoirs, Kim insists that Park never suggested the possibility of Kim “taking a break”; instead, he chose to do so in order to relieve pressure on Park to return to civilian rule.89 Nonwithstanding Park’s actual intentions, the move carried undoubtable political benefits. At this point, Kim had ceased to become useful; although his logistic and ideological capabilities had been essential, Park was now able to use Kim as a scapegoat to remove the blame from himself while vehemently denying any connection between himself and the founding of the DRP.90 However, things quickly took a turn after Park purged the Northeast faction of Kim Tong- ha and Park Im-Hang in another alleged counterrevolutionary plot known as the “Alaska Operation”.91 Afterwards, Park proceeded to smoothly remove the KMA 5 dissidents by firing Kim Chae-chun in July over a logistical technicality and replacing him with Kim Hyung-uk (KMA 8), restoring the “mainstream” KMA 8 faction to its place as second-in-command.92 Again, Park had shown excellent ability to navigate the complex web of intrigue and factionalism and to exploit it to its advantage, encouraging possible rivals to discredit each other while retaining the power to eliminate them at will. Among the senior SCNR members, Park was now the only general remaining; no one remained to oppose him as he re-declared his official candidacy for the presidential race as a DRP member on August 31.93

The Election of 1963

Although the ban on political activities enforced by the Political Purification Act was lifted on March 16 in preparation for the upcoming elections, Park and the KCIA remained hard at work in order to ensure Park’s political dominance in the upcoming elections. In order to weaken likely challengers, Park and the KCIA adopted a divide-and-conquer approach to civilian politicians, deliberately encouraging the reawakening of past divisions within the Democratic Party. In particular, one of Park’s priorities was the arrest of 42 Democratic politicians including Chang Myon, who they accused of plotting a countercoup with the intention of restoring “corrupt” civilian rule.94 In this way, the remnants of the New Faction were subdivided without a clear leader around whom they could coalesce, while the possibility of reunion with Yun’s Old Faction still remained a repugnant one due to what they considered as Yun’s malicious acceptance of the initial 5.16 coup. The KCIA also selectively provided civil and political liberties to weaker or pro-military parties, several - including the Chungmin Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the New Party - would go on to put forward separate presidential nominees, further subdividing the Democratic Party into smaller, less threatening factions.95 As a result, the opposition remained hopelessly fragmented. Initially, after both Chang and Yun declared that they would not run for President - Chang still being barred from engaging in politics by special order of the Park regime - the majority of mainstream civilian politicians began forming an anti-Park coalition, which was officially named the People’s Party on August 1.96 However, internal strife again broke out concerning the party’s nominee for the election, with Yun’s handpicked successor Kim Do-yeon struggling to secure the nomination against political elder and former Interim President Ho Chong, who had Chang’s endorsement.97 Pressed by members of his own faction, Yun decided to replace Kim as candidate for the party nomination, causing widespread backlash and outrage in the party convention on September 5.98 In the end, the coalition lasted little more than a month; both Yun and Ho launched presidential campaigns without further attempts for a mutual compromise. Ho would only withdraw his candidacy and endorse Yun much later in the race on October 3, his reserves of political support too depleted to make a significant impact on the outcome of the election.99 With the bulk of the race being between Park and Yun, it was abundantly clear that the election would essentially be a referendum on the military junta. Consequently, Park centered his campaign around the corruption of the civilian government and the new order established by the SCNR, promising that his mass mobilization of the country would restore a sense of purpose to the people.100 Yun also made a critical mistake on October 13, two days before Election Day, when he chose to focus on Park’s his possible implication in the communist mutiny during his cadet years despite the staunch anti-communist rhetoric Park had consistently used during his interim presidency.101 Nonetheless, the result was a surprisingly close race; although Park did win, he did so by an extremely narrow margin of 156,026 votes, the smallest margin in any South Korean presidential election thus far.102 The United States also recognized the election as free and fair in an October 22 telegram, wherein it described the “orderly manner” in which the voting was conducted.103 On December 17, 1963, Park was officially inaugurated as the democratically elected , bringing his odyssey thus far to a close.

Conclusion

With the 1963 election, Park’s journey to political power was officially complete. During the three-year period from general to president, he had already achieved an unprecedented degree of power centralization and carved out a massive base of support. On his first day in the Blue House, Park already had the armed might of a united ROKA, the political power of the Democratic-Republican Party, and the extrajudicial authority of the KCIA all under his direct control. The government of South Korea had been transformed into an entirely different entity from the chaotic chambers of the Second Republic. Above all, this political machine would never have existed without the unique circumstances of the Second Republic. In times less plagued by civil unrest, Park’s planned civilian transition would never have gained popular support, while any military with a functioning chain of command would have laid Park’s vision for a popular mutiny to rest. At the same time, Park’s unique ability to seize and consolidate power was crucial throughout this process. His divide-and-conquer policy was instrumental in subduing the diverse factions of both the civilian and military establishments, while allowing him to portray himself as a steadfast, reliable alternative. In the end, Park was brought to power not by circumstantial fortune, or by the force of his political cunning; rather, it was a peculiar mixture of both which created one of the defining figures of modern Korean politics.

Endnotes 1 Jeong Minji and Shin Youseop, “Post-War Korean , Japanese Statism, and the Legacy of President Park Chung-hee in South Korea,” The Korean Journal of International Studies 16, no. 1 (2008): 68. 2 Park Chung Hee, The Country, The Revolution, and I, ed. Nam Jung-uk (Seoul: Giparang, 2017), 55. 3 Kang Wontaek, “The Impeachment of Park Geun-Hye and Democracy in Korea,” East Asia Institute, March 21, 2017, 2. 4 Son Bongsuk, “The Party Politics of the Liberal Party,” The National Journal of Korean History 27 (1991): 47. 5 Seo Jinyeong, “The Origins of the Citizen in Korean Politics: The 4.19 Revolution.” Seoul University, August 2016, 11. 6 Song Eunho, “Reevaluation of the Collapse of the Second Republic”, Sogang University Press, 2013, 5. 7 Kim Quee-Young, The Fall of Syngman Rhee (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983), 174. 8 Song, “Reevaluation”, 2. 9 Ibid., 3. 10 Kim Sejung, “The Democratic Party in the First and Second Republics,” The National Journal of Korean History 54 (1994): 165. 11 Jeong Sangho, “The Research on Bicameral System in the Second Republic of Korea,” The Journal of the Korean Association of Party Studies 11, no. 3 (2012): 17. 12 Song, “Reevaluation”, 9. 13 Gregg A. Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of A Democracy (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 109. 14 Jeong, “Bicameral System”, 15. 15 Chang Myon, Unless A Grain of Wheat Dies. (Seoul: CatholicBooks, 1999), 84. 16 Park Chung Hee, A New Horizon in Asia, ed. by Nam Jung-uk (Seoul: Giparang, 2017), 153. 17 “Debate Over Command of the Army: New Democrats Argue That President Yun Has Right to Military Command,” Kyunghyang News, December 9, 1960, https:// newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.nhn? articleId=1960120900329101014&editNo=3&printCount=1&publishDate=1960-12-09&officeId =00032&pageNo=1&printNo=4553&publishType=00010. 18 Lee Yongwon, The Second Republic and Chang Myon (Seoul: Bumwoosa, 1999), 176. 19 Ibid. 20 Park Chung Hee, A New Horizon in Asia, 156. 21 Jeong, “Bicameral System”, 18. 22 Brazinsky, Nation Building, 186. 23 Chang Myon, A Grain of Wheat, 87. 24 Ibid., 88. 25 Brazinsky, Nation Building,110. 26 Kim Insoo, “Civilian-Military Relations”, 59. 27 Carter J. Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism (1866-1945) (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 248. 28 Ibid., 45. 29 Park Kihak, “The Far East Strategy of the US and the Role and Importance of the ROKA,” Research Institute SPARK, March 13, 2019, 51. 30 Lee Yongwon, The Second Republic, 314. 31 Kim Insoo, “Civilian-Military Relations”, 65. 32 Kwan S. Kim, “The Korean Miracle (1962-1980) Revisited: Myths and Realities in Strategies and Development,” The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, November 1991, 4. 33 Ibid. 34 Park Chung Hee, The Revolution and I, 60. 35 Kim Insoo, “Research on the Civilian-Military Relations of Korea,” Yonsei University Press, December 2000, 64. 36 Park Chung Hee, The Revolution and I, 56. 37 Ibid., 50. 38 Kim Insoo, “Civilian-Military Relations”, 64. 39 Yun, Yeojoon. The Qualifications of a President (Seoul: Kyobobook MCP, 2011), 156. 40 Jeong and Shin, “Post-War Korean Conservatism”, 64. 41 “Mar. 31, 1939 Manchukuo News Page 7,” in The Dictionary of Pro-Japanese Collaborators, Center for Historical Truth and Justice, 2009. 42 Eckert, The Roots of Militarism, 95. 43 Jeong and Shin, “Post-War Korean Conservatism”, 65. 44 Eckert, The Roots of Militarism, 99. 45 Ibid., 322. 46 Kim Insoo, “Civilian-Military Relations”, 34. 47 Ibid., 66. 48 Kim Byung-Kook, and Ezra F. Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 39. 49 Noh Yongki, “Analysis on Power Group of May Coup d’Etat in 1961”, Critical Review of History 57 (2001): 163. 50 Kim Insoo, “Civilian-Military Relations,” 58. 51 Ibid. 52 Kim and Vogle, The Park Chung Hee Era, 40. 53 Hong Seok-ryule, “Military Purification Movement after the April Revolution and 5.16 Coup in South Korea,” The Journal of Korean History 158 (2012): 202. 54 Ibid., 201. 55 Noh Yongki, “Analysis on Power Group,” 153. 56 “Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State,” in The Central Decimal Files, United States Department of State, May 26, 1960, 795B.00. 57 Kang Changsong, Military Factional Politics, 197. 58 “Statement by General Magruder,” Donga Ilbo, May 31, 1960, 3, http:// www.donga.com/pdf/pdf_search_archive.php?y=1960&m=5&d=31. 59 Hong Seok-ryule, “Military Purification Movement”, 203. 60 Korea Democracy Foundation, Compilation of Democratic Movement Materials Following the April Revolution (Seoul: n.p., 2013), 690. 61 Hong Seok-ryule, “Military Purification Movement”, 214. 62 Ibid., 208. 63 Kim and Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 47. 64 Ibid., 48. 65 Cho Kap-che, Spit On My Grave, Volume 4: National Reconstruction (Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa, 1999), 361. 66 Chang Myon, A Grain of Wheat, 91. 67 Hong Seok-ryule, “Military Purification Movement”, 216. 68 Cho Kap-che, Spit On My Grave, Volume 4, 26. 69 Lee Yongwon, The Second Republic, 249. 70 Committee for the Publication of the History of the National Military Revolution, History of the National Military Revolution: Volume 1 (Seoul: n.p., 1963), 185. 71 Yun Bosun, Road of Thorns: The National Salvation (Seoul: Chungkyungsa, 1967), 324. 72 Chang Myon, A Grain of Wheat, 95. 73 Ibid., 89. 74 “The Korean Central Information Agency Act,” The National Law Information Center, June 10, 1961, Bill No. 619. 75 Kim Chungshik, The Man Standing Next (Seoul: Politicus, 2012), 24. 76 Kim and Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 89. 77 Ibid., 93. 78 Cho Kap-che, Spit On My Grave, Volume 4, 282. 79 “Letter from the Ambassador to Korea to Secretary of State Rusk,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, United States Department of State, 1961-1963, 22:543. 80 “The Political Purification Act.” The National Law Information Center, March 16, 1962, Law No. 1032 81 Yun Bosun, Road of Thorns, 20. 82 “Constitution of the Republic of Korea.” The National Law Information Center, December 26, 1962, Constitution No. 6. 83 Kim Hakjun, “Research on the History of Political Parties in Post-Independence South Korea,” The National Journal of Korean History 25 (1991): 270. 84 Yun Bosun, Road of Thorns, 101. 85 Kim Jong Pil, The Eyewitness Accounts of Kim Jong-Pil (Seoul: WiseBerry, 2016), 84. 86 Kim Chungshik, The Man Standing Next, 72. 87 Kim and Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 110. 88 Ibid., 71. 89 Kim Jong Pil, The Eyewitness Accounts, 103. 90 Kim Chungshik, The Man Standing Next, 77. 91 Cho Yongjong, The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (Seoul: n.p., 1982), 155. 92 Kim Hyunguk, Revolution and Idol (Seoul: People and Ideology Publishing, 2009), 39. 93 Kim Hakjun, “History of Political Parties,” 270. 94 Chang Myon, A Grain of Wheat, 95. 95 Kim Hakjun, “History of Political Parties,” 271. 96 Yun Bosun, Road of Thorns, 134. 97 Ibid., 140. 98 Kim Doyeon, My Life: The Memoirs of Sangsan (Seoul: Gangwoo Publishing, 1968), 275. 99 Republic of Korea National Election Commission, History of Elections in the Republic of Korea (Seoul: n.p., 1968), 819. 100 Park Chung Hee, The Revolution and I, 124. 101 Yun Bosun, Road of Thorns, 220. 102 Republic of Korea National Election Commission, History of Elections, 831. 103 Kim and Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 72.

Bibliography

Brazinski, Gregg A. Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of A Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. Chang, Myon. Unless A Grain of Wheat Dies. Seoul: CatholicBooks, 1999. Cho, Kap-che. Spit On My Grave, Volume 4: National Reconstruction. Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa, 1999. Cho, Yongjong. The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Seoul: n.p., 1982. Committee for the Publication of the History of the National Military Revolution. History of the National Military Revolution: Volume 1. Seoul: n.p., 1963. “Constitution of the Republic of Korea.” The National Law Information Center, December 26, 1962, Constitution No. 6. “Debate Over Command of the Army: New Democrats Argue That President Yun Has Right to Military Command.” Kyunghyang News, December 9, 1960, https:// newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.nhn? articleId=1960120900329101014&editNo=3&printCount=1&publishDate=1960-12-09& officeId=00032&pageNo=1&printNo=4553&publishType=00010. Eckert, Carter J., Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism (1866-1945). Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016. Eunho, Song. “Reevaluation of the Collapse of the Second Republic.” Sogang University Press, 2013. Hong, Seok-ryule. “Military Purification Movement after the April Revolution and 5.16 Coup in South Korea.” The Journal of Korean History 158 (2012): 197-230. Jeong, Minji, and Shin Youseop. “Post-War Korean Conservatism, Japanese Statism, and the Legacy of President Park Chung-hee in South Korea.” The Korean Journal of International Studies 16, no. 1 (2008): 57-76. http://dx.doi.org/10.14731/kjis. 2018.04.16.1.57. Jeong, Sangho. “The Research on Bicameral System in the Second Republic of Korea.” The Journal of the Korean Association of Party Studies 11, no. 3 (2012): 5-37. Kang, Changsong. Military Factional Politics in and Korea. Seoul: Haedong Munhwasa, 1991. Kang, Wontaek. “The Impeachment of Park Geun-Hye and Democracy in Korea.” East Asia Institute, March 21, 2017. Kim, Byung-Kook, and Ezra F. Vogel. The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Kim, Chungshik. The Man Standing Next. Seoul: Politicus, 2012. Kim, Doyeon. My Life: The Memoirs of Sangsan. Seoul: Gangwoo Publishing, 1968. Kim, Hakjun. “Research on the History of Political Parties in Post-Independence South Korea.” The National Journal of Korean History 25 (1991): 253-279. Kim, Hyunguk. Revolution and Idol. Seoul: People and Ideology Publishing, 2009. Kim, Insoo. “Research on the Civilian-Military Relations of Korea.” Yonsei University Press, December 2000. Kim, Jong Pil. The Eyewitness Accounts of Kim Jong-Pil. Seoul: WiseBerry, 2016. Kim, Kwan S. “The Korean Miracle (1962-1980) Revisited: Myths and Realities in Strategies and Development.” The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, November 1991. Kim, Sejung. “The Democratic Party in the First and Second Republics.” The National Journal of Korean History 54 (1994): 151-174. Kim, Quee-Young. The Fall of Syngman Rhee. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983. Korea Democracy Foundation. Compilation of Democratic Movement Materials Following the April Revolution. Seoul: n.p., 2013. Lee, Yongwon. The Second Republic and Chang Myon. Seoul: Bumwoosa, 1999. “Letter from the Ambassador to Korea to Secretary of State Rusk.” In Foreign Relations of the United States. United States Department of State, 1961-1963. “Mar. 31, 1939 Manchukuo News Page 7.” In The Dictionary of Pro-Japanese Collaborators. Center for Historical Truth and Justice, 2009. “Memorandum of Conversation.” In The Central Decimal Files. United States Department of State, August 25, 1960, 611.95B. Noh, Yongki. “Analysis on Power Group of May Coup d’Etat in 1961.” Critical Review of History 57 (2001): 152-197. Park, Chung Hee. The Country, the Revolution, and I. Edited by Nam Jung-uk. Seoul: Giparang, 2017. Park, Chung Hee. A New Horizon in Asia. Edited by Nam Jung-uk. Seoul: Giparang, 2017. Park, Kihak. “The Far East Strategy of the US and the Role and Importance of the ROKA.” Research Institute SPARK, March 13, 2019. Republic of Korea National Election Commission. History of Elections in the Republic of Korea. Seoul: n.p., 1968. Seo, Jinyeong. “The Origins of the Citizen in Korean Politics: The 4.19 Revolution.” Seoul University, August 2016, http://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/ 10371/134127/1/000000137236.pdf. Son, Bongsuk. “The Party Politics of the Liberal Party.” The National Journal of Korean History 27 (1991): 33-59. “Statement by General Magruder.” Donga Ilbo, May 31, 1960. http://www.donga.com/pdf/pdf_search_archive.php?y=1960&m=5&d=31. “Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State.” In The Central Decimal Files. United States Department of State, May 26, 1960, 795B.00. “The Political Purification Act.” The National Law Information Center, March 16, 1962, Bill No. 1032. “The Korean Central Information Agency Act.” The National Law Information Center, June 10, 1961, Bill No. 619. Yun, Bosun. Road of Thorns: The National Salvation. Seoul: Chungkyungsa, 1967. Yun, Yeojoon. The Qualifications of a President. Seoul: Kyobobook MCP, 2011.