1 the Ohio State University Political Science 776
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THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY POLITICAL SCIENCE 776 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AUTUMN 2011 Time: T 9:30-11:18pm Location: Derby 0150 Irfan Nooruddin 2084 Derby Hall Email: [email protected] STATEMENT OF PURPOSE The purpose of this course is to introduce graduate students to the diverse literature on comparative political institutions. REQUIREMENTS A one-page single-spaced response to the readings to be circulated via e-mail by 10am on the day before we meet each week (to start Week 2 so nothing due Week 1). A research paper on a topic of your choice due on Thursday, December 6th, at 12pm. The paper should be 20-25 pages long. Some sources of data for your paper include: Political Institution data available for free on-line: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/ Conflict Data: http://www.prio.no/Data/ Correlates of War Data: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ Constituency-level Election Data: http://brancati.wustl.edu/CLE.htm Dataverse: http://thedata.org/ ICPSR: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ Read all assigned readings carefully before class. Attend class regularly and participate in seminar discussions. OTHER DETAILS Academic Honesty: I expect all of the work you submit for this course to be your own. Cheating or plagiarism (using someone else’s words or ideas without proper citation) will not be tolerated. All cases of cheating and plagiarism will be reported to the University committee on academic misconduct, and they will be handled according to University policy. Disability: Students who feel they may need an accommodation based on the impact of a disability should contact me privately to discuss their specific needs. Please contact the Office for Disability Services at 614-292-3307 in room 150 Pomerene Hall to coordinate reasonable accommodations for students with documented disabilities. 1 1. INTRODUCTION: INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (9/27) Required: John M. Carey. 2000. “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions,” Comparative Political Studies 33 (6-7, August-September): 735-61. Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. “Institutionalism as a Methodology.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(2):201-232. Grief, Avner, and David D. Laitin. 2005. “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change,” American Political Science Review, 98 (4): 633-652. Peter R. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. “Political Science and Three New Institutions.” Political Studies XLIV: 936-57. Jack Knight. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge UP, pp. 21-47. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. 1996. “Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions,” Governance, 9 (3, July): 247-64 . Terry M. Moe. 1990. “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7: 213-53. Karen Remmer. 1997. “Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: The Resurgence of Institutional Analysis,” World Politics, 50 (1): 34-61. William Riker. 1980. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,” American Political Science Review, 74: 432-447. Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1 (2, April): 131-147. Recommended: Oliver E. Williamson. 1998. “The New Institutional Economics: The Institutions of Governance.” The American Economic Review 88(2):75-79. Kathleen Thelen. 1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 369-404. W. Brian Arthur. 1994. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Robert Bates. 1984. Markets and States in Tropical Africa. University of California Press. Robert Bates et al. 1998. Analytical Narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2 Elisabeth Clemens and James M. Cooks. 1999. “Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change,” Annual Review of Sociology, 25: 441-66. Paul A. David. 1985. “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.” The American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 75(2): 332-337. (jstor Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002- 8282%28198505%2975%3A2%3C332%3ACATEOQ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I ) Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, eds. 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Thráinn Eggertsson. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thomas H. Hammond. 1996. “Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance,” Governance, 9: 107- 85. Samuel P. Huntington. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale UP, Chps 1-2. Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds. 1995. Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: (1) “Introduction”; (2) Douglass North: “Five Propositions about Institutional Change”; (3) Jack Knight: “Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change”; (4) Randall Calvert: “Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions.” David Laitin. 1985. "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Religious Cleavages in Yorubaland." In Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 9. James G. March and Johan Olsen. 1984. “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.” American Political Science Review 78:734-749. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: the Organizational Basis of Politics. Ch. 1: “Institutional Perspectives on Politics,” pp. 1-20. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance. New York: Free Press, 1995. James G. March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang Zhou. 2000. The Dynamics of Rules: Change in Written Organizational Codes. Stanford University Press. Terry M. Moe. 1984. "The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science, 28 (4, Nov): 739-777. Douglass C. North. 1990. “A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2(October): 355-67. Douglass C. North. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3 Douglass C. North. 1991. “Institutions.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1):97-112. (jstor stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199120%295%3A1%3C97%3AI%3E2.0.CO%3B2- %23 Elinor Ostrom. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scott Page. 2003. “A Path Dependence Primer.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan. Talcott Parsons. 1990. “Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions,” American Sociological Review, 55: 318-333. Paul Pierson. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review 94(2):251-268. Stanley Reiter. 1977. “Information and Performance in the (New)2 Welfare Economics.” American Economic Review 67(1):226-234. (jstor stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002- 8282%28197702%2967%3A1%3C226%3AIAPIT%28%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C ) William Riker. 1995. “The Experience of Creating Institutions: The Framing of the United States Constitution.” In Explaining Social Instituitons, edited by Jack Knight and Itai Sened. University of Michigan Press. Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1986. “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions.” in Herbert Weisberg, ed. Political Science: The Science of Politics. New York: Agathon Press, pp. 51-81. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds. 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 1. Arthur Stinchcombe. 1968. Constructing Social Theories. New York: Harcourt, Brace, pp. 101-29. 1988. Symposium on "The Return to the State," American Political Science Review 82 (3, Sept): 853-901. 4 2. REGIME TYPE: WHAT IS IT? DOES IT MATTER? (10/4) Required: Carles Boix. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge UP, chps. 1, 5, 6. Anthony Downs. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy, 65 (2, April): 135-150. James Fearon. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, eds. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation (Cambridge University Press, 1999). Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117: 1231-1294. Mancur Olson. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review 87 (3): 567-576. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Diverson, and Alastair Smith. 2001. “Political Competition and Economic Growth,” Journal of Democracy 12(1): 58-72. David A. Lake and Matthew A. Baum. 2001. “The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services.” Comparative Political Studies 34 (6): 587-621. Recommended: Alicia Adserà and Carles Boix. 2002. “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness,” World Politics, 56 (2): 229-262. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 1978. Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy. 2nd