AsianEthnicity, Volume 2, Number 2, September 2001 Towarda Synthesis of the Theories of Peripheral Nationalism: AComparative Study of China’s Xinjiang and Guangdong YUAN-KANG WANG* (Universityof Chicago) Thecentral question of this article is: whyis peripheral nationalism virtually non-existent inGuangdong but has long been a problemin Xinjiang? Existing theories are inadequate foranswering this question. They are tailored to either wealthy or poor regions, but not both.They also fail to explain the absence of nationalism in Guangdong and its presence inXinjiang. In this article, I proposea modelthat can explain peripheral nationalism in bothwealthy and poor regions. The model incorporates two key variables, elite status and nationalidentity. Speci cally, I arguethat if the elites from the peripheral region can hold importantpositions in the central government and if the peripheral residents identify themselveswith the core nation, the probability of nationalist movements will be low. On theother hand, if their elites are excluded from high of ce in the central government and iftheirpeople do notidentity themselves with the core nation, the probability of nationalist movementswill be high. The model succeeds in explaining the cases of Xinjiang and Guangdong. Introduction At rst glance,China’ s XinjiangUighur Autonomous Region and Guangdong province lookrather different. In terms of economic development, Xinjiang is relatively backward, whileGuangdong is relatively advanced. More than half of the population in Xinjiang consistsof Muslim minority nationalities, while the majority of the population in Guang- dongis considered Han Chinese. However, both also have some similarities. They are locatedin the peripheral regions of China and far awayfrom centralpolitical leadership. TheMuslim nationalities in Xinjiang do notspeak the of cial language Mandarin, while the populationin Guangdong speaks Cantonese, a languagequite different from Mandarinin spokenform. Bothhave their respective regional identity. In short, these two regions have someethnic potential, though apparently Guangdong has less. Secessionismhas long been a prominentissue in Xinjiang. Uighur nationalists seek to establishan independent state free from HanChinese domination by resorting to riots and rebellions.In contrast, such secessionism is unthinkable in Guangdong. Cantonese have longconsidered themselves Chinese and Guangdong has always been part of China. Why isperipheralnationalism virtually non-existent in Guangdong but has long been a problem inXinjiang? Existingtheories of peripheral nationalism are inadequate for answeringthis question. Oneversion was developedto explain secessionism in economically dynamic peripheries, *IthankDavid Laitin, two anonymous reviewers, andparticipants at the48th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conferenceon Asian Affairs (1999)in the United States, for their thoughtful comments andsuggestions. ISSN1463-1369 print; 1469-2953 online/ 01/020177-19 Ó 2001Taylor & FrancisLtd DOI: 10.1080/14631360120058857 178 Yuan-kangWang suchas the Basque Country in Spain, while the other was designedto explain nationalist movementsin economically backward regions, such as the Celts in Britain. They are tailoredeither to wealthy or poor regions, but not both. This restriction to a greatextent reducesthe applicability of both theories. Inorder to llthis theoretical gap, this article proposes a newmodel that can explain nationalistmovements in both wealthy and poor peripheries. Speci cally, the model incorporatestwo key variables— national identity and elite status— in explaining secession- ismin the peripheral region. I arguethat if thenational identity of the peripheral residents iscongruentwith the core nation, and if elites in theperipheral region can serve high of ces inthe central government, the probability for secessionismwill be low. On the other hand, if theperipheral people identify themselves as distinct from thecore nation, and if their elitescannot hold signi cant positions in the centre, the probability for secessionismwill behigh. I thentest my argument in the cases of Xinjiang and Guangdong. I ndthat nationalidentity and elite status greatly reduce the nationalist potential in Guangdong,while thelack of two such qualities gives rise to secessionist movements in Xinjiang. Cantonese believethat they are really Chinese, even though their spoken language is quite different. Localelites were ableto make it to the top of the country, such as Sun Yat-sen, as well assome key national guresin the People’ s Republicof China (PRC). However,such hegemonicnotion and elite status were absentamong the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Thenext section reviews existing literature on peripheral nationalism and critiques its shortcomings.Then, I presentmy theory, explicate the two master variables— elite status andnational identity— and explain how they contribute to the emergence of peripheral nationalism.Finally, I testmy argument in a comparativecase study of Xinjiang and Guangdongand discuss its implications. CurrentTheories ofPeripheral Nationalism Thereare currently two versions of the theory of peripheralnationalism, depending on the developmentlevel of the region in question relative to the political centre. The rst deals witheconomically advanced regions. This version focuses on the interaction between the economicdevelopment of theperipheries and the centre’ s abilityto provide further growth. Accordingto Peter Gourevitch, when there is a lackof congruence between political leadershipand economic dynamism, the regions with ethnic potential are likely to develop peripheralnationalism. This non-congruence may result either from thefaltering of thecore inprovidingeconomic growth or politicalleadership, or from theimprovement in economic positionof the peripheral region relative to thecentre. 1 Inother words, if thepolitical centre isexperiencing economic or political decline or the ethnically distinct region in the peripheriesbecomes economically dynamic, the peripheral region is likely to develop ‘strong,politically relevant nationalism’ . 2 Gourvitch’s theoryfocuses on the economic function the centre plays vis-a`-vis the periphery.However, the logic of the theory is incomplete. The principal problem is that he doesnot establish any objective, independent criteria for regionswith ‘ ethnicpotential’ . He admitsthe dif culty of such a dauntingtask, but tries to circumvent it by asserting that ‘circularitycan be avoided by specifying (however arbitrary it may appear) which regions 1Peter A.Gourevitch, Parisand the Provinces: ThePolitics of LocalGovernment Reform in France (University ofCaliforniaPress, Berkeley,CA, 1980), chap. 10. 2Ibid.,p. 203. Synthesisof the Theories of Peripheral Nationalism 179 haveethnic potential and which do not’ . 3 Nevertheless,without any objective, clear and independentcriteria for ethnicdifferences, his theory still tends to be tautological. 4 Evenwithout clear criteria, it wouldbe hardto deny Guangdong’ s ethnicpotential. And aswe shallsee, it has the other ingredient needed for Gourevitch’s theory:economic dynamism.Guangdong’ s economicposition in the PRC before the 1978 reform was below average.During 1953– 78, its average annual GDP growthrate was 5.1per cent, 1 percent lowerthan the nation’ s average.This low level of growthwas duein large part to Chinese leadership’s emphasison developing the interior region. 5 After 1978,Guangdong became themajor testing ground for DengXiaoping’ s economicreforms. SpecialEconomic Zones were setup to attract investment. During 1979– 91, its average annual growth rate was 12.6 percent, 3 percent higher than the nation’ s average. 6 By1998, its GDP hadalready been thenation’ s largest,accounting for 10per cent of total national income, and per capita incomeranked fth,after Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjing and Zhejiang province. 7 These gures suggestthat Guangdong has become economically dynamic since China’ s reforms. Given itsregional identity and distinct spoken language, Gourevitch’ s theorywould predict peripheralnationalism in Guangdong. However, there is no nationalist movement there. Andas we shallsee later, careers of aspiring elites from Guangdongcould be aimedat the politicalcentre. Thus, we needto ndout other factors that can explain the absence of peripheralnationalism in Guangdong. Thesecond version of peripheral nationalism deals with backward regions. Michael Hechter,Tom Nairn and Ernest Gellner attribute the rise of nationalism to the painful inequalitysuffered by the people of backwardregions resulting from theuneven pattern of development. 8 Wavesof industrialisation and modernisation hit different areas in uneven speed,engendering sharp and painful inequality in standards of living. Egalitarian expec- tationand non-egalitarian reality make the misery of those in peripheral regions seem all themore perennial, and intolerable. If theyare distinctly differentiated from thepeople of moreadvanced regions, such as by skin colour, religion or customs, we arelikely to see nationalistmovements there. 9 Independencebrings the prospect of being in charge of the nation’s ownaffairs andfreeing the region from exploitativerelationship with the centre. 10 Thisversion of peripheralnationalism presupposes industrialisation as the driving force ofnationalism. For Gellner,agrarian societies were composedof laterally insulated communities,while the ruling class was horizontallysegregated. Cultural differentiation 3Ibid.,p. 202. 4See DavidLaitin, ‘ TheNational Uprising in the Soviet Union’