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Report on Iraqi Militias Report on Iraqi Militias Iraqi sources have described Jaysh al-Mukhtar [Army of the Chosen One] as a mere tool in the hands of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, supporting him to remain in his post for a third or even a fourth parliamentary session. The actions and statements of Wathiq al-Battat, the leader of Jaysh al-Mukhtar, are being used to support Iranian agendas in Iraq and the region. Sources have told Al- Sharq that Ayatollah Mahmud Shahrudi, the influential Iranian cleric, has returned as head of what is described as "Tajammu al-Du'at" [Gathering of Islamic Preachers] that consists of the leaders of the Al-Da'wah parties. These are: "Al-Markaz al-Am" [The General Center] led by Al-Maliki; the "Tanzim al- Kharij" [Organization of the Exterior] led by Deputy Prime Minister Khudayr al- Khaza'i; "the "Tanzim al-Dakhil" [Organization of the Interior] led by Abd-al-Karim al-Ghazzi; the "Tayyar al-Islah Current' [Reform Current] led by Ibrahim al-Ja'fari; and the "Tanzim Ansar al-Da'wah" Organization of the Supporters of Al-Da'wah] led by Mazin Makkiyah. These organizations needed a militia loyal to the "Tajamu al-Du'at" to be its strike force. So Iran's Supreme Guide Ali Khamene'i ordered the various militias of Hizballah to unite. These militias are known as "The Hizballah Brigades" led by al-Ibrahimi, the former National Assembly deputy who is also known as Abu-Mahdi al-Muhanndis; "Militia of Ahl al-Haq Leagues" led by Qays al-Khaz'ali; and the Badr Organizations led by current Transport Minister Hadi al-'Amiri. At Khamene'i's instructions, these militias united under the leadership of Abu-Mahdi al-Muhanndis and the immediate command of Hadi al-'Amiri. These groups retained their names and structures and formed coordination committees to carry out quality operations that serve Iran's agenda. These committees came to be known as "Jaysh al-Mukhtar". The main tasks of the Jaysh al-Mukhtar are to win over the Shiite street under the slogan of confronting the Sunni current supporting the demonstrations in Al-Anbar; to confront the alleged Gulf support by Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia for the demonstrators; and to send an indirect message of support from Iran affirming its rejection of changing the Syrian regime. The Iraqi sources residing in the Jordanian capital, Amman, maintain that the Iranian agenda is obvious. It wants to consolidate its influence on the political process by forming a clear Shiite majority in the upcoming provincial elections in April. Another aspect of the Iranian agenda is not to lose the influence of the rest of the Shiite forces that support Iranian Velayet-e Faqih Khamene'i, particularly the influence of the Islamic Supreme Council (led by Ammar al-Hakim) and the Sadrist Trend that continues to hold on to a militia known as "Liwa al-Yawm al- Maw'ud" {Brigade of the Promised Day]. Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council, has formed a militia known as "Tanzim Fursan al- Amal" [The Knights of Hope Organization]. Commenting on the threats of Jaysh al-Mukhtar leader to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and even to Nuri al-Maliki who is accused of inability to protect the Shias (in a step meant to boost Al-Battat's popularity), these sources said that the stands of Wathiq al-Battat, who commanded the communications center of the Hizballah Brigades, aim at inciting the Shiite street against the demonstrations in Al-Anbar and at confronting the possible consequences of the Syrian crisis. The National Coalition (that consists of all the political Shiite forces) and General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Qods Corps, a division of the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, have come to the conclusion that the fall of Bashar al-Asad may return all their deputies and commanders again to Iran in case the Al-Qa'ida organization resurfaces and in case a new Iraqi Ba'th Party resurfaces to replace the disbanded Ba'th Party. This is especially true after the announcement that a free Iraqi army has been formed and after pamphlets have appeared calling for support to this army in areas known to be l oyal to the defunct Ba'th Party in the southern governorates, especially in Babylon, Al-Diwaniyah, and Al-Nasiriyah. In recent press statements, Al-Battat admitted that he is a supporter of Iran, saying: "I believe in the line of Velayet-e Faqih that Al-Sayyid Khamene'i represents; Hizballah is obedient to Khamene'i. We consider him our commander and we turn to him in all military and political matters". Answering a question on which religious authority he represents, Al-Battat said: "I am the regional representative of religious authority Ayatollah Muhammad Ali al-Alawi al-Jirjani whose headquarters are in Qom. I am the director of his office in Al-Najaf". Al-Battat affirmed that he is also the representative of all the major religious authorities in Al-Najaf. On his relationship with the Lebanese Hizballah, Al-Battat said: "All the branches of Hizballah in the world are linked to the office of the vali e-faqih; their commander is Al-Sayyid Khamene'i". Al-Maliki supports Jaysh al-Mukhtar Iraqi political analyst Humayd Shawkat expressed concern about the formation of "a popular regional army that supports Al-Maliki's government under the pretext of combating corruption and the Al-Qa'ida organization under the name of Jaysh al-Mukhtar". Shawkat added: "Hizballah's formation of the Army of the Chosen One has aroused everyone's concern because it seems to be supported by the Al-Maliki government". He went on to say: "Al-Maliki's chances at assuming power once again are almost non-existent. That is why he turned to the terrorization and intimidation of the people and the national political forces. Al- Maliki's government has failed to win over the Iraqi street and its defiance of the masses has made it lose its reason. Al-Maliki is turning to terrorist actions by forming the Jaysh al-Mukhtar as a last resport". Shawkat added that in coordination with the Al-Da'wah party, Iran is trying "to tear up Iraqi into pieces by manipulating these terrorist militias". In a statement to the press, the secretary general of Hizballah in Iraq (the Al-Ghalibun wing) disclosed that he has information that Wathiq al-Battat is supported by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Muhammad Majid al-Nasiri said: "Wathiq al-Battat is stupid; he is an undesirable person. He was expelled from Iran and Lebanon several times for his childish behavior" Al-Nasiri added that he helped Al-Battat by releasing his brothers "when I interceded with the state officials to have them released". Al-Battat is in Iraq It is to be recalled that Abdallah al-Rikabi, the spokesman of Jaysh al-Mukhtar, said on Sunday that the Wathiq al-Battat, the founder of Jaysh al-Mukhtar and secretary general of the Hizballah (Iraq Nahdah wing) left for Syria after an arrest warrant was issued against him. However, Al-Rikabi later withdrew his statement saying that Al-Battat is in the Al-Najaf governorate undergoing medical treatment. He also disclosed that more than one million volunteers have enlisted in the army so far. Al-Rikabi went on to say: "Al-Battat had intended to leave Iraq for Syria; however, he did not", adding: "Al-Battat is in poor health; he is receiving medical treatment in Al-Najaf". The same Iraqi sources affirm that Al-Battat is currently living in a house on the same street as the residence of Qays al-Khaz'ali, the commander of the "Ahl al-Haq Leagues" in the city of Al-Najaf. However, several sources from Al-Najaf close to the offices of the religious authorities there deny that Al-Battat is in the city of Al-Najaf. They agree that the religious authority, especially the Al-Sistani authority, do not recognize these organizations. In his Friday sermon, Al-Sistani proclaimed that he opposes any kind of militia adding that arms should only be in the hands of the state. Threat to the Sunnis of Baghdad In a follow-up to the operations carried out by Al-Battat's army, a senior commander in Jaysh al-Mukhtar calling himself "Nasir Baghdad" announced that Jaysh al-Mukhtar takes credit for the first armed operation tar geting "Ba'thists" in various parts of Baghdad and Diyala. In a statement posted on a forum called "Al-Battat's supporters", Nasir Baghdad said that the army takes credit for the armed attack against a number of Sunni Ba'thists in several parts of Baghdad and Diyala. He added that this was the first Jaysh al-Mukhtar operation targeting Iraq's Sunnis. In the statement, Nasir Baghdad threatened to liquidate "every single Ba'thist". The Jaysh al-Mukhtar militia also threatened to kill the residents of the Al-Jihad (Sunni) neighborhood in Baghdad if they do not vacate their homes. This demonstrates part of a new series of sectarian targeting and forcible displacement supported by Al-Maliki's government against the Sunni population of Baghdad. The residents of the Al-Jihad neighborhood said: "Threatening messages were put in front of our houses saying O enemies of Ahl al-Bayt, O Sunnis in the Al-Jihad neighborhood, we are lying in wait for you; we are coming; leave before zero hour approaches". The residents added: "With each message there was a rifle bullet meant to terrorize us and force us to leave quickly".
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