SEARCHING

FOR HOME ABROAD

Japanese and

Transnationalism

Edited by

JEFFREY LESSER

Duke University Press

Durham and London

2003

~i ~ yOtfl'lto..AAiA- \\ FefMiHibtioM ctf Jar"ese

£aii Iituv ~ y M~j ,(;tit'(M. ~ Jry;tIM- )1/ r. 1G3 - ZbO . CONTENTS

Acknowledgments· ix

Glossary· xi

JEFFREY LESSER· I Introduction: Looking for Home in All the Wrong Places

JEFFREY LESSER· 5 Japanese, Brazilians, Nikkei: A Short History ofIdentity Building and Homemaking

SHUHEI HOSOKAWA· 21 Speaking in the Tongue of the Antipode: Japanese Brazilian Fantasy on the Origin ofLanguage

KOICHI MORI ·47 IdentityTransformations among Okinawans and Their Descendants in

Interlude

KAREN TEl YAMASH ITA· 67 Circle K Rules ANGELO ISHI • 75 Searching for Home, Wealth, Pride, and "Class": Japanese ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Brazilians in the "Land ofYen"

JOSHUA HOTAKA ROTH· 103 Urashima Taro's Ambiguating Practices: The Significance of Overseas Voting Rights for Elderly Japanese Migrants to Brazil

TAKEYUKI (GAKU) TSUDA· 121 Homeland-less Abroad: Transnational Liminality, Social Alienation, and Personal Malaise Like many academic collections, Searching for Home Abroad has wandered down (or perhaps up) a long road on its way to completion. The authors worked KEIKOYAMANAKA· 163 ~ very hard on their chapters, and we all benefited greatly from careful readings Feminization ofJapanese Brazilian V by Dr. Lane Hirabayashi and an anonymous reader for Duke University Press. Labor Migration to Dr. Hirabayashi was a splendid colleague throughout the preparation ofthis manuscript, reading some ofthe material more than once and always insist­ DANIEL T. LINGER· 201 ing that we bring the work to a higher level. His attention to d~tail and his Do Exist? superb critiques were crucial to the intellectual labor ofthis volume and I, in the name ofall the authors, thankhim for his efforts. While each authorwas re­ Contributors· 215 sponsible for her/his own translation and transliteration, I would like to thank Index· 217 Joshua Hotaka Roth, who, like me, was in Sao Paulo conducting research dur­ ing much ofthe final preparation ofthis manuscript. He was a constant help in translating material from Japanese to English and working with me in the final editing ofsome ofthe chapters. In the early stages ofthe project, Jayme (Akers) Feagin ofthe department ofhistory at Emory University was very help­ ful in the preparation ofthe manuscript. Special thanks go to Ryan Lynch, also ofthe department ofhistory at Emory University, for her invaluable help in the final stages in the preparation ofthe manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank Valerie Millholland for her support of this project, Miriam Angress and Leigh Anne Couch for their help with my constant questions, and Patricia Mickelberry for a magnificent job ofcopy-editing this volume. KE! KO YAMANAKA

Feminizationof Japanese Brazilian Labor Mi9rationto Japan

In January 1998, on a Sunday afternoon in Hong Kong, I witnessed tens of thousands of Filipina housemaids congregated in parks, on sidewalks, and be­ tweenbuildings, celebrating their day off. Clustered in every possible space, they sat on plastic sheets to spend hours picnicking, chatting with friends,and exchanging letters and photos fromhome. It was a scene both astonishing and saddening. These foreignwomen are temporary workers on contract, serving Hong Kong's middle-class households as live-inmaids who cook meals, clean houses, and tend children fortheir employers. In exchange they receive wages that are beyond reach in their home country.The personal costs of this work in the alien environment are, however, heavy. As Nicole Constable (1997) reports in her ethnographic study of these immigrant women, lack of personalfree­ dom, exacerbated by separation forextende d periods of time from their own families, is demoralizing. The sight of the Filipina maids in Hong Kong struckme at once with its sharp contrast to the situation,1 familiarto me, of Japanese Brazilianw omen in Japan employed in factories, living as they do with their families in small but com­ fortableapartments. Like the Filipinas in Hong Kong, they are of third-world origin, having migrated to a first-world country where they provide cheap and expendable contract labor. Unlike the Filipinas in Hong Kong, however, they are immigrants with ancestral ties to the host country and are therefore en­ titled by law to live andwork in Japan with their families.That being the case, it remains to be explained why Nikkeijin women in Japan are factoryworkers ac­ companied by their families,whereas Filipinas inHong Kong are housemaids who have lefttheir families behind. of

164 • KtikoYamanaka Feminization Labor • 165 What followsis a case study of the feminization of Japanese Brazilian labor tion policies and practices have resulted in patterns of immigration that vary migration to Japan in the context of female migration throughout the Asia­ by industry, occupation, legalstatus, visa category,nationality, ethnicity, and 0 Pacificin the 199 s. Underlying the entire analysis is the fact that Japan's immi­ gender. 0 gration policy prohibits employment of unskilled foreignerswhich, at the peak During the 198 s economic restructuring accelerated in Singapore, Hong 0 of the economic boom in 199 , prompted the government to admit Nikk�ijin Kong, and Taiwan, as a result of which dependence on foreign labor in manu­ and their familiesas legal residents-because they were not regarded as en­ facturing industries declined. Meanwhile, the demand for female domestic 00 000 tirely foreign-forup to three years. As a result, by 1996 some 2 , of these helpers grew considerably, as an increasing number of middle-class women 0 return migrants, 4 percent of them females,had arrived fromBrazil, as well as entered the labor force.Consequently, gender emerged as a criticalfactor shap­ smaller numbers fromother Latin American countries. Most of them obtained ing the demographic and occupational profiles of their foreign labor forces work in small- to middle-scale manufacturingindustries. (Shah et al. 1991; Filipino Migrant Workers 1994; Cheng 1996; Lim and Oishi FEMINIZATION OF REGIONAL MIGRATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 1996; Wong 1996; Yeoh et al. 1999). Table 1 shows occupation and immigra­ tion characteristics oflegal female immigrantworkers in fivelabor-importing MigrationPatterns countries: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Japan. 0 In the 198 s Hong Kong moved much of its production to southern By themid-199os the Asia-Pacific,with a migrant population estimated at more where abundant, inexpensive migrant labor was available, while the foreign one of the most active sites of international labor maid population increased within the colony. By the mid-199os Hong Kong thanfive million, had become 0 0 migration in the world (Yamanaka 1999). This was due to its rapidly developing employed more than 152, 0 foreign maids, mostly fromthe Philippines, ac­ economy and the increasing regional integration that resulted in growing eco­ counting for 76 percent of its entire immigrant population. The remaining nomic disparity between a few rich countries and their many poor neighbors. 24 percent were mostlymale workers engaged in large construction projects. The five developed countries with mature economies-Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Likewise, in Singapore during the same period, there were 81,000 female do­ ently import labor, whereas the two coun­ mestics accounting for23 percent of the migrant workforce. Taiwane mployed Hong Kong, and Singapore-curr 000 recently-Malaysiaand -importlabor and some 17, foreignw omen in both private homes and convalescent hospitals, tries that developed most 0 surplus labor. Most neighbors of these seven labor im­ which constituted 1 percent of all contract laborers in the country. simultaneously export 00 000 portersin East, Southeast, and South Asia sufferfrom stagnant economies and Malaysia harbored about 1 , female migrants working as domestics on large populations, and thereforeex port surplus unskilled labor, while import- contract, mostly from Indonesia, accounting for 14 percent of the legal mi­ ing none. grant population. Moreover, Malaysia and neighboring Thailand hosted a large The seven labor-importing countries differsignificantly from one another but unknownnumber of illegal migrants fromMyanmar, Indonesia, and other in the histories of their nation-states, levels of industrialization, demographic nearby nations (Pillai 1995; Sussangkarn 1995). In both countries, females, profiles, and ethnic relations. Immigration policies and enforcement mecha­ most of them engaged in domestic service, sex industries, and other compo­ nisms differaccordingly (Yamanaka 1999). Singapore, Hong Kong, and Tai­ nents of the informale conomy, com prised a substantialproportion of the ille­ wan import unskilled labor through an officiallysanctioned front-door policy gal, undocumented population (Hugo 1993; Stern 1996; Asia Watch19 93). De­ comprising a number of state-run contractwor ker programspromulgated to spite growing public and international concern for their health and human benefitlabor short industries. Malaysia and Thailand also admit unskilled for­ rights, accurate informationis not yet available,nor haveeffectiv e public poli­ eigners on legalc ontract, but their porous national borders comprise a "loose cies addressed the dire needs of immigrant women working under substandard door" through which a much larger number of foreigners enter unnoticed. In conditions in Southeast Asia. contrast, Japan and Korea officially prohibit unskilled foreigners from being The factthat Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan admit large numbers of employed, while admitting them through covert back-door practices contrived foreign women as domestic helpers for household employment, while Japan to facilitate their entry when they are needed. These contrasting immigra- and Korea admit none, is a result of the official policy adopted by the latter Feminizationof Labor • 167 two countries excluding unskilled foreign labor regardless of sex. Nonethe­ less, a large number of unskilled workers enter through various back-door

""'0 - p § practices. For instance, 32,000 female entertainers arrived in Japan in 1997 OJ "' � 8 as "skilled" performers, the majority of whom were Filipinas working as bar ::, ... 0 t.8 u; C: hostesses (Yamanaka 1993; Japanese MinistryofJustice 1998). Japan was also - home to an estimated 300,000 foreignerswho had entered the countrywith validvisas (tourist, student, or other) and had illegallyoverstayed them to work in the unskilled sector (Morita and Sassen 1994; Lie 1994; Sellek 1994; Yama­ naka2000a). Governmentalstatistics estimated that 40 percent of those illegal workers were females employed in service and manufacturingindustries, of which the majority were assumed to work in the sex industry (Japanese Ministry ofJustice 1996). Likewise, by the mid-199os Korea hosted an estimated 130,000 illegalvisa­ overstayers toiling in manufacturing and construction industries (Lee 1997; Park 1998; Kirn 1999; Lim 1999). Studies have found that nearly 40 percent

ci, of illegal workers in Korea are females engagedin textile, clothing, and other "' C: 7J r: manufacturingindustries (Park 1993; Park 1994). Yet,little is reported in the lit­ 8 -� 0 0 0 0 0 OJ 8 0 0 0 0 0 erature about employment and working conditions ofthese immigrant women E o. o. q_ 0 0 [::;0 ·­ "- m o o· ,,;- in Korea. .... H ('-. 00 00 "' OJ ""' 0 �H � ..c8_ z ::, "' Japanese Brazilian Women in Japan Z o ,!:. In June 1990, at the height of its economic expansion, Japan opened a major

C: ... back door, contraveningthe policy prohibiting foreignunskilled labor, when it .9.... "' � "' ::, implemented the revised Immigration Control andRefugee Recognition Law .fili 1s ...... I..... (hereafter "the 1990 Revised Immigration Law") that defined immigrants of 8 u, u � � � .....� ...... § C: C: Japanese descent as long-term residents. This new ethnic category allowed =0 =0 0 0 u u u u people of documented Japanese ancestryup to the third generation, regardless of nationality, to stay three years in Japan with no restriction on their socio­ economic activities (Yamanaka 1996). Spouses and children of these Nikkeijin C: ... 0 ...OJ OJ were alsopermitted to stay, usually up to one year. Visas of both the Nikkei­ .... n. 0 ·- � E

Heyzer 1986; Ong 1987; Lo 1990; Wolf 1992; Brinton 1993; Roberts 1994). rity bonds, and other feesrequired by law, employers are motivated to illegally Clearly, female workers fromrural, "peripheral," or third-world areas are triply undercut wages, require long working hours, and demand that more tasks be vulnerable because of their gender, class, and ethnicity, and are subject to ex­ done than was initially agreed (Yeoh et al. 1999; Wong1996; Constable 1997). If ploitation as inexpensive, disposable, and tractable labor in the process of capi­ a migrant woman is unwilling to comply with her employer's demands, emo­ talist expansion. tional, physical, and even sexual assaults may be used against her to enforce compliance (Constable 1997). Class, Gender, Sex, andthe State Moreover, the receiving state often regards immigrant women's child­ By the late 1980s full employment, rising living standards, and rapidly aging bearing capability as a threat to the integrity of national boundaries and to populations forcedSingapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia to seek for­ ethnic homogeneity. Governments usually adopt strict exclusionary policies eign workers for labor-short occupations and industries shunned by local by which unskilled migrants are prohibited fromobtaining social welfare ser­ workers. In the meantime, the capital-intensive and information-based econ­ vices, establishing permanent residence or citizenship, and integrating socially omy that increasingly characterized these countries in the 1990s required a with the local population (Wong 1997). Migrants are thus prevented fromre­ large number of highly trained personnel in a wide range of professions, to uniting with their families in the host country and from marrying citizens 2 which young, educated women have been drawn in large numbers. As these or permanent residents of the host society. In an extreme form of control of women faced conflict between employment and household tasks, they dele­ female bodies, some states require immigrant women to take periodic preg­ gated the latter to foreignhousemai ds. The transferof foreignwomen fromthe nancy tests and to leave the country immediately if they become pregnant "periphery" (e.g., the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and others) to work (ibid., 161). in reproductive labor in the "core" (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong,Taiwan, and Malaysia) has enabled middle-class women in the core to enter the skilled and professional labor force, moving up the occupational ladder. CHANGING PATTERNS OF JAPANESE WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

Labor-importing governments have been willing to administer contract Like other Asian women, Japanese women have contributed significantly to labor programs in orde r to satisfythe middle-class demand for foreignhouse­ the economic development of their country from the onset of the Industrial maids (see Chin 1998). Such public policy suggests an ideological agreement Revolution in the 1880s to the "economic miracle" in the 1960s (Nishinarita between these governments and their householders to maintain the existing 1985; Brinton 1993). During the 1950s massive waves of rural-to-urban migra­ sexual division of labor. By allowing massive deployment of foreign maids in tion brought hundreds of thousands of girls and boys to the rapidly developing private homes, labor-importing governments have avoideda divisive society­ ind ustri al zones on the PacificCoast followingtheir junior high school gradua­ wide debate over gende r equity,whil e individualcouples have avoided confront­ tion. Girls worked as assembly-line operators until they married, while boys ing the question of sharing household and childcare tasks between the sexes became skilled laborers remaining in the stable-essentially lifetime-labor (Huang and Yeoh 1998). The proliferation of third-world domestics in a few force (Nakamura 1993; Roberts 1994). By the early 1960s full employment and rich Asian countries in the 1990s is thereforea consequence of three confluent rising wages in the service sector began to shrink the pool of young women will­ forces in the region: rapid economic expansion, patriarchal gender ideology, ing to work in factories, whilec ompletely doing away with those who once sup­ and relaxed immigration policies. plied domestic serviceto middle-class households. The rapid spread of electri­ In addition to theproblems associated with their sex, ethnicity, and class, cal appliances drastically reduced manual tasks in most households, virtually foreign domestics faceproblems inherent in their occupation. Working and re­ eliminating employment of housemaids (Shiota 1994). siding in private homes, live-in maids increase the risk of suffering violations of Facing looming labor shortages, Japanese manufacturing firms vigorously contract terms and abuses by employers and family members (Cox 1997; Shah pursued heavy mechanization to cut redundant labor while recruiting new and Menon 1997; Yeoh et al. 1999). Because hiring legal migrant workers is sources of laborelsewhere (Reubens 1982). This was accomplished in twoways. expensive, incurring not only their salaries but also large financiallevies, secu- Outside the country, many firms relocated production to export-processing Yamanaka ofLabor

172 • Ktiko TABLE Feminization • 173 zones in other Asian countries where localyoung women supplied abundant, a. 2. Japanese Female Workers by Industryand Occupation, 1965-1990 cheap, and docile labor (Kitamura 1992, 62-68). Within Japan, many firms moved factories from urban centers to semi-urban and then to rural areas Industry where they could tap a reservoirof middle-aged women during the nonharvest­ Agriculture, Sales, Service, ing season (lyotani 1996). To help firmsshort of labor, the Japanese govern­ % °lo Manu-°lo °lo Fishing, Mining Finance facturing Other* ment encouraged women and the elderly to participate in the workforce(Japa­ Year Number nese Ministryof Labor 1991; Goto 1993). The calls forlabor, however, met only 5.5 limited success within the country. By the mid-198os many firmsfound them­ 1965 18,780 30.7 41.4 22.4 selves left with too few workers, even females or the elderly, to support the 1970 20,030 22.7 45.2 25·9 6.3 kinds of industrial production that could not be exportedelse where. 1975 19,530 17.0 51.7 24.3 7.0 Statistics on Japanese women's economic activities clearly demonstrate the 1980 21,420 13.3 54.7 24.6 7.4 stagnant labor supply in manufacturingindustries between 1965 and 1990. In 1985 23,040 10.6 57.2 24.9 7.3 1965, 30.7 percent of women in the workforceengaged in primary industries 1990 25,360 8.5 60.1 23.5 8.o (e.g., agriculture, fisheries,and forestry),while 41.4 percent were in servicein­ dustries and 22.4 percent in manufacturingindust ries (see table 2a). By 1990 b. Occupation the equivalentpercentages had changed to 8.5 forthe primary industries and Clerical, 60.1 forservice industries, but the percentage forthe manufacturingindustry Craft, Agriculture,% Sales,°lo Service, Operative, Mining, remained virtually unchanged at 2 3. 5. In the same period, the occupational dis­ °lo °lo % % Fishing Transport Construction Professional Managerial Laborer tribution of women also showed drastic changes: femalefarm labor dropped Year Number from29.9 to 8.4 percent and serviceworkers increased from39.8 to 53.4 per­ cent (see table 2b). However, the women's share remained almost constant 1965 18,780 29.9 39.8 20.3 5.1 0.3 4.5 forproduction workers, increasing only from20. 3 to 20.9 percent. During the 1970 20,030 22.4 44.4 23.1 5.8 0.2 4.0 same decades proportions of skilled femaleworkers doubled from5.1 to 11.4 1975 19,530 16.8 49.4 22.4 8.o o.6 2.9 percent and amongmanagerial workers, fromo. 3 to o. 7 percent. The last sta­ 1980 21,420 13.1 50.9 22.6 9.6 0.5 3.3 tistic demonstrates the steady but very slow growth in female professionals 1985 23,040 10.5 51.0 22.4 10.6 o.6 4.8 and corporatemanagers in Japan. 1990 25,360 8.4 53-4 20.9 11.4 0 * Other is the total ofthose industries in electricity,gas, heat, and watersupply; transportand .7 communication;5.1 Despite significant changes in the distribution of industrial employment government; and not elsewhere classified. and occupations among Japanese women, their labor-forceparticipa tion rates Source: Government ofJapan (1998, !4-85). have shown little change in recent years. According to published data, by 1970 82 percent of Japanese female students advanced to senior high school rather than entering the labor force.Amon g all femalesfifteen years of age and over, 1999 49.9 percent were in the labor force, accounting for 39.3 percent of the na­ participation rate peaks at 75.1 percent among those aged twenty to twenty­ tional labor force (Japan Almanac 1998, 248; Japanese Ministry of Labor four (Japanese Ministry of Labor 1995; see figure r). This rate drops to 61.4 1995, 345-47). By 1990 femalestudents' enrollment in senior high school had percent forthe twenty-fiveto twenty-nine age bracket (which is the period of reached 94 percent, while rates of femalerepresentation in the labor forcere­ average age at marriage andchi ldbearing) and furtherto 51.7 percent forthe mained at about the 1970 level -50. 1 percent, accounting for40. 6 percent of thirtyto thirty-fourage bracket (child rearingages). Then it rises to 62.6 per­ the nationalworkforc e. Breakdown of the statistics for1990 by age shows that cent and 69.1 percent forbrackets thirty-five to thirty-nine and fortyto fifty­ forwomen who are betweentwenty and fifty-fouryears of age, the labor-force four, respectively. Feminizationof Labor • 175

Ages 15-19 Ages 20-24 Ages 25-29 In sum, these statistics verifythe labor shortages widely reportedby Japa­ 80- So 80 nese manufacturingfir ms in the mid-198os. They show that (1) Japanese wom­ 70 70 70 en's labor-forceparticipation has reached its highest level ever, leaving little 60 60 60 room forfurther increase under the existing institutionsof family,labor, and 50 50 50 technology; (2) employed women have been drawn massively to the servicein­ 40 40 40 dustries and occupations, as a result of which the percentage of the female 30 30 30 workforce engaged in manual jobs in the manufacturing industries has re­ 20 20 20 IO IO IO mained unchanged during the twenty-fiveyears from1965 to 1990; (3) despite 0 0 0 increased levels of education and sweeping technologicalchanges, Japanese 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 women have experienced very little professional and organizationalmobili ty during the same decades. This last point contrasts sharply with the occupa­ Ages 30-34 Ages35 -39 Ages40-54 tional mobility achieved by educated women during twodecades of "economic 80 80 80 70 70 70 miracles" in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia,where large num­ 6o 60 60 bers offoreign maids are imported to provide domestic service formiddle-class 50 50 50 households, freeingtheir women to pursue other occupations. 40 40 40 30 30 30 20 20 20 JAPAN'S "BACK-DOOR" IMMIGRATION POLICY IO IO IO Legal Nikkeijin 0 0 0 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 By 1988 the "foreign-workerproblem" in Japan had become a national con­ cern. The numbers of foreignersarrest ed forillegal labor, most of them from Ages 55-59 Ages 6o-64 Ages 65+ Asia, increased while many factories went bankrupt when they failed to re­ 80 80 80 cruit sufficient workers. In that year the number of male arrestees reached 1 70 1 70 7 0 8,929, exceeding forthe firsttime that offemale arrestees (5,385). Until then, 60 - 60 60 female entertainers, mostly Filipinas, comprised the major unskilled foreign 50 50 50 : 40 40 40 labor force, outnumbering allothers arrested forillegal employment (Morita 30 30 30 and Sassen 1994; Ito 1992). After1988, there was a rapid increase in male ar­ 20 20 20 rivals fromthe Philippines, , , South Korea, Malaysia, and IO IO IO China in response to a rising demand for unskilled labor in manufacturing, 0 0 0 j,111970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 I1990 construction, and service industries (Morita and Sassen 1994, 156). Japan's im­ migration law prohibiting unskilled foreignlabor continued to be an obstacle FIGURE r. Female Labor Force Participation Ratesin Japan, 1970-1990 to both foreignersand their employers. Toco pe with this problem, a variety of (by percentage) organizations, including government ministries, business organizations, re­ search institutions, political parties, and labor unions, drafted proposals for guest-worker programs. The incumbent conservative government, however, considered ethnic and class homogeneity to be of key importanceto Japanese society in the context 176 • KtikoYamanaka Feminizationof Labor • 177 of progressive globalization. Faced with the dilemmaof howto ameliorate the Brazil (Gaimusho, Rodosho, Homusho 1990, n-16). According to him, their shortage of labor on the one hand and maintain social homogeneity on the remarkable socioeconomic success in their adopted countries would assure other, the Japanese government came up witha solution. In December 1989 it their return after a fe w years of employment in Japan. In his opinion, Asian revised its 1951 immigration lawwithoutchanging its central provisions, which immigrants would not return to their homelands. limited imported labor to skilled occupations. It did so by introducing two measures designed to increase the supply of inexpensive labor, while reducing The number of Nikkeijin workers is not as many as that of workers from illegal immigration and virtually stemming the tide of unwanted foreigners Asia .... There are not many Nikkeijin firstof all, and the majority is very (Yamanaka1993; Yamanaka1996; Cornelius 1994; Weinerand Hanami 1998). well off. ... Some Nikkeijin who have grown up in remote Japanese com­ First, it made employers of illegal workers subject to criminal penalties­ munities of Brazil are more Japanese than contemporaryJapanese who have two years imprisonment or a maximum fine of two million yen ($20,000). grown up in Japan. The blood tie is so strong that we should regard them This was clearlydesigned to reduce the flowof illegal workers, most of whom as Japanese up to about the third generation .... Such [well-off]Nikkeijin came from neighboring Asian countries.Second, the Revised Immigration Law will come to work in Japan. Money is not their goal.... If they return home established a new "long-term resident" visaca tegory exclusively forNikkeijin with good knowledge of Japan, this would be effective grassroots public without Japanese citizenship but with documented Japanese ancestry up to the relations for Japan. This is why Nikkeijin are different from Asians whose third generation. This newcatego ry allowedNikkeijin to engage in unskilled goalin coming to Japan is solely to make money. Another differenceis that labor, a step apparently taken with the intention of supplying much-wanted Asians would not return to their homelands but might settle down here. additionalunskilled labor fromabroad but ethnically "Japanese." 3 They would send fortheir familiesand have babies. (Ibid., 12) In short,the legal admission ofNikkeijin was a politicalcompromise made The RevisedImmigration Law has thus opened a golden backdoor ofoppor­ by the Japanese government to accommodate labor-starved employers while tunity to ethnicJapanese fromSouth America. The same law, however, closed at the same time maintaining social homogeneity in the face of accelerating the door to other unskilled workers, most of whom were Asians without Japa­ transnationalization. By constructing the new category of Nikkeijin, the gov­ nese ancestry. Many Japanese employers, threatened by criminalpenalties, dis­ ernment could maintain the core principle of its nationality and immigration charged their undocumented workers and replaced them with Nikkeijin. De­ laws, jus sanguinis(law of blood), which gave the revision process the appear­ spite its officialrhetoric, the Japanese government does not strictly enforcethe ance ofbeingtechnical rather than political(Yamanaka 1996). The conservative lawbanning hiring of the undocumented, but it does occasionallydeport for­ agenda of maintaining ethnic and social homogeneity was thus upheld and, eign workers.The large number of illegal visa-overstayers-anumber that has in view of the fact that a precedent forspecial admission of descendants of remained at the 3 oo, ooo level since the beginning ofthe 1990s- demonstrates formeremigrants had been set by European countries, criticism of Japan for this. This laximplementation ofthe criminalcode is indicative ofthe important being "racially" orientedwas deflated. contribution undocumented labor makes to employers who cannot afford to hire documented Nikkeijin workers, who, because of their authorized status, Nikkeijin and Asians command higher wages than do undocumented Asians. The "racial" consideration was nonetheless a factorin the government's deci­ sion to revisethe law. In June 1990, a month afterthe law took effect, Kokusai A CASE STUDY OF NIKKEIJIN WOMEN IN HAMAMATSU Jinryu (a journal published by the Japan Immigration Association with the co­ operation of the admissions bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Justice) pub­ Research forthe following findings was conducted in both Japan and Brazil lished a special issue on "Return Migration ofNikkeijin," which included dis­ between 1994 and 1998. In March and November 1994 I conducted personal cussion of the law change. In an interview forthe magazine, a foreign affairs interviews with members of sixty-threeNikkeijin households in Hamamatsu ministry official,Katsunori Toda, emphasized the importance ofJapan's blood and , in centralJapan. I conducted a similar study in July 1995, with tie with Nikkeijin in South America, especially the largest group, 1.2 million in members of thirty-three households of Nikkeijin in Brazil who had returned 178 • KeikoYamanaka Feminizationof Labor • 179 from Japan to three major southern cities: Sao Paulo, Londrina, and Porto and eastern Nepal.4 Most of them have entered the country on valid tourist Alegre. Altogether, these field studies yielded data (here called the Nikkei­ visas, then overstayed them, and when interviewedwere working for small­ jin Data) containing information from a total of 171 individuals fifteen years scale employers in manufacturing and construction industries. Data fromthis of age and over-81 women and 90 men. This paper draws primarily on the study (here called the Nepalese Data) provide information rarely available on female sample (Yamanaka 1997). Having collected the Nikkeijin Data, I then the subject of Asian workers illegally employed in industrial production in conducted a study, between September and December 1998, of social changes Japan. They reveal the natureof emerging labor-market inequality (based on currently sweeping Hamamatsu and neighboring cities. Intensive interviews legal status, nationality, ethnicity, and gender), resulting from the 1990 immi­ with more than fiftyJapanese citizens, both Nikkeijin and other foreign resi­ gration reform. dents in Japan, yielded information regarding public responses to the grow­ ing foreign populations on the one hand and rapidly developing immigrants' NIKKEIJIN POPULATION ANO EMPLOYMENT IN TOKAI organizations andcommunity a ctivities on the other.

Hamamatsu is a city of half a million located in western Shizuoka Prefec­ Until 1988 few Brazilians lived in Hamamatsu. Some 1,900 Korean perma­ ture, 257 kilometers southwest of . It and its satellite cities, including nent residents, descendants of prewar colonial immigrants, had comprised

Kosai and Iwata, are headquarters for several major automobile and motor­ the city's largest ethnic minority (Weiner 1994; Yamawaki 2000). Most of cycle companies, including Suzuki, Yamaha, and Honda, together with their them, particularly those of young generations, adopted Japanese names, lan­ thousands of contractors and subcontractors comprising a layered pyramidal guage, and behavior, thus remaining almost completely invisible. In response hierarchy: companies at the top, large contractors below, with sub- and sub­ to Japan's booming economy, in 1989 the firstwave of Brazilians, 815 in num­ subcontractors in increasing numbers and of diminishing size toward the base. ber, arrived to make their way to Hamamatsu. In 1990, with the implementa­ These subcontractors supply parts to be assembled on the way up the pyramid tion of the Revised Immigration Law, the Brazilianinflux to the city grewsud­ to ultimately become vehicles. The lower on the pyramid, the poorer are job denly to 3,500 (see table 3). Hundreds and thousands followedeach year forthe security,remuneration, and working conditions foremployees-with undocu­ next ten years. By late 1998, 10,000 Brazilian nationals and their families had mented foreigners at the bottom. registered as alien residents, accounting for two thirds of Hamamatsu's for­ Contiguous to, and west of, these cities lie Toyohashi, a city of350,000, and eign population of 16,000, and comprising 3 percent of its total population. s its neighbors, Toyokawa, Toyota, and others, in the eastern part of adjacent As these statistics suggest, by the late 1990s Hamamatsu was spearheading . This area will be referred to here as Tokai, after the region of the unprecedented grassroots globalization that is currently sweeping Japan which it is a part. These cities host another giant automaker, Toyota, and its in many nonmetropolitan, working-class locales. Prior to the Nikkeijin influx, thousands of subcontractors. Immigrant workers, both documented and un­ residents of these localities rarely saw "foreigners" with their distinctive lan­ documented, are attracted to this industrial area because of the chronic labor guage, behavior, and physical appearance. shortage there among small-scale employers. In the first few years of contact, Hamamatsu citizens and Nikkeijin experi­ In order to obtain some understanding of the increasingly diverse immi­ enced serious miscommunication and conflictbased on linguistic andcultu ral grant populations in Takai, I also studied a small group of undocumented differences.6 The Revised Immigration Law had been intended and expected Nepalesevisa-overstayers there and in their homeland on several occasions be­ to attract Nikkeijin as culturally familiar supplements to the shrinking Japa­ tween 1994 and 2000 (Yamanaka 2000a, 71-72). By 1995 an estimated 3,000 neseworkforce and to stem the alarming influxof non-Japanese labor migrants Nepalese nationals were working illegally in the Tokyo metropolitan area, To­ from such Asian countries as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines. But kai, and elsewhere. My sample was drawn from the Nepalese population of these expectations and intentions proved to be ill-fated. On arrival the Nikkei­ Tokai,estimated at 500. It comprises 30 females and 159 males of workingage . jin immediatelyfound themselves to be regarded not as Japanese but as cultural Most are ofTibeto-Burman language-speaking ethnic groups (oftendescribed strangers. They were treated as lower-class migrants from a backward coun­ and self-described as "Mongols") of the Himalayan "middle-hills" of western try. Japanese, on the other hand, found the Nikkeijin to be disturbingly alien, Feminizationef Labor • 181

despite the Japanese features of many of them, because of their foreigndress, Lri (? � 1-4 1-4\0� � lf"'tO'\LriMO'\ ci ...... ,,..,.ci,,..; ci demeanor, behavior, and .7 r-'4VLriL/'\Lrilf"'!L/'\l.f"'t"'"'+sooci\O\,,Q...; My interviewsand surveys with 81 Nikkeijin women in Takaiand in the three Brazilian cities reveal that nisei (second) and sansei (third) generations Japa­ nese of prime working age (fifteento forty-fouryears) constitute the majority "' "' "' � M O O O O N m�00 o ci ci ci ...... ; ri ri...; (n=57) of the female sample. Many of them are accompanied by their young children (see table 3). Also included in my sample are a small number (8) of older Issei (first-generation)and nisei women agedforty-five and older, as well m "' oo N��°'°' � ... 'T H,....O,\..Qt--.. as a substantial number (16) of Brazilian wives of Nikkeijin men (Yamanaka O °' "t � � N")>-< "'!: 0 1-4 H H �- "'1 lf"'t \.0 ... 1997, 30). As this sample and others demonstrate, the immigrant population ...... H 1-4 H H H is heterogeneous by generation and ethnic background, which adds further

complexity to the analysis of identity and immigration experiences (see Kita­ gawa 1993). The Nikkeijin Data suggest that young adult nisei and sansei had been well educated in Brazil: half have a high-school education and one third have some

V ... °' ��o years of college or a bachelor's degree. Prior to coming to Japan, most had ...; ri st- so oci H H H H H held white-collaror professionaloccupations, such as nurse, dentist, teacher, accountant, bank teller, secretary, sales clerk, retailer, or student. In Japan, almost all of them work as temporary machine operators or assembly-line H �O\M� i i i i � workers producing automobile and motorcycle parts and electrical appliances. For many of these nisei and sansei and their Brazilian spouses, contract labor in Japanese factories therefore represents downward social mobility, however

\0��0\1.f"'t economically profitableit may be. A few have found clerical jobs in labor bro­ \O H Hf"l"10'\ HOr-...... \Ot--.. kers' officesand sales jobs as clerks in imported-goods stores catering to Bra­ \0 " " °' °' zilian customers. The older Issei and nisei have few marketable skills, but many, being fluentin the , have foundjobs that require and reward 000 000 '1" °' °'...... ri... st" their cultural competence and experience, such as interpreter or convalescent attendant. Some took jobs that do not require physical strength, such as gate­ keeper or foodprocessor (Yamanaka 1997). The guest-worker system embodies institutional discrimination as de­ fined by Castles (1984). For Nikkeijin workers, this is manifest in the labor­ contracting system by which they are employed on short-term contracts by job brokers (assen or haken ,gyosha), who in turnsend them to their workplaces in "'....., subcontractors' factories.This means that technically they do not belong to the factoryworkfo rce, but to the brokers' stables of employables. As a result, they are subject to being hired and firedat will by the brokers.Their jobs generally °'"' \0 °' °'� 00 °' °'... °'...... °' °' require physical strength and on-the-job experience but not complex techni­ cal or language skills. The Nikkeijin guest-workersystem is thus designed to 182 • Keiko Yamanaka Feminization of Labor • 183 servesubcontractors (factoryo wners) as an expendable shock absorber (or "ad­ Table 4 presents monthly and hourlywages earned by workers of contrast­ justment valve" in theJapanese phrase) betweenp eak and slack periods of the ing nationalities, legal statuses (equivalentto ethnicity in this context), and sex economy so that their Japanese workers' jobs and wages will remain secure dur­ employed in the manufacturingindustry in western .First, ing times of recession. In the early period of their settlement, most Nikkeijin it provides informationon the average monthly earnings in 1994 formale and and their familiesrely heavily on job brokers (as their employers) formany other femaleJapanese workers of ages nearest the average age forimmigrant workers aspects of their lives as well, including obtaining officialdocumentation, chil­ of each sex (thirty to thirty-four formales and twenty-five to twenty-ninefor dren's education, housing, and furniture, forall of which the brokers charge females) who work forsmall-scale employers in the manufacturing industry substantial fees. (here theJapanese Data) (Shizuoka Prefecture 1995). Because informationon

WAGE ANALYSIS: GENDER, NATIONALITY AND LEGALITY the hourly pay rate forJapanese is not available, it is calculated by dividing the monthly wages foreach category of workers by the total of their usual working hours per month. Second, table 4 includes informationon Nikkeijin workers' In Tokai, wages ofNikkeijin workers dropped by some 20 percent in 1992, when average hourly wages. This was obtained fromthe Nikkeijin Data and is based the Japanese economy fell into deep recession. Likewise, the available hours on presumed monthly earnings (calculated as eight working hours plus two of overtime work on which workers depended decreased substantially. During hours of overtime forfour 6-day weeks). Third, it includes similar information the depth of the recession, hundreds ofNikkeijin were discharged and found forundocumented Nepalese workers based on the Nepalese Data. it necessary to return to Brazil. Nonetheless, the hourly earnings of full-time In comparing average wages of foreignersand Japanese, it should be noted Nikkeijin factory workers ranged from900 to 1,ooo yen (about $9 to $IO at 102 that there are substantial differencesin treatment experienced by workers ac­ yen per dollar in 1994) for women eighteen to forty-fouryears old, and from cording to their seniority (age or experience), employment status (whether 1,100 to1,45oyen ($II to $14.50) formen eighteen to fifty-fouryearsold (Yama­ regular or temporary), and designated working hours (whether full-time or naka 2000b, 140-42). These rates result in monthly earnings of 216,000 to part-time). RegularJapanese workers are entitled to lifetimeemplo yment, so­ 240,oooyen ($2,16oto $2,400) forfemales and 264,ooo to 348,oooyen ($2,640 cial security benefits (including pension, medical insurance, and unemploy­ to $3,480) formales (calculated on the basis of eight working hours plus two ment insurance), dependents' allowance, transportation allowance, annual hours of overtime forfour 6-day weeks). From these monthly earningsJapa ­ bonuses, and annual vacations. Japanese temporary and part-time workers nese brokers deduct the brokeragefee, taxes, rent, utility costs, debt, interest, (disproportionately women and the elderly) are denied many of these benefits. and other expenses. Yet, the Nikkeijins' monthly earnings equaled more than Most foreignworkers are employed temporarilyand are usually excluded from twentyto thirty times the minimum monthly wages (the equivalent of $100 in such fringe benefits.The earnings shown in table 4 are the average monthly 1995) allowed by the Brazilian governmentat home. earnings, including overtime income, for workers of all employment cate­ Nikkeijins' high monthly earnings indicate that Japanese subcontractors Monthlygories. Earnings place high value on their willingness and capacityto engage in arduous, even dangerous, unskilled labor on demand. In order to appreciate the marketvalue of Nikkeijins' labor, however, their earnings must be compared to those of Comparing the average monthly earnings ofJapanese and foreigners,a cursory other categories and ranks of unskilled workers in the local labormarket, and glance may give the misleading impression that foreignworkers earn more the collective characteristics by which the 1990 Revised Immigration Law has than Japanese workers. However, foreigners' workinghours per month aver­ defined them. These characteristics include legal status (whether legal resi­ age considerably morethan those ofJapanese: 240 forforeigners of both sexes; dent or not), ethnicity (whether of Japanese descent or not), and nationality 195 forJapanese men; and 181 forJapanese women, and foreignersare denied (whether Japanese or not). Moreover,workers are also defined by sex in two valuable benefitstaken forgra nted by Japanese employees. Consequently,some ranked categories with long-establishedJapanese patterns of wage and social foreigners surpass the monthly earnings of Japanese, but at the cost of sig­ discrimination against women (see Brinton 1993). nificantlymore working hours and feweror no benefits.That is, documented , l 76 64 on the the kei­ and (for and ssed sig­ n lega earn show refer­ labor; • 185 of about males hourly th regular ear Nik employ females females earn make Undocu­ Japanese (without ale the compari­ Nikkeijin them and Nepalese expre to m percentage mon Labor as for foreign, Results workers) shows ($2,104). age. of its epalese Nikkeijin each employers workers w males. per Three females N nationality/legal averaging averaging females Japanese month Japanese (nationality/legal that Nepalese Nikkeijin provide yen are also males for those of (legal ry 4 their 2) males. documented Japanese ( per nationality ,917) not of hourly 2 ges labor males, of of compares ($ provide Japanese cost do that Feminization Feminization wages. 01,360 category. earnings Undocumented Undocumented table Japanese wa Nepalese 2 effects catego females workers, ,060) by by documented Japanese 3 rly and (1) yen ch on Nikkeijin (3) females. Japanese must ($ effect eveal with flexible ea Japanese ses motivates employers percent hou by for Nikkeijin workers that while female ese in and 88-89). the they yen percentages reference n 3 u 3 workers, counterparts; 85 the and benefits). benefits). employers Nepalese to Nepalese by that effects combined of 291,690 of as groups of at on apa facts that Results r Results ofworkers J wages being earned and male the foreign month, identical 2000a, sex wages; two offer of rning the earn value 306,000 earned that gender specified because Tu bstantial valued per that percent their age a � ) hourly estimate hourly wage earned wage hourly each wages s security male is w other comparis inexpensive category in 74 by constant. almost , males females, he an of effect include t the wages job workers market es wages. undocumented average with month. sex of each (Yamanaka labor ($1,738 earn the he hourly those demonstrate Japanese, hourly t and make wag in on and per and by to relatively Nikkeijin yen do hourly Results on the the on Japanese demonstrates male Nikkeijin provides workers) indicates wages of percent holding earn behind these behind of 2 the those of I 739 has The overemphasized hours wages earned wages than 85 females order is by far g This earned ($2,280) ($2,659) be cent It gender 173, in Nepalese male the sex) demonstrate undocumented, (illegal males less not wages, earn entitlements, made. per yen yen Nikkeijin sex. of of to percent Nepalese males Nepalese standard n and and earned on Wages wages are workin nationalities. at category. 75 (1) are 87 percentage cannot Japanese average Finally, Comparison a each males Comparison It the at order 28,000 as ence th Japanese females, Japanese status percent percent earn earn three of and mented jin status especially Nepalese sons wages of them fewer Hourly In benefits, employees. 2 nificantly status Nikkeiji the males 265,920 benefits), whereas benefits),

0 "! ... ci U'\ '

0 0 0 g... 8... 8...

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s:t" s:t" ... m "' "' � ,; � I I I I I I 0 00 N °' m'"'N U'\ 00 N .., .., Feminizationof Labor • 187 186 • Keiko Yamanaka (2) Nepalese male labor is valued at 74 percent; (3) Japanese female labor is undocumented immigrants is inevitably small.For exampie, I estimate the pro­ valued at 64 percent; (4) Nikkeijin female labor is valued at 64 percent; and portion of females in the Nepalese population analyzed here to be less than (5) Nepalese female labor is valued at 56 percent. 20 percent.s This wage analysis, based on Nikkeijin Data, NepaleseData and Japanese Despite officialrhetoric on the criminalityof illegal employment, the Japa­ Data, sheds light on the systematic ways by which the Tokai labor market ranks nese government has been reluctant to rigorously enforcethe legalsanction s sex, nationality, and legal status of unskilled workers. Among all, worker's that were put in place to prevent the entry of undesirable foreigners.This laxity sex makes the largest differencei n determining his or her hourly wage, with of enforcement is in response to employers' dire need forcheap, flexiblelabor. femalespenalized by a 25 to 36 percent loss of earnings. Of the three nation­ Occasionally,well-publicized incidents of enforcementare deemed necessary alities of women, Japanese suffer the greatest gender deficit as compared to to demonstrate to workers, employers, and the public that immigration offi­ Japanese men. Foreign nationalityreduces market value of Nikkeijin workers cers are alert to the situation and have it under control. Such "ineffective,"s po­ by more than 15 percent for males but not forfemales. When combined with radic implementation of the immigration law has been effectivein achieving illegal status, foreignstatus furtherun dercuts wages. Consequently, undocu­ its dual, latent aims. First, it controls and keeps under surveillance the inflowof mented malesearn n percent less and undocumented females12 percent less undesirable foreigners,preventing themfrom settling permanently with fami­ than documented workers of their respective sexes. lies. The small percentages offemales in theTokaiillegal Nepalese community Without doubt the most striking findingillustrated by this table is that ille­ demonstrate this point. Second, it allows weaker employers access to willing, ,galstatus is penalized lessthan ,gender, as a result of whichfemale Japanesecitizens earn inexpensive, and tractable labor, which is no longer to be foundin the local wa9es 15 percent lower than ille9al forei,gnmales. labor market. These economic and social contexts of Japan's back-door immigration policy go fartoward explaining the increasing feminization of Nikkeijin im­ GENDER IN THE BACK-DOOR POLICY migration, a trend that promises significanteconomic and social benefitsfor More research is necessary beforeconclusive statements can be made about Japanese manufacturersand the government. First, Nikkeijin women are many, wage dynamics. However, it is important for the present analysis to under­ young (at least at present), and because of the large wage differential between stand that Nikkeijin (legal immigrant) women are rewarded equally to Japa­ Japan and their third-world home, are highly motivated to take jobs shunned by nese women, whereas Nepalese (illegal immigrant) women are discriminated young Japanese women. Second, employers regard them as secondary earners against as a combined result of their entirely foreign and illegal status. If in the family becauseof their gender, as they do Japanese women as well, and this were the rule, one would expect that, forreasons of profitmaximization, thereforepay both only two-thirds of the hourly wagesfor J apanese men. Third, Japanese employers would be most strongly motivated to hire undocumented their legal status (a consequence of their Nikkeijin ethnicity) allows them to females. live with their familiesin Japan, which benefitstheir employers by enhancing But this is not the case. Subcontractors of major manufacturing firms, the social stability of their work force. Last, as noncitizens, Nikkeijin exempt especiallythose subcontractors with more than 100 employees, routinely ex­ both employers and the state fromresponsibility to provide them socialw el­ clude undocumented Asians from their labor force, even though Japanese fare,social security,and health benefits. Pregnant women and children under labor brokers oftensend these workers to them. This is explained by the fact fourteen are especially vulnerable to the withholding of health benefits from that subcontractors fear legal sanctions and in addition are under pressure their employed familymember(s). fromhigher-order companies in the subcontractor pyramid to maintain a law­ An estimated 80,000 working-age Nikkeijin women fromBrazil have thus abiding image. Therefore, it is largely the mini- to small-scale employers at provided the manufacturingindustries with an ideal supplement to the dwin­ or near the bottomof the pyramid (and thus relatively remote fromsanctions dling Japanese femalelabor forceof the 1990s. Although other unskilled sec­ fromon high) who depend heavily on labor provided by undocumented, mostly tors, such as leisure and entertainmentservices, are severely short of}apanese male,workers . Under present immigration law, femalerepresentation among labor, the government regards manufacturingas the most important sector for 188 • KeikoYamanaka Feminizationof Labor • 189 national economic survival and therefore it attends that sector's every need. ships they faceat work and home, together with the pervasive institutional re­ Consequently, the 1990 legal construction ofNikkeijin ethnicityenab led many sistance to women's upward occupational mobility within organizations. This partiesto avoid fundamentalchanges in the institutions of gender, labor, and deep-seated patriarchal order clearly explains, at least in part, why there is no family, thus contributing to the preservation of patriarchal gender ideologies demand for housemaids among middle-class households inJapan. In casual and practices. By supplementing Japanese women with Nikkeijin women in conversations,J apanese commonly referto the small size of their houses as the factories,employers avoided demands fororganizational reforms to eliminate main reason they do not import foreign maids. However, the factth atJapan's gender inequityin the workplace while theJapanese government was enabled to population density (867 people per square mile) is much less than that of Sin­ avoid an increase in child-caresubsidies and facilitiesthat had been requested gapore (14,425), Hong Kong (16,626), and Taiwan (1,541), all of which import by employers and working families. At the same time, Japanese couples and the maids, counters that explanation (Population Research Bureau 1996). society at large avoided confronting unequal gender roles that assign women The rigid separation of women and men in their public and private roles to reproductive roles and men to productive roles. Moreover, the then incum­ accounts for the proliferation of entertainment businesses catering to men bent conservative government avoided complaints and accusations by one of its (Douglass 2000). Dedication to their corporate duty requires "salarymen" to most influentialconstituencies -small- to middle-scale factoryowner s, many occasionally entertain colleagues and customers at bars (see Allison 1994). By of whom might otherwise have facedexpensive mechanization or bankruptcy. the late 1970s, as youngJap anese women were increa�ing]y drawn into skilled and prestigious occupations, the entertainment industry suffered a chronic labor shortage. The industry's solution was to import young women from GENDER ROLES AND FEMALE IMMIGRANT LABOR Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and recently Russia(Ito 1992). The state ac­

Traditionally Japanese men have been solely engaged in "public spheres" of en­ commodated this practice by granting "professional entertainer" visas to these deavor-economically productive activities outside of the home such as wage foreign women, whose primary duties were to serve drinks and provide con­ or salaried employment, artisanship, agriculture, entrepreneurship, profes­ versation and companionship to male customers. Despite numerous reports sions, and corporate and bureaucratic administration. Women have been con­ of abuse, exploitation, and human-rights violations perpetrated on the enter­ finedto the "domestic sphere" (Rosaldo1974; Caulfield 1981). There they are tainers by customers, employers, and brokers, many of whom are reported to in charge of meeting household needs, including care and education of chil­ be involved in organized crime ( yakuza), theJap anese governmentc ontinues to dren, maintenance of the house, cooking and marketing, managing household allow them to recruit foreign femaleentertainers in large numbers each year finances, and caring foraged parents (Imamura 1987; Uno 1991; Uno 1993). (International Organization forMigration 1997).

The rising cost of living and education now drives many middle-class In sum,Japan's deployment of immigrant women as factory workers and women to economic activities outside the home, oftenp art-time, foradditional barmaids, but not as housemaids, is a phenomenon reflecting the deeply em­ income (Houseman and Osawa 1998; Wakisaka and Bae 1998). The traditional bedded gender ideologyofJapanesesociety and culture,together with its xeno­ sexual division of labor in households, however, remains largely unaltered, phobic immigration policy and rapidly dwindling femalelabor force(Ito 1996). forcing many women to leave the public labor force in order to fulfill their In the short-run, both foreign and local women profit economically. The for­ domestic obligations of marriage, motherhood, household management, and eigners acquire jobs and make more money than they did at home, while the filialpiety. As graph 1 demonstrates,Japanese women's labor forceparticipa­ locals derive more money and prestige in newly found skilled jobs than they did tion rates drop sharply between twenty-five and thirty-four years of age, and in the jobs they leftto the foreigners. However, in the long run, unequal labor

rise quickly afterward.This patternof women's labor-forcep articipation rates exchange widens the economic and social gapbe tweenthe immigrants and the demonstrates their strong commitment to their homemaker roles. citizens.Nonci tizen women wiII remain in the host society as an underclass of This pattern also highlights the severe disadvantages encountered by temporarycontract workers denied opportunities to rise economicallyor so­ women in building skiIIs and careers in the labor market. The extremely low cially, whereas citizen women wiIIcontinue to increase their skills and income proportion of managerialpositions held by women attests to the personal hard- through training and seniority. 190 • KeikoYamanaka Feminization efLabor • 191 women characteristicallyplay major roles in uniting families,developing social EVOLVING NIKKEIJIN COMMUNITIES networks, and thus solidifyingethn ic communities and occupational niches Based on European and North American immigration experience,Castles and (Morokvasic1984;Gabaccia199 2). By1998, a fewNikkeijin, usuallythose most Miller (1993, 25) predict the formationof ethnic-minority communities once fluentin Japanese, had begun to interact with the main Japanese population. the number of immigrants reaches a critical mass. According to this model, This was most evident in the area of education. As table 3 shows, 18 percent as the many and diverse needs of the immigrants begin to be met at their des­ of the city'sBrazilian population in 1998 were children under fourteenyears of tination, their social networkswill tend to grow into small-scale ethnic com­ age. One third of these Portuguese-speaking minors attended public elemen­ munities with their own institutions and enterprises. Although immigration tary and junior high schools while their parents worked. Japanese teachers and policies, business cycles, and public attitudes toward immigrants in the host the city's board of education were ill-prepared forthe sudden increase in Bra­ society significantly influence the development of these immigrant popula­ zilian pupils and experienced great difficulty in coping with it. In response, tions, their communities tend to remain resilient and flexible.This is because the city administration and its affiliatedorganizations hired bilingual Nikkei­ familyand community ties sustain the flowof immigrants, while the grow­ jin women as advisors, coordinators, and teachers to assist policymakers in ing ethnic economy functionsto absorb incoming immigrants and their fami­ the development of multilingual and multicultural programs (lkegami 2001, lies. The instances of Turkishguest workers in the formerWest and 124-39). Mexican workers in the southwestern United States demonstrate that sharp At the end of the 1990s, nearly ten years after the Nikkeijin influx, a ma­ economic downturns and anti-immigration policies do not necessarily lead to jority of the Japanese Braziliansin Hamamatsu stillexpress their intention to drastic changes in immigration flows(Massey et al. 1987; Martin1994). return to Brazil.Realistically, however, it is clear that as they prolong their stay A similar situation is rapidly developing in those Japanese manufacturing the possibility that they will do so diminishes. The expansion of Brazilian cul­ cities in which a sizable Nikkeijin population has settled. Hamamatsu, for tural and social activities is a significantindicator of growing interest in long­ example, with the arrival of more than 10,000 Brazilians by 1997, this cityof term settlement among Nikkeijin immigrants. A recent article in Veja, a weekly In 570,000 witnessedrapid growth of Brazilian small businesses attending to the Brazilian magazine comparable to Newsweek, reports that forBrazilians, life in needs of the immigrants and their families(Yamanaka 2000b). These establish­ Japan is comfortable as all necessities are provided within their ethnic com­ ments, mostly Nikkeijin owned, include retail stores selling imported Brazil­ munities (0 Iene Volta1999, 62-64). Similarly, an article in Made in Japan, a ian food,drinks, clothing, cosmetics, books, magazines, , videos, Portuguese-language magazine published in Tokyo, discusses the increasing tapes, and compact discs. There are .also a variety of Brazilian commercial ser­ numbers of babies born to Brazilian couples in Japan (Os Novos Immigrantes vices and culturalorganizations, including restaurants, discos, banks, travel 1999, 20). 1994 1,725 Brazilianbabies were registered at Brazilian consul­ agents, documentation services, language schools, hobby and sports clubs, ates in Tokyo and . In 1998 their number more than doubled to 3,820, In day-care centers, and the like. Brazilian Catholic churches provide weekly indicating that on the average ten babies had been born daily among services for their congregations in various locations. Portuguese couples that year. weekly newspapers and daily radio and programs report Nikkeijin ''Today many Brazilians want to establish themselves in Japan foreconomic cultural and social activities and other news and provide important public space reasons. When the firstgroup began to arrive in the198 0s, they worked hard, forcommunication and exchange of opinions within the immigrant popula­ leaving little time forleisure and diversion," says Etsuo Ishikawa, President tion. Clearly NikkeiBrazilians in Hamamatsu com prise a lively cultural enclave of the Brazilian Association. Ten years later, as the Japanese economy has complete with familiar goods, activities, and symbols. entered recession, Brazilians must change their plans. "Now we earn less Nikkeijin women, as well as their menfolk,are at the centerof Hamamatsu's money than at the beginning of the migrationmovement, so it is impossible expanding Brazilian social and cultural scenes. This findingis consistent with to collect enough in a few years of labor to return to Brazil,"explains Ishi­ that of recent literature on immigrant women elsewhere that suggests that kawa. "It is also natural forthe Brazilianswho have decided to extend their Feminizationof Labor • 193 192 • KtikoYamanaka residence permanently inJapan to fallin love, enjoy themselves, marry, and "alien" population or will become socially integrated depends on the attitudes have children." (Ibid.) and actions of both parties to the relationship. It depends on the Japanese definition of Japanese nationality, citizenship, and membership in Japanese This Nikkeijin view can be contrasted with the opinion of Japanese for­ society, and it depends equally on the ways in which Nikkei Braziliansdefine eign affairsministry officialKat sunori Toda, quoted abovein the discussion of ethnicity and nationality forthemselves, as well as fortheir children. Nikkei­ "Japan's 'Back Door' Immigration Policy." jin women will play a major and increasing role in determining the futures of their familiesand communities in their adopted society. Meanwhile, Japa­ nese and Nikkeijin peoples will continue to interact in their daily lives at work, SIGNIFICANCE OF NIKKEIJIN ETHNICITY schools, shopping centers, and other venues, each havinga significantimpact The consequences ofJapanese Brazilian labor migration toJapan demonstrate on the other's beliefs and behaviors, including most importantly those related that Nikkeijin ethnicity has been a double-edged sword forboth the receiving to issues of identity, nationhood, economic equality,and socialjustice (Yama­ state and the 230,000 immigrants. For the Japanese state, the policy of em­ naka 2002). bracingNikkeijin ethnicity was a convenient means to maintain "racial" purity while responding to the domestic labor shortage. But it has also spawned a populous minority community with a distinct and alien culture and identity, NOTES thereby subvertingthe very purpose of the policy. Tothe immigrants who took 1 In this article, I use the term Nikkeijin primarilyto referto those who have "returned" advantage of their governmentally redefined ethnicity, the policy seemed to from Brazil to work in Japan since the late 1980s. Returned Nikkeijin from Peru, promise privileged access to economic opportunities and cultural integration Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Mexicoare also to be foundin Japan, but the Brazilians inJapan, their now immensely weal thy ancestral homeland. Instead, it has rele­ comprise the vast majority of Nikkeijin there. gated them to the position of a disadvantaged "ethnic" minority in the society. 2 For example, in Singapore the labor forceparticipation rate of women fromtwenty­ Despite the official definition of Nikkeijin as "Japanese" based on their an­ fiveto fortyyears ofage increased by 17 percent from 1980 to 1990. Among single cestry, most Japanese citizensregard them as behaviorally strangeand cul­ women, the labor force participation rate increased from 35. 6 percent in 1970, to turally inferior as a result of their Nikkeijin ethnicity and their third-world 68.9 percent in 1990, while among marriedwomen it rose from14. 7 to 43.2 percent nationality. during the same period (Wong 1996 : 121; Yeoh and Huang 1998). The experience of the Nikkeijin ethnic community in Japan is sociologi­ 3 This widely cited explanation for the creation of Japan's long-term residence visa category has been recently challenged by Japanese sociologist Kajita (2000). Ac­ callystriking when compared with that of the 700,000 Koreans who have lived cording to him, his interviews with high level officials in the Ministry of Justice in Japan for several generations as permanent residents (Kajita 1998). Like revealed that the categorywas created primarily in order to deal with Japan's un­ many Nikkeijin, the Koreans are physically indistinguishable fromthe domi­ resolved problems ofJapanese nationals stranded in China afterWorld War II. The nant population, but unlike most Nikkeijin, they have assimilated toJapanese officials also explained, Kajita reports, that the long-term residence category was language and culture and are therefore behaviorally scarcely distinguishable not intended to ameliorate the serious labor shortages prevalent at the time ofthe fromthe dominant population. Yetthe Japanese state regards Korean descen­ Revised Immigration Law.

dants as foreignersbased on their nationality (or lack ofJapanese citizenship), 4 The majority ofNepalese undocumented workers in Tokai belong to ethnic groups whileJapane se citizens treat them as culturally inferiotbased on their foreign that the British designated "martial races"-for example, the Magar, Gurung, ancestry. As a result, nearly a centuryafter their forebearsbegan to arrive in Limbu, and Rai -whose tradition offoreign service as Gurkha soldiers in the British search of a betterlife, Koreans remain socially stigmatized and economically and Indian armies produced a culture ofemi gration and a remittance economy in segregated by the nation in which they and their parents were born and raised, rural Nepal (Des Chene 1993). whose languagethey speak, and whose culture they largely share. 5 In November 1998 other major nationalities registered in Hamamatsu included Whether Nikkeijin will continue to be marginal toJapanese society as an 1, 695 Koreans, 973 Filipinos, 892 Chinese, 876 Peruvians, and 436 Vietnamese. 194 • Keiko Yamanaka Feminizationof Labor • 195

6 Steven Weisman, In Japan, Bias Is an Obstacle Even for the Ethnic Japanese, New Constable, Nicole. 1997. Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipino Workers.Ith aca, New York Times,13 November 1991, sectionA, pp. 1, 3. York: Cornell University Press. 7 As discussed below, the Nikkei Brazilianpopulation in Japan includes an unknown Cornelius, Wayne A. 1994. Japan: The Illusionof Immigration Control. In Controlling but high proportion ofnon -Nikkeijin spouses ofNikkeijin and their children (mes­ Immigration:A Global Perspective, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and ti�os) who are admitted as family members of legal residents. Consequently, the James F. Hollifield, 375-410. Stanford, Calif.: StanfordUnive rsityPress. physiognomy of the Nikkeijin population is heterogeneous. Cornelius, Wayne A., Philip L. Martin,and James F. Hollifield,eds. 1994. 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