John E. Joseph

Two Strands in Whorfian Thought and their Neo-Whorfian Implications

Series A: General & Theoretical Papers ISSN 1435-6473 Essen: LAUD 1998 (2nd ed. with divergent page numbering 2007) Paper No. 440

Universität Duisburg-Essen

John E. Joseph

University of Edinburgh (U.K.)

Two Strands in Whorfian Thought and their Neo-Whorfian Implications

Copyright by the author Reproduced by LAUD 1998 (2nd ed. with divergent page numbering 2007) Linguistic Agency Series A University of Duisburg-Essen General and Theoretical FB Geisteswissenschaften Paper No. 440 Universitätsstr. 12 D- 45117 Essen

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Two Strands in Whorfian Thought and their Neo-Whorfian Implications

Introduction By simultaneously revisiting Humboldt and Whorf, this symposium forms part of what is now a long tradition of linking the 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis' to a spectrum of 17th and 18th-century thinkers, with Humboldt as the knot binding the various threads (see Koerner 1992, Joseph 1996, Lee 1996). In a 1996 paper I have attempted to complexify this genealogy, to take account of a second strand of thought feeding into Sapir's and Whorf s ideas about how shapes thought, perception, and culture. The present paper will first lay out what these two strands are, then will consider how the second, previously ignored strand might usefully be brought back into play in order to expand the range of neo-Whorfian approaches to language.

Language as a 'magic key' to Thought and Culture In Humboldt, as in Herder before him, language is treated as the embodiment of a national , a kind of spiritual essence without which a culture cannot be adequately understood. Language is thus what we might call a 'magic key', for the claim or implication is that studying the language of a people is the secret to comprehending their minds or souls. As Humboldt declares, [...] there resides in every language a characteristic world-view. As the individual sound stands between man and the object, so the entire language steps in between him and the nature that operates, both inwardly and outwardly, upon him. He surrounds himself with a world of sounds so as to assimilate and process within himself the world of objects. (Humboldt 1836 [1988:60]) In certain regards the basic approach to language, thought and culture taken by Sapir in his 1921 book Language is related to this magic key view, with numerous provisos which I discuss in Joseph (1996: 367-370). At least we can say that Sapir in 1921 may be a 'closet' semi-Humboldtian to the extent that he believes in a significant attachment between language and culture. He has no time for the sort of causal correlation between language structure and the intellectual power of cultures which is at the heart of Humboldt (1836). "Rightly understood", writes Sapir (1921:219), "such correlations are rubbish". Nevertheless, he rejects any notion that language might be a mere 'garment' in which thought is clothed (Sapir 1921: 15). Sapir 1921 does not describe language as the kind of shaping force on culture it will become in some of his later writings, most famously in his paper "The Status of as a Science", delivered in December 1928 and published

1 the following year. But by then his overall approach to the relationship of language and thought has changed markedly.

Language as Source of 'metaphysical garbage' As to precisely when between 1921 and 1928 Sapir "changed his mind" (Sampson 1980:82) or at least his , we can pinpoint it to the summer of 1923, when, laid up with a broken leg, he read and reviewed 's (1889 - 1957) and Ivor Armstrong Richards' (1893-1979) newly published book The of Meaning, subtitled A study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism. It was this book that gave him entree into a conception of language and thought which had developed in analytic with no counterpart in linguistics or . Most linguists down to Sapir's time would have accepted the premise that , or some languages, serve human beings well as instruments of thought, or at least are neutral vehicles for thought.1 But the tradition of that arose in the nineteenth century with George Boole (1815-1864), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), Ernst Schröder (1841-1902), (1848-1925), and Giuseppe Peano (1858-1932, on whose involvement in the international language movement see Falk 1995) began from a very different premise: that ordinary languages are grounded in metaphysical presumptions which present an obstacle to rational understanding. We thus need to get through existing languages in order to understand the universal logic that only a 'pure' artificial language like that of mathematicians can adequately capture. This idea has a long historical pedigree (discussed below), but in the wake especially of Frege it took off in the later nineteenth century with a force that would propel it to the forefront of philosophy with the work of (1872-1970) and Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), 's (1889-1951) Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921, translated into English and published by Ogden, with a foreword by Russell), and the logical positivists, including (1891-1970), one of whose best known works (to judge from the number of its later anthologizations), entitled precisely "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" (Carnap 1931), appeared shortly before he left Prague for the , at about the same time Sapir left Chicago for Yale. We might call this the 'metaphysical garbage' view of how language influences thought, for it sees all such influence as a problem to be overcome, garbage to be taken out. Russell lays it out at length in a 1924 article, though already by then it had been informing his philosophical work for at least two decades:

1 They disagreed about whether some did so better than others, with the most 'progressive' linguists following liberal anthropologists in adopting a doctrine that all races and languages represent an equal endpoint to the evolutionary process, hence that every language is perfectly adapted to the needs of the culture that uses it.

2 The influence of language on philosophy has, I believe, been profound and almost unrecognized. If we are not to be misled by this influence, it is necessary to become conscious of it, and to ask ourselves deliberately how far it is legitimate. The subject-predicate logic, with the substance-attribute metaphysic, are a case in point. It is doubtful whether either would have been invented by people speaking a non-Aryan language; certainly they do not seem to have arisen in China, except in connection with , which brought Indian philosophy with it [...] In these respects language misleads us both by its vocabulary and by its syntax. We must be on our guard in both respects if our logic is not to lead to a false metaphysic. Syntax and vocabulary have had different kinds of effects on philosophy. Vocabulary has most influence on common sense. It might be urged, conversely, that common sense produces our vocabulary. This is only partially true. A word is applied at first to things which are more or less similar, without any reflection as to whether they have any point of identity. But when once usage has fixed the objects to which the word is to be applied, common sense is influenced by the existence of the word, and tends to suppose that one word must stand for one object, which will be a universal in the case of an adjective or an abstract word. Thus the influence of vocabulary is towards a kind of platonic pluralism of things and ideas. The influence of syntax, in the case of the Indo-European languages, is quite different. Almost any can be put into a form in which it has a subject and a predicate, united by a copula. It is natural to infer that every fact has a corresponding form, and consists in the possession of a quality by a substance. This leads, of course, to monism, since the fact that there were several substances (if it were a fact) would not have the requisite form. Philosophers, as a rule, believe themselves free from this sort of influence of linguistic forms, but most of them seem to me to be mistaken in this belief. In thinking about abstract matters, the fact that the words for abstractions are no more abstract than ordinary words always makes it easier to think about the words than about what they stand for, and it is almost impossible to resist consistently the temptation to think about the words. (Russell 1924:367-9 [1959:38-9]) 'Metaphysical garbage' is more or less the negative counterpart of 'magic key'. There are few if any obvious metaphysical garbage traces in Humboldt. In the quotation from Humboldt given above, immediately after he declares that "there resides in every language a characteristic world-view", he proceeds to deny any implication that this state of affairs mitigates the connection of thought to the 'simple truth', which is the principal claim of the metaphysical garbage view: These expressions in no way outstrip the measure of the simple truth. Man lives primarily with objects, indeed, since feeling and acting in him depend on his presentations, he actually does so exclusively, as language presents them to him. (Humboldt 1836 [1988:60]) The worldview embodied in a language is seen instead as a positive force, producing national unity in its linguistic but also its cultural and social dimensions. Its only negative

3 aspect is the comparatively small one that no individual can ever fully escape the worldview of his or her native tongue.2 What I am calling the metaphysical garbage and magic key views are not inherently contradictory, since it is logically quite possible that the structures of all languages diverge from universal logic and do so in ways that reflect the particular worldview and intellectual power of the cultures in which they originated. Moreover, the two views concur in recognizing a direct bond between language and thought. Where they differ is in envisioning language as an essentially positive or negative force within culture, a way toward truth or a source of obfuscation. In addition, where 'metaphysical garbage' takes the ultimate truth to lie in universal logic, and so assigns the most meaningful work on language to philosophers, 'magic key' takes it to lie in historical reconstruction, and contends that neither philosophers nor anyone else can understand another culture or even what they are doing within their own culture until linguists teach them.3

The Metaphysical Garbage Line in Sapir Immediately after Sapir's reading of Ogden and Richards, echoes of the metaphysical garbage line begin appearing in his work for the first time. In his glowing review of he writes: Of all insidious machines, words are the most insidious. Like the humblest of kitchen help they work themselves into our good-natured, patronizing confidence and have us at their mercy before we realize that their almost dispensable usefulness has grooved our minds into an infinite tracery of habit [...] Every intelligent person knows that words delude as much as they help [...] And yet few accept with due cheer and conviction the notorious failure of a given

2 "By the same act whereby he spins language out of himself, he spins himself into it, and every language draws about the people that possess it a circle whence it is possible to exit only by stepping over at once into the circle of another one. To learn a foreign language should therefore be to acquire a new standpoint in the world-view hitherto possessed, and in fact to a certain extent is so, since every language contains the whole conceptual fabric and mode of presentation of a portion of mankind. But because we always carry over, more or less, our own world-view, and even our own language-view, this outcome is not purely and completely experienced" (Humboldt 1836 [1988:60])). 3 A full history of these two views of language and its relationship to thought would far exceed the bounds of the present paper. Each has roots extending back to antiquity. Something like the metaphysical garbage view is already implicit in the development of Socratic dialectic, which attempts to pass beyond the apparent meaning of words to (re)discover their 'real' signification. Something like the magic key view is already implicit in the rival development of etymology as an attempt to locate truth in the original form of words by eliminating the false accretions of usage. In modern times, 'metaphysical garbage' was articulated as a problem most influentially by (1632-1704) in Book III of the Essay Concerning Humane Understanding (1689). 'Magic key' can be seen as developing out of the linguistic views of Port Royal, put into forceful contrast with Locke's by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646—1716) in his Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain (written 1703, published 1765), and of the reinterpretation of Locke's views by Etienne Bonnot, abbé de Condillac (1714-1780). Yet only with the dawn of Romanticism, for instance with the Essai sur l'origine des langues (written 1761, published 1781) of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Herder's 1772 essay, does it emerge fully-blown.

4 universe of speech-, a language, to correspond to the universe of phenomena, physical and mental [...]

Messrs. Ogden and Richards [...] make it clear, as no philologist has ever quite made it clear, why an understanding of the nature of speech is a philosophic essential, why every epistemology and every system of logic that does not subject speech, its necessary expressive medium, to a searching critique is built upon the sands, is sooner or later snared in the irrelevances of the medium. Philosophers and psychologists, most of them, have had little patience with the ways of speech. They have either dismissed it as a by-product of human behaviour, as an adventitious code that only grammarians need be seriously interested in, or they have seen in it but a conveniently externalizing expression, an adequate symbolic complement, of a mental life that is open to direct observation. They have been either blindly disdainful or blindful [sic] trustful. (Sapir 1923:572) And in a 1924 article for a general audience, Sapir has this to say about Ogden and Richards, ignoring their sharp dismissal of his own work: To a far greater extent than the philosopher has realized, he is likely to become the dupe of his speech-forms, which is equivalent to saying that the mould of his thought, which is typically a linguistic mould, is apt to be projected into his conception of the world. Thus innocent linguistic categories may take on the formidable appearance of cosmic absolutes [...] In their recently published work on "The Meaning of Meaning" Messrs. Ogden and Richards have done philosophy a signal service in indicating how readily the most hardheaded thinkers have allowed themselves to be cajoled by the formal slant of their habitual mode of expression. Perhaps the best way to get behind our thought processes and to eliminate from them all the accidents or irrelevances due to their linguistic garb is to plunge into the study of exotic modes of expression. At any rate, I know of no better way to kill spurious 'entities'. (Sapir 1924:154 [1949:157]) Again, Sapir's Language gave no hint that the interrelation of language and 'thought- grooves' might be pernicious, yet the idea will be central to his subsequent writings on the matter, and nowhere more so than in the December 1928 address (Sapir 1929), where he also says ([1949: 162]) that language "powerfully conditions" thinking, that speakers are "very much at the mercy" of their language, and so on. It goes on to state that The philosopher needs to understand language if only to protect himself against his own language habits, and so it is not surprising that philosophy, in attempting to free logic from the trammels of grammar and to understand knowledge and the meaning of symbolism, is compelled to make a preliminary critique of the linguistic process itself [...] Of all students of human behavior, the linguist should by the very nature of his subject matter be the most relativist in feeling, the least taken in by the forms of his own speech. (Sapir 1929:212 [1949:165])

5 The reference to "the meaning of symbolism" is evidently meant to evoke Ogden and Richards, though they are not named in the paper, as a result of which their role in the formulation of the 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis' has been forgotten. My 1996 article also gives details of Sapir's correspondence with Ogden, in which the influence posited here is further documented.

From Sapir to Whorf Whorf was in attendance when Sapir presented his December 1928 address.4 He was already familiar with Ogden and Richards at the time, judging from a reference to "the philosophers of the 'meaning of meaning'" at the end of Whorf (Whorf 1928 ms., frame 610), which he had completed by 28 May 1928 (see letter from Whorf to B. A. M. Schapiro, 28 May 1928, B. L. Whorf Papers, microfilm reel 1, frame 58). The spread of analytic philosophy in the 1920s and '30s made the idea that language shapes thought something of a commonplace, which may explain why Whorf starts his 1941 article with the : "There will probably be general assent to the proposition that an accepted pattern of using words is often prior to certain lines of thinking and forms of behavior [...]". The aftermath would show how much truer this was for other fields than for linguistics. The article goes on to tell how Whorf s interest in the matter predates his studies with Sapir, and comes from his experience with fire insurance cases in which "[...] the cue to a certain line of behavior is often given by the analogies of the linguistic formula in which the situation is spoken of [...] And we always assume that the linguistic analysis made by our group reflects reality better than it does" (Whorf 1941 [1956:137]). Whorf writes about the cases in order to dramatize the danger inherent in this state of affairs, for in each case a misunderstanding prompted by language resulted in a catastrophe his company had to indemnify. At times his position becomes almost identical with Russell's as in the quote on pp 2-3 above: But it must be emphasized that 'all modern Indo-European-speaking observers' is not the same thing as 'all observers.' That modern Chinese or Turkish scientists describe the world in the same terms as Western scientists means, of course, only that they have taken over bodily the entire Western system of rationalizations, not that they have corroborated that system from their native posts of observation. (Whorf 1940a [1956:214]) Of course, Whorf goes further. The last quote leads directly into a comparative look at and "Standard Average European" ("SAE") that will culminate with the formulation of what

4 The Whorf archives at Yale include a letter from Whorf to Roland G. Kent dated 1 January 1929 (B. L. Papers, microfilm reel 1, frame 109) stating that "After attending the fifth session, held jointly with the American Anthropological Association on Dec. 28, 1928,1 should like to make application for membership in the Linguistic Society of America". Also in the archives are his programs from the AAA (B. L. Whorf Papers, microfilm reel 5, frames 1420-22) and LSA (frames 1436-9), the latter with a now barely legible note in Whorf s hand ('"operation of more or less intuitions of factors that never quite reach the intellectual level' Sapir"; in margin, with arrow: "in language", frame 1439).

6 he elsewhere calls the " principle" (Whorf 1940b [1956:221]): " of 'time' and 'matter' are not given in substantially the same form by experience to all men but depend upon the nature of the language or languages through the use of which they have developed" (Whorf 1941 [1956:158]). In formulating the principle this way Whorf gets beyond the metaphysical garbage view he inherited via Sapir and rejoins, again in part, the Humboldtian magic key line. Yet he does not abandon garbage rhetoric consistently, but uses it as needed to persuade laymen of the importance of linguistics. To hammer his point home he even suggests that Hopi or another non-Western language is superior to SAE for formulating certain aspects of physics, leading Percival (1966:8) to remark: "It is as if Sapir and Whorf believed that all languages were equally irrational, but some were more irrational than others, namely our own much- vaunted Indo-European languages [...] Their professed relativism was in reality only skin- deep". Ironically, at these moments when Whorf comes closest to being a Humboldtian, it is in order to reverse Humboldt's hierarchy of linguistic supremacy. What we find in Whorf are language-as-obstacle views from the analytic philosophical line as filtered through Sapir, mixed with professions of relativism and of the superiority of non-Western languages. One might attribute a Humboldtian spirit to Whorf on the grounds that he raises these issues at all, yet this must not prevent our recognizing that the perspective he brings to bear upon them are both anti-Humboldtian and antirelativist in content.

Implications of the two Strands for Neo-Whorfian Linguistics As I noted at the outset, neo-Whorfian approaches to language have concentrated almost exclusively on the magic key strand in Whorfian thought. In an unplanned division of labour, interest in Whorf s metaphysical garbage side has been left to the General movement, which, as is well known, appropriated Whorf to their cause in the year of his death. In the best metaphysical garbage tradition, is devoted to freeing speakers from the power of propaganda, advertising and other forms of mental enslavement which rely on the illusions created by habitual modes of language. As the founder of the movement wrote: We do not realize what tremendous power the structure of an habitual language has. It is not an exaggeration to say that it enslaves us through the mechanism of s.r [semantic reaction] and that the structure which a language exhibits, and impresses upon us unconsciously, is automatically projected upon the world around us. (Korzybski 1933:90, italics in the original) So fully has Whorf been absorbed into General Semantics that Pula 1992 writes of the "Nietzsche-Korzybski-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis". But given that General Semantics claims (and, rightly or wrongly, is usually accorded) only a tangential relationship with linguistics, it will not be the direct springboard for reuniting Whorf s metaphysical garbage strand into the linguistic analysis that takes its inspiration from him.

7 It does, however, suggest a general direction for such a reunification. The common cause which the General Semanticists have recognised in Whorf is the belief that in every language there potentially exist problems which fall out from the language's structure, and more precisely from the way in which thought and speech are conjoined within that structure. Now, for many linguists this belief would be untenable, because it conflicts with an axiomatic doctrine of linguistics that the structure of every language has evolved so as to suit ideally the culture of the people who speak it. As I have pointed out in Joseph 1987, there is no way in which to test this doctrine of linguistic relativism one way or the other. And as discussed in Joseph 1996, Whorf in this regard is not a 'relativist' at all, since he makes very clear that he considers some languages structurally superior to others for particular contexts, as for example when he says that the time structure of Hopi would make it superior to Western languages for use in modern physics. Certain contemporary schools of linguistics, however, do treat particular aspects of language structure and use as problematic. Sapir and Whorf, as well as Ogden (see Joseph forthcoming) and more recently Chomsky (though not in his linguistic work) have been among quite a number of linguists who have taken propaganda and issues related to it as crucial problems of language in the 20th century. In recent years, through a series of influences that go back via Halliday to Firth, Malinowski and perhaps also Ogden, a subarea of discourse analysis known in Britain as critical linguistics has emerged which shares many of the concerns of General Semantics. Critical linguistics however offers itself as a programme not for how to change language to make it impervious to propaganda, but for how to change readers to make them resistent to its effects. Its basis is a kind of close critical reading using the tools developed in discourse analytic work since the early 1970s, and as a result it is methodologically more familiar and appealing to most linguists than General Semantics has ever been. So far, critical linguistics has been practised to my knowledge only by rather radical lefties, but there is no reason in principle why this must be so; indeed, it would be interesting to turn their methods of critical analysis back onto their own discourse. The trouble with critical linguistics in my view isn't that it fails to be descriptive enough, but that it fails to be observant enough. Its descriptions, for me, are too closely driven by its ideology to be convincing, or for that matter to be truly 'critical' in any meaningful sense. Yet I admire its overall willingness to identify some areas of language structure and use as problematical, to set out a view of why they are so and of how the problems can be dealt with. In this regard, critical linguistics goes about overtly doing something which I think may be implicit in all linguistics of a functionalist sort. For functionalist linguistics originated with, and continues to operate on, the assumption that the superficial structures of language which formalist analysis allows us to see do not reveal all that language is really about. Indeed, the formal structures mask the real meanings and operations of language, which only analysis done from a directly functionalist starting point can bring to light. What I want to suggest here, without going into the kind of detail that would make this

8 paper excessively programmatic, is that neo-Whorfian linguistics cannot really be what it claims without developing its own critical dimension, which isn't possible within a strictly formalist framework. Functionalist analysis is inherently critical, because it always implicitly criticises the gap between function and form; and it can be more explicitly critical, as we have seen in the case of critical linguistics, and as there is further room to develop in many areas of therapeutic linguistics, comparative discourse analysis and rhetoric, applied linguistics and education, translation studies and textual studies, to name a few. In all these areas it is comparatively rare for Whorfian perspectives to be invoked, yet Whorf raises fundamental questions for each of them, and in turn, each of them offers a chance to complete Whorf s heritage within neo-Whorfian linguistics.

9 References Carnap, Rudolf. 1931. "Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache". Erkenntnis 2.219-241. Falk, Julia. 1995. "Words without Grammar: Linguists and the international auxiliary language movement in the United States". Language and Communication 15.241-259. Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1836 Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts. Berlin: Koenigl. Academic der Wissenschaften. (English transl., On Language: The diversity of human language-structure and its influence on the mental development of mankind, by Peter Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988.) Joseph, John E. 1987. Eloquence and Power: The rise of language standards and standard languages. London: Frances Pinter; New York: Basil Blackwell. Joseph, John E. 1996. "The Immediate Sources of the 'Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis'". Historiographia Linguistica 23.365-404. Joseph, John E. Forthcoming. "Basic English and the Debabelization of China". Koerner, E. F. Konrad. 1992. "The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis: A preliminary history and a bibliographic essay". Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 2.173-198. (Revised and extended version in Koerner, Professin Linguistic Historiography, 203-240, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1995.) Korzybski, Alfred. 1933. Science and Sanity: An introduction to non-aristotelian systems and general semantics. Lakeville, Ct.: International Non-aristotelian Library Publishing Co., distributed by the Institute of General Semantics. Lee, Penny. 1996. The Whorf Theory Complex: A critical reconstruction. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Ogden, C. K., and I. A. Richards. 1923. The Meaning of Meaning: A study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Percival, Keith. 1966. "A Reconstruction of Whorf s Hypothesis". Anthropological Linguistics 8.8.1 -22. Pula, Robert P. 1992. "The Nietzsche-Korzybski-Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?". ETC.: A Review of General Semantics 49.50-57. Russell, Bertrand. 1924. "". Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal statements, ed. by J. H. Muirhead, 1st series, 359-383. London: George Allen & Unwin. (Repr. in Logical , ed. by A. J. Ayer, 31-50, New York: Free Press, 1959.) Sampson, Geoffrey. 1980. Schools of Linguistics. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press. Sapir, Edward. 1921. Language: An introduction to the study of speech. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Sapir, Edward. 1924. "The Grammarian and his Language". American Mercury 1.149-155. (Repr. in Sapir 1949: 150-159.)

10 Sapir, Edward. 1929. "The Status of Linguistics as a Science". Language 5.207-214. (Repr. In Sapir 1949: 160-166.) Sapir, Edward. 1949. Selected Writings in Language, Culture, and Personality, ed. by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley & Lose Angeles: Univ. of California Press. Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1928 ms. "The Inner Nature of the Hebrew Language". B. L. Whorf papers, microfilm reel 4, frame 800. Yale Univ. Library, Manuscripts & Archives. Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1940a. "Science and Linguistics". Technology Review 42, no. 6 (Apr. 1940), 229-231, 247-248. (Repr. in Whorf 1956: 207-219.) Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1940b. "Linguistics as an Exact Science". Technology Review 43 (Dec. 1940), 61-63, 80-83. (Repr. in Whorf 1956: 220-232.) Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1941. "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language". Language, Culture, and Personality: Essays in memory of , ed. by , 75-93. Menasha, Wise.: Sapir Memorial Publ. Fund. (Repr. In Whorf 1956: 134-159.) Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1956. Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected writings of , ed. by John B. Carroll. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

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