Post 9/11 and ’s policy on Issue by Khadija Abid

Research Brief www.cscr.pk Background

According to Indian Independence Act 1947, there were 562 princely states and these were left to choose to whether join Pakistan or . Jammu and Kashmir had predominately Muslim population and was ruled by Hindu ruler Maharaja Hari Singh. He signed the instrument of accession on 25th October 1947 to accede to India. This scenario of linking Muslim majority with India emerged as a never-ending dispute between India and Pakistan.

India, stanched on secular nationalism, wants Kashmir as its part to justify the fact that Muslim- majority area would flourish under Indian rule so that India’s secularism agenda can be demonstrated. On the other hand, Pakistan, believing in Two Nation Theory which projects the Hindus and Muslims as two separate communities, believes that Kashmir should be part of Pakistan because Kashmir is a Muslim- majority area.

Introduction

The Kashmir dispute, termed as the nucleus of all disputes (because of its usefulness for each state’s defense posture) between the two countries, has taken various shapes over the period of six decades. However, post-9/11, the Kashmir dispute influenced the course of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The presence of the US in Afghanistan drastically changed the security environment of and forced Pakistan to adapt their foreign and security policies in accordance with the latest development in the region. The US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan to completely destroy the safe havens of terrorist groups and hence Pakistan had to abandon its supports to the Afghan Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

With dramatic changes wrought by the US inductive forces on fighting extremism, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism put great pressure on Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Using the blurring difference between freedom struggle and terrorism, international entities became intolerant to terrorism and while India ante the commitment of Pakistan to fight terrorism and cross-border terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK).

The research brief is written to understand the steps taken by Pakistan and India on Kashmir issue after 9/11. The major focus contemplating not only to the pressure exerted by the war on terror (post 9/11 invasion of Afghanistan) on the armed struggle to free Kashmir but also to major political shift that provides opportune chances for serious talks on the issue.

Musharraf’s Kashmir policy

At the time of 9/11 attacks Musharraf government was in power and had to face the biggest threat to Pakistan. Musharraf government had two choices – join the US-led anti-terror campaign by opposing the Afghan Taliban regime or to put Kashmir movement at risk and a potential American blank check of support to India. Pakistan was left with the choice of abandoning the Afghan Taliban regime and support the US-led coalition to keep the Kashmir freedom struggle intact and differ it from Afghan Taliban. The anticipated outburst was seen as thousands of people came to roads to protest against the government decision.

In 2001-2002, the world saw military standoff at the Pakistan –India borders against the backdrop of the waron terror in the region. The terror attacks on Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly and Indian Parliament in the last quarter of 2001 precipitated a 10 -month long military standoff between the two countries. India declared Kashmiri freedom struggle as terrorism. In the meanwhile, the decision from Washington to include two organizations, Lashkar- e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), who struggle to free Kashmir from Indian occupation in the list of terrorist organizations put more pressure on the Musharraf government. Coupling with the fear to label Pakistan as “a terrorist state”, the Musharraf government underwent a substantial policy change on Kashmir issue after 9/11 and policy makers attempted to devise new methods of achieving political goals.

Following attack on the Indian parliament, India blamed Pakistan and termed these attacks as “the Indian9/11”. Moreover, Pakistan perspective on the issue remained “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris.”

2 www.cscr.pk The US-led ‘war on terror’, the pressure of international community and subsequent attack on Indian parliament were the major factors that provided the leadership of Pakistan with the greater opportunity to revise its policy on Kashmir issue. The cautious steps taken by Musharraf regime in the wake of major political shift of the region were rather impossible for civilian leadership, as the former Pakistani Ambassador to the USA Husain Haqqani points out that “Pakistan Army has been the sole architect of the country’s policy making vis-à-vis the dispute. Whatever decision Pakistan has taken amid the six decades long course of the Kashmir dispute, its military has had a leading role”.

The initiative taken by Musharraf is often termed as the diplomacy-led solution of the Kashmir issue. The first significant foray in serious dialogue to resolve Kashmir issue after Kargil was the Agra Summit in 2001. It proved to be the diplomatic disaster because of lack of preparatory meeting, no efforts to take foreign office in confidence or any other policy formulation institution worthy of consultation. Musharraf used public diplomacy to articulate his views on Kashmir issues, which Musharraf briefly account in his book as “sad and ridiculous episode”. Whereas, Prime Minister Vajpayee addressing the Indian parliament on July 24 said that Pakistan’s insistence on the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue as a pre-condition for the normalization of relations. On 15th August, Vajpayee said that Musharraf “came here with a single point agenda – to make India accept Pakistan’s terms on Kashmir.”

The bilateral relations between Pakistan and India remain stalled until 2003 when Pakistan announced the confidence building measures (CBMs) in terms of resumption of train and bus service, air link restoration between two countries and the immediate release of all Indian fishermen. The process was carried to offer the sustained dialogue opportunity to resolve the Kashmir issue and observe a complete cease fire along the LOC. To further restore the welcoming opportunity to talk, Pakistan on November 24 announced 10 CBMs which also contained a complete observance of cease fire by Pakistani forces on the LoC. In addition, Musharraf also announced Pakistan’s agreement to resume air links. Consequently, Prime Minister Vajpayee confirmed his visit to attend the SAARC summit in Islamabad. Furthering the trust, India, on 31st December 2003, announced to propose her own CBMs to help process the diplomatic mission and agreed to start bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar and Khokhrapar and Morabao.

During his visit to Pakistan for the SAARC summit, Prime Minister Vajpayee held a bilateral meeting with Musharraf and showed confidence that the “resumption of composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues including Jammu and Kashmir to the satisfaction of both sides”.

Since then, there have been 4 rounds of dialogue altering between Islamabad and Delhi. Beside the satisfactory expression on the progress and affirmation of joint commitment to lead the direction of peace, there has been zero tangible progress made on Kashmir issue. Failure to the standstill on a common ground on Kashmir dispute with India, Musharraf came up with several new ideas. However, Indian response to proposed strategies remained confined to tentative improvement on LoC. In 2004, Musharraf proposed another Four Point agenda which were articulated as “off the cuff”. His proposal included.

1. Identify seven regions, demilitarize them, and change their status before looking for possible options to resolve the dispute. 2. The status quo in Kashmir is unacceptable and the LOC cannot be a solution to the lingering dispute 3. As a starting point for a step-by-step approach on the option of demilitarization, the regions on both sides of the LOC need to be analyzed for local culture and demographic composition. After identifying these regions, there could be gradual demilitarization following which the two sides could discuss who should control these areas. 4. Pakistan and India could also have joint control of these areas or the United Nations could be asked to play a role. The fundamental shift in Kashmir policy is based on Musharraf‘s appeasement policy with India. The slow but steady silence of Indian carnages in the IHK and projection of Kashmir in UNGA holds the testimony to this change of policy

PPP Government’s Kashmir policy

The 2008 general elections, on 18 February 2008, marked the return of PPP to the helms of power. The anti-Musharraf blocs anticipated the reversing of the changes made by the previous government. The general perception hoped that Pakistan would further the peace dialogue with India and support the Kashmir movement irrespective of the change of the government. However, PPP president Asif Ali Zardari verdict on Kashmir that “Kashmir cause should not become

3 www.cscr.pk an impediment to normalization between India and Pakistan” suggested a drastic shift in Pakistan’s policy in resolving the issue. Later, President Zardari exasperated to disclaim the meaning taken from his statement. Whilst, it is evident that PPP government did nothing to further the cause of Kashmir dispute other than “internationalization”of the issue during its tenure.

The PPP government faced unfortunate events in maintaining the peace talks with India. The 2008 bombing of Indian embassy in Kabul, LoC violations and 26/11 Mumbai attacks were the main events that disrupted the bilateral talks. However, the PPP government managed to open the Poonch-Rawalakot route for the trade across LoC after the successful trip of then Pakistani National Security Adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani to Delhi in 2008.

Following the 26/11 attacks, Indian leadership blamed LeT for masterminding the attacks. In response to the attacks, Pakistan banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and arrested seven of their senior leaders.

However, the PPP government continued to highlight the Kashmir issue on different international forums. One of the significant occasions was on 2nd January 2009 when President Asif Ali Zardari told the US ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson that “He would have no choice but to respond militarily to an Indian attack and there was no more politically sensitive issue in Pakistan than Kashmir.” He further mentioned that Pakistan was expecting the US to play the mediator role in the issue. The US President Barack Obama’s statement that “ending Indo-Pakistani differences over Kashmir was one of the keys to calming tensions in South Asia and winning the war on terror”. This statement from the US President brought hopes and eventually Obama administration decided to send a special envoy to South Asia.

Following Obama administration’s decision to send a special envoy to South Asia, President Zardari wrote in Washington Post that Kashmir issue is equivalent to the Palestinian issue which also remained an obstacle for peace in Middle East and it is hoped that the special envoy will not only bring reasonable resolution to the Kashmir issue but also address the critical economic and environmental concerns between India and Pakistan.

Robert A Wood, then US State Department Spokesman, statement that Kashmir issue was not the part of Richard Holbrooke’s mandate and also that “India has some very clear views as to what it wants to do vis-à-vis dealing with the Kashmir issue, as well as the Pakistanis”, had brought a sheer disappointment among Pakistani policy maker. This development assured the PPP government that internationalizing the Kashmir issue and normalizing the bilateral relations with India was the only way to move forward.

From 2009 onwards, the PPP government put its efforts on the issue and pulled out series of associative talks with international communities. Pakistan lodged a complaint in United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) over the suspected breached of LoC ceasefire. The complaint was sent to local commanders to solve the issue.

In November, President Zardari met with Chairman Hurriyat Conference Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and assured him of moral and political support towards the Kashmir issue. Moreover, he also influenced the local politics and his efforts made Raja Farooq Haider as elected Prime Minister of AJK in October 2009 – making him the region’s third Prime Minister since 2006 elections. The PPP leadership is believed to have kept Sardar Attique away from the election by virtue of the fact that he supported Former president Musharraf on his four point agenda.

The PPP government ,along with military establishment, decided to keep -led PML (N) government in AJK because “this would have sent an unwelcoming signal to the Indians that Pakistan was ready to absorb AJK on the basis of the status quo.”

One of the most significant moves of PPP government was the introduction of administrative changes in the governance system of northern areas (hereafter Gilgit-Baltistan) and provided a provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan. The decision to introduce the administrative changes was to give the signal to India that Pakistan is serious about restarting the peace talks on the Kashmir dispute.

In continuation of PPP government’s efforts to raise Kashmir issue at international fora, Zardari raised the Kashmir

4 www.cscr.pk issues in the 67th session of UN General Assembly and calls it a symbol of the failure of the UN system. He stated:-

Kashmir remains a symbol of failure of the UN system and Pakistan’s principled position on territorial disputes remains bedrock of its foreign policy…we will continue to support the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to peacefully choose their destiny in accordance with the UN Security Council’s long-standing resolutions on this matter

During his 2010 visit to AJK, Zardari said that:-

“The struggle for Kashmir began before the struggle for Pakistan. We achieved Pakistan, we will also achieve Kashmir….India could never hope to get its way on Kashmir by force…. Democratic governments in Pakistan had negotiated with India on equal terms.”

The term of PPP government ended in 2013 and the government had not been able to initiate a reasonable phase of bilateral negotiation with India on the issue. Similarly, other issues like cease fire violation on LoC still remained untouched until new government taken the office in June 2013.

PML-N government’s Kashmir policy

PML-N assumed office in a time when dealing with the terror outfits was the burning issue and government had to promptly respond to it. However, the Kashmir issue did not go in dark but remained noteworthy. Even before 1999 Kargil conflict, both countries agreed to initiate bilateral talks in order to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Therefore, it was well expected of that Nawaz Sharif after coming again in the government would work more to strengthen the relations between the two countries.

Nonetheless, within the first year of his government, PML-N government saw an escalation of enmity on the LoC. India kept on blaming Pakistan for the , giving a free hand to militant organizations and flourishing extremist elements such as Hafiz Saeed to form “Difa-e-Pakistan Council” against India. Concerning peace with India, Prime Minister Sharif stated that it is one of the highest priorities. The situation can be analyzed when an attack in Indian-held Kashmir resulted in the killing of eight Indians did not affect Pakistan-India peace talks. At the sidelines of the 2013 UN General Assembly, prime ministers of both countries agreed that DGMOs of both countries would meet to identify improved mechanism to uphold ceasefire and prevent intrusion. Nawaz Sharif’s statement that “Kashmir might become a nuclear flash point and cause of a fourth war between India and Pakistan, so it should be resolved” also reflects his emphasis on peaceful means to resolve the dispute.

Like PPP government, PML-N leadership’s approach to resolving Kashmir issue remains ambiguous. However, towards the end of 2015, India and Pakistan decided to hold Foreign Secretary-level talks. This desire for the continuation of talks came after the meeting of the PMs of both countries at the sidelines of Paris Climate Conference. In December, Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Pakistan to attend the heart of Asia conference and confirmed the resumption of FS-level talks between the two countries. Kashmir issue also made it to the agenda issues to be discussed at FS talks.

Presently, the talks between the two countries are not as favourable yet four times India cancelled scheduled talks. The first derail was made over the issue of involvement of Pakistani soldiers in alleged killing of Indian soldiers during a firefight on Kashmir in 2013. In August 2014 and subsequently 2015, India cancelled scheduled FS-level talks as well as National Security Advisors (NSAs) for the sole reason of the decision of Pakistani envoy to India to meet Hurriyat leadership. Lastly, the Pathankot Attack became the reason for fourth derailment from the Indian side.

The recent Uri attack has served as another blow to any chance of peace talks between the two countries in the near future. India, as usual, blames Pakistan for planning the Uri attack. The latest blame by India is not something. India has a tradition of blaming Pakistan for attacks happening in India and Indian-held Kashmir without providing any substantial evidence to back up its claims.

Conclusion

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Over the past 25 years, Pakistan has successfully managed to internationalize of Kashmir issue. Pakistan adopted the fair approach to facilitate the process of internationalization of the issue. International press was allowed to cover the consequences of crisis over LoC. On the other hand, every interested sightseer or human right activists were allowed to visit AJK. Nonetheless, Pakistani governments over the period of time effort to place the issue before India and tried to resolve a peaceful solution to the dispute. The deadlock over the issue remained an element to disrupt the peace of the whole region.

6 www.cscr.pk References

• Akhtar, Shaheen. n.d. War on Terrorism & Kashmir issue. Institute of Regional Studies (IRS). http://pu.edu.pk/ images/journal/pols/Currentissue-pdf/SHAHEEN%20AKHTAR.pdf. • Bose, Sumantra. 2003. "KASHMIR, Roots of Conflict, Path to Peace." HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS. https:// kashmirebooks.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/sumantra-bose-kashmir_-roots-of-conflict-paths-to-peace-harvard- university.pdf. • Cheema, Musarat Javed. 2015. Pakistan – India Conflict with Special Reference to. A Research Journal of South Asian Studies. • Fayaz, Sadia. 2015. "Kashmir Dispute between Pakistan and India: The Way Out." Qurtuba University of Science and Information Technology Peshawar XI (1): 65-82. http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/11_1/ Dialogue_January_March2016_65-82.pdf. • Nabeel, Fahad, Khoula Afzal Qamar, and Faiza Maqsood. 2016. "Pakistan and India FS talks." http://cscr.pk/pdf/rb/ PakIndiaFSTalk.pdf. • Qassem, Ahmad Shayeq. 2009. Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealised. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. https:// books.google.com.pk/books?id=oAzACwAAQBAJ&pg=PT197&lpg=PT197&dq=pakistan+access+to+central+asia+ through+afghanistan&source=bl&ots=qtw7jeRdow&sig=O5msBnzqAOhr5-OvLbY0fno6ibs&hl=en&sa=X&redir_ esc=y#v=onepage&q=pakistan%20access%20to%20central%20asia. • Saddiqi, A.R. 2003. "Musharraf's Kashmir Demarche: Kargil Reversed." (Dawn). • Shafiq, Dr. Sumaira. 2015. PAKISTAN’S POLICY TOWARD KASHMIR DISPUTE. Margalla Papers. • Shah, Jamal, and Nasir Riaz. 2013. "September 11, 2001 and Change in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy." American International Journal of Contemporary Research 3 (1). http://www.aijcrnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_1_January_2013/12.pdf. • Siddiqui, Tayyab. 2012. "Musharraf’s Kashmir Policy: An Appraisal." Criterion Quarterly. http://www.criterion- quarterly.com/musharrafs-kashmir-policy-an-appraisal/. • Times of India. 2012. "Zardari rakes up Kashmir in UN, calls it a symbol of UN system's failure." Times of India, sep 26. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Zardari-rakes-up-Kashmir-in-UN-calls-it-a-symbol-of-UN- systems-failure/articleshow/16553210.cms.

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Khadija Abid is pursuing her MPhil in International Development studies from Iqra University- Islamabad Campus. She has already completed her Master degree in Governance and Public Policy. Her expertise are related to research in development and governance sectors. Apart from that she is a recent exchange program fellow to US and has worked as an ambassador to British Council.

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