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30Th January–25Th February 2013
Security Trends NCCI’s Security Trends Analysis providesSecurity internal advice for TrendsAnalysis NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside your 30th January–25th February 2013 By organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed Analysis on to any third parties. [Type text] The NCCI Security Trends Analysis is provided to member NGOs once a month as an informational and advisory report on possible trends, threats and incidents based on information received from NGOs, the media, international organizations and official sources. Every reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this analysis. NCCI collates information from reliable sources. Where a source is in doubt, NCCI seeks to corroborate that information. There may be an occasion when some information is included and its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This typically occurs with an emerging or developing situation when it is considered in the best interests of NCCI’s member organisations to be made aware of any available information. We thank you in advance for NOT disseminating this document and ensuring that it is ONLY circulated between members within your organisation General information is available to members at the NCCI website, www.ncciraq.org Please do not hesitate to contact us at [email protected] 2 | NCCI | We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization Table of Contents Mukhtar Militia is -
Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Updated May 8, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies May 8, 2019 Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats Kenneth Katzman to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of Specialist in Middle the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs x Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. x Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. x Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. x Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s “oppressed” and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. x Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy. -
Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies name redacted Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs December 21, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Summary Iran’s national security policy is the product of many, and sometimes competing, factors: the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution; Iranian leadership’s perception of threats to the regime and to the country; long-standing Iranian national interests; and the interaction of the Iranian regime’s various factions and constituencies. Some experts assert that the goal of Iran’s national security strategy is to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that Iran asserts favors the United States and its allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. Iran characterizes its support for Shiite and other Islamist movements as support for the “oppressed” and asserts that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. Others interpret Iran as primarily attempting to protect itself from U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate it or to change its regime. Its strategy might, alternatively or additionally, represent an attempt to enhance Iran’s international prestige or restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of the ancient Persian empires. From 2010 until 2016, Iran’s foreign policy also focused on attempting to mitigate the effects of international sanctions on Iran. Iran employs a number of different tools in pursuing its national security policy. Some Iranian policy tools are common to most countries: traditional diplomacy and the public promotion of Iran’s values and interests. -
Iraq: Politics and Governance
Iraq: Politics and Governance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs March 9, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21968 Iraq: Politics and Governance Summary Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions—muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military intervention in Iraq—are fueling a major challenge to Iraq’s stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs toward the Shiite- dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh). Iraq’s Kurds are separately embroiled in political, territorial, and economic disputes with Baghdad, but those differences have been at least temporarily subordinated to the common struggle against the Islamic State. U.S. officials assert that the Iraqi government must work to gain the loyalty of more of Iraq’s Sunnis—and to resolve differences with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—if an eventual defeat of the Islamic State is to result in long-term stability. Prospects for greater inter- communal unity appeared to increase in 2014 with the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki with the current Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abbadi. Although both men are from the Shiite Islamist Da’wa Party, Abbadi has taken some steps to try to compromise with Sunnis and with the KRG. However, a significant point of contention with the KRG remains the KRG’s marketing of crude oil exports separately from Baghdad. -
Of Islamist Terrorist Attacks
ISLAMIST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD 1979-2019 NOVEMBER 2019 ISLAMIST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD 1979-2019 NOVEMBER 2019 ISLAMIST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD 1979-2019 Editor Dominique REYNIÉ, Executive Director of the Fondation pour l’innovation politique Editorial coordination Victor DELAGE, Madeleine HAMEL, Katherine HAMILTON, Mathilde TCHOUNIKINE Production Loraine AMIC, Victor DELAGE, Virginie DENISE, Anne FLAMBERT, Madeleine HAMEL, Katherine HAMILTON, Sasha MORINIÈRE, Dominique REYNIÉ, Mathilde TCHOUNIKINE Proofreading Francys GRAMET, Claude SADAJ Graphic design Julien RÉMY Printer GALAXY Printers Published November 2019 ISLAMIST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD Table of contents An evaluation of Islamist violence in the world (1979-2019), by Dominique Reynié .....................................................6 I. The beginnings of transnational Islamist terrorism (1979-2000) .............12 1. The Soviet-Afghan War, "matrix of contemporary Islamist terrorism” .................................. 12 2. The 1980s and the emergence of Islamist terrorism .............................................................. 13 3. The 1990s and the spread of Islamist terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa ........................................................................................... 16 4. The export of jihad ................................................................................................................. 17 II. The turning point of 9/11 (2001-2012) ......................................................21 -
The Gulf and Sectarianism
ANALYSIS GULF THE GULF AND SECTARIANISM Introduction by Fatima Ayub ABOUT By virtue of their confined political environments, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and their most important neighbours often remain impenetrable to domestic and Has the Arab Awakening degenerated into a nightmare? foreign observers. And yet, the evolving politics After its first experiment with credible elections, Egypt has of Peninsula countries, their relationship to reverted to the strongman politics of the deep state. A free one another and to the wider region, pose Libya looks to be in free fall. Yemen’s managed political some of the most significant and unanswered transition is stagnating. Bahrain’s national reconciliation questions for the changing geopolitics of the is less a dialogue than a monologue by its self-assured Middle East. Gulf politics are entering the monarchs. Syria is unravelling into an ever more divisive most unpredictable and volatile era since their and brutal internecine conflict, jeopardising the political establishment. and economic health of already anaemic Lebanon and Jordan. The war in Iraq, metastasizing anew as the Arab Understanding these new trends as they Awakening triggers new power struggles around it, claims unfold will be critical if Europeans and other hundreds of dead each month as it fuses with the war on its international actors intend to rely on the Gulf western border. Perhaps the most worrying trend is that of states as financial and political partners in the sectarianism and in particular the re-emergence of identity region. In the coming decade, the Gulf states politics along the Shia-Sunni divide. -
„ Ein Jahr Wie Im Märchen“
KURANYI_INTERVIEW Sein Leben, seine Pläne, sein Traum Dänemark 28,– Dkr Griechenland € 3,40, Ungarn 960 Ft., Schalkes Aufschwung Kanaren (Luftfracht) € 3,40, Spanien (cont.) € 3,10, Portugal (cont.) € 3,10, Portugal Italien € 3,10, Der Blick Frankreich € 3,10, BeNeLux € 2,70, Richtung Europa Schweiz 4,20 sFr., Schweiz FRANKFURT LEIPZIG HERTHA Nr. Österreich € 2,40, 97 1. 12. 2016 Keeper Jarstein Mit Kovac So kämpft Kaiser 48. Woche € 2,20 „ Ein Jahr auf der Jagd um seinen Platz Deutschland BAYERN TRAINERWECHSEL wie im Robben und das Ismael, Gisdol, Märchen“ Ü-30-Problem Nouri: Der Check 2. LIGA Vier Ex-Löwen analysieren das Chaos bei 1860 Fotos: imago/Team 2, Ulmer 2, Fotos: imago/Team 2 BUNDESLIGA EINWURF VON MICHAEL RICHTER Der Leiter der kicker-Regionalredaktion Nord über die anhaltende Talfahrt der dortigen Klubs Nicht nur die Trainer sind schuld am Niedergang eine Frage, tatsächlich geben So ist, Stand heute, der mögli- VALERIEN ISMAEL die Taten und Ergebnisse der che Effekt eines Trainerwechsels Kaktuellen Trainer im Norden überall im Norden verpufft. Wie Anlass zur Kritik. Ob die drei wirk- hilflos alle mit dieser Erkenntnis lich die Richtigen sind, bleibt offen. dastehen, zeigt die noch immer Die Alleinschuld am Niedergang spürbare, trügerische Hoffnung, ihrer Klubs aber tragen sie sicher es werden sich im Abstiegskampf nicht, mussten oder müssen die bis Saisonende schon noch min- neuen Besen doch auskehren, was destens zwei schlechtere Vereine ihnen teilweise ihre Vorgänger, vor finden. Nur, wer soll das diesmal allem aber die Macher in der Füh- bitteschön sein? Egal! Den HSV rung an Unrat hinterlassen haben. -
Page 01 Dec 23.Indd
ISO 9001:2008 CERTIFIED NEWSPAPER Monday 23 December 2013 19 Safar 1435 - Volume 18 Number 5922 Price: QR2 Spain to take India in thrilling action against draw against Bankia sales South Africa Business | 17 Sport | 28 www.thepeninsulaqatar.com [email protected] | [email protected] Editorial: 4455 7741 | Advertising: 4455 7837 / 4455 7780 Emir meets head of Syrian National Coalition Envoy: Qatar, Egypt Free shares for relations strong DOHA: Qatar has strong ties with Egypt and there are no problems in relations between the two countries, according to disadvantaged the Qatari ambassador to Egypt Saif bin Mokadem Al Buainain. Al Buainain who is also perma- nent representative of Qatar in Qatari citizens the Arab League said economic cooperation between the two countries received a major boost with the launch of a new Qatari New IPO offers several benefits company with capital of EP500m investment in Egypt, almesry- oon.com reported. The number of DOHA: To make sure that the The Minister of Energy and Egyptians in Qatar is estimated at fruits of development reach even Industry H E Dr Mohammed bin 180,000 out of the 2m in the coun- the most disadvantaged sec- Saleh Al Sada said yesterday’s try. There are no restrictions on tions of the Qatari society, the offer for Qataris is the first of Egyptian investors in Qatar and country yesterday announced a series to come in the coming they are free to set up their own several new privileges to the months. The Emir H H Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani with the Head of the Syrian National Coalition Dr Ahmed Saleh businesses. -
Croat Hostage Beheaded by IS Affiliate in Egypt
SUBSCRIPTION THURSDAY, AUGUST 13, 2015 SHAWWAL 28, 1436 AH www.kuwaittimes.net Croat hostage beheaded Min 33º Max 46º by IS affiliate in Egypt High Tide 09:45 & 23:25 Low Tide First such killing of a Westerner 03:20 & 17:05 40 PAGES NO: 16608 150 FILS CAIRO: The Islamic State group said yesterday it has beheaded a Croatian hostage, and released a picture of Regime raids kill dozens near Damascus a body after what would be the first such killing of a Westerner in Egypt. Croatian Prime Minister told BEIRUT: At least 37 civilians were killed yesterday in reporters he could not “confirm with 100 percent cer- Syrian government air strikes near Damascus, while at tainty” that Tomislav Salopek, who worked for French least 13 people died as rebels fired a barrage of rockets company CGG, had been murdered. “But what we see into the capital, a monitor said. The Syrian Observatory does not look good,” he said. Salopek was abducted for Human Rights said at least four children were among last month west of Cairo. The jihadists had issued a 48- the dead in regime strikes on the rebel-held Eastern hour deadline that expired on Friday threatening to kill Ghouta region, where some 120 people were also him if Muslim women prisoners were not freed from wounded. The death toll was likely to rise further, it said. Egyptian jails. The authenticity of the picture could not The air raids hit the towns of Douma, Saqba, Kafr be immediately verified. Batna and Hammouriyeh in the rebel stronghold. -
The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects
THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS Phillip Smyth This piece is dedicated to the memory of a true scholar, friend, and mensch, Barry Rubin. I would never have been able to complete such an undertaking without his confidence in me. POLICY FOCUS 138 THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS PHILLIP SMYTH THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2015 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Design: 1000colors Photo: Sayyeda Zainab mosque, Damascus (Ahmad al Husseini). CONTENTS Acronyms | iv 1 introduction | 1 2 the NArrAtive of JihAd | 3 3 cAll to JihAd: clericAl Views of the Shiite JihAd in SyriA | 13 4 Building An Army for ZAinab | 21 5 the WeB of Multiplying Shiite IslAmist MilitiAs in SyriA | 37 6 Joining of Fronts: Blowback in IrAq And Lebanon | 48 7 policy RecommendAtions | 55 8 notes And Sources | 58 ABout the Author | 80 APPENDICES (ONLINE ONLY) 1 phAses of Shiite MilitiA -
Big-5 Weekly Post
Issue 45 - 03/09/2013 Big-5 Weekly Post Transfer expenditure of big-5 league clubs* (million euro, summer transfer window) Total 2008-2013, per league 2 200 1. Premier League 3 511 2 139 2. Serie A 2 473 3. Liga 1 982 1 800 1 866 1 890 1 743 4. Ligue 1 1 400 5. Bundesliga 1 208 1 598 1 400 1 340 1 000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 *Only permanent transfers of first-team players Evolution, per league (million euro, summer transfer window) (2013) 800 1. Premier League 719.2 ENG 2. Serie A 404.9 600 3. Ligue 1 382.6 ITA 4. Liga 372.9 400 5. Bundesliga 259.1 ESP FRA 200 GER 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Transfer expenditure of the 10 most active clubs (%) Expenditure of the three most (% of total fees paid, summer transfer window) active clubs (2013) 60 1. Ligue 1 85.8% 2. Liga 70.1% 48.0% 49.0% 40 44.0% 3. Bundesliga 54.5% 42.7% 41.5% 4. Serie A 49.4% 35.2% 5. Premier League 45.2% 20 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Editors: Raffaele Poli, Loïc Ravenel et Roger Besson Issue n°46 - 26/09/2013 Big-5 Weekly Post Throughout the season for the five major European leagues, the Big-5 Weekly Post Average number of new signings on the pitch per club presents exclusive data on club composi- tion and players’ pitch performance. All of our statistics are carefully reviewed using a detailed methodological approach to en- sure academic accuracy. -
Bundesliga - Season 2008/09
Table of Contents Index Content Page I League Tables ...............2 II Fixtures & Results..........5 III Attendance Statistics .....9 IV Player Statistics ........... 10 V Clubs ........................... 14 Bayern ..................... 15 Bielefeld................... 19 Bochum ................... 23 BBuunnddeesslliiggaa Bremen .................... 27 Cottbus .................... 31 Dortmund ................. 35 Frankfurt .................. 39 Hamburg .................. 43 Hannover ................. 47 SSeeaassoonn Hertha BSC ............. 51 Hoffenheim .............. 55 Karlsruhe ................. 59 22000088//0099 Köln ......................... 63 Leverkusen .............. 67 M'gladbach .............. 71 Schalke.................... 75 Stuttgart ................... 79 Wolfsburg ................ 83 VI Referees ...................... 87 © by soccer library VII Match Statistics............ 88 VIII Play-offs ..................... 122 Bundesliga - Season 2008/09 Overall Home Away Pos Team Pd W D L GF GA GD Pts Pd W D L GF GA GD Pts Pd W D L GF GA GD Pts 1 Wolfsburg 34 21 6 7 80 41 39 69 17 16 1 0 51 13 38 49 17 5 5 7 29 28 1 20 2 Bayern 34 20 7 7 71 42 29 67 17 12 2 3 45 23 22 38 17 8 5 4 26 19 7 29 3 Stuttgart 34 19 7 8 63 43 20 64 17 12 3 2 34 14 20 39 17 7 4 6 29 29 0 25 4 Hertha BSC 34 19 6 9 48 41 7 63 17 12 3 2 29 14 15 39 17 7 3 7 19 27 -8 24 5 Hamburg 34 19 4 11 49 47 2 61 17 13 2 2 27 13 14 41 17 6 2 9 22 34 -12 20 6 Dortmund 34 15 14 5 60 37 23 59 17 8 9 0 34 11 23 33 17 7 5 5 26 26 0 26 7 Hoffenheim 34 15 10 9 63 49 14 55 17