DOCSLIB.ORG

Post 9/11 and Pakistan's Policy on Kashmir Issue

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Post 9/11 and Pakistan's Policy on Kashmir Issue Post 9/11 and Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir Issue by Khadija Abid Research Brief www.cscr.pk Background According to Indian Independence Act 1947, there were 562 princely states and these were left to choose to whether join Pakistan or India. Jammu and Kashmir had predominately Muslim population and was ruled by Hindu ruler Maharaja Hari Singh. He signed the instrument of accession on 25th October 1947 to accede to India. This scenario of linking Muslim majority with India emerged as a never-ending dispute between India and Pakistan. India, stanched on secular nationalism, wants Kashmir as its part to justify the fact that Muslim- majority area would flourish under Indian rule so that India’s secularism agenda can be demonstrated. On the other hand, Pakistan, believing in Two Nation Theory which projects the Hindus and Muslims as two separate communities, believes that Kashmir should be part of Pakistan because Kashmir is a Muslim- majority area. Introduction The Kashmir dispute, termed as the nucleus of all disputes (because of its usefulness for each state’s defense posture) between the two countries, has taken various shapes over the period of six decades. However, post-9/11, the Kashmir dispute influenced the course of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The presence of the US in Afghanistan drastically changed the security environment of South Asia and forced Pakistan to adapt their foreign and security policies in accordance with the latest development in the region. The US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan to completely destroy the safe havens of terrorist groups and hence Pakistan had to abandon its supports to the Afghan Taliban regime in Afghanistan. With dramatic changes wrought by the US inductive forces on fighting extremism, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism put great pressure on Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Using the blurring difference between freedom struggle and terrorism, international entities became intolerant to terrorism and while India ante the commitment of Pakistan to fight terrorism and cross-border terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK). The research brief is written to understand the steps taken by Pakistan and India on Kashmir issue after 9/11. The major focus contemplating not only to the pressure exerted by the war on terror (post 9/11 invasion of Afghanistan) on the armed struggle to free Kashmir but also to major political shift that provides opportune chances for serious talks on the issue. Musharraf’s Kashmir policy At the time of 9/11 attacks Musharraf government was in power and had to face the biggest threat to Pakistan. Musharraf government had two choices – join the US-led anti-terror campaign by opposing the Afghan Taliban regime or to put Kashmir movement at risk and a potential American blank check of support to India. Pakistan was left with the choice of abandoning the Afghan Taliban regime and support the US-led coalition to keep the Kashmir freedom struggle intact and differ it from Afghan Taliban. The anticipated outburst was seen as thousands of people came to roads to protest against the government decision. In 2001-2002, the world saw military standoff at the Pakistan –India borders against the backdrop of the war on terror in the region. The terror attacks on Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly and Indian Parliament in the last quarter of 2001 precipitated a 10 -month long military standoff between the two countries. India declared Kashmiri freedom struggle as terrorism. In the meanwhile, the decision from Washington to include two organizations, Lashkar- e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), who struggle to free Kashmir from Indian occupation in the list of terrorist organizations put more pressure on the Musharraf government. Coupling with the fear to label Pakistan as “a terrorist state”, the Musharraf government underwent a substantial policy change on Kashmir issue after 9/11 and policy makers attempted to devise new methods of achieving political goals. Following attack on the Indian parliament, India blamed Pakistan and termed these attacks as “the Indian 9/11”. Moreover, Pakistan perspective on the issue remained “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris.” 2 www.cscr.pk The US-led ‘war on terror’, the pressure of international community and subsequent attack on Indian parliament were the major factors that provided the leadership of Pakistan with the greater opportunity to revise its policy on Kashmir issue. The cautious steps taken by Musharraf regime in the wake of major political shift of the region were rather impossible for civilian leadership, as the former Pakistani Ambassador to the USA Husain Haqqani points out that “Pakistan Army has been the sole architect of the country’s policy making vis-à-vis the dispute. Whatever decision Pakistan has taken amid the six decades long course of the Kashmir dispute, its military has had a leading role”. The initiative taken by Musharraf is often termed as the diplomacy-led solution of the Kashmir issue. The first significant foray in serious dialogue to resolve Kashmir issue after Kargil was the Agra Summit in 2001. It proved to be the diplomatic disaster because of lack of preparatory meeting, no efforts to take foreign office in confidence or any other policy formulation institution worthy of consultation. Musharraf used public diplomacy to articulate his views on Kashmir issues, which Musharraf briefly account in his book as “sad and ridiculous episode”. Whereas, Prime Minister Vajpayee addressing the Indian parliament on July 24 said that Pakistan’s insistence on the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue as a pre-condition for the normalization of relations. On 15th August, Vajpayee said that Musharraf “came here with a single point agenda – to make India accept Pakistan’s terms on Kashmir.” The bilateral relations between Pakistan and India remain stalled until 2003 when Pakistan announced the confidence building measures (CBMs) in terms of resumption of train and bus service, air link restoration between two countries and the immediate release of all Indian fishermen. The process was carried to offer the sustained dialogue opportunity to resolve the Kashmir issue and observe a complete cease fire along the LOC. To further restore the welcoming opportunity to talk, Pakistan on November 24 announced 10 CBMs which also contained a complete observance of cease fire by Pakistani forces on the LoC. In addition, Musharraf also announced Pakistan’s agreement to resume air links. Consequently, Prime Minister Vajpayee confirmed his visit to attend the SAARC summit in Islamabad. Furthering the trust, India, on 31st December 2003, announced to propose her own CBMs to help process the diplomatic mission and agreed to start bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar and Khokhrapar and Morabao. During his visit to Pakistan for the SAARC summit, Prime Minister Vajpayee held a bilateral meeting with Musharraf and showed confidence that the “resumption of composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues including Jammu and Kashmir to the satisfaction of both sides”. Since then, there have been 4 rounds of dialogue altering between Islamabad and Delhi. Beside the satisfactory expression on the progress and affirmation of joint commitment to lead the direction of peace, there has been zero tangible progress made on Kashmir issue. Failure to the standstill on a common ground on Kashmir dispute with India, Musharraf came up with several new ideas. However, Indian response to proposed strategies remained confined to tentative improvement on LoC. In 2004, Musharraf proposed another Four Point agenda which were articulated as “off the cuff”. His proposal included. 1. Identify seven regions, demilitarize them, and change their status before looking for possible options to resolve the dispute. 2. The status quo in Kashmir is unacceptable and the LOC cannot be a solution to the lingering dispute 3. As a starting point for a step-by-step approach on the option of demilitarization, the regions on both sides of the LOC need to be analyzed for local culture and demographic composition. After identifying these regions, there could be gradual demilitarization following which the two sides could discuss who should control these areas. 4. Pakistan and India could also have joint control of these areas or the United Nations could be asked to play a role. The fundamental shift in Kashmir policy is based on Musharraf‘s appeasement policy with India. The slow but steady silence of Indian carnages in the IHK and projection of Kashmir in UNGA holds the testimony to this change of policy PPP Government’s Kashmir policy The 2008 general elections, on 18 February 2008, marked the return of PPP to the helms of power. The anti-Musharraf blocs anticipated the reversing of the changes made by the previous government. The general perception hoped that Pakistan would further the peace dialogue with India and support the Kashmir movement irrespective of the change of the government. However, PPP president Asif Ali Zardari verdict on Kashmir that “Kashmir cause should not become 3 www.cscr.pk an impediment to normalization between India and Pakistan” suggested a drastic shift in Pakistan’s policy in resolving the issue. Later, President Zardari exasperated to disclaim the meaning taken from his statement. Whilst, it is evident that PPP government did nothing to further the cause of Kashmir dispute other than “internationalization”of the issue during its tenure. The PPP government faced unfortunate events in maintaining the peace talks with India. The 2008 bombing of Indian embassy in Kabul, LoC violations and 26/11 Mumbai attacks were the main events that disrupted the bilateral talks. However, the PPP government managed to open the Poonch-Rawalakot route for the trade across LoC after the successful trip of then Pakistani National Security Adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani to Delhi in 2008.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Journalism Caught in Narrow Nationalism: the India-Pakistan Media War
    Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper University of Oxford Journalism Caught in Narrow Nationalism: The India-Pakistan Media War by Dwaipayan Bose Hillary and Trinity Terms 2011 Sponsor: Thomson Reuters Foundation Acknowledgments In a profession marked by tight deadlines, breakneck speed, long hours, intense competition and pressure from both above and below, it is absolutely essential that one takes a break, rejuvenates the brain cells and finds out what’s happening to journalism across the world. In order to do that, one needs a helping hand, a catalyst. That, for me, has been the Thomson Reuters Foundation, my sponsor and the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, my place of study. I am deeply grateful to both for giving me the opportunity to spend six months in Oxford and absorb all that this great university town has to offer. Writing this paper, researching for it, studying at the Bodleian, attending seminars was an ‘Experience Extraordinary’. I am thankful to RISJ director Dr David Levy, head of the journalism fellowship programme James Painter, and director of journalism John Lloyd for structuring the fellowship in a way that left me intellectually stimulated and enlightened. Life and logistics were taken care of by RISJ administrator Sara Kalim, staffers Alex Reid, Kate Hanneford-Smith and Amanda Armstrong – all of whom were extremely kind and helpful. I can never thank Dr Daya Thussu, my guide, enough for the great interest and commitment with which he helped me navigate through this delicate subject. Senior journalists, editors of India, Pakistan and beyond have helped me, spoke to me and gave their frank and free views on the subject.
    [Show full text]
  • Some Reflections on the India-Pakistan Binary and De
    S/III/ Nil /If/I//I /1/1 III 'I/I/(II I\I/mlllll 1/111111 y /I/I,{ I) S / /1//1/11111/1/1 I I) In ih sam P 'I'i )J ill P,t1dSt.IIl, 1 h l' hnvc b icn I 0 I rim ' minis; 'I'S nd five ) in .ral I Lions.J 11 b .twc .n I l (-2008 lh 'I" was a ne r de ade-long period of military rule. Again, as in the asc of India, over this quarter century, virtually the entire political spectrum of Pakistan has been associated with government, in one form or the other. 13 The "engagement-disengagement" binary has very evidently a structural basis. It is alsoa fact that the engagement-disengagement binary has intensified in Some Reflections on the India-Pakistan both directions over time. The greater the intensity of engagement, equally significant and fraught has been the disengagement that followed. The Lahore Binary and De-Securitisation Bus Initiative was followed by Kargil, the Agra summit followed by the attack on our Parliament, the CBM/structured dialogue process of2004-2008 was severely T CA. Raghavan undermined with the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008 and the Pathankot attack in January 2016 followed the Prime Minister's visit to Lahore a few days earlier, There could be other instances also. "Pakistan has made a horrible mess 0/ itself almost as if, because it wants to be It is also interesting that a new initiative with reference to engagement, or the antithesis of India, it must embrace failure if India is a success.
    [Show full text]
  • Kashmir, Nuclear Weapons and Peace
    KASHMIR, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PEACE by Admiral L. Ramdas1 March 22, 2005 "Three fourths of the miseries and misunderstandings in the world will disappear, if we step into the shoes of the adversaries and understand their standpoint" --Mahatma Gandhi Having been through two and a half wars against Pakistan, and nothing to show for it, except lost friends, widows and orphaned children on both sides of the fence; the futility of wars as a means to resolve issues became increasingly clear. The reason for this failure is because a political issue needs a political solution and not a military one. Every meeting and every kind of interaction that I have had with people in both countries over the past eleven years has reinforced this demand. It is a given that the context understanding of security issues is a socio-political one. But in turn it is now well recognized that insecurity also makes development difficult and at times impossible. The insecurity in Kashmir, which in turn is linked both to socio-economic difficulties in that region and distorted development and nuclear insecurities South Asia is a case in point. It is, moreover, a case that is connected to global security in a vital way both because of its connections to the questions of nuclear weapons and of the context of terrorism in the region. Nuclear Weapons in South Asia The decision to conduct nuclear tests at Pokhran on May 11, 1998, by the newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led government introduced a whole new dynamic in the already complex and confused situation prevailing between India and Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia
    Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider, editors Copyright © 2004 The Henry L. Stimson Center All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from the Henry L. Stimson Center. Cover design by Design Army. ISBN 0-9747255-8-7 The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street NW Twelfth Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org Table of Contents Preface ................................................................................................................. v Abbreviations..................................................................................................... vii Introduction......................................................................................................... ix 1. The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia Michael Krepon ............................................................................................ 1 2. Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: Structural Factors Rodney W. Jones......................................................................................... 25 3. India’s Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture Rajesh M. Basrur ........................................................................................ 56 4. Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia Feroz Hassan Khan ...................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Urdu Press in India and Pakistan – a Comparison1
    ISAS Working Paper No. 68 – Date: 17 June 2009 469A Bukit Timah Road #07-01, Tower Block, Singapore 259770 Tel: 6516 6179 / 6516 4239 Fax: 6776 7505 / 6314 5447 Email: [email protected] Website: www.isas.nus.edu.sg The Urdu Press in India and Pakistan – A Comparison1 Tridivesh Singh Maini2 Introduction Amongst the key binding factors between India and Pakistan, the Urdu language emerges as a significant one. While it is the national language of Pakistan, in India too, the generation of pre-partition individuals is most at home with the Urdu language. Interestingly, the current Prime Minister of India, Dr Manmohan Singh, does not know the Devanagari script and is conversant in Urdu. The same can be said of former Prime Minister, I. K. Gujral, who was more comfortable in Urdu. In fact, he was part of a committee to look into the promotion of the Urdu language in India. It would be pertinent to mention here that the Urdu language also played a crucial role in India’s freedom struggle.3 Former Indian President, K. R. Narayan, while inaugurating the All India Urdu Editors Conference on 29 July 1999, emphasised the role of Urdu as a bridge between India and Pakistan and stated that,4 “...it is a lively link with the people of Pakistan.” If one were to examine the reach of the Urdu press in Pakistan, Urdu newspapers have a much wider circulation than English newspapers. In fact, it is often said that to actually understand the pulse of the ordinary man or woman in Pakistan, it is important to know the opinions expressed by the Urdu press which, on most occasions, are radically different from those of the English press.5 In India too, the Urdu press is important and is read by the Muslim community, which is 15 percent of the total population.
    [Show full text]
  • The Agra Summit: a Critical Appraisal
    Umbreen Javaid * Khushboo Ejaz ** The Agra Summit: A Critical Appraisal Abstract Agra summit held from July 14-16, 2001 between President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. This India- Pakistan summit remained inconclusive because of hawks present in Indian cabinet. The two arch rivals and nuclear powers of South Asia came to negotiation table due to international pressure and domestic compulsions. Pervez Musharraf Chief executive of Pakistan arranged referendum and became President in order to look taller in India. Furthermore, he got legitimacy in Pakistan because of his frank, direct and vocal nature which was highlighted by free Indian media. The talks lasted for twice the scheduled time and following this the release of a joint nine point “Agra Declaration” was repeatedly put off. The talks, which covered many bilateral issues, concentrated on the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan insisted that Kashmir is the core issue while India wants a more broad based dialogue linking “cross-border terrorism” in the valley with it. Indian and Pakistani news coverage of this summit has been analyzed in this analytical paper. Key words: Agra Summit, Indo- Pak Summits, Indo-Pak Relations Agra Summit Indo-Pak Relations Pakistan–India relations have been complicated, tense and contentious due to traditional rivalry from the time of their inception. It has been more than fifty years since the barbed wire fence has divided India and Pakistan, yet they have never enjoyed good neighborly relations due to mistrust present on both sides of border. “Let guiltless souls be freed from guilty woe” (Shakespeare) Kashmir has continued to be major issue, bone of contention, causes of wars and border skirmishes huge military budgets and of nuclearisation of the sub-continent.
    [Show full text]
  • What's Urdu for Biltong?
    RESEARCH REPORT 2 Security and Terrorism in Africa Project February 2009 What’s Urdu for biltong? Can South Africa help Pakistan? ABOUT SAIIA The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent, non-government think-tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s research reports present in-depth, incisive analysis of critical issues in Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good governance and democracy; economic policy-making; international security and peace; and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about SAIIA’s work. ABOUT THE SECURITY AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA PROJECT A new project in 2005, Security and Terrorism in Africa examines how Africa fits into the global terrorism and counter-terrorism equations post-9/11. It focuses on four key areas of research: Are there factors that make African states more or less prone to terrorism? What factors serve to radicalise states and societies? What can be done to address this internally? What can be achieved through external engagement? Specific research involves country and regional case studies on the particular natures of Islam in the African context and the extent to which it is susceptible to external influence; terrorism and counter-terrorism activity in the Horn and Sahel regions; and the potential for engagement by African states in international counter-terrorism and non-proliferation policy in bridging the gap between the West and problematic states and regions, including Pakistan, North Korea, Syria and Iran.
    [Show full text]
  • India-Pakistan Relations: the Story of Unsolved Conflicts
    ISSN: 2455-2631 © May 2017 IJSDR | Volume 2, Issue 5 INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: THE STORY OF UNSOLVED CONFLICTS Dr. Saroj Choudhary Assistant Professor ALS, Amity University Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior – 474005 INTRODUCTION Since, India became independent and divided by the British government the relationship between these two countries has been mostly unstable with ever growing distrust on each other. Both countries have fought wars in the South Asia region at different fronts and continue to face problems like border terrorist activities, infiltrations, low intensity wars and intelligence/spy operations that seem unstoppable as both will continue to consider each other as an untrustworthy enemy.1 It is seen that after the end of cold war, it has become one of the most dangerous and volatile regions in the international politics for which several reasons are responsible such as pre-independence hostility between the Muslim League and the Indian national Congress and bloodletting riots in post independence period at the time of partition. Moreover, disputes over waters flowing from India to Pakistan and finally, Kashmir which remains a subject of conflicts and bone of skirmishes between these two countries. However, there are many changes in the field of technology, global political economy and social networks took place particularly after the disintegration of Soviet Union. With this, the controversial and disappointing relationship between India and Pakistan has worsened as both have become nuclear states. In recent years, infiltration, proxy war and civilian attacks by Pakistan are increasing which is taking both states far away from the negotiation table. So many times, Pakistan took resort to International Organizations to solve the matters which in turn creates space for external powers as well.
    [Show full text]
  • For One Tooth, the Entire Jaw: Cross-Border Extremism, Coercive Diplomacy, and the India- Pakistan Security Dyad
    For One Tooth, the Entire Jaw: Cross-Border Extremism, Coercive Diplomacy, and the India- Pakistan Security Dyad Aateeb Khan, advised by Bruce Jentleson, PhD A thesis submitted to the Public Policy Department for Honors Duke University Durham, North Carolina 2018 Khan: For One Tooth, The Entire Jaw Table of Contents 1. Introduction: “A Tooth for a Jaw” 4 a. Literature Review 5 b. The Kargil War 14 c. Method 22 2. Case Study I: The Twin Peaks Crisis (2001) 26 a. Contextual Factors 27 b. Strategic Decision-making During Conflict 31 3. Case Study II: The Mumbai Attacks (2008) 40 a. Contextual Factors 41 b. Strategic Decision-making During Conflict 45 4. Case Study III: The Uri Incident (2016) 51 a. Contextual Factors 52 b. Strategic Decision-making During Conflict 5. Analysis 61 a. Coercive Diplomacy and Third Party Diplomacy 61 b. Deterrence by Denial and Deterrence by Punishment 66 c. Nuclear Posturing and Pakistan’s Nuclear Umbrella 70 6. Conclusion 74 7. Works Cited 76 Abstract 2 Khan: For One Tooth, The Entire Jaw This thesis analyzes the factors that affect the stability of the current security dilemma between India and Pakistan. In particular, it develops a strong link between the advent of cross-border militant attacks and the potential for escalation to nuclear-level conflict. A survey of three major case studies—the 2001 “Twin Peaks” crisis, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2016 Uri incident—suggests that a number of changing contextual and strategic factors contribute to the increasing destabilization of the status quo. These factors are as follows: Pakistan’s acquisition/posturing of tactical nuclear warheads, India’s shift from a strategy of coercive diplomacy to persuasive compellance, and the growing internal security threat that violent extremists pose within Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy Towards Pakistan: a Story of Estrangement and Engagement
    The Discourse Volume 06 Number 01 January - June, 2020 Post-Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Pakistan: A Story of Estrangement and Engagement Tahira Nasib PhD Research Scholar International Relations Department, University of Peshawar [email protected] Prof. Dr. Ghulam Mustafa Advisor academics, FATA University ABSTRACT Hegemony through expansionism remained the dominant thought of Indian mind since partition. Such thought is the legacy of British colonialism, which made India to strive for regional leadership. Successful nuclear tests of India paved its way to cherish its long awaited dream of undoing Pakistan. But the thought and its power expression stumbled with the nuclear detonation of Pakistan. The counter nuclear explosions of Pakistan turned the desire of Akhand Bharath immaterialized. Pakistan’s nuclear capability categorically made it vivid that peace in the region without being peaceful to Pakistan is of no consequence. Pakistan’s explosions hushed the belligerent India, who was dreaming of forceful acquisition of Kashmir. To be a hegemon and regional leader, India revisited its bellicose foreign policy towards Pakistan and initiated peace process. The journey of peace that started with Lahore declaration and moved towards Agra Summit and CBMs, faltered when India rejected the involvement of Kashmiri leaders in their fate decision. While following the footprints of Real Politik, India turned its bellicosity into affirmation towards Pakistan but never compromised on strategic issues like Kashmir, Siachin and Sir Creek. India agreed when India decided to agree without considering Pakistan’s reservations. But the nuclear deterrence clarified Pakistan’s security posture in the region and beyond. The inflexibility and stubbornness in Indian attitude keeps the region prone to conflicts and violence as opposed to peacefulness for trade and development.
    [Show full text]
  • The India-Pakistan Reconciliation and Other Experiences in Post-Conflict Management
    The India-Pakistan Reconciliation And Other Experiences In Post-Conflict Management Edited by Gilles Boquérat and Richard Asbeck l es é tud es The Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental and a non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, IFRI sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, IFRI brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, IFRI stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2009 ISBN: 978-2-86592-630-5 ISSN: 1962-610X Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27 rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – France 1000 Bruxelles – Belgium Phone: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Phone : +32 (0)2 238 51 10 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Contents Introduction ..................................................................................... 3 PART 1 DEFUSING THE PAST: THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY .......... 8 Recollections of Hope Kuldip Nayar ............................................................................... 9 European Unity and Franco-German Reconciliation Gérard Bossuat ......................................................................... 14 Citizen Diplomacy and Civil Society Contacts Asma-ul-Husna Faiz ................................................................. 30 PART 2 HISTORY AS A METAPHOR OF ESTRANGEMENT/ RAPPROCHEMENT ....................................................................... 47 Post-Conflict Memory and Representation: How Trafalgar Affects Franco-British Relations Today Claire Sanderson .....................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances
    SOUTH ASIA IN 2020: FUTURE STRATEGIC BALANCES AND ALLIANCES Edited by Michael R. Chambers November 2002 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at [email protected] ***** Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://www. carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e- mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-108-3 ii CONTENTS 1. Introduction Michael R. Chambers . 1 I. SETTING THE SCENE . 11 2. Policy Paths in South Asia: Intersections between Global and Local Sir John Thomson . 13 3. Thoughts on the Current Crisis Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
    [Show full text]