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“A LINGERING MUST BE PREVENTED:” THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTHERN FRONTIER, 1812-1871

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The State University

By

Joseph M. Schweninger, M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University 1998

Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Allan Millett, Adviser

Professor William Childs Adviser Professor Randolph Roth Department of History UMX Number : 9834063

Copyright 1998 by Schweninger, Joseph Michael

All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9834063 Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how the United States defended its northern frontier between and from the to the signing of the of

Washington in 1871. Plans addressed all of the “elements of national defense,” namely , naval forces, regular troops, , and internal improvements.

Geographical considerations, British global policy, cultural connections along the border, technological advances, and population growth were important factors also. As a frontier contiguous with “enemy” territory, the northern frontier required some level of defense.

The population there had a powerful voice that politicians could not ignore.

Based on manuscript sources at the National Archives, official War and State

Department records, and Congressional documents, this study discusses the various crises that threatened to bring war to the northern frontier. To Americans, Britain was the only obstacle to their “” to control the continent. To the British, the border was the only one where they faced a modem nation possessing great potential strength.

Canada was both a hostage used by the United States to ensure Britain’s good behavior and a British bridgehead that could be used to exert leverage on the United States. The

Patriot Rebellion, Oregon Crisis, , Confederate raids on and

11 , and the raids threatened to upset what were ordinarily good Anglo-

American relations.

American strategy on the northern frontier rested on two principles: seizure of the

St. Lawrence River to cut British communication with the interior, and naval supremacy on the . Given logistical considerations, this was an effective strategy. A quick drive against the British lifeline placed the American strength, the ability to marshal superior communications, population, and industrial resources, against the

British weakness, dependence on the St. Lawrence. American strategic goals on the northern frontier were in harmony with national resources. The question remained, however, whether or not success against would be enough to achieve success in a war with Britain.

Ill Dedicated to Ann

IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Professor Allan Millett for his support throughout the project.

Professors Joan Cashin, William Childs, and Randolph Roth also provided valuable advice and insight.

1 am thankful to DeAnne Blanton and Mike Musick at the National Archives.

Mike always responded quickly to my requests and was a valuable asset to my research.

The Inter-Library Loan at The Ohio State University also provided valuable assistance, and Ron McLean of University Technology Services produced the maps.

My Mom and Dad instilled in me the values of faith, hard work, responsibility, and attention to detail that have helped me immeasurably in my personal and professional life. Thank you!

Most of all 1 am grateful to my wife Ann for the enthusiasm, patience, and love that have helped me through my years as a graduate student. She is God’s greatest blessing to me. Without her support my work would not have been possible. Ann kept me grounded in reality, helped me to enjoy my life outside academia, and held my feet to the fire as necessary. Professor Millett warned me that graduate school would be a significant sacrifice. No one knows that more than my wife, and it is to her that I dedicate my work. VITA

September 26, 1964 Bom - St. Louis,

1996 M.A, The Ohio State University

1993 - 1998 Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

1. “Sustaining the Civil Authorities: The Ohio National Guard and the Riot of 1884.” Accepted for publication in Queen City Heritage: The Journal o f the Cincinnati Historical Society.

2. "Fort Davidson and the of Pilot Knob." Fortress 17 (May 1993): 37-45.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Minor Fields: Early Modem European History United States History to 1877

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Dedication ...... iv Acknowledgments ...... v Vita...... vi List of Tables ...... viii List of Maps ...... ix Abbreviations ...... x Chapters; 1. Introduction ...... 1 2. The War of 1812 and the Northern Frontier ...... 13 3. Development of a Strategy, 1815-1824 ...... 60 4. Neglect of the Frontier’s Defenses, 1825-1837 ...... 118 5. The Patriot Crisis, 1838-1840 ...... 155 6. Border Tensions and the Boundary Settlement, 1841-1842 ...... 201 7. The Frontier Between Crises, 1843-1860 ...... 235 8. The Civil War, 1861 -1863 ...... 284 9. The Decline of the Military Frontier, 1863-1871 ...... 333 10. Conclusion ...... 380 Maps ...... 396 Appendices ...... 399 Bibliography ...... 405

Vll LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

3.1. U.S. regiments and corps on northern frontier, 14 March 1815 ...... 63

3.2. Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1816-1824 ...... 65

3.3. U.S. force on the lakes, 1 January 1816 ...... 79

4.1. Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1825-1837 ...... 121

5.1. Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1838-1840 ...... 164

5.2. Military installations recommended for northern frontier, 1840 ...... 190

6.1. Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1841-1842 ...... 204

7.1. Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1843-1851 ...... 249

7.2. Estimates to complete defenses o f northern frontier, 1851 ...... 266

7.3. Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1852-1860 ...... 273

9.1. Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1866-1871 ...... 366

V lll LIST OF MAPS

Map Page

1. The Northern Frontier ...... 396

2. The North Eastern Frontier ...... 397

3. The Outlet of ...... 398

IX ABBREVIATIONS

ASPFR American State Papers: Foreign Relations ASPIA American State Papers: Indian Affairs ASPMA American State Papers: Military Affairs ASPMisc American State Papers: Miscellaneous ASPNA American State Papers: Naval Affairs Brown Papers Jacob J. Brown Papers. Library o f Congress Buell Collection Buell Collection o f Historical Documents Relating to the Corps o f Engineers Jones Papers Roger Jones Papers, Library o f Congress NA, RG 45 National Archives, Record Group 45, Office o f Naval Records and Library NA, RG 59 National Archives, Record Group 59, General Records o f the Department o f State NA, RG 71 National Archives, Record Group 71, Records o f the Bureau o f Yards and Docks NA, RG 76 National Archives, Record Group 76, Records o f Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations NA, RG 77 National Archives, Record Group 77, Records o f the Chief o f Engineers NA, RG 92 National Archives, Record Group 92, Records o f the Office o f the Quartermaster General NA, RG 94 National Archives, Record Group 94, Records o f the Office o f the Adjutant General NA, RG 107 National Archives, Record Group 107, Records o f the Office o f the Secretary o f War NA,RG 156 National Archives, Record Group 156, Records o f the Office o f the Chief of Ordnance NA, RG 393 National Archives, Record Group 393, Records of Army Continental Commands OR The War o f the Rebellion: A Compilation o f the Official Records o f the Union and Confederate Armies ORN Official Records o f the Union and Confederate Navies in the War o f the Rebellion Totten Papers Letters and Reports ofJoseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers, 1803- 64 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On the grounds of , overlooking the shores of Lake , stands a monument commemorating the naval arms limitation agreement of 1817 between the

United States and Great Britain. Erected in 1934, the monument informs the tourist that

“Through mutual understanding and good will the policy set forth by and

Charles Bagot in this treaty has resulted in an unfortified boundary between Canada and the United States.”

The monument is a strange thing to see at a fort that served as a key military post for , Great Britain, and the United States for almost three centuries. Occupied from 1679 to 1759 by the French and by the British until 1796, Fort Niagara controlled access via the Great Lakes to the heart of the continent and its lucrative fur trade. Far from being part of the world’s longest unfortified frontier. Fort Niagara was instead part of a chain of fortifications built by the United States in the years following the War of

1812 along the northern frontier. This frontier was over 2,200 miles long from

Passamaquoddy Bay in Maine to Lake Superior, much of it impenetrable wilderness. It was always considered a possible of war with Britain, the world’s premier maritime power during the period in question and the only realistic foreign threat to

American interests. * Over the years, the Rush-Bagot agreement came to be seen as an

example of an arms accord that worked, proof that disarmament between nations was a

feasible option. Canadian historian C.P. Stacey overturned this view in 1950 with his

article “The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-1871.” He described the

“undefended border” between the United States and Canada as a “popular legend” and a

“distortion of historic fact.” In fact, suggested Stacey, the Rush-Bagot agreement had no

influence on border fortifications. Before 1871 and the signing of the Treaty of

Washington, war between the United States and Britain was always a possibility, and

both sides prepared accordingly. In particular, the rebellion of 1837-1838, the northeast

boundary crisis, the Oregon crisis of 1844-1845, the Trent crisis in 1861, and

Confederate raids launched from Canadian territory in 1864 threatened the otherwise

peaceful relations. It was only with the signing of the Treaty of Washington of 1871 that

outstanding Anglo-American differences were resolved and Canada was released from its

position as an American hostage to Britain’s good behavior."

This study will address the measures the United States government took to defend

its northern frontier^ between the War of 1812 and the signing of the Treaty of

Washington in 1871. The conduct of the War of 1812 is critical to an understanding of

the northern frontier defense issues. That conflict saw the use of fortifications, naval

forces, regular troops, militia, and internal improvements. These factors were all considered “elements of national defense” by nineteenth-century American defense planners. The War of 1812 provided the model for any future conflict with Britain, and the United States prepared accordingly/ Plans for the defense of the northern frontier after the War of 1812 addressed all of the elements of national defense, with the emphasis on each varying according to the threat, population growth, or technological progress. This study will examine how American military planners viewed the British threat, how national development affected military preparations on the northern frontier, and the effectiveness of those preparations. It will also address the various crises that threatened to cause a war between the United States and Britain. Although the two nations never did go to war after 1815, there were several incidents that threatened to destroy the good Anglo-American relations that American presidents claimed to want.

At times, only the quick thinking of local military commanders or wise diplomacy averted tragedy.^

The northern frontier, then, was hardly an unfortified frontier. It was an area of real interest to some American officers, especially in the Corps of Engineers, but more importantly, to the growing population of the region. The northern frontier was not necessarily a Tumerian frontier, a region where immigrants were Americanized and liberated, where native-born Americans demonstrated mobility, optimism, and individualism. In fact, the northern frontier was a frontier where the advance was a steady movement toward, not away from, European influence. The border region was instead a zone of cultural and economic interchange, heavily populated on both sides by

New Yankees. The border itself was largely imaginary, and people migrated back and forth, creating a common community of English-speaking North Americans.

Adam Fergusson, travelling in in 1831, asked his Yankee guide in Kingston about the likelihood of war. He received the response that “if we don’t fight for a year or two, we won’t fight at all, for we are marrying so fast, sir, that a man won’t be sure but he may shoot his father or his brother-in-law.” But as a frontier contiguous with

“enemy” territory, the northern frontier of the United States required some level of defense, because Anglo-American disputes could lead to war along the border. Although they might not have feared their Canadian brethren, the Americans of the northern frontier nurtured a traditional Anglophobia and had a powerful voice that politicians could not afford to ignore.^

The Northern frontier played an important role in military planning since it marked the only location where American and British territory were contiguous. From the British point of view, this border was the only one on which Britain faced a modem western nation that possessed great potential strength. From the American point of view,

Britain was the most powerful neighbor of the United States, the only conceivable obstacle to the “Manifest Destiny” of Americans to control the continent. Canada was both a hostage used by the United States to ensure Britain’s good behavior and a means for Britain to exert leverage on the United States, since Canada was a bridgehead that the

British could use to deploy military force in case of conflict. The defense of this frontier was not of equal importance to both sides, however. Britain was more vulnerable on the

St. Lawrence and Great Lakes, while the United States was more vulnerable along the

Atlantic seaboard. Thus, each side focused on the defense of these particular frontiers.

British planners were convinced that Canada could be defended, while American planners were equally certain that Canada could not be. The inhabitants of Canada were caught in the middle, forced to participate in that were the creation of Westminster or Washington. Nevertheless, there tended to be little attention paid to the northern frontier, especially by the Americans, except in time of crisis. The British considered a large garrison and extensive fortifications to be too expensive, while the Americans were willing to rely, against the wishes of the residents of the Old Northwest, on operations to be the best defense of the northern frontier.’

Geography and climate had an enormous impact on military and naval operations along the northern frontier and affected strategy accordingly. Ocean inlets, rivers, the

Great Lakes, mountains, and harsh winters placed limits on what the United States or

Britain could achieve during a war. Of course, these geographic factors could provide opportunities as well. While rivers and mountains limited the number of avenues of approach for the invader, they made the defender’s job easier by providing chokepoints that could easily be closed by fortifications. For both sides, then, the defense of the northern frontier was a matter of defending chokepoints or exploiting them. In the case of the United States, offense seemed to promise the best chance of decisive results.

Thus, American officers considered quick offensive action against at the onset of war with Britain to be the best way to defend the northern frontier. This neglect of the western population’s concerns demonstrates the same lack of political savvy that would plague many Union commanders during the Civil War.

American strategists in the nineteenth century likened to a tree.® The taproot, the source of sustenance, was the great naval base at Halifax.^ This was a crucial position for several reasons. First, it was a way station to the source of supply in Britain. As long as Halifax remained in British hands, the mother country could project men and materiel across the Atlantic, a crucial prerequisite for the survival of Canada. Second, Halifax was the key to the maintenance of during the winter, because ice and storms closed the St. Lawrence River between December and April.

During that period supplies had to be sent overland from Halifax, up the St. John and

Madawaska Rivers to Lake Temiscouata, across the thirty-six miles of rocky wilderness known as the Grand Portage, to the St. Lawrence at Notre Dame du Portage. This

“Temiscouata route” would later be the basis for the Maine boundary dispute, since secure communication between the Maritime Provinces and Quebec was a matter of great importance to the British. Finally, Halifax provided a base for raids on the United

States seaboard, posing an offensive threat during war. For example, the British base was about 400 miles from . Removing the taproot, seizing Halifax, would ensure the fall of the rest of the British North American tree and reduce the threat of raids on the maritime frontier. Logistically, however, such action was unlikely. Most of Maine remained a dense wilderness through the mid-nineteenth century and lacked the communications, such as roads and railroads, to make an attack on the Maritime

Provinces possible. The lack of settlement also meant that it would be impossible for armies to live off the land. American troops could interdict the Temiscouata route merely by marching across the border, but this still left Halifax in enemy hands.

Logistical restraints dictated that American efforts would be directed against other parts of the tree." Quebec was the stump of the tree, and both British and American observers knew that seizing the city would inevitably lead to the fall of the rest of the provinces. Situated high above the St. Lawrence on a blitff, the city was naturally strong and also possessed fortifications that could at least protect against a swift surprise attack. Quebec was more accessible to American forces than Halifax, as events during the American War of

Independence proved. In 1775, American rebels approached the city both from Montreal and from the south. Benedict Arnold took the latter route, following the Ketmebec River in Maine up to its source, then going cross-coimtry over the Height of Land and down the

Chaudière River. Although this avenue of approach brought the American invaders within about five miles of Quebec, it was also a logistical nightmare. Arnold’s force was greatly reduced by desertion, disease, and other hardship, and it lacked the heavy ordnance needed to breech the city’s defenses. The Americans attempted to storm the lower city and failed, finally retreating back to the United States when the ice melted and

British reinforcements arrived by sea in May. Thus, logistical constraints dictated that

Maine would not be a suitable base for offensive operations, no matter how appealing the situation might appear on a map. Again, the major American offensive effort against

Canada would have to come elsewhere.

The logical place to strike at British North America, given the logistical considerations, was along the St. Lawrence River in the vicinity of Montreal, the trunk of the Canadian tree. Since British sea power was essential to Canadian security, the seizure of the St. Lawrence could block British attempts to project men and materiel to the interior of the continent. By cutting the trunk, Americans believed, they could cause the rest of the tree to wither and die. The Montreal region was a critical chokepoint because of the rapids on the St. Lawrence above the city. Above Montreal, men and materiel could move by boat, but only by small craft such as Durham boats or bateavxP

Between Montreal and Kingston, dangerous rapids seriously hampered navigation on the

St. Lawrence, a situation relieved only somewhat by the later construction of and railroads. Montreal was thus the link between the and Upper Canada, and it providentially sat at the end of an excellent avenue of approach, the Lake Champlain-

Richelieu River corridor. Along this route an American army, supplied from Albany, could move its heavy ordnance and supplies by boat, seize Montreal, and cut off British assistance to the Great Lakes region. As the branches withered, American forces could then move downstream and take Quebec by a regular , permanently removing

British power from the continent except for the base at Halifax. The Lake Champlain axis was feasible from a logistical standpoint, and it would remain the key to American military planning throughout the nineteenth century.

British North America above the St. Lawrence constituted the branches of the

Canadian tree. Ideally, there would only be supporting operations in the Great Lakes region, meant to distract British resources from the decisive theater around Montreal.

The lakes were important most of all because they served as lines of conun unication for both the British and the Americans, the difference being that the Americans also had well-protected lines of communication in the interior of the country as well. The Great

Lakes had long been crucial to the fur trade, which demonstrates the fact that chokepoints at the heads and mouths of the lakes were equally important both

8 commercially and militarily. The first forts at these locations were built to control the fur trade, and later served to protect the border from enemy attack.'^ The first of these chokepoints was at the mouth of , where the city of Kingston, Ontario stands. Kingston was an important base that helped secure the line of communication from Britain to the interior of North America, and as such was the objective of American attacks, both during the War of 1812 and in war plans. The second chokepoint was the

Niagara frontier, along the strait that connects Lakes Ontario and Erie. The greatest of the obstructions to navigation in British North America, Niagara Falls, divided the Great

Lakes into Lake Ontario and the “Upper Lakes” of Erie, Huron, , and Superior.

Control of this chokepoint could block British access to the Upper Lakes and facilitate

American operations in Upper Canada. The importance of controlling the Great Lakes cannot be underestimated, since navigation on them was crucial to the success of land campaigns. These lakes are actually great inland seas, requiring the same precautions as ocean navigation.'^ The War of 1812 showed how command of the lakes enabled the possessor to move armies and supplies with relative ease, given the terrible state of roads at the time. Controlling the key Great Lake chokepoints would help achieve naval supremacy and would provide or deny bridgeheads to invading armies.

The third great chokepoint was on the frontier, which controlled the straits between Lakes Erie and Huron. This chokepoint, as the others, was in both American and British hands. The Detroit frontier was additionally important since it controlled

British access to the Indians and the fur trade of the Northwest, as did the other chokepoints above Detroit. One of the main American considerations in the Upper Lakes region was to get in between the Indian tribes and their erstwhile British allies. If the

Americans could secure the Detroit frontier and the lakes above it, they could eliminate the chance of destructive Indian raids against the Old Northwest. If the British prevailed in the area, the results could be disastrous, as in 1812. Due to its location far to the west, however, Detroit would never be the decisive theater in a war. would still be the main objective. The other two key chokepoints, at Mackinac and Sault Ste. Marie, were likewise too far west to be decisive but remained important for local defense concerns. The former location guarded the straits between Lakes Huron and Michigan, while the latter was on the rapids connecting Lakes Superior and Huron. Logistical concerns also dictated that major operations would not take place in this theater, at least until the arrival of railroads. The Black Swamp, a marshy region covering most of northwest Ohio, isolated Detroit from the rest of the United States. The Great Lakes region was too far removed from the center of American power for the area to be the scene of decisive operations. The Upper Lakes would always be of secondary importance to American planners, despite the pleas of the growing population of the Old

Northwest. Geography thus was the primary consideration in American strategy for the defense of the northern frontier.

10 ’ For a detailed description of the topography along much of the boundary between the United States and British North America, see McEIroy and Thomas Riggs, eds.. The Unfortified Boundary: A Diary o f the First Survey o f the Canadian Boundary Line from St. Regis to the Lake o f the Woods by Major Joseph Delafield American Agent under Articles VI and VII o f the (: Privately printed, 1943); Delafield traveled back and forth along the boundary between 1817 and 1823. For the historical geography of the northern frontier, see Ralph H. Brown, Historical Geography o f the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World 1948), 195-235, 270-87, and R_ Cole Harris and John Warkentin, Canada before : A Study in Historical Geography (: Carleton University Press, 1991), 3-231. For the extent of the northern frontier, see “Reduction of the Army Considered” 14 December 1818, in ASPMA 1, 15th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 168, ser. 16, 791: Fond de Lac to Sault Ste. Marie (340 miles); to Mackinac (100); to outlet of (290); to Detroit (100); to Bufialo (375); to Sackets Harbor (240); to St. Regis (160); to River (165); to northeast extremity of United States (250); to (210); for a total of 2,230 miles.

^ C.P. Stacey, “The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-1871,” American Historical Review 56 (October 1950): 1-18. See also Stanley L. Falk, “Disarmament on the Great Lakes: Myth or Reality?” Proceedings o f the United States Naval Institute 87 (December 1961): 69-73; Falk, writing at the height of the , builds on Stacey’s thesis, adding that the Agreement of 1817 is hardly proof that disarmament can work.

^ During the period in question, what Americans referred to as “Canada” was actually several provinces, the “Maritime Provinces” of Newfoundland , Prince Edward Island, and , Lower Canada (roughly present-day Quebec), and Upper Canada (roughly present-day Ontario). Lower and Upper Canada were also referred to as “” and “Canada West” in the mid-nineteenth century. The great frir-trading concern, Hudson’s Bay Company, controlled the vast lands to the Northwest, known as Rupert’s Land.

■* For the emphasis of the Army oflBcer corps on planning for a war with European powers, see William B. Skelton, An American Profession o f Arms: The Army Corps, 1784-1861 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992); many officers were preoccupied with fortifications, reflecting their view that a future war would likely be with Britain, a replay of the War of 1812.

' For an alternate view, see Edgar B. Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study o f Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (Miimeapolis: University of , 1935); Wesley suggests that despite local protest, the northern frontier ceased to be a military frontier. Due to rapid settlement, reduced Indian threat, and better relations with Britain, Wesley believes, the area had lost its strategic significance. Nevertheless, the funds spent on the northern frontier, though small compared to the Atlantic and Gulf Coast frontiers, would seem to suggest otherwise.

* Frederick J. Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in The Frontier in American History, with a foreword by Ray Allen Billington (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1920, 1947, 1962); Marcus Lee Hansen, The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940); Fergusson, in Fred Landon, Western Ontario and the (: The Ryerson Press, 1941), 61.

’ Richard A. Preston, The Defence o f the Undefended Border: Planning fo r War in North America, 1867- 1939. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977), 11; Albert B. Corey, “Canadian Border Defence Problems after 1814 to Their Culmination in the ‘Forties,” Annual Report o f the Canadian Historical Association (1938): 111-19. A Canadian historian has summed up the Canadian dilemma well: “The British expected Canadians to defend themselves from dangers the British themselves had helped create” (Desmond Morton, A Military : From Champlain to the , 3d. ed., (Toronto: McClelland & 11 Stewart, 1992), 85). For an overview of Canadian military history, highlighting the role military operations have played in ensuring Canada’s status as a distinct political unit in North America, see George E.G. Stanley, CeuuuJa's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People, 3d ed. (Toronto; Macmillan, 1974).

* See, for example, George W. Cullum, Campaigns of the War o f 1812-15, Sketched and Criticized (New York: , 1879).

’ For the strategic importance of Halifax, see C.P. Stacey, “Halifax as an International Strategic Factor, 1749-1949,” Annual Report o f the Canadian Historical Association ( 1949), 46-56.

For opening and closing dates of navigation on the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, see William J. Wilgus, The Railway Interrelations o f the United States and Canada (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 219n; Wilgus gives 28 April to 7 December as the navigation season on the St. Lawrence below Montreal.

“ C.P. Stacey, “The Backbone of Canada,” Annual Report o f the Canadian Historical Association (1953): 1-3.

For a brief description of the American operations against Canada in 1775-1776, see Don Higginbotham, The War o f American Independence: Military Attitudes. Policies, amd Practice, 1763-1789 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983), 106-15. For the supply difficulties encountered during Arnold’s march, see James A. Huston, “The Logistics of Arnold’s March to Quebec,” Military Affairs 32 (December 1968): 110-24.

John M. Duncan, a British traveler in the northern fi-ontier region in 1818 and 1819, described these vessels. Durham boats could use sails or oars, but they had to be laboriously moved by poles to go through rapids; the boat he traveled in was sixty-two feet long and eleven feet four inches wide, drawing twenty- eight inches of water. To water out, the crew nailed planks along the sides. Duncan described bateaux as flat-bottomed, strongly-constructed vessels, tapering to a point at the ends. He felt that the bateaux could withstand a severe pounding on the rivers and did not ride as low in the water as Durham boats. Duncan urged travelers to use batecnix, which were not as fast as Durham boats but much safer. See John M. Duncan, Travels Through Part o f the United States and Canada in 1818 and 1819, vol. 2 (New York. W.B. Gilley, 1823), 118-19. Duncan found the St. Lawrence navigable by and between Kingston and Prescott, but between Prescott and Montreal, nothing larger than Durham boats or bateaicc could pass due to the rapids.

'■* For the dangers of the St. Lawrence rapids, see John Knox, An Historical Journal o f the Campaigns in North America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760, vol. 2, ed. Arthur G. Doughty (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1914), 557; a British force moving down the St. Lawrence in September 1760 tried to run the rapids between Coteau-du-Lac and Lac St. Louis and met with disaster, losing forty-six bateaux, seventeen whale boats, one row galley, and eighty-four men drowned.

** For the fur trade and the interior of British North America, see W.J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760, rev. ed. (Albuquerque: University o f New Press, 1969, 1983).

For instance, John Duncan, a traveler voyaging from Niagara to York in 1818 across Lake Ontario, the smallest of the Great Lakes, was out of sight o f land for twenty-four hours; see Duncan, Travels Through Part o f the United States and Canada, vol. 2, 109.

12 CHAPTER 2

THE WAR OF 1812 AND THE NORTHERN FRONTIER

A lingering war mast be prevented. - , 10 February 1815’

On 13 July 1812, General William crossed the at the head of an American army and issued a proclamation to the people of Canada. He assured them that his invasion was only “manly resistance” in response to repeated British “insults and indignities,” that he had invaded Canada “to find enemies not to make them.” Hull appealed to the Canadians’ love of liberty, urging them to accept American assistance against British “Tyraimy” and “injustice.” He offered them “the invaluable blessings of

Civil, Political, & Religious Liberty, and their necessary result, individual, and general, prosperity.” If they did not resist, Hull proclaimed, the inhabitants o f Canada had nothing to fear; if they did fight back, however, they would be subject to the horrors of war, especially if the British followed their “barbarous and savage policy” of unleashing

Indian tribes against American citizens. In that case, the conflict would become “a war of extermination.” Hull warned that “the first stroke with the , the first attempt with the scalping knife will be the signal for one indiscriminate scene of desolation.” The choice, Hull said, was between “Peace, Liberty, and Security” and

13 “PFûfr, slavery, and destruction.'"’ Little did know that within a few weeks

his liberating army would withdraw in confusion, that he would surrender both his force

and the fort at Detroit, and that later he would be sentenced to death by court martial for

cowardice and neglect of duty/

Both Britain and the United States had recognized the possibility of another

Anglo-American War after the War of Independence. In his “Sentiments on a Peace

Establishment” (1783), had recognized the vulnerability of the

northern frontier and recommended eight or nine garrisons from Maine to Lake Superior.

He also understood the advantage that naval supremacy on the lakes gave the British.^

Unfortunately for Washington and other nationalists. Congress was in no mood to

maintain a large standing army. Many commentators insisted that the militia was the

best means of defense for the nation, compatible with republican ideals and no threat to

individual liberties. A standing army, through the power that it provided, could corrupt

the governing authority, and then be used as a tool of oppression. Thus, any plans for the

northern frontier had to take citizen soldiers into account.^

After the War of Independence, there were numerous differences between the

United States and Britain. First, the British refused to relinquish several key posts on the

northern frontier, namely Point-au-Fer on Lake Champlain, Oswegatchie on the St.

Lawrence River, Oswego, Fort Niagara, Detroit, and Michilimackinac (Mackinac). The

British held these posts to maintain their influence over the valuable fur trade

(headquartered at Montreal) and to continue their assistance to the Indian tribes along the border and Great Lakes/ Abandoned at the peace table in 1783, the tribes resented their

14 treatment by the British. If the posts were in American hands and the Indians no longer received the customary gifts, the British feared, the tribes might turn on the British settlements in Canada. Second, Britain was involved in war with Revolutionary France, and Royal Navy seized the neutral shipping that plied the profitable route between the West Indies and Europe. Some 300 of these seized vessels were American, and the resulting dispute had by 1794 created a war scare, prompting the United States to start construction on the so-called “First System” of coastal defenses. Jay’s Treaty in 1794 required the British to relinquish the border posts by July 1796, but it did nothing about neutral seizures. That issue would continue to harm Anglo-American relations until war broke out in 1812.

But the greatest threat to Anglo-American relations prior to 1812 was the

Chesapeake affair in 1807. The resulting public outcry forced the Jefferson administration to prepare for a possible war with Britain, prompting the “Second System” of coastal defenses. In a letter to Jefferson on 25 July 1807, Secretary of the Treasury

Albert Gallatin gave his recommendation for American strategy.^ Gallatin’s letter reflected several realities that would face American planners for the rest of the century.

First, the United States would be forced to conduct defensive operations along the seaboard and offensive operations along the Canadian frontier. Second, the main object of the attack should be in the Montreal region. Finally, militia would have to provide the bulk of the American forces, given the prejudice against a large standing army.

Gallatin’s strategy sought decisive results, and while at times overly ambitious, was generally sound. First, he recommended that the administration seek the service of

15 twelve-month volunteers instead of the customary six months. Offensive operations would require a force that remained in being long enough both to achieve some level of tactical competence and, most importantly, to get the job done before the men started drifting home. Second, Gallatin designated points on Lake Erie, the Genesee River in upstate New York, and Lake Champlain, and either Portland, Maine or Boston, as depots for war materiel. He warned that a large number of bateaux would be necessary to support the planned attacks.

Gallatin’s operations recognized Britain’s strategic dilemma, which was the vulnerability of her communications. The loss of the St. Lawrence River line would ultimately lead to the fall of British North America above Montreal. Gallatin recommended that American forces seize the St. Lawrence near Montreal, in order to cut communications with the Indian tribes and the settlements of Upper Canada. New York militia would play a major role in that effort, seizing the important Lake Ontario port of

Kingston as well. Upon securing Montreal, United States forces could then move downstream and attack Quebec before the garrison could be reinforced. Gallatin did recommend secondary operations against Upper Canada to protect the Great Lakes frontier and to ruin the British fur trade. These attacks, conducted by troops drawn mainly from Ohio, , and , would take place on the Detroit and

Niagara frontiers. Gallatin also told Jefferson that an attack on New Brunswick from the state of Maine would cut the communication between Nova Scotia and Quebec, assisting the American attack on the city. Finally, Gallatin recommended that American forces, mainly drawn from the militia, take Halifax. This would provide the

16 United States with a new naval base and would reduce the chance that Britain could mount an effective blockade against the American seaboard. While the Halifax operation was probably not realistic, given the logistical difficulties and the vagaries of militia while engaged in offensive operations, Gallatin had recognized the keys to American success in a war with Britain; cut the St. Lawrence trunk and remove the stump at

Quebec.

British officers in Canada recognized this threat from the United States.

Canada’s defense system had slowly taken shape since 1775, and it was based on two factors, Britain’s awesome naval power and the presence of a garrison of regular troops.

Naval supremacy allowed Britain to project both its industrial strength and manpower to

Canada if needed, and the regulars provided a nucleus of well-trained units that could train the militia, bear the brunt of field operations, and hold out against American attack until relief arrived. While Britain would provide regulars, leadership, professional and technical skill, and costly items such as ordnance, fortifications, and canals, Canada’s role was to provide militia, which would make up the greater part of the military’s strength. units were administrative and not tactical organizations, and there was little provision for peacetime training. In wartime, the more active men, that is to say generally the youngest and the most expendable, would be organized into long- service units trained, and sometimes led, by regulars.’

Thus, pre-war British strategy was based on the premise that as long as the Royal

Navy controlled the North Atlantic and a respectable garrison held Quebec, any

American attempt to conquer Canada would end in failure. An American army

17 advancing along the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route would not have time to take both Montreal and Quebec before the onset of winter. In the spring, a British fleet would arrive at Quebec with supplies and an army that could recapture whatever had been lost.

Nevertheless, some British officers were pessimistic about Canada’s chances of survival in an Anglo-American war. In December 1807, Governor General Sir James Craig complained that Quebec was the only British post that could “be considered tenable for a moment.” He feared that if the Americans made a concerted effort to take Lower

Canada, his forces could only delay the invaders for a short period of time. Eventually,

Craig predicted, the British forces in Lower Canada would have to take refuge in Quebec, which would fall to a siege. The situation in Upper Canada was even worse. In February

1812, General warned that unless British forces controlled Detroit and

Mackinac, he would probably have to evacuate the entire province as far as Kingston.

Conditions for American success, then, seemed favorable.*

The United States declared war on Great Britain on 18 June 1812. It was the closest vote on a declaration of war in American history, 19-13 in the Senate and 79-49 in the House. The vote was mainly along party lines, with the Republicans, strongest in

Pennsylvania, the South, and the West, voting for the war, and the Federalists, stronger in the North and East, voting against. Americans along the northeastern seaboard opposed war with Britain for several reasons. First, the pro-British Federalists feared that a war could help Napoleonic France. Second, war would greatly disrupt trade, the source of the

Northeast’s great wealth. Finally, the coastal areas of the Northeast were vulnerable to

British attack. War was more popular in the South and West for two main reasons. First,

18 war could eliminate British, and perhaps Spanish, influence among the Indian tribes

blocking American expansion.^ Second, the West had less to lose in a war since it was

secure from British naval power. Thus a second war aim emerged among the “War

Hawk” politicians, the removal of British power from Canada. This war aim fit the traditional American goal of absolute security. Remove the British, reasoned many observers, and remove the only possible threat to the continued existence of the United

States.

War with Britain, then, could both force the British to make concessions concerning “free trade and sailor’s rights” and permanently remove the British from

North America. Permanently removing Britain from the continent required, of course, an invasion of Canada. In fact, it is perhaps unlikely that the United States would have declared war if Canada had not been in British hands. There was nowhere else that

American forces could inflict sufficient damage to British interests. The only alternative was a naval war, but this could be no more decisive than the Quasi War of 1798-1800 had been with France. But how could attacking Canada gain the United States satisfaction for maritime grievances? J.C.A. Stagg has suggested that by occupying the increasingly-prosperous Canada, a key part of the , Madison hoped to damage the British economic position enough to force concessions. Britain had obtained the bulk of her naval stores, such as hemp, pitch, and timbers, from and the Baltic.

Since the had cut off access to the Baltic, Britain needed access to

Canada’s resources more than ever. Furthermore, Madison had long wanted to place

American and British trade on an equal footing; seizing Canada could enhance America’s

19 commercial position vis-à-vis Britain. The inhabitants of British North America would

pay, then, for their proximity to the United States and for their connection to Britain.

Involuntary enemies of the United States, Canadians would bear the brunt of the war.

The Madison administration had no other choice, once it had made the fateful decision to go to war. Taking the offensive against Canada was the only way to bring the war to a successful and decisive end. As Secretary of State James Monroe said in June 1812, “in case of war, it might be necessary to invade Canada; not as an object of the war, but as a means to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion.”' '

Unfortunately for the United States, the War of 1812 would be far from

“satisfactory.” Instead, the war would be a constant story of campaigns for limited strategic gains. This was certainly not due to a lack of resources. The United States, with a population in excess of seven million, had a great advantage in terms of manpower resources. The British provinces, by contrast, totaled only about 500,000, scattered across the breadth of the colony, growing sparser as one went west. Based on the superior population, the American militia system provided an immense reservoir of manpower. As Robert L. Kerby has shown, by 1812 there were enough militiamen not just to invade Canada but to repopulate it. Incomplete returns estimated militia strength at 719,449 men. The various states would thus have had little trouble meeting their quota, which called for a national total of 100,000 men. In addition, British North

America was inferior to the United States in agriculture and manufacturing. Throughout the war, British forces were dependent for survival on American meat and grain, and they faced constant shortages of clothing and other war materiel. All goods had to be shipped

20 from Britain, a daunting prospect given the distance of almost 4,000 miles between

London and , the main British post on the Detroit frontier. This route was one of great difficulty and complexity. Goods went first by sea to Quebec, where they were transferred to or steamboat for the trip to Montreal. At Montreal, shipments were again transferred, this time to bateaux for the arduous trek up and over the rapids and portages of the St. Lawrence to the Great Lakes. From Montreal west, the route was vulnerable to American attacks and plagued by bad roads. Another major obstacle was the climate since winter closed harbors and heavy rains turned those roads that did exist into quagmires. There is little wonder, then, that the British planned to remain on the defensive. Offensive operations would have ruined the already over­ burdened logistical system.'^

While the United States possessed great advantages in material resources, political opposition to the war in key states along the northern frontier was a serious weakness. In New England, governors refused to detach their militia for federal service.

For instance. Governor Caleb Strong of rejected Secretary of War William

Eustis’s call for Massachusetts’ quota of 10,000 militia. Eustis wanted to put the men under federal control and use them for harbor defense. Strong did not believe the danger of invasion to be considerable, and furthermore told Eustis that the troops would perform better if stationed in their home districts and commanded by their own officers. The governors of Cormecticut and likewise refused, both out of constitutional scruples over militia control and as a way to register protest against a war that they believed to be unjust. There was also considerable opposition to the war in Vermont.

21 Geography dictated that the Champlain Valley had close economic ties to Canada; the

Champlain-Richelieu corridor was the best way to send goods to market, so most

Vermonters sent their produce to consumers in Lower Canada and Britain. War threatened to disrupt this trade, and in fact Vermonters continued to trade with the enemy throughout the war. American officers complained that profiteers in the Champlain

Valley fed the very enemy armies that were devastating the frontiers. Lumbermen kept supplying tar, planks, spars, and other naval stores to enemy shipyards at Isle aux Noix and Sl Jean, and as many as two-thirds of the troops in Canada lived on beef from

Vermont and New York. Despite the harmful effects to the American war effort,

Madison’s government did little to stop the illegal trade. A complete stoppage would have had serious economic ramifications and might have led to open opposition to the

American war effort. In western New York, there was little enthusiasm for an offensive war against the British. The inhabitants were exposed to attack, and active military operations could hurt their economic position since they had great trade with and through

Canada. For example, the Americans in the region of Ogdensburg were reluctant to start hostilities, and many even wanted to remain neutral. Their Upper Canadian neighbors reciprocated and remained on the defensive, begging British commanders to refrain from attacks on American private property that could invite retaliation. Since the United

States had to rely on militia and volunteers to build the forces necessary for offensive operations, opposition to the war in those regions nearest the primary theater, the St.

Lawrence-Lake Champlain region, was a serious strategic liability. Enthusiasm for the war would thus have a direct impact on American strategy.

22 Thus, even though the administration, its friends, and its enemies recognized that

the key to decision was directing all efforts at Montreal and a final siege of Quebec,

Madison could not make the drive from Lake Champlain the main effort. In July 1812

there were only 6,686 American regulars, scattered to all comers of the country. The

cooperation of local governors and the enthusiasm of the local population were

imperative if the administration could hope to raise the militia and volunteers needed for

successful offensive operations. Federalist New England was unlikely to provide enough

men and materiel for a successful attack against Montreal and Quebec, so Madison

agreed also to conduct operations in the one area where there was support for the war, the

West. In states such as Kentucky and Ohio the administration could find the necessary

men and supplies for offensive operations. Furthermore, something had to be done about

the Indian threat in the Northwest. Campaigns on the western frontiers could protect the

American population from Indian depredations. Montreal would still be an objective in

1812, but it would not be the primary one.’^

The United States conducted its operations in three theaters in 1812, on the

Detroit, Niagara, and St. Lawrence frontiers. The Americans suffered from over­

confidence. War Hawk John C. Calhoun declared in June that Upper Canada and part of

Lower Canada would be in American hands within a month. described

the conquest of Canada up to Quebec as “a mere matter of marching.” The odds seemed

to be good. There were only about 10,000 British regulars and some 86,000 ill-equipped

and undisciplined militia scattered throughout British North America. Lower Canada had about 4,000 regulars and 60,000 militia, while Upper Canada had only about 1,200

23 regulars and 11,000 militia. The British could not risk transferring many of the regulars in Nova Scotia, the neighborhood of Halifax, to points west. If the United States could mobilize its great strength, its militia, Canada would easily fall. Despite the great

American confidence, however, all three operations ended in failure, and the British position in the West emerged from the campaign of 1812 in far better shape than it had been at the beginning.

On the Detroit frontier, the campaign started off on a promising note, as

American forces entered Upper Canada. Hull’s invasion in mid-July faced little resistance, although 200 Ohio militiamen refused to enter foreign territory. Although many Canadian militiamen deserted to Hull’s army, problems soon set in. The British controlled the Great Lakes at the beginning of the war, due mainly to the presence of the

Provincial Marine, the military transport service. Britain maintained government vessels on the lakes since water transport was the only way to move men and materiel with ease.

The British had six vessels on Lake Ontario, while the United States had only the

Oneida on anti-smuggling patrol.*^ The British had another six vessels on Lake Erie, opposed by the American army vessel Adams, which soon fell into British hands. This naval supremacy had great logistical implications. Hull’s line of communication passed over the Detroit River, and it was thus vulnerable to interdiction by the British Lake Erie flotilla. The British could also land forces at any point along the lake frontier. In addition, the Americans had great difficulty transporting supplies in the Northwest, given the wild and unsettled nature of the region. The only populated area was Detroit itself, which was cut off from Ohio by the nearly-impenetrable Black Swamp.'* As British

24 blocked water communications and Indian raiders harassed communications overland, Hull received word that a British and Indian force had captured Mackinac, an important post that commanded the straits between Lakes Huron and Michigan, the fur trade, and the allegiance of the Northwest Indian tribes. The capture of that post was significant because it encouraged the tribes to support the British; in previous wars with the Americans, the British had abandoned their Indian allies, and decisive action against

Mackinac convinced the tribes of the Northwest that the British were in earnest this time.

Fearing the descent of thousands of Indians across the Great Lakes, Hull pulled back to

Detroit, ordered the garrison at Fort Dearborn () to evacuate their post, and waited to see what the British would do.

Hull did not have to wait long, for he faced a bold opponent. Isaac Brock, commanding a force of regulars, militia, and Indians under , marched on

Detroit. Brock felt he had little choice, recognizing the importance of his lines of communication back to Lower Canada. He admitted his move against Detroit was bold, but he said that the situation required “nothing but desperate remedies.” Brock’s forces had captured papers indicating Hull’s fear of Indian attack. Thus, Brock sent a note to

Hull on 15 August, warning that he might not be able to control his Indian allies during an assault on Detroit. Aged, infirm, and concerned about the safety of his female relatives, Hull surrendered the next day, even though his 2,500 men oumumbered

Brock’s force almost two to one. Incompetent leadership thus emerged as another

American weakness. To make matters worse, Pottawatomie warriors attacked the retreating Dearborn garrison and refugees, killing most of them. The capture of

25 Mackinac emboldened the tribes, whose resentment toward the United States had been building before the war. The Indians were now convinced that the British meant business in the conflict; the frontier was now aflame and Indian raiders ravaged settlements in the

Northwest Brock’s audacity, Hull’s timidity, and another disastrous American defeat at

Frenchtown in January 1813 wrecked the American position in the West and turned the war around for the British. The original British strategy had accepted the loss of the

West and a concentration on Lower Canada, but Brock had made this unnecessary. By delaying the American invasion of Upper Canada for at least a year, he provided time to collect reinforcements and organize militia and volunteer forces. Henry Goulbum, one of the three British representatives who worked on the Treaty of Ghent, credited Brock’s capture of Detroit with “the ultimate preservation” of Upper Canada.

Operations on the Niagara frontier were equally disappointing to the Americans.

After taking Detroit, Brock took advantage of his naval superiority on Lake Erie and quickly shifted to the Niagara frontier. Control of the Lakes gave Brock the advantage of the central position, namely the . He had excellent communications with his flanks at Detroit in the west and Kingston in the east. The American commander was , a Federalist politician recently commissioned a general in command of an army of 6,000 regulars and militia. Brock had about 2,000 regulars, militia, and Indians at his disposal. On 13 October Van Rensselaer’s forces crossed the Niagara and captured Queenston, but the bulk of his militia refused to enter foreign soil, leaving the regulars stranded. About 950 Americans were forced to

26 surrender; for the British, the Niagara frontier was secure, albeit at the cost of Isaac

Brock, killed during the battle on Queenston Heights.

The offensive against Montreal, the most important of the three operations in

1812, made the American debacle complete. This operation, commanded by the aged

General , was supposed to help divert British forces from the west as well as take the key to Upper Canada. Political considerations were crucial. The cooperation of New England and New York was critical to the success of a drive on

Montreal, but Federalists obstructed efforts to raise the necessary militia. Dearborn had delayed for several months trying to raise men in New England and prepare coastal defenses there. The delay allowed Brock to concentrate his meager forces and inflict defeats on the Detroit and Niagara frontiers. Secretary of War Eustis finally ordered

Dearborn to go to New York and prepare to attack on Montreal. Thus, it was not until

November that Dearborn led his army, up to 8,000 strong, to Plattsburgh on Lake

Champlain. Again, the militia refused to cross the border. It was far too late in the season anyway for a successful attack, so Dearborn established a base just across the border in preparation for the campaign in 1813. Decisive efforts to seize Montreal thus remained elusive.

Despite failures on land, the naval situation steadily improved for the United

States. At sea, American had spectacular successes against the Royal Navy, whose vessels were stretched thin due to commitments against Napoleonic France. The situation on the Great Lakes was even more significant. As C.P. Stacey has shown, one must imderstand the military and economic resources of the combatants, the lines of

27 communication over which these resources had to be conducted, and the “vital

importance” of naval power on the Lakes in deciding the final outcome of the war. The

American position on Lakes Ontario and Erie slowly improved under the direction of

Captain . He set up his Lake Ontario base at Sackets Harbor, creating a squadron by arming merchant schooners. By November 1812 he was strong enough to claim that he controlled that lake. Evidence of this strength was the 24-

Madison, built in forty-five days and larger than any British vessel on the lakes. The base at Sackets Harbor would evolve into the most important American position on the lakes, consisting of a shipyard, barracks, and a semi-circle of protective earthworks and . On Lake Erie, Chauncey had bases at Black Rock (near Buffalo) and Erie and began to build a fleet, based on two captured British vessels and converted merchantmen.’^ In the long run, American naval forces would have the advantage on the lakes. They were superior in leadership and manpower, manned by professional officers and sailors. The was not a real fighting navy, being little more than a ferry service, and it allowed Chauncey to establish bases and fleets on the Great Lakes.

Furthermore, the British were also fighting a major war against and were reluctant to tie up resources in an inland theater. In a naval contest that depended just as much on building a navy as using it, resources were paramount. The United States was thus able to marshal its superior resources and eventually make a bid for mastery of the lakes.^^

Despite Chauncey’s progress, American operations in 1812 were a disaster, ending in defeat on all three fronts. The Northwest groaned under Indian attack and

28 pleaded with the government for protection; three armies surrendered at Detroit,

Queenston, and Frenchtown; and the main attack against Montreal was a dismal failure, not the full-blooded thrust necessary for a decisive outcome. The supporting attacks in the west had become main efforts, seriously stretching American resources. In addition, they failed to achieve their primary goal, which was to protect the frontier from Indian attack. The incompetence of the Madison administration and its ill-conceived strategy, poor leadership, and the reluctance of the militia to leave American soil were all to blame. Unfortunately for the United States, the campaign of 1812 was perhaps the only chance to inflict a decisive blow on the British position in North America since Britain’s situation in Europe was greatly improving. By October 1812, Napoleon’s campaign in

Russia had failed, and his 600,000-man Grand Army dissolved in the subsequent retreat.

The British could now consider the possibility of committing more resources to the North

American theater. Furthermore, Napoleon’s Moscow debacle made the Baltic more accessible, ending Madison’s hopes that by putting pressure on Canada he could extract concessions from Britain.

American strategy for 1813 again focused on Upper Canada, if for no other reason than Lower Canada was too strong. Newly-appointed Secretary of War John

Armstrong informed the cabinet in February 1813 that although the enemy force at

Montreal probably did not exceed 12,000 men, it far exceeded the 2,400 American regulars on both sides of Lake Champlain. Until recruits augmented this force,

Armstrong argued, the choice was either to do nothing or to achieve the secondary, but still important, objective of reducing Upper Canada. The 2,100 British regulars there

29 could do nothing to resist American advances until the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario thawed, by 15 May and 1 April respectively; after those dates, the British could send relief to Upper Canada. Armstrong suggested that the object should be the ships at

Kingston and York (Toronto), and Forts George and Erie on the Niagara frontier.

Control of the lakes was thus the key to the American strategy for 1813, while the ubiquitous offensive against Montreal would have to await more troops.^"*

Accordingly, Isaac Chauncey launched a raid against York in April 1813. This raid, commanded by , was an extension of the naval war on Lake Ontario.

Unlike on Lakes Erie and Champlain, where there was one battle with a minimum of previous maneuvering, the contest on Ontario was a shipbuilder’s race."^ Both the

American and British fleets were frequently in the presence of each other, and even clashed three times during the war. Nevertheless, there was never a major fleet engagement on Lake Ontario since control of it was too crucial to risk all on a battle unless the odds were certain. Although Chauncey’s true objective point was supposed to be Kingston, the raid on York, in which Pike died, was a crippling blow to the British.

The British burned the Sir Isaac Brock to prevent her capture. The vessel was under construction and when completed would have ensured British control of Lake

Ontario for 1813. York also held ordnance and naval stores intended for the Lake Erie squadron, supplies that were either captured or destroyed to keep them out of American hands. Before leaving, the American raiders put the government buildings to the torch.

This coup, combined with a brilliant amphibious operation that captured Fort George in

May and interrupted the British supply line to Lake Erie, had a major impact on the naval

30 war. First, the United States was able to maintain parity with the British on Lake

Ontario. Second, and more important. Sir Robert Barclay, commanding on Lake Erie, was unable to complete the corvette Detroit or to arm his squadron with adequate ordnance. The necessary stores and were either lost at York or delayed in transport as a result of Pike’s raid.^^

York was such an easy target that Chauncey attacked it again in May, but Admiral

Sir James Yeo soon returned the favor, attacking Sackets Harbor at the end o f the month.

General and about 900 men repulsed the attack, but an American officer set fire to the naval yard, convinced that the British were winning. The premature firing of the yard did not seriously hurt the vessels there since the fire was soon put out. A large quantity of sails and other stores were lost, however, delaying Chauncey’s squadron and giving Yeo superiority on Lake Ontario for about three weeks. Thus the naval war proceeded, each side temporarily gaining supremacy, only to lose it to a newly- constructed or to an over-zealous ."’

The greatest American success in 1813 came on Lake Erie. The Niagara frontier remained a disappointment since Dearborn was unable to build on the success at Fort

George. His forces were defeated in engagements at Stoney Creek and the Beaver Dams, forcing a to Fort George as the British went over to the offensive in July.

Meanwhile, , William Hull’s replacement, was building on his reputation far to the west in Ohio. Forced on the defensive by a lack of resources,

Harrison managed to hold the supply post of Fort Meigs in northwest Ohio, despite two in May and July by a British and Indian force under General Henry Procter and

31 Tecumseh. Trying to revive the spirits of his demoralized Indian allies, Procter also agreed in August to attack Fort Stephenson on the Sandusky River. When this operation failed, Procter ordered a retreat. There would be no more British offensives in the

Northwest, a situation that would be guaranteed by the in September.

There had been major American efforts to gain permanent control of Lake Erie since March, when construction of transports for an invasion of Upper Canada commenced at . At the same time, the commander on Lake Erie, Oliver

Hazard Perry, showed great energy and resolve in building a fleet at his bases at Erie and

Black Rock. Barclay did little to stop Perry’s efforts. The British did not attack the vulnerable shipyards, and Barclay allowed Perry to unite his Erie and Black Rock contingents, each of which was inferior to the British lake squadron. The result was a decisive American victory near Put-in-Bay, Ohio on 10 September, in which Perry destroyed Barclay’s fleet and gained permanent control of Lake Erie. The battle was as much a logistical as it was a tactical victory. Although British industrial strength was greater than that of the United States, American industry was far superior to that of

Canada. was a growing town with a significant iron industry, which meant that most of Perry’s heavy fittings did not have to come from the seaboard. The British had no facilities comparable to Pittsburgh’s in Upper Canada, so materiel had to come by sea and up the vulnerable St. Lawrence-Great Lakes route. Imagine Barclay’s dilemma at his Amherstburg base, with no local iron industry and at the end of a long and tenuous line of conununication back to Britain via Montreal. In addition, those items that came to Perry from the seaboard came via an overland route that was secure from British

32 attack. Thus, American industry, secure communications, and Perry’s leadership secured the use of Lake Erie to the United States.'®

The unopposed use of the lake made the a strategic victory as well. Upon learning of the victory, Armstrong ordered Harrison to take and advance on the rear of the British position on the Niagara frontier. Once there, Harrison was to take control of the combined American forces and operate against the British.

Armstrong warned his general, who had come to political prominence as an Indian fighter, to drive the enemy from the region between Lakes Erie and Ontario and not to be distracted by pursuing “the Indians into their woody and distant recesses.”'^ Harrison wasted little time and crossed Lake Erie on 27 September, using the boats built at

Cleveland. His army of 5,500 men included about 3,000 Kentuckians, eager to whip the

British and lift Indian scalps. Taking the abandoned Fort Malden and reoccupying

Detroit, Harrison had little difficulty catching Procter and his demoralized army. At the

Battle of the Thames on 5 October, most of the British troops surrendered while the

Indians, who were engaged in a struggle for their way of life in the Northwest, fought harder. Tecumseh’s death there ended the Indian confederacy that blocked American expansion in the Northwest, so Harrison helped achieve a regional war aim; the elimination of British support to the Northwest tribes.

But Harrison’s success did little to bring the war itself to a successful conclusion.

On the frontier of decision, the St. Lawrence, American blunders continued. There, the new commander was General , a schemer with a bad reputation from his service in the Southwest who replaced Dearborn. Wilkinson made a vague proposal to

33 march on Montreal from Sackets Harbor, joining with a force under General Wade

Hampton that was at Plattsburgh. Hampton hated Wilkinson, however, and refused to

obey him. There was little hope for cooperation between the two, and neither officer

showed much confidence in the plan anyway. When the campaign finally got underway

in October, the British easily dealt with each invasion in turn. Hampton’s 4,500 men

consisted of raw recruits and militia. Most of his 1,000 militia refused to cross the

border, and numerically-inferior British forces defeated the rest of Hampton’s army at the

Battle of Chateaugay on 26 October. Wilkinson, under the influence of copious amounts

of alcohol and laudanum, fared little better, his 7,000-man army meeting with defeat at

the Battle of Chrysler’s Farm on 11 November. Again, a smaller British force

vanquished the American invaders. The American plan for the St. Lawrence frontier was

too complicated, the success of the operation being dependent on the success of its

component parts. Each attack failed, and even if they had not, the combined force

probably would have lacked the strength to take Montreal anyway. After another defeat

at La Colle Mill in March 1814, the administration removed Wilkinson from command.^’

Once again, the United States failed to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

The situation was getting desperate. On the Niagara frontier in late December, British

troops captured Fort Niagara, which they held for the rest of the war, and British and

Indian raiders burned Lewistown, Black Rock, and Buffalo in retaliation for the

American burning of Newark.Elsewhere, the British were on the offensive, conducting

raids on the settlements since the spring, and the Royal Navy tightened the blockade and started to strangle American commerce. Time seemed to be running

34 out for the United States. In October 1813, Napoleon lost the and retreated to France. By April 1814, British forces had cleared of all French forces and could thus be used elsewhere. American forces had failed to conquer Canada in

1812 and 1813, and they would never get another chance. Veterans of the wars with

Napoleon were on their way to North America.

The American situation was bleak by 1814. Madison could not force the British government to acquiesce over maritime matters, especially since Britain could now bring her superior military and naval resources to bear and had no reason to negotiate. The

United States had stabbed Britain in the back in a time of great national peril, and the

Americans would now have to pay. The war was now one of national survival for the

Americans, not just one to achieve satisfaction for maritime violations. The Republic would survive only if it weathered the campaign of 1814.

In July, Sir George Prévost received his orders from Secretary of State for War and the Colonies Lord Bathurst. The British strategy had two objects, to protect Canada and to secure the basis for favorable boundary changes. There were

15,000 regulars on the way to Canada, commanded by four of ’s best brigadiers. Prévost’s orders were to destroy Sackets Harbor and the American bases on

Lakes Erie and Champlain, to hold Fort Niagara, and to seize Detroit and “an advanced position” on the Champlain frontier. Destroying the naval bases would provide the necessary security for Canada, while holding bridgeheads on American territory would provide a bargaining chip at the peace table and restore the British and Indian position in the west. Prévost’s orders also suggested that he seize Maine to secure the

35 communication between Halifax and Quebec. Elsewhere, four regiments would be used against the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, and a large force was assembling at

Cork for “a more serious attack” on some part of the coastline.

Again, American officials decided to concentrate on Upper Canada when planning strategy for 1814. The United States held the initiative there, having control of

Lake Erie and shorter and more secure lines of communication. American forces would retake Mackinac and take control of Lake Huron, defeat the British on the Niagara frontier and drive them from that theater, and take British positions on Lake Ontario. If all went well, commanders could target Kingston and Montreal. The chances for resolute offensive action were better than ever since a group of skilled and bold officers had emerged, as would happen later during the Civil War. Men such as Jacob Brown,

Edmund Gaines, , Alexander Macomb, and would make names for themselves in the campaigns of 1814 and would play a prominent role in political and military affairs long afterward. Their tactical skill, however, could not overcome the strategic blundering of the Madison administration.

In the West, American forces had mixed success. Major operations first took place on the Niagara frontier, where Brown led 3,500 men across the river in July. The best of his troops had been meticulously trained by Scott and fought with a skill and élan that shocked their British opponents. Brown took Fort Erie, moved north and defeated the main British force at the Battle of Chippewa on 5 July, and prepared to launch a combined attack with Isaac Chauncey against the rest of the British posts. Chauncey was more concerned with the build-up of his fleet on Lake Ontario, though, and considered a

36 major fleet engagement to be more important than cooperating with the army. Brown pushed on anyway and fought the British to a draw at Lundy’s Lane on 25 July, but he was unable to make any more progress on the Niagara frontier. He withdrew his troops to Fort Erie, which Gaines brilliantly defended against heavy British attacks. Despite the victory, the Americans finally blew up the fort and pulled back to United States territory in early November. Although the campaign had demonstrated the fighting quality of the

American soldier and the ability of the army’s new young leaders, it accomplished little of strategic significance. The Niagara frontier was again the scene of inconclusive action.

In the far Northwest, the United States experienced total disaster. On 20 July, a small force of British and Indians seized the post at Prairie du Chien, on the Mississippi

River in what is now Wisconsin. On 4 August the garrison at Mackinac fought off an

American assault and captured two schooners, giving Britain undisputed control of Lake

Huron and secure communications with Mackinac, the key to the fur trade and contact with the Northwest tribes. The British also had plans to build a 44-gun frigate at their new base at Penetanguishene. If the war had continued into 1815, the situation would have been even more dire for the residents of the far Northwest. Fortimately, the war ended before the American position worsened. It was bad enough that the British went to the peace table possessing most of the Upper Mississippi Valley.^"*

On Lake Ontario, Chauncey and Yeo continued their “shipbuilder’s war.” The defeat on Lake Erie had shocked the British into avoiding a similar fate on Lake Ontario.

Yeo was cautious, refusing to fight unless victory were certain; Chauncey reciprocated,

37 and each side built ever-larger ships in the pursuit of naval supremacy. In May there was a small engagement near Sandy Creek, won by the Americans, and the British destroyed the post at Oswego, the key point on the line of communication between the American interior and Sackets Harbor. At Oswego, supplies had to be transferred to lake vessels for the final, and exposed, leg of the journey to the base at Sackets.

Nevertheless, construction consumed most of the commanders’ energy. At great expense, the British sent a 56-gun frigate in pieces from Britain for final assembly at

Kingston. Yeo sought to gain supremacy at a single stroke with the construction of the

112-gun ship of the line St. Lawrence. The new vessel gave Yeo great confidence. He believed that she gave him superiority on the lake, and he was probably correct, for the

Americans had nothing to oppose her before the war ended. As a result, the St. Lawrence never saw action and spent the rest of her days in dock at Kingston. Yeo also started construction on two 120-gun ships of the line, Wolfe and Canada, which were never launched. Chauncey responded, of course, laying down two ships of the line. New

Orleans and Chippewa. Some 1,200 carpenters worked on the ships at Sackets Harbor until peace halted construction. Thus, the struggle on Lake Ontario remained inconclusive as well. The huge size and heavy armament of the vessels built there indicate the significance of naval superiority on the lake; nevertheless, the resources expended there by both sides did little to bring the war to a successful conclusion. The key theater was farther to the east, along the Champlain-Richelieu axis.^^

Madison’s nightmare continued in August, when a British invasion force attacked

Maine. The Appalachian highlands were a major obstacle between the and the

38 Maritime Provinces, and the overland route via the St. John River and Lake Temiscouata

was the easiest route through the mountains between Halifax and Quebec. Unfortunately

for the British, the salient created by Maine threatened the Temiscouata route, which had

proved vital in moving troops and sailors to the interior. Thus, for political and military

reasons it seemed prudent for the British to secure an uninterrupted and defensible line of

communication, and Bathurst ordered Lieutenant General Sir John Sherbrooke, Governor

of Nova Scotia, to occupy that area of Maine that blocked communication between

Halifax and Quebec. Sherbrooke was a man of initiative, not content with just occupying the northern portion of Maine; he sent out a small detachment in July that captured

Eastport without a shot. The British occupation there was a mild affair, and about two- thirds of the residents took a loyalty oath to King George HI. In August Sherbrooke led the main invasion force of 2,000 troops and nine ships against Castine and took it in the

face of very weak opposition. The Maine authorities were more interested in protecting private property than in organizing resistance, and those militia units that did put up a

fight usually fled so quickly that most managed to escape to their homes. By 21

September Sherbrooke was able to establish a provisional government for the occupied territory between the Penobscot River and Passamaquoddy Bay. He had little trouble with the Americans, many of whom found occupation acceptable. The region provided

26,000 new subjects to the crown, and Castine became a bustling and prosperous British port of entry.

Combined with British raids elsewhere on the New England coast, this extension of the war by Britain only strengthened the Federalist-dominated area’s desire to end the

39 war. The region was far from united behind Madison, who was under attack across the nation for his conduct of the war. After raiders burned Washington in August, in retaliation for the attack on York, few Americans had any confidence in the Madison administration’s ability to defend the nation. Andrew Jackson’s defeat of the Creek

Confederacy in March and the stirring victory at Baltimore in mid-September could not hide the facts. The bulk of the British troops, twenty-five regiments, had arrived in

August; Maine and the Upper Mississippi Valley were in British hands; there was no progress on the Niagara frontier. New England was on the verge of rebellion; Lake

Champlain was in danger of attack; and other powerful British forces lurked on the horizon.

In the north, the final showdown between American and British forces took place on the Lake Champlain frontier. Although there had been numerous raids by both sides, no major engagements had taken place in the area while fighting raged to the west. Both belligerents had major bases on the lake, the United States at Whitehall and Britain at

Isle aux Noix, and used their resources to build up fleets powerful enough to seize superiority and assist offensive moves on land. General Prévost had preferred to fight a defensive war on the frontier since large numbers of British troops deserted if stationed too close to the border. In fact, some American officials suggested crossing the border and fighting small skirmishes to give British regulars the chance to desert while fighting in the woods. Prévost also knew that the American militia was not likely to cross the border, meaning that the bulk of the American forces could not attack and that Canada would be safe. At all times, Prévost showed caution, being reluctant to risk his forces

40 and expose Lower Canada to American occupation. In fact, his orders from Bathurst for

1814 commanded him to seize an advanced position on Lake Champlain that would

contribute materially to the defense of the province. Prévost was predisposed to avoid

unnecessary risk, and his orders confirmed this position. Bathurst warned him to be

careful “not to expose His Majesty’s Forces to being cut off by too extended a line of

advance,” advice prompted, no doubt, by memories of ’s disastrous

advance in 1777. It is important to note that Prévost probably never had any intention of

advancing any farther than Plattsburgh. Taking the town would provide the foothold that

would ensure Lake Champlain’s demilitarization and a possible boundary shift at the

peace table. The invasion would not be a major irruption into the American interior.

Massive reinforcements made a British offensive move possible, however, and

American commanders made haste at Plattsburgh to prepare defenses against attack.

Major General George Izard commanded on the Champlain frontier, but a War

Department blunder sent him to Sackets Harbor with 4,000 men in late August.

Secretary o f War Armstrong had not expected a British attack. This left Alexander

Macomb in command at Plattsburgh with about 3,400 troops, half of them regulars, to hold the region, while a squadron under Lieutenant held the lake.

Chief engineer Joseph Totten had wanted to fortify Rouses Point to block British entry to

Lake Champlain, but Izard rejected the advice. Rouses Point would play a major role in

American strategy on the northern frontier for the rest of the century, but for the time being it would remain unused. Izard had Totten fortify Plattsburgh instead, a job the engineer performed with such skill that he was brevetted lieutenant for his

41 conduct in the subsequent battle. The three forts and extensive fieldworks that Totten designed and built enabled Macomb to hold Plattsburgh against Prévost's attack.

Prévost had delayed his offensive, wanting to complete his lake fleet before conducting major operations. He was particularly concerned about the fiigate Confiance, under construction at Isle aux Noix, which was larger than anything Macdonough possessed and would give Britain control of the lake. Prévost could wait no longer, however, and crossed the border on 31 August. Brushing aside light American resistance, he halted in front of the works at Plattsburgh with 8,200 men on 6 September and waited for Captain George Downie to arrive with the lake squadron. Another 2,100

British troops occupied outposts back to the border. Prévost was reluctant to attack the forts since the cost might be too high; his orders were to seize a foothold on American territory while preserving his force. He believed that if Downie could defeat

Macdonough, such loss of life would be unnecessary since he could threaten Macomb’s flank at Plattsburgh. The delay allowed Macomb to improve his defenses, and 2,500

Vermonters arrived in time for battle on 11 September.

Unfortunately for the British, both Prévost and Downie blundered. Prévost’s failure to take the forts made it possible for Macdonough to take shelter in Plattsburgh

Bay; had Prévost taken the forts, a naval battle would probably have been unnecessary.

Downie made the mistake of accepting Macdonough’s challenge to fight in the bay.

Although Prévost had bullied Downie into sailing before the fleet was ready, the British still had a firepower advantage. Downie had more long-range guns, but he negated his advantage and engaged Macdonough’s force at close range in the bay on 11 September.

42 Downie was killed almost immediately, and Macdonough went on to destroy his opponent’s squadron. The British lost all four of their major vessels, and only the light gunboats escaped. At the same time, British troops were having success in driving back the American defenders in Plattsburgh. When Prévost heard of Downie’s defeat, however, he decided to halt the attack. The British commander feared that he could be cut off once the Americans commanded the lake. He also was concerned that swarms of militia would overwhelm his army, as had happened to Burgoyne in 1777. Macomb had planted a letter that falsely announced the imminent arrival of 19,000 militia from New

York and Vermont, and the whole was in retreat by the next morning.^'

Needless to say, Prévost faced a storm of criticism for his conduct. Yeo criticized

Prévost, saying that the troops should have secured the town, obliging Macdonough to leave the shelter of the bay and to give Downie “a fair chance.” Further, Yeo said, a naval victory could not possibly have assisted the troops attacking the forts anyway.

Prévost felt, however, that he had done his duty. He gave Bathurst several reasons for the retreat. First, the naval defeat removed any advantage he had over the American forces; to persevere would be “highly imprudent.” Second, the bad weather and American harassment ruined the roads, making a future withdrawal hazardous. Water transport was the only effective way to move troops and supplies, and Downie’s defeat made such movement impossible. Finally, Prévost said that he was plagued by desertion, insufficient supplies, and the massing American militia. Given the circumstances,

Prévost decided not to satisfy “the Ardor of the Troops ” and continue the attack but instead considered “the more substantial interests of my Country by withdrawing the

43 Army which was yet uncrippled for the security of these Provinces.” Prévost did not think the risk of losing a land battle was worth the price."*"

Whatever the reason for the outcome, the failure at Plattsburgh had a direct impact on the outcome of the war. Word of the defeat arrived in on 21 October, where, although it showed that continued war would be expensive, it initially had little effect on British policy. It was not until November that the British decided to try to end the war, on the advice of the Duke of Wellington. Wellington told the Prime Minister, the Earl of Liverpool, that Britain could never succeed in North America until she had achieved superiority on the lakes. Until then, British forces would be unable to defend the entire frontier, much less conduct successful offensive operations. Without command of the lakes, Wellington warned, he could do the government little good in Canada other than proving that Prévost was correct in retreating. Yeo had already warned that pursuing naval supremacy on the lakes was “an endless if not a futile undertaking,” so the course for Britain was clear. There was no way to inflict a severe enough blow to force an end to the war. Napoleon had abdicated after the Allies occupied , yet the had not had a similar disproportionate effect. Britain might as well sign a peace now that she would have to sign later.^^

Madison, of course, did not have any knowledge of British plans and had to prepare for yet another campaign. He also had to deal with the political opposition of

New England as a convention was meeting in Hartford, Connecticut to discuss Madison’s conduct of the war. As American negotiators sparred with their British counterparts in

Ghent, Secretary of War James Monroe, in office since 26 September, was busy at work

44 preparing plans for the campaign of 1815. Monroe’s initial concerns, however, were

defensive. He had received reports in November that Prévost was embarking 6,000

troops for . Monroe feared that the force would either watch the Hartford

Convention and await developments favorable to Britain, or it would unite with thirteen ships of the line that had sailed from England in early September and attack New York

City. On 26 November, he ordered Izard to detach 1,000 men from Buffalo and send them to Greenbush, a central position near Albany from which they could move to threatened points on the frontiers. Monroe felt that there was little reason to defend

Buffalo since future operations, if they were to have “any important effect,” would not take place there."*^

Monroe knew that fewer troops were needed at Buffalo because he planned a major offensive in the spring of 1815. Although the American and British negotiators had completed a peace treaty at Ghent on 24 December, unusually bad weather delayed news of the treaty from reaching the United States. Until both sides officially signed the peace, commanders had to plan for war. Lord Bathurst had instructed Sir Gordon

Drummond, Prévost’s successor, to direct his efforts toward achieving naval supremacy on the lakes, especially Ontario. Bathurst thus ordered Drummond to “direct as much of the force as you can collect together to act” against Sackets Harbor. On Lake Champlain, the British continued their shipbuilding efforts at Isle aux Noix, working on twelve gunboats and making plans for the construction of three frigates and two brigantines to redress the naval balance. There were also plans to encourage further Indian attacks in

45 the west. Meanwhile, Monroe was busy discussing plans with his commanders for a major offensive that would eject the British from Canada once and for all.^^

O f course, peace had already been signed, although not formally ratified by the

United States. Bad news continued to roll in. On 6 January, the released its report. Although moderate in tone, it seemed to threaten secession, a perception that tainted the New England Federalists with treason in a time of great national peril. Monroe also had reports that the British were assembling sleighs for a possible attack on Lake Champlain. On 11 January 1815, he asked New York Governor

Daniel Tompkins to call out the militia to defend the area.^

On 4 February, however, news of Andrew Jackson’s victory at arrived, electrifying the capital. Monroe sent a flurry of letters to politicians and general officers, discussing his measures for securing what he called “a speedy and honorable peace.” In a letter to General Jacob Brown written on 10 February, Monroe outlined his plan for an offensive against the St. Lawrence River. Monroe seems to have wanted

Brown, an aggressive and resourceful commander, to command the operation. In addition. Brown lived in Brown ville, near Watertown in upstate New York. He knew the northern frontier well and recognized the importance of the St. Lawrence. Monroe advocated carrying the war into Canada and breaking British power there, by concentrating American forces against the eastern end o f the British line of communications. He would waste no regulars on the Detroit or Niagara frontiers, which could be held by militia. Monroe realized that the British had no line of communication other than the St. Lawrence, so he wanted to invade with a force of 40,000 troops, 15,000

46 of them regulars, defeat the British field force somewhere between Kingston and

Montreal, and drive the survivors back to Quebec/’

The stage was now set for the strategy that the United States should have emphasized in 1812. Details remained. Monroe suggested that the invasion could be launched from either Sackets Harbor or Plattsburgh, with a central depot somewhere behind the mountains at Greenbush or Johnstown; he awaited Brown’s advice. In addition, Monroe wanted to halt the trade with the enemy, and he told Brown to suppress the practice immediately. Congress had authorized the raising of 40,000 state troops, so to raise the necessary force Monroe pleaded with several state governors to provide assistance. He requested the Governor of Vermont’s “patriotic and very useful exertions” during the upcoming campaign; 10,000 Vermont troops would assure the operation’s success, which would “make a more decided impression on the enemy” than done previously. Monroe requested 20,000 New York troops from Governor Tompkins, assuring him that if the campaign were well executed and conducted with vigor, “Canada must sink under the arm of the United States.” He also expected troops from Kentucky,

Ohio, Pennsylvania, and ."**

Could Monroe’s plan have worked? It might have been too late, given the precarious state of the national treasury and the discontent in New England. Raising the necessary force might have been difficult, given the national mood, and even a skilled drillmaster such as Winfield Scott, who would have played a key role in the campaign, might not have been able to train the raw recruits in time. Furthermore, Gordon

Drummond was no Prévost. He had shown great initiative in engagements on Lake

47 Ontario and the Niagara frontier. But Monroe had little choice. The United States could not continue the struggle, which increasingly appeared to be pointless, especially since the war in Europe was over and British maritime violations were no longer an issue. He knew that something decisive had to be done, telling the governor of Pennsylvania that “a lingering war must be prevented.” Yet, although the British had 29,500 regulars, or thirty-six battalions, in alone, Monroe’s plan might have worked, given the situation in Europe. Once war broke out after Napoleon’s return in March, Britain would have had to make some tough choices concerning the North American theater. To deal with the French threat, the British withdrew twenty-one of the thirty-six battalions to fight in Europe. That might have been just enough for Monroe’s “great and vigorous exertions” to succeed.'*^

The campaign never took place, of course, since news of the Treaty of Ghent arrived in Washington on 14 February and Congress ratified it three days later. After three years the United States was unable to bend Britain to its will or to seize any significant part of British North America. In fact, the Americans had lost territory in the west and in Maine. Unexpectedly, the British made an effort to reinforce and to defend

Canada, and the United States was unable to bring the war to a decisive conclusion. The

Madison administration was, however, more successful at the peace table. Both sides had agreed to a peace based on status quo ante bellum. The Duke of Wellington felt that there was no basis for settling the conflict on the basis of uti possidetis, meaning that each belligerent would hold the land it occupied upon the termination of hostilities.

Fortunately for the United States, the British had not inflicted enough of a serious blow,

48 and they concluded that acquiring new territories was not worth the risk of a continued war, especially while the political situation in Europe remained unsettled. For instance,

Wellington was concerned more about affairs in Europe than the interminable conflict in

North America. The peace itself did not address the original American grievances. Both sides agreed to exchange prisoners, set up commissions to determine the international boundary and refer it to an arbitrator if necessary, to desist from all hostilities against the

Indian tribes as long as they did not attack the signatories, and to do their best to abolish the slave trade.

The United States, then, emerged from the war in a far better position than it deserved. It regained its lost territory, and although it did not conquer Canada or extract maritime concessions from the British, the United States did succeed in breaking the power of the tribes in the Northwest and Southwest. Harrison and Jackson did much to seriously weaken the ties that Britain and Spain had to those tribes blocking American expansion. Thus, the war was far from a stalemate that did not settle anything. The vanquished tribes forced to accept American expansion could attest to that. The fact that the United States had survived against the might of Britain also helped to create powerful myths. As memories faded, the Americans glossed over the disasters and emphasized the successes in what was a successful Second War of Independence. The war also stimulated a powerful sense of national identity and pride. The Canadians created myths of their own. Both they and the Americans believed, incorrectly, that the militia was responsible for beating back the enemy. Canadian survival in the war also created

49 a powerful sense of nationalism in Canada and made the inhabitants more pro-British than they had been before.

Although the war was not decisive, American politicians and military men did

I earn important lessons. First, control of the lakes was critical. Naval forces on Lake

Champlain could support land operations either south against Albany or north against

Montreal. Thus, the side that controlled the lake possessed a crucial advantage in wartime. Lake Ontario was the key to the British strategic position in North America, because the side that commanded it had access to Upper Canada. Control of Lake Erie and the other Upper Lakes was important as well. Naval superiority on those bodies of water would allow American forces to move supplies and troops, protect against British raids, and conduct raids of their own against enemy possessions.

Second, critical avenues of approach needed defenses. Defended areas had successfully driven off British attacks, while points lacking fortifications suffered. For example, Plattsburgh, Baltimore, and New Orleans had benefited from both temporary and permanent fortifications, and British naval forces easily moved up the Potomac after

Fort Warburton’s garrison fled and left the capital’s approaches undefended. The war had shown the effectiveness of fortifications, and officers such as Joseph G. Totten noted the importance of protecting the key chokepoints on the northern frontier. The St.

Lawrence, Niagara, and Detroit frontiers were important border areas and had played major roles during the War of 1812 and prior conflicts. Both the British and Americans knew that they could again be the scene of military operations. It thus made sense to block them. Furthermore, since the main British offensive threat was attacks on the

50 seacoast, the maritime frontier would receive the bulk of appropriations in the future.

Third, although the militia system and the regular army had proven their worth, both elements of national defense needed improvement. The British regarded the

American militia with such contempt that they usually allowed captured militiamen to return to their homes on parole. Nevertheless, although the militia who turned out were at times little better than crowds of poorly organized, trained, and equipped men, incapable of behaving as disciplined line , the militia could fight if properly drilled and, more importantly, led. The militia system did provide the only means to raise the armies that the United States managed to produce, and some excellent leaders, such as pre-war lawyer Jacob Brown, came out of the system as well. The United States had survived the War of 1812 with an imperfect regular army and militia system, but the nation might not be so blessed in the future. In training, discipline, administration, and leadership, the nation’s military forces needed reform.

Fourth, internal improvements were necessary both to improve the economic health of the nation and to facilitate military movements in wartime. The United States faced a huge logistical challenge during the war since most manufactured goods were produced along the Atlantic seaboard. Materiel had to be sent to the frontier by river if possible, but it usually went over the wretched road network. For instance, a supply train of thirty-seven traveled from Pittsburgh to Upper Sandusky, Ohio in November

1812. Plagued by bad roads and bridges, rain and , and delays for the repair of equipment and re-shoeing of horses, the train took thirty-six days to travel the 250 miles.

51 In fact, the train used up all its repair parts, food, and forage halfway to its destination and had to buy local supplies at exorbitant prices. A comprehensive system of roads and canals could alleviate such difficulties.^'*

Finally and most importantly, in the future all military efforts had to be directed at the most decisive theater, the St. Lawrence frontier. Political considerations forced the

United States to make its main effort in the west instead of in the east against Montreal and Quebec, the key point of the enemy’s defense. Through 1814 American forces expended much effort on the Detroit and Niagara frontiers with little direct effect on the war itself. Harrison’s victory at The Thames had great impact on the Old Northwest, but it did nothing to bring the war to a decisive conclusion. By 1815 James Monroe and

Jacob Brown were ready to direct operations against the St. Lawrence instead of diverting resources along the length of the northern frontier. By attacking north against the lifeline to Upper Canada, American armies would be following the shortest and most direct line of operations against the heart of British defenses, both penetrating the enemy line and cutting the enemy’s communications with his base. There was no more effective way for the United States to avoid a lingering war.

52 ' James Monroe to Governor of Pennsylvania, 10 February 1815, NA, RG 107, Confidential and UnoflBcial Letters Sent by the Secretary ofWar, 1814-1847, M7, roll 1, 58-59.

^ For Hull’s proclamation, see William Wood, ed.. Select British Documents o f the Canadian War o f 1812, vol. 1 (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1920), 355-57; only Hull’s advanced age and service in the War of Independence spared his life. For the general outline of the War of 1812,1 have followed Donald R. Hickey, The War o f 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of Press, 1989), and J.C.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison's War: Politics. Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

^ Washington recommended a force of regular troops on the fi'ontiers “to awe the Indians, protect our trade, prevent the encroachment of our Neighbours of Canada and the Florida’s, and guard us at least fi'om surprizes.” As part of this plan, he recommended posts on the Penobscot or St. Croix Rivers (or both), the Connecticut River near the 45th parallel, the north end of Lake Champlain (to block entry to the lake and protect the population on both shores), Ticonderoga, Oswego, Niagara, the north end o f Lake Erie, Detroit, and on the straits between Lakes Huron and Superior (to control the fur trade). Other troops would occupy posts in the Ohio Country and on the Carolina and fi'ontiers. Since the British controlled the lakes and would make wartime supply of the lakes posts difGcult, Washington advised that the United States open up alternate lines of communication via the Susquehanna, Potomac, or James Rivers to the Ohio River, thence via water and portage to Lake Erie; see “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed.. The Writings o f George Washington, vol. 26 (Washington. GPO, 1938), 374-98.

■* For the role of the military during the period, see Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and : The Federalists and the Creation o f the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: The Free Press, 1975). For the impact of ideology on , see Lawrence D. Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War o f 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

’ For the fur trade and its importance in British control of the NorthwesL see Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Innis demonstrates that the organization of the Northwest Company and its successor, the Hudson’s Bay Company, played a great role in the development of the Dominion of Canada. The fur- producing areas of the Northwest were very dependent on Britain, strengthening that nation’s hold on British North America.

^ For Gallatin’s letter, see Hemy Adams, ed.. The Writings o f Albert Gallatin, vol. 1 (: J.B. Lippincott, 1879), 344-53.

' C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems o f Canada: A Survey o f Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions Past and Present (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1940), 54-56.

* J. Mackay Hitsman, “Sir George Prevost’s Conduct o f the Canadian War of 1812,” Annual Report o f the Canadian Historical Association (1962), 35; for Craig’s and Brock’s views, see Alfi'ed Thayer Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War o f 1812, vol. 1 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1905), 304-05.

’ For reports critical of British influence among the Indians, see “Northwestern Frontiers,” in ASPIA I, 12th Cong., 1st sess, No. 135, ser. 7, and “Hostile Movements,” in ASPIA 1, 12th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 136, ser. 7; these reports blame British support for Indian depredations. For the fears of residents in the Northwest, see “Northwestern Frontier,” m ASPIA I, 12th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 132, ser. 7; this is a memorial fi'om the citizens of to the President and Congress, seeking government protection fi'om Indian attack. The memorial captures well the attitude on the fi'ontier: “The savage mind, once fully incensed, once 53 diverted from the pursuit of their ordinary subsistence, once turned upon plunder, once inflamed by the loss of their kindred and friends, once gratified with the taste of blood, is difiScult to appease, and as terrible as subtle in vengeance. The horrors of savage belligerence, description cannot paint. No picture can resemble the reality. No effort can bring the imagination up to the standard of the fact. Nor sex, nor age, have claims.. . . No human foresight can divine the quarter which shall be struck. It is in the dead of the night, in the darkness o f the moon, in the howling of the storm, that the demoniac deed is done.”

For contemporary concerns about absolute security, see Reginald Horsman, “On To Canada; Manifest Destiny and United States Strategy in the War of 1812,” Michigan Historical Review 13 (Fall 1987): 1-24; Horsman quotes Republican Representative Thomas Robertson of , 11 January 1813: “The power of Britain must be extinguished in America. She must no longer be permitted to corrupt the principles and disturb the peace and tranquillity of our citizens. Our frontier inhabitants must not be kept in dread and danger from her Indian allies. And never shall we be secure among ourselves, and exempt from the mischievous intrigues of Europeans, until European power is expelled across the Atlantic.”

" Horsman, “On To Canada,” 11; Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 3-47; Monroe quoted in Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War o f 1812, vol. 1, 293.

A Century o f Population Growth from the First Census o f the United States to the Twelfth, 1790-1900 (Washington: GPO, 1909; reprint. New York: Johnson Reprint, 1966), 57; George F G Stanley, The War o f 1812: Land Operations (Toronto: Macmillan, 1983), 49, 66-75; Robert L. Kerby, “The Militia System and the State in the War of 1812,” Magazine o f History 73 (June 1977): 111-12. For the state militia quotas, see ASPMA 1, 12th Cong., 1st sess.. No. Ill, ser. 16, 319. Before the war, mail could take a month to travel the 200 miles between Kingston and Montreal; see Brereton Greenhous, “A Note on Western Logistics in the War of 1812,” Military Affairs 34 (April 1970): 42. For the transportation diflBculties the British encountered, see Wood, Select British Documents, vol. 3, part 1, 503-06: Commissary General W.H. Robinson complained in November 1814 that the water route between Lower and Upper Canada needed major improvements, such as canals and the removal of obstacles, or the supply of forces in the west would be impossible. The British did take steps to secure the hazardous supply route along the St. Lawrence, organizing a force of gunboats to convoy supply vessels and militia patrols and blockhouses to cover the miserable roads. The Americans did not take advantage of the opportunity, however, and generally left the route unmolested; see George F.G. Stanley, Guns and Gun Boats on the St. Lawrence (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1976).

" Caleb Strong to William Eustis, 5 August 1812, m ASPM A 1, 12th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 115, ser. 16, 323; H.N. Muller, “A ‘Traitorous and Diabolical Traffic:' The Commerce of the Champlain-Richelieu Corridor During the War of 1812,” Vermont History 44 (1976): 90-96; Muller demonstrates that even soldiers, especially those in the militia, helped smugglers or engaged in the profitable business themselves; Robert J. Bums, : A Narrative and Structural History, 1812-38 (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1979), 10- 12. For the opposition to the war in the Ogdensburg area, see Harry F. Landon, “British Sympathizers in St. Lawrence County During the War of 1812,” New York History 35 (April 1954): 131-38.

'■* Thomas H S. Hamersly, Complete Regular Army Register o f the United States: For One Hundred Years, (1779-1879) (Washington. T.H.S. Hamersly, 1880), 204.

An editorial in the 3 December 1811 issue of the expressed this view that the western frontiers had to be secured by rapid advances in addition to the drive on Montreal. It stated that Canada above Quebec “is in the power of the United States,” since it consists of a slender chain of settlements separated only by the St. Lawrence from “a populous and powerful part” of the United States. It recommended that if war broke out, the government should “lose no time in reducing the whole country above Quebec,” directing efforts against Montreal and the Niagara frontier. Once Upper Canada fell, American forces could reduce Quebec at their leisure. A delay would expose the western frontier to the 54 depredations of “Indians, British and Tories.” Quoted in Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 522-24. For British strategy during the war, see John K. Mahon, “British Command Decisions in the Northern Campaigns of the War of 1812,” Canadian Historical Review 46 (September 1965): 219-37. Mahon feels that it was probably beyond the power of the British leaders on the scene to achieve results, and he takes the British ministry to task for allowing Britain to “slide” into a war with the United States before defeating Napoleon.

For British military strength, see Stanley, The War o f 1812, 63-64. Criticisms of the 1812 campaign are legion. For example, M^'or General Sir James Carmichael-Smyth described American operations as “almost beneath criticism;” they were “loose, unconnected, and exhibited a great want of vigour and enterprize.” said the operations were of a “diverse and discordant character.” See James Carmichael- Smyth, Precis o f the Wars in Canada, from 1755 to the Treaty o f Ghent in 1814 (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1862), 147, and Henry W. Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: or. Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics o f , &c.; Embracing the Duties o f Staff, Infantry, , Artillery, and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia (New York: D. Appleton, 1846; reprint, Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1971), 226.

The only other United States Navy vessels on the lakes were gunboats 169 and 170, laid up on Lake Champlain; see Spencer C. Tucker, The Jeffersonian Navy (Columbia: University of Press, 1993), 109.

In late 1812, William Henry Harrison complained about transportation diflBculties in the Northwest, saying “You can scarcely form an idea, sir, of the diflBculty with which transportation is effected . . . The country . . . is almost a continuous swamp to the lakes;” quoted in Harold L. Nelson, “Military Roads for War and Peace— \T9\-\%'i6,'' Military Affairs 19 (Spring 1955): 4.

Two of the officers forced to surrender at Detroit were Lewis Cass, one of Hull’s brigade commanders, and Thomas Jesup, the acting adjutant general. They would go on to play important political and military roles after the war.

Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, vol. 1, 347; Isaac Brock to William Hull, 15 August 1812, in Wood, Select British Documents, vol. 1, 461. For Goulbum’s views, see Wilbur Devereux Jones, “A British View of the War of 1812 and the Peace Negotiations,” Mississippi Valley Historicai Review 45 (1958): 485. As allies, the Indian tribes were a mixed blessing to the British; the cost of merely feeding the warriors and their families probably outweighed the benefit of their military assistance. For a British soldier’s view of the Indian allies, see Norman C. Lord, ed., “The War on the Canadian Frontier, 1812-14: Letters Written by Sergt. James Commins, 8th Foot,” Journal o f the Society for Army Historical Research 18 (Winter 1939): 200. Commins described the Indians as a “Cowardly, Pusillanimous Filthy Crew . . . 1 conceive them to be the most cowardly despicable characters 1 ever saw . . . their cruelty exceeds everything 1 have seen among enemies.” At least the tribes were not attacking the British, however, and Indian raids had a disproportionate psychological effect on the American frontier.

For Brock’s naval advantage, see Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War o f 1812, vol. I, 353-54. Two of the American officers captured at Queenston Heights were expedition commander Winfield Scott and engineer Joseph Totten, key figures in northern frontier strategy for the rest of the antebellum period.

Black Rock, near Buffalo, had proven to be a poor choice for a naval base. It was within musket range of the Canadian shore, and vessels entering Lake Erie had to fight against a four-knot current for three miles. For these reasons, the Americans established a base at Erie, Pennsylvania; see Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War o f 1812, vol. 1, 374.

^ C.P. Stacey, “Naval Power on the Lakes, 1812-1814,” in After Tippecanoe: Some Aspects o f the War of 1812, ed. Philip P. Mason (East Lansing: The Michigan State University Press, 1963), 49-54. Stacey 55 disparages the oflScers of the Provincial Marine as “little more than ferry captains.” For the importance of shipbuilding on the lakes, see C Winton-Clare, “A Shipbuilder’s War,” Mariner’s Mirror 29 (July 1943): 139-48. Winton-Clare concludes that naval control of the lakes was “dependent on the skill, and above all the energy, of one or two designers and a handful of workmen.” Builders such as Adam and Noah Brown were as important to American success on the lakes as naval commanders Oliver Perry or Thomas Macdonough.

For Armstrong’s plan see “Causes of the Failure of the Army on the Northern Frontier,” in ASPMA 1, 13th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 127, ser. 16, 439.

“ There was, of course, extensive raiding by both sides. For example, in July 1813 Sir George Prévost launched an incursion on Lake Champlain known as “Murray’s Raid.” The American militia defenders proved ineffective, and leading citizens at Plattsburgh wanted no resistance, hoping that the British would then not attack private property. The raiders briefly occupied Plattsburgh, removed or destroyed $25,000 in public stores, wrecked the barracks and military buildings, looted private homes, and captured several vessels; see Allan S. Everest, The War o f 1812 in the Champlain Valley (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 115-19. American raiders put the Lake Erie town of Port to the torch in May 1814; the British used the wanton destruction there as pretext for raids on Chesapeake Bay. It was precisely these types of raids that later generations of northern frontier residents wanted to avoid in a future war.

“ Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War o f 1812, vol. 2, 52; Stacey, “Naval Power on the Lakes,” 54-55.

Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, vol. 2, 45.

Mahon, “British Command Decisions,” 226-27. For the role of American resources in the Battle o f Lake Erie, see C.P. Stacey, “Another Look at the Battle of Lake Erie,” Canadian Historical Review 39 (March 1958): 41-51.

” John Armstrong to William H. Harrison, 22 September 1813, \n ASPMA 1, 13th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 127, 455.

British troops found Indian warriors distasteful but thought even less of Kentuckians. One soldier describing them as “wretches suborned by the Government and capable of the greatest villainies. They are served out with blanket clothing like the Indians, with a long scalloping knife and other barbarous articles and with Red Paim with which they daub themselves all over and in summer nearly went naked. In this manner, they would surprise our piquets and after engagements they scallop the killed and wounded that could not get out of their way.. . [They are] the most barbarous illiterate beings in America;” see Lord, “The War on the Canadian Frontier,” 206.

For analysis of Wilkinson’s campaign, see Carmichael-Smyth, Precisof the Wars in Canada, 170-71.

Militia supporters believed that citizen soldiers were most effective when defending their homes and families, but when General George McClure called out the militia of the Buffalo area to repel the British and Indian attack, only 400 men responded. The rest decided to take care of their families individually instead of engaging in a cooperative effort. The decision was a poor one since the raiders plundered the district at will; see John K. Mahon, “The Principal Causes for the Failure of the United States Militia System during the War of 1812,” Indiana Military History Journal 4 (May 1979). 19-20. Leadership probably played a role as well because McClure was greatly disliked in the area.

For British strategy in 1814, see Lord Bathurst to George Prévost, 3 June 1814, in J. Mackay Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 7763-/57/(Toronto: Press, 1968), 105-06. 56 ^ For the naval situation on Lake Huron in 1814, see Stacey, “Naval Power on the Lakes,” 56-57. The war seriously disrupted the fur trade, hurting merchants on both sides, such as John Jacob Astor. Astor was caught in the middle and more interested in protecting his own interests than supporting either side in the war, see John D. Haeger, John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance in the Early Republic (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991), 138-69.

For the importance of naval control on Lake Ontario, see Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War o f 1812, vol. 1, 301-02. Prévost informed Secretary of State Lord Bathurst in August 1814 that “the command of the lakes enables the enemy to perform in two days what it takes the troops from Kingston sixteen to twenty days of severe marching. Their men arrive fresh; ours fatigued, and with exhausted equipment. The distance from Kingston to the Niagara frontier exceeds two hundred and fifty miles, and part of the way is impracticable for supplies.”

Stacey, “Naval Power on the Lakes,” 56; C.P. Stacey, “The Ships of the British Squadron on Lake Ontario, 1812-14,” Canadian Historical Review 34 (December 1953): 315-16, 322-23. St. Lawrence, Wolfe, and Canada rotted at Kingston until disposed of in 1832; Chippewa was disposed of in 1833, while New Orleans lingered on the United States Navy rolls until 1883. Most secondary sources rate New Orleans and Chippewa at 120 guns; they are rated as 74’s, however, in “Naval Force on the first of January, 1816,” in American State Papers: Naval Affairs, vol. 1, 14th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 133, ser. 23, 379-80.

For the British occupation of Maine, see George F.G. Stanley, “British Operations on the Penobscot in 1814,” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 19 (Autumn 1940): 168-78; for the importance of the Temiscouata route, see C.P. Stacey, “The Backbone of Canada,” Annual Report of the Canadian Historical Association (1953), 3-4.

Everest, The War o f 1812 in the Champlain Valley, 52; Lord Bathurst to George Prévost, 3 June 1814, in Witsman, Safeguarding Canada, 105.

Everest, The War o f 1812 in the Champlain Valley, 164-65. For Totten’s conduct, see George W. Cullum, Campaigns o f the War of 1812-15, Sketched and Criticized (New York: James Miller, 1879), 79- 83.

^ Everest, The War o f 1812 in the Champlain Valley, 162, 167, 177.

41 Ibid., 178, 184-87.

Yeo’s testimony, 24 September 1814, quoted in Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War o f 1812, vol. 2, 370-71; George Prévost to Lord Bathurst, 22 September 1814, in Wood, Select British Documents, vol. 3, part 1, 365-66. James Carmichael-Smyth, a British officer writing in 1826, considered Prevost’s retreat regrettable since the British troops at Plattsburgh were known to be among the best in the British army, distinguished against Napoleon’s legions. Carmichael-Smyth feared the effect that a British retreat would have on the Americans. In the future, he warned, American forces would not be easily intimidated by British regulars. The 500 men that Prévost saved at Plattsburgh could, Carmichael-Smyth predicted, “cost Great Britain 5,000 upon some future occasion;” see Carmichael-Smyth, Precis o f the Wars in Canada, 194.

For Wellington’s role, see Dudley Mills, “The Duke of Wellington and the Peace Negotiations at Ghent in 1814,” Canadian Historical Review 2 (March 1921): 19-32. Wellington’s advice was significant. If he had encouraged the government’s policy the war would have dragged on, and operations would have had to wait until the spring. If the American war had still been in progress in March 1815, the British government would have been in a weak position after Napoleon’s return from Elba. Britain would have had to recall troops to

57 Europe and possibly make peace with the United States at a higher price than before. For Wellington’s and Yeo’s comments, see Stacey, "T^aval Power on the Lakes,” 58.

^ James Monroe to George Izard, 26 November 1814, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1814-1847, M7, roll 1, 2-3; see also James Monroe to Thomas Jesup, 26 November 1814, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1814-1847, M7, roU 1, 1-2.

Lord Bathurst to George Drummond, 10 January 1815, in Wood, Select British Documents, vol. 3, part 1, 507-09; for British preparations on Lake Champlain, see André Charbonneau, The Fortifications o f Ue aux Noix: A Portrait of the Defensive Strategy on the Upper Richelieu Border in the I8th and I9th Centuries {OiXzwz.-. Parks Canada, 1994), 165.

^ James Monroe to Governor Tompkins, 11 January 1815, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1814-1847, M7, roll 1, 23-25.

For Monroe’s plan, see James Monroe to Jacob Brown, 10 February 1815, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1814-1847, M7, roll 1, 53-58. This letter is also reprinted with excellent commentary in C.P. Stacey, “An American Plan for a Canadian Campaign,” in The Defended Border: Upper Canada caui the War o f 1812, ed. Morris Zaslow (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964), 273-82.

■** James Monroe to Governor o f Vermont, 10 February 1815, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary o f War, 1814-1847, M7, roll 1, 52-53; James Monroe to Governor Tompkins, 4 February 1815, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1814- 1847, M7, roll 1, 43-46; James Monroe to Winfield Scott, 21 February 1815, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1814-1847, M7, roll 1, 60.

James Monroe to Governor o f Pennsylvania, 10 February 1815, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary o f War, 1814-1847, M7, roll 1, 58-59; Stacey, “An American Plan for a Canadian Campaign, 276-77. Writing to Winfield Scott after the war, Monroe assured him that he would have played a “distinguished role” in the campaign that would “have shaken, if not overset, the power o f Great Britain on this continent.” Monroe empathized with Scott since peace had robbed Scott and his fellow officers of glory, but Monroe did have to admit that peace had brought great advantages to the nation; see James Monroe to Winfield Scott, 21 February 1815, NA RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1814-1847, M7, roll 1, 60.

For a discussion of the diplomats and negotiations associated with the Treaty of Ghent, see Fred L. Engelman, The Peace o f Christmas Eve (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1960, 1962); for the treaty provisions, see “Treaty of Peace and Amity, between His Majesty and the United States o f America,” in and Agreements Affecting Canada in Force between His Majesty and the United States o f America, with Subsidiary Documents, 1814-1925 (Ottawa: F A Acland, 1927), 1-6. Some British commanders could hardly believe the performance of the United States. Admiral Yeo said in May 1815 “that tho’ much has been done by the mutual exertions of both services, we also owe as much, if not more, to the perverse stupidity of the enemy; the impolicy of their plans; the disunion of their commanders, and lastly, between them and their M inisters of War the fatal, and fortunate for us, mistaken confidence they placed in the attachment o f the Canadians to their cause f quoted in Everest, The War o f 1812 in the Champlain Valley, 195.

Abert Gallatin commented on this revived American nationalism on 7 May 1816, when he said that “the war has renewed and reinstated the national feelings and character which the Revolution had given, and which were daily lessening. The people have now more general objects of attachment, with which their pride and political opinions are connected. They are more Americans; they feel and act more as a nation; 58 and I hope that the permanency o f the Union is thereby better secured;” quoted in Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War o f 1812, vol. 2, 436.

The American militia system did provide an immense reservoir of manpower, the Adjutant General office estimated that 458,463 of the 527,654 men who saw service as soldiers, sailors, or marines came fi’om the militia; see Kerby, “The Militia System and the State Militias in the War of 1812,” 111-12. For a refutation of the myth that Canada owed its salvation to the militia, see Stacey, The Military Problems o f Canada, 56- 58. According to Stacey, casualty lists show that regular units bore the brunt of combat, the most effective leaders were those with experience as regulars, and the most effective Canadian units were those organized along regular lines.

Kerby, “The Militia System and the State Militias in the War of 1812,” 103; Mahon, “The Principal Causes for the Failure of the United States Militia System during the War of 1812,” 15-21.

'■* For the effect of logistical difficulties on the American war effort, see Jeffrey Kimball, “The Fog and Friction of Frontier War: The Role of Logistics in American Offensive Failure during the War of 1812,” The Old Northwest 5 (Winter 1979-1980): 323-43.

59 CHAPTERS

DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGY, 1815-1824

All blows struck above the outlet o f Lake Ontario are struck in vain. - Jacob Brown, 9 December 1818’

Although the Treaty of Ghent had brought peace between the United States and

Britain, both sides continued to prepare for war along the northern frontier. Geography dictated that a future war would take place along the northern frontier and the Atlantic seaboard, with the United States on the offense in the former theater and on the defense in the latter. Although Canada seemed to be highly vulnerable to American attack, the extensive seaboard of the United States provided easy targets for British amphibious operations. The War of 1812 had shown the threat that bases such as Halifax and

Bermuda posed to the seaboard; American strategy on the seacoast would thus focus heavily on coastal fortifications. On the northern frontier, James Monroe’s plan for the campaign of 1815 continued to have an impact on American strategy. The plan, calling for a decisive thrust at the St. Lawrence frontier to cut off Upper Canada from supplies and reinforcements, dominated the thinking of Jacob Brown, who commanded the

Army’s Northern Division between 1815 and 1821. Brown, Monroe, and others such as

60 Secretary of War John Calhoun pressed for the forts, troop strength, and internal improvements that could make a decisive campaign possible/

American strategy in the immediate post-war period remained the same, namely, the defense of the maritime and inland frontiers. In his annual address to Congress on 5

December 1815, reminded the American people that although they should rightly seek peace, “the character of the times particularly inculcates the lesson that, whether to prevent or repel danger, we ought not to be unprepared for it.” He urged

Congress to make liberal appropriations for extending and completing the nation's fixed and floating defenses on the seacoast and to provide for the adequate defense of the inland frontiers. To help accomplish this, Madison recommended the enlargement of the

Military Academy and the establishment of other academies in different parts of the

Union; an improvement of the militia system, which, although it had proved itself to be of value as a “resource for the public defence,” was deficient in skill and discipline; new shipbuilding establishments and fortifications; and a national network of roads and canals. Madison recognized the nation’s deficiencies, as had most politicians and officers. These elements of national defense, namely fortifications, regular army and militia, navy, and internal improvements, would be the foundation of all future strategy.^

The key players in post-war strategy on the northern frontier, however, were

Monroe, Calhoun, and Brown. The War of 1812 had shown both Monroe and Calhoun the inadequacy of America’s defense system, and Monroe’s inaugural address in 1817 reflected his concern for improving the nation’s defenses. To defend the nation, Monroe said, the government should fortify the coastal and inland frontiers, keep the army and

61 navy in perfect order, and place the militia on the best footing possible. He acknowledged that fortifying the frontiers would be costly, but Monroe believed that fortifications were less expensive than the ruin caused by war, not to mention the loss of property and the distress to the citizenry. He wanted a regular army that was moderate in size yet adequate to man the fortifications and repel the first onslaught of an enemy. The regulars would also serve as the foundation of a larger force and would “preserve the science as well as all the necessary implements of war in a state to be brought into activity in the event of war.” The navy would maintain the nation’s dignity as a neutral trading power and protect Americans from “spoliation.” Monroe recognized that the

United States was suited neither constitutionally nor financially to maintain large standing forces, however, so he admitted that the government must rely on “the great body of the people” and their “ardent patriotism and youthful vigor” to defend the nation.

An effective militia system was necessary since invasions could be too formidable for the modest land and naval forces to resist. If the militia were properly prepared, he said, “the

United States have nothing to dread from foreign invasion.” Finally, Monroe stressed the importance of improving the nation with roads and canals, which would shorten distances, make remote regions more accessible, and bind the coimtry together.” Monroe had the resolve and the subordinates to make such plans possible. Whether or not

Congress would provide the funds was another question.'*

In the months following the war, powerful American forces remained on the northern frontier (table 3.1). Twenty-two of the nation’s fifty infantry regiments occupied posts from Maine to Detroit, with a large concentration at Troy, near Albany,

62 New York. The location was an excellent one for the defense of the St. Lawrence frontier. From Albany all roads leading from the heart of the United States diverged toward Canada, allowing American forces to attack any point along the northern New

York border. This advantage would leave the British defenders in serious doubt as to the location of an American attack and would force them to spread their resources in an attempt to defend against all attacks. By the fall of 1815, however, these troops started to move west. The New York frontier was secure, protected by natural barriers and troops at Plattsburgh, Sackets Harbor, and Fort Niagara, and the United States Navy helped to transfer the troops to the new area of strategic importance, the western posts in the

Northwest. Limited appropriations also reduced the number of troops available to man the northern frontier.^

Location Infantry Dragoon Light Artillery Artillery Bath, ME 1 Saco, ME 1 Pittsfield, MA 1 Woodstock, VT 1 Burlington, VT 2 Plattsburgh, NY 2 Sackets Harbor 2 1 Troy, NY 5 1 1 Utica, NY 2 Buffalo 2 Erie, PA 1 Detroit 2 U.S. total 50 1 1 3 SOURCE: NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretaiy of War, 1814-1847, M7, roll 1,62-64.

Table 3.1; U.S. regiments and artillery corps on northern frontier, 14 March 1815.

63 Given fiscal and constitutional realities, then, the regular army would be a small one. There was a strong movement in Congress to reduce the defense establishment after the war, despite the protests of those who saw the need for a respectable standing army.

Traditional fears of a standing army and its threat to liberty played a major role as well.

Many politicians wanted to rely on the virtuous citizen soldier to defend the national interest, because standing armies lacked the necessary republican virtues and could be a tool of terror in the hands of a despot. Many critics, including Presidents Madison and

Monroe, did point out the deficiencies of the current militia system. Monroe informed

Congress in 1817 that “an improvement in the organization and discipline of the militia is one of the great objects which claim the unremitted attention” of that body.

Nationwide, state adjutants general either provided fragmentary returns of their militia’s strength, or they submitted returns dating to the War of 1812. The opponents of an ambitious defense policy won out, however, and an act passed on 3 March 1815 reduced the army to 10,000 men. As a result, there were fewer troops available to man the northern frontier, and the garrisons there declined accordingly. As tensions with Britain eased and as the strategic focus shifted west, the majority of troops on the northern frontier were posted on the Great Lakes and beyond (Appendix C).°

Secretary of War Calhoun, however, found it difficult to meet the growing nation’s defense needs with 10,000 troops. Calhoun did concede the danger that large standing armies posed to liberty and granted that the militia should be the “ultimate reliance for defence.” But to expect the militia to stand up to European regulars in the open field flew in the face of historical experience. A standing army was necessary,

64 Calhoun believed, because an army needed organization and discipline to distinguish it

from a crowd of untrained individuals, and a sufficient regular officer corps was needed

“to create and perpetuate military skill and experience.” In order to comply with a

further reduction to 6,000, he presented a plan in 1820 for an expansible army of “an

adequate number of experienced officers” and a small cadre of enlisted men that could

provide the nucleus of an army of new recruits and citizen soldiers. Congress rejected

Calhoun’s modest expansible army plan and reduced the army again in March 1821. The

nation thus returned to its traditional reliance on a small army of regulars and the military

potential of an armed populace. Such were the instruments that Jacob Brown and other

officers had to execute strategy on the northern frontier.^

Location 1816 1817 1818 1819 1822 1823 1824 F t Sullivan 7 — 39 25 50 59 54 Plattsburgh 514 428 431 252 69 60 — Sackets Harbor X 561 555 499 179 — 169 Greenbush X’ 71 74 77 —— — Fl Niagara X 179 100 95 42 40 51 Detroit 2) 371 199 204 48 — 76 Fl Wavne i 56 91 ——— — F t Gratiot 2 49 41 ——— — Ft Saginaw —— — — 93 94 — Ft Mackinac 175 195 208 56 58 55 Sault Ste. Marie —— — — 274 237 265 Ft Howard •X 224 174 158 243 223 353 Ft. Dearborn X 93 84 84 90 ~ — Total 2,596 2J07 1,983 1,602 1.144 771 1,023 U.S. total 10,024 8,220 7,676 8,688 5 JU 5,949 5,779 X 2d Infantry, 78S men, garrisoned Sackets Harbor, Greenbush. and Ft Niagara. ® 5th Infantry, 635 men, garrisoned posts m the Detroit region 3) 3d Infantry, 662 men, garrisoned Forts Wayne. Mackinac, Howard, and Dearborn. SOURCE; 1816: .XSfAfU I, 14th Cong., 2d sess . No. 151, ser. 16; 1817; .-tSPAW 1. 15th Cong., 1st sess . No. 158, ser. 16,669-72; 1818 ASPKU 1, 15th Cong., 2d sess . No. 168, ser. 16, 787-90; 1819; ASPKU 2. 16th Cong., 1st sess . No. 177, ser. 17. 36-37; 1822; .ASPKiA 1, 17th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 235, ser. 17, 450-72; 1823; .ASPXLA 1, 18th Cong, 1st sess.. No. 247, ser. 17, 558; 1824: .ASPXLA 2, 18th Cong., 2d sess , No. 262, ser. 17, 706. U.S. totals are in Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts o f the United Stales, 143-44. There w ere no retinns m 1820 and 1821

Table 3.2: Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1816-1824.

65 On the northern frontier, strategy focused on two key issues. These were first,

gaining naval supremacy on the Great Lakes and concentrating troops for the decisive

attack on the St. Lawrence, and second, placing troops and forts between the Indian tribes

and Canadian settlements in order to reduce British influence in the Northwest. The St.

Lawrence theater was the long-recognized key to decision in any war between the United

States and Britain. American forces had failed to cut the St. Lawrence line of communication during the War of 1812, and Jacob Brown was not going to repeat the

mistake. In a letter to Secretary of War William Crawford in November 1815, Brown outlined his plan for decisive operations and adequate defense on the northern frontier.

First, “a well constituted work” at Rouses Point, the outlet of Lake Champlain, would command the entrance to the lake and would give the United States “undisputed command” of the key waterway. Second, Brown deemed it to be “of the first importance” to establish “an impregnable fortress” on the St. Lawrence which would cut the British line of communications to the west and force British forces to portage around the fort at “great inconvenience.” Seizing the St. Lawrence line, in Brown’s opinion, was the best way to cut off Upper Canada from assistance and protect the western states and territories. This strategy, to defend the Great Lakes region by a vigorous offensive farther to the east, would remain the foundation for American strategic thinking for the next several decades.*

Brown informed Crawford that Canada was unlike any other country, “a mere line of frontier possessing very little resource within itself.” Since the colony was “fed and sustained by the mother country,” breaking the line of communication along the St.

6 6 Lawrence would have two decisive effects. First, British forces in Upper Canada would have to fall back toward their source of supply, and second, the British fleets on the lakes would be “rendered comparatively useless.” In case of war. Brown counseled, any point above Rouses Point and the St. Lawrence was merely secondary. Since American forces could not directly attack the seat of British power, he hoped at least to “interpose a force to restrain her within as narrow limits as possible.” Thus, operations along the northern

New York frontier were the key to decision, in Brown’s view. Otherwise, he only advised spending funds on fortifications at Fort Niagara, Detroit, and Castine, Maine; a good road from Ohio to Detroit would provide the necessary security for the northwestern frontier.

Meanwhile, Brown’s British counterparts focused on defensive measures to protect against future American attacks. Although the war had shown the need for a larger regular garrison in British North America, the force was reduced in 1817 after it was apparent that there was no immediate threat of hostilities. By the end of 1819, there were about 4,900 British regulars left in the Canadas and the Maritime Provinces. Given the smaller garrison, the British decided to rely on loyal settlers, forts, command of the lakes, and offensive action on the American seaboard to defend the provinces. After the war, there were major efforts to strengthen the loyal population through a wise settlement policy, especially in Upper Canada Some officers wanted to discourage settlement along the border, because roads and towns along the frontier could facilitate and supply an American invasion. Such plans never came to fruition, however, because the authorities decided to plant colonies of veterans, both Canadian militiamen and British

67 regulars, along vulnerable stretches of the frontier. The purpose was to strengthen the vulnerable border against American attack and keep the region overwhelmingly British in the face of American immigration, which continued despite official attempts to stop it.

Thus, the British expected a loyal population to provide a means of defense against the

Yankee invader.’

British strategy also focused on fortifications and the naval command of the Great

Lakes. The war had shown that the defense of Canada depended on the security of communications between the Atlantic and the lakes. Thus, much money went toward improving navigation on the St. Lawrence and to building fortifications at key chokepoints along the frontier. British officers knew of American plans to seize the St.

Lawrence if the war had continued into 1815, and many of them, most notably the Duke of Wellington, pressed for a along the Rideau route to bypass the vulnerable St.

Lawrence. Naval construction continued so that British forces could achieve and maintain naval supremacy along the frontier, especially on Lake Ontario. Finally, British engineers began a very active fort-building program in 1818, providing new fortifications at Quebec, Montreal, and Fort Lennox near the outlet of Lake Champlain. Fort Lennox was especially important since it defended the British naval base for Lake Champlain. In a war with the United States, it could either be the supply depot for a British offensive against the lake, or it could hinder American efforts to penetrate Lower Canada. The main assumption, however, was that offensive action against the American seaboard provided the best means of defense against American aggression in Canada. British

68 fleets based at Halifax and could plunder American coastal towns or interfere

with trade, making any future American government reluctant to risk hostilities.

American strategy also emphasized fortifications, and in 1815, Corps of

Engineers officers surveyed the border and made several recommendations. On the St.

Lawrence frontier, works at Rouses Point and Plattsburgh would help secure Lake

Champlain; depots at Crown Point or Ticonderoga could help supply offensive operations in the area On the St. Lawrence, the engineers believed that two

fortifications could force the enemy to waste resources in a siege or to conduct a time- consuming portage around the forts. The recommended locations were Point, a peninsula commanding the river near present-day Iroquois, Ontario, and either

Ogdensburg or Morristown, the termini of good turnpike roads which could facilitate the quick dispatch of troops to the threatened point. On the lakes, the engineers stressed the need to secure Sackets and Henderson’s Harbors on Lake Ontario, Put-in-Bay on Lake

Erie, Detroit, and Mackinac. To support naval operations on the Upper Lakes, fortified depots at Maumee or Sandusky Bays on Lake Erie and at Chicago were crucial, as was a military road from Chicago to the Maumee River. ' *

These were only recommendations, of course, and few of the key points along the northern frontier received any appropriations from Congress. The eastern anchor of the frontier. on Passamaquoddy Bay, returned to American control by 1818; the fort held a small garrison but received no funds for major building. Despite Brown’s desire to start work at Iroquois Point by 1817 and the recognition by British officers that an American fort there would block the river, nothing was ever built to command the St.

69 Lawrence; the site was unsuitable for construction, and funds were limited.'^

Ogdensburg, a bustling and prosperous town on the St. Lawrence, received no fort, even though its citizens petitioned President Monroe for one; they stressed the town’s remote location, its proximity to a powerful enemy, and the importance of navigation on the river. Despite such pleas, the government did not consider the site important enough to warrant the use of the nation’s limited resources. At Sackets Harbor, the government built no new defenses, but did establish Madison Barracks in the summer of 1816.

Although built with soldier labor, the stone barracks proved to be more expensive than estimated, but Jacob Brown countered the critics, insisting that the post was “worthy of a great people.” By February 1821, the army had spent $43,311.47 on the buildings there, but there was no permanent fortification to protect the location from attack.

There likewise was little construction on the Canadian side of the border west of

Lake Champlain, because the British had limited resources and used them mainly to defend Lower Canada. There were few fortifications along the St. Lawrence, the main work being a timber and earthworks at Fort Wellington, near Prescott. The fort at York, on Lake Ontario, slowly crumbled into ruins, and the forts on the Niagara frontier were likewise in a dilapidated condition. Fort Mississauga, across the river from

Fort Niagara, was still under construction but reported to be in poor condition in 1819;

Forts George and Erie were decaying and still showed signs of heavy war damage.

Above Montreal, then, there was little to stand in the way of an American invasion. The

British recognized that everything hinged on operations near Montreal, as did the

70 Americans; only as long as Montreal remained in British hands could Upper Canada hope to hold out in a future war.

On the American side of the northern frontier, only two locations received appropriations for major construction. Fort Niagara, of the Niagara frontier for a century, underwent major rebuilding to repair extensive war damage. American troops reoccupied the post on 22 May 1815, and Brown requested repairs in August so that the fort “may yet last for ages.” The intent was to strengthen Fort Niagara against artillery fire from the Canadian shore. The most important site on the border was at

Rouses Point, where work started as early as April 1815, when Jonathan Swift ordered

Joseph Totten to survey the outlet of Lake Champlain and determine a suitable site for a fortification to command the passage into the lake. The assignment was a major coup for the young engineer. Totten had served with great distinction on the Niagara frontier and at Plattsburgh during the war, and now he was in charge of work on the most important fortification on the northern frontier. Totten had understood the importance of controlling the lake’s outlet when he was the chief engineer in the Lake Champlain region prior to the British attack in 1814. Once in charge of operations there after the war, he reminded his chief, Jonathan Swift, that “the free and undisturbed navigation by us of the Lake, will be as invaluable to our military operations on that frontier, as it would be fatal in the hands of the British.” Totten’s views were in accord with those of

Jacob Brown, who was anxious to get construction underway. Command of Lake

Champlain would secure use of the lake to American forces and make an attack on the

Montreal region possible. If the British commanded the lake, they could thwart an

71 attempted invasion and could wreak havoc on the lake settlements. A fort that sealed the entrance to the lake would eliminate such a threat.

To control the outlet and secure command of Lake Champlain, Totten, assisted by

René DeRussy of the Engineers and Isaac Craig of the Artillery, settled on a site at Island

Point, just north of the settlement of Rouses Point.** The officers considered the location to be the best point inside the 45th parallel for a defensive work. The river channel there was narrow enough to be covered by the guns from one fort; any sites further south would require two forts to command the passage. Totten’s plans called for a massive , casemated for heavy guns, in the shape of an irregular nonagon. Before he could build the fort, however, Totten had to purchase the site, so his chief concern was to obtain land for the work at a reasonable price. Thus, it was imperative not to let the local residents know the importance of the proposed fortification. Totten instructed DeRussy to tell land owners that the government proposed to build a “small and unimportant” fort at Island Point. To keep prices down, DeRussy was supposed to inform potential sellers that it was not important which lot he purchased, and that the engineers would build the work on the other side of the Richelieu River or on a shoal if necessary. Despite Totten’s admonition to “admit none, no not one, to your confidence,” word leaked about the nature of the proposed fort, and Totten complained to Swift that land owners and suppliers made “abominable demands” as a result.^”

Totten had greater concerns than exorbitant prices, however. The tower proposed for Island Point appeared to be just south of the 45th parallel, as determined by a survey in the early , but there was some suspicion that the true parallel was actually farther

72 south. If this were true, the construction site could actually be on British territory.'‘

Secretary of War Crawford warned Jacob Brown in May 1816 that “some well informed men” believed that the true parallel could be several miles different from the surveyed line; if this were the case, Crawford felt that the fort was useless. Therefore, he informed

Brown that it would be expedient to halt all construction until engineers could find an alternate site. In particular, Crawford wanted French engineer to inspect the region."

Whereas previous fortifications had been designed and constructed by individual engineers acting under the Secretary of War, the post-war system of national defenses, the so-called Third System, was under the control of a board which made an extensive survey of national defense needs, set standards, and coordinated and supervised construction. The goal was to create a comprehensive system of national defenses, not just a scattering of forts suited only to local conditions. The board, organized in late

1816, was composed of several American engineers and a French general, Simon

Bernard, a skilled engineer who had served with distinction under Napoleon. The

Frenchman had come to the United States on the recommendation of the Marquis de

Lafayette.'^ The board, commonly referred to as the Bernard Board, did not just confine itself to fortifications but looked at the other key elements of national defense as well, namely the navy, regular army and militia, and internal improvements.

The American members of the Board included a navy officer, hero of Plattsburgh

Thomas Macdonough, and two army engineers, William McRee and Joseph Totten. The appointment did not please Totten, however, because he felt that it would take him away

73 from “the execution of my favorite scheme of the defence of this entrance to the

country,” the works at Rouses Point. Concerned also that the extensive travel would

keep him separated from his family and reduce his income, Totten informed Chief of

Engineers Swift that he would “not hesitate a moment” to decline the appointment if he

could.

Furthermore, Totten had not approved of the appointment of Bernard in the first

place, a concern held by other American officers. Joseph Swift considered the

appointment a “humiliating act” and an attack on the skills of the engineer corps;

Bernard would also gain knowledge of the country’s weak points, a danger if France and the United States went to war. While Totten admitted that the Frenchman might have

“rare talents” and that the United States might profit from his advice, he questioned the wisdom of bringing Bernard into the military establishment. The appointment bothered

Totten for two reasons. First, it would place “the safety of the country” in the hands of a foreigner. Second, appointing Bernard was an affront to the professional pride of Totten and other American engineers. Totten did not understand why American engineers, just because they had not seen the great fortresses of Vauban or built, defended, or besieged fortifications, should be considered “ignorant.” Totten felt that the skills of American engineers had improved, that they had proven their skill and patriotism during the late war, and that engineering was a science whose only difficulty was “in properly applying given principles.” According to Totten, talent was the only requirement for a good engineer, and the government did not have to go to Europe for that."^

74 Despite his reservations about Bernard’s presence on the Board, Totten had to work closely with him. Bernard joined Totten at Rouses Point in December to plan defenses for the area, and the presence of the French engineer so soon after his appointment demonstrated the importance given to the Lake Champlain frontier. Their joint report described the importance of controlling the outlet of Lake Champlain and would be a model for strategy on the northern frontier in subsequent decades '^

According to Totten and Bernard, the British would never attempt “serious military operations” without first achieving mastery of Lake Champlain. The movement of supplies would otherwise be difficult, and the British would be exposed to attack on their flanks by American forces. If the invaders depended solely on land movement for their supplies, they would be cut off and destroyed before they reached the lake’s southern extremity. Thus, it was “of the highest importance” to block British access to the lake if the United States wanted to prevent British offensives in the area. Blocking access would provide several other advantages. First, the Americans could use the lake to move troops and supplies. Second, the American settlements and vessels on the lake would be safe from attack. Third, the government would save money by not having to maintain a large naval force on the lake. Finally, by fortifying the outlet, the United

States would force the British to conduct time-consuming siege operations to remove the obstacles in their path. The delay would give American forces time to concentrate for a counterattack. Interestingly, the report did not mention that British control of Lake

Champlain would seriously hamper American efforts to operate against the St. Lawrence.

75 American control of the lake would permit a decisive thrust along the Champlain-

Richelieu corridor against the St. Lawrence."^

In the opinion of Totten and Bernard, the only location where batteries could command the river was at Island Point. There the channel was 440 yards wide, well within the range of heavy guns, passing close to the western where the proposed tower would stand. The engineers recommended a three-tiered tower mounting sixty guns on Island Point, wood and stone piers and sharpened timbers to obstruct the channel, another fort on the west bank to defend the tower, and a small work near Rouses

Point to complete the defenses. The Island Point location now had Bernard’s approval in addition to Totten’s, and construction proceeded. The importance of the work was such that it was one of only five forts under construction during 1817. The other locations were Fort Niagara, , Pea Patch Island near Philadelphia, and Fort

Warburton near Washington, D.C. The fact that two of the locations were on the northern frontier demonstrates that the security of the border with British North America was still a dominant concern of the United States government. Such concern would quickly fade, however."®

Although Totten managed to get relieved from the Board of Fortifications in April

1817,"* he had little time left at Rouses Point since Secretary of War Calhoun ordered work stopped until the international boundary could be accurately determined. As late as

December 1818 Calhoun still requested appropriations for the site, considering it so important that he asked $200,000 for works mounting 300 guns and capable of withstanding a siege; this was part of a national fortification appropriation totaling $1.19

76 million.^® A boundary commission, following the dictates of the Treaty of Ghent, did indeed determine that the actual 45th parallel passed about three-quarters of a mile south of the supposed line, placing Island Point within British territory. The lake outlet thus required alternate defenses, so Totten submitted two alternate proposals in March 1819 for fortifications that could still “obstruct the passage of a fleet into the broad waters of

Lake Champlain.” First, there could be “formidable” batteries at Point au Fer and on the reef farther out in the lake. The passage between the reef and Isle la Motte could be blocked by a line of timber piles. As Totten admitted, these works would be prohibitively expensive, which made a second position at Stony and Windmill Points more attractive. The width of the lake just south of the outlet required a fort on each point, but the positions were strong and commanded the channel. Although work stopped at Lake Champlain and the Island Point tower fell into ruin. Stony and Windmill

Points remained the focus of engineer plans until the final boundary settlement in 1842.^'

Totten’s tenure on Lake Champlain was over anyway, for by April 1819 he prepared to head to the seacoast to work again with Bernard on the Board of

Fortifications. He rejoined the board after the resignations of Swift and McRee. Totten no doubt looked forward to the renewed partnership with trepidation, as Bernard had severely criticized Totten’s plans for the works around Rouses Point. Bernard considered the work on Island Point too small for its purpose, which should have been to defend the lake and support the right flank of a force marching from Plattsburgh against Montreal.

Bernard stressed to Calhoun that no more work should be done at the outlet of the lake until the boundary had been settled. He furthermore warned him that the United States

77 should not “project for separate points before knowing their relation with the whole frontier, in order to satisfy, at the same time, the defence of each point, and of that of the general system.” Nevertheless, despite the strategic importance of Lake Champlain, there would be no further work at its outlet for two more decades.

There could perhaps be less concern about the security of Lake Champlain and the Great Lakes thanks to a naval agreement reached with Britain in 1817. President

Monroe gave much attention to the defense of the northern frontier, because the War of

1812 had shown the need for better defenses along the border. Between May and

September 1817 he went on a tour of the northern frontier to determine locations of new defensive works, which works were improperly sited and should be demolished, and where regular troops should be concentrated. Naval supremacy was equally important, however, and the United States had to achieve control of the lakes without resorting to another ruinous shipbuilding race with Britain.

Both sides retained large numbers of vessels on the lakes, but most were not immediately available for service. The burden of maintaining the naval establishment was too great given the inadequate state of communications, so immediately after the war, on 27 February 1815, the Senate authorized the sale or laying up of all lake vessels not needed for customs enforcement. At Sackets Harbor, construction stopped on New

Orleans and Chippewa, and at the cost of $25,000 the Navy built shiphouses over them to protect the vessels against the elements. By early 1816 the United States had twenty- three of its seventy-four warships on Lakes Champlain, Ontario, and Erie, but most of them were laid up or were captured British vessels (table 3.3). The British likewise had a

78 declining force on the lakes, possessing twelve gunboats and the frame of a frigate at Isle aux Noix for use on Lake Champlain; eight ships and schooners on Lake Ontario; three small vessels used mainly as transports on Lake Erie; and two schooners on Lake Huron, where the British base at Penetanguishene had tons of stores and ordnance, posing a threat to the American settlements in Michigan. The British did, however, take better care of their vessels and were building more for use on the lakes, putting the United

States in a vulnerable position.

Location Ships Bngs Schooners Gimboats Uofguns Whitehall, C onfiance Eagle Ticonderoga 6 92 Lake Champlain Saratoga Linnet Sackets Harbor, Sew Orleans Jefferson Lady o f the Lake * 15 378 Lake Ontario Chippewa Jones* Plattsburg Sylph Superior O neida M ohawk G eneral Pike M adison Ene, Lake Erie Siagara* Porcupine* 72 Lawrence G hent* D etroit Queen Charlotte • Vessel equipped and ready for service SOURCE: "Naval Force on the First of January, I8I5,".-tS'/’.V'.-l I, 14th Cong,, 1st sess . No. 133, ser. 23. 379-80

Table 3.3: Ü. S. force on the lakes, 1 January 1816.

Remembering the ruinous expense of maintaining fleets during the war, both sides were eager to reach an agreement on force levels on the Great Lakes. When

Secretary of State, Monroe had been concerned about the deteriorating American position on the lakes and wanted a naval agreement in order to reduce “the expenses of each country” and “the chances of collision,” and to “prevent any feelings of jealousy.”

79 When Monroe first approached the British in November 1815, the British initially reacted

coolly to his proposals. Luckily, both the American minister in London, John Quincy

Adams, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, recognized that an agreement would

be useful in avoiding clashes between naval officers on the lakes. The concern about a

“collision” on the lakes was not an idle one. For example, British cruisers on Lake Erie

in the summer of 1816 were stopping and searching American vessels in a “highly

provoking and insulting” manner, according to Alexander Macomb, commander at

Detroit. He wanted an American naval presence to prevent such “very offensive” behavior from recurring.

Castlereagh knew, of course, that any agreement would benefit the United States, which could use its superior local resources to gain naval supremacy quickly. During the war the key to American naval power on the lakes had been the naval yards on the

Atlantic seaboard, industry at towns such as Pittsburgh, and superior communications.

The routes supplying American bases, from Philadelphia to Erie and from New York

City to Sackets Harbor, were better, shorter, and less exposed than those on the Canadian side. To Adams’s surprise, however, the British were willing to negotiate. Parliament was unwilling to continue spending large sums on the military and naval establishments, reducing the ships of the line, for example, from seventy-eight in 1814 to only fourteen in

1817. A naval race with the Americans promised to be a futile undertaking, and eliminating the lake fleets might reduce the chance of war by reducing the possibility of an altercation. Castlereagh thus instructed the minister to the United States, Charles

Bagot, to deal with the issue in Washington with Monroe. The two sides reached a vague

80 agreement in August 1816, made more formal by an exchange of notes between Bagot and Richard Rush, acting head of the State Department after Monroe’s election as president, in April 1817.^^

The Rush-Bagot Agreement went into effect immediately and greatly reduced the naval establishments on the Great Lakes. Each side could possess one vessel, of up to

100 tons and armed with an 18-pounder cannon, on Lakes Champlain and Ontario. On the Upper Lakes each side could have two such vessels. All other warships were to be immediately dismantled, and each side agreed to neither build nor arm any more. If either the British or the Americans wished to annul the agreement, they could do so after giving six months’ notice. The agreement was a great concession by the British, because the lakes were such a vital line of communication, not just a frontier, and because the only way in which Britain could prevail in a future war was by adequate prior preparation. Understandably, British commanders in Canada were upset by the agreement since they lacked the local resources to gain naval supremacy quickly.

Financial won out, however, leaving the United States in a very favorable position on the northern frontier.

The agreement thus encouraged the rapid demobilization of the American lake fleets, which continued apace. The United States Navy reduced its force on the lakes to the galley Allen on Lake Champlain, schooner Lady o f the Lake on Lake Ontario, and schooners Porcupine and Ghent on Lake Erie. While Congress had established a major building program in 1816 to strengthen the high seas fleet, the lake stations slowly rotted away; attention shifted to distant stations and gunboat diplomacy abroad. By 1821, there

81 were still thirty-six personnel at Sackets Harbor and seventeen each at Erie and

Whitehall; the number of personnel at Sackets Harbor and their annual cost, $15,343.25, were second only to the base at Boston, with forty-three personnel costing $16,010.75.

Nevertheless, these statistics only reflect the passing importance of the lake stations. Just three years later, these numbers were reduced to thirteen, nine, and seven respectively.

The lake stations themselves were threatened with elimination, the Secretary of the Navy recommending in January 1821 that the public property at Whitehall should be removed to New York and the station “dispensed with.” By 1822, there were vessels on station in the Pacific, the Mediterranean, the West Indies, and the Afncan coast, but not on the lakes. All the vessels on the lakes were laid up in ordinary, except for two of the smallest vessels, which were employed as revenue cutters.

As financial retrenchment set in after the Panic of 1819, Congress reduced its original naval appropriations, sealing the fate of the Great Lakes fleets. To deal with the new fiscal reality. Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard proposed in January 1824 that there be two classes of navy yards, the first class on the Atlantic and the second on the lakes. Southard considered the naval stations at Whitehall and Erie to be “not useful,” and he insisted that “no course of events can hereafter render them necessary to the public defence.” He recommended that the government abandon the two stations and remove the public property. Presumably, the naval agreement and superior American communications rendered a substantial naval establishment on Lakes Champlain and

Erie unnecessary. The Secretary also recommended that the government maintain the

Lake Ontario station at Sackets Harbor “on a very reduced scale.” In his opinion, only

82 Chippewa and New Orleans were worth preserving, which could be done at little cost by a few men. While the three lake stations currently cost $27,000 per year to maintain.

Southard proposed only the maintenance of Sackets Harbor, which would cost the government just $2,000 annually. In a follow-up report to the Senate Committee on

Naval Affairs, Southard reported that the senior officer of the Navy, John Rodgers, concurred. Rodgers recommended that the government sell everything at Erie and

Whitehall and maintain an establishment at Sackets Harbor just large enough to protect public property. Thus peace, the naval agreement, and fiscal realities dictated that the large establishment on the lakes would not be maintained. By December 1824, the Navy

Department reported that most of the vessels on the lakes, except for Chippewa and New

Orleans, should either be broken up or sold.^^

The Agreement of 1817 and the decline of the navy on the lakes, however, did not greatly change American strategy for a future war along the northern frontier, where decisive action would provide the necessary defense. In 1818, Jacob Brown presented a plan for decisive operations on the northern frontier to Secretary of War Calhoun. Given the nature of the northern frontier, he said, American forces should be on the defense above Lake Ontario and on the offense below it, because “all blows struck above the outlet of Lake Ontario are struck in vain.” He placed a great emphasis on roads and fortifications. According to Brown, offensive moves would be greatly strengthened by good military roads on the American side of the border, west of Lake Champlain. The region east of the lakes presented a barrier of “swamps, wilderness and mountains, as impervious to the enemy as to ourselves,” so no defenses were necessary there. Good

83 roads between Plattsburgh and French Mills (Fort Covington) would provide access to the border for armies operating against the St. Lawrence. In addition. Brown still wanted a fortification somewhere on the St. Lawrence that could break the British line of communication. This would help the United States avoid a “fruitless war upon our resources by armaments on the Lakes,” and it would prevent British assistance to the

“Savages” of the Upper Lakes region. Brown advocated, then, the traditional strategy of cutting the St. Lawrence to provide decisive results. A year later. Brown insisted to

Calhoun that in addition to operating against the St. Lawrence and severing the line of communication with the west, American forces would have to take Quebec as well. In

Brown’s view, Quebec was the great source of sustenance for the rest of Canada and had to be seized in order to eliminate British power; in his words, “to annihilate it vitally—to preclude its resuscitation, it is necessary to strike at the root.”’*®

In order to carry out this strategy, however, the United States needed an effective road network along the St. Lawrence frontier, something Brown had wanted since the end of the war. Although there was a large network of roads in the east by 1815, they were of incredibly poor quality and discouraged long-distance transport by any means other than water. While there had been a movement to build turnpike roads linking major commercial centers before 1812, the war had shown the necessity of a good road network. It had been difficult to move men and materiel along the northern frontier, and the British blockade had forced much travel further inland, highlighting the roads’ inadequacy. Presidents Madison and Monroe, Calhoun, and officers such as Brown recognized that neglecting the nation’s roads could be suicidal in wartime. In addition,

84 better roads would provide obvious commercial benefits, serve the expanding west, and strengthen ties between the various sections of the country. State legislatures also recognized the utility of an improved road network, and several states boasted impressive mileage in the years after the war. Through a combination of incentives from state governments and private enterprise. New York had 4,000 miles of turnpikes by 1821, while Pennsylvania had 1,800.'“

The major obstacle to a national program was the debate over the program’s constitutionality. Some Congressmen, such as Ohio Senator Jeremiah Morrow, believed that only the federal government had “the means and resources” to carry out a great national system of internal improvements. Morrow had no problem with the constitutionality of federal sponsorship of roads and canals. Strict constructionists of the

Constitution stood in the way. When Calhoun and Henry Clay sponsored the Bonus Bill in March 1817, which provided that funds from the charter of the Second Bank of the

United States would be devoted to a national system of internal improvements, Madison himself vetoed it. He believed that Congress lacked constitutional authority to appropriate funds for the general welfare, and Monroe likewise rejected federally- sponsored internal improvements. There was just not enough support for a federal program providing benefits that many believed that the states should handle themselves.

The president could, however, authorize the construction of roads that served a military function. For that reason, roads along the northern frontier were built by executive order and justified on military grounds; in this manner, the roads vital for the security of the frontiers, including the northern, could be built without Congressional sanction.

85 The major roads built as a result of executive initiative were concentrated in two areas, the St. Lawrence and the Detroit frontiers. To facilitate their construction, the War

Department directed commanders to employ soldier labor, which also was used on construction at such locations as Rouses Point and Sackets Harbor. Some believed that soldier labor contributed to the discipline and health of the troops and was far less expensive than hiring . Brown himself was proud of the 2d Infantry’s work on the Sackets Harbor-Plattsburgh road and hoped that their efforts would arouse the admiration of the American people. Of course, there were disadvantages to using soldiers as laborers. While he considered building roads and forts to be “very proper objects of employment,” benefiting both the nation and the soldiers’ well-being, Calhoun admitted in July 1818 that soldier labor contributed to the desertion problem along the border with Canada. Many soldiers, in Calhoun’s view, reasoned that “if I must labour I had better do it for myself than the public.” In addition, the emphasis on soldier labor reduced the time and resources devoted to military training. Despite the drawbacks to soldier labor, however, it was the only realistic way in which the government could execute the necessary construction.'*^

Under the direction of army commanders and performed by soldiers, military road building on the northern frontier progressed rapidly. On the St. Lawrence frontier,

Monroe ordered the construction of a road between Plattsburgh and Sackets Harbor in autumn 1817. The 2d Infantry built the road in two sections. The east section went from

Plattsburgh to French Mills (Fort Covington) on the Salmon River, which flowed into the

St. Lawrence. The west section went from Sackets Harbor to Morristown on the St.

8 6 Lawrence. The gap, Monroe and others assumed, would be filled by settlers who were attracted to the area by existing road construction. Brown had also suggested opening a road from Plattsburgh north to the border, but Monroe rejected the plan, feeling that such a road would be of more utility to British invaders than to the Americans. Monroe preferred the line of communication to remain parallel to the border, where it would be of little use to the British but would greatly assist operations on the St. Lawrence frontier."”

In any event, Monroe, Calhoun, and many officers recognized that American forces had suffered greatly during the war for want of such a road, and it could play a major role in a future war. The road was an important factor in Brown’s proposed strategy for the northern frontier. In case o f war, he proposed that Plattsburgh and

Sackets Harbor would be the main depots for the Lake Ontario, St. Lawrence, and Lake

Champlain frontiers. From those points. Brown felt, “the military resources of the country can be most conveniently assembled & from them most effectually directed against the Canadian territories.” The Plattsburgh-Sackets Harbor road would help

American forces avoid the “embarrassments” o f the last war and provide a secure means to convey resources within the national borders. In addition, the roads would allow

American forces to penetrate Canada at any point they chose, cut the St. Lawrence, and force the enemy to move his resources along an interior route at great delay and uncertainty. Internal improvements, then, were just as critical to national defense as forts, troops, and fleets."*^

87 The other important military road was under construction on the Detroit frontier.

In May 1816, the Secretary of War ordered Alexander Macomb, commander of the Fifth

Military Department at Detroit, to start construction on a military road from that city south to Fort Meigs, the supply post on the Maumee River rapids. Such a road was crucial since Detroit, the only major center of population in Michigan Territory, was cut off from the rest of the nation by the forbidding Black Swamp, a vast boggy area covering much of northwest Ohio. Lewis Cass, governor of the territory and an officer on the Detroit frontier during the war, had urged the construction of military roads from

Michigan to the neighboring states ever since his appointment in 1813. The military road, built with soldier labor and without congressional sanction, helped reduce the isolation of the territory by opening up communication between Detroit and the interior of Ohio. During the war, American forces were hampered severely by the lack of such a road, so Macomb’s enthusiasm about the project is understandable. By November 1818, the troops had already built seventy miles of the road south from Detroit. Macomb described the road as “magnificent,” eighty feet wide and well provided with causeways and bridges. One of the bridges was 450 feet long. The troops, in Macomb’s opinion, showed great “zeal and perseverance” in their labor, which was “highly beneficial” to the

American people. In strategic terms, Macomb felt that the road contributed greatly to the defense and strength of the frontier. Furthermore, the road greatly increased the value of public lands in Michigan Territory by opening them up to settlement. Settlement of the frontier was important to Governor Cass as well, because an expanding population would provide the manpower necessary for the defense of the Detroit frontier. Of course, an

8 8 expanding population would also demand that the government take greater measures for the defense of the area.’*^

Roads were not the only internal improvement that could assist the northern frontier both militarily and commercially. Water had long been the preferred means of transportation in the region, and it took little imagination to determine how improvements to the existing water transport routes could benefit the people on both sides of the border. As early as 1792, the Western Inland Lock Navigation Company made great efforts to improve the navigation of the Mohawk River, with the goal of providing a continuous system of inland navigation between the and Lake

Ontario. Work progressed slowly until, significantly, the state of New York stepped in and provided government assistance. The intention of the company was not to help in the defense of the northern frontier, however, but to divert the Great Lakes trade to New

York City, bypassing Montreal. The military utility of the canal, of course, was substantial."*’

Government assistance, especially at the federal level, was always a crucial consideration in intemal improvements. In 1808, Albert Gallatin submitted a report on roads and canals to the Senate. He proposed that the United States take advantage of the

Hudson River and use it to breach the Appalachians, the mountainous barrier that stood in the way of national progress, unity, and security. Gallatin proposed canals between the

Hudson and Lake Champlain, the Hudson and Lake Ontario, and around Niagara Falls; the cost would be $4 million out of the $16.6 million national system he proposed. The plan proposed that the government would play a significant role in constructing a system

89 that many advocates outside of Washington had long supported. No government aid was

forthcoming, however, held up by sectional jealousies and debate over rival routes. In addition to congressional opposition, troubles abroad also delayed implementation, and the federal government built only fragments of Gallatin’s system. Private enterprise and state governments would have to do the rest."**

The war had shown the necessity of good inland navigation, however, be it by river, lake, or canal. Steamboats were already in use on both sides of the border, on the

St. Lawrence and Lake Champlain by 1809, on Lake Ontario by 1816, and on Lake Erie by 1818.“*^ There was a well-established steamboat line on the Hudson between New

York City and Albany as well. In terms of artificial improvements to navigation. New

York led the way by providing state support to canal construction. Governor De Witt

Clinton was a great advocate of canals to connect the Hudson to Lakes Erie and

Champlain, seeking the assistance of Congress in December 1816. Clinton assured

Congress that the canals, as outlets for produce, would enhance the value of the public lands in the west; this would certainly be attractive to western politicians and the nationalists in Washington. There were other benefits, however, that such canals could provide. By drawing the trade of the Upper Lakes away from Britain, especially the fur trade which kept the Indian tribes in the thrall of the British, the canals would contribute greatly to national security, in addition to providing fast and secure transportation in time of war. Of course, Clinton did not mention the benefits that the canals would provide to the state of New York; there were few congressmen who were willing to subsidize the continued commercial dominance of the Empire State, so New York would have to bear

90 much of the burden of canal construction. Note, however, the fact that private or state enterprise could have a great impact on the defense of the northern frontier.

Many congressmen did agree with Clinton, however, and appealed in vain for substantial government assistance for intemal improvements. Pennsylvania

Representative Thomas Wilson stressed that improving inland navigation would remove the Appalachians as a barrier to national prosperity, keep American produce from flowing through British ports in Lower Canada, and reduce British influence among the

“numerous hordes” of Indians. While “individual and local enterprise” should bear much of the burden of internal improvements, Wilson believed that the federal government should at least provide some assistance to matters of such great national importance.

Pennsylvania Senator Abner Lacock emphasized the military utility of internal improvements, claiming that good inland navigation would facilitate the transport of troops and supplies to vulnerable points on the frontiers. Canals and river improvements could thus also reduce the amount of money spent on coastal defenses. Constitutionality of federal assistance to such works remained a major obstacle, though, so it was up to states such as New York to provide the improvements that the nation so desperately needed/'

Spurred on by the determination of De Witt Clinton, New York started construction on canals that would enhance the commercial strength of the state. Military concerns were probably of less import. Lobbying the state legislature for assistance to a canal that would coimect the Hudson River near Albany to Lake Erie near Buffalo,

Clinton stressed the waterway’s importance. It would open up the most remote parts of

91 the country to New York; it would divert the Upper Lakes trade to , making it “the great depot and warehouse of the western world”; it would reduce transportation costs in wartime; and it would unite the commercial interests of the

Atlantic and Western states, overcoming the mountain barrier and providing “an imperishable cement of connexion, and an indissoluble bond of union.” The improvement of commercial intercourse, Clinton felt, was “the first duty and the noblest employment of government.”^'

Clinton got the support he was looking for, and construction of the Erie Canal began in 1817. Completed in 1825, the 363-mile long canal connected Albany and

Buffalo and encouraged an American canal-building craze, especially in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Construction also started in 1818 on the Champlain Canal, a sixty-four mile waterway connecting the Erie Canal at Waterford, the head of navigation on the Hudson just north of Albany, to Whitehall on Lake Champlain. Completed in 1822, the canal strengthened the ties of Vermont and northern New York to the rest of the nation. The canals provided the western states and the Lake Champlain region with a water connection to the Atlantic through American territory. Of course, the canals also gave

New York City a huge competitive edge, threatening every other Atlantic seaport.^^

Most importantly for the northern frontier, the canals would figure prominently in both American and British plans for military operations of the region since commercial routes and defense concerns went hand in hand. Although the Erie and Champlain

Canals were built for commercial purposes with no intervention by the War Department, the canals helped open up three lines of operation to United States forces, namely Lake

92 Champlain, Kingston and the St. Lawrence, and the Niagara frontier. The canals also made the resources of New York City and the rest of the nation easily available to

American forces operating along the northern frontier. Furthermore, the trade that the canals drew away from Lower Canada and to American ports threatened to weaken the moral, political, and commercial connections between Canadians and the British government. John Duncan recognized this fact while traveling along the northern frontier in 1823, commenting that the canals, especially the Erie, did “more to endanger to the British crown the loss of Upper Canada, than all that warlike operations could ever have effected.” The great success of the Erie Canal thus encouraged the British to adopt similar measures.

On the British side of the border, as on the American, canal advocates used both commercial and military concerns to justify construction. As the importance of the fur trade gradually declined and staples such as wheat and timber became more important, commercial emphasis shifted away from the Ottawa River and the Upper Lakes to the St.

Lawrence. Concerned that the American canals would steal Canadian agricultural trade,

Quebec and Montreal merchants demanded improvements of the St. Lawrence River system before New York destroyed their commercial empire. The war had also shown the military utility of improved inland navigation. Many British officers recognized the importance of the “Rideau route,” a waterway that could allow small British vessels to move between Montreal and the upper St. Lawrence along an inland route, out of range of guns on the American shore and fairly secure from raids. In April 1817, British officer

“Red George” Macdonnel reported that a canal along the Rideau route would be no more

93 circuitous than the St. Lawrence and could be built at a reasonable cost, at least half that of a major warship on the lakes. The canal would, furthermore, “enable reinforcements to penetrate at all times to Upper Canada, unseen by the Americans, who can count every man, with the naked Eye, who ascends by the present road on the St. Laurence.”

Macdonnel felt that the American fort planned for Iroquois Point made the St. Lawrence even more vulnerable than before.

In pursuit of both commercial and military advantages, the British started construction on canals on the Ottawa River rapids in 1819 and at the Lachine rapids near

Montreal in 1821; these would be the first of many canals built to improve the St.

Lawrence lifeline to the interior. The construction, however, was not fast enough for some observers, especially given the greater achievements of the Americans. During his travels in 1818, John Duncan complained that while nothing had been done at Lachine, it would have taken the “fidgetty Yankees” two weeks to build the canal. Despite the slow

British start, however, there was thus a canal race between the two nations in the decades after the War of 1812, each side trying both to strengthen its hold on the valuable trade of the interior and to enhance the security of the border region. Intemal improvements worked both ways, of course, so canals on each side of the border played a major role in strategic planning. If, for example, the Champlain Canal allowed the United States to deploy its resources against Montreal, so too could the canal facilitate a British incursion toward Albany.

As the importance of roads and canals grew, so too did support for federal assistance to a national system of intemal improvements.^’ Secretary of War Calhoun,

94 who was still an ardent nationalist and had not yet committed himself to strict construction of the Constitution and to states rights, believed that no country needed a good system of roads and canals more than the United States. Such a system would at the same time meet both the military and economic needs of the growing nation.

Wracked by debate over the constitutionality of federal support to such a system.

Congress directed Calhoun in April 1818 to prepare a plan for roads and canals “that may deserve and require the aid of Government, with a view to military operations in time of war.” Calhoun presented his report in January 1819.^*

The report was a significant document, brilliant in concept and national in scope.

Calhoun reported that “a judicious system of roads and canals,” even if built only for commercial and mail purposes, would be one of the most efficient ways to provide for national defense. Such a system would, by consolidating the United States, increase the nation’s “wealth and fiscal capacity” and its resources for war, he reminded Congress that those improvements required by commercial concerns are usually also needed for operations in wartime. Calhoun also felt that the people would be more willing to support a future war effort if the government had done its utmost to make the people

“prosperous and happy” in peacetime.

There was no other country, Calhoun felt, to which “a good system of military roads and canals is more indispensable” than the United States. While the nation had great military capacity in terms of population, such capacity was actually quite small when compared to the great extent of the country. Calhoun pointed out that the very extent of territory that make it difficult for an invader to conquer the United States also

95 make it difficult for the government to provide defense to all its citizens. Only a national system of intemal improvements could overcome this difficulty. Calhoun also tied the national system to the traditional reliance on the militia. Since Americans were opposed in principle to large standing armies, the nation needed some means to project power to its threatened frontiers. During the last war, Calhoun pointed out, the militia had to travel great distances once called into service. Intemal improvements would have alleviated the difficulties in transport.

In Calhoun’s view, the Atlantic, Northern, and Gulf frontiers demanded “special attention” since they were most exposed to the threat of a European power. While he thought that a future enemy would most likely direct his “principal efforts” against the long and exposed Atlantic coastline, Calhoun wanted improvements on the other frontiers as well in order to help concentrate troops at threatened points. For defense of the northem frontier, Calhoun suggested that the most important objects for defense were the water communication between Albany and Lakes George and Ontario and between

Pittsburgh and Lake Erie. He pointed out that New York was already at work on the former system, which would allow the government to concentrate troops anywhere in the

Atlantic states and move them, “fresh and unexhausted,” to the state’s inland frontiers.

Calhoun urged constmction of the latter system because it would greatly increase

American naval power on the Upper Lakes. Pittsburgh was the “great military depot” west of the Alleghenies and would again play a major role in supplying the lake fleets in time of war. Finally, Calhoun recommended both the Detroit-Ohio road and a canal from the Illinois River to , a waterway examined by engineers as early as 1817,

96 as the best defense of the western portion of the frontier/^ In his report, then, Calhoun recognized the importance of both supplying operations along the Champlain and St.

Lawrence frontiers and achieving naval supremacy on the lakes, the two key conditions for successful defense of the northem frontier. He recognized that commercial and military concerns coincided and felt that it would be unwise to rely solely on private enterprise to construct a system of such national importance. The federal government would have to get involved.

Slowly, Calhoun and Monroe laid the foundation for a national system of intemal improvements. Calhoun suggested in his report that army engineers could survey the necessary routes and that soldiers could provide part of the labor, thus reducing costs and putting the army to good use. In 1823, Monroe authorized the use of army engineers on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. Such actions paved the way for the General Survey Act of 1824, which authorized the president to use military and civil engineers to survey road and canal routes for commercial, military, or postal purposes. To execute the provisions of the Act, Monroe created a Board of Engineers for Intemal Improvements, which included Simon Bemard, the ubiquitous Joseph Totten, civil engineer John Sullivan, and three topographical engineers. Calhoun directed the Board to survey routes and make estimates for various roads and canals.^

Of the twenty-seven routes surveyed on all the nation’s frontiers, several contributed directly to the defense of the northem frontier. Of greatest importance on the

Canadian border was the route cormecting Lake Champlain and the St. Lawrence River.

Other recommended works were canals connecting the east and west ends of Lake Erie to

97 the Ohio River and a canal connecting the Upper Lakes to the Mississippi. These waterways, combined with other roads and canals along the Atlantic and Gulf frontiers, would overcome the mountain and water barriers that stood in the way of national defense and progress. The Board also examined harbors on the Great Lakes and made recommendations on necessary improvements. The most significant of these locations was Erie, which the board described as a commercial center, a harbor of refuge, and a naval center to protect communications with the Erie Canal. The General Survey Act, then, used the Corps of Engineers to contribute both to national defense and economic expansion. Monroe believed that their skills would be invaluable in carrying out such great national works, and he felt that the corps would benefit as well by gaining knowledge that could be of great use in war. By providing army assistance and part of the necessary financing, the federal government encouraged a great national system of roads and canals that would, in Calhoun’s view, give “effectual protection to every portion of our widely extended country.”^*

While strategy on the eastern end of the northem frontier focused on the decisive thrust toward Montreal, the concern farther west was to protect the growing population from Indian attack and to control the fur trade. Drawing gifts from the British at

Drummond Island, occupied after Britain’s return of Mackinac to the United States,

Indians prevailed in the Upper Lakes area and remained a great threat to American control of the region. As early as 22 February 1815 Monroe, as Secretary of War, had suggested establishing forts in the Northwest as a show of force to intimidate the Indian tribes, curb the influence of British traders, and control the fur trade. Brown agreed, and

98 wrote to Acting Secretary of War Alexander Dallas in August, recommending that “all the disposable force of the Division of the North” erect a chain of posts as far north and west “as practicable.” This would keep British traders and emissaries out of American territory and away from the tribes. Brown believed that “the peace and security of the country” would best be achieved by preventing all British trade and communication with the Indians, an intercourse that was dangerous to the “peace and happiness” of the frontier settlements. A few days later Brown admitted to Andrew Jackson, commander of the Division of the South, that the Indians in Michigan appeared to be “very shy” and were probably amenable to a treaty, but he felt that there would be no “honest peace” with the tribes until the government prevented the ‘Tmrestrained intercourse” between the

British and Indians.^^

In February 1818, Brown submitted to Secretary of War Calhoun a proposal to

“form an efficient and permanent defence to the northern and northwestern frontiers.” In it. Brown listed the key locations that, if firmly under American control, would prevent intercourse between the British and their erstwhile Indian allies. The first of these key points was the outlet of Lake Huron. There, Fort Gratiot kept the tribes of upper

Michigan confined above the post and blocked their communication with Fort Malden, reoccupied by the British in July 1815 and a source of gifts to the tribes. Since Mackinac did not command the wide strait separating Lakes Huron and Michigan, Brown recommended that the United States abandon the post; he favored the Falls of St. Mary

(Sault Ste. Marie) instead. Brown suggested that the tribes considered Mackinac important only because it was a source of supplies and “a haunt of idleness and vice.” If

99 the post were at the Falls instead, St. Mary’s would instead become important.

Furthermore, communications with Mackinac were difficult, the location was vulnerable to surprise attack, and there needed to be a post at the Falls to command Lake Superior anyway. Brown also recommended a post at the mouth of the Fox River (present-day

Green Bay) and the maintenance of Fort Dearborn, which shielded the Indiana settlements. Forts Wayne and Harrison could be abandoned since the people of Indiana were numerous enough to protect themselves. Significantly, Brown declared that he had little to fear in the west from “our civilized neighbors” the British, given the fort then under construction at Rouses Point. The fort, as has been seen, secured the use of the

Champlain-Richelieu corridor to American forces for a decisive attack on the St.

Lawrence line of communications. Brown’s plan is one of the earliest statements confident that quick offensive action in the east could be the best way to defend the west from British aggression.^^

To the Americans, the threat from the tribes was real.^ In May and July 1819,

Brown conducted a tour of the northem frontier between Sackets Harbor and Green Bay; his intent was to acquaint himself with the important points on the frontier, which he believed was threatened by several tribes and was under the influence of “the English fur company.” According to Brown’s estimate, there were almost 9,000 warriors out of an

Indian population of more than 55,000 in the region around the Upper Lakes and the upper valley. To his indignation, he discovered that the tribes were still receiving subsistence from the British. From as far south as the Ohio River, tribes traveled to Drummond Island, occupied by the British after they evacuated Mackinac, for

100 assistance. Believing that the United States would never have peace as long as the government allowed the British to come between it and the Indians, Brown urged

Calhoun to request that Britain stop such conduct, which was “unworthy of the British character.

Michigan Territory Governor Lewis Cass was as active as Brown in providing for the defense of the western reaches of the northern frontier. An Anglophobe, War of 1812 veteran, ardent expansionist and nationalist, Cass conducted a 4,000-mile tour of Lake

Superior and the Upper Mississippi Valley between May and September 1820 in order to examine the region’s tribes, fur trade, and resources. During the tour, he impressed the

Chippewas with his bravery and refusal to be intimidated, and Cass persuaded them to cede land for the fort at Sault Ste. Marie. In 1821, Cass negotiated another treaty at

Chicago with the Pottawatomies, , and Chippewas, obtaining a cession of five million acres in Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois in return for goods, cash, and annuities.

Combined with his efforts to build roads, survey lands, and encourage orderly government in Michigan Territory, Cass did a great deal to provide for the future defense of the region.^

Despite Brown’s reports, many of the forts in Michigan Territory continued to crumble as the government shifted troops to the west (Appendix C). Detroit’s defenses decayed even though Brown constantly asked the War Department to provide at least a small permanent fort that could resist Indian attack. Fort Gratiot, a bastioned earthwork at the outlet of Lake Huron, had been built in 1814 and held a garrison until 1821 when the men were shifted west to occupy new posts. The War Department did not act on

1 0 1 Brown’s recommendation that the fort be rebuilt of durable materials. There was also a short-lived post at Saginaw, a disease-ridden occupied between October 1822 and July 1824 to protect settlers from a brief Indian threat. In the southern part of

Michigan Territory, then, the military presence was hardly one that demonstrated the power of the United States to potential enemies. Many citizens in the area questioned the reduction of forces and the lack of defenses for the growing population, a common refrain that would continue for decades. The editor of the Detroit Gazette questioned in the summer of 1823 why there was artillery on the Atlantic coast and troops posted at

Sackets Harbor and Niagara. Such resources were needed on the Detroit frontier to overawe the Indians and to prevent British communication with them. The fact was that the Detroit frontier gradually ceased to be a military frontier; given improved relations with Britain and the growing population, the government felt that the area could fend for itself.^"

As defenses on the Detroit frontier crumbled, however, the American presence continued, and even increased, farther north. At the Falls of St. Mary, troops established a post in 1822 to keep watch over the pass between Lakes Huron and Superior; the fort, in Winfield Scott’s opinion, exercised “a strong moral restraint” on the tribes of the region and kept British traders out of American territory. The major disadvantage of the site was its isolation, reachable only by snowshoe in the winter. The garrison of more than 200 men, about 10 percent of the complement stationed on the northem frontier, indicates the site’s importance. At Mackinac, despite Brown’s admonition to abandon the place, troops continued to man the post, as it was just too important a location to

102 abandon. Admittedly, there was communication with the post only between May and

November, due to ice, but the fort at Mackinac provided at least the key to naval control

of the straits between Lakes Huron and Michigan. Stephen H. Long, a major in the

Topographical Engineers who conducted a 4,500-mile tour of the Upper Lakes and Red

River country in 1823, insisted that the post retain a garrison. Long advocated erecting a

chain of works across the straits that could block the pass to British vessels massing on

Lake Huron and supplied from depots in Upper Canada. Although such a proposal was

hardly feasible given fiscal realities, not to mention the limited range of cannon. Long

recognized that holding the straits protected the entire shore of Lake Michigan from enemy attack. Only light defenses capable of fighting off Indian raids would be needed at Green Bay and Chicago. The War Department obviously shared the view that

Mackinac was a crucial garrison, retaining the post until the 1890s. Mackinac also demonstrated that key military points along the frontier were key commercial points as well, because the island was also the center of operations for John Jacob Astor’s

American Fur Company.

By the end of Monroe’s presidency, then, strategic attention had shifted away from the northem frontier to the maritime and western frontiers. Fiscal realities dictated that there would be limited resources for national defense, and several factors made it possible for Congress to focus less concern on the northem frontier. First, relations with

Britain tended to be relatively amicable as tensions eased. Besides the naval agreement of 1817, there were trade agreements between the two nations in 1815 and 1818. In the latter year, Britain also agreed to recognize the forty-ninth parallel as the intemational

103 boundary between Lake of the Woods and the . Furthermore, the

Monroe Doctrine of 1823, designed to keep European powers from meddling in the

Western Hemisphere, demonstrated that the Americans and British had common goals.

Both governments wanted to forestall French and Spanish action against the incipient

democratic republics of Central and South America and were willing to act in concert to do so. Only British naval power, of course, could enforce the Monroe Doctrine.^^

Second, the growing population and industry of the United States seemed to provide adequate defense of the northem frontier. While the eastern reaches of the frontier were protected by generally rough terrain, the frontier along the Great Lakes would benefit from the influx of immigrants attracted by roads, large amounts of available public lands, and canals that provided a conduit for the movement of both passengers and freight between the Great Lakes and the eastern seaboard. By 1820, the population of Michigan Territory, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio was approximately 792,000, while that of Upper Canada was only 150,066 by 1824. By the mid-1820s, the population of those states bordering the northem frontier was close to five million, compared to a population in British North America of less than 800,000 (Appendix E and

F). Assuming that no more than 4 to 10 percent of the total population could realistically be expected to be available for ,™ the United States still had a huge potential military population. Given this superiority, many observers felt that the

Canadas themselves posed little threat; surely the states’ militias could provide the necessary defenders in case of war, if not carry the war into Canada itself. Of course, while the larger American population provided a very substantial manpower pool,

104 whether or not the men could be compelled to serve, be armed, or be trained in such numbers was another question. In addition, the population of the Great Lakes region saw the British as a threat to their security, one that a larger population did little to minimize.

British gunboats and regulars were a major concern, and assurances that a swift and decisive strike against the St. Lawrence would defend the Detroit frontier, for example, rang hollow with the people of the Old Northwest.

The American superiority in industrial output, backed up by intemal improvements, also appeared to be a key factor in the security of the northem frontier.

Britain, of course, possessed great industrial strength, but this resource was several thousand miles from her colony in North America. American industry was near at hand, however; Canada possessed nowhere near the industry of the United States, and no

Canadian town could compare with Pittsburgh or the burgeoning manufacturing towns in the Middle Atlantic and New England States. Combined with a third strategic factor, superior intemal improvements, the industrial resources of the United States could be expected to provide the means for a successful war on the northem frontier. Although the naval agreement of 1817 had limited fleet strength on the Great Lakes, the United

States possessed a great potential advantage in its ability to convert lake vessels to gunboats at the first hint of war. Growing towns such as Oswego, Rochester, Buffalo,

Erie, Cleveland, and Detroit could provide the men and materiel to arm commercial vessels and achieve supremacy on the lakes. The British had to rely on materials stockpiled at bases such as Kingston and on the tenuous lifeline via the St. Lawrence and

Atlantic to Britain. Intemal improvements, specifically canals, would thus play a crucial

105 role in the defense of the northem frontier. Canals such as the Erie and Champlain, although built to serve commercial purposes, could facilitate operations along the length of the northern frontier, especially in the theater of decision along the St. Lawrence.

Furthermore, such canals allowed the United States government to draw on the resources of New York City, not to mention the rest of the Atlantic seaboard, to defend against

British attacks or to conduct decisive offensives.

The American coastline was extremely vulnerable to British naval attack, however, and given the experience of the War of 1812, many politicians and army engineers preferred to focus attention on the defense of the maritime frontiers. Monroe himself warned Congress in 1824 that “in the event of war, it is on the maritime frontier that we shall be assailed. It is in that quarter, therefore, that we should be prepared to meet the attack. It is there that our whole force will be called into action to prevent the destruction of our towns, and the desolation and pillage of the interior.” Thus, by the end of Monroe’s presidency, strategic attention shifted to the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, with an emphasis on making the maritime frontier as impregnable as possible.’'

When the Bemard Board presented its report on national defenses in 1821, it emphasized seacoast defense. The Board admitted that it had not sufficiently examined the land frontiers of the nation to determine defense needs there; apparently the uncertain state of the intemational boundary stood in the way of plans for the northem frontier.’*

Nevertheless, the Board did feel that the northem frontier could be protected “at a very moderate expense.” Given the geography of the frontier, key points could be fortified at little cost, exposing the invader “to disasters almost inevitable.” Presumably, the Board

106 had the Lake Champlain frontier in mind. Defense there would be of little concern, however, because American forces would be able, “at the very opening of the first campaign, to carry the theatre of war beyond her own territory.” The Board concluded that “a general system of permanent fortifications and naval establishments,” good intemal communications by land and water, “a well-constituted regular army,” and a well-organized militia would “completely secure” the nation from attack. Thus, permanent fortifications would protect the maritime frontiers from British depredations while the offensive thrust against the St. Lawrence would bring a war with Britain to a successful conclusion.’^

The Bemard Board confirmed a trend that saw an increasingly greater portion of the nation’s military resources devoted to the maritime frontier. By 1819 there were only

289 large guns on the northem frontier, while the New York harbor defenses alone had

389. Furthermore, between 1815 and 1824 only $138,376, about 3 percent, of the

$4,468,392 spent on fortifications were devoted to northem frontier sites. Both the

United States and Britain held the view that a vigorous offense was the best way to defend, if indirectly, the intemational border. The Americans thus hoped in the efficiency of their militia system and intemal improvements to provide the force that a small regular army would lead to victory near Montreal. In the absence of an intemational crisis, there seemed to be little need to expend large sums along an increasingly-peacefiil border.’**

107 Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, December 9, 1818, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 132-34.

C P. Stacey, “An American Plan for a Canadian Campaign,” in The Defended Border: Upper Canada and he War o f 1812, ed. Morris Zaslow (Toronto; Macmillan, 1964), 277.

For Madison’s address, seeASPFR 4, 14th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 278, ser. 4.

For Monroe’s inaugural address, seeASPFR 4, 15th Cong., Special sess.. No. 288, ser. 4.

Edgar B. Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study o f Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1935), 120-21. For the strategic importance of Albany, see John Armstrong to William Eustis, 2 January 1812, quoted in , Sea Power in its Relations to the War o f I8 I2 , vol. 1 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1905), 309.

* Carlton B. Smith, “Congressional Attitudes Toward Military Preparedness during the Monroe Administration, ” Military Affairs 40 (February 1976): 22-25. For a representative view in favor of the militia, see David Trimble of Kentucky, who said in 1821: “Liberty is gone when the military art is taught and practiced only in the standing army.. . . Abandon the Republic to the protection of standing armies, and a prostration of political virtue will ensue, that must terminate in the spasms of despotic power” (Smith, 24). For presidential concern about the state of the militia system, see Madison’s address of 3 December 1816 in ASPFR 4, 14th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 283, ser. 4, 96-98, and Monroe’s address of 2 December 1817 in ASPFR 4, 15th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 289, ser. 4, 129-32.

^ For Calhoun’s views on army reduction, see “Reduction of the Army Considered,” 14 December 1818, in ASPMA 1, 15th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 168, ser. 16, 779-82, and “Reduction of the Army,” 12 December 1820, in ASPMA 2, 16th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 197, ser. 17, 188-98. While he admitted that economy was a great political virtue, Calhoun warned that reducing the military establishment was hardly economical if it exposed the nation to grave danger.

* Jacob Brown to William Crawford, November 30, 1815, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 1, 398-401. Brown noted a few months later that the British were “evidently calculating to be prepared in this quarter for another war, come when it may.” He reported that the British were hard at work on border defenses, especially at Kingston; there also was an “enormous” amount of naval and military stores passing from Kingston to the west; see Jacob Brown to William Crawford, April 27, 1816, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 10-11.

’ For plans to leave a wilderness belt along the border to hinder American invasion, see H R. Holmden, “Baron de Gaugreben’s Memoir on the Defence of Upper Canada, ” Canadian Historical Review 2 (March 1921): 58-68, and George Raudzens, “ Red George’ Macdonnel, Military Saviour of Upper Canada?,” Ontario History 62 (December 1970): 211-12. For British settlement policy, see Eric Jarvis, “Military Land Granting in Upper Canada Following the War of 1812,” Ontario History 67 (September 1975): 121-34. The plan generally failed since many of the veterans were single and the granted lands were poor; thus many of the original settlers moved on. See also Fred Landon, Western Ontario atui the American Frontier (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1941), 46-61, for a discussion of American immigration to Upper Canada. Americans poured into the province, providing much-needed capital and technical expertise. The immigrants played a major role in the province’s economic development, and many observers also felt that the large numbers of “Yankees” in the region made a future war unlikely.

C P Stacey, “The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-1871,” American Historical Review 56 (October 1950): 2-5; J. Mackay Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871 (Toronto: University o f 108 Toronto Press, 1968), 110-20; Stacey, “An American Plan for a Canadian Campaign,” 277-79. For Fort Lennox, see André Charbonneau, The Fortifications of île aux Noix: A Portrait o f the Defensive Strategy on the Upper Richelieu Border in the 18th and I9th Centuries (Ottawa; Parks Canada, 1994). The fort played an important role in British strategy, because British control of the Richelieu River would make it difficult for American invaders to use the Champlain-Richelieu route to block the St. Lawrence. The fort’s classic bastioned design was obsolete, however, even before it was finished in the late 1820s, and the ramparts suffered from serious subsidence problems. The best Fort Lennox could do was resist a coup de main-, it could not hope to resist an American siege. For Halifax and Bermuda, see Harry Piers, The Evolution o f the Halifax Fortress, 1749-1928 (Halifax: The Public Archives of Nova Scotia, 1947), John J. Greenough, The Halifax , 1825-1860: A Narrative and Structural History (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1977), and Roger Willock, Bulwark o f Empire: Bermuda's Fortified Naval Base, 1860-1920 (Princeton, N.J.: By the author, 1962). For the importance of the Royal Navy to the security of Canada, see Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance o f Power in North America, 1815-1908 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 48; in March 1816, a naval spokesman declared to Parliament that the naval force at Bermuda “formed the great security of Canada.”

” Joseph Swift to William H. Crawford, 30 December 1815, “Report, Fortifications, 1816,” NA, RG 77, Buell Collection, M417, roll 2, 58510/623. Interestingly, this report gives the northem and maritime frontiers almost equal emphasis. For subsequent reports concerning the Iroquois Point site, see the survey by Engineers J. Anderson and J. Roberdeau in “Part of the River St. Lawrence,” 1816, NA, RG 77, Headquarters Map File, AMA 31.

Jacob Brown to William Crawford, April 27, 1816, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 10-11. “Red George” Macdonnel, a British officer, reported in April 1817 that the St. Lawrence would be “effectually compressed by the impassable Fort which the United States have now decided upon erecting opposite to Pointe aux Iroquois.” It was bad enough that the river was within musket range of the heavily-wooded American shore; see Raudzens, “'Red George’ Macdonnel,” 206. Totten, however, had found the Iroquois Point site unsuitable. Given the site’s isolation, the fort needed to be a large one with an adequate garrison. The site would have to be leveled, at great expense, to provide space for anything of sufficient size. He recommended another position, preferably between St. Regis (on the St. Lawrence near Ft. Covington) and Ogdensburg; see Joseph G. Totten to Joseph Swift, 22 September 1816, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 50-53 and Joseph G. Totten to Joseph Swift, 26 October 1816, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 61-67. The United States never did construct works at Iroquois Point

David Zimmerman, Coastal Fort: A History o f Fort Sullivan, Eastport, Maine (Eastport, Me. : Border Historical Society, 1984), 3-64. For the Ogdensburg petition, see A Narrative of a Tour of Observation, Made During the Summer of 1817, by James Monroe, President o f the United States, through the North- Eastern and North-Western Departments o f the Union, With a View to the Examination of Their Several Military Defences (Philadelphia. S. A. Mitchell & H. Ames, 1818), 188-89. Ogdensburg impressed British traveler John Duncan in 1818; he said the town was “characterized by all the activity for which the young towns in the United States are so remarkable; and the contrast of apathy and inexertion on the one side of the river, with bustle and business on the opposite, cannot but be mortifying to one of genuine national feelings.” See John M. Duncan, Travels Through Part o f the United States atui Canada in 1818 arul 1819, vol. 2 (New York: W.B. Gilley, 1823), 124. For the work at Madison Barracks, see Original Order for Building the Barracks at Sackett’s Harbor, 16th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 112, vol. 3, ser. 44, 1-20. In 1819, Captain Roger Jones described the barracks as “the best in the country, very spacious and built of durable materials: the whole military establishment exhibits a good deal of taste and much comfort;” see “Memoranda of a Military Tour commenced at Brownsville on Sunday the 30th of May 1819 to several Posts and garrisons on the Waters of the Western Lakes,” Jones Papers, roll 48.

'■* Robert J. Bums, Fort Wellington: A Narrative and Structural History, 1812-38 (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1979), 18; Carl Benn, Historic , 1793-1993 (Toronto: Natural Heritage, 1993); David Flemming, 109 Fort Mississauga, Ontario (1814-1972) (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1982), 31-35; Yvon Desloges, Structural History of Fort George (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1980); David Owen, Fort Erie (1764-1823) (Niagara Fails, Ont : , 1986). For American descriptions of the crumbling forts on the Niagara frontier in 1817 and 1819, see Robert McElroy and Thomas Riggs, eds.. The Unfortified Boundary: A Diary of the First Survey of the Canadian Boundary Line from St. Regis to the Lake of the Woods by Major Joseph Delqfield, American Agent under Articles VI and VII o f the Treaty o f Ghent (New York: Privately printed, 1943), 166, 228.

Jacob Brown to Alexander Dallas, August 17, 1815, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 1, 376; Brian L. Dunnigan, History and Development of Old Fort Niagara (Youngstown, N.Y.: Old Fort Niagara Association, 1985%

For a biography of Totten, see John G. Barnard, “Biographical Notice o f ,” Annual o f the National Academy o f Sciences fo r 1865 (1866): 51-130.

Joseph Swift to Joseph G. Totten, 28 April 1815, NA, RG 77, Buell Collection, M417, roll 2, 58510/554; Joseph G. Totten to Joseph Swift, 20 December 1815, NA, RG 77, Buell Collection, M417, roll 2, 58510/622. Secretary of War Crawford assured Brown that his plan to fortify Rouses Point and some point on the St. Lawrence would “be duly considered” once the surveys of the areas in question were complete; see William Crawford to Jacob Brown, December 6, 1815, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 1, 403. For a brief history of the fortifications at the outlet of Lake Champlain, see Stanley W. Dziuban, “Fort Blunder: A Vignette of American History,” Military Engineer 60 (January-February 1968): 46-48.

For a biography of DeRussy, see Frederick W. Herman, “René Edward De Russy,” Professional Memoirs, Corps o f Engineers 1 (1915): 758-60.

The original work at Rouses Point appears to have reflected the early-nineteenth century American fascination with containing multiple tiers of guns in , a design inspired by the “perpendicular” style of the eighteenth-century French engineer Marc René, Marquis de Montalembert; see Emanuel R. Lewis, Seacoast Fortifications o f the United States: An Introductory History (Missoula, Mont.: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, 1970, 1979), 31-35, and Quentin Hughes, Military Architecture: The Art of Defence from Earliest Times to the Atlantic Wall (Liphook: Beaufort Publishing, 1974, 1991), 130.

For a plan of the work at the Lake Champlain outlet, see “Plan of a for Island Point,” [no date], NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 7-4; the tower’s ground plan was approximately 155 feet by 200 feet. Totten’s instructions to DeRussy are in Joseph G. Totten to R. DeRussy, 2 March 1816, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 5-6. For Totten’s concerns about the price of land purchase and construction, see Joseph G. Totten to Joseph Swift, 8 May 1816, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1,8-10, and Joseph G. Totten to Joseph Swift, 13 July 1816, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 27. Difficulties in purchasing and gaining title to the necessary land continued for years.

For the provisions of the concerning the boundary between the United States and the British North American provinces, see Hunter Miller, ed.. Treaties and Other Intemational Acts of the United States o f America, vol. 2 (Washington: GPO, 1931), 152-53.

^ William Crawford to Jacob Brown, May 9, 1816, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 15. Chief of Engineers Swift later assured Crawford, incorrectly, that the Rouses Point works were well within the intemational boundary; see Joseph Swift to William H. Crawford, 21 September 1816, NA, RG 77, Buell Collection, M417, roll 3, 58510/676. In 1763, a royal proclamation had established the line of 45° latitude as the boundary between Quebec and New York, and the governors of those two provinces engaged John

110 Collins and Thomas Valentine in 1771 to survey and mark the line. They completed their task by 1774; see William H. Gill, “Old Fort ‘Blunder’,” Military Engineer 34 (March 1942): 151-52.

^ For Bernard’s background and his activities in the United States, see Joseph H. Harrison, “Simon Bernard, the American System, and the Ghost of the French Alliance,” in John B. Boles, ed., America in the Middle Period: Essays in Honor o f Bemard Mayo (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973), 145-67. Bernard remained in American service until 1831.

For Totten’s reluctance to serve on the Board, see Joseph G. Totten to Joseph Swift, 6 December 1816, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 81-83.

^ Joseph G. Swift, The Memoirs o f Gen. Joseph Gardner Swift (Worcester, Ma.. F.S. Blanchard, 1890), 144; Joseph G. Totten to Joseph Swift, 2 June 1816, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 13-18.

For the orders sending Bemard to Rouses Point, see Joseph Swift to Simon Bemard, 4 December 1816, NA, RG 77, BueU Collection, M417, roll 3, 58510/699.

Joseph G. Totten and Simon Bemard to Joseph Swift, 26 December 1816, “Report of the Board of Engineers on Rouse’s Point,” NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 84-90.

“A Map of Rouse’s Point and its vicinity,” NA, RG 77, Headquarters Map File, D-19 appears to be a plan of the proposed fortification complex at the outlet of Lake Champlain. A description of the 1817 works is in Joseph G. Swift to John Calhoun, 8 December 1817, in Robert L. Meriwether, ed.. The Papers o f John C. Calhoun, Volume II, 1817-1818 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1963), 4-7.

^ Totten repeatedly asked Swift for the relief, informing him that he did not like to leave the works at Rouses Point; Totten’s absence could inflict “important injury to the service.” Totten had also found it difficult to communicate with Bemard since they could not converse in a common language about technical subjects. It was difficult for Totten to express his objections clearly, and he did not want silence on a topic to indicate agreement with Bemard. Totten felt that a French-speaking officer, such as or , would be better suited to the task; see Joseph G Totten to Joseph Swift, 21 March 1817, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 11-13. Swift filled Totten’s place on the board but resigned in November 1818, disgusted with the nation’s reliance on foreign, not American, engineers to determine national defense requirements. In Swift’s opinion, Bemard was “not in any sense a man of genius;” see Swift, Memoirs, 179-80.

Calhoun’s “Estimates for the Year 1819,” submitted to Congress on 22 December 1818, are in ASPMA I, 15th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 169, ser. 16, 810-13. Calhoun made the following requests for permanent works:

Gulf of Mexico $450,000 Chesapeake Bay $330,000 Lake Champlain $200,000 New York harbor $ 110,000 Delaware Bay $ 100,000

John Calhoun to Samuel Smith, 19 December 1818, in Meriwether, The Papers o f John C. Calhoun, Volume III, 18I8-I8I9, 408; Joseph G. Totten, “Report submitted on the subject of fortifying at Windmill Point in Lake Champlain,” 6 March 1819, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 5-10; Joseph G. Totten to Secretary of War, 9 April 1819, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 1, 11.

For Bernard’s critique, see Simon Bemard to John Calhoun, March 15, 1819, NA, RG 107, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Registered Series, 1801-1860, M22I, roll 80, B-228. Bernard’s plans for

111 Rouses Point, calling for a massive pentagonal bastioned fort with supporting works on the east bank of the river, are in “Genl. Bernard’s project of a Fort for Rouses Pt.,” no date, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 7-1 and “Trace proposed by Genl. Bemard,” no date, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 7-20. These plans clearly show the 45th parallel too far north of its actual position.

For Monroe’s tour, see A Narrative o f a Tour o f Observation.

U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 3, 217; Stacey, “The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier,” 9-14; Elsie McLeod Jury, The Establishments at Penetanguishene: of the North, 1814-1856 (London, Ont.; The University of Western Ontario, 1959), 13-25. For the British naval force on the lakes as of 1 September 1816, see “Great Britain—Naval Armament on the Lakes,” 6 April 1818, \n ASPFR 4, 15th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 301, ser. 4, 204-05. Visiting Kingston in 1818, Joseph Delafield found that the vessels there occasionally got a fi'esh coat of paint and were in better order than those at the American base at Sackets Harbor, see McElroy and Riggs, The UrrfortifiedBoundary, 213.

For Monroe’s motives, see “Great Britain—Naval Armament on the Lakes,” 6 April 1818, in ASPFR 4, 15th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 301, ser. 4, 203. For Macomb’s report on British naval offenses on Lake Erie, see Alexander Macomb to Jacob Brown, July 27, 1816, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 42.

“ C P Stacey, “Naval Power on the Lakes, 1812-1814,” in After Tippecanoe: Some Aspects of the War o f 1812, ed. Philip P. Mason (East Lansing: The Michigan State University Press, 1963), 51; Bourne, Britain atui the Balance o f Power in North America, 12-21. For British financial retrenchment after the war, see Michael S. Partridge, Military Planning for the Defense o f the , 1814-1870 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 21-23.

For the provisions of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, see “Exchange of Notes between His Majesty’s Minister at Washington and the United States Secretary of State Concerning the Naval Force to be Maintained on the Great Lakes, Washington, 28-29 Aprü, 1817,” in Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada in Force between His Majesty and the United States o f America, with Subsidiary Documents, 1814-1925 (Ottawa: F A. Acland, 1927), 12-13; Monroe officially issued a proclamation on 28 April 1818. Several Canadian historians have condemned the agreement. For instance, George F G Stanley has said that the British policy of appeasement removed Canada’s first line of defense, and whatever money British taxpayers saved by not building ships on the lakes, they would lose by having to build fortifications later. In Stanley’s view, the British government was more concerned about the high cost of the Canadian naval establishment than about Canadian defense needs; see George F.G. Stanley, “Kingston and the Defence of British North America,” in To Preserve & Defend: Essays on Kingston in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Gerald Tulchinsky (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1976), 93-94. Of course, such a state of affairs is to be expected in any colonial relationship. Colonies exist for the benefit of the mother country, not vice versa.

“War Vessels on the Great Lakes,” 27 February 1900, 56th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 471, vol. 91, ser. 3988, 14, “Condition of the Navy and Its Expenses,” 25 January 1821, in ASPNA 1, 16th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 196, ser. 23, 713-15; “Condition of the Navy and Marine Corps, ” 7 December 1824, in ASPNA 1, 18th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 249, ser. 23, 1020-21; “Condition of the Navy, and Its Operations,” 3 December 1822, \n ASPNA 1, 17th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 212, ser. 23. The rotting lakes fleets presented a striking sight. In May 1819 Roger Jones, adjutant to Jacob Brown, visited Sackets Harbor during Brown’s tour of the northem frontier. While Jones praised the location as “one of the finest, and most spacious harbors I ever saw,” he looked “with a sort of national melancholy” on the decaying hulks rotting there; see “Memoranda of a Military Tour commenced at Brownsville on Sunday the 30th of May 1819 to several Posts and garrisons on the Waters of the Westem Lakes,” Jones Papers, roll 48.

112 Southard’s report is in “Plan for a Naval Peace Establishment,” 30 January 1824, in ASPNA I, 18th Cong, 1st sess.. No. 236, ser. 23; Rodgers’s comments are in “Naval Peace Establishment,” 3 February 1824, in ASPNA 1, 18th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 239, ser. 23; the annual report, “Condition of the Navy and Marine Corps,” 7 December 1824, in ASPNA 1, 18th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 249, ser. 23, lists most o f the lakes vessels as “totally unworthy of repair.” It is important to note, of course, that many of the Great Lakes warships had been built hastily out of green timber, the Navy would have had to condemn them regardless of the financial or strategic situation.

Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, December 9, 1818, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 132-34; Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, September 15, 1819, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 155.

For the necessity of an eflBcient road network, see George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart, 1951), 15-31. Although turnpikes provided the first hard-surfaced roads, they did not lower fireight rates enough to be beneficial to fi’eight haulers. The failure to provide cheap, long-distance transport doomed the turnpikes, and in some places they were failing even before canals and railroads became a major threat. Road building declined after 1825, influenced, no doubt, by the success of the Erie Canal.

For Morrow’s advocacy of federal support for internal improvements, see “Roads and Canals,” 6 February 1816, in ASPM isc 2, 14th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 398, ser. 38, 283-85. Morrow recommended an annual appropriation of $600,000 to carry out a national program of internal improvements. For the role of the military in road construction during the period, see Harold L. Nelson, “Military Roads for War and Peace— \19\-\S36,” Military Affairs 19 (Spring 1955): 1-14.

For Brown’s praise of the soldier laborers, see Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, 11 June 1819, in Meriwether, The Papers o f John C. Calhoun, Volume TV, I8I9-1820, 100. For Calhoun’s views on soldier labor, see John Calhoun to Jacob Brown, 29 July 1818, in Meriwether, The Papers o f John C. Calhoun, Volume 11, 1817-1818, 435. For the role of the regular army as pioneer, engineer, and policeman on the fi'ontier, see Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1953). Zachary Taylor wrote in 1820 that “the ax, pick, saw and trowel, has become more the implement o f the American soldier, than the cannon, musket or sword;” see Edward M. CoSman, The Old Army: A Portrait o f the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 44.

“Roads and Canals,” 14 January 1819, in ASPMisc 2, 15th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 462, ser. 38, 537. Monroe’s objections to Brown’s plan are in John Calhoun to Jacob Brown, 9 January 1819, in Meriwether, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Volume III, 1818-1819, 479-80.

For Brown’s view of the military road’s strategic role, see Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, January 20, 1823, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 221-22; the letter is also reprinted in “Military Road from Plattsburg to Sackett’s Harbor,” in ASPMisc 2, 17th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 534, ser. 38, 988.

^ Nelson, “Military Roads for War and Peace,” 6. For a biography of Macomb, see Milo M. Quaife, “Detroit Biographies: Alexander Macomb,” Burton Historical Collection Leaflet 10 (November 1931): 3- 16. Macomb’s thoughts on the Detroit-Fort Meigs road are in Alexander Macomb to John Calhoun, 2 November 1818, contained in “Roads and Canals,” 14 January 1819, in ASPMisc 2, 15th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 462, ser. 38, 537. For the Black Swamp, see Martin R. Kaatz, “The Black Swamp: A Study in Historical Geography,” Anrtals of the Association o f American Geographers 45 (March 1955): 1-35. Cass exhibited strong and energetic leadership as governor of Michigan Territory, making great efforts to rebuild the war-torn region, to encourage settlement and effective local government, and to obtain lands fi"om the Indian tribes; see Malcolm J. Rohrbough, The Trans-Appalachian Frontier: People, Societies, coui Institutions 1775-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 219-32. 113 Nathan Miller, “Private Enterprise in Inland Navigation: The Mohawk Route Prior to the Erie Canal,” New York History "il (October 1950): 398-413.

Carter Goodrich, “National Planning of Internal Improvements,” Political Science Quarterly 63 (March 1948): 18-21, 28; Ronald E. Shaw, Canals fo r a Nation: The Canal Era in the United States, 1790-1860 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1990), 23-24, 33-36.

For the first steamboat on Lake Champlain, launched in June 1809, see David J. Blow, ''Vermont I: Lake Champlain’s First Steamboat,” Vermont History 34 (April 1966): 115-22. Dalhousie and Accommodation were steaming on the St. Lawrence starting in 1809, and the Canadian Frontenac and the American Ontario were launched on Lake Ontario in September and October 1816 respectively; see H A. Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: The Ontario and the Frontenac," American Neptune 3 (October 1943): 333-44. The first steamboat on Lake Erie was the American Walk-in-the-Water, launched in May 1818; see H A. Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: The Walk-in-the-Water," American Neptune 5 (January 1945): 27-42.

Clinton’s petition is in “Canals from Hudson River to Lakes Erie and Champlain,” 11 December 1816, in ASPM isc 2, 14th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 412, ser. 38, 399-401.

For the reports of House and Senate select committees on the subject of internal improvements, see “Roads and Canals,” 8 and 14 February 1817, in ASPMisc 2, 14th Cong., 2d sess.. Nos. 427 and 429, ser. 38.

For Clinton’s memorial on the Erie Canal’s benefits, see David Hosack, Memoir of De Witt Clinton (New York: J. Seymour, 1829), 406-20.

Shaw, Canals for a Nation, 30. For a description of the Champlain Canal, see “G.W.,” A Sketch of the Great Northern or Champlain Canal (Waterford, N.Y.: Privately printed, 1822).

Stacey, “The Myth o f the Unguarded Frontier,” 7. Dimcan’s comments are in Dimcan, Travels Through Part o f the United States and Canada, vol. 1, 328n.

For the commercial rivalry between Lower Canada and New York, see D.G. Creighton, The Commercial Empire o f the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850 (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1937). For Macdonnel’s report, see his “The Topography o f the Canadas,” printed in Raudzens, ‘“Red George’ Macdonnel,” 199-212.

^ For the history and specifications of Canadian canals, see Robert F. Legget, Centals o f Canada (Vancouver: Douglas, David & Charles, 1976). For Dimcan’s comments, see Duncan, Travels Through Part o f the United States and Canada, vol. 2, 158-59. For the partnership between military officers and Canadian businessmen in persuading Parliament to approve funds for navigation improvements after the War o f 1812, see George K. Raudzens, “The Military Impact on Canadian Canals, 1815-25,” Canadian Historical Review 54 (September 1973): 273-86.

In Britain, internal improvements were built entirely by private enterprise. This was not the case, however, in the United States, where they were the product of government, government and private enterprise, or private enterprise receiving government aid. This was so because the improvements in Britain generally ran through settled country and connected established centers of trade. In the United States such conditions usually did not exist, so the improvements could not be profitable until the area had been settled. Thus, in the early years of the “transportation revolution,” government aid was to be expected since the country was in the process of development. Government assistance was a fi'ontier phenomenon, which tended to die out as settlement and traffic became more dense and as business corporations developed the 114 means to raise the necessary sums of money, see Carter Goodrich, “American Development Policy; The Case of Internal Improvements," Journal o f Economic History 16 (December 1956): 449-60.

For Calhoun’s report, see “Roads and Canals,” 14 January \%\9, \n ASPMisc 2, 15th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 462, ser. 38, 533-37.

” Stephen Long reported to acting Secretary of War George Graham on 4 March 1817 that a canal between the Illinois River and Lake Michigan could be built at relatively little expense and would be of great national importance; see “Letter from the Secretary of War, Transmitting Topographical Reports, Made with a View to Ascertain the Practicability of Uniting the Waters of Illinois River, with Those of Lake Michigan.” 16th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 17, vol. 2, ser. 32. This route would have long-term significance in the debate over how best to defend the Great Lakes region.

^ For Calhoun’s views on the importance of the work of the Board of Engineers, see “Condition o f the Military Establishment and the Fortifications,” 7 December 1824, in ASPMA 2, 18th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 262, ser. 17, 699-701.

For Monroe’s views on the Corps of Engineers and the Survey Act, see “Aimual Message,” 7 December 1824, vaASPFR 5, 18th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 378, ser. 5, 353-59. For the government’s role in encouraging internal improvements, especially in those states confronting the Appalachian barrier, see Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion o f American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 (New York: Press, 1960). For the role of the government and the Corps of Engineers in creating a national system of internal improvements, see Forest G. Hill, Roads, Rails & Waterways: The Army Engineers and Early Transportation (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957); Hill suggests that the lack of a national system “was a barrier to political unification, commercial expansion, and military defense. Without government intervention, national development would be obstructed; with proper guidance by the government, it could be accelerated along desired lines.” Todd Shallat, Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the Rise o f the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Austin: University of Press, 1994) examines “the rise and spreading influence” of the Corps, its early work, its political agenda, and its role as an embattled public works organization.

Jacob Brown to Alexander Dallas, 17 August 1815, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 1, 308-09; Jacob Brown to Andrew Jackson, August 20, 1815, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 1, 372-73. For Monroe’s plan, see Wesley, Guarding the Frontier, 119-20. The plan, adopted on 22 May 1815, called for posts along the routes taken by British traders. The posts would be at Mackinac, Green Bay, the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers, Prairie du Chien, the Upper Mississippi River, and St. Anthony’s Falls.

Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, February 5, 1818, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 90-94; Dennis Carter-Edwards, Fort Malden: A Structural Narrative History, 1796-1976 (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1980), 112-45. In a subsequent letter to Calhoun, Brown recommended that the government construct strong permanent forts at the Falls of St. Mary and at the mouth of the Fox River in order to prevent incursions by hostile Indians. Given the posts’ remote locations. Brown wanted them strongly garrisoned as well; see Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, September 27, 1819, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 156-57. Calhoun had even grander plans for defense of the western region, proposing that the army garrison forts as far away as the Mandan villages on the Upper Missouri River, this would demonstrate the power of the United States to the tribes and end British influence; see John Calhoun to Jacob Brown, 17 October 1818, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 123. For the historical geography of the fur trade, see Brown, Historical Geography o f the United States, 174-77, 293-302, and R. Cole Harris and John Warkentin, Canada before Confederation: A Study in Historical Geography (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), 232-68.

^ For a recent view that there was a negligible British and Indian threat to expansion after the war, see Colin G. Calloway, “The End of an Era: British-Indian Relations in the Great Lakes Region after the War of 115 1812,” Michigan Historical Review 12 (Fall 1986); 1-20; Calloway suggests that the British were neither willing nor able to support the tribes and thus urged their erstwhile allies to remain on good terms with the Americans. Britain did not want another war and was more concerned with grain and other resources than with Indian allies and furs; the tribes had become an undesirable burden. By January 1823, the American agent at Prairie du Chien believed that the British no longer had any influence among the tribes.

For a narrative o f Brown’s tour, see “Memoranda o f a Military Tour commenced at Brownsville on Sunday the 30th o f May 1819 to several Posts and garrisons on the Waters of the Western Lakes,” Jones Papers, roll 48; Jones’s diary is also printed in “General Brown’s Inspection Tour up the Lakes in 1819.” Publications o f the Buffalo Historical Society 24 (1920): 295-323. Brown’s Indian population estimates are in “Memorandum of the Tribes of Indians in the North-West,” Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 160-66. For Brown’s report on British assistance to the tribes, see Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, August 23, 1819, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 150.

^ Willard Car! Klunder, Lewis Cass and the Politics o f Moderation (Kent, Oh. : The Kent State University Press, 1996), 35-40.

Brown’s suggestions for Detroit defenses are in Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, August 4, 1819, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 148-49, and Jacob Brown to John Calhoun, May 12, 1823, Brown Papers, Letter book No. 2, 233-34. For Fort Gratiot, see William L. Jenks, “Fort Gratiot and Its Builder Gen. Charles Gratiot,” Michigan History 4 (January 1920): 141-55. For Saginaw, see Wesley, Guarding the Frontier, 128-30. The Detroit Gazette criticisms are quoted in Wesley, Guarding the Frontier, 132.

For Scott’s comments, see Winfield Scott to John Calhoun, 18 April 1822, in Meriwether, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Volume VII, 1822-1823, 50-51. Brian L. Dunnigan, “Fort Mackinac: A Revolutionary War Post in Michigan,” Military Collector & Historian 29 (Spring 1977): 15-21, provides a brief history of the post. For Long’s thoughts on Mackinac, see William H. Keating, comp.. Narrative o f an Expedition to the Source o f St. Peter "s River. Lake Winnepeek, Lake o f the Woods, &c., &c.. Performed in the Year 1823, by Order of the Hon. J.C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, under the Command o f Stephen H. Long, Major U.S. I.E., vol. 2 (Philadelphia: H.C. Carey & 1. Lea, 1824), 243-44. For Long’s career, see Roger L. Nichols and Patrick L. Hailey, Stephen Long and American Frontier Exploration (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1980), 181-216. The ofiflcial navigation season at the Straits of Mackinac was between 15 May and 1 November, see U.S. Quartermaster’s Department, Outline Description o f U.S. M ilitary Posts and Stations in the Year 1871 (Washington: GPO, 1872), 178-79.

“Convention of Commerce between His Majesty and the United States of America Signed at London, 3rd July, 1815,” in Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada, 9-12; “Convention of Commerce between His Majesty and the United States o f America Signed at London, 20th October, 1818,” in Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada, 15-17; V. Dennis GoUaday, “The United States and British North American Fisheries, \%\5-\%\Z," American Neptune 33 (October 1973): 246-57.

™ According to the 1840 Census, males aged 15-50 made up about 24.6 percent of the total population for the states on the northern fi'ontier, ranging from 23.6 percent in Western Pennsylvania to 27.3 percent in Michigan; see U.S. Census Office, Compendium of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants and Statistics o f the United States (Washington: Thomas Allen, 1841; reprint. New York: Amo Press, 1976). An examination of Canadian census statistics reveals that in 1851, unmarried males in the Canadas between the ages of 15 and 50 comprised 11.7 percent of the total population; see Censuses o f Canada, 1665-1871, vol. 4 (Ottawa: IB Taylor, 1876), 184-90, 208-14. Ten percent would seem to be a reasonable proportion of the population that could be considered “expendable” enough for military service, but this is only a potential number. Even during the heady days at the beginning of the Civil War, the northern states never came close to providing 10 percent of their population as volunteers. For example, Ohio provided 91,441 volunteers by December 1861, about 3.9 percent of its population; most states averaged 3 to 4 percent; see Report of the Secretary

116 o f War, 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1118, 3. Thus, 4 percent would seem to be a more realistic figure for the number of males that could be expected to be available for military service.

Monroe’s annual address to Congress, 7 December 1824, vaASPFR 5, 18th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 378, ser. 5, 353-59.

^ Chief of Engineers Alexander Macomb later reported that the Board could not recommend defenses for the inland fi-ontiers until the international boundary was finally adjusted; see “Statements of Fortifications in Maine,” 29 December 1832, \a ASPMA 5, 22d Cong., 2d sess.. No. 539, ser. 20, 127-28.

^ For the Bernard Board report, see “Fortifications,” 15 February 1821, m ASPMA 2, 16th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 206, ser. 17, 304-13. The Board estimated that the necessary seacoast fortifications would cost $17,795,055, money that politicians fi’om the northern fi’ontier wanted spent on their states.

For ordnance returns in 1819, see “Numerical Strength of the Army, Its Distribution, and Number of Ordnance,” 12 January 1819, m ASPMA 1, 15th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 170, ser. 16, 821. For funds expended on fortifications, see “System of Fortifications Recommended by the Board of Engineers,” 1 March 1826, in ASPMA 3, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 316, ser. 18, 246-50; the northern fi'ontier sites were Rouses Point, Sackets Harbor, Ft. Niagara, and Ft. Mackinac. After 1821, army engineers left the northern frontier and worked Instead on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts; see, for example, the report of the Chief of Engineers for 1823 va ASPMA 2, 18th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 247, ser. 17, 567-70.

117 CHAPTER 4

NEGLECT OF THE FRONTIER’S DEFENSES, 1825-1837

/ am therefore o f opinion that our lake frontier requires no permanent defences. - Lewis Cass, 8 April 1836'

By the beginning of ’s presidency in 1825, politicians and officers still paid little attention to the defense of the eastern half of the northern frontier, given the uncertain international boundary line, fairly amicable Anglo-American relations, and the larger American population along the border. Most resources went toward the maritime frontier. The Bernard Board’s second report in 1826 on “the system and plan of fortifications proposed for the national defence” again referred only to seacoast locations. There was no more construction on the northern frontier. Adams himself claimed that American sentiments toward Britain were “all friendly and conciliatory,” and he hoped that the British would return those feelings with equal good will. Until surveyors determined the actual boundary line and the American and British governments agreed to it, there was little point in planning for the defense of a border that could change drastically, especially in the case of the northern boundary of Maine, at the negotiating table. Only later, when tensions along the frontier during the “Patriot” crisis of 1837-1838 threatened to start a war between the United States and Britain, would the

118 United States government again focus more attention on the eastern reaches of the northern frontier.*

On the other side of the border, however, there was more activity as the British plarmed for a future American invasion. A commission headed by an engineer. General

Sir James Carmichael-Smyth, inspected British North America in 1825 and reported on the state of defenses there. Believing that the Americans would come from one of three directions, up Lake Champlain, up the Mohawk River, or across the Niagara frontier thanks to the recently-completed Erie Canal, the commission reported that such moves could be blocked if the government fortified the key chokepoints. While the commission recommended small fortifications in Upper Canada, particularly at Amherstburg, the main focus was farther east. Because the Americans could declare war and be across the border long before news reached Britain, it was crucial to build major fortifications at

Halifax, Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, and the Niagara frontier. In addition, the commission emphasized the need for a final settlement of the international boundary.

The officers hoped that such measures would help preserve the North American provinces, possessions closely connected with British naval superiority, because of the naval stores and the fisheries that provided a nursery for seamen, and thus its great power status.^

Part of the commission’s report remained secret, however, and this was a section recommending possible offensive action against the United States. One possibility involved operations in upstate New York. An army attacking down Lake Champlain could prevent an attack against Montreal and possibly seize the eastern terminus of the

Erie Canal at Waterford. The commission also suggested that British forces could 119 interdict the Erie Canal since it ran parallel to the frontier for many miles. After examining the canal route, the commission suggested that there were three vulnerable points. First, at Lockport the canal was close to the frontier and its five locks could be destroyed with little difficulty. Second, at a point about thirty miles east of Lockport, raiders could cut a large canal embankment. Third, a British force could seize Rochester and destroy the large canal aqueduct. These were the only operations launched from

Canada that the commission thought would have any impact on the American government.

The second recommendation was for attacks on the Atlantic seaboard, assuming that a key American vulnerability was its seaborne trade and its reliance on customs revenue. Thus, if British forces did not occupy Waterford or interdict the Erie Canal, the only way to strike a decisive blow was to blockade New York City and the adjacent coastline by occupying Staten and Long Islands. Long Island was particularly suitable since its resources made it possible for 25,000 troops to hold it indefinitely. By disrupting America’s external commerce, the blockade would deprive the United States government of its revenue from customs duties. Lacking the means to fight a war, the

Americans would be compelled to submit. Such a blow would be far more decisive than any attack launched from Canada. The United States was correct, then, to fear for the safety of the seaboard if war ever broke out with Britain. The fact that the Duke of

Wellington kept these offensive measures secret indicates their importance to British preparations for a future war.

American planners recognized that there was little threat of a British offensive launched from Canada, and the War Department posted troops accordingly. As before,

120 the mainstay of American defense would be the militia, which had a paper strength in

1825 of 1,065,083 men. The House Committee on the Militia spoke for many when it

reported that the government could protect the nation with “an inconsiderable regular

army; a few durable fortifications; a considerable navy; a well-organized militia; good

roads and other channels of inter-communication to facilitate their marches.” There was

indeed a small regular army, poorly paid, fed, and equipped, plagued by alcoholism and

desertion.^ By 1826 there was only one company stationed on the northern frontier east

of Fort Mackinac, at Madison Barracks, Sackets Harbor (table 4.1 ). Obviously, the

potential military population of the United States, the militia, would have to play a major

role in defending the border. The militia system was far from well organized, however,

and the War Department recognized that serious reforms were needed if citizen soldiers

were to play an effective role in national military policy.^

Location 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 Ft. Sullivan 50 62 48 55 54 52 56 67 49 62 57 — — Hancock ——— 190 183 185 192 225 175 200 213 78 89 Barracks Madison 202 45 46 79 96 108 108 —— 10 13 12 — Barracks Ft Niagara 53 —— 85 98 84 102 49 124 —— —— Detroit 77 — 2 ————— — ——— — Ft Gratiot —— — 100 95 114 100 103 102 91 104 122 — Ft. Mackinac 50 49 53 70 107 111 110 115 104 109 113 105 — Ft Bradv 200 196 199 65 89 118 112 89 113 109 110 114 110 Ft Howard 344 214 206 134 217 219 113 157 180 220 218 149 — Ft Dearborn — — — 65 105 95 — 101 93 101 105 67 — Total 977 567 554 843 1,044 1,086 893 906 940 902 933 647 199 U.S. total 5,719 5,809 5,722 5,529 6,169 5,951 5,869 6,102 6,412 6,824 7.151 6JS3 7,834 SOURCE; 1825: .4SPMA 3, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 284, ser. 18; 1826: .-tSPXH 3, 19th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 334, ser. 18; 1827: ASP.KL4 3 ,20th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 360, ser. 18; 1828: .iSPXM 4 ,20th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 390, ser. 19; 1829: .tSPX/A 4,21st Cong., 1st sess.. No. 410, ser. 19; 1830: ASPM.i 4, 21st Cong., 2d sess.. No. 458, ser. 19; 1831: .-ISPA/A 4, 22d Cong., 1st sess.. No. 485, ser. 19; 1832: .iSPMA 5, 22d Cong., 2d sess.. No. 532, ser. 20; 1833: .4SPM4 5, 23d Cong, 1st sess.. No. 551, ser. 20; 1834: .iSPU-l 5, 23d Cong., 2d sess.. No. 585, ser. 20; 1835: ASPX/A 5, 24th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 613, ser. 20; 1836: .4SPXC4 6, 24th Cong, 2d sess , No 699, ser. 21; 1837: .ASPXU 7, 25th Cong., 2d sess. , No. 745, ser. 22. U.S. totals are in Prucha, .4 Guide to the Kiilitary Posts o f the United States., 143-44.

Table 4.1: Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1825-1837.

121 The government did provide for the supply of citizen armies in wartime by establishing a network of arsenals throughout the nation. Just as the citizen soldiers represented a potential military force, so too did the arsenals represent American military potential. By stockpiling materiel in peacetime, the nation would be better prepared to conduct military operations in war. Basil Hall, a Royal Navy captain traveling in the

United States, recognized this fact when he visited Watervliet Arsenal in the summer of

1827. Impressed by the 50,000 stands of arms he found there. Hall had no doubt that such a “bristling mass of dormant strength” could quickly be put to use in case of war with Britain. Given its location on the Erie and Champlain Canals, the Watervliet

Arsenal could play a major role in the defense of the northern frontier, because materiel made or stored there could be moved quickly to Niagara, Oswego, or Lake Champlain.

By 1836 there were other arsenals on the northern frontier at Augusta, Maine, essential to the defense of that state’s extensive inland and maritime frontiers; Vergennes, Vermont;

Rome, New York; Pittsburgh; and Detroit. Supporting these arsenals were the national armories at Springfield, Massachusetts and Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Although there was no armory west of the Alleghenies,’ the system of national armories and arsenals was capable of supplying both citizen soldiers and regular troops, making the great strength of the United States, its superior population relative to that of British North America, a potentially decisive resource in case of war with Britain.*

Of course, for this potential American strength to become a reality, there would have to be reform of the militia system. In an attempt to improve the system. Secretary of War James Barbour created a board of officers in 1826 to study the condition of the militia and make recommendations. Although the report was well publicized, nothing

122 was done, and the militia system became a joke to most Americans; many, especially those in labor unions or pacifist groups, were glad to see the system die. By 1836 acting

Secretary of War Benjamin Butler was complaining about the imperfect organization of the militia system and the horrid state of strength returns. In vain, he begged the

“enlightened interposition” of Congress in the matter. Few states submitted uniform or current strength returns of their militia. Vermont, for example, did not have an adjutant general between 1825 and 1837, and submitted only one current strength return between

1820 and 1840. Drill was, in the words of a British observer, “a perfect farce.” Thus, the one element of national defense upon which the government most relied in the past, the militia, was in the eyes of many critics probably the least capable of fulfilling its .^

Given the imperfect organization of the militia, volunteer units started to fill the void throughout the nation, especially in New England and New York. These units provided both potential military forces and social clubs for young men who wanted to play at soldiering. Although they were too small to have an impact and they emphasized dash and enthusiasm rather than tactical training, the volunteer units did provide a reservoir of military experience at a time when most Americans distrusted, even felt contempt for, the regular army. In the Age of Jackson, with its distrust of privilege and emphasis on egalitarianism, many Americans considered soldiering economically foolish.

Soldiers could be more productive as civilian laborers than loafing around their garrison.

In addition, obsessed with liberty and avoidance of slavery, critics wondered why recruits would relinquish their freedom and accept military discipline. Finally, Jacksonian

America feared the military elite, the officer corps. In the popular mind, officers were 123 synonymous with aristocracy, and the hierarchical nature of the army bothered an egalitarian society. Citizen soldiers, in the form of volunteer units, thus remained the bulwark of national defense. There was a general belief in the general capacity of all

Americans, irrespective of knowledge or training, to excel in the military art. Inspired by democracy and liberty and led by virtuous officers, the citizen soldier, aided by a small regular army, was considered more than capable of providing the foundation of national defense.'”

As the militia system declined, so too did the strength of the navy on the Great

Lakes. Given the peaceful conditions along the border and the American superiority in population and industrial output, there was little reason to maintain a substantial naval force at great expense. In accordance with a naval reduction act in March 1825, the Navy had sold all its vessels on the Great Lakes with the exception of the ships New Orleans and Chippewa at Sackets Harbor; the latter vessel was sold in 1833." The naval stations at Whitehall and Erie were broken up and Sackets Harbor reduced, and the public property was either sold or transferred, with the personnel, to the Atlantic navy yards.

For example, more than 1,300 tons of shot, 200 cannon, 210 , and a large quantity of sails were sent to the Brooklyn yard from Sackets Harbor and Whitehall.

Thus, through the 1830s, the only American naval establishment on the lakes was the naval station at Sackets Harbor, with two ships under cover watched by a naval master and one or two shipkeepers. The United States did not even maintain the naval force allowed by the Rush-Bagot agreement.'"

American superiority in both commercial vessels and industry would make up for the virtually non-existent naval force on the northern frontier. By 1834, for example, 124 there were thirty-one steamboats and 337 sailing vessels operating on the Upper Lakes under the American flag. On the Canadian side, there were only three steamboats and twenty-five sailing vessels. In time of war, naval planners assumed, the commercial vessels on the lakes could be converted into gunboats and used in the struggle for naval supremacy that would ensure the security of the northern frontier against British attack.

The larger American commercial marine, coupled with the industrial capacity of towns such as Pittsburgh, promised American naval superiority on all the lakes except for

Ontario, where the British had thirty steamboats to three for the Americans. Steamboats also provided a novel means of defense. While naval advocates most often considered steamboats good for maritime defense, such vessels would be equally useful on the lakes.

In case of war, crews did not have to be recruited from the ranks of sailors since steamboat crews needed relatively little instruction for efficient service. A qualified officer to train gun crews and a steam engineer were the only experts required for a vessel in a steam fleet. Thus, steamers promised to be the naval equivalent of the citizen soldier. In peacetime, they plied the lakes in pursuit of commerce, while in wartime they could be manned by any able-bodied member o f the population and used as a military instrument. The large number of men with steamboat experience on the inland rivers of the United States provided yet another important resource that the British would have difficulty countering.

For conversion of commercial vessels to serve as an effective means of defense, however, the United States would have to depend on internal improvements. Since lake vessels needed safe harbors in peace as well as war, harbor improvements were crucial to the security of the northern frontier. Accordingly, army engineers surveyed lake harbors 125 for necessary improvements, and in the late 1820s and 1830s built piers and breakwaters and removed obstructions at various locations on Lakes Champlain, Ontario, and Erie.*"*

While these were considered civil construction works, they had obvious military utility just as other internal improvements did. Safe harbors on the American lake shores protected the growing commercial marine and would provide shelter in time of war as well. A raging Great Lakes storm could be as devastating to American naval superiority as a British fleet‘s

Canals were also important to the American naval position because there were no depots on the lakes besides the arsenal at Vergennes, which had water communication with Lake Champlain via Otter Creek. In addition, important industrial centers such as

Pittsburgh were far inland and required a means of communication to the lakes. Again, the canals were built for commercial purposes but also had military utility. Depending on the quality of the horses, canal boats could travel anywhere from forty-five to one hundred miles in a day, an important capability that would facilitate both military and naval operations. Army experiments in 1823 demonstrated that troops could cover up to sixty miles per day by canal, compared to twenty miles per day on good roads. The Erie

Canal, for example, reduced the travel time between Albany and Buffalo to five days, a distance that took fifteen days to cover on foot. Furthermore, while troops needed a rest period after five or six days of marching, no recuperation was needed after a canal trip.

Troops would thus arrive at their destination fresh for action.'^

Another important waterway was the Oswego Canal, completed in 1828, which followed the Oswego River for thirty-eight miles from Syracuse to Oswego. By connecting Lake Ontario and the Erie Canal, the Oswego canal continued the diversion of 126 Canadian trade from the St. Lawrence and Lower Canada to New York City. The canal also made it possible to support American land and naval forces operating against

Kingston or cruising Lake Ontario, contributing to the defense of that portion of the frontier. Citizens along the northern frontier recognized the dual benefits of canals and stressed the commercial and military benefits in their petitions to Congress. For example, when the citizens of Franklin County, New York petitioned Congress in 1826 for a canal connecting Lakes Champlain and Ontario, they stressed that such a waterway would provide secure communications between Plattsburgh and Sackets Harbor, linking some of the most important military positions on the northern frontier. The petition mentioned in passing that the canal would provide great benefits in peace as well. Obviously, appealing to national defense was one way to get government assistance for a work calculated to improve the local economy. Unfortunately for the petitioners, the canal was never built, presumably because the Oswego Canal already provided most of the same military benefits.

Two proposed canal routes could help assure naval superiority by enabling the

United States to transfer resources from the Upper Lakes and the Mississippi and Ohio

Rivers to Lake Ontario, where the British had a larger commercial marine. The first of these canals was one around Niagara Falls, connecting Lakes Erie and Ontario.

Residents petitioned Congress for the route in 1834, reminding members that the northern frontier was no longer “a naked forest” as it was during the last war. It was now the scene “of agricultural improvement, of the successful cultivation of manufactures and the mechanic arts, of a laborious, enterprising, and prosperous commerce” essential to the nation’s industry. A ship canal around the falls would facilitate navigation on the lakes 127 and would have great commercial benefits, but it would also be “indispensable to the national defence.” Given the British plans to complete a similar canal, the British would soon possess steamboat navigation from the sea to Lake Erie. Although the petitioners no doubt were very concerned with the canal’s commercial benefits, they were unwilling to rely on a decisive thrust at the St. Lawrence to protect their region. They also made an important point. By building canals along the St. Lawrence and around Niagara Falls, the

British could ensure that their awesome naval power reached at least as far as Lake Erie, seriously undermining American superiority on the Upper Lakes. If the United States, however, built a canal around the falls, it could move steamers from Lake Erie and fight for control of Lake Ontario. Furthermore, a ship canal could allow the Americans to move the steamboats and other resources of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, via canals through Ohio, onto Lake Ontario. Suitably impressed with the canal’s benefits. Congress directed the War Department to survey the route.'*

The second route that could prove critical to the American naval position on the lakes was one connecting the Mississippi River to Lake Michigan. Two of the routes went through Wisconsin, connecting Green Bay with the Wisconsin River and

Milwaukee with the Rock River. The route that received the most attention, due to its practicability, was that connecting Chicago with the Illinois River, a route surveyed in

1817. A House Select Committee agreed in 1825 that the federal government should assist Illinois in the canal’s construction, given the many benefits of the waterway. It would lower the cost of transportation between the Atlantic and the western regions, encouraging population growth and production, and thus strengthening the bonds of

Missouri and Illinois to the rest of the nation. The military benefits appeared impressive. 128 By encouraging “the rapid settlement of our most vulnerable frontier, that bordering on

Canada,” the canal would help provide for the border’s defense. It would help keep “the numerous hordes of savages” in line, and the resulting increase of the American commercial marine on the lakes would be “a strong safeguard” against the depredations of the British and their Indian allies. Furthermore, by increasing lake commerce, the

United States could also develop a nursery for seamen. This canal, then, if built to accommodate large vessels, increased American options in case of war with Britain, making the large number of steamboats on the western rivers available for operations on the lakes and further increasing the superiority of the American commercial marine. The canal would not only assist operations along the northern frontier, it could also be used to shift troops from the Great Lakes region to the Gulf in less time than a British fleet could sail from Quebec to New Orleans. The canal could thus improve the flexibility of

American forces defending the northern and maritime frontiers. Also, by allowing the

United States to place river steamers or vessels built at inland river ports onto the lakes, the canal would provide a way to get around the provisions of the Rush-Bagot

Agreement.

While canals played an important role in American military planning, they were important on the British side of the border as well. In Canada the canals had great commercial utility, overcoming rapids along the lifeline to Upper Canada, but engineers also recognized their obvious military utility. As in the United States, the military played an important role in canal building and thus played a major role in Canada’s growth.

Along the Richelieu River, the Canadians built short canals at Chambly and St. Ours in the 1830s and 1840s, despite the resistance of the military, which feared that there were 129 now no obstacles, other than obsolete Fort Lennox, standing in the way of an American invasion. On the St. Lawrence, canals at Lachine and Beauhamois eased the way around the rapids, while smaller canals were built on the upper stretch of the river in the 1840s.

The Welland Canal, built in the late 1820s and later enlarged, provided a route around

Niagara Falls and was a vain attempt to divert traffic from the Erie Canal route. These canals failed to meet the commercial expectations of their builders, however, because the bulk of the lake trade still went through the New York canals. The Canadian canals were generally too small and impeded by many locks, limiting the size and speed of boats traveling them. One major exception in Canada to American practice was the Rideau

Canal, built solely for military purposes at the urging of the Duke of Wellington. British officers had long recognized the vulnerability of the St. Lawrence route, and a waterway utilizing the Ottawa and Rideau Rivers provided a way for British vessels to move to

Upper Canada, in relatively safety, far from the border. Built between 1827 and 1832 through 120 miles of wilderness, the required forty-six locks and fifty-two dams. A canal was built on the Ottawa River as well to overcome dangerous rapids. The

Rideau route, defended by blockhouses, provided a military corridor for men and materiel moving between Lower and Upper Canada, but the canal served mainly commercial purposes, despite its small size.^°

Fortunately, then, internal improvements flourished in the United States as other elements o f national defense declined. Posing no threat to American liberties as standing armies might, roads, canals, and railroads had important social, political, and commercial benefits that most Americans recognized. Fortunately for national defense, they also provided military benefits. General Edmimd P. Gaines believed that internal 130 improvements were more essential to national security than all the seacoast fortifications, particularly since they allowed prompt concentration of the scattered American militia.

He developed several plans in the 1830s for the use of railroads in national defense, linking the two great interior states of Kentucky and , which were a safe distance from international borders and great reservoirs of military manpower, to key points on the frontiers. The key points on the northern frontier were Chicago, Detroit,

Buffalo, St. Regis, Plattsburgh, and Portland. Gaines and his iconoclastic views, irksome in particular to the fortification-minded Corps of Engineers, influenced many members of

Congress and added to the general support for government assistance to internal improvements. In fact, there were so many engineer officers at work on roads, canals, and railroads that the Corps of Engineers and the War Department routinely asked for an increase in the number of engineer officers to a level sufficient to meet their immense responsibilities."'

On the northern frontier, road construction continued, and engineers surveyed routes for new roads to perfect the security of the border. The importance of good communications along the frontier was obvious, and construction continued on roads from Detroit to Ohio, Detroit to Chicago, and Detroit to Saginaw. There were also plans to build roads in Maine that could facilitate an attack on . Construction had stopped on the Plattsburgh-Sackets Harbor road in 1824. Roads were presumably more important in the wilderness regions of Maine and Michigan, where canal building was either impossible or prohibitively expensive, than in an area well-provided with canals such as New York. Given the great distance between the border and Washington, D C. there were also plans, prepared by engineer Stephen H. Long in 1826 and 1827, to link 131 Buffalo to the capital with a road. In 1828, the Committee on Roads and Canals approved a national system of roads linking the seat of the federal government with the frontiers, believing that “no danger can threaten the United States on their remote borders” as long as intelligence was “promptly received.” Such a road, which would link the Niagara frontier with the Middle Atlantic States, would provide access to great reserves of men and materiel and provide prompt news of enemy movements. Roads built with federal money and by army engineers thus continued to play an important role in the defense of the northern frontier.

Railroads, however, started to supplant other internal improvements in the 1830s on both sides of the border. Railroads provided faster travel times, and they did not depend on a water source as did canals, allowing travel In most winter conditions and through areas lacking major rivers or lakes. Although critics claimed that speeds as high as fifteen miles per hour could be damaging to health and that railroads were more expensive to build than canals, private companies started laying track by the late 1820s.

The first American railroad, the Baltimore and Ohio, started construction in 1828. There were small railroads in Canada, built as portages between navigable rivers on the

Champlain and Niagara frontiers, by the early 1830s. Military roads provided the precedent for railroad construction, because national defense provided the justification for politicians to seek funds for railroads and other internal improvements in their districts. Many army engineers thus surveyed and helped construct several railroad lines, notably the Baltimore & Ohio, gaining much valuable experience as they did while working on canals. In addition, promoters stressed how railroads would increase the military effectiveness of national resources. When the citizens of Adams County, Illinois 132 petitioned Congress in 1832 for a railroad between Buffalo and a point on the Mississippi

River, they pointed out how troops could be quickly and cheaply moved to the frontiers, fresh and ready for action. Thus, the railroad could play the same role as other internal improvements in the defense of the northern frontier, namely the concentration of men and materiel at threatened points. By 1840, however, 90 percent of the nation’s 3,000 miles of track was still east of the Appalachians.^

Despite the generally good relations between the United States and Britain, the northern frontier remained a potential flashpoint, especially in the northwest, where

Indian tribes posed a threat, and in Maine along the disputed border. While attention had shifted from the eastern part of the northern frontier to the maritime frontier, the

American government did consider measures to secure the northwest. In 1826 the House

Committee on Military Affairs recommended, on the advice of Jacob Brown and Chief of

Engineers Alexander Macomb, that permanent fortifications and good military roads were the keys to the defense of the northwestern frontier. Brown felt that American naval superiority on the lakes, due to the larger population and commercial marine and the occupation of Mackinac, protected most of the area from British aggression. The only vulnerable portion of the border, the Detroit frontier, could be defended by roads that would both facilitate military movements and encourage settlement of the region.

Macomb also stressed the importance of forts along the border, given the fact that the frontier was thinly settled and remote from the settled regions of the coimtry. Such defensive measures would be costly, of course, especially at a time when there seemed to be little concern about British attack.'^

133 It was Lewis Cass, governor of Michigan Territory, who provided the most thoughtful and extensive report on the measures necessary to defend the 1,200-mile northwestern frontier. Concerned by the border’s great extent, the decaying or abandoned stockade forts there, and apparent British support to the Indian tribes, Cass reported in 1826 that the situation was “utterly unworthy of the character of permanent defences for an important frontier.” He felt that there was no reason to expect “a perpetual peace” with Britain, which held the northern shores of four of the Great Lakes and their intervening straits. Cass recommended a network of military roads in

Michigan, connected to the National Road in Ohio, to facilitate military movements, and permanent fortifications on the Detroit frontier and Sault Ste. Marie, where the British could possibly invade American territory. By establishing a strong presence at those locations, the United States could intimidate the “turbulent, disaffected savages” and counter British influence among them. In Cass’s view the Detroit frontier was particularly important, because during the last war the frontier was quiet only so long as

American troops held Detroit. After the city’s capture the British let the tribes loose to spread “dismay and death from lake Erie to the Mississippi.” Although sound, most of

Cass’s suggestions would have to wait for a crisis for them to go into effect.

That crisis was not long in coming since Indian attacks prompted new attention to the northwestern frontier. Encouraged by weak American defenses and rumors that

Britain and the United States were on the brink of war (there were problems along the disputed Maine boundary), the Winnebagos attacked settlers in the vicinity of Prairie du

Chien in the summer of 1827. The outbreak was quickly put down, and part of the government response involved the reoccupation of several posts in the Great Lakes 134 region to overawe the tribes and control trade. Two companies of the 2d Infantry occupied Fort Gratiot, razing the old defenses and erecting a bastioned stockade and timber quarters and service buildings. Two companies of the 5th Infantry likewise reoccupied Fort Dearborn. Indian unrest in the Northwest was not yet over, however.'^

From 1831 to 1832, in the so-called Black Hawk War, a faction of the Sacs and

Foxes fought against the United States in present-day northern Illinois and southern

Wisconsin. Under the leadership of the chief Black Hawk, they opposed removal to new lands west of the Mississippi and until August 1832 fought off the sometimes farcical attempts of the United States to subdue them. Given the nature of the uprising, it seemed as if the fears of Americans about British influence among the Indians were justified.

Black Hawk had fought for the British during the War of 1812, and he harbored great hatred toward the United States. As a reward for his wartime services, he traveled to Fort

Malden each fall with some of his followers to receive gifts from the British government.

Although he received no assurance of British support. Black Hawk believed rumors of possible British assistance and struck back against the encroachment of American settlers. He was mistaken, however. After 1818 John Jacob Astor’s American Fur

Company began to supplant British influence, and official British policy was to encourage the tribes to accept United States control. The tribes had become an undesirable burden, and the British valued trade and peaceful relations with the United

States more than their traditional alliance with the tribes of the northwest. Thus, Black

Hawk’s “British band” was crushed. The killed many of those fugitives who escaped the American regulars and militiamen.^^

135 The Black Hawk War resulted in a great deal of military activity on the northwestern frontier and one of the more impressive army movements of the ante­ bellum period. To deal with the disturbance, the War Department dispatched troops under Winfield Scott from locations well away from the scene of hostilities. In this way, the frontier would not be left defenseless. Thus, troops from Fort Niagara and the seacoast went by water transport to Chicago for use against the Sacs and Foxes. The speed with which the reinforcements reached the theater was impressive, but the condition in which they arrived was not. Six artillery companies traveled from Fort

Monroe on Chesapeake Bay to Chicago, covering the 1,800 miles in just eighteen days.

The speedy transfer of troops demonstrated the value of modem transportation and internal improvements. Unfortunately, the troops contracted cholera during the movement, falling victim to an epidemic that swept the United States and Canada in spring 1832. The Surgeon General blamed “filthy foreign immigrants,” particularly from

Ireland, who brought the disease to Quebec. The disease spread along the lines of communication to the interior and caught the troops as they made their way to Detroit, devastating posts such as Forts Niagara and Gratiot as well. Of the seventy-eight soldiers from Fort Niagara, forty-seven contracted cholera at Detroit, twenty-one of them dying.

One-third of the troops from succumbed before reaching Chicago. Despite the sickness, the troop movement had great implications for the northern frontier.

Defense of the border region depended on good communications, and the War

Department used water transport to great effect. Admittedly, the movement took place during a period of peace with Britain, and the troops could travel unmolested, by British and Canadian forces at any rate, along the length of the frontier. Nevertheless, the army 136 had demonstrated that it could deploy forces over great distances. Whether or not the army understood disease was, of course, another matter.^*

Meanwhile, there had been disturbances farther east as well. Smuggling along the border led the army to reoccupy Fort Niagara and increase the garrisons at Fort Gratiot and Madison Barracks in 1828 (table 4.1), and in the disputed border region of northern

Maine, the United States and Britain had conflicting claims along the boundary. The

Americans were trying to establish a border as far north as possible, while the British wanted a line farther south and away from the St. John River in order to secure their overland communications between Halifax and Quebec. During the winter when ice closed the St. Lawrence, the only way to reach Quebec was along the Temiscouata route, which incorporated the St. John. As settlers filled the Aroostook region along the St.

John, there were minor incidents arising from the activity of timber-cutting trespassers.

Disputes between the citizens of Maine and their neighbors across the uncertain border threatened to involve the United States in a conflict with Britain. The War Department dispatched troops to prevent further clashes, an action that Secretary of War Peter B.

Porter described as “universally acceptable” to the citizens of the northern frontier. The soldiers established , a stockade enclosure and quarters, at Houlton in

May 1828 and built a military road from the post to Bangor. Although a British observer considered Hancock Barracks to be a “contemptible” fortification, the four companies of the 2d Infantry and the road contributed greatly to the defense of the Aroostook, encouraging further settlement as well. The security provided by the military and reports that the Aroostook was excellent agricultural land brought many immigrants, who only

137 added to the demands that the United States take over the disputed territory. Clashes continued, culminating later in 1839 during the .^^

The uncertain international boundary, then, promised to be a great threat to good

Anglo-American relations, and border tensions sparked renewed interest in the defense of the northern frontier. Until the two nations agreed on a boundary line, the residents along the northern frontier would continue to fight over access to resources that were under vague jurisdiction. Despite the perception that he was an Anglophobe, President Andrew

Jackson tried to establish relations of mutual respect with the British and was concerned about settling the disputed boundary. In fact, there was a far greater threat of war with

France during his presidency, over American claims for damages sustained during the

Napoleonic Wars. In his annual address to Congress in 1829, Jackson stated that the

United States looked “forward to years of peaceful, honorable, and elevated competition” with Britain; he felt that it was in the best interests of each country “to preserve the most cordial relations.” For his part, Jackson promised, his policy toward Britain would “be of a just and pacific character.” Jackson knew that he could not intimidate Britain, so he would have to rely on diplomacy to settle a dispute that threatened to damage Anglo-

American relations. While at times, especially in his youth, he was stubborn and bold,

Jackson was prepared to act with great tact to settle the international boundary line.^°

Two areas along the northern frontier were of the most interest during the boundary negotiations. In the northeast, diplomats discussed the northern boundary of

Maine, an indistinct line that had already led to trouble between the United States and

Britain. The Treaty of Paris in 1783 had defined the northeast boundary as a line due north from the source of the St. Croix River, to the “Highlands” that separated the rivers 138 flowing to the S t Lawrence from those flowing to the Atlantic, to the northwestemmost head of the Connecticut River, and along the 45th parallel to the St. Lawrence. Each of these geographic markers was in dispute. The British claimed that the highlands in question were south of the . Furthermore, they wanted a boundary that would protect the overland route between Halifax and Quebec, the only way to communicate between the mother country and the Canadas when ice closed the St.

Lawrence River. The state of Maine, however, claimed that the highlands instead ran parallel to the St. Lawrence, giving Maine a boundary that came to within about thirty miles of the river at Quebec. Both nations had referred the matter in 1827 to King

William 1 of the for arbitration, as stipulated by the Treaty of Ghent.

William did not receive the claims of each side until December 1829, and on 10 January

1831 he offered a compromise that gave the Americans about 8,000 of the 12,000 square miles in the disputed region. To a European monarch, the offer appeared to be a good compromise since William granted land at the outlet of Lake Champlain to the United

States as well.^’

Political considerations, however, prevented Andrew Jackson from accepting the award. He was inclined to accept the decision, but he had to deal carefully with the state of Maine, which would be losing territory. Maine claimed the highlands separating the waters of the St. Lawrence from the Atlantic as the basis for the boundary line. By

August Jackson decided to accept the award. The British were eager to cooperate, and the president was unwilling to risk a border war. As a sovereign state, Maine objected to the award, so Jackson tried to persuade the state to agree by granting it the proceeds of the sale of a million acres of public land in Michigan Territory. Jackson was especially 139 interested in a settlement, telling negotiator in December 1831 that

“perpetual peace, and harmony between the two nations” would be an excellent theme for his farewell address. Jackson’s opponents in Congress were unwilling to grant him a foreign policy coup in an election year, however, so in June 1832 National Republicans rejected the northeast boundary decision. Pressured by Maine and an obstinate Senate,

Jackson declined further British officers at mediation and the northeast boundary remained unresolved.^^

The other crucial area along the uncertain boundary was at the outlet of Lake

Champlain. Given the large sums of money the United States spent on fortifications at

Island Point, King William assumed it to be of great importance to the Americans, a worthy exchange to the British for a portion of the disputed northeast border area. Thus, the king concluded that the boundary should follow the actual 45th parallel, instead of the incorrectly-surveyed Valentine-Collins line of 1774 as the American negotiator demanded. The award did grant Island Point to the United States, however, because King

William granted it and the land within a one-kilometer radius to the Americans.

Although the Treaty of Ghent dictated that the parties were bound by the arbiter’s awards, the boundary at Rouses Point remained disputed. When it rejected the northeast boundary, the Senate rejected the companion grant at the outlet of Lake Champlain as well.^^

Despite the suitability of Rouses Point for a fortification to control Lake

Champlain and thus defend the northern fi*ontier, Joseph Totten was not concerned about the rejection of the boundary arbitration. Indeed, in a confidential letter to the Chief of

Engineers in May 1831, he urged General Charles Gratiot not to assign too much 140 importance to Rouses Point. Totten warned that the United States should not be influenced to keep Rouses Point just because there were already foundations of a fort there; it would be difficult to build on the ruins, which were unsound anyway.

Furthermore, the British were unlikely to occupy Rouses Point. Twenty miles of wilderness separated the location from the post at Isle aux Noix, and American forces could easily cut off any fort at the lake outlet. Although the Island Point location was

“the best position” to command Lake Champlain, Totten considered it to be too weak on the land side. Given the proximity of British forces and the sparse settlement of the area, which made quick relief from local forces unlikely, a fort there would have to be capable of holding out for weeks. The high ground to the west of Island Point made a project to defend the land side of a fort costly. Totten felt that Windmill Point was better suited for land defenses and thus would be less expensive to fortify. Although the channel there was wider, Totten assured Gratiot that it could be “effectually commanded” by a fort at

Windmill Point. Another point in favor of Windmill Point was its isolation from the border. Dense woods shielded the location from British territory, and the area on the east shore of the lake had fewer roads. Thus, a British attack on a fort there would be very difficult. What Totten did not explain was how American forces themselves would communicate with a fort at Windmill Point. Easy access to that location depended on control of the lake, and its position on the east shore rendered it easily cut off by an invader.^"*

Since it appeared that there would be no boundary settlement in the immediate future, the defense of the northern frontier remained in an uncertain state, given debate over the necessity of spending the nation’s scarce funds there. Despite Jackson’s best 141 efforts, many Americans remained doubtful that the amicable relations with Britain would continue, and they felt it best to prepare for war while the nation had the luxury to do so. New York Representative Aaron Ward spoke for many on the northern frontier when, in support of continued appropriations for the Military Academy, he warned in

1834 that many points of difference remained between the United States and Britain.

There was no resolution of the British practice of search and impressment, the British had not granted free navigation of the St. Lawrence to Americans, and the northeast boundary remained unsettled. Furthermore, Ward pointed out that despite a huge debt, Britain was spending millions on the defense of Canada. Although he overstated the strength of the fortress at Quebec, Ward did make clear the importance of being prepared for war along the northern frontier. Just as “a farmer makes hay while the sun shines,” so too did the

United States have to accept the possibility that Britain remained a potential, and powerful, threat. Critics, some of them Congressmen from states along the northern frontier, pointed out, however, that there was little need to expend scarce fimds for the defense o f the border with British North America. Given the population of the British provinces and the United States, the idea of a successful attack from Canada was absurd.

New York state alone, with a population of 1,919,000 in 1830, was far larger than the

Canadas with their population of about 789,000 (Appendix E and F). The traditional question remained unresolved. Was the superior American population sufficient defense in case of war with Britain, or would fortifications be necessary to shield that population, block British invasion, and secure the lakes and assure naval supremacy?^^

Although the maritime frontier had swallowed up all fortification appropriations since the early 1820s, residents along the northern frontier remained concerned about the 142 British threat and petitioned Congress for fortifications. In 1829 the Vermont legislature requested the construction of fortifications between Isle la Motte and Point au Fer to command the outlet of Lake Champlain. In 1836 Maine demanded that the federal government provide the state, “the most defenceless and exposed” in the Union, with adequate seacoast and interior frontier fortifications without delay. Such petitions prompted some concern on the part of Congress for the fortification of the northern frontier.

Given the preoccupation with westward expansion and the defense of the maritime frontier, however, the fact remained that the northern frontier remained low on the federal government’s list of priorities. In his report “On the Means and Measures

Necessary for the Military and Naval Defences of the Country” in April 1836, Secretary of War Lewis Cass questioned both the engineers’ seacoast fortification system and the necessity of fortifications for the northern frontier. Cass preferred to rely instead on naval forces, and President Jackson concurred with the report. Cass stated that since the inland frontier rested upon the possessions “of civilized nations” and that “we may reasonably anticipate emergencies there,” the United States would have both the time and the ability to move a sufficient force to any threatened point. Internal improvements would thus be an important element of defense. Cass could see little need to build forts along the northern frontier. In his view, they would only defend the area directly under the cover of their guns. A far more effective defense would be control of the lakes.

Given the “considerable commercial marine” on the American side, Cass believed that there was no way for the British to achieve naval supremacy. Except for a fort at the outlet of Lake Champlain, Cass asserted that the lake frontier required no permanent 143 defenses. Small temporary works would provide sufficient defense for the lake towns in

time of war, and a supply depot somewhere in Michigan could supply the American

forces operating in the region. Cass was content to rely on the American superiority in

population and materiel to defend the northern frontier. His critique of the seacoast

defenses was such that appropriations on even the maritime frontier stopped in 1837.^’

While Totten still stressed the importance of seacoast forts, he did agree with Cass

on the importance of internal improvements to the defense of the frontiers. In fact, Cass

seems to have based many of his conclusions on Totten’s advice. In his report on

national defenses, submitted with Cass’s report to Congress, Totten made his suggestions

for the defense of the northern frontier. He did so “with diffidence,” since that portion of the frontier had yet to be “the subject of particular care and study.” Totten did feel, though, that permanent works were not as important along the northern frontier as they were on the seacoast. First, the British provinces could someday become independent, and there would then be no more need for vigilance along the frontier than there currently was along the boundaries between the United States. Second and more importantly, the region was rapidly becoming “populous and wealthy,” served by an excellent network of roads, canals, and railroads. In Totten’s view, “the growth in numbers and the increased facilities of intercommunication, the increased power of rendering mutual succor, and of drawing aid from the interior, would, in a still greater degree, make aggression difficult and improbable.” The cheapest form of defense on the northern frontier would be naval superiority, which could be achieved by placing two or three armed vessels on each lake to convoy commercial shipping and military transports. Naval superiority would protect the growing towns and cities of the Great Lakes far more effectively, and at less cost, 144 than a network of forts. Conceding control of the lakes to the British would expose the

people of the northern frontier to attack.^®

The key to the defense of the entire northern frontier remained the Champlain-

Richelieu corridor, in Totten’s view. Decisive action there would eliminate the need for a

shipbuilder’s war on the lakes and would give naval superiority on the lakes to the

Americans by default. Therefore, Totten stressed the importance of commanding the

outlet of Lake Champlain, both to keep the British from attacking the country along the

lake’s shores and to preserve use of the lake to American forces. He suggested that a fort

near the abandoned Island Point site would be sufficient and would cost about $600,000.

It was the only permanent recommended for the entire northern frontier, and

he felt that it should be built without delay since the British recognized the lake’s

importance as well. Totten expressed the traditional view that Lake Champlain was the

best possible line of communication for offensive operations against the St. Lawrence,

“the weakest point of the Canadian frontier.” Starting from the lake’s outlet, American

forces could bypass, blockade, and later reduce British defenses at Isle aux Noix and

interdict the St. Lawrence at any point between the mouth of the Richelieu and Montreal.

Such action would paralyze Upper Canada by cutting off its supplies and spare the United

States an “exhausting and interminable” struggle for control of the lakes. The Americans could then proceed to take Quebec. In Totten’s view, a fort at the outlet of Lake

Champlain would make operations against the St. Lawrence possible, rendering “the defence of the upper portion of the frontier . . . complete.” The people of the Upper

Lakes would thus have to await the outcome of an offensive against the St. Lawrence and rely on its success for security. Given the testimony in favor of a permanent fort on Lake 145 Champlain, the Senate directed on 18 April 1836 that there be a survey for fortifications at the lake’s outlet.^^

The reports of Lewis Cass and Joseph Totten reflect the fact that strategy for the defense of the northern frontier remained based on the growing population of the region.

Given the overwhelming population advantage that the United States possessed, the

Americans could rely on the military mass of its population to support a decisive offensive against the St. Lawrence and to provide local defense against British attack.

Few fortifications were considered necessary, and internal improvements would provide the means to concentrate the men and materiel. By cutting the British line of communication to the interior, officials hoped that the United States could achieve two goals. First, American forces could acquire and maintain naval supremacy on the lakes, the key to the defense of the frontier. Second, an invading American army could lay the foundation for a successful attack on Quebec, the link to Britain and its overwhelming naval power. Success on the lakes and the capture of Quebec would both defend the population of the northern frontier and possibly remove the British permanently from

North America.

The growing population, however, demanded more tangible defensive measures than a promised attack against the St. Lawrence lifeline. Although some critics pointed out that there was little to fear from a Canada weaker in terms of population and industry than the United States, many residents demanded proof that the government was devoting enough attention to their defense. Given small appropriations and army commitments elsewhere, there was little indication to many observers that Washington was doing enough to protect the northern frontier. Between 1825 and 1837, there were no 146 fortification appropriations for the northern frontier, while almost $10.4 million was appropriated for the seacoast defenses."*® There was no real naval presence on the lakes either, the conversion of commercial vessels into gunboats, made possible by the

American commercial marine, industry, and canals, was only potential security, far less reassuring in the minds of some than permanent fortifications. Finally, there were very few regular troops posted on the northern frontier, a situation made worse by the

Seminole War, which was a drain on the army’s resources. By 1837, the only occupied posts were Hancock Barracks and Fort Brady, with two companies of infantry each.

Thus, while the bulk of the regular army was in the swamps of Florida, there were about

199 soldiers posted at either end of the northern frontier."* ‘

While the apparently weak defenses of the northern frontier aroused the ire of some residents, there was little need at the time to expend vast sums on the defense of the northern frontier given the fairly amicable relations between the United States and

Britain. Indeed, many Americans in the Age of Jackson were probably quite pleased that there were so few regular troops. Also, while the attention paid to the maritime and western frontiers was an affront to the pride of the rapidly-growing areas of New York and the Northwest, there was little point in building expensive fortifications along a border which remained ill-defined. Furthermore, an extensive system of fortifications was hardly necessary since British forces would most likely remain on the defensive and temporary field fortifications would be sufficient in most situations. Superior communications on the American side of the border would have made it possible to move forces to threatened points on the frontier, and the small regular army, reinforced by the

147 military mass of the population, could either defend against British invaders or push north to the St. Lawrence.

In a future Anglo-American war, American success seemed to be certain if the

United States did not fail in certain areas as it had during the War of 1812. President Van

Buren and his cabinet would have to be able war leaders; citizen soldiers would have to turn out in sufficient numbers willing to accept a modicum of military discipline; the commander of the offensive against the St. Lawrence, presumably Eastern Department chief Winfield Scott, would have to conduct his operations with the necessary vigor; and finally, the seacoast defenses, which in the 1830s were unfinished and generally unarmed, would have to repel British raids. Whether or not the Americans would perform better in the next conflict remained the great intangible and provided grounds for concern on the part of the residents of the northern frontier. As trouble brewed along the uncertain international boundary starting in 1837, these concerns intensified. Only when crises threatened to provoke an Anglo-American war did the United States start to provide the fortifications, naval presence, and troops demanded by the most vocal advocates of defenses for the northern frontier.

148 ‘ Lewis Cass, “On the Means and Measures Necessary for the Military and Naval Defences of the Country,” 8 April 1836, vaASPMA 6, 24th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 671 ser. 21, 367.

^ For the Bernard Board’s second report, see “System of Fortifications Recommended by the Board of Engineers,” 1 March 1826, in ASPMA 3, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 316, ser. 18. For Adams’s annual address to Congress on 5 December 1826, sesASPFR 6, 19th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 438, ser. 6.

^ J. Mackay Hhsman, Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 120- 24. See also James Carmichael-Smyth, Precis o f the Wars in Canada, from 1755 to the Treaty o f Ghent in 1814 (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1862). Basil Hall, a captain in the Royal Navy, warned that Britain could not allow its North American possessions to fall into American hands. Such a catastrophe would triple or quadruple American naval resources at one blow and correspondingly weaken Britain’s naval position; see Basil Hall, Travels in North America, in the Years 1827 and 1828, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Caudal, 1829), 409.

^ James J. Talman, ed., “A Secret Military Document, 1825,” American Historical Review 38 (January 1933): 295-300.

’ British army observers had a bad view of the United States Army. Although most British officers praised the American officer corps, they noted that the enlisted men were either the dregs of society or the most worthless of immigrants; see Francis Paul Prucha, “The United States Army as Viewed by British Travelers, Military Affairs 17 (Fall 1953): 113-24. The Royal Army, however, had problems of its own; for a discussion of the British army, ossified thanks to the deadening influence of the Duke of Wellington, see Richard L. Blanco, “Reform and Wellington’s Post Waterloo Army, 1815-1854,” M ilitary Affairs 29 (Fall 1965): 123-31. For an American reply to British criticism, see “Notes on the Army of the United States,” Military and Naval Magazine of the United States 1 (April 1833): 97-108, which defends the character of the soldiers as steadily improving. Desertion and drunkenness remained a problem, however, despite the efforts of teetotaling Secretary of War Lewis Cass to encourage temperance and improve the Army’s “moral culture” in the early 1830s. For Cass’s concerns, see his annual report for 1831 in ASPMA 4, 22d Cong., 1st sess.. No. 485, ser. 19. Some officers, however, felt that some of the reforms, especially the abolition of flogging, had a bad effect on discipline and created many o f the problems that Cass tried to eliminate; see Inspector General ’s comments in Francis Paul Prucha, ed.. Army Life on the Western Frontier: Selections from the Official Reports Made Between 1826 and 1845 by Colonel George Croghan (Norman. University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 112-14.

* “On the Subject of the Organization and Discipline of the Militia o f the United States,” 27 February 1827, in ASPMA 3, 19th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 356, ser. 18, 602. For a brief history of the militia and the rise of volunteer units during the ante-bellum period, see John K. Mahon, History o f the Militia and the National Guard, (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 78-96.

^ Despite Secretary of War John Calhoun’s reports on the necessity of a western armory in 1818 and subsequent surveys for a site in Pennsylvania or on the Termessee or Ohio Rivers in 1823, there was still no armory on western waters in the 1830s; see “Western Armory,” 7 December 1818, in ASPMA 1, 15th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 166, ser. 16, and “National Armory on the Western Waters,” 18 January 1825, in ASPMA 2, 18th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 263, ser. 17. Other suggested sites were Fort Wayne, Indiana, well- served by canals and a potentially useful depot for the lake frontier, and a site on the Mississippi River near the Kentucky-Tennessee boundary, see “General Report on an Examination and Survey of Various Sites for the establishment of an Armory on the Western Waters,” 28 May 1830, in ASPMA 4, 21st Cong., 1st sess.. No. 455, ser. 19, and “Considerations and Reasons in Favor o f Establishing an Armory on the Western Waters,” 18 March 1834, in ASPMA 5, 23d Cong., 1st sess.. No. 570, ser. 20.

149 * Hall, Travels in North America, vol. I, 115; “Fortifications, Armories, and Arsenals,” 14 December 1836, 24th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 13, vol. 1, ser. 297; History o f the Watervliet Arsenal (Watervliet, N.Y.: United States Arsenal, 1963). For the importance of the Augusta Arsenal, see ordnance chief George Bomford’s report in “On making further appropriation for the arsenal at Augusta, Maine,” 20 February 1828, 20th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 121, vol. 4, ser. 166.

^ For Barbour’s report, see John K. Mahon, “A Board of Officers Considers the Condition o f the Militia in 1826,” Military Affairs 15 (Summer 1951): 85-94. Among the board’s recommendations were a reduction of the active militia to 400,000 men, apportioned among the states according to population and seriously trained; an adjutant general for militia affiairs in the War Department; a common organization for all militia units; distribution of drill manuals; and an annual training camp o f at least ten days. The board also agreed that volunteer units were more efficient than militia. For a typical complaint about states neglecting their militia reports, see Adjutant General Roger Jones’s comments in “Annual Returns of the Militia o f the United States,” 15 February 1826, ASPMA 3, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 311, ser. 18. See Anthony Marro, “Vermont’s Local Militia Units, 1815-1860,” Vermont History 40 (1972): 28-40, for the decline of the Vermont militia. For Butler’s comments, see “Annual Report of the Secretary of War,” 6 December 1836, in ASPMA 6, 24th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 699, ser. 21, 812. For British criticism of the American militia system, see “Notes on the Army o f the United States o f America,” United Service Journal 47 (October 1832): 154-61, in which a British observer described a Vermont militia muster: “The privates turned out in their usual working dresses—belts and pouches over surtouts, long coats, and round jackets; feathers, red, green, and blue, of all sorts and sizes, were stuck in round hats, on the front of some of which was tied the eagle with a string; some had broomsticks for muskets, and others muskets without locks. The band sent forth from seven bass drums, a fife, and a fiddle; and the colonel (as usual a tavern keeper), vrith a huge broadsword by his side, could not attend to his duties for mixing “gin sling” behind a tree, wherewith to inspirit his gallant troops.” Needless to say, British regulars felt they had little to fear from the American military establishment.

Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o f Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 203-08; Marcus CunlifFe, Soldiers & Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865 (New York: The Free Press, 1968, 1973), 215-41.

" Navy Department, Dictionary o f American Fighting Ships, vol. 2 (Washington: GPO, 1963), 111.

U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 4, 131; “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 6 December 1825, in ASPMA 2, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 268, ser. 24, 102, 126-29; “Statement of Expenditures for Ship Houses at Navy Point or Sackett’s Harbor, ” 27 December 1834, in ASPMA 4, 23d Cong., 2d sess.. No. 568, ser. 26. Royal Navy officer Basil Hall found Sackets Harbor to be a village in decline by 1827; see Hall, Travels in North America, vol. 1, 356-57.

For the number of vessels operating on the Upper Lakes, see H.A. Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats—Westward Ho! and Flush Times, 1831-1837,” American Neptune 7 (January 1947): 56. For the number of steamers on Lake Ontario, see “Ship Canal between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario,” 6 January 1834, 23d Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 34, vol. 1, ser. 254. For a contemporary view of the advantages of steam vessels in time o f war, see “New Maritime Artillery,” American Quarterly Review 4 (December 1828): 480-507.

There were harbor improvements in the 1820s and 1830s at the following locations: Lake Champlain (Plattsburgh, Port Kent, Burlington Bay); Lake Ontario (Sackets Harbor, Oswego, Big Sodus Bay, Genesee River); Lake Erie (Black Rock, Buffalo, Dunkirk, Erie, Conneaut Creek, Ashtabula Creek, Cunningham’s Creek, Grand River, Cleveland, Black River, Huron River). See “Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers,” 8 December 1829, \n ASPMA 4, 21st Cong., 1st sess.. No. 410, ser. 19, 164-74, and “Harbors— Plattsburgh, Port Kent, Burlington Bay,” 7 February 1834, 23d Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 131, vol. 3, ser. 256. 150 For example, in one of the worst maritime disasters in Great Lakes history, the British Ontario foundered during a snowstorm on Lake Ontario on 23 November 1783. Carrying some 190 troops from Niagara to Oswego, she went down with all hands; see Roy F. Fleming, “The Thirteen Major Disasters of Great Lakes Navigation with Fatalities of 100 or more,” Inland Seas 11 (Summer 1955): 137.

** Alvin F. Harlow, Towpaths: The Story o f the American Canal Era (Port Washington, N.Y.. Kennikat Press, 1964), 124, 148. For the great logistical benefits provided by canals, see Cynthia Ann Miller, “The United States Army Logistics Complex, 1818-1845: A Case Study of the Northern Frontier” (Ph.D. diss., Syracuse University, 1991), 186-87,475-76.

For the Franklin County petition, see “Canal to Connect Lakes Champlain and Ontario,” 2 January 1826, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 230, vol. 2, ser. 142.

“Ship Canal between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario,” 6 January 1834, 23d Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 34, vol. 1, ser. 254. The state of Ohio supported the Niagara ship canal as a way to monopolize the trade of the West and to defend the northern frontier, see “Resolutions of the Legislature of Ohio,” 23 January 1837, 24th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 156, vol. 2, ser. 298. For the engineer survey o f the proposed canal, described by the author as a “shield of national protection,” see Captain W.G. Williams, “Canal—Lake Erie to Lake Ontario,” 17 March 1836, 24th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 214, vol. 5, ser. 290.

“Upon the subject of a canal communication between the Illinois River and Lake Michigan,” 1 January 1825, 18th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 53, vol. 1, ser. 53.

Robert F. Legget, Canals of Canada (Vancouver: Douglas, David & Charles, 1976), 36-39, 242. See also John P. Heisler, The Canals of Canada, Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History - No. 8 (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1973) for the history of Canada’s canals and their role in commercial development and settlement. Specifications of the Lachine, St. Lawrence, Ottawa, Rideau, and Welland Canals are in George Phillpotts, “Report on the Canal Navigation of the Canadas,” Professional Papers o f the Corps o f 5 (1842): 2-55, and a contemporary description of Rideau Canal is in E C. Frome, “Account of the Causes which led to the Construction of the Rideau Canal,” Professional Papers of the Corps o f Royal Engineers 1 (1837): 73-102. For the crucial role the military played in Canada’s growth after 1815, similar to the role played in the United States by the Corps of Engineers, see George K. Raudzens, The British Ordnance Department and Canada’s Canals (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979). For the dominance of the New York canal system, see D G. Creighton, The Commercial Empire o f the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850 (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1937), 251; for example, the Welland canal served merely as a feeder to the Erie Canal system. In 1834, the Welland carried 40,634 bushels of wheat for Montreal while transporting 224,285 bushels for Oswego, New York.

Harold L. Nelson, “Military Roads for War and Peace— 1791-1836,” Military Affairs 19 (Spring 1955): 10. For Gaines’s views, see James W. Silver, Edmund Pendleton Gaines: Frontier General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949), 236-57, and “Memorial o f Edmund P. Gaines, proposing a system of national defence,” 31 December 1839, 26th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 256, vol. 5, ser. 358. St. Regis is on the St. Lawrence near Ft. Covington. For the need of more engineers, see for example “Annual Report of the Secretary of War,” 4 December 1832, in ASPMA 5, 22d Cong., 2d sess.. No. 532, ser. 20, 19. One problem was the high rate of attrition. While the engineers were gaining valuable military experience, they were also making personal contacts and gaining skills that made them attractive in the more lucrative civilian sector, see Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait o f the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 50.

“Statement of the Military Roads Constructed by the Army o f the United States,” 13 January 1831, in ASPMA 4, 21st Cong., 2d sess.. No. 462, ser. 19. For plans for roads in Maine, see “Report on ftie subject of providing for the survey of Canal Routes,” 19 April 1826, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 81, vol. 4, ser. 151 128. For plans to connect the capital to the frontiers, see Richard G. Wood, Stephen Harriman Long, 1784- 1864: Army Engineer, Explorer, Inventor (Glendale, Ca.: Arthur H. Clark, 1966), 146-47; “Roads and Canals,” 26 May 1828, 20th Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 270, vol. 4, ser. 179, and “Road—Washington to Northwest Part o f New York,” 20th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 38, vol. 2, ser. 185.

^ E.G. Campbell, “Railroads in National Defense, 1829-1848,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 27 (1940): 361-78; Norman Thompson and J.H. Edgar, Canadian Railway Development from the Earliest Times (Toronto: Macmillan, 1933), 4-7. For the role of army engineers in early railroad construction, see Forest G. Hill, “Government Engineering Aid to Railroads before the Civil War,” Journal o f Economic History 11 (Summer 1951): 235-46. For track mileage in 1840, see John F. Stover, The Life and Decline of the American Railroad (New York; Oxford University Press, 1970), 11. For the debate over railroad costs, see Harlow, Towpaths, 83. The Erie Canal cost $19,255.49 per mile, while railroad supporters asserted that railroads never cost over $15,000. For a different view, see the report of the House Committee on Roads and Canals in “Canal—Michigan to Illinois River,” 25 June 1834, 23d Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 546, vol. 4, ser. 263, which recommends that Illinois should build a canal, not a railroad, to connect the Illinois River and Lake Michigan. The cost of initial construction and for annual repairs would be far less; the committee compared the cost of the Ohio canals, about $10,000 per mile, to the cost of railroads in New York and New Jersey which ranged as high as $30,000.

“On the Defence o f the Northwestern Frontier,” 20 January 1826, in ASPMA 3, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 297.

“ “Memoir from Governor Cass,” 11 January 1826, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 42, vol. 1, ser. 141. For a typical view of the condition of the defenses on the northwestern frontier, see Inspector General George Croghan’s appraisal of Fort Brady, Sault Ste. Marie, in Prucha, Army Life on the Western Frontier, 35-36. Inspecting the post in July 1826, Croghan found it in poor condition and badly designed, reporting that “why this place is dignified with the name of fort I can not imagine, for it is fitted for neither offensive or defensive purposes. So badly is it designed for either that in the event of an attack the danger of the troops composing its garrison would be lessened only when they had gained an open spot without the line of pickets.”

Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword o f the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York: Macmillan, 1969; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 163-67; Bruce Hawkins and Richard Stamps, Report o f the Preliminary Excavations at Fort Gratiot (Rochester, Mich. : , 1989), 4-24; “Annual Report from the Department of War,” 2 December 1828, in ASPMA 4, 20th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 390, ser. 19, 9.

Prucha, The Sword of the Republic, 211-31; Colin G. Calloway, “The End of an Era: British-Indian Relations in the Great Lakes Region after the War of 1812,” Michigan Historical Review 12 (Fall 1986): 1- 20. By international agreement in 1828, Britain relinquished Drummond Island, the main post of the Indian Department for the northwest lakes, to the United States. That left Fort Malden at Amherstburg as the remaining source of British supplies, an influence that was on the decline due to the official policy by 1842 of forbidding gifts to Indians from American territory. For Black Hawk’s activities at Fort Malden, see Donald Jackson, ed.. Black Hawk: An Autobiography (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 97. Black Hawk had been present at the in 1813; surely he had reason to doubt the reliability of British allies?

For the impact of cholera on the transfer of troops during the Black Hawk War, see Thomas Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States, Compiled from the Records of the Surgeon General’s and Adjutant General's Offices—Ejnbracing a Period o f Twenty Years, from January, 1819, to January 1839, compiled by Samuel Forty (Washington: Jacob Gideon, 1840), 81, 90-92. Apparently, the troops from Fort Niagara were quartered “in the most filthy part of the town” when they arrived in Detroit on 30 June 1832. Their quarters were surrounded by taverns, and the troops 152 “indulged in every kind of excess;” by 4 July almost the entire command was drunk, and cholera appeared on 6 July. The first victims were “those of intemperate habits and debilitated constitutions.” See also “Annual Report of the Secretary of War,” 4 December 1832, in ASPMA 5, 22d Cong., 2d sess.. No. 532, ser. 20, 18.

^ David Lowenthal, “The Maine Press and the Aroostook War,” Canadian Historical Review 32 (December 1951); 315-16; “Aimual Report from the Department of War,” 2 December 1828, in ASPhAA 4, 20th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 390, Ser. 19, 1. For a British description of Hancock Barracks, see “Notes on the Army o f the United Stales of America,” United Service Journal 47 (October 1832): 158.

“ For Jackson’s annual address to Congress, see 21st Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 192. For his foreign policy, see John M. Belohlavek, “"Let the Eagle Soar! The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985).

For the boundary settlement of 1831, see Belohlavek, “'Let the Eagle Soar!", 60-73, and Howard Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1843 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 13-19. For the provisions of the Treaty of Paris concerning the boundary between the United States and the British North American provinces, see Hunter Miller, ed.. Treaties and Other International Acts o f the United States o f America, vol. 2 (Washington: GPO, 1931), 152-53.

Jackson to Van Buren, 17 December 1831, in John S. Bassett, ed.. Correspondence o f Andrew Jackson, Vol. 4, 1829-1832 (Washington: The Carnegie Institution, 1929), 384-85.

Stanley W. Dziuban, “Fort Blunder: A Vignette of American History,” Military Engineer 60 (January- February 1968): 46-48. Another area of great uncertainty was the ill-defined border region at the head of the Connecticut River between New and Lower Canada; the King of the Netherlands had awarded the area to Britain, a grant rejected by the United States. Independent-minded settlers organized the area as the Indian Stream Republic in 1832 and rejected American claims to the area. They went so far as to petition the governor-general o f Canada for protection against New Hampshire authorities. New Hampshire had claimed the area as Coos County since 1824, and in November 1835 Governor William Badger sent militia into the area, overpowered the settlers, and forced them to swear allegiance to the state. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 confirmed New Hampshire’s jurisdiction over the area; see Roger H. Brown, The Struggle for the Indian Stream Territory (Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press, 1955), Daniel Doan, Indian Stream Republic: Settling a New England Frontier, 1785-1842 (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1997), and “Jurisdiction North of 45° North Latitude,” 24th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 155, vol. 4, ser. 304.

Joseph G. Totten to General Gratiot, 10 May 1831, NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 98, T2458'/2.

Albert B. Corey, The Crisis of 1830-1842 in Canadian-American Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 146-47. For Ward’s comments, see Register o f Debates in Congress, 23d Cong , 1st sess., vol. 10, part 4 (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1834), 4488-89. Quebec’s defenses were not as formidable as they seemed to contemporaries; see Glenn A. Steppler, Quebec, the of North America? (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1976).

^ “Application of Vermont for the Construction of Certain Fortifications,” 29 December 1829, in ASPMA 4, 21st Cong., 1st sess.. No. 414, ser. 19; “Application of Maine for Liberal Appropriations by Congress for the Defences of the Country,” 2 April 1836, in ASPMA 6, 24th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 673, ser. 21.

Lewis Cass, “On the Means and Measures Necessary for the Military and Naval Defences of the Country,” 8 April 1836, in ASPMA 6, 24th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 671, ser. 21, 366-67. For Cass’s tenure as 153 Secretary of War, 1831-1836, see Willard Carl Klunder, Lewis Cass and the Politics o f Moderation (Kent, Oh. : The Kent State University Press, 1996), 59-95.

For Totten’s report of 29 March 1836, see “On the Means and Measures Necessary for the Military and Naval Defences o f the Country,” 'm ASPM A 6, 24th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 671, ser. 21, 377-96.

“Annual Report of the Secretary of War,” 6 December 1836, in ASPMA 6, 24th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 699, ser. 21, 856.

For fortification appropriations, see Aimual Reports of the Secretary o f War, 1825-1837, in the Congressional Serial Set.

■“ “Annual Report o f the Secretary of War,” 5 December 1837, in ASPMA 7, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 745, 594-98. The Second Seminole War, 1835-1842, severely taxed the nation’s military resources, and the War Department stripped the garrisons fi’om the maritime and northern fi-ontier forts to build an army to fight in Florida. In the words of the North American Review, “Florida has been the Aaron’s rod, which has swallowed up every thing;” see “Coast Defence,” North American Review 51 (July 1840); 172. For the Seminole War, see John K Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967).

154 CHAPTERS

THE PATRIOT CRISIS, 1838-1840

The primary object is to penetrate to Montreal, and to this all operations mast be subordinate, & as far as practicable, tributary. - Joseph G. Totten, 21 March 1839'

While the United States government devoted few resources to the defense of the northern frontier and fought a frustrating guerrilla war against the Seminoles, trouble was brewing by 1837 along the Canadian border. In Maine, officials of that state and New

Brunswick precipitated a conflict that could have embroiled the United States and Britain in a war over the Aroostook region. At the same time, growing discontent in the

Canadas, fueled by rigid colonial government, bad harvests, and economic depression, led to open rebellion in late 1837. In Lower Canada, where there had been unrest since the early 1820s, there were clashes between civilians and troops by July 1837, prompting the United States once again to look to the defense of its northern frontier. The threat of war was a real one since many of the Americans living along the frontier sympathized with the Canadian rebels. Suffering from the Panic of 1837 and influenced by the reform mania of the 1830s, the rebel supporters saw in the Canadian rebellion the chance yet again to free the downtrodden from the British yoke. For some Americans living along

155 the northern frontier it was not enough to enjoy republican institutions, they had to ensure that the people of the Canadas enjoyed similar blessings. The formation of the Patriot and Hunter Lodges and other organizations sympathetic to the rebel cause and the direct and indirect support to the rebels were all manifestations of the reform phenomenon that had been sweeping the United States. The tensions along the frontier led to unprecedented government attention to the defense of that troubled border region."

Along the length of the northern frontier, Americans held meetings that expressed support for the rebels and provided recruits for “Patriot armies” that would conduct filibustering raids into Canada from the sanctuary of the United States. In 1835,

American sympathizers had helped Texas rebels to achieve independence and establish a republic. The situation could repeat itself in the Canadas. The Niagara frontier was especially tense, because as many as a thousand Patriots occupied in the

Niagara River by late December 1837. The support, both physical and moral, that the rebels received from the American side of the border angered the British and could have led to hostilities between the United States and Britain. Unfortunately, there was little that American state and federal officials could do to prevent military activities mounted from American soil. In Vermont, New York, and Michigan, where the tensions were highest, the militia was of dubious utility since many militia members sympathized with the Patriot cause. The Army could provide little assistance either. Most of the troops on the northern frontier had been sent to fight the Seminoles in Florida, and the government had preferred to rely on the growing population to protect the border. By December

1837, the only posts still occupied on the northern frontier were Hancock Barracks and

156 Fort Brady, each garrisoned by two companies of the 2d Infantry, totaling 199 men. The large American population was no longer the best defense against a sparsely-populated

Canada, but it was instead the very cause of trouble along the frontier that could lead to war.^

The inability of American authorities to do anything about the rebel concentration at Navy Island forced the Canadians to take matters into their own hands. The rebels had been using the American steamboat Caroline to transport supplies and men to Navy

Island, and a force of Canadian raiders planned to stop this activity. During the evening of 29 December 1837, the raiders went to Navy Island, where they failed to find the steamboat; they found her instead docked at Schlosser, New York. Having been ordered to destroy the boat wherever they found her, the Canadian militia disregarded the international border, boarded the boat, killed an American in the process, and set the boat on fire. This violation of American soil inflamed passions along the northern frontier, and district attorney H.W. Rogers reported that the whole frontier was in commotion.

Although the local militia had been called out to prevent “further depredations,” Rogers felt that it would be difficult to restrain American citizens from avenging such a “flagrant invasion of our territory.” Some of the residents of Erie and Niagara counties did indeed plan to retaliate. In petitions to Congress in February 1838 they expressed a willingness to avenge the murder “of our sleeping and unarmed citizens” and to protest “the violation of our soil by a foreign soldiery,” and they demanded that the government seek extradition of the murderers and vindicate American rights. The petitioners also admitted their support for the rebels, likening the assistance to that provided by Lafayette

157 to their revolutionary forefathers. Such a violent atmosphere obviously demanded a resolute response by the federal government if the situation were not to degenerate into an Anglo-American war.^

When he received news of the Caroline incident on 4 January 1838, Secretary of

War Joel Poinsett acted quickly to forestall further violence. The next day, he ordered

General Winfield Scott to proceed to the Niagara frontier to restrain the citizens and enforce strict American neutrality in the rebellion.^ Poinsett warned Scott that he would have to use his “influence” to prevent “excesses,” since President Van Buren hoped that

Scott could accomplish the mission without resorting to force. Just in case, Poinsett requested that New York Governor William Marcy place his militia under Scott’s command. The secretary also warned Scott to draw troops from as far away from the border as possible, so that they would be “exempt from that state of excitement which the late violation of our territory has created.”^

Scott proceeded to the Niagara frontier, the scene of his great triumphs during the

War of 1812, at once. Although he initially sympathized with the Canadian rebels, he and other army officers began to view the rebellion unfavorably. They were disgusted by the behavior of some Americans, especially the civilian officials of the government, and they were aware that the United States could be dragged into a war for which it was ill prepared. Scott knew that he faced a difficult challenge in dealing with the Patriots who were, in his words, “the cankers of a calm world and a long peace.” His only were “rhetoric and diplomacy,” and the enemy was his own countrymen. Acting with great energy, Scott traveled the length of the Niagara frontier, addressing crowds and

158 urging them to stay out of the Canadian troubles. In his opinion, support to the rebels was “absurd” and dangerous both to national honor and security. Scott’s excellent local reputation, gained in the campaigns along the Niagara during the War of 1812, played no small role in maintaining peace along the frontier, as did his frequent correspondence with Canadian officials which assured them of his peaceful intentions. Scott’s presence on the Niagara frontier, combined with the desire of most American politicians to avoid war, assured that the United States would not go to war with Britain over the Caroline incident.’

Scott had the assistance of several able officers in his attempt to pacify the northern frontier. In Vermont, Colonel John Wool accepted volunteers into federal service and used them to prevent the movement of men and supplies in the Lake

Champlain region. On the critical Detroit frontier. General Hugh Brady, commander of the 7th Military Department, played a major role upholding the neutrality of the United

States and curbing the activities of the Patriots, despite the shortage of regular troops and the political unreliability of the local militia. Brady seized rebel arms stores, had a steamboat patrolling the Detroit River, and used a volunteer company to assist his force of some ninety army recruits. Fortunately for the condition of Anglo-American relations,

British regulars and Canadian volunteers and militia were able to foil rebel attempts to seize footholds on the Detroit frontier. Lake Erie, along the St. Lawrence, and on the

Vermont border in February 1838. By March 1838 all seemed quiet on the northern frontier, and Scott left the border to head south and deal with the problems surrounding

Indian removal.*

159 The Patriot troubles emphasized the vulnerable state of the northern frontier, and

on the American side of the border residents fearful of British attack petitioned the

government for strengthened defenses. Given the tense situation on the northern border

of Maine, the state legislature had asked Congress in March 1837 to fulfill its “plain

constitutional duty” and “provide for the common defence and general welfare.” While

the federal government had made “liberal appropriations” for the defense of the seacoast

south of Maine, the legislature criticized the “mere trifle” spent on Maine. In addition to

seacoast fortifications to protect the state’s great shipbuilding capacity, large number of

sailors, and thriving trade, Maine demanded “a strong fortification” along the uncertain northeastern boundary to protect the citizens who were exposed to British attack.

Governor repeated these demands in March 1838. In February 1838, the citizens of Erie County, New York asked for “fortifications of suitable size,” especially at

Buffalo, to prevent attacks from British territory. At the same time the citizens of

Oswego requested that Congress look into “the expediency of repairing and arming” the old fortifications at Oswego to defend the town. Given the growing population and improvements there, the petitioners feared, Oswego would be a tempting target for a

British attack. Furthermore, a fort would protect the outlet of the Oswego Canal, which provided excellent communications with New York City and its vast resources, helping to prevent the British from dominating Lake Ontario. Such requests would soon be honored as tensions continued and the threat of war hung over the northern frontier.^

Spurred by tensions with Britain and the pleas of anxious citizens. Congress took an unprecedented step and appropriated the largest sums for the defense of the northern

160 frontier since the War of 1812. In 1838 and 1839 Congress appropriated $625,500 and

$500,000 respectively for the “protection of the northern frontier;” the appropriations were meant to defray the costs of calling out the militia and volunteers to patrol the border. Although small in comparison to the appropriations for the defense of the maritime frontier, these sums represented a substantial commitment to the northern frontier, where American activities were reactive. Only in time of crisis did defense measures more extensive than relying on the large population seem necessary.

On Lakes Ontario and Erie, both sides maintained vessels to patrol the frontier, transport troops, and thwart rebellious activities. The British reopened Kingston dockyard by April 1838, repurchasing three former war vessels from their civilian owners and converting other merchant vessels into gunboats, resulting in a force on Lake Ontario of three armed schooners and two steamers. On Lake Erie, Britain employed five steamers, three of them being American vessels. One of the three American vessels.

General Porter, was converted into a gunboat, christened H.M.S. Toronto, and used to patrol the Niagara frontier. These naval strengths on the lakes exceeded the limits imposed by the Rush-Bagot agreement, and the British government debated whether or not to modify or terminate the agreement given the changed state of affairs in North

America. ‘ '

Alarmed by British naval preparations on the lakes. Congress responded in May

1838 by considering the expediency of building “an armed steam vessel” on Lake Erie to enforce revenue regulations, uphold laws, preserve “the public peace,” and repel foreign invasions. After consultation with the president and the Treasury, War, and Navy

161 Departments, the House Committee on Naval Affairs recommended that the government

hire one steam vessel each for Lakes Ontario and Erie, to be manned and equipped so as

not to violate the Rush-Bagot agreement. Accordingly, Secretary Poinsett ordered

Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup on 9 June to charter two steamboats large enough to carry fifty men for use on the lakes. These vessels, the Telegraph on Lake Ontario and the Little Belt on Lake Erie, were maimed by their civilian crews and commanded by a naval officer. There was also the revenue cutter Erie on Lake Erie. Some residents on the northern frontier did not consider these measures to be adequate, however, because in

February 1839 Congress received petitions to build an armed steamer to secure the Upper

Lakes. These requests would later be granted with the construction of the Michigan in the 1840s. Nevertheless, the provision for two steamers on the lakes marked a change on the northern frontier, where the American fleets had been dismantled in the early 1820s.

The vessels allowed Scott and his subordinates to move troops quickly to threatened points along the troubled border, helping commanders to make the most of their limited resources and contributing greatly to eventual peace in the region.’*

In addition to arming vessels along the lakes, both the British and American governments took steps to increase their military presence along the turbulent frontier.

Britain sent reinforcements for its garrison in North America, so that by 1840 there were over 12,000 regular troops in the Canadas. During the same time period, the force of

Canadian militia and volunteers rose to over 21,000. On the American side, there was a movement to expand the regular army given the disturbances along the border.

Congressional advocates of a larger regular force pointed out that the troops were needed

162 to protect the northern and western frontiers and were superior to militia, given the current militia organization. Detractors, however, claimed that the people of the frontier could defend themselves. Virginia Representative John Robertson said that New York, with its population of over two million, was more than competent to enforce the civil laws without military assistance. He also felt that the good relations between the United

States and Britain meant that there was little threat of war. Vermont Representative

Horace Everett also felt that an army increase was unnecessary given the large population on the frontier. Furthermore, he feared that an enlarged army would require the enlistment of foreigners, and Everett did not want “Irishmen, Englishmen, and other aliens” defending his state. Supporters did get an increase in the regular army, passed in

July 1838, but it was a modest one, slightly increasing the size of infantry and artillery companies and authorizing an additional regiment, the 8th Infantry, commanded by

Colonel William J. Worth. Given fiscal realties and the drain caused by the war in

Florida, the army would thus have to make due on the northern frontier with limited means.'"

By shifting troops and posting the newly-raised 8th Infantry to the northern frontier, the United States increased its meager army presence along the tense border. In

June 1838, Poinsett directed Commanding General Alexander Macomb to take command of the troubled frontier in person with headquarters at Sackets Harbor. Once there,

Macomb was to collect all available troops and post them to the most vulnerable locations on the border. For example, the 8th Infantry patrolled the St. Lawrence frontier and manned passenger steamers for their protection. For the first time, regular troops

163 occupied many of the border’s vital chokepoints, both to enforce American neutrality and

to help defend against a possible British attack. The troops were not garrisoned in large

concentrations, but instead formed a screen along the frontier (table 5.1). The 8th

Infantry and 1st Artillery, 1,062 strong, manned positions at Hancock Barracks, the

Vermont frontier, Plattsburgh, Fort Covington, Sackets Harbor, Big Sodus Bay, and

Oswego. Farther west, the 2d Artillery, with 468 men, garrisoned posts at Rochester,

Fort Niagara, Buffalo, Detroit, and Fort Gratiot. By providing a more respectable

presence along the threatened frontiers, these troops met the demands of the residents of

the northern frontier for greater protection, demands that had continued for over two

decades. It was only in time of crisis that their pleas were heard.

Location 1838 1839 1840 Ft Sullivan —— 78 Hancock Barracks X 153 294 Plattsburgh —— 75 Madison Barracks X a) 141 Ft Ontario ——— Ft Niagara & $ Buflalo Æ X £ Detroit ;£ s X Ft Gratiot & s> X Ft Mackinac — — 80 Ft Brady 56 97 83 Ft Howard 41 86 66 Total 1,627 2,417 1,823 U.S. total 8,653 9,704 10,570 X 8th Infantry and 1st Artillery, 1.062 men, garrisoned Hancock Barracks, Vermont fixintier, Plattsburgh, FL Cosington, Sackets Harbor, Big Sodus Bay, and Oswego. X 2d Artillery, 468 men, garrisoned Rochester, Ft Niagara, Buffalo, and the Detroit frontier. 8th Infantry and 1st Artillery, 912 men, garrisoned Madison Barracks and its dependencies. X 2d Artillery, 687 men, garriâmed Rochester and the Niagara frontier. S' 4th Artillery, 482 mert garrisoned Cleveland, the Detroit frontier, and F t Gratiot '£} 2d Artillery, S27 men, garrisoned Rochester and the Niagara frontier. ® 4th Artillery, 479 mert garrisoned Cleveland, the Detroit frontier, and F t Gratiot. SOURCE: Reports of the Secretary of War. 1838: 25th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. /, \ol. 1, ser. 338, 130-34; 1839: 26th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 354, 70-79; 1840: 26th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 1, vol. 1, ser. 375, 44-53. U.S. totals are in Prucha, .4 Guide to the KUlitary Posts o f the United States, 143-44.

Table 5,1 : Number of froops posted on northern frontier, 1838-1840.

164 Increased appropriations also made new fort construction possible. Concerned especially by the deteriorating situation in Maine’s disputed Aroostook region, the Senate directed Secretary Poinsett in October 1837 to present a plan for the defense of the nation’s northern and eastern frontiers. Accordingly, Alexander Macomb sent Winfield

Scott to the Maine frontier to report on the most suitable means to defend the state borders. Scott recommended in December that if the goal were to possess the Aroostook region, to prevent Britain from doing so, or “to guard against check or disgrace,” there would have to be six regiments of infantry and artillery, about 5,000 men, in addition to the garrisons already present along the frontier. Divided into thirds, the troops should advance and take key positions. Two forces advancing from Hancock Barracks would seize points along the Temiscouata Route, and a third force, operating from high up on the Kemiebec and Penobscot Rivers, would seize a point along the highlands looking toward Quebec. Scott pointed out that such actions would, of course, “not fail to be regarded by G.B. as war,” at which point American operations would have to shift to a line between Lake Champlain and the St. Lawrence.'^

Poinsett’s plan for national defenses, submitted in January 1838, dealt mainly with seacoast matters, given the experience during the War of 1812. Warships from

Halifax and Bermuda threatened the Atlantic seaboard, while bases in the West Indies threatened the Gulf Coast. Poinsett described the frontiers as “exposed to insult and attack along their whole line,” the result of the inland frontier’s lack of “proper garrisons” and the fact that the seacoast forts were neither finished nor armed. In his report, Poinsett included the recommendations of Winfield Scott, who informed the

165 Secretary of War that the United States needed over 160 infantry and artillery companies to man the northern frontier in wartime from Maine to Wisconsin. Of this, one hundred companies were supposed to concentrate at Albany in preparation for the decisive thrust against the St. Lawrence. Poinsett was a great advocate of concentration for the small regular army, posting troops to a few select locations where they could serve as a rallying point for local militia and volunteers or march to threatened areas. In his annual report he stated that there was no other way that the regulars could defend the extensive national frontiers. Pending a detailed examination of the border area, Poinsett presented no other plan specific to the northern frontier, although he did inform Congress in March

1838 that the northern defenses needed to be repaired and enlarged if they were to restrain ''the lawless” and protect American soil from aggression. Although not detailed, the plan reflected traditional army thought, incorporating elements that would soon appear in later, more comprehensive plans. No matter where the crisis was on the border, the solution was to cut the British line of communications along the St.

Lawrence.

Despite the efforts of Scott and his counterparts on the Canadian side of the border, violence continued as the rebels made attacks along the frontier from Michigan to

Vermont. Secret societies in the United States continued to aid the rebels and provided the support that made many of the attacks possible. While British troops and Canadian militia managed to defeat the rebel attacks, incidents on the lakes further increased tensions. On 29 May 1838, a band of river pirates dressed as Indians burned the British steamboat Sir Robert Peel near the mouth of Lake Ontario. The attack, partly in

166 retaliation for the destruction of the Caroline, was also part of a plan to embroil the

United States and Britain in war. In response, Canadian militia at fired on the

American steamboat Telegraph on 2 June, but the Peel incident passed. Other rebel

attacks in Vermont and along the St. Lawrence also failed in November. Nowhere did

the rebels have the organization or resources to achieve their goals, which eased the

burden of American army officers endeavoring to maintain peace along the northern

frontier. Scott was once again ordered back to the border because of the renewed Patriot

disturbances, and he used his skills of persuasion at Detroit, Sandusky, Cleveland,

Buffalo, Oswego, Sackets Harbor, Ogdensburg, Plattsburgh, and northern Vermont. His

success at calming “the multitudes of frenzied citizens” eased tensions on both sides and

prevented war.'*

Meanwhile, there was the threat of an Anglo-American war in Maine, where there

had been conflicts since 1837. The so-called Aroostook War occurred when the Maine

legislature authorized the removal of trespassers from the Aroostook River region. By

January 1839 Maine authorities had detected 250 timber poachers in the area, and the

legislature sent a posse to expel them. When poachers captured one of the posse leaders and sent him to the jail at in New Brunswick, Governor asked the Maine legislature for 10,000 militia to deal with the “outrage.” The legislature approved the measure unanimously, appropriating $800,000 for the force and asking

Massachusetts for assistance. When the New Brunswick authorities condemned the posse’s operations as an invasion and called for enlistments in the provincial forces, the

“war” was on.

167 While the Maine militia forces were enthusiastic and ready to march north, there was opposition to war in the rest of the United States. The war scare had hurt the New

York stock market, there were fears that a war would kill thousands and destroy millions of dollars in property, and many observers insisted that Maine had started the conflict by illegally sending the posse to expel the British poachers. President Van Buren himself wanted to avoid war, criticizing Governor Fairfield for not gaining the cooperation of

New Brunswick officials in ousting the trespassers. War never broke out, however, due in part to the actions of Winfield Scott. Scott had been sent to Maine in February 1839 to ease tensions there. As the forces of each side conducted a phony war along the of the St. John River, Fairfield realized that he could not face Britain alone. Thus, on 25

March he agreed to Scott’s proposal that Maine withdraw its troops if New Brunswick did likewise. The troops went home, but permanent peace along Maine’s frontiers would only come with a boundary settlement.

Of course, the United States could not rely on Winfield Scott’s diplomatic skills to resolve every border crisis. Indeed, his presence was at least worth that of an entire army. There were thus many calls for more active measures to defend the northern frontier as a result of the Patriot Rebellion and Aroostook War. Contemporaries had no idea that there would not be an Anglo-American war, so the federal government, especially the War Department, took the first tentative steps ever to provide for tlie comprehensive defense of the northern frontier.

Secretary of War Poinsett met his obligation to present a plan for the defense of the northem frontier by sending Joseph Totten and Sylvanus Thayer to examine that

168 frontier and report on which points east of Lake Ontario immediately required military works. They presented their report in January 1839. Estimated to cost $1.18 million,

Totten’s recommendations called for repairs to the forts at Niagara and Oswego and the barracks at Sackets Harbor; one fort at Ogdensburg and another fort nearby on the narrows of the St. Lawrence; two forts on Lake Champlain to command the outlet; barracks at Plattsburgh and Albany; and a good macadam road from Plattsburgh to

Ogdensburg. Poinsett concurred with Totten’s report, recommending that Congress take

“prompt measures” to carry out the plans."'

Poinsett also sent Totten and Thayer to report on Maine’s defenses. Unable to visit the region, the officers relied on a report presented by General John Wool in

October 1838. Sent in the summer of 1838 to determine Maine’s defense requirements.

Wool selected a site for a military post to defend the northwest frontier of Maine near

Moose River, a settlement on the road to Quebec. In Wool’s view, the road was the only route British forces could use to penetrate Maine from Lower Canada. Dense forests prevented an invader from using any other avenue. Wool reported that Hancock Barracks was well suited for the defense of the northeast frontier of Maine, and he recommended sites for depots that formed the basis of Totten and Thayer’s report. Wool did not believe, however, that Britain would waste its resources fighting in Maine to gain a settlement of the boundary question. Instead, the British would attack American commerce, ports, naval depots, and frontier towns.

In a report submitted in February 1839, Totten gave Poinsett his recommendations for the defense of Maine. The separation of Maine from Lake

169 Champlain by miles of dense wilderness would seem to account for the separate

treatment of Maine’s defense needs by Totten and others. The works Totten proposed for

Maine would fulfill both offensive and defensive purposes, assisting an invasion of

British territory or preventing incursions by British naval raiders. First, Totten

recommended establishments at the confluence of both the Dead and Ketmebec Rivers and the Mattawamkeag and Penobscot Rivers, supported by a central arsenal at Bangor.

The former establishment would both assist in the defense of the Aroostook and threaten

New Brunswick. The latter post would threaten Quebec, supporting operations over the

Height of Land along the route used by Benedict Arnold in 1775. To stop British naval forces from making deep incursions into Maine, Totten also recommended forts on the

St. Croix at Calais, with supporting works at Eastport and on the Penobscot near

Bucksport that would protect Bangor from naval attack. Totten did not have enough information to make cost estimates or to suggest specific locations for posts, but the report did represent a comprehensive plan for the defense of Maine in case of war with

Britain. Whether or not the United States could provide the necessary troops, or funds for construction, remained to be seen."^

Totten’s plans for the northem frontier reflected the traditional contention that defense would be best served by taking prompt offensive action against Lower Canada.

Totten’s instructions to focus on works west of Fort Niagara are significant. Presumably, the existing defenses on the Detroit frontier were sufficient since decisive action would not occur there in any event. In Maine, American forces would act on the defensive or possibly conduct limited offensives against British posts in New Brunswick. The fort at

170 Niagara would assist the defense of the Niagara frontier, while a new fort at Oswego would protect both the harbor there and the outlet of the Oswego Canal, aiding the

American naval position on Lake Ontario. The remodeled barracks at Sackets Harbor would house troops that could defend the harbor and threaten the British base at

Kingston. The other works would assure that American forces could block British access to Upper Canada, providing sure defense, in the view of Totten at any rate, for the Great

Lakes region. The forts at Ogdensburg would prevent British vessels from ascending the

St. Lawrence, while the forts on Lake Champlain at Stony and Windmill Points would secure the use of the lake to American forces. Troops concentrated at Albany, the best inland position from which to support the entire line of the frontier, could use the

Plattsburgh-Ogdensburg road to threaten, or defend, any point on the St. Lawrence frontier. Fortifications were thus an essential component of an offensive plan for the defense of the northem frontier.

Convinced by the reports of the War Department and of Totten, who was by now the Chief of Engineers, Congress started to make the fortification appropriations that would make construction on the northem frontier possible (Appendix A). On the troubled Niagara frontier. Congress appropriated funds to make repairs to the crumbling defenses of Fort Niagara. The new construction there, designed by Totten and started in

August 1839, consisted of a timber-revetted and bastioned earthwork on the land side of the fort and a masonry wall on the river side to counter the British fortification of Fort

Mississauga. Totten also sent engineers to survey the old fort at Oswego for repairs.

Congress having appropriated funds for that site as well. In August 1839 construction

171 started on a bastioned earthwork overlooking the outlet of the Oswego Canal and the

dock at Oswego. Finally, to house the troops that would either defend the Lake Ontario

and St. Lawrence frontiers or, more likely, invade Canada and seize the St. Lawrence

line. Congress appropriated a total of $50,000 for the building and repair of Plattsburgh

Barracks and Madison Barracks at Sackets Harbor. Farther west, on the Detroit frontier.

Congress also appropriated $20,000 in 1840 for new barracks at Detroit. In Poinsett’s

view, the disturbed state of the frontier required the United States to maintain large

garrisons at key points, so “permanent and comfortable” barracks were necessary.

Crucial to the good health and morale of the soldiers, the barracks could be expected to

play a major role in any future conflict with Britain.'"*

Congress was reluctant, however, to appropriate funds for the defense of the outlet of Lake Champlain, the key to American strategic planning and the one location that most observers agreed needed permanent fortifications. Poinsett described the works there as “of essential importance.” Despite Totten’s assurances in November 1839 that surveys for works at the lake outlet were complete and a request of $50,000 to meet the cost of land and other initial expenses, there was not enough support for construction at the lake outlet. The international boundary remained uncertain, and few members of

Congress wanted to throw money at a project that could be rendered useless given a boundary change.'^

In order to convince a skeptical Congress, Totten and his engineers took another look at the defense of Lake Champlain. Assuming the loss of Rouses Point in any future boundary settlement, Totten focused his attention on the alternate sites farther south at

172 Stony and Windmill Points. Having no time to consider the matter or visit the lake,

Totten turned the project over to Sylvanus Thayer in January 1840. Totten gave Thayer the old surveys of Rouses, Stony, and Windmill Points and directed him to prepare a report on the best means of defending the lake outlet Thayer rejected a fort at Windmill

Point influenced, no doubt by the fact that it stood on the east shore, accessible only by water, and could easily be cut off from relief in case of British attack. Armed with

Thayer’s findings, Totten submitted his report in December 1840 recommending that a fort first be built at Stony Point on the west side of the lake outlet. The engineers estimated that the work would cost $268,000 and suggested an armament of seventy-five

24-pounder guns costing $49,323. These recommendations were by far the most ambitious for any site on the northem frontier, reflecting the importance of the Lake

Champlain outlet to American strategic planning. Totten admitted that another fort on

Windmill Point would be necessary to close the passage, but he felt that the Stony Point fort would for the time being “exercise a powerful control over the passage” and serve as a “point of support” for all operations on the Lake Champlain frontier. Despite a

$75,000 appropriation in September 1841, however (Appendix A), construction did not start, and then at a different location, until after the boundary settlement of 1842. The uncertain boundary line thus continued to exercise a powerful influence over the defense of the northem frontier.

While the engineers were making plans for the fortification of the northem frontier, they and other army officers were also making recommendations for how to fight a war with Britain. Secretary Poinsett requested that several officers present their

173 thoughts concerning a possible war over the disputed territory in Maine. Responding in

March 1839, Poinsett’s correspondents were confident about the prospects for success and relied on operations against the St. Lawrence to achieve success against Britain.

While the cause of the war might be the Maine boundary, American plarmers thus looked elsewhere for a decisive result.

In Adjutant General Roger Jones’s view, there would be 36,000 “drafted militia” available for the defense of the northem frontier, 6,000 at Bangor, Maine; 8,000 at

Plattsburgh and 6,000 at Albany; 4,000 at Sackets Harbor; 8,000 on the Niagara frontier; and 4,000 at Detroit. At the onset of war, the militia would act on the defensive on the crucial Maine, Lake Champlain, Niagara, and Detroit frontiers, while the regular troops concentrated for an offensive against the St. Lawrence. Presumably, the militia at

Plattsburgh, Sackets Harbor, and Albany would also assist the regulars in their operations against the British line of communications. Jones also recommended that the militia make demonstrations along the length of the frontier. Diversionary attacks “could not fail to hold the enemy in check everywhere in Canada,” since the British were aware that once an American army was on British soil “the mass of the disaffected would quickly rally around its standard.” Thus, Jones assumed that the United States could count on fifth column activity from Patriots and other rebels to augment the effects of an invasion.

Furthermore, while the British regular garrison in the Canadas of over 12,000 men exceeded the 9,700 or so men of the entire United States army, about 3,500 of whom were in Florida, the feints of the American militia could force the British to commit their

174 limited resources to the defense of the entire frontier. The Americans then could concentrate for a knockout blow along the weakened and over-extended British line."^

Joseph Totten presented a more detailed plan for war with Britain, one that incorporated many of the views expressed in his report of 1839 on the defense of the northem frontier. Totten recommended that there be no major operations in northeast

Maine or New Brunswick, wilderness areas not worth fighting for. He did realize that the

American people would not stand for the loss of territory, however. Totten thus suggested that the Maine militia be concentrated at selected positions that could support the “one great strategic movement” at the beginning of the war, the advance to the St.

Lawrence and the subsequent capture of Montreal and Quebec. Supported by the central arsenal at Bangor, militia at the confluence of the Mattawamkeag and Penobscot Rivers and the Dead and Ketmebec Rivers could threaten New Brunswick and Quebec respectively, keeping the British from shifting reinforcements to the St. Lawrence frontier. If the militia were “indisposed to a part this passive,” they could unite with the forces operating against Quebec or conduct limited offensives against New Brunswick.'*

Far more important, in Totten’s view, was the frontier along New York’s northem border, which he considered “the chief theatre of military operations. ” Between Maine and Lake Champlain the terrain was rough and sparsely settled, presenting few opportunities for defensive or offensive operations, so Totten saw no need to concentrate militia there. Instead, they could be marched to Maine or New York as needed. Of course, Totten felt that the control of Lake Champlain was crucial to the success of any

American operations. The lake and its tributary canals allowed the United States to draw

175 “any necessary amount of military means” from the “heart of the country” and direct them, in a very short period of time, “very near to the feeble point of the enemy,” the St.

Lawrence. Control of Lake Champlain was essential, because if the British gained control of the lake they could make a serious penetration into the interior and disrupt the decisive American offensive. Since regaining control of the lake would require an expensive naval buildup, the United States should fortify the outlet of the lake and assure

American control.

While militia could be used to defend key points and to make demonstrations along the frontier, they were unsuitable for the advance from Lake Champlain, in

Totten’s view. While the militia could be concentrated in Maine on the St. Croix,

Penobscot, and Kennebec Rivers, at Burlington and Plattsburgh, on the St. Lawrence, at

Oswego, Buffalo, and Detroit, and at depots on the Indian frontier, they could not be expected to conduct major offensive operations. The terrain south of Montreal was open and level, “perfectly adapted” to the operations of British regular troops. Even if militia forces were “prompt, bold, & persevering,” they would be unreliable on foreign soil and lacked the ability to face regular troops in the field. How, Totten asked, “could disorderly, unmanageable, alarmed, & unsheltered crowds oppose the rapid and unexpected deployments of masses of the finest infantry in the world upon flank and rear?” Totten obviously felt that the militia would be more useful fighting behind fortifications, a role in which they had excelled in the past.^°

Totten wanted regular troops to bear the brunt of operations along the St.

Lawrence and Lake Champlain frontiers. The thrust against the St. Lawrence could not

176 start, then, until enough American regulars concentrated in northem New York. In fact,

Totten recommended that “the great body” of the regulars on the northern frontier be sent there. Some regulars would garrison the works commanding the outlet of Lake

Champlain and others would be at Plattsburgh and Burlington, the main points of militia concentration, but most of the American regulars would be used for offensive operations.

Thanks to the superior American canal network, a large force of troops at Albany could threaten the entire frontier between Lakes Champlain and Erie, forcing the British to spread themselves thin and allowing a decisive American blow before the arrival of seaborne reinforcements. By placing temporary forts on the St. Lawrence near

Ogdensburg, American troops could command the river and support the main blow against British North America. The main blow, the advance to the St. Lawrence, could start in the east from Lake Champlain, in the west from the Chateaugay River, or by both routes. The macadam road from Plattsburgh to Sackets Harbor, recommended by Totten in his fortifications report of 1839, would give American commanders the choice of either invasion route and keep the British from anticipating where the blow would fall.^‘

Totten believed that naval supremacy on the lakes would provide the necessary security for the western reaches of the northem frontier. By controlling Lake Ontario, the

United States would avoid the need to post a large number of regulars there. In addition, the British would be unable to land troops at will along the lake’s shores. Totten recommended fortifications at Sackets Harbor, Oswego, the mouth of the Genesee River, and Fort Niagara. If the lake were under American control militia could occupy these posts, freeing regulars for operations elsewhere. Totten had little doubt that the United

177 States would dominate Lake Erie, due to its “superior naval means.” Only a few

important points, such as Buffalo and Detroit, would need a small garrison of regulars,

while volunteers and a few heavy guns would suffice for the lake’s defense.

Totten thus envisioned a quick and decisive conflict along the northem frontier,

one in which regulars delivered the knockout blow to the British provinces while militia

and volunteers provided local defense. At all times, Totten stressed, “the primary object

is to penetrate to Montreal,” to which all other considerations were subordinate. By building strong field works at the key chokepoints on the northern frontier, local militia could bear the brunt of defense along the northem frontier. Thus, the huge population advantage possessed by the United States made it impossible for the British to spread the war along the frontier and to force the Americans to spread their regulars thin. Indeed,

American citizen soldiers could even be used to conduct local attacks along the frontier, forcing the British to stretch their resources to the breaking point. In Totten’s opinion, the activities of the militia were a net gain to American forces. If successful, the militia attacks could support the main thrust by the regulars and shorten the war. If unsuccessful, the attacks at least tied up British resources and would not hurt the attack against the St. Lawrence. While fraught with danger and vulnerable to British counterattacks on the flanks, the American offensive launched from northem New York would, in Totten’s opinion, be the best way to bring a war over the disputed Maine boundary to a successful conclusion.

By far the most ambitious war plan was that of Quartermaster General Thomas

Jesup. An officer on the Detroit frontier during the War of 1812, Jesup had been

178 captured at Detroit, commanded the reserve at the Battle of the Thames, and commanded

a regiment at the battles of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane. Before the war and in late

1814, Jesup had presented the War Department with a plan to neutralize the Royal Navy,

destroy Britain’s global supremacy, and make the United States the world’s greatest

maritime power. Secretary of War James Monroe liked the plan and sent it to President

James Madison, who approved it; the war ended, however, before the government took

any further action. Jesup presented a similar plan to Secretary Poinsett in 1839.^“*

If war came with Britain, Jesup wanted to accomplish more than the elimination

of British North America; he wanted to fight a climactic war with Britain for global

commercial supremacy. Jesup had a reputation for impetuosity. While in command at

New Orleans in 1816, for example, he suggested an attack on Cuba and the seizure of

that island from the S p an ish .H e did not accept half measures. In Jesup’s view, Britain

was a formidable adversary, possessing great natural wealth, mechanical skills, a

productive population, and “the richest commerce in the world.” Although she had

“sublime military talent,” a strong island location, and overseas bases that dominated the

globe, Jesup detected a weakness in the British position. He believed that Britain only

went to war “for the interests of her commerce,” seeking commercial advantage at the

peace table. It was Britain’s awesome naval strength that made her both a world power and a commercial power, and this strength was due to her possession of the North

American provinces. An alternate source of hemp, timber, and other naval stores if the

Baltic Sea were cut off during a war, British North America was also a great nursery of daring seamen, important since naval superiority depended not on ships but on the sailors

179 to man them. Britain’s great source of power, then, was her ability to send out fleets

'"built rigged provisioned armed and manned through means at her exclusive disposal,” and the United States was the only nation that could interfere with this British asset.

American interference with Britain’s colonial position was a matter of national survival, in Jesup’s view, and required an all-out effort in case of war. He felt that the

British possessions placed “a powerful check upon us,” and British influence in Texas,

Mexico, and among the Indian tribes threatened the weakest flanks of the country. By seizing the British provinces, the United States could double its maritime resources, free itself forever from Indian difficulties, and render the defense of the northem frontier almost unnecessary. Britain’s power would then, decline in proportion to the American increase. In a war with Britain, Jesup felt that “it would be worse than suicidal to commit the peace of this country for paltry objects.” Presumably, he had the Maine border in mind. The stakes would be not just “a few millions of worthless acres,” but

“nothing short of the commercial and naval supremacy of the globe.” Jesup believed that the Americans had the means to achieve this goal, possessing financial resources second only to Britain’s. Only the lack of national will could prevent success, but Jesup felt that

“the magnitude of the object itself will cluster around it the whole moral energies of the

American people.”

In Jesup’s plan, American forces would be on the defensive along most of the frontiers, conducting only limited offensives. The maritime frontier could be defended by the existing forts, manned by regular artillerymen and local militia and supplemented by steam-powered batteries. Naval supremacy on the lakes would secure the northem

180 frontier. Dragoons and local militia and volunteers could defend the northem and western frontiers, and American forces could also conduct limited offensives on the

Detroit and Niagara frontiers. Two companies of regulars and 5,000 Michigan militia could defend the Detroit frontier, which would be further assisted by some of the 35,000

Canadian militia in Upper Canada, a third of whom were probably disaffected and would keep the loyalists in check. On the Niagara frontier, eight regular companies, 3,000 volunteers, and up to 10,000 Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York militia could seize the

Welland Canal.

Jesup’s plan for war built on the traditional strategy for an advance against the St.

Lawrence, but he also stressed the need for a simultaneous attack on the great naval base at Halifax. Powerful American forces would “carry the war into the enemy’s country and compel him to assume the defensive,” the most effective way to defend the United States and achieve a decisive result. Jesup estimated that the United States had 9,000 regulars,

45,000 12-month volunteers, and, if necessary, up to 500,000 militia available for offensive operations. In addition, the Americans could employ 10,000 Indians “for their moral effect” and could make use of discontented local residents, particularly among the

French population in Lower Canada. The United States should thus rapidly concentrate its forces and overwhelm the British by sheer numbers. First, the Americans should assemble two corps in northem New York, one corps of four regular regiments, 15,000 volunteers, and necessary militia on Lake Champlain, and one corps of one regular regiment, 10,000 volunteers, and necessary militia between the lake and Sackets Harbor.

These corps, acting together or separately, would cut the St. Lawrence between Montreal

181 and Quebec, and seize Montreal and the Rideau Canal. Jesup estimated that more than half of the 90,000 militia in Lower Canada were “disaffected.” They could both control the loyalists and support American operations with at least 20,000 men. Jesup stressed that it was important to make the inhabitants of Lower Canada friends, not enemies. This could be done by organizing a provisional government, headed by “the men of most influence in Canada,” and allowing the people to govern themselves. With Lower

Canada thus secured, American forces could then seize Quebec.

Meanwhile, four regular regiments, 16,000 volunteers, and the necessary militia from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine would concentrate in Maine and operate against New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Divided into two corps, one force would assemble near Eastport, cross the Bay of Fundy to Annapolis, and proceed to

Halifax. The other force would attack toward Fredericton, seize the isthmus separating

New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and cut Halifax off from reinforcement by land.

Although a small force would be needed to control the 12,000 New Brunswick and

25,000 Nova Scotia militiamen, most of whom were loyal, the American militia could secure occupied territory as the regulars moved forward to attack Halifax. Jesup was certain that the seizure of Halifax would ruin Britain’s position in North America, because the great naval station there was the only place where British fleets operating against the United States could recruit and refit. If Halifax fell to American forces, the

Royal Navy would have to rely on the home country, greatly complicating Britain’s logistical requirements and probably forcing an end to the conflict. Once British North

America was in American hands, Jesup predicted, the West Indies were sure to follow.

182 Could plans such as Totten’s and Jesup’s have worked? There were many

Americans who felt that a war would end in victory for the United States. For example,

Andrew Jackson was certain that if the war were “well conducted,” Britain would lose her North American possessions within three months. The British position was, no doubt, weak in many respects. The North American provinces were separated from the mother country by several thousand miles of ocean, hampering logistics and forcing

Britain to rely on the security of Halifax and Quebec to assure relief in time of war.

Furthermore, the main line of communication between the Canadas, the St. Lawrence, would also be the main fighting front and was very vulnerable to American attack. The

Royal Army was in a state of decay and in need of serious reform, hurt by Parliament’s favoritism toward the Navy and the Duke of Wellington’s unwillingness to tamper with a military machine that had proved successful enough at Waterloo in 1815. Officers played at soldiering and had little interest in professional development, the enlisted men were miserably equipped, and the army as a whole had little or no combat experience.

Along the northem frontier, the regular garrison of about 10,500, although larger than the

United States Army, was spread out and vulnerable to defeat in detail, and Canadian defenses were not as strong as they appeared. For example. West Point professor Dennis

Hart Mahan visited Quebec and reported in August 1839 that “the strength of the works was overrated,” as he expected. The Royal Navy was not the formidable force it had once been, and the British government was distracted by disputes with Russia and then

France in the eastern Mediterranean. Finally, the rebellions in the Canadas showed that a

183 significant portion of the population was unhappy about British control and could

possibly aid the American invader/^

An American invasion of British North America would be an operation fraught

with danger and uncertainty, however. First, raising the necessary troops might have

been difficult. The regular army in 1839 was only about 9,704 men, 3,478 of whom were

embroiled in the interminable conflict in Florida. Jesup’s call for 9,000 regulars seems

highly optimistic, given the demands of the Seminole War and garrison requirements on

the maritime and western frontiers, and it is unlikely that regular army recruits could

have been trained in time to perform any better than militia or volunteers. While citizen

soldiers would have been available in sufficient numbers to defend the frontiers, it is also

unlikely that they would have turned out in the numbers envisioned by Jesup, who estimated that 45,000 volimteers and up to 500,000 militia would be available for offensive operations. Assuming that no more than 4 percent of the population would turn out for military service, as was the case in 1861 when the stakes were higher and war

fever ran rampant, the northern frontier states had the potential to raise some 682,778 men for military service.N evertheless, the great question was whether or not the

United States had the will for a major struggle with Britain. There was much opposition to a war over the Aroostook region, and relying on traditional Anglophobia might not have been enough to fill the ranks of the invading armies.

Second, although Totten’s plan was more realistic, the British would obviously oppose an American advance against the St. Lawrence. While American forces could easily bypass Fort Lennox on the Isle aux Noix and the British fortifications on the St.

184 Lawrence were not formidable, the British could attack the flanks of the troops attempting to cross the St. Lawrence. The river is broad and deep and difficult to cross, and the British could use steamboats to fall on the invaders or to move men and materiel rapidly to threatened points, drawing troops from Upper Canada, Quebec, the Maritime

Provinces, and even Europe. Furthermore, the American forces would have to prevail in a battle in the open and level country south of the river, where the decisive battle would presumably be fought. Jesup’s plan also called for an attack on Halifax, incorporating a crossing of the fifty-mile-wide Bay of Fundy. The United States Navy would have had to achieve at least local superiority in the area, and Halifax was a formidable position, as engineer John G. Barnard reported after a reconnaissance. While American forces and their commanders later proved to be capable of amphibious movements and difficult overland campaigns during the Mexican War, the British would have probably proven to be more resourceful opponents.

Finally, success on the northem frontier would matter little if British naval raids reduced American seaports to ashes. The seacoast defenses were still incomplete and generally unarmed, and Britain had increased its naval presence on the North American and West Indian stations forty-one vessels by 1839, a force almost as large as the entire

United States Navy. From bases such as Halifax, Bermuda, and Jamaica, these naval forces threatened both the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The seacoast defenses might have proven unable to stop British raids, although there would probably have been a few successes as there had been at Baltimore in 1814. An Anglo-American war over Maine would have been similar to Britain’s situation during the Napoleonic Wars, with Britain

185 as the shark and the United States, instead of France, as the tiger. Neither side could have come to grips with the other and probably would have prevailed in their respective spheres."*”

Despite the difficulties, the war most likely would have gone better than the War of 1812 had for the United States. Instead of major operations in the west, there would only have been limited local offensives, in some cases meant only to harness the enthusiasm of the local citizen soldiers and keep them occupied. The American superiority in manpower and industrial output, coupled with an excellent system of internal improvements, provided the opportunity for decisive action against the vulnerable British line of communications. The question remained, however, whether or not American success against the St. Lawrence was sufficient to gain a satisfactory peace settlement from Britain. The British learned from Montcalm’s failure in 1759 and

Carleton’s success in 1775-1776 that the best way to keep the lifeline open to Europe was to take shelter behind Quebec’s walls and await relief. While the United States could cut the trunk of the Canadian tree near Montreal, could it remove the stump at Quebec in time and prevent British reinforcements from taking back all that had been lost, as had happened in 1776? Fortunately, there was no Anglo-American war, a conflict that some

Oswego residents had said would be “a calamity to the world.”"*' Britain wanted to avoid war, fearing that France could take advantage of the distraction. Peace was a far more satisfactory condition for two great commercial powers such as Britain and the United

States.

186 While Britain and the United States remained at peace despite the tensions in the

Canadas and in Maine, British military preparations on the northem frontier alarmed many Americans. Both sides maintained large garrisons on the frontier, and although these garrisons served defensive purposes, both the Americans and the British viewed the other side’s troops as an offensive threat. Michigan Senator John Norvell declared that while the British were “amusing us with negotiations” they were also actively preparing for offensive and defensive operations along the northem frontier. Meanwhile, the

Americans “were slumbering at our posts, unarmed, and without defence.” Norvell felt that it was time to awaken “from this dangerous repose” and determine the extent o f

British activities, especially on the Detroit frontier. Accordingly, in March 1840 the

Senate resolved that the president must present a report on British naval and military preparations on the northem frontier. The response, prepared by Winfield Scott, presented the alarming news that the British were building or strengthening forts on the northem frontier as far west as Detroit. Furthermore, Scott reported that Britain had

“numerous corps of well-organized and well-instmcted militia” and more than 20,000 o f her best regular troops in her North American provinces. Although many of the British forts were mere blockhouses or gim towers and in need of major repairs,"*^ British activity alarmed many Americans on the northem frontier, particularly in the west where there had been few defensive preparations other than the construction of barracks at Detroit. It appeared as if there were indeed a widespread threat along the frontier, and concemed citizens pressed Congress for defensive measures on their behalf. The Michigan legislature, concemed that Detroit was “immediately exposed to the devastations of the

187 enemy,” petitioned Congress in April 1840 for suitable defenses to protect that “naked and unprotected” city. In July, Detroit residents presented a petition for a railroad connecting their city with Ohio. Since British forts commanded the Detroit River and blocked water access to the city, building a railroad safe from interdiction would provide secure communication with the rest of the country.

Scott’s report, the simmering uiu’est in British North America, and the petitions of a worried citizemy prompted Congress to commit itself to the defense of the entire northern frontier. Some congressmen did, however, believe that war with Britain was impossible. South Carolina Representative Waddy Thompson felt that forts were a waste of money and that the nation could prepare for war in time anyway. The nation could rely on “the stout hearts and strong hands” of the citizen soldier as Andrew Jackson had at New Orleans in 1815. Nevertheless, enough congressmen agreed with Representative

Henry Wise of Virginia, who believed that every part of the frontier was “exposed to

British aggression and British bayonets,” to support at least some attention to the nation’s frontier defenses. No longer would the government accept only naval supremacy and the advance to the St. Lawrence as acceptable substitutes for a respectable military presence on the Upper Lakes. In March 1839 the Senate had already requested reports on the military and naval defense of the country. By the time the report was submitted to

Congress in April 1840, many Congressmen were willing to expend the funds necessary to build at least part of the fortification system recommended by the engineers.^

Directed to present a plan. Secretary Poinsett convened a board of army officers to address the defense of the nation’s frontiers, consisting of engineers Joseph Totten and

188 Syîvanus Thayer, Assistant Quartermaster General Trueman Cross, and ordnance officer

George Talcott. Their report emphasized the maritime frontiers, estimating that 135 forts armed with 10,538 guns, costing $33,440,965, would be necessary to defend the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Ninety-seven of the report’s 115 pages in fact dealt with seacoast defenses. The board did address the northern and western frontiers as well, however, and in their “Report on the Northern Frontier,” the officers presented a plan for fifteen forts armed with 555 guns, costing $2.16 million. Stressing that the northern frontier was maritime in many of its features, Totten and the others urged that the border had to be defended in a similar manner to the seacoast. Since naval supremacy would be crucial and both sides would struggle to attain it, it was crucial to fortify the lake harbors and the important chokepoints on the frontier. Otherwise, the British would be able to occupy

American harbors, destroy the towns on the Great Lakes, and control the lake commerce.

To support the border, the board recommended arsenals at Detroit, Pittsburgh, Rome and

Watervliet in New York, Vergennes in Vermont, Augusta in Maine, and Watertown in

Massachusetts. The board emphasized, however, that it was of “vast importance” to be prepared not only for defense along the northern frontier but also for offense, the only way to act “with decisive effect” in a conflict. Therefore, the drive to the St. Lawrence still played the most important role in the defense of the northern frontier."*^

The report on the northern frontier was the first comprehensive examination of the entire length of the international boundary with British North America and provided the basis for future fort construction. While the locations identified never received their proposed armament and few received permanent defenses, the report did highlight the

189 key chokepoints on the northern frontier, most of which received some form of fortification by the 1850s. What Totten’s board proposed, however, were permanent fortifications for those chokepoints (table 5.2). On the Upper Lakes, with the exception of Detroit and the old British fort at Mackinac, army installations would remain simple .

Location Cost{S) Guns Carronades Mortars Fl Brady 75,000 8 2 2 Fl Mackinac 50,000 8 ■> 2 Fl Gratiot 50,000 8 2 2 Detroit 100,000 18 4 4 Detroit Barracks 150,000 Bufialo 150,000 18 4 4 Ft Niagara 65,000 24 4 8 Oswego 45,000 25 4 8 Sackets Harbor 75,000 18 4 4 Ogdensburg 100,000 18 4 4 Stony Point 300,000 82 20 12 12 Windmill Point 300,000 82 20 12 12 Plattsburgh 150,000 12 4 2 Albany 300,000 Kennebec River 75,000 16 6 2 Penobscot River 75,000 16 6 2 Calais 100,000 16 6 2 Total 2,160,000 369 40 76 70 SOURCE: “A report fixim the Secretary' of War, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate, in relation to the military and natal defences of the coimtry," 24 Apnl 1840,26th Cong., 1st sess , Sen. Doc. 4SI. vol. 7, ser. 360,98-105.

Table 5.2: Military installations recommended for northern frontier, 1840.

At the chokepoints on the Upper Lakes, Totten’s board recommended a fort at the

Falls of St. Mary m order to control communication between Lakes Huron and Superior, protect the local settlements, and to serve as a rallying point for the local militia. While there was already a stockade and barracks at Fort Brady, the post was in decay and subject to periodic flooding,'*^ New construction was thus in order. At Mackinac there

190 should be a new fort to control the straits between Lakes Michigan and Huron and to protect “the rich and productive States” on Lake Michigan’s shores. Finally, at the foot of Lake Huron, there should be a fort to control communication between Lakes St. Clair and Huron, protect the local settlements, and serve as a militia rallying point; the crumbling stockade of Fort Gratiot was not sufficient. While troops of the 5th Infantry and 4th Artillery occupied these locations in 1840, no permanent fortifications were ever built there. Sault Ste. Marie and Mackinac were just too far removed from the major centers of population to receive permanent defenses.

The board considered Detroit a crucial location on the lake frontier, because the city would be a point of troop concentration for both defensive and offensive operations along the Detroit frontier. The center of the upper section of the northern frontier,

Detroit needed a fort and barracks large enough for a regiment that could harass Upper

Canada. While the main operations should be directed at the enemy’s “vital points” farther down the line, the board reported that it might be “expedient” to conduct operations in the west to divert the attention of British forces. Congress did indeed appropriate $20,000 for barracks at Detroit, far short of the board estimate of $150,000, and in 1841 set aside $50,000 for a new permanent fortification as well (Appendix A).

The Detroit frontier thus started to receive the attention that many of its residents felt it deserved."*^

On the Niagara frontier, the board recommended a field work and barracks near

Buffalo. The city’s “wealth and commercial importance” and proximity to the border rendered it a likely target in time of war, and a fort there could serve as a base for

191 diversionary raids across the . Congress was convinced and started making appropriations for the site in 1841 (Appendix A). At Fort Niagara, there should be a new fort to command the entrance to the Niagara River and to protect the harbor, a crucial consideration since the British were sure to make naval preparations on Lake Ontario.

Given the fort’s importance, the appropriations that had started in 1838 continued through the 1840s (Appendix A), and the post remained garrisoned by elements of the 2d

Artillery.

On Lake Ontario, the board proposed a fort at Oswego to protect the harbor and provide a secure refuge to American vessels. Given its location on the Oswego Canal, the town was an important part of the inland water communications of the United States and was thus a likely target of British naval attack. The town also had important shipbuilding capabilities and could serve as a depot, helping assure American naval supremacy on the lake. Work had already started on a fort at Oswego in response to the

Patriot affair, and appropriations continued (Appendix A). Sackets Harbor was also a likely war depot and had an excellent harbor. Directly across the lake from the British naval base at Kingston, Sackets Harbor would also be a concentration point for troops operating on that frontier and defending the naval depot. While the board considered the barracks there to be sufficient, the location needed a fort to cover the harbor approaches.

Congress was not convinced and did not make the necessary appropriations, although two companies of the 2d Artillery remained there in 1840.

But of all the key locations on the northern frontier, the outlet of Lake Champlain remained the most important. The board emphasized the importance of cutting the St.

192 Lawrence line of communications, proposing a fort at the narrows below Ogdensburg to block communication between Montreal and Kingston, and thus the officers wanted to secure the use of Lake Champlain to American forces operating in northern New York.

While the fort at the Ogdensburg narrows was never built, the government eventually devoted large resources to the defense of Lake Champlain. In the board’s opinion, the pass into the lake was the most important fortified location of any projected for the entire northern frontier. If unfortified, the lake would allow the British to carry the war deep within American territory. If under American control, the lake would be the most effective line over which to attack the British possessions. Two forts, at Stony and

Windmill Points, would effectively close the outlet to the British and secure the lake “as the great channel by which our troops and supplies may be rapidly thrown forward to” the St. Lawrence.

The proposal for the defense of Lake Champlain reflected the important role the lake played in American strategy. Each fort would cost $300,000, actually a modest sum compared to the seacoast defenses, and would mount 126 guns, sixty-four of them being

24-pounders, the largest guns on the northern frontier. These forts were never built, and plans for the outlet’s defense changed once the boundary was settled in 1842. To support troops using the Champlain-Richelieu line to attack the St. Lawrence, the board also proposed barracks and a depot for Plattsburgh and “a great central station” at Albany.

Plattsburgh would be the point of concentration prior to offensive operations and the location of the reserve; a company of the 1st Artillery was already stationed there, and

Congress appropriated $20,000 for work on the barracks. In addition, a major depot at

193 Albany would support the frontier defenses. Albany was remote enough from the border to be secure but close enough to support operations on the northern frontier. Possessing excellent communications by steamboat, canal, and railroad with the rest of the country,

Albany made it possible for the nation's resources to be marshaled for the defense of the northern frontier. From there, troops could be moved to any point between Detroit and the New England coast and strike at several locations on the border without giving any indication as to the true point of attack. The Albany depot was never built, but the board’s report demonstrated that internal improvements would play a major role in the decisive thrust against the St. Lawrence and supporting operations, helping American commanders keep British forces off guard and forcing the enemy to spread his resources thinly along the border.

Finally, the board reported that Maine required no fortifications other than a work at Calais. East of Lake Champlain, the frontier was no longer along lakes and thus could not be secured by naval supremacy. An inland frontier, the Maine boundary would best be defended by a mobile force that could assume the offensive if necessary. The board recommended two depots at the heads of navigation on the Kennebec and Penobscot

Rivers to support the mobile forces, while a fort at the advanced position of Calais would threaten the rear of any British penetration into the state of Maine. Although six companies of the 1st Artillery occupied Hancock Barracks, none of the proposed works were ever built.

The report of Totten’s board in 1840 thus built on much of what Totten himself had recommended in 1839, but there was a crucial difference. First, the report was the

194 first comprehensive plan for the defense of the northern frontier. While the proposed

forts served local defense needs, they also either made possible, or supported, the

decisive thrust to the St. Lawrence, the key to American strategy in the first place.

Second, while previous reports concentrated on the decisive thrust against the St.

Lawrence, public pressure and British activities along the length of the border forced the

War Department to consider the defense of the entire northern frontier. This concern

remained on paper for the most part, however. While the board had recommended

permanent fortifications for all of the important locations along the frontier, only five

sites would receive the proposed work. The outlet of Lake Champlain, Oswego, Fort

Niagara, Buffalo, and Detroit all received permanent fortifications in the last decades

before the Civil War, reflecting the War Department’s insistence on focusing most

attention to offensive action along the northern New York border. Fortifications at the

outlet of Lake Champlain would assure the use of that lake to American forces and assist

in the advance to the St. Lawrence, while the other four forts protected important

population centers, chokepoints, and harbors. As had been the case previously, offensive

action would be the best guarantee of the northern frontier’s safety, but now the residents

of the two largest towns on the lakes, Buffalo and Detroit, could see tangible evidence of

the government’s concern for their safety. Unfortunately for the state of good Anglo-

American relations, the Patriot crisis was not over and the boundary issue remained

unresolved. These factors would contribute to continued, albeit fleeting, interest in the defense of the northern frontier.

195 * * Joseph G. Totten to Joel Poinsett, 21 March 1839, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 4, 48-49.

^ This account of the Patriot Rebellion follows Albert B. Corey, The Crisis o f 1830-1842 in Canadian- American Relations (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1941). For the response of the United States Army to the crisis, see Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York: Macmillan, 1969; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 311-18. For the influence of “reform mania” on American support for the Patriot Rebellion, see Wilson P. Shortridge, “The Canadian-American Frontier during the Rebellion of 1837-1838,” Canadian Historical Review 1 (March 1926): 13-26.

^ “Annual Report of the Secretary of War,” 5 December 1837, in ASPMA 7, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 745, ser. 22, 594-98.

H.W. Rogers to Martin Van Buren, 30 December 1837, in “Northern Frontier,” 25th Cong., 2d sess.. H ouse Doc. 73, ser. 323. For the petitions of Niagara frontier residents, see “Memorial Adopted by a Meeting of the Citizens of Erie County,” 12 February 1838, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 248, vol. 8, ser. 328, and “Memorial of Citizens of Niagara County,” 19 February 1838, in ASPMA 7, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 786, ser. 22.

* Van Buren’s request for greater executive power to enforce American neutrality received much support from the Senate, notably from Henry Clay and John Calhoun; see Congressional Globe, 25th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 6 (Washington: Blair and Rives, 1838), 79. Residents on the northern frontier, however, saw the neutrality laws as dangerous and arbitrary, infringements on the rights of Americans to aid those who were engaged in a struggle for liberty; see “Petition and Protest of 187 Inhabitants of Montpelier, Vermont,” 19 February 1838, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 193, vol. 7, ser. 327, and “Memorial of a Number of Citizens of Portage County, Ohio,” 2 March 1839, 25th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. 303, vol. 5, ser. 342.

* For Poinsett’s instructions to General Scott and Governor Marcy, see “Northern Frontier,” 25th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 73, vol. 3, ser. 323. For his tenure as Secretary of War, see J. Fred Rippy, J o el R. Poinsett, Versatile American (Durham: Duke University Press, 1935; reprint. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 167-96,

’’ C P Stacey, “A Private Report of General Winfield Scott on the Border Situation in 1839,” Canadian Historical Review 21 (December 1940): 408. For Scott’s account of his activities during the Patriot crisis, see Winfield %cqxs.. Memoirs o f Lieut-General Scott, LL.D., Written by Himself, vol. 1 (New York: Sheldon & Co., 1864), 305-17.

* For Brady’s activities at Detroit, see Francis Paul Prucha, “Reports of General Brady on the ,” Canadian Historical Review 31 (March 1950): 56-68.

’ “Northeastern Boundary,” 29 March 1837, 25th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 31, vol. 1, ser. 311, and “Message from the Governor, and Resolutions of the Legislature, of Maine,” 22 March 1838, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 422, vol. 5, ser. 318; “Memorial Adopted by a Meeting of the Citizens of Erie County,” 12 February 1838, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 248, vol. 8, ser. 328; “Application of the Inhabitants of Oswego County,” 14 February 1838, \n ASPMA 7, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 785, ser. 22.

For appropriations in 1838, see “Report from the Secretary of War,” 25th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. 94, vol. 2, ser. 339; for 1839, see “Appropriations and Expenditures—War Department—for 1839,” 26th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 107, vol. 3, ser. 365.

196 “ J. Mackay Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871 (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1968), 134-36; H A. Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: The Battle of the Windmill and Afterward, 1838- 1842,” American Neptune 8 (January 1948): 37-38. For the fortifications of Kingston, see George F.G. Stanley, “Kingston and the Defence o f British North America,” in To Preserve & Defend: Essays on Kingston in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Gerald Tulchinsky (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1976), 94-101, and W.A. LaveU, “History of the Present Fortifications at Kingston,” Papers and Records o f the Ontario Historical Society 31 (1936): 155-77.

“Steam Vessels on Lake Erie and Lake Ontario,” 25th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 1018, vol. 4, ser. 336; Joel Poinsett to Quartermaster GeneraL 9 June 1838, NA, RG 92, Consolidated Correspondence File, 1794- 1915, entry 225, box 266, “Canadian Troubles;” Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: The Battle of the Windmill and Afterward, 1838-1842,” 37-38. For petitions concerning an armed steamer for the Upper Lakes, see “Petition of a Number of Citizens upon the Northern and Western Frontiers,” 4 February 1839, 25th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. 181, vol. 3, ser. 340, and “Resolutions o f the General Assembly of Michigan, in favor of the construction of a steam revenue cutter, to be employed on the Northern Lakes,” 8 February 1839, 25th Cong., 3d sess., Setu Doc. 240, vol. 3, ser. 340. The House Committee on Roads and Canals also recommended in January 1838 that a canal around Niagara Falls was needed more than ever since the current tensions closed the Welland Canal to American citizens; see “Ship Canal around the Falls of Niagara,” 25 January 1838, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 463, vol. 2, ser. 334.

For British troop strengths, see Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 137. For the debate over regular army expansion, see The Congressional Globe, 25th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 6 (Washington: Blair and Rives, 1838), 482-89, and Prucha, The Sword of the Republic, 333-37. Everett’s fears of an army dominated by foreigners were not idle ones. For example, when Inspector General George Croghan visited Fort Brady in September 1838, he found that thirty-two of the fifty-two men there were foreigners whose English could scarcely be understood; see Francis Paul Prucha, ed.. Army Life on the Western Frontier: Selections from the Official Reports Made Between 1826 and 1845 by Colonel George Croghan (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 141-42.

Corey, The Crisis o f 1830-1842, 97; Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 135; Edward S. Wallace, General William Jenkins Worth: Monterey's Forgotten Hero (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1953), 43-44; “Report of the Secretary of War,” November 1838, 25th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 338, 130-34.

“A Plan for the Protection of the North and Eastern Boundary of the United States,” 10 January 1838, in ASPMA 7, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 761, ser. 22; Winfield Scott to Alexander Macomb, 21 October 1837 and 8 December 1837, NA, RG 393, Correspondence, Eastern Division and Department, Box 43, Entry 1355.

Both Secretaries of War and Chiefs of Ordnance had long requested more money to complete the armament of the seacoast forts. For example, in 1829 the ordnance chief Colonel George Bomford, reported that a SI00,000 aimual appropriation for fort ordnance would never be enough to provide the 2,587 guns, costing $2 million, needed at the sixteen forts that were then at or near completion; see “Armual Report of the Secretary of War,” 8 December 1829, in ASPMA 4, 21st Cong., 1st sess.. No. 410, ser. 19, 188-92. When Inspector General George Croghan examined the seacoast forts fi’om New York to Maine in 1828, he described them as “in a most wretched condition, not a single post along the whole line, with the exception of Fort Independence [Boston] perhaps, being able to protect itself against the insults of even an armed brig;” see Prucha, Army Life on the Western Frontier, 12-13. The deficiency in fort ordnance was a problem that continued through the Civil War. For an alternate contemporary view, disagreeing with the assertion that the national defenses were in a weak state, see “Coast Defence,” North American Review 5 1 (July 1840): 158-72.

197 ” “A Plan for the Protection of the North and Eastern Boundary of the United States,” 10 January 1838, in ASPMA 7, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 761, ser. 22; Secretary of War Poinsett to Speaker James K. Polk, 5 March 1838, in “Defences—Frontiers,” 25th Cong., 2d sess., Hotise Doc. 199, vol. 7, ser. 327. For Poinsett’s thoughts on the concentration of the regular army, see Prucha, The Sword o f the Republic, 353.

“British Steamboat Sir Robert Peel and American Steamboat Telegraph,” 25th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 440, vol. 11, ser. 331; Scott, M emoirs, vol. 2, 331-54. For Vermont’s role in the Patriot disturbances, see John Dufiy and H. Nicholas Muller, “The Great Wolf Hunt: The Popular Response in Vermont to the Patriote Uprising of 1837,” Journal o f American Studies 8 (August 1974): 153-69.

David Lowenthal, “The Maine Press and the Aroostook War,” Canadian Historical Review 32 (December 1951): 316-19.

“ Ibid., 322-35; Scott, Memoirs, vol. 2, 331-54.

“Defence Northern and Western Frontier,” 12 January 1839, 25th Cong., 3d sess., Hotise Doc. 117, vol. 3, ser. 346; James W. Kershner, Sylvanus Thayer: A Biography (New York: Amo Press, 1982), 260.

“The defence of the frontier of Maine,” 30 October 1838, 25th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. 35, vol. 2, ser. 339.

“ Joseph G. Totten to Joel Poinsett, 20 February 1839, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 5, 20-24, also reprinted in “Documents relating to the defence of the northeastern frontier of the United States,” 20 February 1839, 25th Cong., 3d sess.. Sett. Doc. 251, vol. 3, ser. 340; Kershner, Sylvatms Thayer, 261.

“Report from the Secretary of War,” 25th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. 94, vol. 2, ser. 339; “Appropriations and Expenditures—War Department—for 1839,” 26th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 107, vol. 3, ser. 365; “Report from the Secretary of War,” 26th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 103, vol. 3, ser. 377. For Totten’s plans of Fort Niagara, see “Plan of Fort Niagara,” July 1839, in NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 3-14; for Totten’s instructions to the surveyors of the fort at Oswego, see Joseph G. Totten to J. Abert, 13 March 1839, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 5, 29. For Poinsett’s views on the importance of good barrack accommodation, see “Report of the Secretary of War,” 30 November 1839, 26th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 1, vol. 1, ser. 354, 41-42. The quality of barracks was a serious concern, because in the opinion of the surgeon general, “whilst our troops are better paid, fed, and clothed, they are worse quartered than those of any other nation;” see Thomas Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States, Compiled from the Records o f the Surgeon General's and Adjutant General's Offices—Embracing a Period o f Twenty Years, from January, 1819, to Jarmary 1839, compiled by Samuel Forry (Washington. Jacob Gideon, 1840), 69.

Poinsett, in “Report of the Secretary of War,” 30 November 1839, 26th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 1, vol. 1, ser. 354, 41-42; “Appropriations for Fortifications—Explanations of Estimates,” 26th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 164, vol. 4, ser. 366.

Joseph G. Totten to Sylvanus Thayer, 2 January 1840, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 5, 121; Kershner, Sylvanus Thayer, 264-65. For Totten’s description of the proposed Stony Point site, see “Survey of a site for fortifications on Lake Champlain,” 17 December 1840, 26th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 34, vol. 2, ser. 376. For plans of the proposed fort at Stony Point, see Montgomery C. Meigs, “Project for the Defence of Rouse’s Point,” 24 August 1840, in NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawers 7-8 and 7-11; Meigs’s plans depict a work in the shape of an irregular pentagon, defended at the angles by either or tower , with two tiers of guns, one of those tiers being casemated.

198 ^ Roger Jones to Secretary of War, 11 March 1839, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Received, 1832-41, entry 21, box 1, J-6. For United States Army strength in Florida in 1839, see “Report of the Secretary of War,” November 1839, 26th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 354, 70-79.

28 Joseph G. Totten to Joel Poinsett, 21 March 1839, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 4, 36-38.

® Ibid., 38-42.

30 Ibid., 41-42, 51.

" Ibid., 41-44.

" Ibid., 44-46.

" Ibid., 48-49.

” For Jesup’s War of 1812 plans, see Chester L. KiefiFer, Maligned General: The Biography o f Thomas Sidney Jesup (San Rafael, Ca.: Press, 1979), 44-46.

William B Skelton, An American Profession o f Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 329.

Jesup’s plan is in Thomas Jesup to Secretary of War, 21 March 1839, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Received, 1832-41, entry 21, box 1, J-5.

Andrew Jackson to William Lewis, 29 May 1839, in John S. Bassett, ed.. Correspondence o f Andrew Jackson, Vol. 6, 1839-1845 (Washington: The Carnegie Institution, 1933), 16; Richard L. Blanco, “Reform and Wellington’s Post Waterloo Army, 1815-1854,” Military Affairs 29 (Fall 1965): 123-31. For Mahan’s assessment of the strength of Quebec, see D.H. Mahan to anon., 21 August 1839, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, D-113-32. Mahan did admit the natural position was strong and, if strengthened by field works, could hold out for a long time.

Based on 4 percent of the estimated population for 1840 in Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1 (Washington: GPO, 1975), 24-37 and A Century o f Population Growth from the First Census of the United States to the Twelfth, 1790-1900 (Washington: GPO, 1909; reprint. New York: Johnson Reprint, 1966), 57.

Totten did recognize some of these difficulties; see Joseph G. Totten to Joel Poinsett, 21 March 1839, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 4, 40-41. For Barnard’s assessment of the strength of Halifax, see John G. Barnard to Joseph G. Totten, “Report of the Defences of Halifax,” 23 May 1839, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, D-113-26. Barnard reported that the defenses were too strong and the approaches too difficult for anything less than a major attack “in force.”

^ For British naval strengths, see C J Bartlett, Great Britain cmd Sea Power, 1815-1853 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 341. For American naval strengths, see “Report from the Secretary of the Navy,” 30 November 1839, 26th Cong., 1st sess.. Senate Document 1, vol. 1, ser. 354, 531-33, 571-73.

“Application of the Inhabitants of Oswego County, New York, for an Inquiry into the Expediency of Repairing and Arming the Military Positions at Oswego,” 14 February 1838, in ASPMA 7, 25th Cong., 2d sess.. No. 785, ser. 22.

199 See, for example, Dennis Carter-Edwards, Fort Malden: A Structural Narrative History, 1796-1976 (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1980), David Flemming, Fort Mississauga, Ontario (1814-1972) (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1982), Robert J. Bums, Fort Wellington: A Narrative and Structural History, 1812-38 (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1979), and André Charbonneau, The Fortifications of île aux Noix: A Portrait o f the Defensive Strategy on the Upper Richelieu Border in the 18th and 19th Centuries (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1994). The most formidable fortifications were at Kingston, Quebec, and Halifax.

John Norvell, in The Congressional Globe, 26th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 8 (Washington: Blair and Rives, 1840), 262-63; “Information in relation to the military preparations of the British authorities on the northern frontier,” 23 March 1840, 26th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 346, vol. 6, ser. 359; “Resolutions of the Legislature of Michigan, to obtain an appropriation for the erection of military defences for the protection of the city of Detroit,” 1 April 1840, 26th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 377, vol. 6, ser. 359; E.G. Campbell, “Railroads in National Defense, 1829-1848,” AZ/ss/Jsrp/?/ Valley Historical Review 27 (1940): 368.

** For the debate in the House about the necessary means to place the northern and northeastern frontiers “in a proper and permanent state of defence,” see The Congressional Globe, 26th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 8 (Washington: Blair and Rives, 1840), 311-13.

“Report on the Northern Frontier,” in “A report from the Secretary of War, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate, in relation to the military and naval defences of the country,” 24 April 1840, 26th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 451, vol. 7, ser. 360, 98-105. The board recommended no regular fortifications for the western frontier, advocating fifteen lightly-defended posts armed with 151 light guns, costing $895,000. The report included an estimate for defended quarters for 400 men and nineteen light guns, costing $50,000, at the western end of Lake Superior.

■** Inspection of 12 September 1838, in Prucha, Army Life on the Western Frontier, 46-47.

“Report from the Secretary of War,” 26th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 103, vol. 3, ser. 377.

200 CHAPTERS

BORDER TENSIONS AND THE BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT, 1841-1842

In 1842, in the administration o f Mr. Tyler, the dispute was settled, and settled satisfactorily. - , 6 April 1846'

Although the Aroostook War had ended peacefully and the Patriot troubles had subsided by the end of the 1830s, residents of the northern frontier and their representatives remained interested in the border’s defenses. During the early 1840s, conflict continued along the border. Conflict continued in Maine, and the Patriot troubles reared their ugly head again during the McLeod affair, threatening to embroil the northern frontier in war. During the War of 1812, the northern frontier was mainly a wilderness, but after the war settlers poured in. The Great Lakes boasted large American towns, prosperous farms, significant industry, and a growing population, all of which seemed to be defenseless against possible British attack. For instance, Chicago experienced tremendous growth between 1830 and 1850, aided by the Erie Canal, steam navigation on the lakes, and the rapid growth of Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois.

Developing from the tiny military settlement at Fort Dearborn to a thriving commercial metropolis, it was one of the fastest growing cities in the western world.' Despite the

201 boundary settlement of 1842, which removed one bone of contention between Britain and the United States, the residents of the border cities continued to demand defensive measures against the British enemy, resulting in new fort construction and naval preparations in the 1840s. While the War Department’s focus remained on the defense of Lake Champlain and the decisive offensive against the St. Lawrence, the concerns of the Upper Lakes region started to play a more prominent role in the defense of the northern frontier.

These persistent concerns for the defense of the northern frontier stemmed from two disputes, one in Maine and the other on the Niagara frontier. In Maine, trouble continued in the Aroostook region, despite Winfield Scott’s success at defusing tensions back in March 1839. Once again, there was a threat of violence as both Maine and New

Brunswick officials tried to assert jurisdiction in the shadowy boundary area, this time the Madawaska settlements along the St. John River. Britain warned Maine posses to stay out of the area, and the United States warned the British to remove their troops. As excitement increased along the border, the local dispute threatened to bring about an international crisis. Maine Governor Edward Kent and the state legislature urged the president to intervene if the British did not withdraw, and Maine’s belligerence prompted many members of Parliament to consider stationing warships outside American ports and posting troops along the disputed border. By the spring of 1841, President John Tyler and Secretary of State Daniel Webster recognized that a boundary settlement, incorporating a compromise with the British, would be necessary if the United States were to avoid an Anglo-American war.^

202 Meanwhile, a serious crisis was taking place in New York as a result of the

Caroline incident. Secret societies in the United States still provided support to

rebellious Canadians, and the arrest in November 1840 of Alexander McLeod provided a

focal point for emotions on both sides of the border. McLeod, a deputy sheriff and

volunteer soldier from Upper Canada, was detained in Lockport, New York for his role in

the destruction of the Caroline. He had allegedly boasted about killing an American,

Amos Durfee, during the attack. The British government demanded McLeod’s release,

insisting that the attack on the Caroline was a public act performed under the orders of

the British government. President Van Buren preferred to keep the federal government

out of the dispute, however. There was some question whether or not the government

could force New York to release McLeod, and Van Buren, a lame duck, preferred to let

his Whig successor, William Henry Harrison, handle the dispute anyway. The situation

quickly turned ugly, as the border Patriots took the British demands as an insult to

American honor; they wanted to try McLeod as a warning to others who would violate

the territory of the United States and attack its citizens. Meanwhile, many Britons felt

that it was high time that they administer a drubbing to the impudent United States, and

their government expected that war would follow if McLeod were executed."*

Given the troubled state of the northern frontier, American army and naval forces

remained at fairly high levels in 1841. While the bulk of the army, 5,212 men, was in

Florida, there were still over 1,900 regulars at key locations along the border, and Fort

Ontario received its first garrison in October (table 6.1). Manning positions along the disputed Maine boundary. Lake Ontario, and the Niagara and Detroit frontiers, the

203 regulars stood ready to thwart Patriot activities or defend against British attack, as the

situation warranted. In addition, that one-man army Winfield Scott returned once again

to the border in March. He put his diplomatic skills to good use, convinced the owner of

the Caroline to drop his damage charges against McLeod, and organized patrols on the

Niagara River. The American government thus still recognized the threat that border

tensions posed to national security and took steps to deal with them.^

Location 1841 1842 Fl Sullivan 70 70 Hancock Banacks '£ ' t Plattsburgh 74 87 Madison Barracks 247 223 Fl Ontario 83 65 Fl Niagara 79 73 Buffalo 323 265 Detroit 384 337 Fl Gratiot 150 114 Fl Mackinac 110 156 Fl Bradv 59 77 Total 1,940 1,816 U.S. total 11,169 10,628 r Six companies of the 1st Artillery, 361 men. garrisoned Hancock Barracks and its "dependencies" at FL Fairfield and Ft KenL $ Six companies of the 1st Artilleiy, 349 men, garrisoned Hancock Barracks and its "dependencies" at Ft. Fairfield and Fl KenL SOURCE: Reports of the Secretary of War. 1841: 27th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1. ser. 395, 90-91; 1842: 27th Cong., 3d sess , Sen. Doc. /, vnl. 1, ser. 413, 210 U.S. totals arc in Prucha. .4 Guide to the Militcay Posts o f the United States. 143-14.

Table 6.1 : Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1841-1842.

The defenses along the northern frontier likewise remained a major concern. In

1841, construction was under way only at Forts Niagara and Ontario, and congressmen from the border areas criticized the meager appropriations for their districts. Forts

Niagara and Ontario, though not yet finished, were ready for their armament, and engineers were surveying the outlet of Lake Champlain, Buffalo, and Detroit for

204 fortifications, but this was not enough, especially when huge sums were being spent on the seacoast defenses. During debate in the summer over the fortification appropriations bill, Michigan Senator William Woodbridge complained that one could assume, given the little attention that had been paid to the defenses of the northern frontier, that the area

“had been blotted from the map.” Woodbridge claimed that there were no “proper defences” on the border and that the inland seas had been “utterly neglected;” he was especially concerned about the security of Detroit, with its $8 million in taxable property and 10,000 residents. Woodbridge claimed, with some hyperbole of course, that Detroit was liable at any time to be attacked by up to 20,000 troops, and he wanted to avoid the disasters of the War of 1812, when much national treasure was spent to recover the city from the British. Indiana Senator Albert White likewise criticized the neglect paid to the defense of “the vast commerce of the Northwestern lakes.” He felt that if war with

Britain came, hostilities would not occur on the seaboard but on the northern frontier, with the intent of harassing the American settlements and destroying the commerce on the lakes. British strategy did in fact call for attacks on the American maritime frontiers,^ but the concerns of northern frontier politicians reflected the growing commercial, military, and political importance of their region.^

The concerns of the politicians reflected the concerns of their constituents. In

August, for example, residents of “the North-Western Frontiers” petitioned Congress for an increase in the military and naval forces on the lake frontier. In their view. Congress should pay as much attention to the lakes as to the seacoast, because the “vast commerce” on the inland seas was in close proximity to “a foreign power.” While the

205 British had two war steamers on the lakes, “30,000 choice troops” on the border, and were working on their fortifications, the United States had only a 60-ton revenue cutter on the lakes,* a few scattered garrisons, and not a single fort in good repair on the entire frontier between Sackets Harbor and Mackinac. The petitioners, who asked for a fort at

Erie and were thus presumably from that city, demanded that Congress extend to the lakes region “that liberality which their commercial importance and widely extended country so justly merits.”^

Congress did appropriate funds for construction at the outlet of Lake Champlain,

Fort Ontario, Fort Niagara, Buffalo, and Detroit (Appendix A), but not without disagreement. Many politicians, such as Senator John Calhoun of South Carolina, felt that naval defenses were the best way to assure the security of the northern frontier. Ohio

Senator Benjamin Tappan felt that if the United States relied on forts to defend its frontiers, it would have to build them “every ten miles.” Naval supremacy would thus provide the best means of defense since it was not financially possible to build and garrison a fort at every possible landing place. By preventing British raiders from using the lakes as an avenue for their operations and allowing American forces to conduct attacks of their own against British possessions, American warships, most of them converted merchant vessels, would be both a cost-effective and more appropriate means of defense than an expensive system of fortifications.

More attention thus focused on the naval defenses of the Great Lakes as a result of the tensions there, especially given the British naval preparations along the frontier.

The British had five vessels patrolling Lake Ontario, four on Lake Erie, and two armed

206 steamers, Toronto, a converted gunboat, and Minos, a war steamer, on the Niagara frontier, these two latter vessels both exceeded the Rush-Bagot agreement’s limits on tonnage and armament. Minos was especially formidable, being approximately 500 tons burden, prepared for eighteen guns, and crewed by seventy-five men. A Buffalo newspaper described her in July 1841 as “a staunch new craft that would be an ugly customer in case of hostilities between ourselves and the Bull family.” The British had two similar vessels under construction at Kingston. “

To counter the British naval force on the lakes, the United States had only the steamer Telegraph on Lake Ontario and the steamer Little Belt and revenue cutter Erie on Lake Erie. Winfield Scott recommended that the government purchase four more steamers for use on Lake Erie. Both sides recognized that the United States had the advantage on that body of water, and such a force would both help secure the Niagara frontier and probably give the Americans naval supremacy. On Lake Ontario, where the

British had the dual advantage of a larger commercial marine and the well-defended dockyard at Kingston, Scott recommended that the government convert the old ship of the line New Orleans into a steamer. The second recommendation was a more dubious proposition. While the New Orleans was large enough to sweep the lake of British opposition, she certainly would have been an ungainly vessel. In addition, a survey in the summer of 1841 found her imder the care of a ship master at Sackets Harbor; protected by the ship house, she was in good condition but suffering greatly from dry rot.

Conversion thus would probably not have been worthwhile.

207 There were other ways to achieve security on the lakes than converting existing vessels, however. First, recognizing the importance of secure harbors for lake vessels, the Senate Committee on Commerce recommended that the federal government make adequate appropriations for the improvement o f lake harbors. These harbors would then be secure shelters from storm in time of peace and from enemy vessels in time of war.

Harbor improvements would help ensure American command of the lakes and thus would provide security for the people and property of the region. Although he also saw the need for adequate fortification of the lakes. Secretary of War John Spencer agreed that harbor improvements would be essential since naval forces would be the chief means of both defense and offense on the lakes. The existing harbor improvement program thus received new impetus. Second, Congress appropriated $100,000 in September 1841 for the construction of an armed steamer or other vessels for the defense of the Upper Lakes.

This appropriation would result in the construction of the Michigan, the first purpose- built American warship on the Great Lakes since the War of 1812. The United States was thus committing itself to more extensive military and naval measures to provide for the defense of the northern frontier by 1841.

Fortunately, these measures were not put to an immediate test due to the peaceful resolution of the McLeod affair. During his brief one-month presidency. Anglophobe

William Henry Harrison was unwilling to stake national security on McLeod’s prosecution. While he believed that the destruction of the Caroline was an act of aggression, a violation of American territory that required a British apology, Harrison felt that McLeod could not be held responsible and that his arrest was contrary to the law of

208 nations. McLeod was only a soldier acting under the orders of his government which he

was bound to obey. Harrison thus held the British government responsible and would not

take vengeance on a soldier who was only doing his duty. In addition, Harrison

recognized that the British were acting in the defense of their borders; although he was

upset by the violation of American territory, Harrison believed that the United States

government should do its best to assure the tranquillity of the frontier and avoid further

trouble in the future.

Harrison’s successor. Vice President John Tyler, held similar views and believed

that negotiations could resolve the crisis. In a message in June, he stressed that his

administration would cultivate goodwill and friendship with all nations, avoiding “the

scourge of war” by conducting its affairs “in the language of truth and with a strict regard

to justice.” Tyler wanted New York to release McLeod since the British government had

assumed responsibility for the destruction of the Caroline. Opposition in New York to

federal involvement in the matter presented an obstacle to a peaceful solution, however, as did continued violence along the Niagara frontier. Raiders damaged one of the locks of the Welland Canal, malcontents on the American shore fired on the Minos and

Toronto, and there were rumors that Patriots planned to abduct and kill McLeod in order to precipitate a conflict.

Since local authorities prevailed and McLeod went to trial at Utica, both

Governor William Seward and federal authorities had to take measures to protect the defendant and to forestall further Patriot violence. By September, Seward placed guards around McLeod’s jail, ordered the county militia to be prepared for duty, authorized a

209 volunteer force of a hundred artillerymen, and employed agents to travel the canals and gather intelligence about Patriot activities. Winfield Scott sent John

Wool and fifty soldiers to the vicinity of the trial as well. McLeod finally went to trial on

4 October 1841. Due to a lack of evidence and conflicting testimony on his whereabouts during the destruction of the Caroline, he was acquitted on 12 October. Fortunately,

McLeod was freed after a fair trial and the United States and Britain avoided war.

Although both sides had taken steps to prepare for a possible conflict, each government wanted to avoid war at all costs. Public opinion was another matter, however. While the

American and British governments might have wished to avoid bloodshed, many of their citizens did not, and their actions threatened to embroil both nations in a pointless war.

Although tensions continued to simmer along the northern frontier, McLeod’s acquittal removed one stumbling block on the road to peace between the Anglo-American peoples.

McLeod’s acquittal did not mean that the United States and Britain halted their military and naval preparations along the northern frontier, however; indeed, some die­ hard Patriots remained, and the international boundary had yet to be resolved. For instance. Secretary of War Spencer warned Governor Seward on 21 October 1841, after

McLeod’s release, to take steps to prevent the ‘"plunder of the public property,” since there were rumors that plans were afoot to seize arms and to “renew the hostile and annoying incursions on the northern frontier.” The survey and construction of forts along the border continued, American troop levels on the border remained fairly high, and new plans for the naval defense of the Great Lakes went forward.

210 As British naval construction continued, so too did American attempts to redress the naval balance on the lakes through either purpose-built war vessels or by converting merchant vessels into gunboats. As the population of the west increased, so too did the number of commercial vessels on the western waters, especially the Mississippi and Ohio

Rivers. There was increasing support for naval establishments in the west, an idea popularized by Matthew Fontaine Maury in the early 1840s. Writing under the pen names “Harry Bluff’ and “Union Jack,” Maury had published several articles on naval reform starting in 1838. Among his many concerns was the desire for naval establishments in the south and the west. Criticizing the Atlantic States’ monopoly of the advantages to be derived from the Navy, such as dockyards, shipbuilding, and federal spending, Maury suggested in July 1841 that the south and west should enjoy such benefits as well. Maury believed that naval establishments in the south and west were essential to “the welfare, safety, and honor of the whole country.” In his view, it was silly to repair ships or obtain crews only on the Atlantic seaboard while there were great resources in the west as well.

Maury pointed out that the large number of steamboats on the western rivers and their crews provided a valuable naval resource that could be utilized in war time, if only the government took steps to develop such resources. In the early 1840s, there were fifty- five steamboats on the lakes, while the western rivers had 337. To develop these resources, Maury suggested that Memphis be the site of a dockyard and a naval academy to educate officers and train steamboat engineers. Memphis had a healthy location, the

Mississippi there was always free of ice, the channel was of sufficient depth, and the city

211 was far inland and secure from foreign invasion; it was thus suitable for the construction and maintenance of vessels for use on the western rivers.

In Maury’s view, the large number of steamboats on the Mississippi and Ohio

Rivers constituted a potential element in the defense of the lakes frontier, a formidable defensive resource if they could somehow make their way on to the Great Lakes. Maury thus advocated that the government construct a “National Canal” to connect the

Mississippi and the lakes, an internal improvement that was essential to the security and prosperity of the Union. In case of war, he felt, the United States would be at a great disadvantage since it could not introduce its river steamers onto the lakes. The British could strike swiftly, bombarding the towns of the northern frontier and destroying the thriving commercial trade. In addition, vessels built on the lakes would be a waste of money. Although they might serve their purpose during a war, what could they do in peace other than rot, as the lake fleets of the War of 1812 had? With a canal, American steamboats could move from Memphis to the lakes and strike the first blow, maintaining naval supremacy. After the war, the vessels could be withdrawn and used elsewhere as needed, either providing coastal defense in the Gulf or performing revenue duty. To provide the ordnance for those vessels that would ply the lakes, the western rivers, and the Gulf, Maury also suggested that there be a national foundry somewhere above

Memphis and convenient to coal and iron deposits. It would be cheaper to cast guns there than to ship them by sea via New Orleans or across the Appalachians.

Maury’s plan did indeed present a way to enhance the defense of the northern frontier. Of course few, if any, of the steamboats on the western waters were fit for

212 naval, much less commercial, service on the storm-tossed Great Lakes. Nevertheless, the large numbers of vessels on the inland rivers represented a formidable resource in terms of experienced crewmen and shipbuilding capability. Observers in both the United States and Britain had long recognized that naval supremacy was the key to success in a war along the border. Advocates had already suggested that canals between the Illinois River and around Niagara Falls would allow American superiority in industrial output, commercial marine, and shipbuilding capability to extend from New Orleans to Lake

Ontario. Maury, a southerner who felt that it was unjust to spend millions on the defense of the Atlantic states while the West was neglected, presented a plan to convert or build vessels that could serve equally well on the rivers, lakes, or Gulf. A “National Canal” would allow steamboats built on the western waters to travel to the lakes, greatly increasing the American advantage on the Upper Lakes.

In addition, the canal would help move the “military population” of Kentucky and

Tennessee to trouble spots on the frontiers. Influenced by the performance both real and imagined of the hardy pioneers in conflicts with Indians and against the British at New

Orleans, many Americans believed that those two inland states provided an excellent resource in case of war with a European power. By 1840 those two states listed 143,317 men on the militia rolls. Realistically, they could probably be expected to provide about

64,360 men available for military service, a formidable manpower pool.^' Being well inland, Kentucky and Tennessee did not border on a foreign power and would thus not be overwhelmed at the first onslaught of an invader. They could provide the manpower reservoir upon which American officers and politicians relied to man fortifications and to

213 help repel invasion. The resources of the west, both in terms o f vessels and in manpower, would remain a key factor in future planning for the defense of the northern frontier.

While Maury and many boat captains felt that it would be more practical to convert civilian craft into gunboats, the federal government took steps to place a purpose- built war steamer on the lakes to help defend the northern frontier. To defend the Upper

Lakes, the Senate passed a resolution in March 1842 calling for the construction of a war steamer. This would certainly tip the naval balance on those lakes in favor of the United

States, which already possessed a larger commercial marine. Indeed, the British recognized that, in the words of Governor General Lord Sydenham in 1840, “the Yankees would drive us at once” from Lake Erie. Congress had already passed a $100,000 appropriation for the construction of war steamers on the lakes, and Secretary of the

Navy Abel Upshur decided to build an iron war steamer with the funds. One school of thought held that war steamers were the best means of coastal defense, capable of shifting back and forth between threatened points and providing more active defense than fortifications. Upshur wanted to test an iron steamer to see if it would be suitable for harbor defense, and the lake steamer provided him with the opportunity. Also, Upshur believed that iron was a “cheap and indestructible” building material. There were abundant supplies of iron and coal, and the Secretary felt that the construction of iron vessels would help to develop the growing American iron industry. The result would be the paddle-fngate Michigan

214 Given the British naval presence on the lakes, an American war steamer appeared to be vital if the United States were to protect its commercial marine and thus its naval position. On Lake Erie, the British had the gimboat Toronto and paddle-sloop Minos, and on Lake Ontario they had the gunboats Traveller and Experiment. To bolster the force on

Lake Ontario, the British also had two paddle-sloops under construction at Kingston by

April 1842. H.M.S. Cherokee was launched in September and reportedly could mount twenty-four guns. H.M.S. Mohawk, launched in February 1843, could carry six guns and was assembled from parts shipped from England. Furthermore, there was a commercial steamer under construction at Niagara, the Chief Justice Robinson, which had a heavy prow allegedly built as an ice-breaker. Her loyalist builder probably intended her to be used as a steam ram in case war broke out over the McLeod affair, however. The British were thus taking great steps to increase their naval presence on the lakes, especially on

Lake Ontario where they had a formidable force relative to the United States. Although their preparations violated the Rush-Bagot agreement, the British did not want to terminate the naval arms accord with the United States. Britain insisted that her naval forces on the lakes served no other purpose than to defend against rebel attacks, an explanation that apparently satisfied both the Tyler administration and its opponents. It was in the best interests of both governments not to terminate the agreement and condemn themselves to a ruinous naval arms race on the lakes.“^

Despite British assurances, however, the naval imbalance on Lake Ontario especially worried the War Department, which had always believed that naval supremacy and fortifications at key points were the key to the security of the lakes frontier. Directed

215 by Congress to report on what measures had been taken to defend Lake Ontario,

Secretary of War Spencer reported that the only fortifications were at Fort Niagara and

Oswego, while Sackets Harbor remained exposed. Spencer warned that something had to be done to defend the lake shore and the “numerous population” there, given the calamities that visited the region during the War of 1812. While fortifications would certainly play a role, Spencer also wanted a steamship to defend against “sudden inroads” by raiding parties who could strike and return to their base before American defenders could react. There were some suitable commercial vessels available at a reasonable cost, and Spencer recommended the purchase of one to avoid the construction of several forts.

Thus, a cruising steamer could move quickly to threatened points on Lake Ontario, a means of defense that could be replicated only by building some type of fort at every single landing place along the lake shore, a ruinously expensive and therefore unlikely prospect.

In the same report, Winfield Scott emphasized the weak state of American defenses. While the United States had no war vessel on Lake Ontario, except for the War of 1812 relics on the stocks at Sackets Harbor, the British had several gunboats and the paddle-sloops under construction at Kingston. Possessing nothing that could stop those warships from capturing all the American vessels on the lake, the United States would be able to do nothing to prevent the British from commanding Lake Ontario until the end of the war. Since the United States did not appear to be able to vie successfully for naval supremacy on the lake, Scott insisted that at least Sackets Harbor should be fortified. It was the best natural harbor on Lake Ontario, and the next best port, the mouth of the

216 Niagara River, was under the guns of British fortifications. Furthermore, the valuable public property at Sackets Harbor, such as the New Orleans in its shiphouse, Madison

Barracks, the hospital, and storehouses filled with war materiel, needed protection from attack. Since land batteries could easily defend the harbor, Scott recommended works mounting forty guns at the entrance as sufficient protection. Despite the testimony of

Spencer and Scott, the United States did not employ a war steamer on Lake Ontario, and

Sackets Harbor remained undefended. Congress did, however, provide for the conversion of commercial vessels into gunboats by appropriating $59,097 in August 1842 for ordnance on the northern lakes."^

Instead, the Navy Department built a war steamer for Lake Erie. Secretary

Upshur considered the $100,000 appropriation sufficient for just one vessel, and Lake

Erie appeared to be a more suitable location for his iron ship-building experiment than

Lake Ontario. Presumably, the vessel would be more useful on the Upper Lakes than if confined to Lake Ontario. Furthermore, the naval facilities on the Atlantic were too far away, and American industrial resources were closer at hand on Lake Erie. Pittsburgh had excellent resources for building the required vessel, given its great industrial facilities, and the city was inland and thus safe from British attack. Upshur’s desire to build the war steamer at Pittsburgh illustrated the crucial importance of the industrial superiority of the United States along the northern frontier. Construction started in the summer of 1842; shipped in pieces by or canal to Erie, the vessel, christened

U.S.S. Michigan, was ready for service by August 1844. She was the first iron-hulled

217 war steamer in the United States Navy and outclassed all British vessels on the Upper

Lakes. ^

Meanwhile, the uncertain international boundary remained an obstacle to peaceful Anglo-American relations. Fortunately, in 1841 new governments had taken power in both the United States and Britain, opening the way for new understanding between the two nations. President Tyler and Secretary of State Daniel Webster recognized that a compromise was necessary, as did Prime Minister Robert Peel, who strove to ensure the prosperity of his country and to avoid war abroad. In Foreign

Secretary Lord Aberdeen Britain had a diplomat who wished above all to maintain peaceful relations with the United States. The state of Maine still stood in the way of a settlement, however, insisting that Maine’s northeast boundary, as vaguely defined by the

Treaty of Paris in 1783, ran to within twenty-five miles of the St. Lawrence River in places. Resistance from Maine had blocked a settlement of the boundary in 1831, and even though Maine’s intransigence was a major factor in tense Anglo-American relations, Maine’s legislature complained to Congress in March 1842 that the state needed “immediate and adequate appropriations’’ for its defense. Reasonable men were unwilling to tolerate such claims any longer; thus Webster persuaded the administration to laimch a newspaper campaign to try to convince the residents of Maine that a compromise was in their best interest."^

Compromise was necessary because Maine’s claim was obviously unacceptable to Britain. First, the claim ran too close to Quebec, the key to the defense of British

North America. Second, the claim blocked the Temiscouata route, the line of

218 communication that Britain used to reach Quebec from Halifax when ice closed the St.

Lawrence. When consulted, officers such as Master General of the Ordnance Sir George

Murray insisted that only pushing the boundary south of the St. John River could protect

the Temiscouata route. If Maine had its way the British would lose the only way to

assure communication with Quebec for almost five months of the year. British troops

had used the route during the War of 1812 to reinforce the Canadas, and during the

Patriot rebellion a regiment had traveled along the route between December 1837 and

January 1838. Despite temperatures of twenty degrees below zero, the troops moved the

420 miles by sleigh in fifteen days. The British claim ran far to the south of Maine’s

proposed boundary, below the Aroostook River. This line would both secure the

Temiscouata Route and place the Madawaska settlement under firm British jurisdiction.

British negotiator Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton thus went to the United States with

instructions to keep the Americans far from Quebec and to secure the Temiscouata

Route. The rest of the claims were negotiable. Lord Aberdeen felt that fnendly relations

with the Americans were more important than “any additional extent of Pine swamp.

Webster and Ashburton first met in June 1842, and the American Secretary of

State was willing to compromise as well. He recognized that the British considered the

Temiscouata route essential to the very existence of British North America and were

willing to fight for it. Webster thus made the sensible decision to let Britain have the

route. He sought a compromise line, not one based on an interpretation of the 1783

treaty, and was willing to swap territory. Webster was prepared to grant Britain jurisdiction over the Madawaska settlements on both sides of the St. John in return for

219 free navigation of that river and the cession by Britain of a small strip of land near the St.

Croix River. For his part, Ashburton did not think it necessary to secure any territory northwest of the St. John, as was Aberdeen’s wish. Ashburton believed that Maine’s claimed northern boundary, although ridiculously close to the St. Lawrence, posed no threat to Quebec or Canadian security. Nowhere, he told Aberdeen, did the Maine claim come within sight of Quebec, and the disputed territory would “remain uninhabited for centuries,” unfit for operations by an invading army. Both sides, then, were prepared to be reasonable in their negotiations, thanks in large part to the wisdom of the negotiators.’’

Just as Lord Aberdeen sought the advice of British military men, so too did

Webster obtain the recommendations of American officers concerning the settlement of the international boundary. During the negotiations in July 1842, Webster asked

Secretary of War Spencer for the opinions of prominent officers. The advice Webster received was nearly unanimous, namely that the United States must obtain Rouses Point

(actually, the old Island Point site) in any boundary settlement. All other considerations were secondary. Armed with this advice, Webster was prepared to offer Britain the security of the Temiscouata Route in exchange for the security of Lake Champlain. The testimony of American military men stressed the vulnerability of the Temiscouata Route, stating in no uncertain terms that American forces could cut the crucial British line of communication anyway. Let the British have their precious route and make them think that they have made a good bargain for Rouses Point, the feeling went. For both sides.

220 then, the defense of the northern frontier would be a major consideration in the negotiations surrounding the international boundary/"

There were some dissenting views, however. While Chief of Engineers Joseph

Totten recognized the importance of Rouses Point, he did not want the United States to stake its negotiating position on retention of that strategic location. Totten admitted that

Rouses Point was the best site to command the river, being within a quarter mile of the channel, while the alternate location at Stony Point was about a mile away and required a companion work at Windmill Point to provide “complete defence.” Although Rouses

Point had “a decided preference,” its advantages were not as great as they would seem, in

Totten’s view. He felt that if the United States did not possess the location, it could still accomplish its goals with a fort at Stony Point, albeit at greater cost. Works farther south of the lake outlet could still “effectually defend” the lake, could serve as depots for the offensive operations against the St. Lawrence, and would provide “a point of rendezvous or refuge to a concentrating or discomfited force.” Thus, Totten recognized the importance of Rouses Point. Indeed, he had advocated the construction of fortifications there since the War of 1812. Totten did not, however, want the United States to hurt its bargaining position in Maine just to save some money on fort construction.^'

Asked for their views, General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, Topographical Engineer

John Abert, and Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup all stressed the importance of

Rouses Point to the defense of the northern frontier and the unsuitability of alternate locations. Scott warned that if the United States did not command Lake Champlain either with forts or war vessels, the British could bring an army by steam to within three

221 days’ march of Albany. Rouses Point was superior to Stony and Windmill Points, the alternate locations for forts well south of the disputed boundary line. The lake was narrow at Rouses Point, having dwindled down into the Richelieu River, and thus was easier to command than at the alternate location. Furthermore, if the United States retained the old fort site at Island Point, the ruins of the old fort could provide materials worth up to $20,000.^'

John Abert also emphasized that command of Lake Champlain was essential to success in a future war with the British. In his view, maintaining “quiet” in the region was “of great national importance.” The United States had to protect its base of operations for the offensive against the St. Lawrence near Montreal, and the area was populated by a “hardy race of agriculturists, mechanics and merchants” who deserved protection. Abert was certain that the British would conduct no offensive operations east or west of the lake; if they went over to the offensive, they would use the lake itself, the best means of entry to the American interior. A fort at Rouses Point could prevent such an attack, because the channel was no more than 800 yards from the shore, well within the one-mile effective range of 24-pounder guns. In addition, enemy vessels would be incapable of maneuver, given the river current and fire from American batteries. British forces could more easily bypass forts at locations such as Windmill Point, where vessels drawing eighteen feet of water could pass over three-quarters of a mile from American guns. In addition, a fort at Windmill Point had to be immensely strong so that it could be self supporting, cut off as it was given its location on the east shore of the lake. Since alternate forts would be “large and costly” and a system of fortifications at Rouses Point

222 would so command the channel that it would be folly for the British to try and force a passage, Abert consider the possession of Rouses Point to be “above all price.”^^

Thomas Jesup likewise recommended that the United States acquire Rouses

Point, especially since American forces could easily cut the Temiscouata Route during an

Anglo-American war. According to Jesup, Rouses Point was “the great strategic point on the Northern frontier.” By holding it, the United States could secure 200 miles of lake shore and provide a secure base for operations north of Lake Champlain. The location was the only one that “completely” commanded the lake outlet, and Stony and Windmill

Points would each require a fort and necessitate a division of force. Windmill Point was especially unsuitable because it could only be approached by land from Canada and could be relieved only if the lake were in American hands. In addition. Rouses Point would be very dangerous if in British hands, because the British could use just one war steamer to deny the use of the lake to American forces. This would throw the whole force of western Vermont and northeast New York “out of action” and prevent decisive operations against the St. Lawrence in that quarter. Jesup insisted concessions in Maine were worth the price of gaining Rouses Point, because the Americans could cut the

British line of communication along the St. John in case of war anyway. He reminded

Secretary of War Spencer what the object would be in an Anglo-American war. Quebec was the “decisive point,” and geography dictated that United States troops would first have to take Montreal by an advance north from Lake Champlain. This would allow the

Americans to neutralize Upper Canada as a base for counterattacks and permit the invaders “to bring the greatest possible amount of force and resources to bear upon the

223 object of attack.” As the sole guarantee of American access to Montreal via the

Richelieu River, Rouses Point was thus “worth more in military effect than the whole territory in Maine north of the St. John.”^'*

Armed with these views, it was little wonder that the importance of Rouses Point impressed Webster. He was of the opinion that the location was “the natural and best point for the defence of the outlet of Lake Champlain.” It commanded the narrowest charmel before the waters widened out into the lake, and any vessels traveling into or out of the lake would be within point-blank range of the guns of any fortification built there.

In fact, vessels approaching Island Point would be exposed to raking fire from the defenders long before the attackers could bring their broadsides to bear. Thus, Rouses

Point would be extremely valuable to the side possessing it. Constructing forts farther south would not be an effective way to secure American use of the lake outlet. The channel was far wider there, and British vessels could probably pass between Stony and

Windmill Points unhindered by the fire of the forts. Finally, Webster saw the importance of Rouses Point to American strategy in a war with Britain, having recognizing decades prior that the major effort would have to be directed at the St. Lawrence. Taking credit for having said after the War of 1812 that when an axeman fells a tree he does not start by lopping off branches but instead by at once striking at the trunk, Webster said that the key to taking Canada was to strike at Montreal and Quebec. In his view, “the true road to

Canada is by the way of Lake Champlain,” and thus Rouses Point was the guarantee of a successful American offensive in the next war with Britain. The Point was thus a very suitable trade for a tract of wilderness in Maine.

224 Fortunately for the state of Anglo-American relations, all parties to the boundary

negotiations were willing to compromise to a certain extent. Webster’s

campaign in the Maine newspapers had been successful. Maine politicians gradually

became amenable to a compromise granting the land north of the St. John above Grand

Falls in return for free navigation of the St. John and a strip of land on the west side of

that river. Lord Aberdeen had authorized Lord Ashburton to make such concessions.

Commissioners from Maine and Massachusetts would not give up on one issue, however,

and that was the Madawaska Settlement. Straddling both sides of the St. John, it was the

flashpoint along the disputed border; the commissioners refused to let the British have

any territory south of the river, and threatened to go home if the British insisted on

holding the entire Settlement. Ashburton yielded lest the negotiations break down.^^

Ashburton was in a conciliatory mood due to fears that France would support the

United States if the talks proved inconclusive. Aberdeen stressed to Ashburton “that the

importance of a successful result is so great, as almost to justify any sacrifice compatible with the safety of the North American provinces.” Presumably, so long as Britain obtained a safe buffer zone for the Temiscouata Route, the Americans could have almost anything they wanted. There were rumors that French King Louis Philippe was prepared to side with the United States if it went to war with Britain, and Ashburton believed that the Anglophobe Lewis Cass, American minister in Paris, was trying to get the French more involved. Aberdeen thus believed that a conciliatory tone during the negotiations would ensure a settlement of Anglo-American differences and also improve the currently

225 “uncomfortable” relations with France. He had to consider the interests of the Empire, not just those of New Brunswick.^’

After a grueling summer of negotiations, Webster and Ashburton thus reached an agreement by 9 August 1842 that was pleasing to both diplomats. Both felt that the agreement benefited both nations, addressing the security concerns of each side and removing an uncertain boundary as a possible cause of war. Each nation obtained what it thought was essential to its security. The new boundary line safeguarded the

Temiscouata Route by placing that vital British line of communication firmly within

British territory, albeit close to the border; furthermore, Maine relinquished much of its claim north of the St. John, giving Britain a wilderness buffer zone between the St.

Lawrence and American territory. Although the United States received less territory than the state of Maine had claimed, the Americans in return obtained Rouses Point. The

Agreement declared the inaccurately-surveyed Valentine-Collins line, and not the correct

45th parallel, as the international boundary between the Connecticut and St. Lawrence

Rivers. This gave the United States a new strip of territory^* some 150 miles long and, more importantly, secure jurisdiction over the Island Point site. In addition, the United

States received free navigation of the St. John, favorable concessions in the Indian

Stream Country on the New Hampshire border, and territory in the northwest that would later be discovered to be the iron-rich Mesabi Range. Britain thus relinquished much in order to secure her lines of communication.^^

Although Webster had obtained the strategically valuable position at Rouses

Point, southern Madawaska, free navigation of the St. John River, the Indian Stream

226 Country, and the still-undiscovered iron deposits west of Lake Superior, he was criticized for unnecessarily large territorial concessions to the British. Democrats tended to oppose the treaty. Former President Andrew Jackson condemned the treaty as “disgraceful,” an agreement “humiliating to our national character and humbling us in dust and ashes.”

Webster’s old rival, Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton, accused the Secretary of being a tool of the British government and suggested that the boundary be marked with black stones to commemorate the dark deed. Benton and other critics believed that

Webster had caved in to the British and relinquished territory in Maine that the Treaty of

Paris in 1783 had granted to the United States. Webster’s supporters, such as South

Carolina Senator John Calhoun, pointed out that Webster had obtained a far more favorable settlement than that granted by King William I of the Netherlands back in

1831. Furthermore, the Secretary of State had removed a cause for war between the

United States and Britain. The Treaty passed the Senate by a vote of 39-9 on 20

August."*®

Despite the ratification of the treaty, opposition to Webster’s diplomacy continued. Attacked by politicians from Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New

York for giving too much territory to the British, Webster insisted that he had struck a sound deal. While Maine had indeed lost some its claimed territory, other states in fact gained as a result of the settlement. The strip of land between the 45th parallel and the

Valentine-Collins line gave Vermont and New York some 70,000 and 40,000 acres respectively, while the Indian Stream Country provided New Hampshire with some

100,000 acres of land firmly under its jurisdiction. Webster also pointed out that

227 obtaining Rouses Point for a wilderness tract in Maine was an excellent swap, one supported by some of the nation’s most prominent military men. He further informed his

New York critics that by securing “the key of Lake Champlain” to the United States, he had done much to advance the security of New York state, as well as the nation. Gaining

Rouses Point was “an advantage which overbalanced all others, forty times told.”^*

Webster also insisted that he had conceded nothing of military value to Britain, an opinion in which Joseph Totten concurred. Totten assured Secretary of War Spencer that the boundary adjustment would have little effect on Maine’s security. The region was so sparsely settled that military operations by either side were unlikely, and it was “not the practice of modem warfare” to pillage a scattered population. Giving the British much of

Maine’s claim north of the St. John’s would not hurt the United States, given the wild nature of the region. There was no large town or military establishment north of Bangor to make a British attack profitable, and Bangor itself would still be too far from the border for the British to get at it."*'

Neither would the boundary settlement affect American offensive operations on the northern frontier, in Totten’s opinion. The United States would never have to consider any operations toward Quebec from the Height of Land north of the St. John, because American objectives could be better met by a decisive offensive launched from northern New York against the St. Lawrence. While American forces could threaten an attack against Quebec along the old Chaudière route followed by Benedict Arnold in

1775, the troops could be on the Kennebec River or at Bangor and still have significant effect. Troops posted at Bangor would threaten both Quebec and Halifax and force the

228 British to keep troops in the threatened areas, weakening the defense of the Montreal region where the main American blow would fall. Furthermore, American forces could easily cut the Temiscouata Route by an advance across the St. John. The United States did not have to have the territory north of the river in order to interdict the British line of communication. Thus, Totten appears to have felt that relinquishing the large claim by

Maine could be done in return for concessions elsewhere, without damaging the security of the United States.

Daniel Webster did indeed negotiate a very favorable boundary settlement in

1842. The Treaty strengthened the American strategic position by assuring the use of

Lake Champlain by the United States in any future Anglo-American war. Ashburton’s critics in Britain picked up on this point. Former Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, merciless in his attacks on the new government, claimed that the settlement further shifted the balance of power in North America in favor of the United States. He was not willing to risk Canada’s future on predictions of American goodwill, as Feel and

Aberdeen were. In addition to enhancing the defense of the northern frontier, Webster also helped to reduce the danger of war between the United States and Britain in the first place. President Tyler was certainly pleased with the treaty, asserting that it would preserve “amicable relations” with Britain “for an indefinite period” and preserve “the peace of Christendom.” Through his personal diplomacy with Lord Ashburton, a man of peace and goodwill, Daniel Webster helped to reduce tensions by eliminating some issues that threatened peaceful Anglo-American relations. The question of the international boundary had, in Webster’s words, indeed been “well settled.”^

229 There was a more immediate impact of the Treaty on the defense of the northern

frontier, and that was the resumption of works on the old Island Point site at the outlet of

Lake Champlain. The proposed forts at Stony and Windmill Points were now

unnecessary, and as Daniel Webster pointed out, the ink on the Treaty of Washington

was hardly dry when the Corps of Engineers shifted its operations to Island Point.

Although the old fort had been left exposed to the elements and was '‘a heap of ruins,”

the engineers went back to work after a suspension of more than two decades and started

making surveys to build a new fortification atop the remains of the old one. The new fort

would help make a decisive offensive against the St. Lawrence possible, the reason why

Webster was willing to acquire the Island Point site in return for thousands of acres of pine forest in northern Maine. Just as the drive to the St. Lawrence dominated American strategic thinking, so too did it dominate the Webster-Ashburton boundary settlement of

1842/3

230 ' Daniel Webster, The Works o f Daniel Webster, vol. 5 (Boston: Charles G. Little and James Brown, 1851) 102.

^ Malcolm J. Rohrbough, The Trans-Appalachian Frontier: People, Societies, and Institutions 1775-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 331. For the importance of cities and their economic power in the Trans-Appalachian West, see Richard C Wade, The Urban Frontier: The Rise o f Western Cities, 1790- 1830 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). For contemporary populations of cities and towns on the northern frontier, see Appendix F.

^ Howard Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1843 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 89-90. For a map of the disputed Maine boundary region, see ' A Map of the Territory in Dispute between Great Britain and the United States,” December 1839, NA, RG 77, Headquarters Map File, BDY 55.

■* Albert B Corey, The Crisis o f 1830-1842 in Canadian-American Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 130-33; Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 48-51.

’ Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 56.

* See, for example, the British reconnaissance in Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 95n. Royal Army Lieutenant H D Fanshawe examined American coastal defenses in the northeast between October and December 1841, reporting to the British government that the defenses of Boston, New York, and other ports were weak, partially armed, and in decay. Although he found American morale to be high, Fanshawe believed that attacks on the northeast ports would be practicable.

’ For fort construction progress, see “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 19 November 1841, in 27th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, set. 395, 117-18. Woodbridge and White, quoted in The Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10 (Washington: Blair and Rives, 1841), 259, 284-85.

* This was the schooner Erie, built in 1832 at Presque Isle (Erie); see K. Jack Bauer, “List of United States Warships on the Great Lakes, 1796-1941,” Ontario History 56 (March 1964), 60.

’ “Petition of a Number of Citizens Residing on the North-Western Frontiers,” 11 August 1841, in 27th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 88, vol. 1, ser. 390. Another petition asked for appropriations for the improvement of the harbor at Erie, “the finest on the northern lakes.” The petitioners pointed out that Erie was a great naval depot in the War of 1812, the location would be an ideal point from which to launch attacks against Upper Canada, and harbor improvements would have commercial advantages as well; see “Memorial of the Town Council and Citizens of Erie, Pa,” 22 December 1841, in 27th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 23, vol. 2, ser. 396.

10 The Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10 (Washington: Blair and Rives, 1841), 284-85.

*’ H.A. Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: The Battle of the Windmill and Afterward, 1838-1842,” American Neptune 8 (January 1948): 56; Buffalo Commercial Advertiser, quoted in H.A. Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: Warships and Iron Hulls, 1841-1846,” American Neptune 8 (April 1948): 132; J. Nlic\:3.y Hxsmaxi, Safeguarding CanacUi, 7765-/57/(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 141.

231 Musham, “Eariy Great Lakes Steamboats: The Battle of the Windmill and Afterward, 1838-1842,” 56. For the condition of the New Orleans, see “Public Defences on Lake Ontario,” 27th Cong , 2d sess.. House Doc. 225, vol. 4, ser. 404.

" “Harbor Appropriations,” 2 March 1841, in 26th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. 225, vol. 4, ser. 378; “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1 December 1841, in 27th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 395, 62; “War Steamer—Northwestern Lakes,” in 27th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 985, vol. 5, ser. 411.

*■’ Webster, The Works o f Daniel Webster, vol. 5, 123-24.

“Message from the President of the United States,” 1 June 1841, in 27th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 1, Vol. 1, Ser. 390, 4; Corey, The Crisis o f 1830-1842, 142-43, 154-55.

Corey, The Crisis o f 1830-1842, 143-45; Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 62-65.

John Spencer to Governor Seward, 21 October 1841, NA, RG 107, Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1814-1847, M7, roll 2, 121-22.

Frances L. Williams, Ocean Pathfinder: A Biography o f Matthew Fontaine Maury (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966); Union Jack, “Letters to Mr. Clay,” Southern Literary Messenger 7 (October 1841): 724-29.

Union Jack, “Letters to Mr. Clay,” 725-27. For vessels in the early 1840s, see “Steamboats on the Mississippi and Northern Lakes,” 27th Cong., 3d sess.. House Doc. 170, vol. 5, ser. 422.

Union Jack, “Letters to Mr. Clay,” 728.

Based on 4 percent of the estimated population for Kentucky of 780,000 and for Tennessee of 829,000 (Appendix E).

“Steamer Building on Lake Erie,” 3 June 1842, in 27th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 238, vol. 4, ser. 404; Sydenham, quoted in Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 141. For the development of the Michigan, see Bradley A. Rodgers, Guardian o f the Great Lakes: The U.S. Paddle Frigate Michigan (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 1-18.

^ Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: Warships and Iron Hulls, 1841-1846,” 132-49; Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 141; Corey, The Crisis o f 1830-1842, 156-57.

John Spencer, 14 May 1842, in “Public Defences on Lake Ontario,” 27th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 225, vol. 4, ser. 404.

Winfield Scott to Secretary of War Spencer, 16 April 1842, in “Public Defences on Lake Ontario,” 27th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 225, vol. 4, ser. 404; “Navy—Appropriations— 1842,” 27th Cong., 3d sess.. House Doc. 131, vol. 4, ser. 421.

“Steamer Building on Lake Erie,” 3 June 1842, 27th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 238, vol. 4, ser. 404; Rodgers, Guardian o f the Great Lakes, 1-18.

Wilbur Devereux Jones, Lord Aberdeen and the Americas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958), 84-86; Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 91-94; “Defence of Maine,” 29 March 1842, 27th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 171, vol. 4, ser. 404.

232 Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 105-06; Aberdeen, quoted in Jones, Lord Aberdeen and the Americas, 14. For the importance of the Temiscouata route, see C P Stacey, “The Backbone of Canada,” Annual Report o f the Canadian Historical Association (1953); 1-13. For the British movement along the route in 1837-1838, see Joseph G. Totten to John C. Spencer, 20 August 1842, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 6, 218-20.

” Stacey, “The Backbone of Canada,” 6; Wilbur Devereux Jones, “Lord Ashburton and the Maine Boundary Negotiations,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 40 (1953-1954): 482-83.

Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 106-08; Webster, The Works o f Daniel Webster, vol. 5, 111.

Joseph G. Totten to John Spencer, 12 August 1842, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 6, 211- 15.

Winfield Scott, “Memoranda for the President,” 1 July 1842, NA, RG 76, Miscellaneous Records Relating to the Northeast Boundary, 1827-42, entry 98, envelope 3, folder 11.

J.J. Abert to John Spencer, 15 August 1842, NA, RG 76, Miscellaneous Records Relating to the Northeast Boundary, 1827-42, entry 98, envelope 3, folder 11.

” Thomas Jesup to John Spencer, 11 August 1842, NA, RG 76, Miscellaneous Records Relating to the Northeast Boundary, 1827-42, entry 98, envelope 3, folder 11.

Webster, The Works o f Daniel Webster, vol. 5, 111-12.

^ Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 91-92; Jones, “Lord Ashburton and the Maine Boundary Negotiations,” 484-87.

Jones, “Lord Ashburton and the Maine Boundary Negotiations,” 484-85. For British concerns about the danger posed by France in the mid-nineteenth century, see Michael S. Partridge, Military Planning for the Defense o f the United Kingdom, 1814-1870 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).

While some observers considered the strip to be a valuable defensive benefit if held by the government and left as a wilderness for the defense of the northern frontier, Joseph Totten believed that such defense would only be effective if the wilderness belt were also secured by “numerous military posts;” see Joseph G. Totten to John Spencer, 12 August 1842, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 6, 211-15.

For the negotiations between Webster and Ashburton, see Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 118- 38. For the Treaty of Washington itself see Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada in Force between His Majesty and the United States of America, with Subsidiary Documents, 1814-1925 (Ottawa: F A. Acland, 1927), 18-22. The Treaty also provided for Anglo-American cooperation in the suppression of the Afiican slave trade.

Andrew Jackson to Francis Blair, 7 August 1842, in John S. Bassett, ed.. Correspondence o f Andrew Jackson, Vol. 6, 1839-1845 (Washington: The Carnegie Institution, 1933), 162; Jones, To the Webster- Ashburton Treaty, 162-65. Jackson, belligerent toward Britain when not in office, later said that Webster also should have insisted on extending the United States border to the Pacific. Distracted by wars in and and by “the attitude of ,” Britain would not risk a war with the Americans over the boundary of the Oregon Country; see Andrew Jackson to Major William B Lewis, 17 September 1844, in Bassett, Correspondence o f Andrew Jackson, Vol. 6, 1839-1845, 319.

233 ■** Webster, The Works o f Daniel Webster, vol. 5, 109-13.

Joseph G. Totten to John C. Spencer, 20 August 1842, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 6, 220- 24.

Ibid., 225-28.

** Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 170-73, 180; Jones, Lord Aberdeen and the Americas, 82; John Tyler, “Message from the President of the United States,” 7 December 1842, 27th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 413; Webster, The Works o f Daniel Webster, vol. 5, 116.

“Report of the Secretary of War,” 26 November 1842, 27th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 413, 184; “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 1 November 1842, 27th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 413, 239.

234 CHAPTER?

THE FRONTIER BETWEEN MAJOR CRISES, 1843-1860

"No change has occurred, or is likely to occur, that will justify the relinquishment o f the system o f defence for the northern frontier. - Joseph G. Totten, 1851'

With the settlement of the international boundary in 1842, Webster and Ashburton removed border tensions in the northeast as a potential cause for war between the United

States and Britain. The British had secured their overland communications between

Halifax and Quebec, and the Americans had acquired secure jurisdiction over Rouses

Point, the guardian of Lake Champlain and the key to American strategy in the event of an Anglo-American war. As tensions eased, both sides could start to consider a reduction in their garrisons along the frontier and focus instead on trade and other benefits of peaceful relations. Although the Webster-Ashburton treaty had resolved the northeast boimdary, the border in the Oregon Country remained a matter of dispute. Once again,

Anglo-American difficulties elsewhere led to a war scare along the northern frontier in the mid-1840s. Although peacefully resolved and followed by more than a decade of good relations, the dispute over the Oregon Coimtry demonstrated that Canada was still an American hostage to Britain’s good behavior. The Canadas and the Maritime

Provinces would be the battleground on which the United States would try to force concessions from Britain. 235 Given impetus by the disturbances in Maine and with the Patriots, American military and naval preparations for the defense of the northern frontier continued as originally planned. Once the money had been appropriated, fort construction went ahead despite improved Anglo-American relations. Congress thus provided for the defense of the northern frontier even when war seemed unlikely. To defend the sea approaches to

Bangor, Maine, engineers started work on a coastal fort on the Penobscot River Narrows south of the city.^ Totten and other officers had stressed Bangor’s importance to the defense of the northern frontier’s defense. Forces in the city would threaten both Quebec and New Brunswick and force the British to defend against a possible invasion from

Maine, stretching their resources thin. Distractions elsewhere would later eliminate much of the funding for defenses along the border with British North America, but for the time being American engineers also went ahead with their plans for fortifications farther west at Rouses Point, Fort Ontario, Fort Niagara, Buffalo, and Detroit.

Identified as crucial to the defense of the lake frontier and to support of the decisive thrust against the St. Lawrence River in case of war. Rouses Point, Fort Ontario,

Fort Niagara, Buffalo, and Detroit each received the attention of the engineers in the mid-

1840s. Since Rouses Point had only recently come back into the possession of the United

States, the outlet of Lake Champlain required new plans for its defense, delaying construction. In 1844, however, surveys for the fort were complete. Congress appropriated a further $40,000 for construction, and operations were underway. The new fort was built around the ruins of the old “castle” built by Joseph Totten after the War of

1812. Thus, the shape of the old fort that was already on the site dictated the new work’s trace. After clearing the old site, the engineers started to drive some 4,383 piles into the

236 muddy bottom of the Richelieu River to support the massive foundations. Plans called for a masonry casemated work in the shape of a demi-octagon, tower bastions at the angles, and two tiers. The “fort at the outlet of Lake Champlain,” still unnamed, was the largest fortification planned for the northern frontier, befitting its important role in American strategy; the difficult construction conditions meant that work would continue through the 1860s. As Daniel Webster pointed out in 1846, there were few fortifications, even at the Narrows of New York Harbor, that the government prosecuted with such zeal. By protecting Lake Champlain, the fort would enable

American forces to concentrate for the decisive thrust against the St. Lawrence, the strategy upon which the War Department relied to bring a decisive result in case of war on the northern frontier.^

The other important works on the frontier were nearly complete, having been well underway since the Patriot troubles, and they received appropriations for finishing work.

Fort Ontario, a pentagonal earthwork revetted with timber, was “essentially finished” by

September 1843, in a good state of defense and in need of only minor improvements to the drainage of the and the outer earthworks. It protected the harbor at Oswego and the outlet of the Oswego Canal, making the fort essential to the defense of Lake Ontario.

With Oswego in British hands, the Americans would have even less hope of achieving naval superiority on the lake than before. Fort Niagara was likewise ready for defense, requiring only the construction of good barracks to house the garrison. Combined with the excellent quarters at Madison Barracks (Sackets Harbor), Forts Ontario and Niagara helped defend key avenues of approach for an enemy invader. On Lake Ontario British tonnage outnumbered American 42,325 to 26,591. The American forts would protect

237 anchorages and preserve the smaller commercial marine, helping the United States to compete for naval supremacy on Lake Ontario, acknowledged by both sides as the key to the security of the lake frontier/

The two remaining fortifications at Buffalo and Detroit were less advanced than their counterparts to the east. At Black Rock near Buffalo, the engineers had been at work since April 1843 on a gun tower and battery to defend the outlet of the Erie Canal and to anchor the southern end of the Niagara frontier. Plans called for a square bombproof tower^ mounting four guns on the roof, surrounded by a battery mounting twenty-eight guns; most o f the ordnance bore on the lake. By November 1844 most of the battery was complete except for some gun emplacements, and the superstructure of the tower was underway. At Detroit, plans called for a square bastioned earthwork revetted by timber, commanding the river channel and protecting barracks that would house regular troops operating on the Detroit frontier. There was still much work to do by late 1844, but the earthen embankments were formed, the timbers procured, and drains were being laid.*

There were, then, substantial fortifications under construction at the key population centers and chokepoints on the northern frontier, a departure from previous practice when there seemed to be a negligible British threat to American security. They were not all permanent fortifications, however; Forts Ontario and Niagara and the fort at

Detroit had defenses of a more temporary nature, apparently in the belief that the United

States might annex British North America in the future. Permanent fortifications could stand in the way of such an outcome, or they would at least be a waste of money . ^ In any event, the forts were an important development. The citizens had petitioned Congress for

238 them, and army officers had long recommended that there be suitable fortifications at the various sites. The fortifications certainly served a psychological function, reassuring the citizens of the northern frontier that the government was indeed concerned about their defense, but they actually were key elements in the offensive strategy of the United

States. The fort at Rouses Point secured the use of Lake Champlain to American forces, allowing them to use the Champlain-Richelieu corridor to attack toward Montreal and cut the St. Lawrence line of communication. Forts Ontario and Niagara and the works at

Buffalo and Detroit provided a support role, helping to assure naval supremacy on the lakes or securing the western reaches of the northern frontier until the decisive offensive took effect.

Elsewhere on the northern frontier, the defenses continued to be poorly- maintained stockades or blockhouses. , an in northern Maine of

Hancock Barracks, consisted of only a blockhouse and some quarters. Its importance had declined since the Webster-Ashburton Agreement clearly defined Maine’s boundaries, and good relations with Britain prompted the withdrawal of troops from that post and

Fort Fairfield, another blockhouse, in 1843. The other defenses on the northern frontier were in Michigan, and most of them were in a ruinous state. Fort Gratiot, at the outlet of

Lake Huron, was a bastioned stockade with the usual barracks and support buildings.

Inspections declared the post to be in an advanced state of decay, and Quartermaster

General Thomas Jesup complained in October 1843 that the garrison should be withdrawn if the fort’s buildings were not repaired. Jesup likewise warned that Fort

Brady at Sault Ste. Marie was “completely dilapidated” and in urgent need of repair. In fact, he wanted the post entirely rebuilt since it had been built of “slight materials” over

239 twenty years prior. Jesup believed that Fort Brady should have the best accommodations in the army, not the worst, because the fort was the northernmost post in the army, isolated and “exposed to the rigors of an almost Siberian winter.” Elsewhere, Fort

Mackinac remained in a tolerable state of repair, and in May 1844 the War Department established Fort Wilkins at Copper Harbor to protect the Lake Superior copper mines from Indian attack.* Although the posts would play a role in any war with Britain, planners expected them to see only minor action. Thus, they were always the last forts to receive repairs, and Congress appropriated major funds only for the more important locations on the northern frontier. As Secretary of War William Wilkins noted in

November 1844, Forts Gratiot and Brady were crucial to the security of the northwest frontier, and the latter post would be especially important once the St. Mary’s Canal was completed. Nevertheless, there were limited funds available and the northwest lost out in the battle for appropriations. Locations farther to the east were just more vital to national interests and could play a direct role in the strategy for the defense of the northern frontier.^

O f course, internal improvements remained a very important factor in the defense of the northern frontier. Canals continued to be an important means of communication, those on the American side of the border siphoning off most of the Great Lakes trade and leaving the merchants in Montreal in a state of despair. The Erie Canal in particular dominated trade in the area, and it would remain one of the principal ways in which the

United States could marshal its resources along the threatened border in case of war with

Britain. Indeed, the canal system, built for commercial reasons, improved water communications so much that Commanding General Winfield Scott reported in

240 November 1843 that Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis, the point of concentration for western forces, could be an important factor in the defense of the northern frontier. There were about 1,000 troops there, and they could be sent to the northern lakes via the

Mississippi and Ohio Rivers and canals through Indiana or Ohio.*°

At the same time there was also a canal under construction at Sault Ste. Marie that had implications for the defense of the northern frontier. The great mineral wealth of

Lake Superior had led to a great increase in shipping tonnage, and there was a steamer, the Independence, plying that lake by spring 1845. A canal thus had obvious commercial utility. The Senate Committee on Roads and Canals encouraged government support to the project based on its military utility, however. According to the committee, the

Hudson Bay Company had about 2,000 employees working among the Indians of the

Northwest; possessing great influence with the tribes, the Company could urge up to

30,000 warriors to ravage the frontiers in case of war. A canal, especially if it were built to accommodate the U.S.S. Michigan and allow that war vessel to operate on Lake

Superior, could allow the United States to intimidate the tribes. Otherwise, in a future war Lake Superior would be what Lakes Erie, Huron, and Michigan were in the War of

1812, '‘the scene of foreign conquest, of merciless Indian massacres, perhaps of national dishonor and shame.” Although the estimate of 30,000 warriors was undoubtedly high, such concerns did reflect the importance of naval power on the lakes and the fact that there were still some lingering fears of Indian attack as late as the mid-1840s. The canal was built, albeit for commercial reasons more than out of concern for the nation’s defense.*’

By the mid-1840s, however, the railroad became more important to the defense of

241 the northern frontier, starting to eclipse the canal as a means of fast and reliable transport o f bulk goods. A vast network of rails blanketed the New England and Middle Atlantic

States and made their industrial capacity available to the rest of the nation. Breaching the

Appalachian barrier in several places, the growing railroad network would eventually bind the nation together even more completely than the canals, providing year-round transportation at speeds of over twenty miles per hour. Mileage increased from 2,808 miles of track in 1840 to 9,021 in 1850. There were only sixty-six miles of track in

Canada by the latter date, mainly portage railroads around rapids on the navigable rivers.

In the United States, although most of the track was still east of the Appalachians in the early 1840s, the military utility of the railroad was great, as Secretary of War John

Spencer had recognized in 1841. Railroads permitted rapid concentration of troops, allowing the United States to defend itself “with armies of very diminished numerical force,” and they reduced the cost of military operations by reducing transportation costs.

For example, a 12-pounder gun that cost $200 to ship from New York to Buffalo in the

War of 1812 could now be sent in a fraction o f the time for $24; the savings involved would more than cover construction costs. Railroad promoters recognized these benefits, and they petitioned Congress for appropriations on the basis of the railroads’ military utility. For example, investors in the Great Western Railway, building a line from the mouth of the Ohio River to the Illinois River, insisted in December 1843 that their railroad’s most important benefit would be military, allowing the transportation of men and materiel to the Great Lakes or south to Mexico via the great rivers. The railroad would thus make “the brave Kentuckians” a flexible defensive instrument, employable on all frontiers. Similar to the canal system, railroads could thus play a major role in the

242 defense of the northern frontier, despite their actual commercial justification.’"

Finally, the telegraph made its debut as the latest element in the transportation revolution. Samuel B. Morse had petitioned Congress for $30,000 to test the feasibility of wire communications, tests on an experimental line between Washington, D C. and

Baltimore in 1844 had demonstrated the system’s “perfect practicability,” and telegraph lines soon spread across the United States and Canada. By December 1846, there were telegraph lines connecting Albany and Chicago via Buffalo, Erie, and Detroit, with connections at various points to New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati. In

1852 there were some 23,283 miles of telegraph lines across the United States, and by

1853 the Champlain Valley and Vermont were tied into the network as well. The northern frontier was thus well served by wire communications that allowed rapid transmission of orders and intelligence, a revolution in military as well as economic affairs. On the Canadian side of the border, telegraph lines followed the traditional lines of communication, from Halifax to Quebec with a wide detour around Maine, up the St.

Lawrence and along the north shore of the lakes to Windsor. The Canadian wire network had the same vulnerabilities as the other elements of the transportation revolution. There was a tenuous wire link to Upper Canada, vulnerable to American attack along almost its entire length. The telegraph, then, provided yet another American advantage in case of another war along the northern frontier.’^

On the Great Lakes, canals, converted merchant vessels, and the paddle-ffigate

U.S.S. Michigan would take part in the defense of the northern frontier. Advocates for a western naval force on the Mississippi and Ohio River systems, such as Matthew

Fontaine Maury, continued to press for a navy yard at Memphis, government support to

243 the training of steamboat crews, and a canal near Chicago to connect the lakes with the

Mississippi via the Illinois River. As before, American planners expected that converted lakes merchant vessels would provide the force necessary to achieve naval supremacy, at least on the Upper Lakes where American tonnage outnumbered British 80,245 to 4,250.

In fact, some ship captains felt that such a resource made U.S. Navy vessels on the lakes unnecessary. A Commodore Blake of the Illinois claimed in June 1844 that the lake frontier had no need of a navy since “commerce is building up one for the defense of the country.” What Blake wanted was safe harbors where he could seek shelter from storm or make repairs. He was confident that he could remove the upper deck of his boat, mount a gun battery on the lower deck, and stay on the lake “in spite of a fleet of British steamers.”***

Despite Blake’s boasting, the U.S. Navy had been taking steps to increase its presence on the lakes. The Michigan was ready for service by August 1844 and conducted its first cruise in October; her peacetime duty was to patrol the Upper Lakes and to rescue vessels in distress. Very seaworthy, with a fourteen-knot cruising speed and mounting a 64-pounder pivot gun, the Michigan was one of the fastest ships in the world, and few vessels could harm the paddle-frigate if they indeed caught her. When rammed on Lake Huron in 1853 by the Bicffalo, the largest propeller-driven steamer on the lakes, the wooden ship bounced off the iron Navy vessel. In addition, the flat bottom and rectangular cross-section made the Michigan a very stable gun platform, and her gunners were consistently more accurate than their counterparts in the saltwater Navy.

Although the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 had limited armament on lake vessels to one 18-pounder gun, the battery of the Michigan at least was in keeping with the spirit of

244 the agreement. The Michigan could have mounted more ordnance, and a plan in 1843 called for two 64-pounder pivot guns and four 32-pounder carronades. Her 582 tons far exceeded the agreement’s provision for vessels of one hundred tons, however.’^

The British were obviously concerned about the Michigan since she outclassed anything that they had on the lakes. In addition, the Americans also had revenue cutters under construction at Oswego and Buffalo, vessels that were in fact ships of war.

Converted merchantmen could not deal with such vessels, and British war steamers of sufficient size were too large to pass through the canals and on to the lakes. The British first protested in July 1844, claiming that the United States had violated the Rush-Bagot

Agreement. The American excuse was that in an age of iron ships, steam, and guns, the provisions of 1817 were obsolete. Given the heavy steam machinery necessary, it was not possible to build an effective steamer under the 100-ton limit. A new naval agreement was thus necessary. Besides, the British had been the first to violate the agreement by their naval construction during the Patriot crisis. Anxious to continue peaceful Anglo-American relations. Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel decided not to engage in a naval arms race; he considered this to be a more dignified course of action than increasing British armament on the lakes. Peel recognized the industrial superiority that gave the United States a naval advantage, at least on the Upper Lakes. He was certain that Britain would lose “a mere race of competition for building Vessels of War on the

Lakes.” Without a naval agreement, the British would remain in a position of inferiority.

Peel thus seems to have been willing to look the other way so long as each side observed the spirit of the Rush-Bagot Agreement.’^

The British could only hope to win the race for naval supremacy on Lake Ontario,

245 and the U.S. Navy Department thus paid increasing attention to the state of affairs at

Sackets Harbor. Congress had already appropriated some $145,271 in March 1843 for ordnance, ordnance stores, and armed vessels on the northern lakes. There was a respectable amoimt of shot and shell stored at Sackets Harbor, and the ship of the line

New Orleans still slumbered away under cover in the shiphouse; a survey in the mid-

1840s said that she could “be put in water in 60 days pierced for 140 [sic] guns.”'^ In

November 1844 the Bureau of Yards and Docks requested $600 to repair the shiphouse and to stabilize the narrow spit upon which it stood, but the Bureau was not sure that repairs to the New Orleans were worthwhile. Indeed, since the introduction of steam vessels would seem to have eliminated the need for sailing vessels, there might be little need even to preserve the ship. Actually, she remained on the rolls until her sale in 1883.

Thus, with only a revenue cutter under construction at Oswego, the United States obviously counted on its industrial potential to convert merchantmen that would fight for naval supremacy on Lake Ontario. The Navy had only two personnel on the entire northern frontier, a shipmaster at Sackets Harbor to watch the New Orleans and a “naval constructor” at Erie, presumably to work on the Michigan. Otherwise, the U.S. Navy focused its attention on distant overseas stations where it protected merchant shipping from attack, surveyed foreign waters, and sought markets for American products.’*

Such was the state of the northern frontier’s defenses when yet another boundary dispute, in the Oregon Country over the international border, became a possible cause for war between the United States and Britain. Despite President John Tyler’s contention in his armual message for 1843 that the Webster-Ashburton Treaty had greatly improved

Anglo-American relations, the Oregon Country remained a point of contention as

246 American settlers poured into the region. British opposition to American annexation of

Texas had already angered expansionist-minded Americans, many of whom wished to

exert undisputed jurisdiction over Oregon as well. National expansion had come to the

forefront of American consciousness due to the crises in Texas and Oregon, and the

Democratic Party capitalized upon the issue. The national mood was such that many

Americans were unwilling to compromise with Britain and accept an international

boundary along the 49th parallel. Hampered by his own campaign rhetoric, incoming

President James Polk found himself embroiled in a dangerous impasse in the Northwest

by the summer of 1845.

Both the United States and Britain once again found themselves faced by the

prospect of war, a conflict that, as before, would play itself out along the northern

frontier. No matter what the cause of an Anglo-American dispute, land operations would

by necessity take place along the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes. The British

had about 10,000 regulars in their North American provinces and could presumably count

on a sufficient number of volunteers to bolster the British garrison. On the Great Lakes

the British had some cause for concern, but they expected the recently-opened Welland

Canal to allow 300-ton ships and gunboats to pass onto the Upper Lakes and improve the

British naval position. The Admiralty also had paid a private firm on the Niagara frontier to build three steamers that could be converted to military use if need be. Britain was far

from planning a war against the United States, however. France seemed to pose more of a threat at the time, and the British were also quite concerned about American war preparations, especially along the lakes.^°

Despite the possibility of war, American military strength was not up to the task

247 of facing down the British lion along the northern frontier. Troop strength gradually declined in order to defend newly-annexed Texas and meet commitments along the western frontier. Regular troops did, however, reoccupy Fort Kent in November 1844 to provide a government presence in the Madawaska settlement, because many of the residents were still uncertain about their new status as United States citizens.

Nevertheless, by 1845 the Army evacuated the Maine forts and sent their garrisons to

Texas, and there were only 531 men left along the border between Maine and Lake

Superior (table 7.1). The American militia, despite its great paper strength of over 1.8 million in 1845 (Appendix D), was hardly capable of providing the necessary reinforcements. For instance, Maine, Vermont, and Ohio had abolished their militia systems in 1844, and most annual militia inspections were rowdy spectacles at best.

Volunteers, a source of manpower that would be vindicated in the Mexican War, would have to fill the gap. It would thus seem hardly likely that Polk actually contemplated a war with Britain over the Oregon Country; perhaps bluster would suffice. With an

American army entering the disputed Texas border region by August 1845, Polk was obviously more interested in using military force to coerce Mexico, not Britain, into making territorial concessions.'*

While Polk could know the intentions of the United States government, he could not be so sure about those of Britain, so as before, tensions with Britain led to heightened interest in the fortifications along the northern frontier. In 1845 the engineers continued their work, driven by the possibility of a conflict. The work at the outlet of Lake

Champlain had progressed to the point where it could be temporarily converted into a shotproof battery. The goal was at least to complete the casemates facing the river

248 channel as soon as possible. Given the state of emergency, the land front could wait.

Forts Ontario and Niagara were receiving their finishing touches, although Chief

Engineer Joseph Totten warned that Fort Niagara desperately needed repairs to the “very dilapidated and uninhabitable” barracks. At Buffalo, the tower was complete and the battery was ready for its armament. At Detroit, the fort was nearing completion, due perhaps in part to Totten’s orders to the engineer in charge, Montgomery Meigs, to “press your operations with the utmost vigor.” Meigs was not to work on the barracks until the defenses were in a state of “perfect readiness.” Although not considered as important as the other forts, even Forts Gratiot and Brady received “indispensably requisite repairs” from the Quartermaster Department in 1845. Thus, work continued on the defenses of the northern frontier, spurred on by the possibility of war with Britain."

Location 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 Fl Sullivan 62 59 — — — 54 57 52 50 Hancock Barracks 272 — — — — — — — Plattsburgh 80 65 48 1 — 33 55 48 58 Madison Barracks 162 168 97 1 — 14 59 54 78 Fl Ontario 61 58 52 1 — 11 51 48 50 Fl Niagara 53 53 46 1 1 41 54 47 46 Buffalo 231 223 — —————— Detroit 312 182 86 — — 105 75 74 — Fl Gratiot 112 115 50 1 1 49 55 37 87 Fl Mackinac 135 114 51 75 77 47 56 41 30 Fl Brady 74 60 53 13 24 53 51 30 28 Fl Howard —— ———— 104 77 63 Fl Wilkins — 112 48 1 1 ———— Total 1.554 1,441 531 94 102 407 617 508 490 U.S. total 8,935 8,573 8,349 10,690 21,686 10,035 10,585 10,763 10,538 D Four companies of the 1st Artillery, 232 men, garrisoned Hancock Barracks and F t Kent SOURCE: Reports of the Secretary of War. 1841: 27th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 395, 90-91; 1842: 27th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 413, 210; 1843: 28th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 431, 66-67; 1844: 28th Cong., 2d sess . Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 449, 134-39; 1845: 29th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 470, 220; 18-16: 29th Cong, 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 493,68; 1847: 30th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 503, 96; 1848: 30th Cong, 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. /, vol. 1,ser. 537, 184; 1849: 31st Cong, 1st sess.. Sen. £r; Z)oc. /, vol. 1,ser. 549, 188; 1850: 31st Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. £ x Doc. /.vol. 1, ser. 587, 116; 1851: 32d Cong, 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 611, 178-86. U.S. totals are in Prucha,^ Guide to the.Uilitary Posts o f the United States, 143-44.

Table 7.1 : Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1843-1851.

249 This did not mean that Congress was willing to consider other important locations on the border for fortification appropriations. The citizens of Rochester, New York had long desired fortifications to protect the harbor at the mouth of the Genesee River, and the House Committee on Military Affairs reported in January 1845 that such defenses were indeed necessary. Estimating the value of lake commerce at $65,826,022, the committee recommended that fortifications at the harbor would play a major role in defending that trade and keeping an important port out of enemy hands. In addition,

Rochester would likely be a military and naval depot in case of war, and the town was a logical target of British attack. Invaders could seize Rochester and destroy the Erie Canal viaduct and railroad bridge, severing the connection between the Great Lakes and the

Atlantic and doing “immeasurable” damage to the nation’s commerce. Despite the committee’s recommendations, Totten’s support for the project, and a subsequent petition in February 1846, the works at Rochester never received the necessary appropriations.

Neither did Totten’s proposal in March 1845 to improve Fort Gratiot with a strong gun battery and adequate barracks receive support. Most Congressmen undoubtedly felt that it was enough that the government was expending funds at the major permanent works on the northern frontier. There was much doubt that war was likely, and there seemed to be little need to spend limited resources on even more fortifications unless the circumstances warranted such action.

American attention continued to focus on the naval defenses of the Great Lakes as well. While the U.S.S. Michigan maintained its patrols of the Upper Lakes, the Treasury

Department had decided to build two iron revenue cutters for lake service, one each at

Pittsburgh and New York. The Pittsburgh vessel, named the Jefferson, was sent in pieces

250 to Oswego for fitting out and made her first trial run on Lake Ontario in April 1845. The

New York vessel, the Dallas, was shipped in pieces to Buffalo and launched on Lake

Erie in January 1846. The Jefferson was pierced for twenty-six guns, although she

carried only one amidships. The Dallas was similar, and these boats were in fact war

vessels. Their classification as revenue cutters got around the provisions of the Rush-

Bagot Agreement, a move that did not fool the British. The Topographical Engineers

also had a small iron steamer, the Colonel Abert, built at Cold Spring near West Point,

New York, and shipped it in pieces to Buffalo, where it was reassembled and launched in

December 1844 for survey duty on the Upper Lakes. In addition, the naval station at

Sackets Harbor received an appropriation of $3,600 in May 1845 for repairs and for stores to equip the New Orleans (Appendix A). Work went ahead on repairs to the ship house, the Navy built a breakwater to protect the point on which the shiphouse stood, and the New Orleans was once again listed by the Secretary of the Navy in his statement of

Navy vessels. The British thus had every reason to be concerned by American naval preparations on the Great Lakes. Even on Lake Ontario, where the British possessed a larger commercial marine, the United States possessed a “revenue cutter” that would more than likely outclass any converted merchantman. In addition, although the New

Orleans was never made ready for service, her very presence at Sackets Harbor gave the

British pause for thought.^"*

Meanwhile, Matthew Fontaine Maury continued his campaign to build a ship canal near Chicago to connect the Great Lakes and Mississippi River systems. Maury felt that forts could only protect individual points, they were not a sufficient defense for the lakes; only “a double-banked Chinese wall” would seal off the frontier, but even then

251 American commerce would be at the mercy of the enemy. The Navy would have to be the first line of defense, and the best way to defend the lakes was to match British naval strength there. Of her sixty war steamers, Maury warned that Britain could have thirty or forty on the lakes in two weeks thanks to the Welland Canal, a naval force that the United

States could not match given current conditions. The Erie Canal was too small, and the

Ohio River’s depth was too uncertain, making it impossible for steamers to reach the canals and canalized rivers through the state of Ohio to Lake Erie. The only suitable way to project American force was through a canal connecting the Illinois River and Lake

Michigan, a waterway that was under construction but going to ruin for lack of funds.

Maury urged that the government purchase and complete the canal, the key to the nation’s security."^

According to western advocates such as Maury, the choice was simple. The

United States could build the Illinois canal at far less cost than the vast seacoast defense system and protect over 2,000 miles of lake shore. To support the navy yard in Memphis, work on which started in 1845, Maury also suggested that there be depots at Chicago and on Lake Erie to supply the steamers from the western waters that would be plying the lake in wartime. The War of 1812 had been a shipbuilder’s war, and the ship canal would allow the United States “to pour the whole Naval strength of the Mississippi

Valley right into the Lakes.” Given the vast wealth of the west and the Great Lakes region, the government had “not the privilege, but the bounden duty” to protect the residents and their thriving commerce. Maury was correct about the value of the northwest. By 1846 there were 2,928,925 people, about 10 percent of the nation, dependent on the lakes as a means of communication with a market, and the lake ports

252 had trade valued at almost $100 million.In Maury’s view, the alternative to a ship canal was to allow Britain to crowd the lakes with “swarms of armed cruisers fresh from sea, that will sweep over those waters with fire and sword, and leave wrecked or ruined all our commerce there.”"^

There were weaknesses in Maury’s plan, of course. It was questionable if the steamboats from the western rivers were fit for service on the lakes. In addition, Maury had constructed a straw man to slay, namely the notion that the United States currently plaimed to rely on the ability to build a lake fleet in time of war as it had done in the War of 1812. In Maury’s words, the fleet was still “standing among the tall trees of the forest.”^* The Navy and War Departments had always counted on converted merchantmen to win the battle for naval supremacy. No responsible individual had ever advocated a return to the days when a hastily-constructed squadron could be built out of green wood in a few weeks. There was already a formidable iron war steamer, the U.S.S.

Michigan, on the Upper Lakes, and the revenue cutters Jefferson and Dallas could spearhead operations on Lakes Ontario and Erie. Furthermore, all three of these vessels had been built far from the lakes and shipped to the frontier via the superior American canal and railroad system. American industry was quite capable, then, of both converting merchantmen and building war vessels. More problematic was how to block British access to the Upper Lakes, but the decisive invasion directed at the St. Lawrence River, if successful, would prevent British seapower from reaching Lake Ontario.

Maury’s ideas did spark debate over the most effective way to provide for the security of the Great Lakes, however, and Secretary of the Navy sent

Joseph Totten and a naval officer. Commander Charles Morris, to determine the defense

253 requirements of the lakes frontier in July 1845. Thus, at about the same time that General

Zachary Taylor was in Texas provoking a war with Mexico at the behest of President

Polk, American officers were examining the northern frontier to determine the best way to defend it in case of a war with Britain. Meeting at , Illinois on 5 July, Totten and

Morris followed the line of the Illinois & Michigan Canal to Chicago. Embarking on the

U.S.S. Michigan, they visited the forts and harbors on Lakes Michigan, Huron, and Erie; examined the Welland Canal; proceeded by British steamer to Toronto; parted briefly and examined both Georgian Bay and the region between Toronto and Detroit; rejoined and visited ports on Lake Ontario; traveled down the St. Lawrence River to Montreal and

Quebec; and returned to Washington, D C. after inspecting Rouses Point and Albany.

Their findings rejected Maury’s plan for the naval defense of the lake frontier.'^

According to Totten and Morris, the “most effectual and economical element of defence” on the lakes was naval superiority, which would secure the 2,000 miles of lake shore in American hands and permit the commercial and military communication essential to the well-being of the frontier. If the British possessed naval superiority, they could destroy the American commercial marine, plunder the lake towns, and disrupt internal communications as well. The elements of American naval superiority would be war steamers, the commercial marine, fortifications, and harbor improvements. In terms of purpose-built warships, there were the Michigan, “a fine vessel of her class,” the generally sound yet “unfinished hulk” of the New Orleans, the revenue cutter Jefferson, and the Topographical Engineers’ steamer Colonel Abert. Totten and Morris also reported that there were thirty 8” shell guns, forty-five 32-pounder guns, and 7,800 rounds of shot and shell at Sackets Harbor, Buffalo, and Erie.^° Presumably, the

254 ordnance stores could be used to arm both existing warships and converted merchantmen.

Fortifications were important because they could allow a small force of regulars or militia to protect key points against raids, while harbor improvements would increase the safety of the commercial marine, benefiting both national defense and commercial prosperity.^*

Totten and Morris did not agree that a ship canal near Chicago would be an effective way in which to assure American naval supremacy on the lakes. In order to accommodate large vessels, the Illinois & Michigan Canal would need about $6 million to complete; furthermore, it would be difficult to maintain an adequate supply of water in the canal.^" Although they admitted that a canal would be commercially beneficial,

Totten and Morris felt that it would be only “incidentally beneficial for national defence.”

There were less expensive ways to deal with the British on the lakes, the most important of which was the superior American commercial marine. Given the resources near at hand from the growing population, there was sufficient capability to arm and man merchantmen. This advantage, when combined with fortifications and one war steamer on each of the lakes except for Lake Superior, would neutralize the British advantage, that of a larger body of regular troops. Most importantly, the United States, through its military operations, would relieve the lake frontier “from any serious danger” of attack; the officers presumably were referring to the decisive thrust against the St. Lawrence

River. There was no need, then, to expend large sums on a ship canal when the means to assure naval supremacy were already close at hand.^^

Since the Straits of Mackinac were the only chokepoint that American forces could pass in safety, Totten and Morris considered Lakes Superior, Michigan and Huron,

Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and Lake Champlain as distinct units. In terms of naval

255 supremacy, they saw little cause for concern except on Lake Ontario. On Lake Superior,

Forts Brady and Wilkins protected the only key points, and the only vessels of considerable size were American. The forts could be used to store naval ordnance for the conversion of such vessels. Despite the presence o f two British steamers at

Penetanguishene, Lakes Michigan and Huron could be secured by placing sufficient ordnance at “convenient ports” and converting the superior commercial marine; the

British had few commercial vessels on Lake Huron and could not hope to compete.

Similarly, although the British could move gunboats and stores through the Welland

Canal, the United States could secure Lake Erie by providing ordnance depots^"* and converting merchantmen. Finally, thanks to the fort under construction at Rouses Point, the United States would surely have naval supremacy on Lake Champlain, where all the vessels were American.^^

The situation on Lake Ontario was different, however. The British had more steamers; they could pass gunboats onto the lake through the Rideau and St. Lawrence

River Canals; they had “a considerable military force” that could be used to attack important American locations; and the British had more protected harbors. There was a large navy yard, ordnance stores, barracks, and “a strong & commanding fortification

[Fort Henry]” at Kingston, while the only defended harbors on the American side were at

Fort Niagara and Oswego. The former site was not suitable since it was under the enemy guns of Fort Mississauga. Totten and Morris suggested that Great Sodus Bay could be converted into one of the most important naval points on the lake by fortifying the entrance and connecting the bay to the Erie Canal, about eighteen miles away, with a canal or railroad. But so long as the enemy could draw reinforcements from Britain, the

256 British would have the advantage. In addition, the United States would be forced to construct expensive fortifications to defend the harbors and other important points. Thus, the officers recommended that the government pay more attention to the command of the

St. Lawrence River. By building a fort that commanded the navigation of that waterway, the United States could prevent “the balance of power on the lake from turning against us” and win the battle for naval supremacy.

Totten considered a fortification on the St. Lawrence so important that he sent two of his engineers to select a site in November 1845. Anglo-American relations were particularly bad during the winter of 1845-1846, no doubt prompting Totten’s concern.

As before, an invasion of Lower Canada to cut the St. Lawrence was the foundation of

American strategy in a war with Britain. In addition, Totten wanted to determine other ways to assist the invasion by cutting the British lifeline to Upper Canada. Accordingly, he sent Captain William Fraser and Lieutenant John Mason to Ogdensburg to accomplish two missions. First, they were to select a site for a temporary fort that would command the St. Lawrence. Totten wanted the site to be on a small island if possible, both to make a siege impossible and to require a smaller garrison, about 300 to 400 men, and lower construction costs. He also wanted the fort to be on the rapids; the river would not freeze there, and the enemy could not approach the fort over the ice. In a “strictly confidential” letter to his officers, Totten emphasized that their mission was very important, “a valuable service to your country.” To maintain secrecy and to avoid alarming the local residents, he directed Fraser and Mason to wear civilian clothes. This would also keep the price of the site down, because the price would undoubtedly be “exorbitant” if the owner knew the location’s importance. Second, the engineers were to examine the St.

257 Lawrence as far downstream as the Beauhamois Canal and determine the best way to blow up the locks of the St. Lawrence Canals. This would assist in cutting the line of communication to Lake Ontario and would provide more time to complete the fort if war came. Fraser and Mason quickly went to work and recommended that a fort be built at

Stone’s Bay near Ogdensburg.

Totten and Morris, then, rejected Maury’s plans to achieve naval supremacy on the Great Lakes, emphasizing the advantages that already existed on the northern frontier.

The great industrial superiority that the United States possessed would guarantee that the

Americans could both build war steamers and convert merchantmen into gunboats. All that was necessary was to continue the program of harbor improvements and to finish work on fortifications at important locations such as Rouses Point. The large population of the lake frontier would provide the militia necessary to garrison both permanent and temporary fortifications. Meanwhile, the invasion near Montreal and a fort near

Ogdensburg would cut off the Great Lakes from British seapower. An invasion along the

Champlain-Richelieu corridor would probably meet little opposition since Fort Lennox was weak, the region was well served by roads and canals, and there was no fort covering the bridge over the Richelieu at St. Jean.^*

It was thus not necessary to provide government support to a ship canal to allow fragile Mississippi and Ohio River steamboats to enter Lake Michigan. Henry W.

Hal leek, the “Old Brains” of the army, branded the western school of defense as “absurd” in his Elements o f Military Art and Science. In his view there were two ways to keep

British steamers off the lakes. First, American forces could immediately march against the enemy’s line of communication and destroy the locks of the St. Lawrence canals.

258 Second, the United States could build a steam fleet at Pittsburgh or Memphis and spend

up to $50 million building canals to get the fleet the 2,000 miles to Lake Ontario. The

choice, of course, was obvious. There were already some thirty steamers of 300 to 1,000

tons on the Upper Lakes, a force that would be more than sufficient to assure American

naval supremacy, especially if American forces cut the St. Lawrence River and Welland

Canal. The War and Navy Departments, then, rejected the idea of tying western defense

to the defense of the northern frontier. The resources for naval superiority were already

close at hand, and there was no need to spend money on a canal when the funds could be

put to better use elsewhere. The population of the Northwest would thus have to rely as

before on military operations against the St. Lawrence to provide perfect security.

Such plans were never put to the test in the 1840s, however, because reason

prevailed and the United States and Britain agreed to a compromise in the Oregon

Country; war would be too damaging to the interests of both countries.^ President Polk

had received reports in January 1846 from Louis McLane, the American minister in

London, that the British were making extensive military and naval preparations. These

activities could, of course, have been in response to the threat from France, but McLane

believed that Britain would strike quickly if negotiations with the United States failed.

Polk faced the near certainty of war with Mexico, and since Congress had taken no steps to put the country on a war footing, the prospect of war with the British was not appealing. On the British side. Lord Aberdeen wanted to avoid war, and he had

intelligence reports that indicated that the Oregon Country was slipping out of British control anyway; the influx of American settlers swamped the small British population in the region. Negotiators thus signed a treaty on 15 June 1846 that divided the Oregon

259 Country between the United States and Britain along the 49th parallel. Fortunately for

Polk, he was able now to focus his full attention on the Southwest. American and

Mexican forces had already clashed, and Congress declared war on Mexico on 13 May.

The defense of the northern frontier would thus fade into the background once again as the nation’s resources were committed elsewhere.^*

With the international boundary defined and Britain gradually acquiescing in

United States domination of North America,'*^ there was a decreased threat of war along the northern frontier and troop levels declined accordingly. By 1847 Britain had reduced her garrison in Canada from 8,000 regulars to 6,000 and started to establish communities of discharged veterans on the border as a substitute for regular garrisons. Likewise, the number of American regulars posted on the northern frontier declined due to the demands of the Mexican War. Most of the northern frontier garrisons withdrew from their posts in

July and August 1846, leaving only caretaker detachments to guard govermnent property

(table 7.1). Only Fort Mackinac retained its garrison, and this force was withdrawn in

June 1847 and replaced by a company of Michigan volunteers. There was obviously little concern that the British were likely to attack along the northern frontier. Indeed, the states that could play a role in the northern frontier’s defense. New York, Ohio, Indiana,

Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee, supplied seventeen regiments of volunteers. The

14,526 men in these regiments demonstrated to supporters that volunteers could be a reliable source of manpower in wartime.”*^ While there were 21,509 regulars and 22,027 volunteers engaged against the Mexicans by the end of 1847, there were only some 102 regulars posted along the boundary between Maine and Lake Superior. Although the regulars returned starting in October 1848, the northern frontier had once again faded

260 from the national consciousness. With the acquisition of vast territory from Mexico after the war, the attention of the nation, as well as that of the army, increasingly turned wesf*^

Despite the decline in the size of garrisons along the northern frontier, however, construction and repairs did continue at key sites along the border. The naval station at

Sackets Harbor received appropriations of as much as $5,000 per year for repairs and construction (Appendix A), and by 1849 there were houses for the commandant and shipmaster, stables, offices, and a fence to protect the site. Likewise, by 1850 Army engineers had made great progress on permanent fortifications along the frontier. The fort at the outlet of Lake Champlain, now named Fort Montgomery, was still far from completion, but most of the river front was finished. Forts Ontario and Niagara were complete, albeit in need of slight repairs to the ramparts. The tower and battery at

Buffalo, now named Fort Porter, were also complete. There also had been plans to build a similar fort on the south side of Buffalo at the mouth of the Buffalo River, but the project had evidently been discarded by 1849. Finally, the fort at Detroit, now named

Fort Wayne, was nearing completion. Thus, although the possibility of war along the northern frontier was remote, the United States continued to take measures to defend key points along the border. The continued construction was as much a result of government inertia as it was of a concern for national defense, however, and the sums spent on the fortification of the northern frontier soon came into question.’’^

Believing that the system of fortifications begun by the Bernard Board in 1816 was no longer suitable given modem conditions, critics began an attack on fortification appropriations. In 1851 the House of Representatives directed Secretary of War Charles

Conrad to report on the expediency of the current system of national defenses. To

261 Conrad, the most important question in relation to the northern frontier was “How far the increase of population on the northern frontier, and of the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates or diminishes the necessity of continuing the system of fortification on those lakes?”^

The Secretary had to determine the best way to allocate hmited resources, and a review of national strategy was certainly in order. Railroads provided the United States with a great advantage in case of a future war along the northern frontier. By 1850 there were 9,021 miles of railroad track, 60 percent of which was in the New England and

Middle Atlantic states. Four major railroads, the New York & Erie, the New York

Central, the Baltimore & Ohio, and the Permsylvania, had crossed the Appalachians and reached either the Ohio River or Lake Erie by the early 1850s. There was some thought that the ability to concentrate troops quickly at threatened points could reduce the need for costly fortifications. In addition, the British appeared less willing than ever to commit substantial resources to the defense of Canada. As the threat of war with the United

States faded, there was a widespread belief in the British government that the Canadians bore the moral and economic obligation for their defense, especially since all of the

British North American provinces had been granted by 1849. In the view of the British government, the North American colonies were large and wealthy, and responsible government entailed more local control of forces and a more equitable sharing of the defense burden. Congress was thus wise to reconsider the necessity of spending large sums on the defense of the northern frontier. Internal improvements, larger population, and naval superiority provided great military advantages to the United

States, and Canada was less of an offensive threat than ever."*^

262 In addition to collecting the thoughts of American officers on the nation’s seacoast defenses, Conrad also consulted Navy officers and Army engineers in June 1851 on the expediency of continuing “the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern lakes.” Navy officers were divided on the issue. Captain Charles Morris did not consider attacks launched from Canada likely, but he did point out that the Rideau and St.

Lawrence Canals could allow the British to move gunboats and gain temporary supremacy on Lake Ontario. It was thus necessary to continue the system of lake defenses in order to protect the cities and lines of communication along the northern frontier. Commander Samuel Dupont stressed the need for forts to protect the “large and populous towns’’ and the “rapidly increasing commerce” from sudden attack, even though the major American operations would be against the St. Lawrence. In Dupont’s view, towns such as Buffalo and Oswego deserved protection as much as Savannah or Mobile.

Finally, Lieutenant John Dahlgren did not doubt that the large population of the frontier could furnish a force “fully sufficient to a prompt and final issue” against any British army in Canada, but he believed that fortifications would be useful at the start of a war.

It would, furthermore, be a waste of money already spent if the United States did not complete the system.'**

Other Navy officers disagreed, however, and stressed the importance of internal improvements and naval forces. Commodore Matthew C. Perry suggested that the superiority in tonnage and seamen, excellent internal communications, and the “well- organized militia” of the Great Lakes states made the present system of defenses unnecessary. Perry was unwilling to wait behind barricades for the onslaught of the enemy, and he believed that the Navy would not live up to its reputation if it did not

263 sweep “every vestige of an opposing force” from the lakes. Likewise, Commander

Robert Cunningham stressed that in addition to having a superior commercial marine, the

United States could outbuild the British five to one on the lakes. This superiority, combined with the “hosts of stout hearts ready to do battle,” guaranteed that the British would face “certain destruction” if they attempted an invasion of the Great Lakes region.

Cunningham recommended that besides storing heavy artillery at depots, the government should take no other defensive measures. Lieutenant Matthew F. Maury was even more optimistic. An invading American army would be treated by Canadians as liberators rather than oppressors, and any war would be “a war of ship building” that the United

States was sure to win. To protect against surprise attack, Maury felt that the United

States only had to place a few guns at the large towns and use canals and railroads to send vessel frames, naval stores, and ordnance to key points. Since the Great Lakes were inland seas, the Navy was “the first, second, and third chief requisite” for any effective system of national defense."*^

Some Army engineers wanted to abandon the system of defenses, but most naturally considered fortifications to be absolutely essential to the security of the northern frontier. One dissenter. Major William Chase, believed that the United States could concentrate a large force capable of falling on Montreal and destroying the British position in North America. Chase urged that no more money should be appropriated, even for repairs; further expenditure would be “a useless waste of public money.” Other engineers were not so sure. Major felt that the major concern was the security of American harbors since a major invasion by the British was hardly likely.

Instead, both sides would make “a desperate effort” to seize enemy vessels. Thus,

264 fortifications were the “only certain security” that would ensure American superiority on the lakes. René DeRussy agreed, reminding Secretary Conrad that fortifications had proven their worth, as at Plattsburgh in 1814, and permanent works would enable citizen soldiers to provide the necessary defense, freeing up regular soldiers for use elsewhere. The northern frontier was exposed to the British, and it deserved the government’s “watchful eye and fostering care.”^°

The strongest case for maintaining the current system of fortifications on the northern frontier was, of course, that of Joseph Totten. The Chief of Engineers disagreed that the population and commercial marine of the lakes region even reduced the need for fortifications. In his view, nothing had occurred that would “justify the relinquishment of the system of defence for the northern frontier.” Totten expanded these views in a report

“on the subject of national defences” in November 1851. The majority of the report covered the seacoast defenses, and Totten repeated many of the recommendations for the northern frontier that he had made in the previous report in 1840. Totten admitted that the United States had naval supremacy on the Upper Lakes, an advantage that would only increase with time. Nevertheless, the nation needed strong works at Forts Brady,

Mackinac, Gratiot, and Wayne to protect the local population, to serve as rallying points for the local militia, and to protect American vessels. Forts Porter and Niagara, and a new tower at Buffalo, were crucial to the defense of the Niagara frontier, while Fort

Ontario would help protect the commercial marine on Lake Ontario, where the United

States did not possess superiority. To cut off Upper Canada from British reinforcements,

Totten repeated his recommendation for temporary fortifications near Ogdensburg. In addition, he stressed the importance of Fort Montgomery, which commanded the outlet of

265 Lake Champlain and made the decisive thrust against the St. Lawrence near Montreal possible. In order to provide adequate defense for the northern frontier, Totten thus urged that the present system of defenses be completed, a task requiring additional appropriations of $528,642 (table 7.2).^*

Fort Estimated Cost Guns Armament Cost Peace Gamson War Garrison (ri (companies) (men) Bradv 75.000 35 18,953 1 300 Mackinac 50,000 39 25,613 1 300 Gratiot 50.000 39 25,613 I 300 Wayne 250.000 63 44,724 1 300 Porter 150,000 64 5L208 1 300 Niagara 84,027 21 12,961 1 300 Ontano 83,013 30 18.610 1 300 Montgomery 411,497 164 132,386 1 500 Total 1,153,537 455 330,068 8 2,600 Maritime frontier 44,958,626 12,685 8,345,066 il'A 62,300 Northern frontier as 2.5 3.4 3.8 14.4 4 % of national total * Includes one hundred rounds of per gun. SOURCE: Joseph G. Totten, Report o f General J.G. Totten, Chief Engineer, on the Subject o f National Defences (.Washington: A. Boyd, 1851; reprint. New York: Amo Press, 1979), 86-87, 108.

Table 7.2: Estimates to complete defenses of northern frontier, 1851.

In his report, Totten emphasized that the major operation in a war against Britain would be an invasion of Canada using Lake Champlain as a base. Thus, it was important not to let any British attack between Montreal and Lake Superior divert the United States from the true decisive point, the St. Lawrence. Totten did admit that the American superiority maritime resources would be a great advantage, as would the huge population, which could permit “a great flood of armed men [to] sweep across the whole surface of

Canada—effacing all organized resistance, and trampling down all opposition.” Such a movement would not provide a decisive result, however. Totten warned that the British would merely fall back on Lower Canada without conducting a serious defense. Once

266 established in the vicinity of the St. Lawrence, American forces would be faced with not just the force of Canada but all the resources of Britain, “a nation always ready with great military power, and prepared with naval means to throw a large army upon the lake shores.” American attacks on Upper Canada would be “unnecessary, and fruitless,” costly in terms of life and treasure, and not capable of “gaining any advantage of vital moment.” It would thus be better for the vast population of the lakes region to act on the defensive, thwarting the diversionary attacks that the British would be sure to launch as they did in the War of 1812.^^

Instead, the government should resist the temptation to divert its effort in order to deal with British harassment farther west. Montreal was “the true point of attack,” as it was in the War of 1812. The government could not allow itself to be alarmed again by the “clamor raised by other frontier districts” and weaken the efforts against Lower

Canada. By taking Montreal or both banks of the St. Lawrence River, an action that would require “a great battle,” American forces would paralyze Upper Canada by cutting it off from the mother country. By capturing Quebec, “the last barrier that can be manned by the British,” the United States could complete the victory and bring the war to a decisive conclusion.^^

In Totten’s view the thrust against the Montreal region was the key to decision in any future war with Britain. The key to this invasion was a strong fortification at the outlet of Lake Champlain, which would ensure the use of that lake to American forces massing for operations against Lower Canada. Fort Montgomery, then, was the most important fortification on the northern frontier. It was also one of the most important locations for the very security of the entire United States and its future as the dominant

267 power in North America. Even the most parsimonious Congressman could not argue with that.

Despite Totten’s confidence in the nation’s fortification system. Secretary

Conrad’s investigation shook the confidence of Congress in the plans of the engineers.

Since 1850 Congress had made no new appropriations for any forts, much less for those on the northern frontier. Fortunately, most of the forts on the northern frontier were substantially complete and only needed minor repairs or the construction of barracks. At

Fort Montgomery, however, construction stopped in June 1851 and little was done other than to protect the site and building materials. Without funds, work could not continue.

When appropriations did resume in August 1854 (Appendix A) Fort Montgomery received $15,000, and construction started anew. Nevertheless, while work continued at the outlet of Lake Champlain, the other key forts on the northern frontier began to decay, especially the earthen ramparts at Forts Ontario, Niagara, and Wayne. In fact, by 1857

Totten was requesting masonry ramparts at those key forts. By contrast Fort Porter, built of stone, was in good condition. Furthermore, none of the forts on the northern frontier had received their full armament, a problem that existed on the maritime frontiers as well.^'*

Thus, by 1860 the fortifications along the border were in a weakened state. There was considerable debate in both American and European circles about the utility of masonry fortifications in light of experience in the , and there was a movement of “Young Turks” in the Engineer Department that advocated earthen batteries instead. One of these iconoclastic officers, James St. Clair Morton, was able to plead his case successfully with Secretary of War John Floyd. By 1859 the Secretary was

268 expressing the opinion that there was no longer any need to appropriate funds for masonry fortifications. In this atmosphere. Congress would understandably be reluctant to expend money on forts that were obsolete to start with. In addition, there seemed to be little fear of war with Britain by the late 1850s, further reducing the need for expensive fortifications along the northern frontier. Only at Fort Montgomery, the most important work, did construction continue. Even then, it remained unarmed and without a garrison, occupied only by the engineer in charge and the seasonal work crew.^^

The naval defenses of the northern frontier declined in a similar fashion. Despite petitions from various state legislatures. Congress did nothing to prepare facilities such as naval stations, depots, or dry docks on the Great Lakes. There were stockpiles of naval ordnance on Lakes Ontario and Erie,^^ but bodies such as the Pennsylvania legislature felt that such resources were inadequate. Petitioning Congress in March 1852 for a dry dock and naval yard somewhere on the lake frontier, the Pennsylvanians asserted that the region’s fertility, material abundance, and growing commerce and population entitled it to the “cherishing and protecting care” of the federal government. There were obviously some politicians on the northern frontier who wanted tangible evidence of government concern for the well-being of the border region. By 1856, the value of commerce on the lakes exceeded that of the seaboard, $629,423,320 to $536,625,366. From the point of view of local politicians, there was thus a need for safe harbors and other measures to secure lake shipping. There were indeed 105 guns on Lakes Ontario and Erie, the most important of the Great Lakes, and they could be used to arm commercial vessels. What the Permsylvania legislature wanted, however, were facilities to build and repair war vessels for use on the lake ffontier.^^

269 Nevertheless, both the Navy and the Congressional Committees on Naval Affairs opposed further naval measures on the Great Lakes. Although Sackets Harbor continued to receive small appropriations for repairs, the Navy Department saw no need for any other provisions for the defense of the lake frontier. In 1852 Joseph Smith, Chief of the

Bureau of Navy Yards and Docks, reported to Congress that he opposed constmction of more navy yards and docks than the Navy required. In his opinion, if a yard was not located “so as to afford ample and ready facilities” for the construction of vessels, it would not be an element “of strength or usefulness” to either the nation or the Navy.

Smith noted that Congress might deem it expedient to spread appropriations throughout the country, but he felt that such practice damaged the efficiency of the naval service.

Given the Agreement of 1817, Smith pointed out, a naval force on the lakes could only be of use during a war. At most, the government should just acquire suitable sites for the deposit of naval stores for use in emergency. Despite the British ability to get light- gunboats up their canals onto the lakes. Smith did not doubt that the United States would easily gain naval supremacy, given its superiority in merchant vessels, railroads, and “the energy of our people.”^*

The naval defense of the northern frontier thus continued to rest on the large

American commercial fleet on the lakes. There were few federal vessels afloat, the most important of which, the U.S.S. Michigan, continued its patrols. In addition, six fiffy-ton schooners, John B. Floyd, Jacob Thompson, Isaac Toucey, Aaron V. Brown, Jeremiah

Black, and Howell Cobb were built in 1856 as revenue cutters to prevent illegal trade on the lakes. The construction did alarm the British, but they accepted American assurances that the cutters were not vessels of war. Those individuals responsible for naval affairs

270 thus did not see the necessity for further preparations along the northern frontier. As the

House Committee on Naval Affairs pointed out in February 1857, the desire to maintain good Anglo-American relations, the stipulations of the Agreement of 1817, and the superior American transportation network made navy yards, depots, or dry docks

unnecessary.^^

Given the great and rapid development o f the border regions, the lack of interest in the military and naval defenses of the northern frontier was reasonable. Canals remained an important factor in defense, and the last major one on the northern frontier, a ship canal at Sault Ste. Marie, was completed in 1855. Canals allowed the concentration of men and materiel at threatened points, and if large enough they could help gunboats reach the Great Lakes. By the late 1850s, however, advocates of canal construction emphasized the commercial benefits more than the military ones. For example, in 1858 a

House Committee recommended federal assistance to a ship canal around Niagara Falls.

The waterway would remove “the last formidable barrier” to commerce between the west and the east.“

This was now the age of the railroad, and many observers felt that railroads could provide a great advantage in a war. Secretary of War John Floyd, for example, reported in 1857 that the railroad “obviates forever” the need for standing armies or a navy larger than that necessary to protect national commerce. They allowed rapid concentration of military resources, permitting the United States to draw upon its entire population for the defense of the frontiers. Although engineers such as Joseph Totten disagreed, there was also considerable opinion in Congress that railroads eliminated the need for frontier fortifications. The United States had more than 30,000 miles of track by 1860, and

271 improving Anglo-American relations resulted in several international railroad connections in the 1850s. These links included lines to Montreal from Boston by 1851, from New York by 1852, and from Portland, Maine by 1853; the construction of the

Niagara Lower Bridge in 1855 allowing railroad travel between New York state and Upper Canada; and the construction of the Victoria Bridge in 1859 spanning the deep and swift St. Lawrence at Montreal. The American rail network tied all the important centers of population and industry together, and since the more than 2,000 miles of

Canadian track followed the border closely, the Canadian railroads could also serve

American military purposes in case of a war. Again, American superiority was evident, and the northern frontier appeared to have little need for an extensive system of fortifications or naval facilities.^*

Finally, the far larger population of the United States seemed to provide adequate defense for the frontiers. By 1860 the states of the northern frontier had a population of approximately 13,881,000, while British North America numbered only about 3,171,000

(Appendix E and F). Furthermore, the excellent American transportation network made it possible to concentrate this larger pool of military manpower for the defense of the northern frontier. While Canada could draw on British support as well, help had to come across over 3,000 miles of ocean and along a vulnerable border. Although many

American army officers wanted the nation to rely on a skilled and disciplined force of regular troops, the supporters of volunteers claimed that the Mexican War had vindicated the use of volunteers as a tool to achieve national objectives. Volunteers were more daring, possessed more valor, and fought harder in order to end the war as quickly as possible. The Regular Army strength remained at around 15,000 men. Congress

272 supposing that volunteers would be available in time of danger, and garrisons along the northern frontier vanished. The population o f the northern frontier was more than capable of defending itself while a small regular army invaded Lower Canada. Thus by

1860 there was only one company of infantry each at Plattsburgh and Fort Mackinac

(table 7.3). Given the difficulties of protecting the westem territories, the Army could no longer be expected to maintain troops along the peaceful border with Canada.^^

Location 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 Fl Sullivan 47 1 ——————— Plattsburgh 1 1 ————— 58 61 Madison Barracks 1 1 ——————— F t Ontario 36 1 63 68 63 ———— F t Niagara 60 51 — — — ———— F t Gratiot 1 1 — — — ———— F t Mackinac 50 57 49 40 37 66 70 56 64 F t Bradv 49 55 46 43 36 80 ——— Total 245 168 158 151 136 146 70 114 125 U.S. total 1L202 10,417 10.745 15.752 15,562 15,764 17,498 16,435 16,367 SOURCE: Reports of the Secretary of War. 1852: 32d Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. /, vol. 2, ser. 659. 52-55; 1853: 33d Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. I. vol. 2, ser. 691; 1854: 33d Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. E x Doc. 1, vol. 2, ser. 747, 54-55; 1855: 34th Cong., 1st sess. Sen. Ex Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 811, 132-33; 1856: 34th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. E x Doc. 5, vol. 3, ser. 876, 236-37; 1857: 35th Cong., 1st sess .Sen. E x Doc. II. vol. 3, ser. 920,68-69; 1858: 35th Cong, 2d sess.. Sen. Ex Doc. I. vol. 3, ser. 976, 770-71; 1859: 36th Cong, 1st sess.. Sen. E x Doc. 2. vol. 2, ser. 1024, 598-99; I860: 36th Cong, 2d sess, Sen. Ex Doc. I. vol. 2, ser. 1079, 214-15. United States totals are in Pnicha, .4 Guide to the Military Posts o f the United States. 143-44

Table 7.3: Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1852-1860.

Although up to 20,000 fugitive slaves had fled to Canada from the South in the

1850s, there were few issues that still threatened good relations between Britain and the

United States. In 1854 the Reciprocity Treaty provided for a closer economic relationship between British North America and the United States, granting Americans free access to the North American fisheries, the St. Lawrence, and Canadian canals in exchange for fewer regulations on the importation of Canadian goods. In 1859 a dispute over the international boundary in the San Juan Islands was resolved diplomatically.

273 partly due to the good offices of General Winfield Scott, who hurried to the Pacific

Northwest and defused tensions as he had done during the Patriot troubles twenty years

before. Britain’s imperial policy by the late 1850s entailed the abandonment of

expensive fortification schemes and a reliance on superior naval power stationed at

selected, well-fortified bases. Forces in Bermuda, the Bahamas, and the Caribbean could

hold American seaports hostage to the good behavior of their government. There were also some 3,000 regulars in Canada and 2,000 at Halifax, and most fortifications, with the exception of Halifax, Quebec, and Kingston, were abandoned or fell into disrepair. For example. Fort Lennox, on the Richelieu River and an outpost on the likely American invasion route, was a youth reform school by 1857. Although the choice of Ottawa as capital in 1858 was due in part to its location remote from the border, Britain did not consider an Anglo-American war likely and expected Canadians to bear more of the defense burden.^^

By 1860, then, Americans had good reason to expect peace along the northern frontier. Some military men warned that war in general was still a possibility, and they pointed to the Crimean War as proof that a European power could equip a large army, ship it 3,000 miles to a distant theater, and conduct operations for over a year. Army officers also occasionally spied on British fortifications that might play a role in a future war. Nevertheless, peace appeared to be the natural condition of Anglo-American relations by 1860. In fact, when Prince Albert sent Edward, Prince of Wales to visit

Canada and strengthen ties between the mother country and her colonies. President James

Buchanan, former minister to Britain, invited the prince to the United States as well.

After touring British North America, Prince Edward visited most of the major northern

274 cities between St. Louis and Boston between 20 September and 20 October. Americans greeted the prince enthusiastically with balls, parades, and military displays everywhere he went, and the visit helped create a feeling of American solidarity with Britain. Little did Americans on the northern frontier know that there would indeed be a strong possibility of war with Britain a year later. This time, the proximate cause would be a war between Americans.^

275 * * Joseph G. Totten, Report o f General J.G. Totten, C hi^ Engineer, on the Subject of National Defences (Washington; A. Boyd, 1851; reprint, New York: Amo Press, 1979), 85.

^ Totten had suggested that an appropriation for works at the junction o f the Mattawamkeag and Penobscot Rivers, a recommendation in previous reports on the defense of Maine, be transferred to the site on the Penobscot Narrows, which would later be named . Totten evidently felt that Bangor fulfilled the same diversionary role that the river junction site did, and no works were ever built there; see “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 1 November 1842, in 27th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 413, 236-82.

^ “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 2 November 1843, in 28th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 431, 89-91, and “Report o f the Chief Engineer,” 30 November 1844, in 28th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 449, 161-63; Daniel Webster, The Works o f Daniel Webster, vol. 5 (Boston: Charles C Little and James Brown, 1851), 116; James L. Mason, An Analytical Investigation of the Resistance of Piles to Superincumbent Pressure, Deduced from the Force o f Driving: with an Application o f the Formula to the FouncEitions of Fort Montgomery, Rouse’s Point, N.Y. Papers on Practical Engineering No. 5. (Washington: Robert A. Waters, 1850). For plans of the fort at Rouses Point, see “Rouses Point,” 13 October 1843, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 7-14 and “Plan and Sections of F o rt , Rouse’s Point,” 30 September 1844, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 7-15. For appropriations, see Appendix A.

* “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 2 November 1843, in 28th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 431, 89-91. An inspection of Madison Barracks in November 1843 found them clean and in good repair; see Francis Paul Prucha, ed.. Army Life on the Westem Frontier: Selections from the Official Reports Made Between 1826 and 1845 by Colonel George Croghan (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 50. For a plan of the barracks, see “Madison Barracks,” 1842, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 142-23. For lake tonnage in 1846, see “A report from the Topographical Bureau, in relation to the commerce, navigation, and means of defence of the western lakes and rivers,” 10 December 1847, in 30th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. 4, vol. 2, ser. 504, 24, 31-32, 49-51.

’ The “Tower at Black Rock” was a classic tour modèle, a type of fortification developed by French engineers around 1800. Napoleon ordered their construction as coastal defenses starting in 1811; see Quentin Hughes, Military Architecture: The Art of Defence from Earliest Times to the Atlantic Wall (Liphook: Beaufort Publishing, 1974, 1991), 148-50. American engineers adopted the French design and used it at a few isolated locations: Boston Harbor, Key West, and near New Orleans.

* “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 30 November 1844, in 28th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 449. 161-63; Lois Prance and James R. Irwin, “History of Fort Wayne,” Michigan History Magazine 30 (January-March 1946): 5-40. For plans of the works at Black Rock, see “Plan and Sections of Tower at Black Rock,” February 1843, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawers 5-5-2 and 5-5-3, and “Plan of projected for Black Rock,” March 1843, NA, RG 77, Misc. Forts File, Black Rock, NY, #1. Future Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs was the officer in charge of the works at Detroit from 1843 to 1849. For his tenure there, see Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster General o f the : A Biography o f M.C. Meigs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 37-48.

^ For the explanation of the temporary nature of some of the forts, see Joseph G. Totten to George McClellan, December 1861, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 10, 22-23.

* Named for Secretary of War William Wilkins, the fort was built in response to a petition from the Michigan congressional delegation. The purpose of the post was to prevent conflict between local Indians and the growing white population that was attracted by the copper mines of the Keweenaw Peninsula. Over 600 miles from the regimental headquarters at Detroit, Fort Wilkins was dependent on lake transports

276 for supply; a monthly 300-mile dogsled expedition kept communications open with the post during the winter. The post closed in 1846 when the troops went to Texas and the copper rush ended, but a garrison again occupied the fort after the Civil War, see “Report of the Secretary o f War,” 30 November 1844, in 28th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 449, 114, and Thomas Friggens, “Fort Wilkins: Frontier Fort,” Michigan History 61 (Fall 1977): 220-50. For the copper district on Lake Superior, see Ralph H. Brown, Historical Geography o f the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1948), 303-05.

’ For Forts Kent and Fairfield, see “Report of the Secretary of War,” 30 November 1843, in 28th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 431, 52-53. For the condition of the forts in Michigan, see Prucha, A rm y Life on the Westem Frontier, 40-41, 47, and 50, and “Report o f the Quartermaster General,” 25 October 1843, in 28th Cong., 1st sess.. Sert Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 431, 74; Wilkins’s comments are in “Report of the Secretary of War,” 30 November 1844, in 28th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 449, 114.

Thomas F. Mcllwraith, “Freight Capacity and Utilization of the Erie and Great Lakes Canals before 1850,” Journal of Economic History 36 (December 1976): 852-75. For Scott’s views on Jefferson Barracks, see “Report of the Secretary of War,” 24 November 1843, in 28th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 431, 63.

" George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (Hew York: Rinehart, 1951), 61-62; “Measures to open a canal around the Falls of St. Mary’s,” 9 April 1844, in 28th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 268, vol. 4, ser. 434.

John F. Stover, The Life and Decline of the American Railroad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 11, 155; William J. Wilgus, The Railway Interrelations of the United States and Canada (New Haven. Yale University Press, 1937), 40-42. For Spencer’s thoughts on railroads, see “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1 December 1841, in 27th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 395, 65-66. For the Great Westem Railway, see E.G. Campbell, “Railroads in National Defense, 1829-1848,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 27 (1940): 373-74. For a regional study of government assistance to railroad construction, see Harry H. Pierce, Railroads of New York: A Study of Government Aid 1826-1875 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).

“Electro-Magnetic Telegraph,” 3 June 1844, in 28th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 270, vol. 6, ser. 444; Robert L. Thompson, Wiring a Continent: The History o f the Telegraph litdustry in the United States, 1832-1866 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 91, 239-42. See Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 151-52, for the assertion that the telegraph experienced the most rapid growth of any element of the transportation revolution.

*■* “The Navy and the West,” Southern Literary Messenger 9 (January 1843): 2, 5; Blake, quoted in H.A. Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: Warships and Iron Hulls, 1841-1846,” American Neptune 8 (April 1948): 132. For lake tonnage in 1846, see “A report from the Topographical Bureau, in relation to the commerce, navigation, and means of defence of the western lakes and rivers,” 10 December 1847, in 30th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. 4, vol. 2, ser. 504, 24, 31-32, 49-51.

Bradley A. Rodgers, Guardian o f the Great Lakes: The U.S. Paddle Frigate Michigan (Arm Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 1-39, 147.

Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: Warships and Iron Hulls, 1841-1846,” 132-49; Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 125-29. For Peel’s concerns, see Paul Knaplund, “The Armaments on the Great Lakes, American Historical Review AO 1935): 473-76.

“Inventory of Public Property at the Sacketts Harbor Station,” NA, RG 45, Subject File, U.S. Navy, 1775-1910, Box 554, Folder 4. The inventory reports that the ordnance on hand consisted of 200 8-inch shell, 100 8-inch shot, 2,500 32-pounder shot, and 13 6-pounder shot. The claim that the ship could be 277 pierced for “ 140 guns” is suspect, given that the naval list of 1816 listed her as a 74. Furthermore, the inventory describes the vessel in the shiphouse as the “Ship of the Line Chippewa;” that vessel had been sold over a decade prior.

** “Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 19 November 1844, in 28th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen Doc. 1, vol. 1, ser. 449, 542-43. For naval appropriations, see “Appropriations and Expenditiu'es of the Navy Department,” 45th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen Ex. Doc. 3, vol. 3, ser. 1782, 15. For a map of the facilities at Sackets Harbor, see “Sackets Harbor,” 31 July 1843, NA, RG 71, Central Office Plans File, Map 313-3-11. The New Orleans remained on the navy rolls until an act passed on 3 March 1883 ordered her sale. Appraised at $200, the ship was bought in September for $427.50; see “Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 48th Cong., 1st sess.. H ouse Ex. Doc. 1, vol. 8, ser. 2188, 162-65, and “Sale of Naval Hulks,” Army and Navy Journal 21 (29 September 1883), 177. For the U.S. Navy’s role in American commercial policy, see John H. Schroeder, Sluiping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American M ny (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1985).

Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 120-25. For Tyler’s message, see “Message from the President o f the United States,” 5 December 1843, in 28th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen Doc. 1, vol. 1, ser. 431. For the ideology of American expansionism, see Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study o f Nationalist Expansionism in American History (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963).

“ Bourne, Britain and the Balance o f Power in North America, 143; C.J. Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, I815-J853 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 174-83; Wilbur Devereux Jones, Lord Aberdeen and the Americas (Athens. University of Georgia Press, 1958), 37. Starting in 1844, there had been a great war scare concerning a French invasion of the English Charmel coast. The Prince de Joinville had published a study that suggested that lightning strikes against the British coastline and commerce, made possible by steamships, could redress France’s weakness relative to the Royal Navy. France had over 500,000 men in its army, while the British had only about 49,000 in the entire British Isles, an indication to some that Britain did not have sufficient regular troops to contest a French landing or defend London. Although the French never had the resources to launch a successful cross-Channel attack, there was great concern in the age of steam that the Channel no longer presented a barrier to invasion. The British government thus took steps to increase its naval forces and to fortify the coast; see Michael S. Partridge, Military Planning fo r the Defense of the United Kingdom, 1814-1870 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989). Given the British concerns in Europe, the “crisis” in the Oregon Country would seem to be of far less import to Britain than to the United States.

John K. Mahon, History o f the Militia and the National Guard, (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 83; K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (Lincoln: Bison Books, 1974, 1992), 18-19. For Fort Kent, see “Report of the Secretary of War,” 30 November 1844, in 28th Cong., 2d sess.. S en Doc. 1, vol. 1, ser. 449, 114. For a local study of the militia in the 1840s, see Anthony Marro, “Vermont’s Local Militia Units, 1815-1860,” Vermont History 40 (1972): 28-42. For contemporary praise of the citizen soldier and scathing criticism of the militia system, see [Edward B. Hunt?], “Army Attack and National Defense,” American Review 4 (August 1846): 150-51.

“Report of the Chief Engineer,” 1 November 1845, in 29th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 470, 236-39; Joseph G. Totten to Montgomery Meigs, 11 June 1845, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 7,211-15; “Report of the Quartermaster General,” 31 October 1845, in 29th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. 1, vol. 1, ser. 470, 225. Fort Brady was in need o f repairs again by 1858, and local residents pleaded unsuccessfully with Congress for a new fortification to command the river and canal; see “Petition for examination o f present condition of Fort Brady & its site,” NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 198, SW2898.

“ “Fortification at the Mouth o f Genesee River,” 11 January 1845, in 28th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 36, vol. 1, ser. 468; “Resolutions o f the Council of Rochester,” 24 February 1846, in 29th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 162, vol. 4, ser. 473; “Fortification at the Mouth o f Genesee River,” 5 March 1846, in 29th Cong., 1st 278 sess.. House Rep. 392, vol. 2, ser. 489; “Report in reference to the strengthening o f Fort Gratiot,” 14 March 1845, in 29th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 3, vol. 3, ser. 472. For plans to construct a permanent fortification mounting seventy-two guns at Fort Gratiot, see Montgomery C. Meigs, “Project for Rebuilding Fort Gratiot,” February 1846, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 1-9.

Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats; Warships and Iron Hulls, 1841-1846,” 146-49. For the works at Sackets Harbor, see “Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 29th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 470, 666, 698, and “A Plan of Sacketts Harbor,” 1845, NA, RG 71, Central Office Plans File, Map 313-3- 10. Despite a recommendation by the House Committee on Military Affairs in March 1846, Sackets Harbor did not receive major fortifications that would secure the harbor and be an important part of the northern frontier defense system defined by the engineers in 1840; see “Fortifications at Sackett s Harbor,” 27 March 1846, in 29th Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 449, vol. 2, ser. 489.

“ Harry Bluff “Lake Defences and Westem Interests,” Southern Literary Messenger 11 (February 1845): 83-91.

“ The value in 1846 of imports and exports at selected lake ports was: Whitehall ($6,327,489); Sackets Harbor ($2,735,091); Oswego ($9,502,980); Rochester ($212,926); Buffalo ($48,989,116); Erie ($6,373,246); Cleveland ($12,559,110); Detroit ($8,706,348); Chicago ($3,927,150). See “A report fi"om the Topographical Bureau, in relation to the commerce, navigation, and means of defence of the westem lakes and rivers,” 10 December 1847, in 30th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. 4, vol. 2, ser. 504, 4-5.

^ Harry Bluff “Lake Defences and Westem Interests,” 83-91. Surveys for the navy yard at Memphis started in 1845; see “Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 29th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 470, 665. For an endorsement of Maury’s plan for a ship canal, see “The Lakes and the Valley of the Mississippi,” Southern Literary Messenger 11 (March 1845): 188-92. For population data for 1846, see “A report fi-om the Topographical Bureau, in relation to the commerce, navigation, and means of defence of the westem lakes and rivers,” 10 December 1847, in 30th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. 4, vol. 2, ser. 504, 23.

Harry Bluff “Lake Defences and Westem Interests,” 85-86.

^ Joseph G. Totten and C. Morris to George Bancroft 18 November 1845, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 7, 155.

In 1845 the following ordnance was in storage on the Great Lakes: Sackets Harbor (ten 8” shell guns, twenty-five 32-pounders, 2,800 shot and shell); Buffalo (ten 8” shell guns, twenty 32-pounders, 2,750 shot and shell); Erie (ten 8” shell guns, 2,250 shot and shell); see Joseph G. Totten and C. Morris to George Bancroft, 18 November 1845, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 7, 156-57.

Joseph G. Totten and C. Morris to George Bancroft 18 November 1845, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 7, 156-58, 163-66. The revenue cutter Dallas, built for duty on Lake Erie, was also near completion.

Surely, though. Lake Michigan would have supplied sufficient water for the canal, a point made by Stephen Long after a survey of the area in 1817; see “Letter fi-om the Secretary of War, Transmitting Topographical Reports, Made with a View to Ascertain the Practicability of Uniting the Waters of Illinois River, with Those of Lake Michigan,” 4 March 1817, in 16th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 17, vol. 2, ser. 32.

Joseph G. Totten and C. Morris to George Bancroft 18 November 1845, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 7, 171-76.

Two likely sites for Lake Erie naval depots were Sandusky and Erie. Both sites had excellent rail and 279 water communications with the interior and possessed harbors of sufficient depth to accommodate lakes vessels. Sandusky did have an advantage in that it was free of ice several weeks before ports on the lower lake. For petitions suggesting these sites as naval depots, see Petition to Congress [received by Engineer Department, 17 November 1845], NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 45, C l890, and “Resolutions of the Legislature of Pennsylvania,” 1 April 1846, in 29th Cong., 1st sess. Sen. Doc. 264, vol. 5, ser. 474. The Pennsylvania legislature also petitioned Congress for a macadamized road between the Pittsburgh Arsenal and Erie, which would provide “safe, cheap, and speedy transportation” o f men and materiel to the northern frontier. The road would also help the economy and development o f the region by providing a link between the northern frontier and the Atlantic seaboard; see “Resolutions o f the Legislature of Pennsylvania,” 2 February 1846, in 29th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Doc. 98, vol. 4, ser. 473.

Joseph G. Totten and C. Morris to George Bancroft, 18 November 1845, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 7, 158-62, 170-71.

^ Ibid., 166-70. Nevertheless, the British were not so sure of their naval supremacy on Lake Ontario, building six new gun towers at Kingston between 1845 and 1848; many British officials considered this a vain attempt to resist the military power the Americans could throw across the lake; see Ivan J. Saimders, A History of Martello Towers in the Defence o f British North America, 1796-1871 (Ottawa; Parks Canada, 1976), 52-74, 118-54. Saunders suggests that the gun towers never made any significant contribution to Kingston's security, but were instead a fast and cheap solution that was meant to reassure the population and vaguely serve some useful military purpose.

Joseph G. Totten to Captain William D. Fraser and Lieutenant John L. Mason, 11 November 1845, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 7, 145-49. For the results of Fraser’s and Mason’s survey for a St. Lawrence River fort, see “Plan of the Proposed Field Work on an Island in Stone’s Bay to Command the St. Lawrence River,” November 1845, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 113-46. The plan called for a field work in the form of an irregular trapezoid, mounting thirty-five guns, with barracks and a magazine. The United States never built a fortification to command the St. Lawrence. For the condition of the St. Lawrence and Welland Canals in the mid-1840s, see H A. Musham, “Early Great Lakes Steamboats: The Battle of the Windmill and Afterward, 1838-1842,” American Neptune 8 (January 1948): 56-58.

For British defenses along the Richelieu River, see André Charbonneau, The Fortifications o f ile aux Noix: A Portrait of the Defensive Strategy on the Upper Richelieu Border in the I8th and I9th Centuries (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1994), 262-65, 281-86. For continued Congressional concern about the defense of the lakes frontier, see “A report from the Topographical Bureau, in relation to the commerce, navigation, and means of defence o f the westem lakes and rivers,” 10 December 1847, in 30th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. 4, vol. 2, ser. 504.

H. Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science; or. Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles, &c.; Embracing the Duties of Staff, Irfcmtry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia (New York: D. Appleton, 1846; reprint, Westport Ct : Greenwood Press, 1971), 231-34.

For a confident assertion that Britain wished to preserve its friendship with the United States in order to ensure the security of its cotton supply, see William H. Chase, Memoir on the Defence of the and the Strategic Principles Governing the National Defences (New Orleans: Jeffersonian Office, 1846), 18-19. Chase was an army engineer active in the construction of Gulf Coast fortifications. If war did come, he was certain that Canada would be an easy conquest. Other Army engineers were not so sanguine about a war with Britain. For example, John G. Barnard, a protege of Joseph Totten, warned that New York City was not strongly fortified enough to thwart an attack by British warships based at Bermuda; see John G. Barnard, “Harbor Defence by Fortifications and Steam-Vessels,” The Southern Literary M essenger 11 (January 1845): 30. For a similar view stressing the need for adequate fortifications to defend against British attack, see [Edward B. Hunt?], “Army Attack and National Defense,” 146-60. The opinion stresses that since the lower portion of the St. Lawrence River was “in the possession of the first

2 8 0 naval power on earth,” the United States needed fortifications to command all avenues of approach and thwart invasion. Otherwise, the British could launch a successful preemptive strike or conduct what would be termed today spoiling operations along the northern frontier. It was important to build permanent fortifications on all frontiers to meet “invasion at the threshold” and halt “that torrent which, unarrested, would bear destruction in its train.”

Julius W. Pratt, “James K. Polk and John Bull,” Canadian Historical Review 24 (December 1943): 341- 49. For British intelligence concerning the population of Oregon, see Joseph Schafer, ed., “Documents Relative to Warre and Vavasour’s Military Reconnaissance in Oregon, 1845-6,” Oregon Historical Society Quarterly 10 (March 1909): 1-99. For the Oregon Boundary Treaty, see “Treaty between Her Majesty and the United States of America, for the Settlement of the Oregon Boundary,” in Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada in Force between His Majesty and the United States of America, with Subsidiary Documents, 1814-1925 (Ottawa: F A. Acland, 1927), 28-29.

For this acquiescence, especially in Central America, see Bourne, Britain and the Balance o f Power in North America, 170-205, and Kenneth Bourne, “The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Decline of British Opposition to the Territorial Expansion of the United States, 1857-60,” Journal of Modem History 33 (September 1961): 287-91. For an example of Anglo-American cooperation during the period, see “Protocol of Conference between Her Majesty and the United States of America, Relative to the Cession by Great Britain to the United States of Horseshoe Reef on Lake Erie, for the Purpose of Erecting a Lighthouse,” in Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada, 33. In 1850, Britain ceded Horseshoe Reef, near the mouth of Lake Erie at Buffalo, to the United States for the construction of a lighthouse, so long as the Americans built no fortification on the site.

President Polk asserted that the Mexican War had demonstrated the ability of the United States to raise an effective army “of citizen soldiers equal to veteran troops, and in numbers equal to any emergency.” In Polk’s view, the citizen soldiers of the United Stales, especially those of the West, were excellent marksmen, intelligent, and of good standing; see “Message from the President of the United States,” 5 December 1848, in 30th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 537, 5-6. Not everyone agreed, however, especially the regulars who were aghast at the lack of discipline among volunteers and believed that a larger force of regulars could have defeated Mexico more efficiently. See, for example, Winfield Scott’s criticism quoted in Mahon, History o f the Militia and the National Guard, 92.

For the reduction of the British garrison and the use of discharged veterans, see Bourne, Britain and the Balance o f Power in North America, 173-74, 186, and George K. Raudzens, “A Successful Military Settlement: Earl Grey’s Enrolled Pensioners of 1846 in Canada,” Canadian Historical Review 52 (December 1971): 389-403. For volunteers, see “Volunteers Received into the Service of the United States,” 29th Cong., 2d sess.. House Doc. 42, vol. 3, ser. 499. For American troop dispositions in 1846 and 1847, see the reports of the Secretary of War in 29th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 493, 68, and 30th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 503, 96. For the forces in Mexico and related areas in 1847, see the latter report, page 75.

“Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 1 December 1849, in 31st Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 549, 563, 575; “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 9 November 1849, in 31st Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 549, 211-12; “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 30 November 1850, in 31st Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Ex Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 587, 347-49. The new northern frontier forts received their official names in January 1849; see “General Orders No. 6,” 31 January 1849, NA, RG 94, M l094, roll 6.

^ Totten, Report o f General J.G. Totten, 78.

Stover, The Life and Decline of the American Railroad, 22-29, 155; Richard A. Preston, Canada and "Imperial Defense A study of the origins o f the British Commonwealth's defense organization, 1867- 1919 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), 21-25. For the value that Britons placed on maintaining a formal empire in North America, see Peter Burroughs, British Attitudes towards Canada, 1822-1849

2 8 1 (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1971). A major &ctor in British reluctance to support her North American colonies was their cost. In 1844, Britain exported as much to the American market as to her colonies, namely £8 million. While the colonies cost £4 million to administer, of which 75 percent was defense related, the embassy and a few consulates in the United States cost only £15,000; see Desmond Morton, A Military History o f Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War, 3d ed., (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), 78. Britain thus hardly needed her North American colonies for guaranteed markets and economic prosperity.

■** “Fortifications,” 32d Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. 5, vol. 3, ser. 631, 131-34, 144-59, 193-218.

Ibid., 135-40, 141-44, 160-93.

“ Ibid., 219-49.

Totten, Report o f General J.G. Totten, 79-84. Totten’s report is also printed in 32d Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. 5, vol. 3, ser. 637.

Ibid., 81-83.

53 Ibid., 81-82.

” “Report of the Colonel of Engineers,” 24 November 1855, in 34th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 811, 191-92; “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 24 November 1857, in 35th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. E x Doc. I I, vol. 3, ser. 920, 168-69. For Montgomery Meigs’s tenure at Fort Montgomery from 1850 to 1852, see Weigley, Quartermaster General o f the Union Army, 50-52. For armament on hand at the northern fi-ontier forts, see “Quarterly Summary Statements of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores on Hand at Forts and Batteries,” NA, RG 156, entry 100, vol. 2. For Secretary o f War ’s concerns about the lack of fort armament, see “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1 December 1856, in 34th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. 5, vol. 3, ser. 876, 11. In Davis’s view, “fortifications without guns are worse than useless.”

” For views that the Crimean War vindicated masonry fortifications, see George B. McClellan, The Armies o f Europe (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1861), 34, Richard Delafield, Report on the Art o f War in Europe in 1854, 1855, and 1856 Washington, D C : George W. Bowman, 1860), 18, 24, and, of course, Joseph G. Totten, “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 29 November 1854, in 33d Cong., 2d sess.. Sen Ex. Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 747, 92. For Morton’s views, see James St. Clair Morton, Memoir on American Fortification Submitted to the Hon. John B. Floyd, Secretary o f War (Washington: William A. Harris, 1859).

In 1852 the following ordnance was in storage on the Great Lakes: Sackets Harbor (ten 8” shell guns, twenty-five 32-pounders, 2,800 shot and shell); Buffalo (ten 8” shell guns, twenty 32-pounders, 2,750 shot and shell); Erie (eleven 8” shell guns, four 32-pounder carronades, twenty-five 32-pounders, 1,850 shot and shell); see “Report on the establishment of a naval depot and dry dock on the lake frontier,” 32d Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Rep. 331, vol. 2, ser. 631.

“Dry Dock and Navy-Yard Depot on Lake Frontier,” 10 March 1852, in 32d Cong., 1st sess.. House Misc. Doc. 30, vol. 1, ser. 652. For lakes and maritime commerce, see House Committee on Commerce, “Improvement o f the Navigation of the Northern and Northwestern Lakes,” 2 August 1856, in 34th Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 316, vol. 3, ser. 870.

“Report on the establishment of a naval depot and dry dock on the lake fi^ontier,” 18 March 1852, in 32d Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Rep. 331, vol. 2, ser. 631.

K. Jack Bauer, “List of United States Warships on the Great Lakes, 1796-1941,” Ontario History 56 (March 1964), 60-61; “Revenue Cutters for the Lakes,” 34th Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. 45, vol. 9, ser. 853; James M. Callahan, “The Neutrality of the American Lakes and Anglo-American Relations,”

2 8 2 Johns Hopkim University Studies in Historical and Political Science 16 (January-Aprii 1898); 132-34. For the report of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, see “Navy Yard, Depot, &c., on Canada Borders,” 13 February 1857, in 34th Cong., 3d sess.. House Rep. 230, vol. 3, ser. 914. The revenue cutters remained on the lakes until 1861 when they were moved to the maritime frontier for blockade duty.

^ Ronald E. Shaw, Canals for a Nation: The Canal Era in the United States, 1790-1860 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1990), 147-48; “Niagara Ship Canal,” 11 May 1858, in 35th Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 374, vol. 3, ser. 966. For a petition stressing both the commercial and military utility of the Niagara ship canal, see “Resolutions o f the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin,” 10 May 1858, in 35th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 255, vol. 4, ser. 937. For the St. Mary’s ship canaL see William R. Willoughby, “The St. Mary’s: Our First Ship Canal,” Inland Seas 11 (Winter 1955): 243-55.

For American views on the military utility of railroads, see John B. Floyd, “Report of the Secretary of War, ” 5 December 1857, in 35th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. II, vol. 3, ser. 920, 17, and Totten, Report o f GeneralJ.G. Totten, 4-7. For international railroad connections, see Wilgus, The Railway Interrelations o f the United States and Canada, 39-AO, 159-60, 163-64.

Mahon, History o f the Militia and the National Guard, 94. For a regular officer’s view that citizen soldiers provided excellent defensive troops, at least when fighting behind entrenchments, see Morton, Memoir on American Fortification, 70-71. Regulars agreed, however, that only regular troops were suited for offensive operations. See, for example, John G. Barnard, “Memoir on National Defence,” Proceedings o f the Military Association o f the State o f New York! (1860): 55-71.

“ For fugitive slaves and their settlements in Upper Canada, see Fred Landon, “The Negro Migration to Canada after 1850,” Journal of Negro History 5 (January 1920): 22-36, and Carter G. Woodson, A Century o f Negro Migration (New York: Russell & Russell, 1918), 35-36. For the Reciprocity Treaty, see Donald C. Masters, The Reciprocity Treaty o f1854: Its History, Its Relation to British Colonial and Foreign Policy and to the Development o f Canadian Fiscal Autonomy (London: Longman’s Green, 1937; reprint, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963). For the San Juan boundary dispute, see James 0. McCabe, The San Juan Water Boundary Question (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964). For British fortification policy, see Bourne, Britain and the Balance o f Power in North America, 207-08, Preston, Canada and "Imperial Defense, " 25-27, and Charbonneau, The Fortifications o f île aux Noix, 297-300.

^ For the possibility o f war, see Edward B. Hunt, “Our Sea-Coast Defense and Fortification System,” Putnam’s Monthly Magazine of American Literature, Science and Art 7 (March 1856): 314-15. For the danger of maritime attack on the United States, demonstrated by British and French operations in the Crimean War, see Delafield, Report on the Art of War in Europe, 56, and John G. Barnard, The Dangers and Defences of New York (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1859), 43. There were cordial professional relations between American and British officers during this period; for example, see Totten’s correspondence with his counterpart. General Sir John F. Burgoyne, in Joseph G. Totten to John F. Burgoyne, 4 September 1858, 11 January and 23 August 1859, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 9, 474, 486, 499. For reconnaissance of British fortifications, see Edward Harris, “American spies at Bermuda’s forts, 1842-52,” Post-Medieval Archaeology 20 (1986): 316-20, John G. Barnard to Joseph G. Totten, February 22, 1849, NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 19, B4246, and James St. Clair Morton to Joseph G. Totten, 15 March 1856, NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 113, M2845. For the tour of the Prince of Wales, see , King Edward VU: A Biography, vol. 1, From Birth to Accession, 9th November 1841 to 22nd January 1901 (London: Macmillan, 1925), 83- 111.

283 CHAPTERS

THE CIVIL WAR, 1861-1863

Great changes have worked themselves out in the region bordering the Northern Lakes, in general population, wealth and means o f communication, all affording a vast augmentation o f power and resources applicable to war. - Joseph G. Totten, December 1861 ‘

While optimists looked forward to amicable Anglo-American relations, the

outbreak of the Civil War in April 1861 brought a renewed threat of a collision between

the two Atlantic powers. The British found themselves in a difficult position. A policy

of neutrality in the struggle was sure to anger both the Union and the Confederacy, while

outright support of one of the belligerents at the start of the war was unlikely. An

American war was the last thing the British government needed when it had to deal with

challenges such as French invasion scares or the rise of Prussia. Nevertheless, Britain

could not avoid some level of involvement in American affairs.

First, Canada could become involved in the struggle, since there were indications that the Union might look to British North America as a replacement for the lost

Confederate states. For example, between January and March 1861 the New York

Herald, a notorious peace paper, suggested that the secessionist states be allowed to

leave the Union in peace. In compensation, the Union could then absorb Canada, a

284 process that would probably be inevitable given the bonds of blood, language, religion,

and political ideas. If Canadians did not agree to annexation, however, the Union could

always secure it by force. The Governor General of Canada, Sir Edmund Head,

considered the situation in North America “most serious.” In April 1861 he declared to a

friend that “whenever their own fighting is over I do not think it will be a pleasant thing

to have 100,000 or 200,000 men kicking their heels with arms in their hands on our

frontier & all the habits acquired in a Southern Civil War.” Although Britain had granted

her North American provinces responsible government several years before, there were

still strong social, commercial, political, and military ties between the colonies and the

mother country. Any move by the United States against Canada would undoubtedly lead

to war with Britain. Thus, the British government could not sit idly by while the

Americans went to war with each other.'

Second, the Confederacy was unlikely to achieve its independence without

foreign assistance. Jefferson Davis and other prominent Southern leaders had claimed

that the Confederate States were the true repository of American values, and such

individuals looked back to the success of the Patriots during the War of Independence

against Britain. While Confederates used the American revolt against Britain as an

historical justification for their action, they also no doubt recognized that they faced a

situation somewhat similar to the one that their forefathers encountered in the 1770s.

There was never any chance that Confederate armies would physically conquer the

Union. In fact, there was no need to do so. The Confederacy only had to hold out against Union pressure long enough for one of two things to occur. Either the will of the

285 Northern people would falter and the federal government would be forced to let the

South go in peace, or European powers would intervene in order to bring the war to a halt. Weak in industrial capacity, the South would need some type of assistance from a foreign power in order to hold out long enough for either circumstance to occur. Given her political, naval, and commercial power, Britain was the most likely candidate to provide such aid. Thus, despite the fact that many Southerners were ambivalent about

Britain and considered it to be the main lair of abolitionists, the Confederacy had to take steps to force or to persuade the British to intervene. Perhaps the need for cotton would overcome any abolitionist principles on the part of Britain.^

Britain would thus play an important role in the Civil War whether or not she wanted to, a fact of which Secretary of State William Seward was well aware. It was bad enough that Britain had proclaimed its neutrality in the conflict in May and granted belligerent status to the Confederacy. British intervention could encourage France and other nations to aid the Confederacy, damage Northern and bolster Southern morale, lead to a possible military alliance with the Confederacy, and disrupt the blockade that the

Lincoln administration clamped on the Southern coastline on 19 April 1861. These were dire consequences that and his cabinet desperately wanted to avoid.

Seward thus took a hard line with the European powers in the hope that they would not think that a war with the United States was worth the risk of providing aid to the

Confederacy. In his instructions to his ministers to Britain and France, Charles Adams and William Dayton, Seward told them to insist that the war was an internal matter, not one between two powers. The United States would consider recognition of the

286 Confederacy an unfriendly act. The Lincoln administration would not tolerate any

foreign meddling in what it deemed to be American affairs. A strong stance with Britain

would prevent such interference."*

Possessing little diplomatic experience. President Lincoln relied heavily on

Seward, and the British could not be sure how the secretary would act. On the one hand,

he distrusted Britain, “the greatest, the most grasping and the most rapacious power” in

the world, the only obstacle to the global commercial supremacy of the United States.

Seward had been critical of Britain’s treatment of Ireland, and he had made no secret of

the fact that he looked forward to the eventual annexation of Canada by the United

States. In 1860 Seward had even told the foreign secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, that

if elected president he would deal harshly with Britain and go to war with her if

necessary. British government officials were thus nervous about Seward. Prime Minister

Lord Palmerston considered him a blustering and ignorant man who would either

provoke a war with Britain or turn on Canada if the Confederacy gained its

independence, while Foreign Minister Lord Russell was adamant that his government not allow Seward to trick Britain into a quarrel. On the other hand, there were indications that Seward might be better disposed to Britain than it seemed. He was a close fnend of

Lord Napier, the former British minister to the United States, and he had played a role in urging the Prince of Wales to visit the United States as a way to improve Anglo-

American relations. In addition he had sent an Anglophile, Charles Adams, as minister to the Court of St. James. ^

287 Nevertheless, despite concerns about Britain’s behavior Lincoln focused on the more pressing issue of restoring the Union. The defenses of the northern frontier declined accordingly. The artillery company at Plattsburgh Barracks had transferred to

Pensacola in January 1861, and in May the artillery company at Fort Mackinac transferred to Washington, D.C., leaving none of the posts on the northern frontier with a garrison. Instead, the forts were usually left in the care of an ordnance sergeant and used as training camps for state volunteer units.^ Some of the forts continued to decay, and in

November Chief Engineer Joseph Totten recommended the construction of stone scarps to replace the earthen ramparts of Forts Ontario, Niagara, and Wayne. While Fort Porter was in good condition, it needed its armament, as did the other fortifications on the northern frontier. Nevertheless, Totten requested appropriations only for the fort at the outlet of Lake Champlain. The key to the defense of the northern frontier. Fort

Montgomery had continued to receive small appropriations (Appendix A), but the engineers could make little progress as long as funds ran low. Totten requested $100,000 to continue masonry work and prepare the fort for its armament. Given the demands of the war, however, there was little chance that the forts would be improved any time soon.

The Union armies in the field needed both skilled engineer officers, who were in short supply, and massive amounts of money to sustain operations.^

The Quartermaster Department was active on the northern frontier, however. In

July 1861, Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs recommended that the government use one of the Lake Erie islands as a prisoner of war camp. If none of the islands proved suitable, Madison Barracks or another point such as Buffalo could be alternates. He had

2 8 8 Lieutenant Colonel William Hofiftnan, Commissary-General of Prisoners, inspect the islands, and Hoffman selected Johnson’s. The island’s owner was willing to lease the island for a reasonable sum, there were forty acres of cleared land suitable for a prison compound, and nearby Sandusky provided a ready source of supplies. In addition, the proximity of Sandusky meant that there would be a substantial population nearby that could recapture any escaped prisoners. Meigs and Secretary of War Simon Cameron concurred, and Cameron directed Ohio Governor William Dennison to raise a volunteer company to serve as prison guards. Presumably, Meigs had wanted a prison camp as far from the fighting front as possible. Little did he know that he would be creating an opportunity for future rebel mischief, and a cause for war between Britain and the United

States, by suggesting a prison site along the northern frontier.*

Meanwhile naval defenses, the key to the security of the lake frontier, declined as well. The New Orleans was still on the stocks at Sackets Harbor, but she could hardly be expected to play any role in a modem war involving steam vessels and shell guns. The six revenue cutters on the lakes were transferred to the Atlantic for blockade duty, leaving the U.S.S. Michigan as the only American war vessel on the Upper Lakes. Too large to pass through the Welland Canal, Michigan could not transfer to the Atlantic. On

9 May 1861 the Navy Department ordered her commander, John Carter, to visit lake ports and enlist seamen for the Mississippi flotilla. When the British complained in

August that the Michigan violated the provisions of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, Seward responded that the war vessel was on the lakes for the sole purposes of enlisting seamen and providing gunnery practice for recruits. In any case, there was evidently little fear of

289 war with Britain, for the stores of ordnance meant for the conversion of merchantmen into gunboats were shipped to the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. The war to restore the

Union, quite rightly, took precedence over the defense of the northern frontier.’

There was, in fact, the small possibility of a clash between Britain and the United

States due to a minor diplomatic incident on the lake frontier. Hearing that rebels had purchased the Canadian steamer Peerless, Massachusetts Governor John Andrew warned

Governor General Sir Edmund Head on 27 April 1861 to take measures to detain the

“piratical cruiser.” Andrew feared that the vessel would escape from Lake Ontario and operate as a privateer, but Head refused to detain the vessel because it lacked “piratical character.” In the event that the Americans took measures into their own hands. Head urged Commanding General Sir to post troops at the Beauhamois and

Cornwall Canals to prevent their destruction. Toward the end of May Seward warned

British minister Lord Lyons that the United States would not tolerate the departure of such vessels. Fortunately, the buyer of the Peerless turned out to be from the North, the vessel sailed to New York in June, and yet another crisis in Anglo-American relations passed.

Whereas the northern frontier of the United States remained virtually defenseless, the British government decided to reinforce the 4,300 troops in North America just in case Seward actually meant business in the future. To inspect the , assist

British subjects, and possibly to threaten the American coastline. Vice Admiral Sir

Alexander Milne had some twenty-five ships on the North American and West Indian station. Meanwhile, Britain sent more than 2,000 troops, along with equipment for the

290 Canadian militia, by July. The government believed it wise to reinforce the garrison to

10,000 men before ice closed the St. Lawrence. While some members of Parliament criticized such measures as unnecessarily provocative and certain to make the Canadians neglect their own defenses, Palmerston wanted to intimidate the United States. The troop movement by the Great Eastern, the world’s largest ship, in eight days in July was no doubt impressive, but few in the British government really believed that it was enough to protect British North America. Such British moves did, however, convince the

Northern press that Britain was hostile to the Union cause. ' '

Public opinion in both Britain and in British North America was divided over the

Civil War. In the mother country, some people supported the Union as the representative of free labor and democracy. The upper classes scorned American democracy, however, and felt an affinity toward the slaveholding aristocracy of the South. Many Britons welcomed the impending collapse of the Yankee experiment in republican government, and the Palmerston ministry assumed that the Union could never prevail, influenced greatly by the reports of William H. Russell of The Times of London. Arriving in New

York in March 1861, Russell toured the divided American states and reported on

Southern resolve and Northern division. Combined with the Confederate victory at First

Bull Run in July, Russell’s dispatches created the impression that the Confederacy would ultimately succeed. Britain wanted to end the war for both humanitarian and economic concerns and felt that Southern independence was the best way to achieve it. Given the official American denial that the war was about slavery, there were no great moral interests at stake. There seemed to be no justification for Britain standing by and doing

291 nothing about a pointless struggle, a brutal war of vengeance aimed at the conquest of the

South.

Public opinion about the war was divided in Canada as well. During the secession crisis during the winter of 1860-1861, Canadians inclined to the North as long as the main issue appeared to be slavery. When the Lincoln administration stressed that the conflict was not a war to destroy slavery, support in Canada cooled and most people wished to maintain strict neutrality, although the border counties did provide recruits to

Michigan and New York regiments. There was little support for the South, except among conservatives encouraged by Russell’s reports in the Times, and there was no point in incurring the wrath of the North. Despite the proximity of Canada, President

Lincoln paid little attention to cultivating public opinion there, assuming that the United

States could concentrate on the British people and press. This was a critical oversight since the Confederates would do their best to press their case in the court of Canadian opinion.*^

Canadian public opinion was critical to the Union war effort, since British North

America provided a sanctuary for rebel agents and sympathizers attempting to tap into disloyal sentiment in the states of the northern frontier. One o f Secretary Seward’s main activities at the start of the war was the detection and apprehension of disloyal citizens, and he employed agents at Portland, Rouses Point, Plattsburgh, Niagara Falls, Detroit, and Chicago to assist him. Pro-Confederate sympathy in Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, and other northern states, and the threat of collusion with foreign powers, kept the State

Department busy. In October Seward warned the governors of the Union states that even

292 before the war had started, “disloyal citizens hastened to foreign countries to invoke their intervention for the overthrow of the government.” It was likely, Seward added, that traitors would try to embroil the nation in a conflict with a foreign power by stirring up

“controversies.” To prevent the addition of a foreign war to the burden of “civil commotion,” it would be necessary to defend the nation’s sea and lake harbors adequately. Seward passed on Lincoln’s direction that the state governors consult their legislatures and submit plans for the defense of their state. Since the federal government was too absorbed with fighting the war to give sufficient attention to frontier defenses, the loyal states would have to show their patriotic spirit and help provide for the “general defence.” Congress had passed a resolution in July agreeing to compensate states for expenses incurred in the defense of the United States, so Seward closed with the assurance that Congress would probably reimburse the state legislatures for their appropriations.

Two of the responses to Seward’s message came from governors who had the most to fear if war broke out with Britain, Maine’s Washburn and New York’s

Edwin Morgan. Washburn criticized the lack of adequate defenses for the excellent harbors in his state, particularly Portland. The port could accommodate the largest war ships, easily capable of sheltering up to 600 vessels during a storm, and the British would control the commerce of the ocean and the lakes if they held the town. Furthermore,

Portland was the terminus of the , which had the capacity to move

10,000 troops between Portland and Quebec or Detroit and Toronto in a single day. The city was also the commencement of the European and North American Railway, which

293 when complete would extend to Halifax through Bangor and Saint John. Secretary of

War Simon Cameron assured Washburn that the federal government would “vigorously” build the necessary defenses once Maine’s legislature appropriated the funds.

Governor Morgan likewise was concerned about the safety of his chief port. New

York, and he agreed to “cordially aid” the govermnent in providing for the defense of his state. Although Morgan claimed that New York did not presently have the means to carry out defensive works, he did direct Colonel Richard Delafîeld to advise him on the condition of the state’s defenses, especially at the lake ports. Since no state was more interested in “a thorough system of defenses” than New York, Morgan also asked Joseph

Totten for reports on the state’s defenses, which at the time were “in a very imperfect and unsatisfactory condition.” Washburn’s and Morgan’s concerns were well founded, for soon they would have to worry about more than rebel sympathizers on the northern frontier.

The seizure of the British mail steamer Trent on 8 November 1861 led to one of the most serious crises in Anglo-American relations in the nineteenth century. U.S. Navy

Captain Charles Wilkes, famed Antarctic explorer and notorious for his bad temper and insubordination, found himself in a minor command at the start of the war despite his staunch Unionist position. Assigned to the command of the U.S.S. San Jacinto on 23

August, Wilkes’s orders were to return her from the West African coast to Philadelphia for repairs. Instead, Wilkes cruised the Aincan coast for a month searching for

Confederate privateers, and then he headed to the West Indies in pursuit of the commerce raider C.S.S. Sumter. Upon arrival in Cuba, the impetuous commander learned from the

294 American consul that the Confederate ministers to Britain and France, James Mason and

John Slidell, were at Havana preparing to travel to Europe. Wilkes resolved to capture the diplomats, and overtaking the British steamer Trent in the Bahama Channel, took

Mason and Slidell prisoner on 8 November. Wilkes considered the seizure to be the most important event in his naval career.

Public reaction on both sides of the Atlantic was enthusiastic, to say the least.

Wilkes’s action came at a time when there were few Union successes, and throughout the

North the public rejoiced at Wilkes’s bold stroke. It was high time to show Britain the resolve of the United States. News arrived in London on 27 November, and the British press also clamored for war. Many Britons relished the prospect of a naval war in which

Britain swept American shipping from the seas and removed her most powerful commercial rival. Equally incensed, Palmerston’s cabinet informed that the seizure of the Trent was “a gross outrage and violation of ,” and they advised the queen to “demand reparation and redress” from the Americans. Palmerston also feared, wrongly, that retired general-in-chief Winfield Scott was in Paris offering

Quebec to France in return for French assistance in the crisis.'* As an initial measure,

Britain immediately placed a ban on the export of saltpeter and other military stores, both to serve as a warning to the United States and to lessen the likelihood of war by limiting the Union’s military resources.

Once again, the United States had to prepare for the possibility of a war along the northern frontier. Lincoln must surely have thought that the situation was bleak. The forts were occupied only by ordnance sergeants and used as recruiting centers; Secretary

295 of the Navy reported that there were no naval depots on the lakes to convert commercial steamers into gunboats; and Secretary Cameron recommended that the government give “immediate attention” to the fortifications of the lake and maritime frontiers. There were few troops to spare for service on the northern frontier. To bolster the state troops who turned out to defend the frontier, the War Department transferred regulars who had been captured and paroled by Confederates in .

Companies of the 7th Infantry occupied Rouses Point, Madison Barracks, and Forts

Ontario and Niagara, and five companies of the 3d and 4th Cavalry went to Fort Wayne.“°

Lincoln recommended to Congress on 3 December “that adequate and ample measures be adopted for maintaining the public defences on every side.” This included the northern frontier, where forts, naval depots, and harbor improvements “would be of great importance to the national defence and preservation.”"'

Accordingly, George McClellan, general-in-chief since Winfield Scott’s retirement on 1 November, consulted with Joseph Totten on the defense requirements of the northern frontier. In Totten’s view, the United States had greatly increased its population, wealth, and means of communication along the border, “all affording a vast augmentation of power and resources applicable to war.” Nevertheless, Canada had also increased its resources, albeit “in a ratio materially inferior,” and American military and naval preparations had “stood still, where they have not deteriorated.” The Michigan was the only war vessel on the lakes, naval stores had been sent to the flotillas on the western rivers, and most of the forts needed “considerable sums of money” to be restored to “their force and efficiency.” Much of the fort construction had been of a temporary

296 nature, since there had been a feeling that Canada would eventually be annexed; any

“barriers or separating walls would be incumbrances” to such a process. National emergency dictated more extensive defensive preparations, however.^

As in previous reports, Totten stressed that naval means remained the best way to defend the commerce and towns along the northern lakes. As of January 1862 there were some 1,223 American steamers and sailing vessels on the St. Lawrence and the lakes, while there were 137 vessels on the Canadian side. On the Upper Lakes the superior

American commercial marine would provide naval supremacy, but only if there were naval stores at the key ports, protected from sudden attack. In addition, Totten recommended that the establishment of strong fortifications and a naval base at

Mackinac, where war steamers could refit, communicate with each other, and seek shelter. The British had a base at Penetanguishene on Georgian Bay, but Totten was certain that they would not risk any operations while Mackinac was “occupied by our superior squadron.” Since the British could possibly close the straits of Detroit, Totten recommended that there be a separate squadron on Lake Erie with a supply depot of its own. Thus, the best American strategy would remain one based on naval supremacy.

Stores of guns and ammunition, protected by permanent forts or temporary batteries, would provide the means to convert the superior American commercial fleet into a flotilla capable of sweeping the Upper Lakes of all opposition. The result would be security for both the commerce and population of the lake frontier.'^

Totten repeated his previous recommendations about the necessary fortifications on the northern frontier. He felt that it probably was not necessary to build a stronger

297 work at Fort Brady, since a flotilla at Mackinac would prevent the British from moving vessels up to Lake Superior. To command both ends of the straits of Detroit and protect the adjacent frontier from naval attack, Totten urged that Fort Gratiot receive permanent fortifications as soon as possible and that Fort Wayne receive its armament. Buffalo needed a gun tower at Buffalo Creek and a harbor battery to help Fort Porter keep British vessels out of range of the city, while Fort Niagara needed extensive repairs. Lake

Ontario especially needed strong defenses, since the British had superiority in commercial tonnage and could move small gunboats onto the lake from their “home ports.” Thus, the mouth of the Genesee River needed temporary defenses to protect

Rochester; Fort Ontario needed extensive repairs to protect Oswego; Sodus Bay needed strong field works at its entrance so that it could be a harbor of refuge and possibly a place for the construction of war vessels; and Sackets Harbor needed defenses to protect the New Orleans, the naval property, and the railroad that allowed quick concentration of troops and supplies. “■*

O f course, the command of the St. Lawrence remained the key to Totten’s strategy. The chief engineer recommended that a force assemble in Vermont or at

Whitehall, New York, cross Lake Champlain by steamer to Rouses Point, and then proceed by railroad to a point near the Beauhamois Canal. Lacking defenses, the locks could be blown up in a few hours. Even if the raiding force were captured, its loss would be “a himdred fold compensated by this entire paralysis of the great ship line of commimication” between the Atlantic and the lakes. Since the Rideau Canal could not accommodate ships, it would then not be difficult for the United States to achieve naval

298 supremacy on Lake Ontario. Temporary forts on the St. Lawrence could also help cut the line of communication, so Totten urged that there be a new survey to determine suitable sites; railroad construction had changed the strategic situation considerably since the last survey in 1845. Ogdensburg itself would need no further defenses, since the vulnerability of the British towns on the opposite shore would discourage British forces from attacking on that frontier."^

Since control of Lake Champlain remained the centerpiece of any American effort during a possible war with Britain, Totten emphasized the importance of Fort

Montgomery. Construction there had continued to the point that the fort could resist escalade and mount some heavy guns on the river front. Since there would be a great deal of work over the winter on the magazines, casemates, and on preparing masonry for construction in the spring, the building site would be full of laborers and materials. For that reason, Totten urged that any troops posted there be quartered in the village nearby.

The soldiers would thus not get in the way o f the work. In the event of '‘a war in the

North,” Totten suggested that the site be turned into an entrenched camp to protect the forces concentrating for the attack on the St. Lawrence. In a letter to Governor Morgan, he also identified Albany as “the great northern point of concentration of troops, and school of organization, discipline, and instruction.”^^

There was thus nothing new in Totten’s recommendations for the defense of the northern frontier. Fort Montgomery remained the key to the defense of Lake Champlain and thus was essential to the success of an offensive against the St. Lawrence lifeline to

Upper Canada. American naval supremacy would provide sufficient protection to the

299 valuable resources on the Great Lakes. As before, fortifications would protect key points

against raids, securing naval stores, harbors, or important lines of communication. Such

measures cost money, however, and Totten estimated that $4.71 million would be

necessary for all the nation’s frontiers, including $700,000 for temporary defenses on the

northern frontier and work at Oswego, Niagara, Buffalo, and Detroit, and $150,000 for

Fort Montgomery."^

Totten worked closely with state governors both to make the necessary military

preparations and to reassure an alarmed public. For example. Governor Morgan warned

Secretary Seward that there was “no little anxiety” in Buffalo and along the shores of

Lake Ontario for the safety of the lake ports. New York would play the most significant role in a war, and Morgan informed Totten that his state’s “exposed position” on the lakes and Atlantic “renders our citizens apprehensive of danger on the least appearance of it.” The Trent crisis had caused much apprehension in New York City,"* among the commercial class, and along the lakes and canals, and Morgan pledged his cooperation to

Totten in taking defensive measures in order to “reassure all classes.” Pennsylvania

Governor Curtin likewise sought Totten’s assistance on the defenses of Philadelphia and ofErie."^

While American officials were taking steps to prepare for the possibility of war along the northern frontier, the British strengthened their military and naval strength in

North America. Although there were some members of Parliament who felt that the

Union armies lacked character, skill, and strength, most responsible men in Britain agreed that Canada would at least have to be prepared to deal with a major American

300 attack. To stiffen the Canadian volunteer forces, the government resolved therefore to reinforce the regular garrison, protect the tenuous line of communications along the length of the frontier between Halifax and Upper Canada, command the lakes, and strengthen the naval forces that could threaten the coastline of the United States/^

Starting on 12 December, some 11,175 British troops traveled to North America over the course of the next month, bringing the troop strength in Canada and the

Maritime Provinces to more than 18,000. With the troops were military stores and a cadre of instructors for the Canadian militia and volunteers. The weather was still mild and the transports tried to get up the St. Lawrence, but only one made it as far as Bic, almost 150 miles downstream from Quebec. After landing at Bic, the small complement of troops traveled by sleigh to the terminus of the Grand Trunk Railway at Rivière du

Loup and finished their journey by rail. Bad weather forced the rest of the transports to put in at Halifax where they unloaded the heavy military stores. The troops landed in

New Brunswick and had to go by sleigh over the vulnerable Temiscouata Route. The experience of the troops sent to Canada vividly demonstrated the vulnerability of communications with the mother country.^*

Fortunately, the crisis in Anglo-American relations passed by the end of

December. Although Lord Palmerston blustered about war to defend the national honor.

Queen Victoria’s most trusted adviser, her consort Prince Albert, felt that Britain had more to gain from peace rather than war with the United States. Although Albert agreed that the Americans should make amends for their actions, he urged that Lincoln’s government be allowed to save face and disavow Wilkes’s rash behavior. Albert wrote

301 the queen’s reply to the British government concerning the Trent affair, asking only for

the release of the captives and an apology. The ailing prince died on 14 December and

did not see the fruits of his labor. Although Lincoln had at first reacted enthusiastically

to the seizure of the Trent as a welcome success in an otherwise disappointing fall

campaign season, both he and Seward came to recognize the seriousness of the situation.

The saltpeter embargo, British movement of troops to Canada, and news that France would stand by Britain in the crisis convinced Lincoln and his cabinet that it was crucial to avoid war. Fighting two wars at once could threaten the very survival of the United

States, so Lincoln agreed to release Mason and Slidell on 27 December. While

Confederates rejoiced at the “national humiliation” of the Union as it “licked the spittle that fell from the British lion’s mouth,”^^ Lincoln avoided war with Britain. Fortunately, as before, international crisis would not translate into a war along the northern frontier, and the last best hope of direct British intervention in the Civil War passed.

Nevertheless, word of the release of the Confederate diplomats did not reach

London until 8 January 1862, and the movement of the British expeditionary force continued, hindered by the rigors of the Canadian winter. The heavy military stores had to wait at Halifax until spring, when they could be sent up the St. Lawrence. The staff officers had to get to Montreal before the troops, so they went to Boston and then by rail to their destination, wined and dined all the way by their fellow passengers; the officers’ private baggage went by rail from Portland to Montreal. Secretary Seward had magnanimously offered the use of American facilities for the movement of British men

302 and materiel, an act that caused no little excitement among the residents and legislature of Maine/"*

Meanwhile, the movement of the bulk of the troops to Canada went ahead in a thoroughly professional manner. Transports put in at St. John, and each morning a party of 160 soldiers set out in eight-man sleighs for the journey over the Temiscouata Route to

Rivière du Loup. Well equipped and dressed for the bitter winter, the troops ate cooked rations and had their rum at the midday halt, ending the day’s journey around 6:00 p.m.

Each overnight stop had a quartermaster staff and medical personnel, and the troops retired for the night after having their tea and cooking the next day’s rations. Of the

6,823 officers and men who went by sleigh, only nine deserted near the Maine border, probably seeking the enlistment bounty from the Union army, and only three men died from exposure, probably through drunkenness. Although most of the troops were concentrated in the Montreal area, including a detachment at Fort Lennox on Isle aux

Noix to watch the Richelieu River, others went farther east to Kingston, Toronto,

Hamilton, Guelph, and London; the plan was to defend those areas and launch counterattacks if necessary. There was little to do, however, besides put on amateur theatrical productions, so some officers took leave and visited the Union and Confederate armies as military observers.^^

The British plarmed for a replay of the War of 1812 if a conflict broke out with the United States. While the Americans had a great advantage in the Great Lakes region in terms of population and industrial output, they were vulnerable along the maritime frontier. Many British naval officers were eager to teach the Yankees a lesson, and they

303 were confident that the adimnistration, leadership, warships, and ordnance of the Royal

Navy were more than a match for the United States Navy. In their view, Britain could throw a steam fleet on the lakes in short order and threaten the American seacoast as

well. In fact. Admiral Milne’s plan was to crush the American fleet and seize bases to blockade the coast north of Cape Henry, especially Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay, New

York, Long Island Sound, Boston, and Portland. Milne would cut off Washington, D C., and “if possible get at the capital.” While the British planned to use Southern bases, they planned to avoid direct cooperation with Confederate forces; influenced no doubt by their experience in the Crimea, the British were wary of combined operations with another power. British strategy thus relied on an active defense against American attacks on the St. Lawrence and Upper Canada and a vigorous offense on the seaboard.

Although there was only a screen of American regular troops along the northern frontier and the nation’s seacoast defenses were incomplete, the British were actually in a weak position. True, the Union was involved in a major war; Rouses Point, the key to

American offensive strategy, was vulnerable to a British spoiling attack; all the frontiers, in Totten’s view, desperately needed “large numbers” of heavy cannon; and the state troops on the northern frontier could not match the British in terms of discipline or training. The traditional British vulnerabilities remained, however. The line of communication from Halifax to Upper Canada was open to American attack; there would be no troop reinforcements until spring; their superior commercial marine ensured that the Americans would control the lakes at least until the ice melted and British steamers could make it to the lakes; there was an inadequate Canadian volunteer force and an

304 untrained militia; and the Irish and French population could prove unreliable, especially if France supported the United States. The Americans would have to be completely unprepared for any British attacks to succeed, and if the Union terminated its war with the Confederacy to fight the British, Canada would drown in a sea of Yankee invaders.

The assistant Quartermaster General of the British expeditionary force. Lieutenant

Colonel Garnet Wolseley, warned a friend not to be surprised if the entire force were prisoners by February.^*

There was much merit, then, in focusing on offensive operations against the

American coastline, but even the British naval situation was precarious. While several

British army officers had advocated an attack against Portland to seize that port and occupy much of Maine, draw off American troops from the attack on Montreal, and solve the perennial communications problem between Halifax and Quebec, naval officers were lukewarm about the project. By 1 January 1862 Milne had forty-two ships totaling

70,456 tons and 1,319 guns to match against the American force of 264 ships totaling

218,016 and 2,557 guns. Given that many of the American vessels were light steamers and the Union’s resources were stretched thin, Milne’s force was a formidable threat, but it faced serious difficulties. Milne’s command lacked dry docks, relying in the past on

American ports; the Nova Scotia coal mines, Milne’s preferred fuel source, were poorly defended; the main bases at Jamaica, Bermuda, and Halifax needed new defenses; desertion and yellow fever ravaged Milne’s squadrons; the engines for the British war steamers were large and inefficient, consuming vast quantities of coal; and Milne’s warships drew too deep a draft to operate in the shallow waters of the American coast.

305 Most British officers and politicians believed that they would fight and win a possible war at sea, where Britain was strongest, but punishing the Union’s maritime cities was a two-edged sword. While such action could bring the war home to the

American people and perhaps force concessions fi'om their government, burning New

York or Boston could have as severe an impact on British commerce as an attack on a major British port. It was also questionable whether or not the cautious Milne could pull off a successful surprise attack against a major American port. National honor was at stake, however, and once France had expressed its support during the Trent crisis, there was little to deter the British from fighting a war to maintain their international prestige.

Fortunately Lincoln decided it was best to fight one war at a time.^°

While the immediate threat of war with Britain might have passed, the citizens of the northern frontier renewed their calls for increased government attention to their defenses. The fortifications were generally in a defenseless state, as a British officer discovered on a tour in February 1862. At Buffalo there were no guns and the 1,100-man garrison included raw recruits and Confederate prisoners, and Detroit had only one hundred soldiers. The officer reported that there was “an entire absence of all preparations for constructing or repairing fortifications” between Niagara and Sault Ste.

Marie. Michigan’s legislature urged Congress to give Forts Wayne, Gratiot, Mackinac, and Brady their full armament and “put them in the best defensive condition to meet any emergency,” and Maine demanded fortifications and railroads in order to keep Portland and most of New England out of British hands. Defenses at Portland and other key ports, a local military force under federal control, and railroads between Portland and Boston

306 and Portland and the Madawaska Settlement would help to defend the region adequately.

From Maine to Michigan, then, there was great concern about the fortifications of the northern frontier. ■“

The states of the northern frontier also demanded that the government take measures to ensure American naval supremacy on the lakes. There was no question that the United States had enough commercial vessels to provide squadrons that would protect the lake towns from bombardment, sweep British commerce from the lakes, and prevent sudden raids by amphibious forces. The means to convert such vessels into gunboats were missing, however. There were no naval depots on the lakes, and the ordnance that had been at various lake towns before the Civil War was transferred to

Union gunboats on the western rivers. Thus, local and state governments along the length of the lake frontier petitioned Congress for naval facilities at such locations as

Erie, northern Ohio, the western shore of Lake Huron, the eastern shore of Lake

Michigan, and even Milwaukee. The Ohio legislature also recommended an inland position, connected by navigable waterway to the lakes, which would circumvent the provisions of the 1817 naval agreement. There were even some northwestern politicians who believed, incorrectly, that the naval agreement did not apply to Lake Michigan.

Despite such pleas, the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs rejected any attempt to build naval facilities on the lakes. Such establishments could only be used to build vessels of war. The facilities would provide the temptation to build a fleet in violation of the treaty, and the committee believed that any breach of the naval agreement was not “advisable under any circumstances.” Thus, there was little federal navy activity on the lakes other

307 than three personnel stationed at Sackets Harbor and the patrols of the U.S.S. Michigan on the Upper Lakes. Presumably, railroads would make it possible to shift ordnance and naval stores quickly to the lakes, lessening the need for depots there."*’

Federal emphasis would thus be on the fortification of threatened locations on the northern frontier. The engineers proceeded to survey sites for temporary fortifications, especially on Lake Ontario where the smaller American commercial fleet gave the

British a marked naval advantage. Totten sent Captain Charles Blunt to the lake in

February 1862, and Blunt recommended the construction of small gun batteries at

Sackets Harbor, Great and Little Sodus Bays, and Charlotte Harbor at the mouth of the

Genesee River. Costing $23,700, these fortifications would help provide excellent harbors of refuge for American vessels.*^

Congress deemed small appropriations sufficient because naval supremacy remained the key to the defense of the northern frontier. Even politicians in the northwest were willing to rely on temporary fortifications so long as the government provided assistance to the canals, harbor improvements, and naval depots that could assure American naval dominance of the lakes. Since the Rush-Bagot Agreement prohibited the construction of war vessels on the lakes, ship canals could improve the defenses on the frontier, making it possible to build vessels inland. Relying on the older proposals of Matthew F. Maury, now a Confederate officer, northwestern politicians once again advocated federal assistance to a ship canal connecting the Illinois River and Lake

Michigan. In addition to providing military and naval advantages, such a canal would be an outlet for the northwest, providing cheaper produce to New England, and would

308 increase New York and Pennsylvania’s revenues. Furthermore, by binding the Union together and rewarding the patriotic northwest, which was fighting valiantly to restore the

Union, the canal would provide political benefits as well. Proponents suggested that the cost of the work, no more than $13 million, was small compared to the great benefits to be gained."”

Likewise, Representative Isaac Arnold of Illinois stressed that the growing population and commercial importance warranted significant appropriations. Compared to the South, that “now rebel and lately petted and favored seaboard section,” the northwest had received almost nothing from the federal treasury. Speaking for the House

Select Committee on the Defence of Great Lakes and Rivers, Arnold demanded justice for the northwest. His plan of defense called for the repair or construction of shore defenses at commanding positions, all of which Totten had mentioned in his report to

McClellan in December; a national foundry at Chicago, the great center of railroad, lake, river, and canal communication to all points; depots on Lakes Ontario, Erie, and

Michigan to arm the merchant fleet on short notice; the improvement of lake harbors and a deepened channel over the St. Clair flats near Detroit; and the enlargement of the

Illinois and Michigan Canal, “the most important work for either military or commercial purposes yet suggested on this continent.” War thus provided an opportunity for the northwest to improve its commercial prospects at federal expense, a factor that would lead to great debate in Congress in the coming months. Nevertheless, Arnold justified his plan by declaring that “the northwest believes that our nationality is worth all the blood and treasure which it may cost to preserve it.”"*^

309 Congressmen set aside their sectional differences enough to make appropriations for the defenses of the northern frontier. Accepting most of Totten’s cost estimates, on

20 February 1862 Congress appropriated $150,000 for Fort Montgomery and $750,000 for fortifications on the northern frontier, including sites at Ogdensburg, Oswego, the mouth of the Genesee, Fort Niagara, Buffalo, Detroit, Fort Gratiot, Mackinac, and Sault

Ste. Marie. Congress also appropriated $3.56 million for the armament of the nation’s forts. Accordingly, in March the War Department authorized 184 heavy guns (few of which were ever mounted) for the major forts on the northern frontier, the bulk of them at Forts Montgomery, Porter, and Wayne, the sites most likely to face heaviest British attack.^ Although Totten continued to complain that he lacked a sufficient number of trained engineer officers to carry out the nation’s defense system, such appropriations represented a renewed interest at the federal level in the security of the northern frontier.'*’

Nevertheless, the maritime frontiers continued to secure the bulk of appropriations. While the northern frontier received $900,000, that sum was a small portion of the total of $5,785 million that Congress appropriated for the defense of the nation’s frontiers. A larger sum was not necessary. Fort Montgomery would make the decisive thrust against the St. Lawrence possible, while temporary works and repairs to existing fortifications would protect key points on the lake frontier from attack. In addition, the states of the northern frontier, especially New York, had federal authorization to appropriate sums for the defense of their frontier with the promise of future reimbursement from the federal government. New York’s legislature appropriated

310 $5 million in March to build fortifications, produce ordnance, and recruit, if necessary, six-month volunteers to defend the state. While the population of the northern frontier may have been reluctant to protect itself with a minimum of federal assistance, it certainly had the means to do so.^*

While there was little doubt that command of the St. Lawrence near Montreal was the only way to achieve a decisive result in a war with Britain, debate continued in

Congress about the best way to defend the lake frontier. Ship canals and ironclad war vessels dominated the discussion. A petition from the Illinois legislature described the enlargement of the Illinois and Michigan canal as a work of “national importance,” and politicians from across the northern frontier advocated a ship canal at Niagara and the enlargement of the Erie and Oswego Canals. Ironclads had changed the nature of and had a great effect on defense planning. John Ericsson, inventor of the

Monitor, testified to the House on 14 April 1862 that an “impregnable iron vessel” the size of the , 200 feet long and twenty-five feet wide, could be stripped of its fuel, ammunition, and stores to draw only six and a half feet of water. Thus, such a vessel could be built inland, circumventing the Rush-Bagot Agreement, and sent by canal to the lakes. Before going into action, the vessel would receive its fuel and stores, a shot-proof , and a fifteen-inch gun that could destroy any vessel the British could put on the lakes. Ship canals could thus guarantee American dominance of the lakes.**^

Unfortunately for such plans there were no canals on the northern frontier capable of handling even a stripped-down Monitor, much less the U.S.S. Michigan, which was about 176 feet long and forty-five feet wide. The Erie Canal, key to the prosperity of the

311 Great Lakes region, had locks only 110 feet long and eighteen feet wide, the result of an

improvement completed between 1836 and 1862. Although the canal’s channel could

handle vessels o f seven-foot draft, the small locks meant that the Erie Canal was not capable of handling Monitor-c\ass ironclads. In the first official report on the nation’s defenses in over a decade, the House Committee on Military Affairs pointed out in April

1862 that the Rush-Bagot Agreement made the defense of the northern frontier very difficult. Warning that a small British fleet of light gunboats could pass up the St.

Lawrence to the lakes, shell the towns, and sweep American commerce from the lakes, the report described the Great Lakes, with no little hyperbole, “as open to incursion as was Mexico when invaded by Cortez ” The best way to defend the frontier would be to command the St. Lawrence and the entrances to the lakes with fortifications and floating batteries and provide the means to transfer vessels easily from one lake to another. This plan would require two major forts on either the St. Lawrence or the mouth of Lake

Ontario and on the Niagara frontier. These defenses would cut off Canada West (Upper

Canada) and ensure that the war would be neither “protracted nor dangerous.” In addition, the enlargement of the Erie and the Illinois & Michigan Canals and a ship canal at Niagara would be necessary. The canals would be a highly cost-effective measure, since their cost would be far less than that of an extensive system of fortifications or the destruction of American towns and commerce. Such canals would make American fleets more useful as well, since while British vessels were ice-bound in the north, American gunboats could pass down the Mississippi to operate in the Gulf and Caribbean and return before the ice thawed.

312 As he had done in 1845, Joseph Totten did not agree that ship canals would provide the best means of defense for the lake frontier. In a personal meeting with

President Lincoln in April 1862, Totten recommended permanent fortifications at

Buffalo and Forts Wayne, Gratiot, Mackinac, and Brady, ordnance stores at the principal harbors to arm temporary forts, and naval stores at those same harbors to convert merchant vessels into gunboats. In Totten’s view, fortifications would protect the fleets of gunboats that were the key to security on the lakes. Mackinac would serve as a naval magazine and rendezvous for an American squadron, exerting an influence on Lakes

Huron, Michigan, and Superior, and other harbors would provide bases for American patrols. Totten insisted that the superiority of the United States in merchant vessels was so great that it would be “inexcusable” if the British achieved naval supremacy.

American gunboats, constantly cruising the lake shores, could interdict enemy shipping, protect American commerce, and keep British war vessels from leaving places such as

Georgian Bay or the Welland Canal. Totten thus presumably saw little need for large expenditures on ship canals for military purposes. The means of defense were already at hand/'

Nevertheless, ship canal advocates continued to press their case in Washington.

Isaac Arnold presented a report in April from the Committee on Roads and Canals, urging the government to take over the Illinois & Michigan Canal and enlarge it. The canal would help the United States circumvent the Rush-Bagot Agreement and would benefit every section of the country, increasing wealth, making products cheaper, and binding the nation closely together. In June Francis Blair presented another report from

313 the Committee on Military Affairs, recommending that the government enlarge the locks of the Erie and Oswego Canals and create a great chain of water communication from

New York City to the Gulf of Mexico. The state of New York petitioned Lincoln himself for such an improvement, which would allow ironclads to get on the lakes and match the

British ability to place gunboats there. New York had provided much to the Union, for example over $971 million in duties from New York City, more than $355 million of which was collected in the 1850s alone. The government thus had the obligation to provide for the defense of the lake frontier. Furthermore, enlarging the Erie and Oswego

Canals would facilitate the movement of the West’s produce to the Atlantic. This was, no doubt, a crucial consideration since the Confederacy still controlled a considerable stretch of the Mississippi in mid-1862.^"

Ship canal supporters in the House presented a bill on 8 January 1863 that called for improvements on the Illinois & Michigan, Erie, and Oswego Canals “to adapt them to the defense of the northern lakes.” The canals had a significant ally in President Lincoln, who believed that ship canals could play an important role in national development in conjunction with the Pacific railroad. The Niagara ship canal project remained on the back burner as House committees looked into its utility. At a cost of $13 million, the

Illinois & Michigan would be enlarged to a channel 160 feet wide and six feet deep, with locks 350 feet long and seventy-five feet wide. The Erie and Oswego Canals would be enlarged to accommodate war vessels 200 feet by twenty-five feet at a cost of $3.5 million. The federal government would have the right to use the canals for movement of troops and supplies free of charge. The advocates of the canal improvements, who not

314 surprisingly tended to be from Illinois or New York, presented various reasons for government assistance to the waterways. Isaac Arnold felt that the proposed works would strengthen the bonds of the Union, and fellow Illinoisan Elihu Washbume stressed that the Illinois & Michigan Canal measure was of more importance to the people of the

Northwest than any other that had been before Congress. He asked the representatives of the Atlantic states not to turn “a deaf ear” to his region’s defense needs. The Great Lakes had $400 million in commerce, a 3,000-mile border with British territory, and great cities. Finally, Abraham Olin of New York pointed out that ironclads could pass through the canals if they were enlarged accordingly. He did not feel that New York was being selfish asking for federal assistance, as the state had proven her loyalty to the Union in the war thus far. In Olin’s view, these were national works made necessary by war.^^

There was great opposition to the bill, however, since the proposed improvements were mainly for commercial purposes and benefited a few states, particularly New York, disproportionately. In January 1863 the House Committee on Naval Affairs had already looked into “the cheapest, most expeditious, and reliable mode of placing vessels-of- war” on the Great Lakes and had rejected ship canals. The committee described fears that the British could move a formidable gunboat fleet from the Atlantic to the lakes as

“imaginary dangers.” The St. Lawrence was closed by ice six months of the year, and the

Canadian canals were too small and ran near the border. For instance, the Beauhamois

Canal was on the south side of the St. Lawrence and would be the main target of

American raiders. By blowing up any one of its nine locks, the Americans would block

315 the canal, flooding and destroying the other locks and canal banks below. There was thus

little chance that the British could put a formidable naval force above Montreal.^**

The biggest threat was vessels already on the lakes. The British had built an iron steamer at Toronto out of parts sent over from Scotland, and several other steamers had been built out of British parts at Quebec. There were sufficient supplies of timber in

Canada, and machinery and armor could be sent over from Britain. To deal with that threat, the committee recommended that the nation rely on its superior population and shipbuilding capacity in the Northwest. Pointing to the fleet built on Lake Erie during the War of 1812, the committee stated that a fleet could be built or converted even faster thanks to the great resources of the Northwest. The committee rejected the cost estimates of the canals’ proponents, saying that it would take $30 million and five years to complete the Illinois & Michigan and $13 million and three years for the Erie and

Oswego Canals. Given the current state of war with the rebels, the nation was “in no mood or condition to lay out large sums upon remote contingencies.” Any project would have to be effective to get support, and the projects’ effectiveness was in great doubt.

The opposition gave several reasons not to enlarge the canals in question. Critics said that there were several places on the lakes where war vessels could be built, that it would be cheaper to construct vessels inland and ship them in parts to the lakes, and that the canals could never be made large enough to accommodate war vessels of sufficient size. Most importantly, though, other congressmen criticized the works as purely commercial measures. Indiana’s delegation was especially vocal. Representative Albert

Porter rejected the canal improvements, stating that his constituents had already been

316 ruined by the war while the Northeast had benefited greatly. Since Indiana’s burdens were already greater than she could bear, the state would not support such expenditures.

Representative William Holman cited the findings of the House Committee on Naval

Affairs and declared the canal bill to be the “extreme of folly and madness.” Spending tens of millions of dollars for commercial purposes was preposterous at a time “when the nation is groaning under taxation and its very life at stake and its credit trembling to its fall.” Finally, Representative Daniel Voorhees rejected the “stupendous” scheme, believing that the true outlet of “the great West” was the Gulf of Mexico. He opposed any further artificial bonds between the West and New England. If his constituents had to be taxed to make such bonds possible, they just might be forced to sever their ties to the Union.

Ohio’s delegation likewise tended to oppose the canal bill. Representative Carey

Trimble declared that the canal improvements were hardly a national measure and served only to improve the commercial position of New York. With the nation on the verge of bankruptcy, now was not the time to embark on “a grand system of internal improvements.” Representative Clement Vallandigham agreed, describing the bill as a blow directed at the commercial interests of the West and its great cities. The canal improvements were calculated to divert western trade from its natural route, the

Mississippi, to the state and city of New York, which were “already bloated with prosperity.” The Ohio legislature summed up the views of the bill’s critics when it resolved on II February 1863 that the federal government should “confine its

317 expenditures strictly to its absolute necessities.” Thus, the war against the rebellion had to take priority. New York would have to pay for canal improvements herself.

The ship canal schemes were just too clearly for commercial purposes for them to gamer widespread support in Congress, and the bill went down to defeat. While the canals were too small to accommodate ironclads, they were also too small to accommodate the larger lake steamers. One great weakness of the Erie Canal was the bottleneck created at Buffalo, where cargoes from the Upper Lakes had to be transferred to smaller boats capable of navigating the canal. Thus, even states as far away as

Wisconsin wanted ship canals to facilitate the shipment of their produce to eastern markets. New York had a vested interest in enlarging the Erie and Oswego Canals, since western goods might find their way down the St. Lawrence instead of to New York City.

Still, huge amounts of grain flowed through the Erie Canal to feed the Union and Europe.

At a time when civil war strained the nation’s resources, however, it was unlikely that a state would get federal assistance for a pet project. There was just not enough of a threat to warrant large expenditures on canal improvements.

Furthermore, the United States could effectively defend its northern frontier without ship canals. The inability of existing canals to handle Monitor-c\ass ironclads was not as great a handicap as the politicians of the northwest claimed. Vessels the size of the Monitor could not pass through Canadian canals either, so the British could at best send light wooden gunboats through the St. Lawrence and Welland Canals. It was thus not necessary to have large American ironclads prowling on the lakes. The superior commercial fleet provided the United States with the naval advantage it needed on the

318 Upper Lakes, so there was little need to build war vessels. Furthermore, the foundation of American strategy, command of the Sl Lawrence, would prevent the British from extending their seapower to the Great Lakes in the first place. Ship canals in Illinois and

New York would undeniably have had great commercial benefits and could have facilitated naval operations on the lakes. Such improvements were not, however, necessary to the defense of the northern frontier. Less expensive solutions were already available.

Construction thus continued on the forts of the northern frontier, which clearly served no sectional purpose. Most of the appropriations had gone to the seacoast forts, where the threat from Confederate and British raiders was greater, and by late 1862 there were only eighty-three pieces of ordnance, mostly light and obsolete field guns, at the northern posts. This was even less ordnance than the northern frontier had in the early

1850s. Nevertheless, “considerable progress” had been made at Fort Montgomery due to the increased appropriations, and the partly-finished work was ready to mount some of its armament. Forts Ontario, Niagara, and Wayne were ready for their armament and the engineers planned to add masonry scarps to the forts’ ramparts in the spring. Fort Porter was also ready for its guns but needed repairs to fix the damage caused by its unruly volunteer garrison. There were also plans to survey Fort Mackinac for new works, part of

Totten’s proposal to make the key site a secure anchorage for American naval forces.

The debate in February 1863 over new appropriations for fortifications saw the same sectional differences that characterized the fight over the canal bill, compounded by disagreement over the utility of masonry fortifications in modem warfare. Maine’s

319 legislature had demanded that the federal government take prompt measures to protect the state’s northeast frontier, particularly the construction of a military railroad from

Bangor to the St. John’s River. One of the state’s representatives, Samuel Fessenden, insisted that Maine’s frontier position, wedged between New Brunswick and Canada, required more money than the $700,000 in the bill. Indiana’s Albert Porter demanded to know how much more money Maine needed. In his view, less money should be spent on seacoast forts due to the effectiveness of ironclads. Ohio Representative Samuel Cox also opposed additional appropriations for Maine, charging that Maine might even “slide over into Canada” someday; it would hardly be worthwhile to spend money on forts that could one day be Canadian. Maine’s Frederick Pike indignantly replied that his state was fighting as hard as any in the present war.“

Politicians of the Northwest also questioned the large appropriations for the maritime frontier when so little went to the northern frontier. Senator James Grimes of

Iowa also pointed out that recent actions, such as the fall of New Orleans, had shown the current system of defenses to be “of very little value.” Continuing the old system of national defense would “be virtually throwing money away.” Illinois Representative

William Kellogg considered it strange that the entire northern frontier should receive

“not one dollar” when the House had already defeated the measure to defend the lakes by improving the Illinois & Michigan Canal; gunboats would have been a cheaper and more effective defense than forts. Whether or not forts were effective, politicians tried unsuccessfully to add amendments to the bill. Pennsylvania Representative Elijah

Babbitt added $100,000 for fortifications at Erie; if seacoast forts were “such excellent

320 things” and received up to $8 million, surely the lakes frontier, which was “equally exposed” to enemy attack, merited attention. Isaac Arnold even proposed $1 million to fortify Mackinac, but this was merely a stunt to draw attention to the neglect of the lake defenses.^'

On 20 February 1863 Congress passed an appropriation of $5.45 million for fortifications on the frontiers and at Washington. Of this total, the government provided

$700,000 for Maine’s maritime frontier and $100,000 for Fort Montgomery. There was also money left over from the original appropriation in 1862 of $750,000 for forts on the northern frontier. The seacoast forts thus still received the bulk of appropriations, but most observers expected naval supremacy on the lakes to be the key to success in a war with Britain. The Trent crisis thus resulted in the improvement of the permanent defenses of the frontier, although the forts still lacked their authorized armament. By protecting the Lake Champlain corridor and key ports, the fortifications would play a major role in assuring naval superiority on the lakes and a decisive conclusion, on the northern frontier at any rate, to a war between the United States and Britain.^"

The British knew about such plans, of course, and a commission headed by

Colonel John Gordon recommended in September 1862 that London prepare for war accordingly. The Gordon Commission recognized that the United States was now a formidable military power, capable of raising large armies and deploying them to any part of the frontier. Operations on the western rivers had also demonstrated that the

Americans also had the means “of rapidly extemporizing a formidable fleet, adapted for

Lake warfare.” The commission foresaw powerful attacks against Montreal and

321 supporting operations all along the frontier to distract British forces. To defend Canada adequately, the commission recommended permanent fortifications on the Detroit,

Niagara, and St. Lawrence frontiers; the enlargement of the Ottawa, Rideau, and Welland

Canals to admit ironclads to the Great Lakes; 150,000 troops including regulars, a naval force of and gunboats at Montreal; and a railway to ensure communication with Halifax. The commission’s report illustrated the difficulty of defending Canada against a powerful United States.^^

Such ambitious plans were not possible, however, given public sentiment in

Canada and the opinions of British politicians and officers. The Canadian government was reluctant to appropriate the funds needed to train a sufficient force o f trained militia, and there was a perception among British officers that the presence of regular troops gave the Canadians the excuse not to provide for their own defense. According to

Colonel Wolseley, the Canadians saw “how prompt England was to send out troops to defend them, and they naturally conclude that the pockets of John Bull will ever be open to help them.” There was great reluctance in Britain to shoulder the bulk of the defense burden. Parliament having resolved in March 1862 that self-governing colonies bore “the main responsibility for their own internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own external defense.” There was now great support for the concentration of troops in

Britain and the use instead of naval power to protect key overseas possessions. Many

Canadians rejected the notion, however, that they bear the burden of defending against wars that were not of their own making. The Toronto Globe summed up this view in

June 1862 when it declared that Canada should not provide entirely for her defense when

322 she was “not the author of the quarrels” which threatened her security. Canadians obviously chafed at the notion that the United States could hold them hostage to Britain’s good behavior.^

There was also less threat that Britain would become actively involved in the

American conflict. Cotton definitely would not be the savior of the South, especially since British mill owners were benefiting from the interruption of the cotton trade. Mill operators were able to sell the surplus goods that had built up due to pre-war overproduction, and they cut production to keep prices high. Charity, the Union’s association with democracy, and their own anti-slavery views kept the unemployed textile workers from rebelling. The Union victory in February 1862 at Forts Henry and

Donelson reversed the effect that the Bull Run debacle had had on British public opinion; it appeared now that the Union might prevail after all. The uncertain outcome of the conflict did keep the British guessing. The Union defeat at Second Bull Run in August seemed to show the folly of continuing the conflict, but the British were more interested in mediation than intervention. Since the United States had a larger army than Britain and had ironclads, a third Anglo-American war posed too many risks. The Union victory at Antietam in September convinced Lord Palmerston that the two sides were locked in a bloody stalemate that could be stopped only by mediation. Even the Emancipation

Proclamation, which went into effect on 1 January 1863, increased the sentiment for mediation by raising fears of a slave insurrection in the South. Horrified Britons recalled the Mutiny in and its atrocities against white women and children.

323 As the threat of war between the United States and Britain, and thus for war along the northern frontier, faded, the regulars left for the fighting front. The 7th Infantry withdrew from the posts on the border, leaving the key positions in the hands of recruiters and state troops. Madison Barracks and Forts Mackinac and Niagara were under the care of ordnance sergeants by the summer of 1863, Forts Wayne and Ontario were recruiting stations for the 19th and 16th U.S. Infantry respectively, and laborers occupied Fort Montgomery. The only significant concentration of troops on the entire frontier was the 399 men of the so-called Hofftnan Battalion at Johnson’s Island; these were prison guards, however, and did not represent a formidable fighting force. The northern frontier had seemingly returned to a peaceful state. Starting as early as January

1863, however, there were reports, albeit false, that rebel forces were in Canada preparing to attack Johnson’s Island and release the prisoners. Perhaps there would be trouble on the northern frontier after all.^

324 Joseph G. Totten to George McClellan, December 1861, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 10, 21 .

^ Brian A. Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, vol. 1 (Montreal; McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1974), 26-27; Head, quoted in D.G.G. Kerr (with the assistance of J A. Gibson), Sir Edmund Head: A Scholarly Governor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), 217. For activity in Canada during the Civil War, see J. Mackay Hitsxnan, Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 165-200. For more British views that the Americans would turn on Canada once their civil war ended, see [Patrick L. MacDougall], Forts versus Ships: Also Defence of the Canadian Lakes and Its Influence on the General Defence of Canada (London: James Ridgway, 1862), 19-20, 24, and “Theseus,” “England’s Naval Resources,” United Service Magazine (February 1862): 214.

^ The belief was prevalent in the South that cotton governed all relations between nations and would guarantee European intervention. For example. Senator Louis Wigfall of Texas declared in I860 that “I say that cotton is King, and that he waves his scepter not only over these thirty-three States, but over the island of Great Britain and over continental Europe, and that there is no crowned head upon that island, or upon the continent that does not bend the knee in fealty and acknowledge allegiance to that monarch;” see Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, vol. 1, 2. Before the war. King Cotton had provided a guarantee that Europeans powers would never go to war with the United States. Now, apparently. King Cotton was the reason that there would indeed be war.

■* Howard Jones, Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 3; Glyndon G. Van Deusen, William Henry Seward (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 292-93. For Britain’s role in the Civil War, see Jenkins, Britain and the War fo r the Union, 2 vols. For the international context of the Civil War, see D P Crook, The North, the South, and the Powers (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), and Harold Hyman, ed.. Heard Round the World: The Impact Abroad o f the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1969). Seward played on British fears that involvement in the war would give Napoleon lU the freedom to carry out his schemes. The French emperor dreamed of building an empire in North America that would relegate Britain to second place in world affairs, and he could take advantage of trouble spots in Europe, such as Denmark, if the British were embroiled in a conflict with the United States; see Jones, Union in Peril, 72-76.

’ Seward, quoted in Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, vol. 1, 30-31; Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, 292-94. For fears that Seward would provoke a foreign war to unite the Union and Confederacy, or at least strengthen Northern resolve, see Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance o f Power in North America 1815-1908 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 210-11. For an alternate view, see Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, 301-05. Van Deusen suggests that Seward sought instead to demonstrate Union resolve to Britain and France and keep them from recognizing the Confederacy.

* By 1 December 1861 the northern frontier states provided some 379,285 volunteers for the Union war effort: Maine (15,007); New Hampshire (10,379); Vermont (8,780); New York (110,388); Pennsylvania (113,959); Ohio (91,441); Michigan (29,331); see “Report of the Secretary of War,” 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1118, 3.

’ “Statement showing the distribution of the U.S. Army on the 1st day of January, 1861, with the changes between that date and the 15th of April, 1861,” in OR, ser. EU, vol. 1, 23; Theophilus F. Rodenbough and William L. Haskin, eds.. The Army of the United States (New York: Maynard, , 1896; reprint. New York: Argonaut Press, 1966), 323; “Report of the Secretary of War,” 37th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 1112, 70-71; “Report of Engineer Bureau,” 30 November 1861, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. E x Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1118, 95-96. 325 M.C. Meigs to Simon Cameron, 3 October 1861, in OR, ser. E, vol. 3, 48; M.C. Meigs to William HoGGnan, 7 October 1861, in OR, ser. E vol. 3, 49; W. Hoffinan to M.C. Meigs, 22 October 1861, in OR, ser. E vol. 3, 54-58; Simon Cameron to Governor Dennison, 29 October 1861, in OR, ser. E vol. 3, 123. For a brief history of the prison camp on Johnson’s Island, see Phillip R. Shriver and Donald J. Breen, Ohio's Military Prisons in the Civil War (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), 29-46. In addition. Ft. Mackinac briefly served as a prison. In the summer of 1862, a company of Michigan volunteers guarded about fifteen state prisoners from Tennessee; see C.A. Waite to L. Thomas, 3 June 1862, in OR, ser. E vol. 3, 634-35, and L. Thomas to William Hofflnan, 27 August 1862, in OR, ser. E vol. 4, 452.

’ Joseph G. Totten to George McClellan, December 1861, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 10, 21-22; J.C. Carter to Gideon Welles, 28 July 1863, in ORN, ser. L, vol. 2, 414-15. For the role of the M ichigan during the Civil War, see Mrs. John C. Carter to anon., Ohio Historical Society, John C. Carter Papers, VFM 1227, and Bradley A. Rodgers, “The Northern Theater in the Civil War; The USS M ichigan and Confederate Intrigue on the Great Lakes,” American Neptune 48 (Spring 1988): 96-105. The recruiting drive o f the Michigan netted more than 4,000 men for the Navy. For British concerns about the Rush- Bagot Agreement, see James M. Callahan, “The Neutrality of the American Lakes and Anglo-American Relations,” Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science 16 (January-April 1898): 138-39. For the operations of the Mississippi flotilla, see John D. Milligan, Gunboats Down the Mississippi (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1965).

Kerr, Sir Edmund Head, 217-19; Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, vol. 1, 43-45; Bourne, Britain and the Balance o f Power in North America, 212.

’* Regis A. Courtemanche, No Need of Glory: The British Navy in American Waters, 1860-1864 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 16-17, 19; Robin W. Winks, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years, rev. ed. (Montreal: Harvest House, 1971), 52-68; Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 211-14. For requests from Windsor in June 1861 for troops to protect against an attack from Detroit, see J. Mackay Hitsman, “Please Send Us A Garrison,” Ontario History 50 (Autumn 1958): 189-92.

Jones, Union in Peril, 4, 16, 37, 57-58; Martin Crawford, “William Howard Russell and the Confederacy,” Journal o f American Studies 15 (August 1981): 191-210. For Russell’s observations, see William H. Russell, My Diary North and South, 2 vols. Eondon: Bradbury and Evans, 1863).

Winks, Canada and the United States, 12-21; Fred Landon, Western Ontario and the American Frontier (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1941), 225-26; Phillip S. Paludan, A People's Contest: The Union & Civil War, 1861-1865, 2d ed. E^wrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988, 1996), 279. For Canadian opinions on the war, drawn mainly from contemporary newspaper accounts, see Helen G. MacDonald, Canadian Public Opinion on the (New York: Columbia University, 1926). For the number of Canadians in Union service during the war, see Robin W. Winks, “The Creation of a Myth: ‘Canadian’ Enlistments in the Northern Armies during the American Civil War, ” Canadian Historical Review 39 (March 1958): 24-40.

'■* Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, 288-91; William Seward to the Governors of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Oregon, 12 October 1861, NA, RG 59, Domestic Letters of the Department of State, 1784-1906, M40, roll 52, 253-55. For the hiring of border agents, see William Seward to Thurlow Weed, 24 August 1861, in OR, ser. II, vol. 2, 46-47, and William Seward to E.L.O. Adams, 30 September 1861, in OR ser. E vol. 2, 83. For the Congressional resolution of 27 July 1861 on reimbursing the states, see U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 12, 276.

326 Israel Washburn to William Seward, 23 October 1861, in OR, ser. ID, vol. 1, 588-91; Israel Washburn to Abraham Lincoln, in “Fortification of the Sea-Coast and Lakes,” 37th Cong , 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. 14, vol. 1, ser. 1127, 3-6; Simon Cameron to Governor of Maine, 16 November 1861, in OR, ser. EL vol. 1, 650. For Totten’s recommendations on the defense of Portland and Maine’s maritime frontier, see Joseph G. Totten to Secretary of War, 4 January 1862, in OR, ser. UL vol. 1, 778-83.

E D Morgan to William Seward, 19 October 1861, NA, RG 59, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department o f State, Ml 79, roll 184; E D Morgan to Joseph G. Totten, 15 November 1861, in OR, ser. lU, vol. 1, 647. Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin did not mention his state’s lake defenses, focusing instead on the approaches to Philadelphia. Curtin also complained about his state having to pay for its fortifications; see A.G. Curtin to William Seward, 2 November 1861, in OR, ser. m, vol. 1, 644-46.

Norman B. Ferris, The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1977), 18-26.

Palmerston did not know that Scott was in France primarily to seek a cure for a bronchial ailment. Furthermore, Seward had rejected Scott’s offer to influence French public opinion while in Europe. When Scott learned about the Trent affair he returned to New York on 26 December, believing that his knowledge of the northern frontier would be valuable. Fortunately, Scott’s services were not needed by that time; see Charles W. Elliott, Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man (New York: Macmillan, 1937), 746-54.

Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, vol. 1, 213-14, 218-19. For the British cabinet’s reaction to the Trent incident, see Arthur C. Benson and Viscount Esher, The Letters o f Queen Victoria, vol. 3, 1854- 1861 (London: John Murray, 1907), 595-96. An irresponsible press on both sides of the Atlantic was probably most to blame for the war fever, see Winks, Canada and the United States, 102-03. For a contemporary British view that in the United States the calls for came from the “vulgar classes,” particularly the Irish, see Cyrus Redding, “England and America,” The New Monthly Magazine 124 (January 1862): 63- 72. Redding asserted that Lincoln knew better than to go to war with Britain.

Through the incompetence or treachery of their commander, seven companies of the 7th Infantry and three companies of the 3d Cavalry surrendered to Confederates at San Augustin Springs, New Mexico Territory, on 27 July 1861. The Confederates paroled the prisoners, who went to Jefferson Barracks in early November and then to the northern frontier in early December. Officially exchanged on 30 September 1862, the infantry then joined the Army of the Potomac and the cavalry went to Memphis; see Rodenbough and Haskin, The Army o f the United States, 201, 502-03.

“Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 2 December 1861, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. J, vol. 3, ser. 1119, 21; “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1 December 1861, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1118, 8; “Annual Message, ” 3 December 1861, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1118. For troop strengths in December 1861 on the northern frontier, see “Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800-1916, ” NA, RG 94, M617, rolls 1045 [Rouses Point], 722 [Madison Barracks], 884 [Fort Ontario], 858 [Fort Niagara], and 1401 [Fort Wayne]. The end of the crisis made the move of two companies of the 3d Cavalry and a Michigan volunteer regiment to Fort Brady unnecessary; see correspondence in OR, ser. HI, vol. 1, 760, 765.

Joseph G. Totten to George McClellan, December 1861, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 10, 21-23.

^ Ibid., 23-26, 35-37. For vessels on the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes, see “Harbor Defences on Great Lakes and Rivers,” 37th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 23, vol. 3, ser. 1144, 10-11.

Ibid., 26-30. 327 “ Ibid., 30-34.

“ Ibid., 34-35; Joseph G. Totten to E.D. Morgan, 30 December 1861, in OR, ser. m , vol. 1, 774.

^ “Estimates for Fortifications,” 9 December 1861, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. 6, vol. 1, ser. 1127.

The great fear was that the British would launch a pre-emptive strike on New York Harbor, similar to the attacks on Copenhagen in 1801 and 1807; see, for example, Thomas Hillhouse to Lorenzo Thomas, 21 December 1861, in OR, ser. IE, vol. 1, 755. For the commercial importance of New York City, and hence the likelihood of a foreign attack on it, see John G. Barnard, Notes on Sea-Coast Defence: Consisting of Sea-Coast Foi^fication, The Fifteen-Inch Gun, and Casemate (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), 23. Barnard described the harbor as America’s center of gravity: “New York is the true heart of our commerce—the center of our maritime resources; to strike her would be to paralyze a ll the limbs.”

E.D. Morgan to William Seward, 23 December 1861, NA, RG 59, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, Ml 79, roll 186; E.D. Morgan to Joseph G. Totten, 18 December 1861, in OR, ser. IE, vol. 1, 750-51; A.G. Curtin to Joseph G. Totten, 18 December 1861, in OR, ser. IE, vol. 1, 751; Joseph G. Totten to A.G. Curtin, 23 December 1861, in OR, ser. IE, vol. 1, 757. For Totten’s recommendations to Morgan, which are substantially the same as those Totten made to McClellan, see Joseph G. Totten to E.D. Morgan, 30 December 1861, in OR, ser. El, vol. 1, 766-74.

For British preparations for war in the winter o f 1861-1862, see Kenneth Bourne, “British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862,” English Historical Review 76 (October 1961): 600-632, and J. Mackay Hhsman, “Winter Troop Movement to Canada, 1862,” Canadian Historical Review 43 (June 1962): 127-35. For the vulnerability of the Canadian fi’ontier, see William H. RusseU, Canada: Its Defences, Conditions, and Resources (London: Bradbury and Evans, 1865), 38-39, 56, 58, 68, 71-88, 111-20, and 200-40. Touring the border in January and February 1862, Russell found all the key points on the frontier, except Kingston, in need of new fortifications.

Hitsman, “Winter Troop Movement to Canada,” 127-31.

“Editorial,” Southern Literary Messenger 34 (January 1862): 65.

John W. Wheeler-Bermett, “The Trent Affair: How the Prince Consort saved the United States,” in A Wrecah to Clio: Studies in British, American and German Affairs (London. Macmillan, 1967), 110-27

Hitsman, “Winter Troop Movement to Canada,” 131-34. For the Maine legislature’s concerns about the use of their territory by British forces, see Israel Washburn to William Seward, 13 January and 10 February 1862, NA, RG 59, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, Ml 79, roll 187. For an interesting insight into both the vulnerability of Canadian communications and the state of international commerce, see Benjamin Clark to William Seward, 10 February 1862, NA, RG 59, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, M l79, roll 187. Clark, secretary of the Canada Powder Company of , informed Seward that his company had in the past acquired its saltpeter through Boston. Now that saltpeter could not be exported from the United States, Canada Powder had to obtain the ingredient from Britain. Since it would be a great disadvantage to wait for the arrival of saltpeter via the St. Lawrence, Clark requested that it be sent by way of Boston or Portland. Once in Hamilton, of course, the saltpeter could be used to produce gunpowder for British and Canadian forces.

Hitsman, “Winter Troop Movement to Canada,” 132-35; André Charbonneau, The Fortifications o f île aux Noix: A Portrait of the Defensive Strategy on the Upper Richelieu Border in the 18th and 19th

328 Centuries (Ottawa; Parks Canada, 1994), 301. For a personal account o f the British troop movement, see Garnet J. Wolseley to Robert Biddulph, 26 January 1862, in H. Biddulph, ed., “Canada and the American Civil War: Mote ^o\se\e^hexxersC Journal o f the Society for Army Historical Research 19(1940): 114-15. For British officers’ requests to observe Union armies, see Joseph G. Totten to George McClellan, 17 March 1862, and Joseph G. Totten to William Seward, 10 April 1862, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 10, 76-77 and 79.

Courtemanche, No Need o f Glory, 57, 59; Bourne, “British Preparations for War with the North,” 627n. For a confident appraisal of Britain’s prospects in a naval war with the United States, see “Theseus,” “Prepared for War,” United Service Magazine (January 1862): 46-52, “Theseus,” “England’s Naval Resources,” 213-20, and the editorial in The London Times, 7 January 1862, 6. For the importance of naval supremacy on the lakes, see [MacDougall], Forts versus Ships, 38-40. MacDougall pointed out that Britain should learn the lesson of the American war: wherever Union gunboats went, the Union was victorious.

Seward had a report that the non-English population o f Lower Canada was generally content with English rule but hated the English “for their haughty manners & overbearing dispositions.” The informant reported that the Irish “could not be depended on in a war,” and the French “would leap to our side with joy” if France sided with the United States. In that case, “England could not hold Canada a week;” see [Illegible] to William Seward, 1 January 1862, NA, RG 59, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, Ml 79, roll 187.

Joseph G. Totten to E.D. Morgan, 8 January 1862, in OR, ser. lU, vol. 1, 785; Garnet J. Wolseley to Robert Biddulph, 10 December 1861, in Biddulph, “Canada and the American Civil War,” 113. Lieutenant Colonel James Daubeny visited Houlton, Maine, which his regiment, the 62d Foot, was supposed to seize in case of war. He reported that “The Town consists of scattered houses extending over more than a mile in length & lying at the bottom of a hill. The only garrison in the place were 60 Volunteers, whom I saw marching in the Town without arms to the inspiring air of Yankee Doodle played on a solitary fife accompanied by a big drum, so that the 62nd would not have had a hard task to perform;” see Hitsman, “Winter Troop Movement to Canada,” 132. For a contemporary appraisal of British strengths and weaknesses in Canada, see [MacDougall], Forts versus Ships, 27-29, 34-35.

Courtemanche, No Need of Glory, 40-56, 154. For a typical view on the proposed attack against Portland, see “The Eastern Provinces of British North America,” United Service Magazine (March 1862): 404, 407. The author suggested that a British Portland would become one of the greatest commercial cities of the world, the equal or the better of New York City, once the British transcontinental railroad was complete.

Bourne, “British Preparations for War with the North,” 630-32.

Intelligence report, quoted in Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 272; “Frontier defences of Michigan,” 3 February 1862, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 31, vol. 1, ser. 1124; “Defences of the Northeastern Frontier,” 31 January 1862, in 38th Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 119, vol. 2, ser. 1207, 62. Army officers agreed with the civilians’ dim assessment o f the northern fi"ontier’s defenses. For example. Captain A. Gibbs of the 3d Cavalry described Fort Wayne as “defenceless;” see Montgomery Meigs to Joseph G. Totten, 4 February 1862, NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 139, Q153.

“Lake and river defences of Pennsylvania,” 3 February 1862, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 33, vol. 1, ser. 1124; “Naval Depot on Western Lakes,” 21 February 1862, in 37th Cong., 2d sess , House Misc. Doc. 45, vol. 1, ser. 1141; “Establishment of a naval station and dock-yard in the State of Michigan,” 16 January 1862, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 19, vol. 1, ser. 1124; “Establishment of a naval depot and national armory in Wisconsin,” 9 April 1862, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 82, vol. 1, ser.

329 1124; “Quarterly Report o f OflBcers and others attached to the Navy Yard and Station at Sacketts Harbor,” NA, RG 45, Subject File, U.S. Navy, 1775-1910, Box 235, Folder 1. For the response of the Committee on Naval Affairs, see “Report on western naval depot,” 10 March 1862, in 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Rep. 22, vol. 1, ser. 1125.

Charles E. Blunt to Joseph G. Totten, 26 February 1862, NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 29, B9023.

“Ship Canal to Connect Mississippi River and Lake Michigan,” 20 February 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 37, vol. 3, ser. 1144.

“Harbor Defences on Great Lakes and Rivers,” 12 February 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 23, vol. 3, ser. 1144.

Heavy guns were authorized for the gun tiers of the following forts: Montgomery (forty-four 10” Rodmans and ten 32-pounders), Ontario (eight 10” Rodmans, five 8” Rodmans, seven 32-pounders, ten 24- pounders), Niagara (three 10” Rodmans, three 8” Rodmans, ten 32-pounders), Porter (twelve 10” Rodmans, twelve 8” Rodmans, eight 32-pounders), and Wayne (fifteen 10” Rodmans, seventeen 8” Rodmans, twenty 32-pounders); see Registers of Cannon and Carriages Required for, on Hand at, and Supplied to Forts and Batteries, 1861-73, National Archives, RG 156, Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, entry 113, vol. 4.

■*’ For appropriations, see U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 12, 342-43, and “Appropriations for the War Department,” 38th Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. 24, vol. 7, ser. 1187. For Totten’s concerns about the lack of engineer officers, see Joseph G. Totten to George McClellan, February 1862, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 10, 124-25. Totten told the general-in-chief that since “there have been millions appropriated for fortifications for the year under extreme anxiety on the part of the people, who are clamorous for the commencement of their works,” he needed the personnel to make the appropriations worthwhile.

For New York’s appropriations, see E.D. Morgan to , 13 March 1862, in OR, ser. Ill, vol. 1,928-30.

“Illinois and Michigan CanaL ” 1 April 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess.. House Misc. Doc. 63, vol. 1, ser. 1141; John Ericsson to House o f Representatives, 14 April 1862, in The Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d sess., part 1 (Washington: John C. Rives, 1863), 814.

“Permanent Fortifications and Sea-Coast Defences,” 23 April 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 86, vol. 4, ser. 1145, 4-14. For the dimensions of the U.S.S. M ichigan, see Bradley A. Rodgers, Guardian of the Great Lakes: The U.S. Paddle Frigate Michigan (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 149. For the Erie Canal, see Ronald E. Shaw, Canals for a Nation: The Canal Era in the United States, 1790-1860 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1990), 45.

Joseph G. Totten, “Memorandum for the President,” 30 April 1862, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 10, 57-62, and Joseph G. Totten to J.G. Nicolay, 22 May 1862, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 10, 83-84.

“Illinois and Michigan Canal Enlargement,” 28 April 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 96, vol. 4, ser. 1145; “Enlargement o f the Locks of the Erie and Oswego Canals,” 3 June 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 114, vol. 4, ser. 1145; “Enlargement of the Locks of the Erie and Oswego Canals,” 9 June 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. 128, vol. 10, ser. 1138.

330 The Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d sess., part 1 (Washington: John C. Rives, 1863), 699-701, 766- 69, 813-15. For Lincoln’s support of canal improvements, see “Annual Message,” 1 December 1862, 37th Cong., 3d sess.. House Ex. Doc. /, vol. 1, ser. 1156, 11. For cost estimates, see “The Naval Defences o f the Great Lakes,” 8 January 1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess, House Rep. 4, vol. 1, ser. 1173, 4-10. For the Niagara ship canal, which House committees described as a great national work and important for commercial and military reasons, see “Niagara Ship CanaL” 3 March 1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess.. House Rep. 53 and 54, vol. 1, ser. 1173.

^ “The Naval Defences of the Great Lakes,” 8 January 1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess.. House Rep. 4, vol. 1, ser. 1173, 1-4.

” Ibid., 4-15.

The Congressional Globe, 37th Cong , 3d sess., part 1 (Washington. John C. Rives, 1863), 766-69, 771- 72,810-13.

” Ibid., 810-13; “Resolution of the Legislature of Ohio,” 11 February 1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 23, vol. 1, ser. 1150.

Robert F. Legget, Canals o f Canada (Vancouver: Douglas, David & Charles, 1976), 150-77.

” “Report of the Engineer Department,” 11 November 1862, NA, RG 77, Annual Reports to the Secretary of War, entry 117, vol. 3, 403-05. For fort armament in December 1862, see Quarterly Summary Statements of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores on Hand at Forts and Batteries, NA, RG 156, entry 100, No. 1. For the early 1850s, see Quarterly Summary Statements of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores on Hand at Forts and Batteries, NA, RG 156, entry 100, vol. 2. Also compare, for example. Fort Wayne’s actual armament in December 1862 (two 10-pounder Parrott rifles) with its authorized armament of 115 guns, howitzers, and mortars, listed in Registers o f Cannon and Carriages Required for, on Hand at, and Supplied to Forts and Batteries, 1861-73, NA, RG 156, entry 113, vol. 2.

“ The Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d sess., part 2 (Washington: John C. Rives, 1863), 817-18. For the resolutions of the Maine legislature, see “Defences of Northeast Frontier,” 9 February 1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess.. House Misc. Doc. 17, vol. 1, ser. 1171.

The Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d sess., part 2 (Washington: John C. Rives, 1863), 918-20, 1045.

U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 12, 654-55

Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 177-80. Gordon was a good acquaintance of Joseph Totten’s; see Joseph G. Totten to Colonel John Gordon, 19 June 1863, NA, RG 77, Totten Papers, entry 146, vol. 10, 167. For British thought on the defense of Canada after the Trent crisis, see C P Stacey, Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871: A Study in the Practice o f Responsible Government, rev. ed. (Toronto. University of Toronto Press, 1963), 147-78.

^ Garnet J. Wolseley to Robert Biddulph, 26 January 1862, in Biddulph, “Canada and the American Civil War,” 115-16; Richard A. Preston, Canada and “Imperial Defense A study o f the origins o f the British Commortwealth’s defense organization, 1867-1919 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), 32; Toronto Globe, 18 June 1862, quoted in Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 176.

Jones, Union in Peril, 9, 104-05, 136, 155-69; Jenkins, Britain and the War fo r the Union, vol. 2, 157- 58.

331 “ For garrison returns, see “Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800-1916,” NA, RG 94, M617, roll 722 [Madison Barracks], roll 695 [Fort Mackinac], roll 858 [Fort Niagara], roll 1401 [Fort Wayne], roll 884 [Fort Ontario], roll 1045 [Rouses Point], and roll 1101 [Johnson’s Island]. For newspaper reports about impending rebel attacks on Johnson’s Island, see John Carter to Gideon Welles, 23 January 1863, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 2, 590.

332 CHAPTER 9

THE DECLENE OF THE MILITARY FRONTIER, 1863-1871

We are engaged at this moment in a war for the suppression o f a long-continued and most virulent rebellion, which has thus far tasked our best energies. To this work let us now dedicate ourselves, without arousing another enemy, through whose alliance the rebellion may be encouraged and strengthened. - Charles Sumner, 19 December 1864’

Although the British government appeared more interested than ever in mediation and not intervention in the Civil War, there remained several points of contention between the United States and Britain by 1863. First, blockade ruimers used Bermuda, the Bahamas, and West Indian ports to get around the United States Navy’s stranglehold on Southern commerce. Through the blockade passed items ranging from perfrune to cannon, and many people in the North saw the blockade runners as proof of British hostility to the Union. Second, British firms supplied the Confederacy with all types of war materiel, including large guns and ocean vessels. In particular, the Confederate purchase of commerce raiders in Britain harmed Anglo-American relations. Southern agents obtained cruisers such as the Florida, Alabama, and Shenandoah for attacks on

Union commerce. The Confederate strategy sought to hurt the Northern economy, make the Northern public weary of war, and divert naval resources as Union warships chased the raiders. For example. Union cruisers patrolled the Gulf of St. Lawrence to protect the

American fishing fleet. There was also evidence by January 1863 that a British firm was 333 building armored rams for the Confederates, formidable vessels that could possibly break the blockade, attack Northern ports, and allow the Confederacy to draw upon Europe for even more supplies. Anglo-American relations were thus hardly amicable.^

Yet, despite the supply of war materiel by private firms to the Confederacy, there was little fear of direct British intervention in the conflict by the summer of 1863. The

British economy was good despite unemployment in the mill towns, and tensions in

Europe, due to the Polish rebellion and the Schleswig-Holstein question, demanded

British attention lest Napoleon m run amok. Furthermore, when it became clear that

John Roebuck, member of Parliament and rabid pro-Confederate spokesman, had been secretly negotiating with the French for joint recognition of the Confederacy, anti-French sentiment reared its head Only Confederate success on the battlefield could win recognition. Lord Palmerston would not act until the Union learned on the battlefield that subjugation of the Confederacy was impossible, and Union successes at Gettysburg and

Vicksburg ended that hope in July 1863. It seemed to the British as if the United States would win, so there was no longer any chance of recognition. To do so would only anger the Union and encourage the Confederacy, prolonging a conflict that the British wanted to end as soon as possible.^

Convinced that a vengeful Union would probably win and perhaps turn its armies on Canada, the British government commissioned yet another survey of the colonies’ defenses. William Jervois, lieutenant colonel in the Royal Engineers, went to Canada in

September 1863 and reported that the American people possessed “warlike power” and might wage a foreign war to ease the problems of reconstruction. Jervois assumed that

Montreal would be the initial objective of any attack, with the ultimate goal being the

334 capture of Quebec. The terrain presented few obstacles to the invader, so Jervois recommended that an extensive system of fortifications was necessary to secure Canada.

In his view, it was important to fortify the vital points and force the Americans to waste the campaign season conducting sieges. Given proper defenses, both Montreal and

Quebec could probably hold out, making relief of the beleaguered provinces possible once the ice melted in the spring. Jervois also recommended strong fortifications at Point

Levis, across the St. Lawrence from Quebec, to defend against an attack from the direction of Maine. Kingston would need new defenses to protect the naval base and assure naval supremacy on Lake Ontario. Jervois suggested that defending Canada West was impossible. There was no way that Britain could control the Upper Lakes, so he proposed only to destroy the Welland Canal. Jervois expected only diversionary attacks in the west anyway, so he believed that concentrating forces at Montreal was sound.

There were already some 11,130 regulars and 36,120 in the Canadas, but few more regulars would be available. Britain needed to devote her resources to Europe and maintain the balance of power during the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, and there was a growing feeling in the British government that the Canadians would have to do more to defend themselves.^

Meanwhile, the Confederacy could try to get around stalemate or defeat on the battlefield by opening a second front against the Union’s northern frontier. Such an action could damage the North, divert Union forces, or possibly lead to a war between the

Union and Britain. In February 1863, Lieutenant William Murdaugh of the Confederate

Navy presented a plan for raids on the Great Lakes. He would purchase a small steamer in Canada, announce that the vessel would be used in the ore trade on Lake Superior, and

335 pass through the Welland Canal to the Upper Lakes. Murdaugh planned to seize the

Michigan, probably at Erie, and get back to Lake Ontario. If the Canadians denied the

Michigan passage through the Welland Canal, he would try at least to get the small steamer through and destroy the Erie Canal aqueduct at Rochester and the locks of the

Oswego Canal. O f course, Murdaugh would never have gotten the Michigan through the

Welland Canal even if the Canadians had allowed such a thing. The canal was too small for the war steamer, a fact that had prevented the Michigan from joining the Union blockading squadrons in 1861.*

If he could not get either vessel onto Lake Ontario, Murdaugh proposed a tour of destruction through the Upper Lakes. He would destroy shipping and the Erie Canal locks near Buffalo; destroy the locks of the Ohio canals and shipping on Lake Erie; slip past Detroit at night; destroy shipping and the Illinois & Michigan Canal locks at

Chicago; continue the destruction at Milwaukee and other places on Lake Michigan; destroy the canal locks at Sault Ste. Marie; and then scuttle the Michigan in Lake Huron.

Although such an expedition held out the promise of serious commerce destruction,

Jefferson Davis refused to support the mission. Such a violation of Canadian neutrality might make Britain, forced by pressure from the United States, prevent the construction of ironclads for the Confederacy. Although fantastic, Murdaugh's plan would provide the inspiration for actual Confederate missions in the future.

What made Confederate operations in the Northwest so attractive was the possibility of taking advantage of disaffection in the region. The war had cut off traditional markets in the South and caused great economic hardship, and there was the popular perception that the war was being waged for the benefit of eastern merchants.

336 The Copperhead, or anti-war Democrat, movement was particularly strong in Ohio,

Indiana, and Illinois. There were reports of underground armies, such as the of the Golden Circle and the Order of American Knights, awaiting the opportune moment to rise up against Lincoln’s tyraimy. One purpose of John Morgan’s unsuccessful raid through Indiana and Ohio in June-July 1863 was to encourage a secessionist uprising.

Despite Morgan’s failure, the Confederacy had other options, especially since the cadre of an army of insurrection waited in confinement in prison camps along the northern frontier. The string of defeats in the summer of 1863 forced Davis’s government to consider more desperate measures to shore up the fortunes of the Confederacy. Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory sent Confederate officers to Canada to prepare an expedition that would capture the Michigan, release the captives at Johnson’s Island, and destroy Union commerce. Johnson’s Island, with over 1,700 prisoners by July 1863, was a tempting target for Confederate raiders.®

The federal government was not aware of any definite plans for attacks on the

Great Lakes, however, so it took no extraordinary measures to defend the frontier. Ship canals continued to be a concern, since ninety-eight members of Congress called for a

National Canal Convention after the failure of the canal bill in March 1863. In June

5,000 delegates met in Chicago, claiming that the issue of enlarging the northern frontier canals was of great national importance, second only to crushing the rebellion. The convention’s resolutions declared that enlarging the canals between the Mississippi and the Atlantic to accommodate gunboats was the “cheapest and most efficient means of protecting the northern frontier.” Furthermore, by connecting East and West the canals would “promote the rapid development and permanent union of our whole country.”

337 Such internal improvements would create “an unbroken brotherhood of States,” an object worth the cost. President Lincoln agreed that the canals would enhance national development and asked Congress to consider the projects. Nevertheless, Congress did not authorize federal assistance to such construction at a time when the nation’s financial resources were stretched to the limit’

Although the Canal Convention delegates declared that the northern frontier was

“utterly without the means of defence,” the government was indeed active in patrolling the lakes and fortifying key points. The Michigan was still on station, spending the summer of 1863 at Detroit, Buffalo, and Milwaukee helping to suppress anti-draft riots.

For example. Commander Carter had reports that 7,000 “ruffians” were ready to destroy

Buffalo’s grain elevators. The presence of the Michigan helped calm fears in the lake cities, and Carter continued to recruit as the danger passed. Otherwise, there was little activity on the lakes, and Congress made appropriations only for minor repairs at Sackets

Harbor (Appendix A). Fort construction on the northern frontier continued, made possible by the appropriations passed after the Trent crisis. The engineers were at work surveying Mackinac and Buffalo for new fortifications, there were plans to reinforce the ramparts of Forts Wayne, Niagara, and Ontario with masonry scarps, and laborers continued to lay stone at Fort Montgomery. There seemed to be little reason to do anything more to prepare for war along the northern frontier.*

Meanwhile, Confederate naval officers were preparing to launch raids against the lake frontier. In August after Morgan’s raid had failed. Secretary Mallory ordered the seizure of the Michigan and liberation of the prisoners at Johnson’s Island. Led by

Lieutenant John Wilkinson, a party of twenty-two men left Wilmington, North Carolina

338 by blockade runner on 7 October 1863, linked up with thirty-two Confederate refugees in

Montreal, and purchased a cannon and a hundred revolvers. The raiders planned to ship their weapons to St. Catherines on the Welland Canal in boxes marked “Machinery,

Chicago,” board a steamer and masquerade as laborers headed for work in Chicago, take over the vessel once beyond British jurisdiction, and seize the Michigan?

It was difficult to keep such preparations secret, however, and rumors pointed to an attack on Johnson’s Island. Local commanders were already concerned. On 16

October the commander of the prison guards. Lieutenant Colonel William Pierson, warned Commissary General of Prisoners William Hoffman that the small guard force might tempt the prisoners to revolt. The Confederates were “a most desperate set of men, with great smartness and a conviction that their escape would be better than a victory in any battle.” Pierson feared that the prisoners could march to Canada in two days and Join forces with sympathizers there, and he requested that the Michigan be posted to

Johnson’s Island to prevent any outbreak. Hoffman foresaw no danger at the prison camp, however, and told Pierson that the prisoners could not possibly escape as long as the guards were alert and commanded the waters around the island. Hoffman assured

Secretary of War Stanton that the ferry to Sandusky was armed with a and could prevent an escape, and by exercising “ordinary vigilance” the guards could keep the prisoners under control. Furthermore, Confederate fugitives would have to march a hundred miles to reach Canada, an impossible task without vessels. Therefore, an increased guard was not necessary.

Not everyone was as sure as Hoffman that there was little to fear at Johnson’s

Island. Ohio Governor David Tod urged Stanton to increase the guard force from four

339 companies to a full regiment, and Navy Secretary Welles ordered Commander Carter to proceed with the Michigan to Sandusky and assist Pierson. The Michigan arrived on 24

October, by which time Carter felt that the danger had passed. He wanted to get back to recruiting and did not want to winter over at Sandusky, but the War Department prevailed and Carter was ordered to remain for the winter “for the better protection against outbreak or escape.” Pierson still wanted more guards, but he was certain that the presence of the Michigan had prevented “a fight with the prisoners.”"

Federal and state authorities continued to prepare for raids on the lakes because intelligence still indicated that a plot was afoot. The presence of such a large group of

Confederate officers in Montreal naturally had attracted attention, and by 9 November there were clear indications that something was afoot on Lake Erie. The assistant provost marshal general at Detroit, Lieutenant Colonel B.H. Hill, had learned that a rebel agent was at Windsor with $100,000 in Confederate certificates of deposit, presumably to purchase vessels. His intelligence indicated that “some project of magnitude is in contemplation,” probably against Johnson’s Island. Governor Tod believed such intelligence, and Secretary Welles warned Carter “to use the utmost vigilance” on the

Michigan to protect against surprise. Carter complied, prepared his vessel and crew, and looked forward to a chance to prove the ability of his command.'^

Rumors of impending attacks against the lake frontier prompted large troop deployments as well. On 11 November Secretary Stanton sent General John A. Dix, commander of the , to Buffalo and ordered him to take steps to defend the Niagara frontier and Ogdensburg; he could call on the volunteer forces of New

York if necessary. Stanton also ordered Generals Jacob Cox, District of the Ohio, and

340 William Brooks, Department of the Monongahela, to prepare for attacks on the lake frontiers of Ohio and Pennsylvania, respectively. They also had authorization to call on state governors for the use of volunteer troops. Finally, Stanton warned the governors of the Great Lakes states and the mayors of the lake cities about the danger of a possible rebel attack. According to the British minister. Lord Lyons, there was a plot to free the prisoners at Johnson’s Island and attack Buffalo. Even Colonel Hoffman was convinced, recommending that the guard force at Johnson’s Island be increased.'^

Driven by rumor and official orders, there was a brief flurry of activity as state and local officials prepared to defend the frontier. The mayor of Chicago was ready to defend the city and arm tugs and sailing vessels if necessary, and army officers and

Senator Zachariah Chandler had the armed steamer Forest Queen patrolling the Detroit frontier to reassure the local population. In Ohio, Governor Tod sent 500 troops and an artillery battery to Johnson’s Island, ordered 2,000 volunteers to assemble at Sandusky, and directed volunteer forces at Cleveland and Toledo to prepare for movement. Not to be outdone. Brooks took 600 troops and a battery to Erie, organized the local citizens and had them build entrenchments, and prepared to defend the harbor entrance with batteries and armed tugs. The population of the northern frontier was prepared to give rebel raiders a warm reception.

Fortunately the raiders never came. As early as 12 November several mayors informed Stanton that there were no indications of impending trouble, and three days later General Cox reported that the rebels had postponed their plans for attacks on the lakes. On 17 November Commander Carter also reported that “the anxiety” about an attack on Johnson’s Island had subsided. He had sent one of his officers to conduct a

341 reconnaissance of the Canadian shore of Lake Erie, where there appeared to be “nothing of a hostile preparation.” Carter was ready to take on all adversaries, because by 25

November the Michigan received new armament, bringing her battery to one 64-pounder gun, one 30-pounder and five 20-pounder Parrott rifles, and six 24-pounder and two 12- pounder Dahlgren howitzers. No action was necessary, however, because there indeed was no immediate danger of a raid. Canadian authorities had orders to arrest suspicious individuals at St. Catherines. Wilkinson and his raiders had been loitering at that lake port, waiting for an appropriate vessel to seize, but they fled once their plans were uncovered.*’

Although tensions eased on Lake Erie, there were still rumors of danger on the northern frontier. While Stanton agreed to release the militia in Ohio and Pennsylvania and Welles authorized the withdrawal of the Michigan to Erie for the winter. General Dix had to deal with rumors of an impending attack against Vermont. Vermont Governor J.

Gregory Smith requested 5,000 rifles, ammunition, and artillery horses, planning to post troops at Swanton, St. Albans, and Burlington. Dix sent a detective to Montreal who reported that there were no indications of an attack, but Dix still thought it prudent to send “a small body of troops” to Fort Montgomery just in case. Dix’s agent was correct, and there was no violence on the northern frontier. The only casualty was the gun tower at Fort Porter, accidentally burned by its occupants on 25 November. General-in-Chief

Henry Halleck believed that the rumors of rebel raids were just a ploy to get the Union to divert troops to the northern frontier. Halleck did not want to play into the enemy’s hands and was determined to keep the troops in the field against the rebels.'^

342 To reassure the population of the northern frontier and prepare for possible attacks. Chief of Engineers Totten suggested that his protégé, John G. Barnard, survey

Lake Erie for defenses. Totten already had Colonel Thomas Cram surveying Toledo for temporary defenses to calm the fears of the city council. The engineers were also still at work adding m asor^ scarps to Forts Wayne, Niagara, and Ontario, and Fort

Montgomery had received a small portion of its armament, seven 32-pounders and twenty-two 24-pounder howitzers, by the end of 1863. Stanton agreed, and on 2

December Barnard received orders to inspect Lake Erie and recommend the temporary fortifications necessary to protect it from “rebels and pirates from Canada.”'*

Barnard submitted his report on 26 December, basing his recommendations on the assumption that rebel raids were the main threat, not a war with Britain. After consulting with Governor Tod and visiting Sandusky, Toledo, Cleveland, Erie, Dunkirk, and

Buffalo, Barnard determined that there were only two likely objects of attack. First, rebel raiders would try to rescue the prisoners at Johnson’s Island. Second, the rebels could

“destroy shipping, railroad depots, grain elevators, machine shops” at the Lake Erie towns. Barnard believed that the current garrison at Johnson’s Island, four companies of volunteers, part of a cavalry regiment, and a heavy artillery battery, was sufficient to defend the place. Far greater was the threat of raiders crossing the ice, which had occurred during the Patriot crisis, and attacking the lake towns. Barnard felt that a mobile field battery at each threatened town would be adequate to defend against attack.

Barnard thus saw little need for temporary fortifications. In his recommendations, he suggested that the government inform governors and mayors that security rested upon

“their own vigilance.” By organizing home guards and employing “a few intelligent men

343 of the right sort” to gather intelligence in Canada, the northern frontier would be safe against raids.'®

Colonel Cram also did not think that an Anglo-American war was the immediate threat on the lakes, but he did recommend fortifications to defend Toledo. Cram knew that seaworthy vessels were too large to pass through the Canadian canals, giving the

United States a great advantage. Nevertheless, he emphasized that Toledo was an important lake port, second only to Chicago, with excellent rail communications to the rest of the country. To prevent a blockade or occupation of the town. Cram recommended two small permanent forts and a temporary fort at the outer entrance of the harbor, with three more temporary forts at the mouth of the Maumee River to deal with enemy vessels that passed the outer line of defense. Cram felt that it was “important for the interests of the government” to carry out the works, and the Toledo city council urged

Stanton that he adopt the plan “as speedily as possible.”^"

The threat of Confederate raids thus encouraged more attention to the defense of the northern frontier. Fort construction continued, and in July 1864 Congress appropriated $50,000 for further work at Fort Montgomery. Canal advocates also continued to press for the enlargement of the Illinois & Michigan, Erie, Oswego, and

Champlain Canals, and the construction of a ship canal around Niagara Falls. As before, the ship canal plans failed. There was no way that the federal government could justify the estimated cost of almost $41 million to improve the canals to allow the passage of gunboats.^' The lack of ship canals prompted some politicians to support the establishment of navy yards on the lakes to build war vessels, a violation of the Rush-

Bagot Agreement. For this reason, Ohio Representative Rufus Spalding introduced a

344 resolution in June 1864 to give the British the required six-month notice that the United

States would terminate the agreement. Although the Senate did not consider the measure after the House approved it on 18 June, the implication for Anglo-American relations was clear. The rumors of Confederate attack had the frontier in turmoil and threatened to overturn an agreement that had helped keep the peace between the United States and

Britain for almost fifty years. “

Future attacks were indeed possible since the Confederate government now hoped to encourage opposition to Lincoln during the presidential election year. Confederate agents, most notably politician Jacob Thompson, were in Canada with instructions to assist the , resorting to force if necessary. Thompson had direct assistance from the Confederate government and was determined to help the northwestern states “throw off the galling dynasty at Washington and openly to take ground in favor of State rights and civil liberty.” In pursuit of these goals, Thompson encouraged peace meetings; assisted the “Sons of Liberty,” allegedly over 200,000 strong, in their plans to seize Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois; met in Windsor with

Copperhead Clement Vallandigham, who had been banished to the Confederacy for his anti-war activities; and laid the plans for a raid on the Michigan and Johnson’s Island.

Given the presence of detectives and informants in Canada, it was difficult to keep such activities secret. There had been new nunors in March of an attack on Johnson’s Island once the ice melted, rumors that Commander Carter believed were false after he took the

Michigan on a cruise in late May. Carter and the authorities at Detroit and Johnson’s

Island felt that things were quiet for the moment. “

345 In September Thompson’s plans finally came to finition. The Michigan had been

at Sandusky since 14 July to guard Johnson’s Island and free up more troops for use in

the field against the fading Confederacy. Carter protested that his vessel would be far

more useful elsewhere, but she remained at Sandusky nonetheless. Seeking a way to

undermine morale in the North prior to the presidential election, Jacob Thompson engaged an escaped Confederate prisoner. Captain Charles Cole, to look into the

possibility of attacking the war vessel. Cole planned to masquerade as a businessman in

Sandusky, ingratiate himself with the officers of the Michigan, and get them drunk.

Meanwhile, a raiding party under John Beall would seize a steamer at Detroit, use it to approach the Michigan, and seize the vessel after subduing the crew. The raiders would then attack Sandusky, seize all available shipping, and transport the prisoners, some

2,717 strong, from Johnson’s Island to Cleveland. The force would then travel to

Wheeling and on to safety in Virginia."'* The conspirators planned to strike on 19

September.^^

Unfortunately for Cole, federal authorities knew about his plans and the entire plot failed. Cole’s unsuccessful attempts to bribe some of the officers of the Michigan no doubt hurt, but informants in Canada provided the news on 17 September that a hijacking of the war vessel was imminent. Commander Carter had Cole arrested, and the crew of the Michigan was ready. Meanwhile, Beall and his men boarded the steamer Philo

Parsons at various points on the Detroit River, seized the vessel on the 19th, and put in at

Middle Bass Island to gather wood for the steamer’s boilers. Another steamer. Island

Queen, pulled alongside looking for firewood. Beall seized the vessel, scuttled it, and left her passengers stranded on the island as he proceeded to Sandusky Bay. Arriving at

346 about 9 p.m., Beall could see the Michigan against the lights of Sandusky, but upon seeing no signal from Cole he aborted the mission. Carter set out in pursuit of the raiders within a few hours, but he broke off the search since he was reluctant to approach

Canadian waters. Beall scuttled the Philo Parsons at Sandwich, federal authorities arrested the conspirators they could get their hands on, and the lake frontier was once again in an uproar.“

As the elections approached and the threat of Confederate raids proved to be real, military officers took no chances. On 20 September Gideon Welles ordered the commander of the New York naval station to have 105 sailors and four howitzers ready to move to Buffalo if necessary, orders that Welles revoked the next day. On the 21st

Richard Delafreld, Chief of Engineers after Totten’s death in April, ordered Captain John

Tardy to go to Sandusky and construct fieldworks for the defense of the bay, town, and

Johnson’s Island. Tardy proceeded to establish a six-gun battery at Cedar Point and two works to guard the prison, mounting seven and four guns each. Meanwhile on 23

September, General C.A. Hitchcock, commanding at Sandusky, requested that the govermnent have “several armed vessels” on the lakes to keep raiders from seizing vessels and attacking the lake frontier. Hitchcock’s request was approved, and on the

26th Acting Secretary of State Frederick Seward informed the British that the United

States would temporarily increase its “observing force” on the lakes. Accordingly, the federal government chartered two propellers, the Hector on Lake Ontario and the

Winslow on Lake Erie, to patrol the lakes and assist the Michigan in her efforts to stop suspicious vessels. Wild stories circulated along the frontier. Shipments of arms were on the way to Indiana to aid opponents of the draft; as many as 2,000 rebels were preparing

347 again to seize the Michigan and attack Johnson’s Island; rebels were equipping vessels with Greek fire to destroy American fishing vessels. Carter found nothing to corroborate such rumors, but there was more trouble to come.^’

On 19 October 1864 Confederate raiders under Lieutenant Bennett Young attacked St. Albans, Vermont, looting banks and unsuccessfully trying to bum the town with incendiary devices. The raiders mortally wounded one resident and fled with their loot across the Canadian border. Young’s stated goal was to retaliate for Union

“outrages” in the Shenandoah Valley and elsewhere. The raiders had little time to enjoy their spoils. Recovering quickly, the residents of St. Albans organized a posse and set out in pursuit across the border. General Dix ordered the provost marshal in Burlington,

Rollo Gleason, to pursue the raiders only if they were “found on our side of the line, and the pursuit then must be instant and continuous.” In other words, the authorities should only cross the border if they were in hot pursuit. Canadian authorities captured fourteen of the raiders and recovered some of the stolen money, but there was trouble once again in Anglo-American relations. Canadians were angry about the violation of their border by the St. Albans posse, and Vermont governor J. Gregory Smith suggested that the

Canadian govermnent be forced to make restitution for the raid’s damages. Smith reported to Stanton that “a good deal of excitement exists on our Northern frontier and apprehension is felt of further raids.

To deal with the possibility of further Confederate attacks. Smith posted state and convalescent federal troops on the Vermont frontier. About 130 convalescents were on guard at St. Albans by the 20th, and the governor authorized the formation of volunteer cavalry units to patrol the frontier. As the danger receded the convalescents returned to

348 their hospitals, leaving sixty men of the Veteran Reserve Corps (V.R.C.)” to protect St.

Albans and twenty to guard the railroad bridge at Alburg. Smith even proposed arming all the able-bodied men along the frontier and having them ready to assemble quickly for the defense of the border. Late October was an especially tense time since the elections were a few weeks away. Stanton warned Dix that Confederate agents were going to send

“refugees, deserters, and enemies” of the Union to vote in the election and organize “a system of robbery and incendiarism” in unprotected areas. To prevent such activity,

Stanton directed Dix to establish “a perfect cordon” on the border to catch any

“miscreants.” He also told Dix to alert the presidential electors so that they could take steps to protect themselves.^"

As consternation prevailed on the northern frontier. Secretary of State Seward decided that the government had to take decisive action to ease tensions and demonstrate the resolve of the United States. On 24 October Seward thus directed Charles Adams to inform British Foreign Secretary Lord Russell that the United States was giving formal notice of its intention to terminate the Rush-Bagot Agreement. Seward emphasized that the action was not meant to demonstrate hostility to Britain. Indeed, he hoped that a more formidable naval presence would thwart raids and maintain good Anglo-American relations. Russell was sturmed and could only reply that Britain might also increase her naval force if necessary; he did hope, however, that the agreement would be renewed once the war was over.^‘

Some action was necessary since agents reported the threat of further disturbances along the border. In late October there were reports from Toronto that “a party of

Southern rebels and sympathizers” had left that city with the intention of attacking

349 Buffalo, Detroit, and possibly other points, and Commander Carter warned the mayor of

Erie on 1 November to be on the lookout for raiders from Canada. There was substance to such intelligence, because Jacob Thompson was trying to obtain another vessel for an attack on the lake frontier. Union agents knew by 5 November that a James Bates had bought the steamer Georgian at Toronto, claiming that he planned to engage in the lumber trade. Bates’s activities were suspicious since he paid $17,000 in gold, a price far higher than the vessel’s worth, and the shipping season had ended. The indications were that the Georgian might be used for “piratical or predatory” attacks on the lake ffontier.^^

Federal and local officials took immediate steps to defend against attack. Carter took the Michigan out on patrol on 6 November, armed tugs patrolled the Detroit River and Buffalo harbor, and Carter sent “a reliable person” from his crew to gather intelligence along the length of the lake frontier. After his patrol. Carter reported to

Secretary Welles that there was no truth to the rumors, and that “ordinary home organizations” of the lake cities could deal with the activities of rebel agents. Carter suggested that the rumors were only designed to alarm the lake population. He was partly correct, because Thompson delighted in the fact that “the wildest consternation prevailed in the border cities.” Welles agreed that the Confederates might just be trying to upset the lake population, but he stressed to Carter that experience had taught authorities “to be on our guard.” He thus ordered Carter to seize the vessel if she proved to be engaged in illegal activity.

While Navy officers dealt with the threat of the Georgian, the War Department took steps to defend key locations on the northern frontier. For example. General Joseph

Hooker, commander of the Northern Department, had state troops from Ohio ready for

350 action on the Lake Erie shore, and Hooker visited Toledo on 10 November to survey the harbor for defenses. At Ogdensburg the authorities had home guard companies patrolling the streets and instituted a passport system to keep unauthorized persons from crossing the border. There were reports that raiders were on the Niagara frontier at Fort Erie and the Niagara Suspension Bridge, so General Dix sent General John Peck and some 480 troops to western New York. Peck’s force had orders to ensure the “quietude and security” of the frontier between Buffalo and Sackets Harbor, especially the New York

Central Railroad. On 7 November Dix also ordered Colonel R. Proctor, commanding at

Burlington, to post the 1st Vermont Cavalry to Plattsburgh and St. Albans after they had voted. General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant even sent several hundred New York and

Vermont troops from Virginia to protect the arsenal at Watervliet.”

Although Lincoln’s re-election occurred without further incident on 8 November, the threats of Confederate attack did not come to an end. A search of the Georgian turned up nothing suspicious, but the new commander of the Michigan, Francis Roe, was still suspicious about the vessel’s activities. The troublesome vessel spent the winter at

Collingwood on Lake Huron. Colonel Hill had reports in Detroit that rebel agents were producing “Greek fire” for use against Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and possibly

Cincinnati and Louisville. He also had reports that a Kentucky regiment had disbanded in Tennessee with orders to report to Canada and attack Detroit once the river froze.

Hooker and Governor Austin Blair thus took steps to defend Michigan, “the most exposed” part of Hooker’s command.^^

The disposition of the St. Albans raiders was yet another blow to Anglo-American relations. It was bad enough that Confederates used Canada as a sanctuary for their

351 depredations against the northern frontier. Lieutenant Young’s raiders went on trial in

Montreal in early December, and the judge released the prisoners since they had been arrested without a proper warrant. To make matters worse, the police chief returned the stolen money to a Confederate agent in Montreal. The release of the prisoners appeared to be a serious injustice, and the American response was swift. Vermont Governor Smith warned Stanton on 14 December that “we are to have serious trouble on the border” as a result of the release, and the same day General Dix issued General Orders No. 97 to deal with future raids. Dix authorized his commanders to shoot down raiders “if possible, while in the commission of their crimes.” If necessary the perpetrators could be pursued across the border, and if captured, they were under no circumstances to be surrendered to

Canadian authorities. Instead, commanders were supposed to send captured raiders to

Dix at his headquarters in New York for trial and punishment under . Dix did not want civilians to retaliate for Confederate outrages and hoped that they would leave justice in the hands of the military authorities.^*

Officials in Washington were equally energetic since Congress convened in

December. Ohio Senator John Sherman, who had been in his home state during the Philo

Parsons affair, introduced a bill for new revenue cutters since the Hector and Winslow were no longer in government service on the lakes. On 20 December Congress authorized $1 million for the construction, purchase, or conversion of six revenue cutters.

The appropriation resulted in the construction of the 480-ton steamers Chase, Perry,

Sherman, Fessenden, Johnson, and Dix, vessels which could assist the Michigan in thwarting Confederate raiders. Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan introduced a resolution on the 14th that the Committee on Military Affairs look into the expediency of

352 placing an army corps on the northern frontier to protect it “from all hostile demonstrations and incursions.” The people along the border were in a state of great excitement, and he feared that the tension might lead to war with Britain. Chandler said that while Vermonters might quietly submit to enemy attacks, the people of the

Northwest would not. It was thus important that the government take “prompt and immediate action” to defend the frontier, otherwise, there was no way to restrain the population. Chandler’s proposal was rejected, but a House vote on 15 December, and the passage of a joint resolution of Congress on 18 January 1865, to terminate the

Reciprocity Treaty further demonstrated the seriousness of the crisis.^^

Lincoln and Stanton did, however, recognize the danger that Dix’s order posed.

The London Times referred to General Orders No. 97 as a declaration of war against

Canada, and Canadian newspapers called for the enlargement of ship canals so that

British war vessels could reach the lakes. While Lincoln approved “prompt and vigilant action, within proper limits,” to protect Dix’s department, he did not approve the provision allowing commanders to pursue raiders into Canada. Violating the border was

“too grave and serious” an issue to be left in the hands of subordinates who could be too eager “to act upon views of military necessity where none really exists.” Both Stanton and Grant agreed with Lincoln’s desire to have commanders apply for “proper authority” before entering Canada. Although Dix protested that such an action would remove “all hope of capturing marauders,” he revoked the order on 17 December and directed his commanders to request authorization before crossing the border.^*

The release of the St. Albans raiders convinced many officials in the North that only decisive action could prevent further Confederate outrages or, possibly, an Anglo-

353 American war. The situation in northern New York and Vermont was similar to that during the Patriot crisis, when border incidents threatened to force the United States and

Britain into a state of war. To patrol the frontier. Dix received authorization to raise a cavalry regiment for one year’s duty on the Canadian border. This regiment was the 26th

New York, or Frontier, Cavalry, organized in December 1864 for one year’s service on the northern frontier and trained at Camp Meigs in Readville, Massachusetts. Consisting of two New York battalions and the 1st Battalion Massachusetts Cavalry, the regiment manned posts in Vermont (St. Albans and Burlington) and in New York (Champlain,

Plattsburgh, Malone, Ogdensburg, Madison Barracks, and Fort Porter) until April 1865.

In addition, the 10th U.S. Infantry had a company at Fort Niagara and three companies at

Fort Porter, recruits of the 16th U.S. Infantry and detachments of the V.R.C. manned Fort

Ontario, and V.R.C. companies occupied Albany. Dix thus covered the key approaches to New York with patrols in anticipation of further trouble. The cavalry and regular troops joined state, local, and V.R.C. units in maintaining peace along the border while

Congress took steps yet again to provide for the defense of the northern frontier.

Once Congress convened, Wisconsin Senator James Doolittle introduced a bill authorizing the president to expend $10 million for fortifications and floating batteries, measures that would defend the northern frontier and lakes commerce against “attack of piratical and hostile expeditions” organized in Canada. During debate on 19 December,

Doolittle suggested that the best way to avoid a war with Britain, a conflict that would be

“a great shock” to civilization and the world, would be to prepare “for any contingencies.” The lake ports needed defenses to prevent rebel raiders from seizing a vessel and reducing towns such as Chicago or Milwaukee to ashes. The bill’s supporters

354 felt that it was high time for the government to show its strength along the frontier in order to preserve the peace. Ohio’s John Sherman wanted the Senate to act quickly in order to alleviate fears along the border.^

There were many senators, of course, who felt that such measures, especially those costing $10 million, were unnecessary. Charles Sumner of Massachusetts was concerned not to do anything to provoke Britain and play into the rebels’ hands. Sumner wanted to suppress the “virulent rebellion” of the Confederacy “without rousing another enemy.” Sherman accused Sumner of not understanding the gravity of the Confederate raids on the lakes. If the attacks had been successful hundreds of vessels, not to mention the lake cities, could have been destroyed. Furthermore, the British could send gunboats to the lakes, destroy the cities, and maintain a blockade more complete than the one against the Confederacy. Senator James Grimes of disagreed with Sherman that an extensive system of fortifications on the lakes was necessary, and he pointed out correctly that Britain had no war ship that could pass through the canals to the lakes. Grimes felt that the only necessary measures were to block the Welland Canal and arm the larger

American commercial fleet. Likewise, Nathan Harwell of Maine assured “our fhends at the West” that there would be nothing to fear in case of a war with Britain. The moment that war broke out, American forces would “take possession of the ingress to the lakes” and combine with converted commercial vessels to assure “entire control of the lakes.

An appropriation of $10 million was hardly necessary for the defense of the northern frontier, and Sherman’s accusation that there was not a gun or fort along the entire border was incorrect. Admittedly, the forts had received a pittance from the federal government relative to the vast sums spent on the seacoast defenses. By late 1864,

355 however, work was already well underway on improving the permanent defenses on the border. The engineers were hard at work improving Forts Wayne, Niagara, and Ontario, providing masonry scarps for the ramparts; there were plans to build another work to replace Fort Porter’s tower, destroyed by fire in 1863; and Fort Montgomery was, in the chief engineer’s words, “now in a defensible condition, at least against raiding parties,” and ready for its casemate armament. In Sherman’s defense, he had claimed that he merely wanted to be prudent and prepare for the possibility of future conflict. The government was, however, improving the important forts on the northern frontier and fighting a major war on another front at the same time. Nothing more could be expected, especially since the forts were supposed to be only one component of the northern frontier’s defense system.’'^

Naval superiority was the key to the defense of the lake frontier, and the issue of naval forces on the lakes also attracted the attention of Congress. In debate on 18

January 1865 over the termination of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, supporters claimed that the agreement was no longer fair to both parties. British ship canals had changed the naval equation, and the United States had no canals of its own that allowed gunboats from the Atlantic to pass onto the lakes. Opponents such as Maine’s Nathan Farwell suggested that terminating the agreement would entail wasteful naval spending. The

United States owned “almost the entire commerce of the lakes,” and his fellow senators had no reason to fear the possibility of British gunboats coming through the Welland

Canal. Given the Union’s “vast military superiority on the land,” Farwell had “no fear at all” that Britain could project any respectable force far into Canada.

356 The debate over the naval agreement also renewed the talk about the necessity of ship canals on the northern frontier. In the debate over the defenses of the northern frontier in December Wisconsin Senator Timothy Howe asserted that a ship canal from the Hudson to the lakes would eliminate the necessity to maintain "‘useless” fortifications or fleets on the Great Lakes. In early February 1865 the House again considered bills authorizing appropriations for the Illinois & Michigan and Niagara ship canals.

Supporters believed that such measures were absolutely necessary to national defense.

Isaac Arnold of Illinois suggested that the expenditure of only $5 million dollars would allow the $50 million worth of gunboats on the Mississippi to pass onto the lakes. New

York’s Fernando Wood pointed out that tennination of the Reciprocity Treaty would close the Welland Canal to American shipping and make the Niagara ship canal a necessity. Ship canal advocates believed that $10 million of fortifications would not be enough to provide the security that a formidable gunboat force could provide.

Furthermore, they felt that the northern frontier was “utterly and completely defenseless.”

While the seacoast was more than 3,000 miles from Britain and received much federal attention, the northern frontier was within musket shot of the enemy. Ohoian Rufus

Spalding pointed out that the 10 million people of the Northwest were asking only $6 million for the Niagara ship canal while over the decades more than $150 million had been appropriated for the seacoast forts alone. Surely the population along the border deserved some consideration from Congress.'”

In the end. Congress took no extraordinary steps to defend the northern frontier.

First, the ship canals again went down to defeat. As Wisconsin Representative James

Brown pointed out, the government was already greatly in debt. In his opinion there was

357 no greater government abuse than to “devote the money wrung from the people o f one portion of the country to the local benefit of another portion.” The ship canals would have to pass Congress on their commercial benefits and not on their military qualifications, which were debatable. Second, Congress appropriated more funds for the forts of the northern fi-ontier (Appendix A). While the $250,000 was a far cry from the original $10 million proposal, the sum would make the engineers’ proposed improvements possible. Finally, on 9 February Congress approved the termination of the

Rush-Bagot Agreement, explaining that peace on the frontier was in danger of attack by

“hostile expeditions” and “other acts of lawless persons.” The naval force of either nation allowed by the agreement was “insufficient to prevent” Confederate depredations.

Fortunately the Confederacy was in complete collapse, and on 8 March Seward instructed

Charles Adams to inform Lord Russell that the United States would observe the naval agreement after all. Seward had seen termination as a temporary war measure anyway, and the British were pleased that the agreement would continue in force.^’

The British government was anxious to avoid war and had already taken steps to quell border unrest. For example, once Commander Roe learned that the crew of the

Georgian planed to strengthen her bow for ramming, destroy the shipping at Detroit and

Cleveland, and liberate the prisoners at Johnson’s Island, he informed the State

Department. Canadian authorities seized the vessel after Seward demanded that the

British confiscate it. On 16 December the Canadian government called out thirty volunteer companies to watch the length of the frontier, and in February 1865 the governor general received authorization to arrest any alien at his discretion. It was clear that Britain was anxious not to give offense to the Americans. Members of Parliament

358 admitted that the Americans had justifiable grievances, the situation in Europe demanded all the diplomatic and military resources that Britain could muster, and the balance of power in North America was against Britain. After defeating the Confederacy, the

United States possessed military and naval power that was too formidable to ignore.^

Fortunately, the end of the Civil War did not bring an immediate threat to Anglo-

American relations, despite rumors that Confederate raiders were still at large. Union soldiers were anxious to go home, and there was little, if any, political support for a war of aggression against Canada. On the Great Lakes, however, there were still reports of possible rebel raids. Commander Roe chose Detroit as his base of operations for the summer, because the city was within range of any possible disturbance up or down the lakes. The Michigan visited Johnson’s Island and patrolled Lake Erie in May '‘to disconcert” any Confederate operations, but after the release of 2,502 prisoners during

June there was only a handful left for raiders to liberate. By October the prison was empty. In July Roe went to Lake Superior after hearing of plans to organize “a piratical raid” down the lakes. Upon arriving at Marquette on 3 July, Roe discovered that the disturbance was actually a miners’ strike. The presence of the Michigan helped pacify the strikers, and Roe left in late July when troops arrived from Chicago. The Michigan went to Buffalo in late September to allay continued fears of attack, but by then all was quiet along the lake frontier.

To ensure that there would be no trouble on the northern frontier, the War

Department once again posted regular troops there and continued work on the key forts.

The 4th Infantry, headquartered at Fort Wayne, manned Forts Brady, Niagara, and

Ontario and Madison and Plattsburgh Barracks by October 1865, the first large

359 deployment of regulars on the border since the Trent crisis. In addition, two companies of the 19th V.R.C. garrisoned Fort Porter, and between June and August the 1st Vermont

Cavalry, fresh from the Grand Review in Washington, occupied St. Albans and posts in

New York. These troops showed the flag on the northern frontier, reassuring the population and thwarting border disturbances. Aided by appropriations earlier in the year, fort construction proceeded at a leisurely pace. The improvement of the ramparts at

Forts Wayne, Niagara, and Ontario continued, while Fort Montgomery was at last almost complete. Meanwhile, engineers surveyed Fort Porter for new fortifications. The only extensive fieldworks on the frontier, those at Cedar Point and Johnson’s Island, were abandoned and disarmed. Modem warfare had demonstrated the weakness of traditional masonry fortifications, however, and the engineer department had plans for future modifications. The engineers were preparing plans to equip forts with large-caliber ordnance, requiring new gun platforms to mount guns with the “penetrating and crushing power” to destroy ironclads. Engineer chief Delafreld planned to rely on nothing smaller than 10” Rodman guns at important frontier sites. The Civil War had made it clear that

Totten’s fortification system would die with him."*®

The Civil War had also made it clear that the Canadians would have to contribute more to their defense. Britain’s small army was an inadequate instrument of government policy, incapable of dealing with hostilities in both Europe and North America. The

Austro-Prussian attack on Denmark in 1864 demonstrated the weakness of the British position, aggravated by the fact that about 15,000 regulars were in the North American provinces. The logical solution was to reduce the garrison and concentrate the bulk of the remaining troops near Montreal and Quebec, the likely targets of American attack.

360 Colonel Jervois estimated that as much as £1.754 million would be needed to build an adequate system of fortifications for the Canadas, an outlay that Parliament was highly unlikely to endorse. Fiscal conservatives, such as Chancellor of the Exchequer William

Gladstone, considered Jervois’s plan too expensive and feared that extensive fortifications could entangle Britain in a war with the Americans. The Canadians, in his view, would have to be more responsible for their own defense."*^

Gladstone believed that American annexation, not invasion, of the provinces was the main danger. In his view, the United States was unlikely to “have a quarrel with

Canada for its own sake,” so detaching the North American provinces from London could possibly be their best defense. There would be no way that the Americans could hope to hurt Britain “in honour and power” if Canada were responsible for her own administration and defense. Furthermore, world opinion would consider an American attack on an independent Canada to be inhuman and unjustified. The Canadians were the masters of their own destiny, strong enough to defend themselves and too self-dependent to rely on London for protection. Such views met with approval with those “Little

Englanders” who wanted every imperial soldier returned immediately. In Gladstone’s opinion, the “brave, self-relying population, which fights for hearth and home,” would be the best defense of Canada and permit Britain to focus her resources elsewhere.'"

Concerned by its weakness on the diplomatic battlefields in Europe, the British government thus encouraged as a first step in shifting more of the defense burden to the colonies. Britain had been hostile to a proposal in 1858 for a federal union in British North America, but subsequent events made the idea very appealing. In June 1865 the Colonial Office informed the Maritime Provinces that the

361 government desired union of the North American colonies, stressing the importance of defense. For example, only a British North American confederation could make a rail link between Halifax and Quebec possible. More important for imperial policy, of course, only Canadian union could make a dignified British withdrawal possible.^’

Accordingly, British and Canadian ministers held discussions on defense issues, agreeing that Canada would have to provide more than an ill-trained militia to supplement the regulars. The Canadians would have to be prepared to defend themselves against American attack until relief arrived, requiring the construction of fortifications and the reorganization of the militia. For their part, the British carried out plans to make

Quebec a modem fortress. As long as Quebec stood, so would Canada, because British reinforcements could use the city as a base from which to recover any ground gained by the Americans. Thus, in the summer of 1865 British engineers started construction of three forts on Point Levis across from Quebec. An American army equipped with heavy siege guns could easily approach the city by rail from Maine, and the new defenses would help keep attackers away from the heart of the city and secure the port for the Royal

Navy. Offensive operations launched from Halifax or Bermuda would make the United

States pay dearly for waging war in the first place.^'

The construction of fortifications by both sides appeared to be a sound decision, because there remained one more major border crisis that could erupt into an Anglo-

American war. The , a tribute to the belligerence, if not the organizational ability, of the Irish, demonstrated that a continued Canadian connection to Britain greatly threatened the colonies’ security. The was interested in striking a blow against Britain and, so they thought, relieving the oppression of their relatives in

362 Ireland. Using American soil as a sanctuary, the filled their ranks with Union

Army veterans and planned cross-border attacks at the major chokepoints on the northern frontier. British and Canadian agents were able to infiltrate the organization, however, and the Canadian government called out the militia on the Detroit, Niagara, and St.

Lawrence frontiers starting in November 1865. On the American side, General-in-Chief

Grant directed General Edward Ord, commander of the Department of Ohio, to prevent

“organized military companies” from entering Canada. There would indeed be an attack against Canada after the Civil War, but a vengeful United States government would not be the instigator. As was the case during the Patriot crisis, the population along the border would precipitate another crisis in Anglo-American relations.^^

Excitement on both sides of the border mounted as the Canadian government prepared for a reported attack on St. Patrick’s Day, 1866. No attack transpired, but

Fenians gathered at Calais and Freeport in Maine, plaiming to seize Campobello Island and use it as a base for privateering and other depredations. Unfortimately for the raiders, the authorities were ready. The Canadians organized home guard units, infiltrated agents into the Fenians, and used two vessels to patrol Passamaquoddy Bay, and British war ships and 700 regulars provided formidable firepower. In addition, the U.S.S. Winooski and American regulars arrived to help keep the peace. General George G. Meade, commander of the Department of the East, arrived at Calais on 18 April and posted artillery companies in the area to guard the border. General Grant had directed him not to interfere with Fenian meetings but to prevent the Fenians from “making War upon a foreign power with which we are at peace.” Meade’s troops seized arms and warned the

Fenians that any raids would lead to their arrest. Although Fenian bands drilled on the

363 border and launched a few half-hearted border incursions, they were running short on funds and drifted back to Boston and New York as their enthusiasm waned/'*

Andrew Johnson was reluctant to anger Irish-Americans at a time when he needed

Democratic votes to counter the Radical Republicans, and American authorities confined themselves to preventing violations of American law. Officials did their best to maintain peace along the frontier by conducting patrols and seizing arms shipments meant for the

Fenians. On 1 June Lieutenant Charles AJlen, commanding at Fort Montgomery, seized a large shipment at Rouses Point, as did customs officers at St. Albans. Allen stored the contraband in the fort after Fenians threatened to take the munitions back. At

Ogdensburg on 2 June, where the revenue cutter Chase and an armed boat patrolled the

St. Lawrence and guarded the ferry boats, customs agents seized boxes of arms meant for a Fenian force gathering at Malone. Elsewhere, the revenue cutters Sherman and

Johnson patrolled the Detroit River, while the cutter Fessenden and two armed tugs assisted the Michigan on the Niagara frontier. Seward had reassured the concerned

British government in November 1865 that the revenue cutters were for revenue purposes only. Now the cutters might help prevent an Anglo-American war.^^

The Niagara frontier was an especially tense area, because by 31 May over a thousand Fenians had arrived in Buffalo. The Fenians planned to organize forces at

Chicago, Niagara, and Vermont, overrun Canada, and establish an in exile.

The Chicago wing was unable to find transport, but preparations went ahead to the east.

The Michigan was already at Buffalo for repairs, and her commander, Andrew Bryson, captured a shipload of gunpowder in the harbor. To prevent the Fenians from crossing the river, Bryson took up station near Black Rock. Unfortunately, the pilot and second

364 engineer of the Michigan went absent without leave and the vessel went aground on a bar. Bryson’s impotence allowed some 600 Fenians to cross the river and defeat 850 volunteers at the Battle of Ridgeway on 2 June. The raiders quickly withdrew upon the approach of a British relief column, and the crews of the Michigan and the tug Harrison managed to capture 700 of the fleeing Fenians. Prompt British and Canadian action, combined with the blockade that Bryson was eventually able to place on the Niagara

River, quelled the major disturbance on the Niagara frontier.^

The Fenians proved to be too disorganized and weakened by political infighting to be any real threat to Canada, and British, Canadian, and American officials had little difficulty quelling disturbances along the frontier. A Fenian raid from Vermont on 7

June ended in a humiliating retreat, and by the 18th the Canadian government dismissed most of the volunteers. General Meade’s troops continued to intercept arms shipments, reinforcements brought the British garrison in North America to over 16,700, and the

British assigned three gimboats. Heron, Britomart, and Cherub, to Lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron respectively. On both sides of the border, vessels patrolled large areas of shoreline that the militia could not guard and reassured the local population during the state of emergency. British tra\ elers noted that there was still some bad blood among

Americans about British support of the Confederacy during the Civil War, but there was little chance that the United States would even contemplate an attack on Canada. British

North America was the aggrieved party, and Americans could hardly justify an attack during the Fenian crisis, especially at a time when the ordeal of Reconstruction absorbed most of the energies of the federal government. Furthermore, although the 1,234 troops

(table 9.1) on the northern frontier by 1867 represented a great increase since the Civil

365 War, almost all of them were members of V.R.C. units. The soldiers were thus little

more than caretakers, many of them missing eyes or limbs, who could keep their posts out of the hands of troublemakers. The 4th Infantry had transferred to the Division of the

Missouri in order to operate on the Great Plains. Most of the nation’s regulars were at the western posts or would soon be in the South enforcing the Military Reconstruction Act.^’

Location 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 Plattsburgh Bairacks 64 125 120 75 62 107 Madison Barracks 95 213 265 43 66 104 Fl Ontario 4 74 57 59 68 53 F l Niagara 46 67 66 64 53 49 Fl Porter 117 159 142 171 184 114 Fl Wayne 177 329 331 260 194 185 Fl Gratiot 115 69 58 136 132 61 Fl Mackinac 1 67 61 67 46 54 Fl Brady 4 64 110 111 85 87 Fl Wilkins — 67 59 34 — — Total 623 1234 1269 1020 890 814 U.S. total N/A 56,815 50,916 36,774 37,075 28,953 SOURCE; Reports of the Secretarv' of War. 1866: 39th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. 12, vol. 1, ser. 1237,43, 56, and Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800-1916," NA, RG 94, M617, roll 952 [Ft Porter]; 1867; 40th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex Doc. /, vol. 2, ser. 1324, 452-55, 458-59; 1868; 40th Cong., 3d sess.. House Ex Doc. 1, vol. 3, ser. 1367, 748-51; 1869; 41st Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1412, 162-65; 1870; 41st Cong., 3d sess.. House Ex Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1446, 80-83; 1871: 42d Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex Doc. / , vol. 2, ser. 1503,98-101. \J.%.\.o\a.\saie'm?r\iciia,.-lGuide lo theSlililary Posts o f the UnitedStates,\A'i-iA.

Table 9.1; Number of troops posted on northern frontier, 1866-1871.

The Fenian crisis did provoke one more round of concern about the defenses of the northern frontier, however. The House Committee on Naval Affairs recommended in

June 1866 that naval facilities be established at Cleveland, Grand Haven, and Milwaukee to defend “the immense magnitude of the commerce” of the lakes from British

“rapacity.” In February 1867 Maine requested defenses for the exposed frontiers of the state, the “outpost of our nation.” The legislature wanted a naval depot for ironclads, “a strong fortress as a naval and military centre,” and a railroad that would help connect

New York to Halifax. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs supported Maine’s 366 petition, suggesting that a railroad network would begin “the peaceful conquest” of

Canada and forever “shut the armies of England and the world from our northern frontier.” The Michigan legislature felt equally exposed, and urged Congress in March

1867 to build “suitable fortifications” at Forts Mackinac and Brady and a gunboat station to protect the “vast commerce” o f the inland seas. There was, then, still a measure of concern about the defenses of the northern frontier.^*

In early 1867 the Niagara ship canal once again came before the attention of

Congress. In March Congress directed the Secretary of War to survey the route and prepare plans for a canal, suitable for “military, naval, and commercial purposes,” to connect Lakes Erie and Ontario. Colonel Charles Blunt submitted a report in February

1868 that proposed five different routes around Niagara Falls. The cost estimate for each route was about $13 million. Chief of Engineers A. A. Humphreys recommended the adoption of a route following 18 Mile Creek since it was farther from the border and thus more secure against attack. Humphreys felt that the 18 Mile Creek route was superior for commercial reasons as well, because its terminus would be fifteen miles farther east than the other routes, making the commercial route shorter. Blunt’s plans were never carried out, and it is significant that the petition of Massachusetts in support of the canal made no mention of its military utility. The ship canal would facilitate the “free and cheap interchange of the products and manufactures of the different sections” and strengthen the

“bond of national union.” The Niagara ship canal would thus primarily be a commercial concern, and it would have to stand congressional scrutiny without the cover of military necessity.

367 Fortification work continued as well, boosted by a further appropriation in 1866 of $50,000 each for Forts Montgomery, Ontario, and Wayne (Appendix A). The appropriation was necessary to finish ramparts and gun platforms at the permanent forts.

By 1867, Forts Porter, Niagara, and Ontario, and Madison and Plattsburgh Barracks received new quarters, hospitals, and storehouses as well. Nevertheless, despite the federal appropriations and the pleas from state legislatures, the forts of the northern frontier were actually in a state of decline. For example, none of the forts had its authorized armament, work stopped at Fort Niagara in October 1866 for want of funds, and the council of Port Huron asked Congress in December 1867 to sell a portion of the

Fort Gratiot reservation. Most of the fort was overgrown and stood in the way of the city’s growth, and engineer chief Humphreys agreed that those portions not needed for military purposes could be sold. The appropriation of $12,500 for Fort Montgomery in

1867 (Appendix A) was in fact the last major federal outlay for the fortifications of the northern frontier, despite the requests of the chief engineer. Subsequent appropriations were only for conservation work. The nation’s attention was focused elsewhere, and the possibility of war with Britain decreased with each passing year.^

Events on the Canadian side of border helped to ensure long-term peace along the northern frontier. The fear of American attack and the probability that Britain would reduce the imperial garrison forced the Canadians to unite for their common defense.

The British government was increasingly tired of protecting its North American possessions, making possible the federation of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the

Canadas into the Dominion of Canada on 1 July 1867. The Fenian disturbances had created a new sense of unity among Canadians and convinced their government to take

368 new responsibility for defense. In fact, Confederation was necessary to ensure the construction of the ; the railroad would help consolidate the union and, most importantly, provide a more reliable means of communication between Halifax and Quebec. Military and political concerns thus went hand-in-hand. The British North

America Act concentrated national defense powers in the hands of the government in

Ottawa, making possible the future withdrawal of the British presence and consequent reduction in the likelihood of another Anglo-American war on the northern frontier.

Canadian independence posed no threat, and some Americans even looked forward to an eventual union of Canada with the United States.^*

Canadian confederation made it possible for the United States once again to reduce the level of military commitment to the northern frontier. Regular troops did return to the border forts in 1869, but as of late 1868 the Fenians posed little threat to the security of the international boundary. The fortifications received no more appropriations since defense technology was in a state of flux. The Board of Engineers planned in 1869 to make extensive use of earthen batteries and disappearing guns, and there was little point in spending more money on the obsolete forts on the frontiers. Work on the northern frontier forts stopped until engineers prepared plans for the necessary modifications. Since the improvements were never carried out, only preservation work took place. In fact, the government even ceded portions of the reservations at Forts

Gratiot and Porter for use as public parks in 1870. Although some of the key points on the northern frontier would remain a factor in later defense planning,^’ the border posts would never again command the attention they did when Britain played a greater role in

Canada’s defense.^^

369 British troop withdrawal made such complacency possible. In February 1870 the

British government informed the Canadians that while Halifax would retain a garrison

and serve as an imperial fortress, the rest of the regulars, except for a handful at Quebec,

would leave North America. There was another Fenian scare in the spring, however.

Although President Ulysses Grant groused about restraining the Fenians when the British

had made no attempt to stop the sailing of the Alabama during the Civil War, American

authorities and troops once again interdicted arms shipments and curtailed Fenian activity. Local Canadian volunteers defeated yet another Fenian invasion from Vermont

in May, humiliating the Irish movement. Even the Fenian leaders admitted that the conduct of their forces was disgraceful, and the threat of further raids passed for good.

There was also some American concern in May about the passage of British troops through Sault Ste. Marie on their way to suppress a rebellion in the Red River country,^ but both the United States and Britain had more pressing concerns elsewhere. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish suggested that the two nations should resolve all their outstanding differences at a conference in Washington. The British retained the garrison at Quebec to demonstrate their commitment to the Canadians, but they were also anxious to reduce

Anglo-American tensions, especially at a time when Prussia was in the process of crushing France. More than ever, Britain needed to devote its resources closer to home.^^

The Treaty of Washington, signed on 8 May 1871, settled many of the outstanding differences between the United States and Britain, removing potential causes of war and indirectly ensuring the security of the northern frontier. Both sides lumped their grievances together, and the treaty addressed such issues as naturalization, the San

Juan boundary, fisheries, and most importantly, the Alabama claims. Many Americans

370 still resented Britain’s support to the Confederacy during the Civil War, believing that the assistance helped prolong the conflict. In particular, the depredations of British-built commerce raiders such as the Alabama caused millions of dollars in damage for which the United States demanded restitution. The treaty submitted the Alabama claims to arbitration, and in September 1872 a tribunal meeting in found Britain legally liable. The Treaty of Washington thus helped put fears on both sides of the Atlantic to rest, giving Britain the opportunity to complete the withdrawal of its garrison from

Canada.^

The withdrawal of British regulars from the interior of Canada further reduced the chance of war along the northern frontier. The last remaining troops at the Citadel of

Quebec left the city on 11 November 1871, leaving Canadian defense in the hands of

Canadians. The British withdrawal was so complete that although an imperial naval base remained at Halifax, Britain ceased to be a North American power by 1872. For its part the United States no longer had to give major consideration to the defense of the northern frontier. Significantly, ship canal advocates no longer bothered to use military benefits as a justification for navigation improvements.^’ A turning point in Anglo-American relations thus came in 1871. Fears of American attack had prompted Canadian confederation, making possible the British withdrawal that made an American attack less likely. Canada no longer had to be an American hostage to British good behavior, and the people on both sides of the northern frontier could look forward to the peaceful development of their region.^*

371 * * The Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 2d sess., part I (Washington: F. & J. Rives, 1865), 58.

^ Jac Weller, “The Confederate Use of British Cannon,” Civil War History 3 (June 1957): 135-52; Frank J. Merli, Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861-1865 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965, 1970), 16-17; Richard I. Lester, “Construction and Purchase of Confederate Cruisers in Great Britain during the American Civil War,” Mariner's Mirror 63 (February 1977): 71-92; Glyndon G. Van Deusen, William Henry Seward (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 352-57. For the Union naval presence in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, see Gideon Welles to John Collins, 30 July 1863, in ORN, ser. L vol. 2, 415. For a contemporary view that Union ports needed improved defenses to protect against Confederate ironclads, see “Harbor Defense,” Harper's New Monthly Magazine 27 (September 1863): 556-57.

^ Brian A. Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, vol. 2 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1980), 267-70; Howard Jones, Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 226-29.

■* J. Mackay Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871 (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1968), 183-

86.

’ For Murdaugh’s plan, see William Murdaugh to Secretary of the Navy of the Confederate States, 7 February 1863, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 2, 828-30.

* Oscar A. Kinchen, Confederate Operations in Canada and the North: A Little-Known Phase of the American Civil War (North Quincy, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing House, 1970), 15-26; Phillip R. Shriver and Donald J. Breen, Ohio's Military Prisons in the Civil War (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), 50-51. For the Copperhead movement in the upper Midwest, see Frank L. Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

’ “Memorial to the President and Congress of the United States, by the National Canal Convention,” June 1863, 38th Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. I, vol. 5, ser. 1184, 119-34; Lincoln’s “Annual Message,” December 1863, 38th Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. I, vol. 1, ser. 1180, 9.

* “Memorial to the President and Congress of the United Stales, by the National Canal Convention,” June 1863, 38th Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. I, vol. 5, ser. 1184, 123; “Appropriations and Expenditures for the Naval Service,” 38th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. 12, vol. 8, ser. 1223; “Report of the Engineer Department,” 31 October 1863, NA, RG 77, Annual Reports to the Secretary o f War, entry 117, vol. 3, 440-43. For the activities of the M ichigan in summer 1863, see Mrs. John C. Carter to anon., Ohio Historical Society, John C. Carter Papers, VFM 1227, J.C. Carter to Gideon Welles, 28 July 1863, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 2, 414-15, and J.C. Carter to Gideon Welles, 3 September 1863, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 2, 435. For plans of improvements at northern frontier forts, see “Fort Ontario,” 10 June 1863, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 4-17, and “Fort Niagara,” 6 July 1863, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 3-28.

’ Kinchen, Confederate Operations in Canada and the North, 26-27.

William Pierson to William Hoffinan, 16 October 1863, in OR, ser. U, vol. 6, 385; W. Hoffman to W.S. Pierson, 19 October 1863, in OR, ser. H, vol. 6, 396-97; W. Hoffman to Secretary o f War, 19 October 1863, in OR, ser. H, vol. 6, 385-86.

“ David Tod to E.M. Stanton, 21 October 1863, in OR, ser. H, vol. 6, 402; Gideon Welles to John Carter, 22 October 1863, in ORN, ser. L, vol. 2, 474; John Carter to Gideon Welles, 28 October 1863, in ORN, ser. L, vol. 2, 478-79; Gideon Welles to John Carter, 31 October 1863, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 2, 488; William

372 Pierson to William Hoffman, 28 October 1863, in OR, ser. H, vol. 6, 435; William Pierson to William Hoffinan, 31 October 1863, in OR ser. II, vol. 6, 448-50.

B.H. Hill to James B. Fry, 9 November 1863, in OR ser. HI, vol. 3, 1008; Correspondence in ORN, ser. L, vol. 2, 495-96; I D Cox to J.C. Carter, 7 March 1866, Ohio Historical Society, John C. Carter Papers, VFM 1227.

Edwin Stanton to John A. Dix, 11 November 1863, in OR ser. m , vol. 3, 1014; Correspondence, 11 November 1863, in OR ser. IE, vol. 3, 1015; Edwin Stanton to Governor of Pennsylvania, 11 November 1863, in OR ser. HI, vol. 3, 1013; Edwin Stanton to Mayor of Buffalo, 11 November 1863, in OR ser. m , vol. 3, 1013-14; W. Hoffinan to L. Thomas, 11 November 1863, in OR ser. U, vol. 6, 500.

F.C. Sherman to Edwin Stanton, 12 November 1863,in OR ser. in , vol. 3, 1018-19; J R. Smith to Edwin Stanton, 13 November 1863,in OR ser. HI, vol. 3, 1031-32; Correspondence from J.D. Cox and Governor Tod to Secretary Stanton, 12 November 1863, in OR ser. Ul, vol. 3, 1023-24; Laura G. Sanford, The History o f Erie County, rev. ed. ([Erie, Pa. ?]: By the author, 1894), 336, 342-43;W.T.H. Brooks to Edwin Stanton, 13 November 1863,in OR ser. Ill, vol. 3, 1033-34.

D C Judson to Edwin Stanton, 12 November 1863, in OR ser. HI, vol. 3, 1022; William Fargo to Edwin Stanton, 12 November 1863, in OR ser. HI, vol. 3, 1022-23; La. G.B. Grant to Edwin Stanton, 12 November 1863, in OR ser. HL vol. 3, 1023; Jacob Cox to Edwin Stanton, 15 November 1863, in OR ser. in , vol. 3, 1043; Carter’s correspondence in ORN, ser. L vol. 2, 498; J.C. Carter to Gideon Welles, 25 November 1863, in ORN, ser. L vol. 2, 503; Kinchen, Confederate Operations in Canada and the North, 28. For the armament of the Michigan, see Bradley A. Rodgers, Guardian o f the Great Lakes: The U.S. Paddle Frigate Michigan (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 147.

“Report of the Engineer Department,” 1864, NA, RG 77, Annual Reports to the Secretary of War, entry 117, vol. 3, 502-05. John S. Billings, Report on Barracks and Hospitals with Descriptions o f Military Posts (Washington: GPO, 1870; reprint. New York: Sol Lewis, 1974), 112-13, states that the tower was burned by bounty jumpers confined there.

Jacob Cox to Edwin Stanton, 17 November 1863, in OR ser. HL vol. 3, 1075, Correspondence, 20 November 1863,in ORN, ser. L vol. 2, 499; John A. Dix to Edwin Stanton, 25 November 1863,in OR, ser. in , vol. 3, 1096; John A. Dix to H.W. Halleck, 28 November 1863, in OR, ser. HL vol. 3, 1099; H.W. Halleck to John A. Dix, 30 November 1863,in OR ser. HL vol. 3, 1104.

'* Joseph G. Totten to Edwin Stanton, 21 November 1863, NA, RG 77, Letters, Reports, and Statements Sent to the Secretary of War and Congress, 1836-68, entry 8, vol. 11, 95; “Report of the Engineer Department” 1864, NA, RG 77, Annual Reports to the Secretary of War, entry 117, vol. 3, 502-05; Quarterly Summary Statements of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores on Hand at Forts and Batteries, NA, RG 156, entry 100, No. 4; Edwin Stanton to Governor Tod, 3 December 1863, in OR, ser. HL vol. 3, 1118.

J G Barnard to Joseph G. Totten, 26 December 1863, in OR ser. 1, vol. 29, part IL 585-87.

T.J. Cram to Joseph G. Totten, 7 January 1864, NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 54, C5402; Resolution o f City Council of Toledo, [received 22 January 1864], NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 54, C5418.

In January 1864, Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs proposed a cost-effective way to build the Illinois & Michigan and Niagara ship canals. In a confidential letter to Henry Raymond, editor o f the New York Times, Meigs suggested using the labor of Confederate prisoners, 50,000 “criminals” in his view; believing that the public “supposes that as a Christian nation we are bound to support these Southern gentlemen in idleness,” Meigs hoped that Raymond would use his newspaper to change public opinion on the matter; see M.C. Meigs to H.J. Raymond, 30 January 1864, in OR ser. H, vol. 6, 893-94. 373 ^ U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 13, 353, 419; “Construction o f a ship canal from the Mississippi river to the lakes,” 1 and 19 February 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. M isc. Doc. 18 and 31, vol. 1, ser. 1177; “Construction of a ship canal around the Falls o f Niagara,” 1 April 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. M isc. Doc. 91, vol. 1, ser. 1177; “Memorial of the Legislature o f Wisconsin,” 27 April 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 110, vol. 1, ser. 1177; Callahan, “The Neutrality of the American Lakes,” 150-51; The Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st sess., part 3 (Washington; John C. Rives, 1864), 2909. For ship canal cost estimates, see “Proposed Improvements to Pass Gunboats from Tide Water to the Northern and Northwestern Lakes,” 24 March 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. 61, vol. 13, ser. 1193, 16.

^ Kinchen, Confederate Operations in Canada and the North, 28-44; Jacob Thompson to Judah Benjamin, 3 December 1864, in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 714; Gideon Welles to John Carter, 28 March 1864, in ORN, ser. L vol. 2, 634-35; John Carter to Gideon Welles, 26 May 1864, in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 39-40.

This was an exceedingly ambitious plan, and the Confederates probably would not have escaped across the Ohio River into Virginia. Morgan’s raiders had failed to do so in 1863 and were eventually killed or captured.

W. Hoffinan to H.W. Halleck, 7 July 1864, in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 95-96; E.G. Martin to Gideon Welles, 14 July 1864, in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 116-17; J.C. Carter to Gideon Welles, 11 August 1864, in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 136-37; Jacob Thompson to Judah Benjamin, 3 December 1864, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 3, 715-16. For prisoner strength at Johnson’s Island, see Shriver and Breen, Ohio's Military Prisons, 50-51.

Bradley A. Rodgers, “The Northern Theater in the Civil War: The USS M ichigan and Confederate Intrigue on the Great Lakes,” American Neptune 48 (Spring 1988): 101-03. For an official report of the Philo Parsons affair, see John A. Dix to E.M. Stanton, 30 September 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part U, 225-47. For the capture o f the Philo Parsons and the Island Queen, see correspondence in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 218-21.

“War Vessels on the Great Lakes,” 56th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 471, vol. 91, ser. 3988, 29, 53; Correspondence, 20 September 1864, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 3, 219-20; Richard Delafield to CPT J.A. Tardy, 21 September 1864, NA, RG 77, Letters Sent to Engineer Officers, 1812-69, entry 6, vol. 37, 291-92; John A. Tardy to Richard Delafield, November 1, 1864, NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 180, T3065; J.C. Carter to Gideon Welles, 6 October 1864, in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 254; Correspondence, 12 October 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 39, part HI, 238; Correspondence in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 495-96. For plans of the fortifications at Sandusky Bay, see “Battery, Cedar Point, Ohio, ” 6 September 1865, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 144-16, “Johnson’s Island, Sandusky Harbor, Ohio, ” 4 November 1864, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 144-13, and “View o f Johnson’s Island,” 1865, NA, RG 92, Post and Reservation File, Map 105-25.

Kinchen, Confederate Operations in Canada and the North, 127-34; John A Dix to Edwin Stanton, 19 October 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part H, 420; John A Dix to Rollo Gleason, 20 October 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part 0, 435-36; J. Gregory Smith to Edwin Stanton, 21 October 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part H, 443-44. For Confederate correspondence concerning the attacks on Lake Erie and St. Albans, see Anon, to Judah P. Benjamin, 1 November 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part H, 914-17.

The Veteran Reserve Corps was a federal organization o f soldiers incapacitated by sickness or wounds but still capable of light duty in garrisons, prisons, or hospitals. Using invalids in such roles freed able- bodied men for field service; see OR, ser. IH, vol. 5, 560-67, 679-82.

J. Gregory Smith to Edwin Stanton, 22 October 1864, in OR, ser. I, vol. 43, part H, 452; William Austine to Colonel Van Buren, 23 October 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part H, 455-56; Edwin Stanton to John A. Dix, 24 October 1864, in OR, ser. I, vol. 43, part H, 463-64.

374 William Seward to Charles Adams, 24 October 1864, and Lord Russell to Lord Lyons, 26 November 1864, in “War Vessels on the Great Lakes,” 56th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 471, vol. 91, ser. 3988, 31, 47-52.

William Rogers to J.B. Fry, 30 October 1864,in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part n, 498; Correspondence, 1 November 1864,in OR, ser. L vol. 43,part tt, 523-25; Frederick Palmer to C.H. Potter, 5 November 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 39, part HL 656-57;John Peck to William Seward, 10 November 1864,in OR, ser. L vol. 43,part 0, 602.

Correspondence in OR, ser. I, vol. 39, part UL 676-77; F A. Roe to Gideon Welles, 20 November 1864, in ORN, ser. L, vol. 3, 377; Correspondence in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 349; Jacob Thompson to Judah Benjamin, 3 December 1864, in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 714-19; Gideon Welles to John Carter, 16 November 1864, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 3, 374-75.

B.R. Cowen to , 31 October 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 39, part UL 552; Clark Waggoner, ed.. History of the City o f Toledo mid Lucas County, Ohio (New York: Munsell & Co., 1888), 109; P S. Garand, The History o f the City of Ogdensburgh (Ogdensburgh: Privately printed, 1927), 214-16; John A. Dix to John J. Peck, 5 November 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part H, 552; John A. Haddock to J.B. Fry, 6 November 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part IL 562; J.B. Fry to John A. Dix, 6 November 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part II, 562; John A. Dix to R. Proctor, 7 November 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part n, 572; Correspondence, 7 November 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part H, 568-69. The veteran members of the 1st Vermont Cavalry who did not re-enlist had returned to Vermont by 22 October and mustered out on 18 November; see Otis F.R. Waite, Vermont in the Great Rebellion (Claremont, N.H.: Tracy, Chase and Co., 1869), 247.

F A. Roe to Gideon Welles, 6 December 1864, in ORN, ser. I, vol. 3, 388-89; B.H. Hill to C.H. Potter, 3 December 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 45, part H, 82-83; B.H. Hill to James B Fry, 5 December 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 45, part U, 69-70; Joseph Hooker to Austin Blair, 12 December 1864, in OR, ser. L, vol. 45, part II, 167-68. For the role that the Confederate raids played in discrediting the Democratic Party and contributing to Lincoln’s re-election, see William F. Zomow, “Confederate Raiders on Lake Erie: Their Propaganda Value in 1864,” Part I, Inlarui Seas 5 (Spring 1949): 42-47, and Part IL Inland Seas 5 (Summer 1949): 101-05.

John D. Kazar, “The Canadian View of the Confederate Raid on Saint Albans,” Vermont History 33 (January 1965): 255-73; J. Gregory Smith to Edwin Stanton, 14 December 1864, in OR, ser. I, vol. 43, part II, 789; General Orders No. 97, 14 December 1864, in OR, ser. I, vol. 43, part H, 789-90; Morgan Dix, Memoirs o f John Adams Dix, vol. 2 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1883 ), 112.

Callahan, “The Neutrality of the American Lakes,” 157-58; “Revenue Cutter Service,” 24 January 1868, 40th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. 112, vol. II, ser. 1337, 4; U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 13, 419; “Senate Resolution,” 14 December 1864, 38th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 5, vol. 1, ser. 1210; “Raids from the British Provinces,” 16 December 1864, in The Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 2d sess., part 1 (Washington: F. & J. Rives, 1865), 33-34; U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 13, 419, 566. The United States government officially notified Britain of its intention to terminate the Reciprocity Treaty on 17 March 1865. The treaty thus officially ended on 17 March 1866; see Donald C. Masters, The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854: Its History, Its Relation to British Colonial and Foreign Policy and to the Development of Canadian Fiscal Autonomy (London: Longman’s Green, 1937; reprint, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), 87.

Robin W. Winks, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years, rev. ed. (Montreal: Harvest House, 1971), 317; Callahan, “The Neutrality of the American Lakes,” 159; Edwin Stanton to John A. Dix, 15 December 1864, in OR, ser. I, vol. 43, part H, 793-94; U.S. Grant to John A. Dix, 18 December 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part H, 800; General Orders No. 100, 17 December 1864, in OR, ser. L vol. 43, part IL 800; Dix, Memoirs, vol. 2, 114. 375 John A. Dix to J.A. Andrew, 15 December 1864, in OR, ser. I, vol. 43, part II, 794; D.T. Van Buren to J.C. Robinson, 21 December 1864, in OR, ser. I, vol. 43, part H, 820-21; Department of the East returns in OR, ser. I, vol. 46, part H, 767-68. For the Frontier Cavalry, see Supplement to the Official Records o f the Union and Corrfederate Armies, part EL, vol. 41 (Wilmington, N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing, 1997), 722-26, Frederick Phisterer, ed.. New York in the War o f the Rebellion, vol. 2 (Albany; J.B. Lyon, 1912), 1106, James L. Bowen, Massachusetts in the War, I861-I865 (Springfield, Mass.: Clark W. Bryan, 1889), 784, and OR, ser. L vol. 46, part IL 767-68.

The Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 2d sess., part 1 (Washington: F. & J. Rives, 1865), 57-58.

■“ Ibid., 58-62.

Ibid., 58-59; “Report of the Engineer Department,” 1864, NA, RG 77, Annual Reports to the Secretary of War, entry 117, vol. 3, 502-05.

The Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 2d sess., part 1 (Washington: F. & J. Rives, 1865), 311-15.

Ibid , 537-43.

Ibid., 567-70; U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 13, 568; W. Seward to C. Adams, 8 March 1865, “War Vessels on the Great Lakes,” 56th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 471, vol. 91, ser. 3988, 60-61. For an example of sectional interests demanding government expenditures, see “Memorial of the Legislature of Wisconsin,” 9 February 1865, 38th Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 29, vol. 1, ser. 1210. The Wisconsin legislature petitioned Congress tor a naval depot at Milwaukee, claiming that the port was the largest grain exporting market in the world and had been overlooked when Congress dispensed funds for the benefit of commerce.

^ F A. Roe, “The United States Steamer “Michigan” and the Lake Frontier during the War o f the Rebellion,” The United Service 6 (December 1891): 547; Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 195; Kazar, “The Canadian View of the Confederate Raid on Saint Albans,” 255-73; Callahan, “The Neutrality o f the American Lakes,” 160-61.

Roe, “The United States Steamer “Michigan” and the Lake Frontier,” 548-51; F A Roe to Gideon Welles, 13 September 1865, in ORN, ser. L vol. 3, 590-91; Shriver and Breen, Ohio's Military Prisons, 50- 51.

“Report of the Secretary of War,” 20 October 1865, 39th Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. I, vol. 3, ser. 1249, 51; “Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800-1916,” NA, RG 94, M617, roll 952 [Ft. Porter]; Waite, Vermont in the Great Rebellion, 249; “Report of the Engineer Department,” 30 October 1865, NA, RG 77, Annual Reports to the Secretary of War, entry 117, vol. 4, 12^28; “Report of the Chief Engineer,” 30 October 1865, 39th Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. I, vol. 3, ser. 1250, 918.

C P Stacey, “Britain’s Withdrawal from North America, 1864-1871,” Canadian Historical Review 36 (1955): 187-88; William D. Jervois, Report on the Defence of Canada (London: G.E. Eyre, 1864); Paul Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 228-42.

^ Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 190-91; Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain’s Imperial Policy, 234-35; Stacey, “Britain’s Withdrawal from North America,” 188. For views that the Canadians could indeed defend themselves and that an American attack would face difficult geographic obstacles, see Millington Synge, “The Lakes and Canals of Canada, ” Journal o f the Royal United Service Institution 10 (1867): 195- 97, and [William F. Coffin], Thoughts on Defence, from a Canadian Point of View, by a Canadian (Montreal: J. Lovell, 1870). Supporters o f a continued imperial cormection feared that the United States would eventually annex an independent Canada, creating a powerful maritime rival to Britain; see, for example, [Patrick L MacDougall], “Canada: The Fenian Raid and the Colonial Office,” Blackwood's 376 Magazine 108 (1870); 493-508.

Stacey, “Britain’s Withdrawal from North America,” 188-90. For Canadian confederation, see Donald G. Crei^ton, The Road to Confederation: The Emergence o f Canada, 1863-1867 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964).

Richard A. Preston, Canada and "Impérial Defense": A study of the origins of the British Commonwealth's defense organization, 1867-1919 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), 48; André Charbonneau, Yvon Desloges, and Marc Lafrance, Québec the Fortified City: From the 17th to the 19th Century (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1982), 74-78, 179-82; C P Stacey, “Halifax as an International Strategic Factor, 1749-1949,” Annual Report of the Canadian Historical Association ( 1949), 50-51.

Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 200-02; U.S. Grant to E.O.C. Ord, 26 November 1865, in John Y. Simon, ed.. The Papers o f Ulysses S. Grant, vol. 15 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 420-21.

Ibid., 202; Harold A. Davis, “The Fenian Raid on New Brunswick,” Canadian Historical Review 36 (December 1955): 316-334; Hereward Senior, The Fenians and Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1978), 92- 93; U.S. Grant to GG. Meade, 12 March 1866, \n S'xmoti, The Papers o f Ulysses S. Grant, vo\. 16, 107-08.

Brian Jenkins, Fenians and Anglo-American Relations during Reconstruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 128-29; Charles Allen to Richard Delafield, I June 1866, NA, RG 77, Letters Received, 1826-66, entry 18, box 5, A2576; Garand, The History o f the City of Ogdensburgh, 218-21; Richard J. Wright, “Green Flags and Red-Coated Gunboats: Naval Activities on the Great Lakes During the Fenian Scares, 1866-1870,” Inland Seas 22 (Summer 1966): 95-96; “War Vessels on the Great Lakes,” 56th Cong., 1st sess.. House Doc. 471, vol. 91, ser. 3988, 34.

Senior, The Fenians and Canada, 101; Rodgers, Guardian o f the Great Lakes, 106-19; W.S. Neidhardt, Fenianism in North America (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), 59-75.

Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 203-05; Garand, The History of the City of Ogdensburgh, 218-21; Wright, “Green Flags and Red-Coated Gunboats,” 100-04, 110; Fred Landon, Western Ontario and the American Frontier (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1941), 229n; “Report of the Secretary of War,” 40th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1324, 436-39.

“Naval Stations on the Lakes,” 6 June 1866, 39th Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 67, vol. 1, ser. 1272; “Defence of the Northeastern Frontier,” 25 January 1867, 39th Cong., 2d sess.. House Rep. 7, vol. 1, ser. 1303; “Defence of Maine,” 25 February 1867, 40th Cong., 2d sess.. House Misc. Doc. 7, vol. 1, ser. 1349; “Appropriation for fortifying the island of Mackinac,” 25 March 1867, 40th Cong., 1st sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 26, vol. 1, ser. 1309. For detailed reports on the military utility of railroads in Maine, see “Defences for the Northern Frontier of Maine,” 25 April 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess.. House Misc. Doc. 75, vol. 3, ser. 1200, and “Defences of the Northeastern Frontier,” 20 June 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess.. House Rep. 119, vol. 2, ser. 1207, 2-3, 14.

” U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 15, 21-22; “Niagara Ship Canal,” 6 February 1868, 40th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. 197, vol. 15, ser. 1341; “Ship Canal—Lakes Erie and Ontario,” 9 May 1868, 40th Cong., 2d sess.. House Misc. Doc. 139, vol. 2, ser. 1350.

^ “Report of the Chief of Engineers,” 20 October 1866, 39th Cong., 2d sess.. House E x Doc. I, vol. 3, ser. 1285, 415-17; “Report of the Secretary of War,” 40th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1324, 171; “Report of the Chief of Engineers,” 21 October 1867, 40th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1325, 3-4; “Sale o f Fort Gratiot Reservation,” 16 December 1867, 40th Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. 234, vol. 15, ser. 1341. For an example o f fort armament, see Registers of Cannon and Carriages Required for, on Hand at, and Supplied to Forts and Batteries, 1861-73, NA, RG 156, entry 113, vol. 2; by December 377 1866 Fort Wayne had only received one 30-pounder and two 20-pounder Parrott rifles and two 15” Rodman guns.

C P Stacey, The bAilitary Problems of Canada: A Survey o f Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions Past and Present (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1940), 61; Robert F. Legget, Railroads o f Canada (New York: Drake Publishers, 1973), 57; Reginald C Stuart, United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871 (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1988), 243. For the impact of the Fenian crisis on Confederation, see C.P. Stacey, “Fenianism and the Rise of National Feeling in Canada at the Time of Confederation,” Ccmadian Historical Review 12 (September 1931): 238-61, and C.P. Stacey, “The Fenian Troubles and Canadian Military Development, 1865-1871,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 13 (April 1936): 270-79. For the importance of the Intercolonial Railway, see C.P. Stacey, “The Backbone of Canada,” Annual Report of the Canadian Historical Association (1953), 8, and “Canada—Our Frozen Frontier,” Blackwood’s Magazine 91 (January 1862): 102-17.

In January 1886 the Endicott Board presented a report on the national defenses. O f the ports at which “fortifications or other defenses [were] most urgently required,” the board listed the Great Lakes ports as fourth in importance, after New York, San Francisco, and Boston. The British were finishing cariais that would allow gunboats of 14-foot draft to pass from the Atlantic to the lakes, threatening the cities and commerce there. In time of war, the Endicott Board recommended that the government convert merchant vessels into gunboats to defend the Upper Lakes, keep gunboats on interior New York lakes and float them on to Lake Ontario, and build three modem forts to help cut British lines of communication. These forts were Fort Montgomery, a fort on the St. Lawrence, and Fort Wayne. For the plan, see “Report of the Board on Fortifications or Other Defenses,” 23 January 1886, 49th Cong., 1st sess.. House Ex. Doc. 49, vol. 28, ser. 2395, 8, 14-15. The government never acted on the board’s recommendations for the northern frontier.

“Report of the Secretary of War,” 40th Cong., 3d sess.. House Ex. Doc. /, vol. 3, ser. 1367, 273, 287-88; “Report of the Chief of Engineers,” 25 October 1869, 41st Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. 1, vol. 2, ser. 1413, 4-6; “Report of the Chief o f Engineers,” 25 October 1870, 41st Cong., 3d sess.. House Ex Doc. I, vol. 2, ser. 1447, 11-12; U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 16, 76, 386. For the report of the Board of Engineers on fort modifications, see “Sea-Coast Defenses,” 41st Cong., 2d sess.. House Ex. Doc. 271, vol. 12, ser. 1426. For proposed improvements to the northern frontier forts, see “Plan of the Barbette Tier, Fort Montgomery,” 26 April 1871, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 7-70, and “Plan and Sections of Fort Ontario,” 1871, NA, RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Drawer 4-43.

^ For the dispute over British troop movement through the St. Mary’s Canal, see the correspondence in NA, RG 393, Letters and Dispatches Sent and Received, Department of the Lakes, entry 3352, 45-47, 55- 56, 72, 74-75, 76-77, and “Passage of any English or Canadian steamer through the canal of the Sault Ste. Marie,” 3 May 1870, 41st Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Ex. Doc. 88, vol. 2, ser. 1406.

R.L. Drum to Philip St. George Cooke, 24 May 1870, NA, RG 393, Letters and Dispatches Sent and Received, Department of the Lakes, entry 3352, vol. 377, 59; Jenkins, Fenians and Anglo-American Relations, 303-06; Senior, The Fenians and Canada, 133-34; Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 221.

^ “Treaty between Her Majesty and the United States of America, for the Amicable Settlement of All Causes of Difference between the Two Countries . . . Signed at Washington, May 8, 1871,” in Treaties and Agreements Affecting Camda in Force between His Majesty and the United States of America, with Subsidiary Documents, 1814-1925 (Ottawa: F A. Acland, 1927), 37-49; Adrian Cook, The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1872 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975).

Between January and April 1872, Kansas, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Maine, and Ohio petitioned Congress for federal assistance to the Niagara ship canal. None o f the petitions mentioned the canal’s military utility; see 42d Cong., 2d sess.. Sen. Misc. Doc. 51, vol. 1, ser. 1481, Sen. M isc. Doc. 100, 111, and 124, vol. 2, ser. 1482, and 42d Cong., 2d sess.. House Misc. Doc. 112 and 198, vol. 3, ser. 1526. 378 “ Stacey, “Britain’s Withdrawal from North America,” 198. For colonial policy concerning the maintenance of imperial garrisons in North America, see Robert L. Schuyler, “The Recall of the Legions; A Phase of the Decentralization of the British Empire,” American Historical Review 26 (October 1920): 18- 36. Schuyler concludes that few British statesmen viewed colonial independence with dismay. After 1871, British planners tended to consider a war with the United States to be only a remote possibility. If war did again break out, Britain piarmed to defend the Richelieu corridor and abandon the Niagara frontier. Command of the Great Lakes remained the key, and of course Britain could hardly hope to compete with the United States if American forces controlled the Welland Canal; see John Gooch, “Great Britain and the Defence of Canada,” in The Prospect of War: Studies in British D^ence Policy, 1847-1942 (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 52-72.

379 CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

All the armies o f Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure o f the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with a Buonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years. - Abraham Lincoln, 27 January 1838'

While foreign invaders might not water their horses on the Ohio or reach the Blue

Ridge, there remained the possibility, albeit slight, that the British might drink from the

Hudson or make a track on the Adirondacks. Major cities on the northern frontier such as Detroit and Buffalo certainly could have felt the heavy hand of an invader. Given the strategic situation, however, the main threat to the United States was in the form of local counterattacks or spoiling attacks. The British had plans to seize the outlet of Lake

Champlain to upset an American invasion directed at the St. Lawrence, and in the west they planned to conduct local attacks to divert American resources. There was never any realistic chance, even during the War of 1812, of substantial British forces penetrating deeply into the American interior from Canada. In any conflict, the British would be on the defensive along the northern frontier and take the offensive along the maritime frontier. There was no other way in which Britain could achieve something resembling a

380 decisive result. If war broke out, then, it was likely that the United States would be the aggressor on the northern frontier.

Both American and British observers always recognized that the best way to conquer Canada, and defend the northern frontier, was to seize the British line of communication along the St. Lawrence and to achieve naval supremacy on the Great

Lakes. Albert Gallatin, Jacob Brown, Joseph Totten, Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, and others knew that a vigorous thrust into Canada near Montreal was the best way to achieve decision in a war with Britain. Cutting the St. Lawrence would lead to the downfall of the British position on the lakes, and American forces could then turn on Quebec and remove the British presence in North America for good. The passage of time only strengthened this strategy’s hold on American planners. New technologies, such as steampower, only facilitated a strategy that remained constant for several decades. In all areas, important strategic factors grew on the American side of the border and remained superior to the resources that Canada possessed. In population, industrial output, and internal improvements the United States remained supreme. All that was required was the skilled administration and command to marshal such resources for the defense of the northern frontier.

The command of the St. Lawrence and naval superiority on the Great Lakes, made possible by superior population, industry, and communications, fît in well with the concept of national defense hammered out in the years following the War of 1812. The nation relied on five “elements of national defense,” namely fortifications, a navy, militia, a small regular army, and internal improvements to defend its frontiers. While

381 planners assumed a defensive stance on the maritime frontier, there would be a major difference on the border with Canada. There, a strike force led by regulars would invade

Lower Canada and seize the main British line of communication along the St. Lawrence.

Militia units would support the invasion by providing local defense against British counterattacks and conducting limited attacks of their own in places such as the Detroit and Niagara frontiers. Naval forces, mainly converted commercial vessels, would sweep

British vessels from the lakes, provide security to the American population, and assist land forces. Internal improvements such as canals and railroads would allow the United

States to concentrate its forces or react to British probes virtually anywhere along the frontier. Finally, fortifications would protect the key chokepoints on the frontier, assist the militia defenders, and make the offensive against Montreal possible. A climactic siege of Quebec would prevent the British from landing reinforcements and recovering their losses, as they had done in the spring of 1776. The ultimate result would be the expulsion of British power from Canada and, ideally, perfect security for the United

States.'

Geography dictated that Montreal was the logical objective of any American attack, and the traditional American strategy fit well with ideas of the influential strategist, the Baron de Jomini. Writing in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Jomini emphasized the offensive, the necessity for bold action and retention of the initiative. It was important not to waste resources on secondary objectives. Jomini proposed that one of the fundamental was “to throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the

382 communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one’s own.”

Decisive points were any positions that, if controlled, would exhibit “a marked

influence” on a campaign. These positions included river valleys, communication

centers, capitals, and mountain passes. Montreal obviously met several of Jomini’s

requirements, because it was both a communications center and the most important city

of British North America. Furthermore, seizing the city would also disrupt the only line

of communication to the interior as well.^

Jomini also discussed the importance of a secure base of operations. A suitable

base provided reinforcements and resources, and it was the place where an army could

either launch its offensive or retreat to safety if necessary. An ideal base would be

located “upon those points where it can be sustained by all the resources of the country,

and at the same time insure a safe retreat.” On the northern frontier, Albany served as a

suitable base, and army officers recognized the city’s importance. The Hudson River,

canals, and railroads made it possible to concentrate the nation’s resources there for

operations against Canada. In addition, the excellent American network of internal

improvements allowed forces at Albany to threaten the British territories at any point between the Niagara frontier and Montreal. The British could never be sure if American

forces would make their main effort against Montreal via the Champlain Canal and Lake

Champlain, or if the Americans would attack further west via the Erie or Oswego Canals.

American strategy thus met the requirements of Jomini, who was described by his

American translators as “one of the ablest military critics and historians of this or any other day.”^

383 The writings of Jomini were especially influential at the United States Military

Academy, where Professor Dennis H. Mahan taught cadets his interpretations of Jomini.

One of those students, Henry W. Halleck, enthusiastically accepted the Jominian system.

Halleck's intellect had impressed General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, and the young officer published Elements o f Military Art and Science in 1846 after his return from a European tour. Halleck emphasized geographical objectives, concentration on decisive points, fortifications, and strong bases of supply. The occupation of strategic points was more decisive than destroying armies, a scientific and rational view of war. In fact, Halleck diluted Jomini’s prescription for a vigorous offensive, stressing for territorial objectives. As the “Old Brains” o f the army, Halleck was an influential theorist, confirming traditional American thought on the defense of the northern frontier.^

Halleck addressed the northern frontier at great length, asserting that the Montreal region was the decisive point. He suggested that the United States should collect troops at Albany, advance by Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence, and seize the British line of communications. Halleck pointed out that one of Napoleon’s maxims was that an army should choose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should either pierce the enemy’s line of defense or cut communications with the enemy’s base. Both nature and the experience of “fifteen campaigns” demonstrated that an offensive near Montreal was the “shortest and easiest line of intercourse with Canada, both in peace and war.”

Halleck said that there could be diversionary operations on the western and eastern extremities of the frontier, but he stressed that they should not be the main effort. The offensives in the War of 1812 were of a “diverse and discordant character” and did

384 nothing to bring the war to a successful conclusion. In Halleck’s view, an attack against the St. Lawrence would cut the trunk of the Canadian tree, paving the way for an attack against Quebec and assuring American naval supremacy on the Great Lakes. A drive north from Lake Champlain would thus ensure the security of the northern frontier and bring a decisive result in a war with Britain.^

The strategy for the defense of the northern frontier thus fit in well with the spirit of the times, but how effective was it? While Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz also stressed the necessity to act with the utmost concentration of force, he also emphasized the importance of acting with the utmost concentration of aim. According to Clause witz, policy is the critical factor in strategy. Policy gives war its logic, converting the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into a mere instrument. The question, then, is how well would the strategy for the defense of the northern frontier help meet national political goals. Allan Millett and Williamson Murray have proposed a model for strategic effectiveness, and several factors in their model help provide insight into how well the employment of armed force on the northern frontier would help secure political goals. For the purposes of this study, the most important of these factors are first, does strategy place strengths against enemy weaknesses, and second, do strategic objectives secure national goals.’

Both the United States and Great Britain possessed strategic strengths and weaknesses that had a direct impact on military and naval operations in war and on planning during peacetime. In terms of weaknesses, the United States possessed a small regular army and a militia force of uncertain quality. Given the nation’s geographical

385 position, surrounded by the world’s oceans, there seemed to be little reason to maintain larger military forces. As C. Vaim Woodward has suggested, the nineteenth century was an era of free security.* Otherwise, there seemed to be nothing but strengths. The United

States possessed a growing population along the northern frontier, especially in the Great

Lakes region. This population provided both a source of supply and a source of soldiers in time of war. The superior American population was a great advantage, because it made it possible for defense strategy to be consistent with the size and structure of

American forces. An examination of the Census of 1840 reveals that approximately 25 percent of the United States population was male and between the ages of fifteen and fifty, or suitable military age. Of course, not all of this population would be available for military service. A war might not be popular, hampering recruiting, and a substantial male population would have to remain behind in order to maintain production levels for foodstuffs and manufactured goods. Nevertheless, if one assumes that 4 percent of the total population would volunteer for service, as was the case in the first year of the Civil

War, the states of the northern frontier, not to mention the United States, could raise a large number of soldiers. The approximate population for the northern tier of states was

6,104,052, yielding 244,162 men. Given the contemporary Canadian population of a little over a million in the Canadas, the United States certainly had the manpower potential to do the job.^

O f course, this population also clamored for protection, distracting the government from what many American officers considered the true objective of any war,

Montreal. The population could also force the United States government into a war not

386 of its own choosing, as nearly happened during the “Patriot” crisis in the late 1830s.

Although defenses west of the St. Lawrence became more important as the American population grew, it was just not politically or financially possible to build enough fortifications to guard every key point on the Great Lakes. Neither was it necessary.

Geography made it possible to rely on a few well-selected fortifications to defend the northern frontier. The wilderness along the border from Maine west to Lake Champlain rendered military operations difficult if not unlikely, so major fortifications would have served little purpose. The United States could rely on a form of mutual assured destruction to defend the St. Lawrence frontier, because the Canadian population would be reluctant to initiate hostilities and risk the destruction of their own river settlements.

Naval supremacy and command of the St. Lawrence would protect the lake frontier.

Thus, permanent fortifications at Lake Champlain, Lake Ontario, and the Niagara and

Detroit frontiers represented sufficient protection for the northern frontier.

Appropriations for the northern frontier actually compare favorably with those for the maritime frontier when one considers both the necessity of fortifications and the cost of individual forts. Through 1871 the government provided large sums for the defense of major American harbors. For example, Boston received almost $2.8 million. New York about $5.4 million, and New Orleans over $2.7 million. These appropriations were not merely pork barrel spending. The great maritime harbors needed protection, and the multitude of approaches or the difficulty of construction resulted in great costs. The northern frontier needed forts at only a few select locations, and the total appropriation of over $1.6 million compares favorably with important seacoast sites. Individual fort

387 appropriations compare favorably as well. Fort Montgomery received $812,500. Fort

Schuyler at New York City had a similar design, albeit with more complicated , and received about $1.2 million. Fort Porter received $180,000, and the similar tower at

Proctor’s Landing near New Orleans garnered $150,000. Of course, fort construction provided tangible evidence of the government’s concern for the defense of the northern frontier. For that reason, the population along the border continued to plead with

Congress for greater appropriations. Naval supremacy was too intangible a concept to provide peace of mind for the residents of the lake frontier. ‘ ‘

The growing population of the lake frontier also produced a large merchant marine, far larger, except on Lake Ontario, than that of the British. This was crucial since merchant vessels could be converted into gunboats to fight for naval supremacy on the lakes. Naval supremacy was important to the United States, because patrolling gunboats could provide a degree of protection while the main attack against Montreal went forward. American industry was a major strength as well, providing a source of materiel close to the theater of war. The British had to send everything across the

Atlantic, at times even shipping pre-fabricated vessels for assembly in Canada. Most importantly, though, American communications, by water, road, canal, or railroad, were more secure than those of the British. They were not exposed to enemy attack at the onset of war, and American forces could quickly sever the enemy’s communications.

Communications were the great British weakness, which in effect became an American strength.

388 This British weakness was the supreme fact on the northern frontier. As C.P.

Stacey has shown, security of communications was the primary concern of Canadian defense. First, the population of the United States always oumumbered that of British

North America. Thus, Canada always had to rely on the mother country for assistance in time of war. For instance, during the War of 1812 Britain provided the regular troops, ordnance, and other materiel that were so critical to Canada’s survival during that conflict, the much-exaggerated performance of the Canadian militia notwithstanding.

Second, Canada was, and still is to a certain extent, a long and thin ribbon of settlement along the border with the United States. Both its population and sources of production were exposed to American attack. Canada’s security thus depended on Britain’s ability to send troops not just to Quebec or Montreal but to the Upper St. Lawrence River and

Great Lakes as well. British sea power, the main British strength, reached only as far as

Montreal,'^ where rapids blocked the St. Lawrence. Communications with the interior were thus yet another British weakness. The St. Lawrence River was the most convenient route to the west, but it was also a strategic liability to the British. Rapids and Niagara Falls interrupted the route to the west, a thoroughfare that was only usable in the warm months after the ice had melted. The great British disadvantage was the fact that their fighting front and only realistic line of communication were the same. Writing in April 1817, British Army officer “Red George” Macdonnel described the British dilemma. He said that the Americans had a great advantage in operations along the frontier. On the one hand, the British lines of communication are exposed and the settlements are thinly settled and less capable of defense. On the other hand, “the

389 Americans are every where thickly settled, and draw supplies from the Country in their own rear, unexposed to all interruption.” While some observers stressed some of the advantages that Canada possessed, such as storm-lashed lakes, many miles of impenetrable wilderness, and a loyal and hardy population, these strengths could not overcome the great weakness faced by the British government, which was geography. ’■*

An unanswered question remained, however, throughout the War of 1812 and the rest of the nineteenth century. Did the strategic objectives of the United States secure national goals? Clausewitz pointed out that war’s object is to impose one’s will on the enemy. How would American success in Canada either force concessions from the

British in a dispute or defend the maritime frontier? In an Anglo-American war, Canada could never be a decisive theater. Despite the belief of James Madison during the War of

1812, the province was not a vital part of the British Empire. Neither could the British launch a decisive attack from what is now Ontario or Quebec. Their forces could not realistically penetrate far enough into, or occupy enough, American territory. Great made conquest of the United States virtually impossible. A war would inevitably find each side attempting to grapple with the other, Britain using her seapower advantage to attack American trade and to conduct raids on coastal ports. In the view of many British planners this strategy would be the best defense of Canada. In effect

Canada was expendable, a diversion that gave the Royal Navy time to go about its business. While the British were on the offense on the seaboard and the defense in

Canada, the United States would instead be on the offense along the northern frontier and on the defense along the maritime frontier.'^

390 The United States government would have to hope that Britain considered the security of Canada important enough that the British would be willing to negotiate an end to war after losing Quebec to an American siege. Quebec, and any other fortification, would fall eventually, so the only hope the British had was that the city could hold out until reinforcements arrived. Depending on the British to negotiate after the loss of

Quebec was a strategic dilemma, but it was the only way the United States could hope to achieve a decisive result. There was just no bett. ' strategic option if war broke out.

There was an additional benefit to American success in Canada, however. This was the possibility of permanently removing Britain from North America, with obvious implications for American security. Ever since the colonial period, Americans had been aware of the impact Canada had on their security. Seizing Canada would remove Britain, which Thomas Jefferson described as “the nation which can do us the most harm of anyone,” as an obstacle to American security and expansion.

In any war along the northern frontier, then, the United States possessed many advantages. The Hudson River, Lake George, and Lake Champlain provided a line of water communication from the heart of the nation’s resources, centering on New York

City, to the key of Canada, Montreal. In addition, there was a good line of communication toward Kingston via the Mohawk River and Lake Oneida to Oswego on

Lake Ontario. For this reason Albany, New York, where these two major lines of communication began, was a critical factor in American planning. The British could never be sure exactly where the blow might fall on Lower Canada, because the American lines of communication diverged outward from Albany to points on the frontier. In the

391 earliest years of the nineteenth century, roads and streams were the primary means of communication. The severe winters, swamps, and dense forests made good roads a near impossibility; in addition, roads reflected the terrain instead of negating it. With the development of canals and railroads, however, the strategic benefits of geography only increased for the United States. With these internal improvements, the Americans could marshal their superior population and material resources and fall on Canada in a quick campaign before relief could come from Britain. The development of the frontier on both sides of the border undermined the British defense position, because alternate means of transportation removed or altered previous obstacles to invasion. Canals and railroads had been built for commercial purposes, but they could serve a military fimction as well.

Unfortunately for the British, their canals and railroads in Canada were as likely to work for the invading Americans as for the defending British and provincial forces. The development, and as a result, the defense, of the northern frontier is a story of overcoming natural obstacles. Superior American communications meant that there were just too many vulnerable points for the British to cover with fortifications.

Between 1815 and 1871, American strategy on the northern frontier rested on two principles, seizure of the St. Lawrence River to cut British communication with the interior, and naval supremacy on the Great Lakes. Given the logistical considerations discussed above, this was an effective strategy. A quick drive against the main British line of communications placed the American strength, the ability to marshal superior communications, population, and industrial resources, against the British weakness, dependence on the St. Lawrence. Winfield Scott’s brilliant campaign against Mexico

392 City in 1847, involving a 200-mile march through guerrilla-infested mountains and desert into the heart of the enemy’s power, demonstrated what American forces were capable of achieving even before the massive buildup during the Civil War. Strategic goals on the northern frontier were definitely in harmony with national resources. The question remained, however, whether or not success in Canada would be enough to achieve success in a war with Britain. In the war of 1812, the answer was no. Gradual British withdrawal from Canada decreased the threat of war, and only another war could demonstrate if Canada were important enough for its capture to have a decisive effect.

Fortunately for the American and Canadian inhabitants along the northern frontier, we will never know.

393 ' Roy P. Easier, ed.. The Collected Works o f Abraham Lincoln, vol. 1, 1824-1848 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 109.

^ For the defense of the maritime frontier, see Robert S. Browning, Two if by Sea: The Development o f American Coastal Defense Policy (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1983).

^ Baron de Jomini, The Art o f War, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1862; reprint, Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1971), 70, 86-87. For an analysis of Jomini, see John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers o f Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 143-85. For the impact of geography on strategy, see Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” in The Making o f Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7-9.

■* Jomini, The Art o f War, 77, 84; quote on page 7.

’ Stephen E. Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln's Chief o f Staff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), 6-7; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way o f War: A History o f United States and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 82-88.

^ H. Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: or. Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics o f Battles, &c.; Embracing the Duties o f Staff, Irrfantry, Cavalry, Artillery, ami Engineers. Adapted to the Use o f Volunteers and Militia (New York: D. Appleton, 1846; reprint, Westport, Ct.. Greenwood Press, 1971), 226, 229-33.

^ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605-10, 617-32; Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness, 3 vols. (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988).

* C. Vann Woodward, “The Age of Reinterpretation,” American Historical Review 66 (October I960): 1- 19. For American strategy in the nineteenth century, see Peter Maslowski, “To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783-1865,” in The Making o f Strategy, 205-41.

’ U.S. Census Office, Compendium o f the Enumeration o f the Inhabitants and Statistics o f the United States as Obtained from the Returns o f the Sixth Census (Washington: Thomas Allen, 1841; reprint. New York: Amo Press, 1976). In 1840, 24.6 percent of the total United States population was male, aged fifteen to fifty. On the northern frontier, the figure ranged from 23.6 percent in western Pennsylvania to 27.3 percent in Michigan. For the purposes of calculation, the northern tier of states includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, northern New York, western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan. By December 1861, these states had provided more than 370,000 volimteers, so a total manpower availability of 244,000 in 1840 would not be unrealistic, assuming, of course, an outburst of patriotic enthusiasm for a war with Britain; see “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1 December 1861, 37th Cong., 2d sess.. Senate Executive Document I, Vol. 2, Ser. 1118,3.

See, for example, Joseph G. Totten to E.D. Morgan, 30 December 1861, in OR, ser. HI, vol. 1, 773. Totten reports that “every town and habitation upon either shore of this river may be said to lie at all times at the mercy of the shore opposite. This reciprocal exposure is, or ought to be, the protection of both.”

" Iruiex to the Reports of the Chief o f Engineers, U.S. Army, 1866-1912, vol. 2, Fortifications, Bridges, , etc. (Washington: GPO, 1916), 1801-08. 394 The population of the United States was, however, concentrated in the North. Between 1790 and 1880, the center o f American population moved in an almost straight line westward near the 39th parallel, between Annapolis, and Cincinnati. The center was in western Virginia from 1820 to 1850 and in southern Ohio during the rest of period in question; see Ralph H. Brown, Historical Geograpl^ o f the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1948), 347.

" The St. Lawrence at Montreal could handle ships of up to 700 tons burden; see John M. Duncan, Travels Through Part o f the United States and Canada in 1818 and 1819, vol. 2 (New York: W.B. Gilley, 1823), 151.

'■* C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems o f Canada: A Survey o f Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions Past and Present (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1940), 2-3; C.P. Stacey, “The Backbone of Canada,” Annual Report o f the Canadian Historical Association (1953) 8-10; George Raudzens, ‘“Red George’ Macdonnel, Military Saviour of Upper Canada?,” Ontario History 62 (December 1970): 207. For the geography o f the St. Lawrence River, see Brown, Historical Geography o f the United States, 168-72.

Clausewitz, On War, 75-89.

Richard A. Preston, Canada and “Imperial Defense”: A study of the origins of the British Commonwealth's defense organization, 1867-1919 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), 51; Reginald Horsman, “On To Canada: Manifest Destiny and United States Strategy in the War of 1812,” M ichigan Historical Review 13 (Fall 1987): 4; Thomas Jefferson, October 1823, quoted in C.J. Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, 1815-1853 (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1963), 74. For the inevitability that any fortification must eventually fall, see George Sydenham Clarke, Fortification: Its Past Achievements, Recent Developments, and Future Progress (hondon, 1907; reprint, Liphook, Hants. : Beaufort, 1989), 144. Clarke suggests that “it should be realized at the outset that all fortresses must fall if sufihcient force is brought to bear against them, and that the only fimction which Fortification can discharge is to gain time, locally or generally.” For a contemporary description of the attack and defense of fortified places, see John Gibbon, The Artillerist's Manual (New York: D Van Nostrand, 1860), 431-64. For the American obsession with absolute security, see Weigley, The American Way o f War.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, vol. 1 (London; Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1905), 309-10; G.P. de T. Glazebrook, A History o f Transportation in Canada (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1938), 124; R.L. Way, “The Topographical Aspect of Canadian Defence (1783-1871),” Canadian Defence Quarterly 14 (April 1937): 284-87.

395 K THE NORTHERN FRONTIER

X Forts — Railroads _ Canals . FL Wilkins • Towns — International Boundary

O R Idoau O Erie @ Illinois & Michigan @ Champlain 0 O sw e g o Q St. M ary's @ Beauhamois 0 W elland Marquette Quebec Marie Drummond s and

Ottawa

Montreal CAN Ft. Lennox (Isle JJoix) ,ôûsês pT < Ft. Montgomeiy M OH G A N Prescott «^ Iroquois Pt. Penetanguishene Brock^lleji^g^gpgljyfg "st. Albans \ Colllngwood Klngston/x(^g,_,Q__ Plattsburgh Burlington Saginaw Vergennes Sackets Harbor Crown Pt (Madison Bks) Mlwaukee Toronto LAKE y Iconderoga / ONTAfI 10 x d sw eg o (Ft. Ontario) W FLN Iagara_J^.^_ Bav .onm. Whitehall Grand Haven Ft. Gratiot Rome , . , ® London ockpo ocheste Johnstown ^ Buffalo # (Ft. Porter) Watervliet Detroit (Ft. Wayne^^^g^i^gfgjgyf NEW YORK Dunkirk Malden

Toledo BLACK Johnson Cleveland SWAMP Island Sandusky

PENNSYLVANIA INDIANA OHIO • Pittsburgh THE NORTH EASTERN FRONTIER

X • N Line of Britain's Claim Line of Maine's Claim Webster-Asfiburton Treaty Riviere / State Boundaries Railroads built by 1861 Temiscouata Prince Edward X Forts Island ^

100

Miles Kent Fairfield

Quebec \ W oodstock w Houlton # so Fredericton (Hancock \ Barracks) \ John ^ Halifax M oose Calais River Indian Stream MAINE Eastport Country . Montreal, Dead R. Bangor, Annapolis

Knôx**( Campobello Island \ C astine R oüses Point Lake August. Champlain NEW YORK

VERMONT ' NEW ^ HAMPSHIRE Portland OUTLET OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN CANADA

UNITED STATES Montgomery CIslandPL) 45th Parallel

VERMONT NEW YORK Champlain Rouses Point

Windmill Point Aiburg Stony Point

LAKE

Point au Fer

Isle La Motte 1.000 2.000 Yards

398 APPENDIX A

Appropriations for Northern Frontier, 1815-1871

Fl Montgomery Ft Ontario Ft Niagara Ft Porter F t Wavne Fort Total Sackets Harbor 1815-1824 155.669 0 $82,326 0 0 $137,995 $44 1838 0 0 $3,000 0 0 $3,000 0 1839 0 $20,000 $30,000 0 0 $50,000 0 1840 0 $20,000 $27,500 0 0 $47,500 0 1841 $75,000 $15,000 $20,000 $50,000 $50,000 $210,000 0 1842 0 $6,000 $5,000 0 0 $11,000 0 1843 0 $9,000 $5,000 0 0 $14,000 0 1844 $40,000 $10,000 0 $20,000 $35,000 $105,000 0 1845 $30,000 $7,500 0 $35,000 $35,000 $107,500 $3,600 1846 $45,000 $8,000 0 $25,000 $30,000 $108,000 $3,500 1847 0 0 0 0 0 0 $5,000 1848 $20,000 0 0 0 $15,000 $35,000 $2,000 1849 $20,000 0 0 0 $20,000 $40,000 $1,500 1850 $15,000 0 0 0 $15,000 $30,000 $700 1851 0 0 0 0 0 0 $2,300 1852 0 0 0 0 0 0 $500 1853 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1854 $15,000 0 $3,000 0 0 $18,000 $5,050 1855 $15,000 0 $6,000 0 0 $21,000 $2,000 1856 $25,000 0 0 0 0 $25,000 0 1857 $50,000 0 0 0 0 $50,000 $1,000 1858 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1859 $10,000 0 0 0 0 $10,000 $1,000 1860 $10,000 0 0 0 0 $10,000 $1,000 1861 $30,000 0 0 0 0 $30,000 $1,000 1862' $150,000 0 0 0 0 $150,000 $1,500 1863 $100,000 0 0 0 0 $100,000 $1,500 1864 $50,000 0 0 0 0 $50,000 0 1865 $50,000 $50,000 $25,000 $50,000 $75,000 $250,000 $2,000 1866 $50,000 $50,000 0 0 $50,000 $150,000 0 1867 $12,500 0 0 0 0 $12,500 $2,000 1868 0 0 0 0 0 0 $2,000 1869 0 0 0 0 0 0 $1,000 1870 0 0 0 0 0 0 $1,000 1871 0 0 0 0 0 0 $1,000 Total $868,169 $195,500 $206,826 $180,000 $325,000 1 $1,775,495 $42,194 *PIus a general appropriation of S7S0.000 for fortifications on the northern fiontier. SOURCE: “Appropriations and Expenditures for Forts, Arsenals, and Armories,” 47th Cong., 1st sess , Sen. Ex. Doc. 196, vol. 7, ser. 1992, 565, 571-72; “Appropriations and Expenditures of the Navj- Department,” 45th Cong. , 1st sess.. Sen Ex. Doc. 3, vol. 3, ser. 1782, 33; “System of Fortifications Recommended by the Board of Engineers,” 1 March 1826, in.-tS/’.Vf4 3, 19th Cong., 1st sess.. No. 316, ser. 18, 246-50

399 APPENDIX B

Appropriations for Northern Frontier Fortifications

$ 1,000,000

$800,000

$600,000

$400,000

$200,000

$- mi 1 1 1 1 1 MillITTTT HIM ON ON ON ON ON (N (N m VD NO O 1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 VI 1—H Î-H r—4 00 t—H APPENDIX C

Regular Troops Posted On Northeast and Northwest Frontiers

3,000

2,500

2,000

□ NW Troops 1,500 ■ NE Troops

1,000 500 ■

Northeast Frontier: Maine-Lake Erie; Northwest Frontier: Detroit-Lake Superior APPENDIX D

Militia returns for states in vicinity of northern frontier, 1815-1870

1815 1820 1825 1830 1835 1840 1845 1850 1855 1860 ME — 30,960 38,221 40,532 40,827 46J38 44,665 50,605 2,617 73,552 MA 69,175 48,140 55,060 49,560 44,933 90,857 90,807 101,781 148,325 161,192 NH 24,902 27,012 28,970 29,149 28,777 28,762 28,397 27,867 33,538 33,538 VT 20J59 20,781 25,581 25,581 25,581 26J07 23,915 23,915 23,885 23,885 NY 95,026 121,553 152,146 186,435 181,945 162,172 162,427 224,665 295,563 418,865 PA 99,414 115,231 158,512 177,741 202,281 202,281 271,687 276,070 164,678 350,000 OH 46,852 83,247 99,865 125,159 132,713 146,428 180,258 176,455 176,455 279,809 MI — 1,707 1,503 1,503 5,476 5,476 60,886 63,938 92,063 113,787 IN 5,010 14,990 20,322 50,000 53,913 53,913 53,913 53,913 53,913 53,913 IL — 2,031 8J10 8,310 27J86 27,386 83,234 83034 170,359 257,420 KY 49,719 51,052 68,518 63,602 70,323 82,335 87,790 87,607 88,858 88,858 TN 29,193 36,146 42,685 42,685 60,982 60,982 71,252 71052 72052 72052 U.S. 748,566 899,541 1,065,083 1,190,853 1,310,450 1,492,444 1,822,288 2,006,456 2.479,725 3,167,936 SOURCES; Militia returns in American Slate Papers: Xdlilary Affairs and House and Senate Documents in Congressional Serial Set.

402 APPENDIX E

United States population, 1810-1870

1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 WI 31,000 305,000 776,000 1,055,000 MI 5,000 9,000 32,000 212,000 398,000 749,000 1,184,000 IL 12,000 55.000 157,000 476,000 851,000 1,712,000 2,540,000 IN 25,000 147,000 343,000 686,000 988,000 1,350,000 1,681,000 OH 231,000 581,000 938,000 1,519,000 1,980,000 2,340,000 2,665,000 KY 407,000 564,000 688,000 780,000 982,000 1,156,000 U 2 1,000 TN 262,000 423,000 682,000 829,000 1,003,000 1,110,000 U59,000 PA 810,000 1,049,000 1,348,000 1,724,000 2 J 12.000 2,906,000 3,522,000 NY 959,000 U73.000 1,919,000 2,429,000 3,097,000 3.881,000 4,383,000 VT 218,000 236,000 281,000 292,000 314.000 315,000 331,000 NH 214,000 244,000 269,000 285,000 318,000 326,000 318,000 ME 229,000 298,000 399,000 502,000 583,000 628,000 627,000 U.S. 7J39.881 9,638,453 12,866,020 17,069,453 23,191,876 31,443,321 38,558,371 SOURCE: Estimated state populations are in Historical Statistics o f the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1 (Washington: GPO, 1975), 24-37; U.S. total population is m A Century o f Population Growth from the First Census o f the United States to the Tvelfth, 1790-1900 (Washington: GPO, 1909 ; reprint. New York: Johnson Reprint, 1966). 57.

Approximate population of selected British provinces, 1825-1861

c. 1825 1831 c. 1840 c. 1850 c. 1860 Nova Scotia 123,630 N/A 202,575 276,854 330,857 Prince Edward N/A N/A 47,042 62,678 80,857 New Brunswick 9,933 119,457 156,162 193,800 252,047 Lower Canada 479,288 553,134 697,084 890,261 1,111,566 Upper Canada 157,923 236,702 487,053 952,004 1,396,091 Total 770.774+ 909,293+ 1,589,916 2,375,597 3,171,418 SOURCE: Censuses o f Canada, 1665-1871, vol. 4 (Ottawa: l.B. Taylor, 1876), 82-403.

403 APPENDIX F

Population of large towns and cities on the northern frontier, 1820-1860

1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 Oswego 992 2.703 4.665 12.205 16.816 Rochester N/A 9.269 20.191 36.403 48J04 Buffalo N/A 8.653 18J13 42J61 81.129 Eric 635 1.329 3.412 5.858 9.419 Cleveland 606 1.076 6.071 17.034 43.417 Toledo N/A N/A 1.222 3.829 13.768 Detroit 1.422 2J22 9.102 21.019 45.619 Milwaukee N/A N/A 1.712 20.061 45.254 Chicago N/A N/A 4.470 29.963 109263 Halihtx N/A N/A 14.422 20.749 25.026 Quebec N/A 22.101 N/A 42.052 51.109 Montreal N/A 31.516 N/A 57.715 90.323 Ottawa N/A N/A N/A 7.760 14.669 Kingston N/A N/A N/A 11.697 13.743 Toronto 1.677 2.860 13.092 30.775 44.821 London N/A N/A N/A 7.035 11.555 SOURCE; Harbor Defences on Great Lakes and Rivers, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., House Rep. 23, Vol. 3, Ser. 1144, 5; Censuses of Canada, 1665-1871, vol. 4 (Ottawa: l.B. Taylor. 1876), 82-403.

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