Sidelining the Islamic State in Niger's Tillabery

Sidelining the Islamic State in Niger’s Tillabery Africa Report N°289 | 3 June 2020 Headquarters International Crisis Group Avenue Louise 235 • 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Preventing War. Shaping Peace. Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Niger’s Battle to Contain the Islamic State ...................................................................... 3 A. The Rise of the Islamic State in Northern Tillabery .................................................. 4 B. Nigerien Militarism Backfires .................................................................................... 7 C. Niger Tries Outreach ................................................................................................. 9 D. Militancy Intensifies .................................................................................................. 11 III. Steps Toward Sidelining the Islamic State in Tillabery ................................................... 15 A. Dialogue ..................................................................................................................... 15 Political dialogue with communities .................................................................... 15 Dialogue with insurgents...................................................................................... 18 B. Security Arrangements .............................................................................................. 20 Representative recruitment ................................................................................. 20 Protecting civilians ............................................................................................... 22 C. Economic Policy, Development and Reform ............................................................. 22 Easing up on heavy-handed measures ................................................................. 23 Development assistance ....................................................................................... 24 Land use reform ................................................................................................... 24 IV. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 26 APPENDICES A. Map of Niger ..................................................................................................................... 27 B. Islamic State-related Violence along Mali-Niger Border ................................................. 28 C. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 29 D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2017 ................................................ 30 E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 33 Principal Findings What’s new? Two years ago, Niger suspended counter-terrorism cooperation with Malian militias in northern Tillabery and began trying to counter the Is- lamic State through outreach to communities where it is present. Since then, however, militants have killed local leaders and launched even deadlier attacks, and Niger has returned to a military approach. Why does it matter? The escalation of Islamic State attacks in Niger adds to the central Sahel’s security crisis. While Niamey has tried several options to contain the jihadists, from force to persuasion, none has worked. The jihadist group is growing stronger, while Nigerien security forces are increasingly evacuating the border area with Mali. What should be done? The Islamic State is both a security threat and a governance competitor for the state. Niamey should combine various efforts – military, but also political – seeking to address border community grievances, end intercommunal conflicts and engage in dialogue with militants to explore ways to distance them from jihadism. International Crisis Group Africa Report N°289 3 June 2020 Executive Summary In December 2019 and January 2020, Nigerien security forces suffered their dead- liest attacks ever, losing scores of troops in ferocious assaults mounted by the Sahel’s Islamic State franchise operating in Mali and Niger’s Tillabery border region. The militants struck over a year after Niamey suspended working with Malian ethno- political militias, a decision taken after authorities saw how that pact triggered blood- letting among competing nomadic tribes in the area, which in turn drove some of them further into the Islamic State’s hands. After that, Niger moved toward outreach to Tillabery residents in a bid to win their loyalty back. But these efforts also failed and, following the recent incidents, Niamey embarked on a new offensive. By focus- ing primarily on a military strategy, the government risks again enflaming local conflicts that the Islamic State could exploit. It should pursue parallel political efforts to build peace among border communities and develop stronger ties with them. In addition, through dialogue, it should probe ways to peel local youths away from jihadist groups. Following the lethal attacks at the end of 2019, and an initial retreat, Niamey has attempted to regain ground in brutal counter-terrorism operations with the support of and possibly under pressure from France, which maintains thousands of troops in the region. The new military push has already led to an alarming escalation in alleged killings of civilians by security forces, however, creating a situation that jihadists could exploit to win more recruits. A similar situation occurred in 2017-2018, when Niger partnered with Malian ethnic militias that were considered rivals to certain ethnic communities, particularly the Peul, many of whom allied with the Islamic State as a result. Niamey should not make the same, or similar, mistakes again, especially now that it faces a COVID-19 pandemic that threatens to weaken or even immobilise its government and military while also reducing the capacity of the authorities and monitoring organisations to keep an eye on the behaviour of troops on the ground. Border communities, which have learned to live by the gun in the last two dec- ades, have become increasingly hostile to the state. Niger’s government has recently made attempts to woo them back but failed to achieve key goals. Multiple uncoor- dinated and overlapping state-led dialogue and disarmament initiatives have led to confusion. State-backed efforts to recruit locals into the security forces have also been compromised by nepotism and corruption, resulting in poor recruitment num- bers from some constituencies, notably the Peul. It has thus become harder to per- suade border zone residents that the government can offer them more than the jihadists, who increasingly present themselves as the state’s competition in governance. Nor have locals convinced many of the Islamic State’s rank and file to surrender, as Niamey hoped its outreach would sway them to do. There are limits to what Niger can do, especially since the Islamic State is present not just in Tillabery but also across the border in Mali – and increasingly in neigh- bouring Burkina Faso. Nevertheless, Niamey’s political management of the crisis in Tillabery will be critical if it is to have a chance of thwarting the Islamic State’s ascend- ancy within Nigerien borders. Authorities should deal with the Islamic State not just as a security threat but also as a governance competitor. Its containment will require Sidelining the Islamic State in Niger’s Tillabery Crisis Group Africa Report N°289, 3 June 2020 Page ii Niger to develop an ambitious and coordinated political response to border communities’ alienation. Even then authorities must tread delicately, so as not to expose those people to the Islamic State’s retaliation if they cooperate with the government. Niger can start by identifying and working to resolve conflicts among and within border communities, where the Islamic State finds many of its recruits. It should pursue dialogue with the jihadists themselves to explore what might entice them to leave the Islamic State’s ranks. Foreign partners – notably France and the U.S. – should take note that, at times, Niger’s efforts to build dialogue with Islamic State commanders may require them to step back from pursuing short-term counter- terrorism objectives that present long-term obstacles. Finally, Niamey should apply itself to addressing the grievances, from under-representation of groups such as the Peul in state security forces to land rights, that have alienated Nigeriens living on the country’s border with Mali. Addressing those will not bring an immediate end to conflict, but it may begin to create the conditions for a more peaceful future. Niamey/Dakar/Brussels, 3 June 2020 International Crisis Group Africa Report N°289 3 June 2020 Sidelining the Islamic State in Niger’s Tillabery I. Introduction Following a failed military surge against the Islamic State’s Sahelian affiliate from 2017 to mid-2018, and subsequent Nigerien government efforts to pursue dialogue with communities where jihadists have taken root, violence is once again spiking in the Mali-Niger border zone of northern Tillabery. Since April 2019, attacks

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