Post 9/11 and Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir Issue by Khadija Abid Research Brief www.cscr.pk Background According to Indian Independence Act 1947, there were 562 princely states and these were left to choose to whether join Pakistan or India. Jammu and Kashmir had predominately Muslim population and was ruled by Hindu ruler Maharaja Hari Singh. He signed the instrument of accession on 25th October 1947 to accede to India. This scenario of linking Muslim majority with India emerged as a never-ending dispute between India and Pakistan. India, stanched on secular nationalism, wants Kashmir as its part to justify the fact that Muslim- majority area would flourish under Indian rule so that India’s secularism agenda can be demonstrated. On the other hand, Pakistan, believing in Two Nation Theory which projects the Hindus and Muslims as two separate communities, believes that Kashmir should be part of Pakistan because Kashmir is a Muslim- majority area. Introduction The Kashmir dispute, termed as the nucleus of all disputes (because of its usefulness for each state’s defense posture) between the two countries, has taken various shapes over the period of six decades. However, post-9/11, the Kashmir dispute influenced the course of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The presence of the US in Afghanistan drastically changed the security environment of South Asia and forced Pakistan to adapt their foreign and security policies in accordance with the latest development in the region. The US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan to completely destroy the safe havens of terrorist groups and hence Pakistan had to abandon its supports to the Afghan Taliban regime in Afghanistan. With dramatic changes wrought by the US inductive forces on fighting extremism, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism put great pressure on Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Using the blurring difference between freedom struggle and terrorism, international entities became intolerant to terrorism and while India ante the commitment of Pakistan to fight terrorism and cross-border terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK). The research brief is written to understand the steps taken by Pakistan and India on Kashmir issue after 9/11. The major focus contemplating not only to the pressure exerted by the war on terror (post 9/11 invasion of Afghanistan) on the armed struggle to free Kashmir but also to major political shift that provides opportune chances for serious talks on the issue. Musharraf’s Kashmir policy At the time of 9/11 attacks Musharraf government was in power and had to face the biggest threat to Pakistan. Musharraf government had two choices – join the US-led anti-terror campaign by opposing the Afghan Taliban regime or to put Kashmir movement at risk and a potential American blank check of support to India. Pakistan was left with the choice of abandoning the Afghan Taliban regime and support the US-led coalition to keep the Kashmir freedom struggle intact and differ it from Afghan Taliban. The anticipated outburst was seen as thousands of people came to roads to protest against the government decision. In 2001-2002, the world saw military standoff at the Pakistan –India borders against the backdrop of the war on terror in the region. The terror attacks on Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly and Indian Parliament in the last quarter of 2001 precipitated a 10 -month long military standoff between the two countries. India declared Kashmiri freedom struggle as terrorism. In the meanwhile, the decision from Washington to include two organizations, Lashkar- e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), who struggle to free Kashmir from Indian occupation in the list of terrorist organizations put more pressure on the Musharraf government. Coupling with the fear to label Pakistan as “a terrorist state”, the Musharraf government underwent a substantial policy change on Kashmir issue after 9/11 and policy makers attempted to devise new methods of achieving political goals. Following attack on the Indian parliament, India blamed Pakistan and termed these attacks as “the Indian 9/11”. Moreover, Pakistan perspective on the issue remained “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris.” 2 www.cscr.pk The US-led ‘war on terror’, the pressure of international community and subsequent attack on Indian parliament were the major factors that provided the leadership of Pakistan with the greater opportunity to revise its policy on Kashmir issue. The cautious steps taken by Musharraf regime in the wake of major political shift of the region were rather impossible for civilian leadership, as the former Pakistani Ambassador to the USA Husain Haqqani points out that “Pakistan Army has been the sole architect of the country’s policy making vis-à-vis the dispute. Whatever decision Pakistan has taken amid the six decades long course of the Kashmir dispute, its military has had a leading role”. The initiative taken by Musharraf is often termed as the diplomacy-led solution of the Kashmir issue. The first significant foray in serious dialogue to resolve Kashmir issue after Kargil was the Agra Summit in 2001. It proved to be the diplomatic disaster because of lack of preparatory meeting, no efforts to take foreign office in confidence or any other policy formulation institution worthy of consultation. Musharraf used public diplomacy to articulate his views on Kashmir issues, which Musharraf briefly account in his book as “sad and ridiculous episode”. Whereas, Prime Minister Vajpayee addressing the Indian parliament on July 24 said that Pakistan’s insistence on the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue as a pre-condition for the normalization of relations. On 15th August, Vajpayee said that Musharraf “came here with a single point agenda – to make India accept Pakistan’s terms on Kashmir.” The bilateral relations between Pakistan and India remain stalled until 2003 when Pakistan announced the confidence building measures (CBMs) in terms of resumption of train and bus service, air link restoration between two countries and the immediate release of all Indian fishermen. The process was carried to offer the sustained dialogue opportunity to resolve the Kashmir issue and observe a complete cease fire along the LOC. To further restore the welcoming opportunity to talk, Pakistan on November 24 announced 10 CBMs which also contained a complete observance of cease fire by Pakistani forces on the LoC. In addition, Musharraf also announced Pakistan’s agreement to resume air links. Consequently, Prime Minister Vajpayee confirmed his visit to attend the SAARC summit in Islamabad. Furthering the trust, India, on 31st December 2003, announced to propose her own CBMs to help process the diplomatic mission and agreed to start bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar and Khokhrapar and Morabao. During his visit to Pakistan for the SAARC summit, Prime Minister Vajpayee held a bilateral meeting with Musharraf and showed confidence that the “resumption of composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues including Jammu and Kashmir to the satisfaction of both sides”. Since then, there have been 4 rounds of dialogue altering between Islamabad and Delhi. Beside the satisfactory expression on the progress and affirmation of joint commitment to lead the direction of peace, there has been zero tangible progress made on Kashmir issue. Failure to the standstill on a common ground on Kashmir dispute with India, Musharraf came up with several new ideas. However, Indian response to proposed strategies remained confined to tentative improvement on LoC. In 2004, Musharraf proposed another Four Point agenda which were articulated as “off the cuff”. His proposal included. 1. Identify seven regions, demilitarize them, and change their status before looking for possible options to resolve the dispute. 2. The status quo in Kashmir is unacceptable and the LOC cannot be a solution to the lingering dispute 3. As a starting point for a step-by-step approach on the option of demilitarization, the regions on both sides of the LOC need to be analyzed for local culture and demographic composition. After identifying these regions, there could be gradual demilitarization following which the two sides could discuss who should control these areas. 4. Pakistan and India could also have joint control of these areas or the United Nations could be asked to play a role. The fundamental shift in Kashmir policy is based on Musharraf‘s appeasement policy with India. The slow but steady silence of Indian carnages in the IHK and projection of Kashmir in UNGA holds the testimony to this change of policy PPP Government’s Kashmir policy The 2008 general elections, on 18 February 2008, marked the return of PPP to the helms of power. The anti-Musharraf blocs anticipated the reversing of the changes made by the previous government. The general perception hoped that Pakistan would further the peace dialogue with India and support the Kashmir movement irrespective of the change of the government. However, PPP president Asif Ali Zardari verdict on Kashmir that “Kashmir cause should not become 3 www.cscr.pk an impediment to normalization between India and Pakistan” suggested a drastic shift in Pakistan’s policy in resolving the issue. Later, President Zardari exasperated to disclaim the meaning taken from his statement. Whilst, it is evident that PPP government did nothing to further the cause of Kashmir dispute other than “internationalization”of the issue during its tenure. The PPP government faced unfortunate events in maintaining the peace talks with India. The 2008 bombing of Indian embassy in Kabul, LoC violations and 26/11 Mumbai attacks were the main events that disrupted the bilateral talks. However, the PPP government managed to open the Poonch-Rawalakot route for the trade across LoC after the successful trip of then Pakistani National Security Adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani to Delhi in 2008.