Vad Påverkar Benägenheten Att Byta Strategier Hos Organisationer? ------En Fallstudie Av Handelsbanken Och SEB

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Vad Påverkar Benägenheten Att Byta Strategier Hos Organisationer? ------En Fallstudie Av Handelsbanken Och SEB Kandidatuppsats Företagsekonomiska institutionen Januari 2003 Att byta eller inte byta? ----------------------------------------- Vad påverkar benägenheten att byta strategier hos organisationer? --------------------------------------------- En fallstudie av Handelsbanken och SEB Handledare Författare Gösta Wijk Dan Bengtsson Michael Eriksson Tove Eriksson Anders Isaksson Att byta eller inte byta? Sammanfattning Titel: Att byta eller inte byta? Vad påverkar benägenheten hos organisationer att byta strategi? En fallstudie av SEB och Handelsbanken Författare: Dan Bengtsson, Michael Eriksson, Tove Eriksson, Anders Isaksson Handledare: Gösta Wijk Nivå och seminarium: Kandidatuppsats, 10 poäng, inom temat strategi i förändring. Seminariedatum::2003-01-14 Nyckelord: Strategiförändring, strategi, bankbranschen, Handelsbanken, SEB Problemformulering: Vilka är orsakerna till att strategiförändringar är mer förekommande i vissa företag än i andra? Vilka är orsakerna till att Handelsbanken haft en större kontinuitet när det gäller strategi, medan SEB oftare genomfört förändringar på detta område? Syfte: Vårt syfte är att undersöka vad som gör organisationer mer eller mindre benägna till strategiskaförändringar, genom en undersökning av vilka faktorer som legat till grund för SEB:s byten av strategi, respektive Handelsbankens större strategiska kontinuitet under perioden. Metod: Som metod för vår uppsats har vi valt att använda oss av en kvalitativ komparativ fallstudie. Detta för att kunna formulera hypoteser kring problemområdet, inom vilket vår frågeställning hör hemma. Vår empiri utgörs av primärkällor i form av kvalitativa intervjuer samt sekundärkällor i form av böcker, artiklar och årsredovisningar. Slutsatser: En organisations benägenhet att byta strategi påverkas enligt de framtagna hypoteserna av ett antal faktorer. De hypoteser som är framtagna och redovisade som faktorer som påverkar är styrkan på organisationskulturen, graden av centraliserad struktur och maktfördelning i organisationen och dominansen av vertikala eller laterala kontroll- och samordningsfunktioner. Omfattningen av extern- respektive internrekrytering och hur organisationen ser på möjligheterna att påverka eller förutspå omvärldens utveckling är ytterligare några. Även den befintliga strategins uppvisade framgångar eller misslyckanden påverkar. Slutligen presenteras ägarförhållandet som en viktig faktor, dock har frågan om hur denna påverkar inte lyckats besvaras inom ramarna för denna studie. 2 Att byta eller inte byta? Lista över förkortningar I den löpande texten använder vi oss av följande förkortningar när vi hänvisar till källor. AFV Affärsvärlden AS Aktiespararen BV Bankvärlden CS Computer Sweden DI Dagens Industri DN Dagens Nyheter GBP Göteborgsposten VA Veckans Affärer ÅRS årsredovisning SEB – Denna förkortning återkommer ofta då materialet behandlades som en helhet. Detta gjordes för att en bra bild av utvecklingen under perioden skulle kunna målas och att en fragmentisering av fakta skulle undvikas och dölja helhetsbilder då SEB har genomgått flertalet förändringar som har pågått under fler än ett år. 3 Att byta eller inte byta? INNEHÅLLSFÖRTECKNING SAMMANFATTNING ......................................................................................... 2 LISTA ÖVER FÖRKORTNINGAR................................................................... 3 1 INLEDNING................................................................................................... 8 1.1 BAKGRUND................................................................................................. 8 1.2 SYFTE ......................................................................................................... 8 1.3 PROBLEMFORMULERING ............................................................................. 8 1.4 AVGRÄNSNINGAR ....................................................................................... 9 1.5 DISPOSITION ............................................................................................... 9 1.5.1 Metod................................................................................................... 9 1.5.2 Teori .................................................................................................... 9 1.5.3 Branschgenomgång och fallbeskrivningar ....................................... 10 1.5.4 Analys................................................................................................ 10 1.5.5 Slutsatser........................................................................................... 10 2 METOD......................................................................................................... 11 2.1 VAL AV FÖRETAG OCH BRANSCH .............................................................. 11 2.2 VAL AV METOD......................................................................................... 11 2.3 TILLVÄGAGÅNGSSÄTT .............................................................................. 13 2.3.1 Val av perspektiv............................................................................... 13 2.3.2 Insamling och bearbetning av primärdata........................................ 13 2.3.3 Insamling och bearbetning av sekundärdata .................................... 15 2.4 VAL AV TEORI........................................................................................... 15 2.5 METODDISKUSSION................................................................................... 15 2.5.1 Kvalitativ datainsamling................................................................... 15 2.5.2 Validitet och reliabilitet .................................................................... 16 2.5.3 Intervjumetod .................................................................................... 17 2.5.4 Källkritik ........................................................................................... 18 2.5.5 Teorikritik.......................................................................................... 18 3 TEORI ........................................................................................................... 19 3.1 STRATEGI OCH STRATEGIFÖRÄNDRINGAR ................................................. 19 3.1.1 Corporate str ategy och business strategy........................................ 19 3.1.2 Strategi .............................................................................................. 19 3.1.3 Strategiförändringar ......................................................................... 20 3.2 STRATEGISKA PERSPEKTIV........................................................................ 21 3.2.1 Det klassiska perspektivet ................................................................. 21 3.2.2 Evolutionsperspektivet ...................................................................... 22 3.2.3 Processperspektivet........................................................................... 23 3.2.4 Systemperspektivet ............................................................................ 23 3.3 EISENHARDTS SIMPLE RULES .................................................................... 24 3.3.1 Ringa in nyckelprocesser .................................................................. 24 3.3.2 Enkla regler för oförutsägbara marknader ...................................... 24 3.3.3 Betydelsen av antalet regler.............................................................. 25 3.3.4 Veta när det är dags att ändra.......................................................... 25 3.4 VÄXTKULTUR ........................................................................................... 25 3.5 NÄR KARTAN FÖRÄNDRAR AFFÄRSLANDSKAPET ...................................... 29 4 Att byta eller inte byta? 3.6 VAD ÄR LEDARSKAP?................................................................................ 31 3.6.1 Ledaren - den karismatiske visionären ............................................. 33 3.7 ORGANISATIONSPERSPEKTIV .................................................................... 35 3.7.1 Det strukturella perspektivet............................................................. 36 3.7.2 Human resource-perspektivet ........................................................... 38 3.7.3 Det politiska perspektivet.................................................................. 40 3.7.4 Det symboliska perspektivet.............................................................. 41 4 BANKBRANSCHEN ................................................................................... 43 4.1 VAD ÄR EN BANK? .................................................................................... 43 4.2 GENERELLT OM BANKBRANSCHEN PERIODEN 1970-2002 ......................... 43 4.2.1 Större händelser................................................................................ 44 5 FALLBESKRIVNING HANDELSBANKEN ........................................... 48 5.1 KORT HISTORIK......................................................................................... 48 5.2 NYA GRUNDLÄGGANDE IDÉER PÅ 1970-TALET ......................................... 49 5.2.1 Ny organisation/decentralisering ..................................................... 50 5.2.2 Kostnader .......................................................................................... 53 5.3 1980-TAL .................................................................................................. 54 5.3.1 Utlandsverksamhet............................................................................ 55 5.4 1990-TAL
Recommended publications
  • Raoul Wallenberg in Documents, 1927-1947
    Raoul Wallenberg in Documents, 1927-1947 1 2 Gert Nylander & Anders Perlinge ___________________________________________________ Raoul Wallenberg in Documents, 1927-1947 _____________________________ Banking & Enterprise No. 3 Stockholm 2000 3 ______________________________________________________________________ Stiftelsen för Ekonomisk Historisk Forskning inom Bank och Företagande The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise Box 16066 SE-103 22 STOCKHOLM Telephone + 46 8 661 70 55 Facsimile + 46 8 665 34 57 [email protected] http://wallenberg.org/arkiv ______________________________________________________________________ No. 1 Ulf Olsson: Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Bosch Group, 1939-1950 (1998, 64 pages) No. 2 Gert Nylander: German Resistance Movement and England. Carl Goerdeler and the Wallenberg Brothers (1999) No. 3 Gert Nylander & Anders Perlinge: Raoul Wallenberg in Documents, 1927 - 1947 (2000) Gert Nylander, Anders Perlinge and The Foundation 2000 Translation by Björn Norrbom Printed in Sweden 2000 by Centraltryckeriet, Borås ISSN 1403-2198 Stockholm 2000 4 ________________________________________________________ Banking and Enterprise ________________________________________________________ The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise was established in 1994 for the purpose of promoting research into economic history, esp. business history. With this end in view, the Foundation collects, organizes and manages the historical archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank (1856-1971) and its Management, as well as those of other companies and foundations closely associated with that bank. In 1994-1995, these historical archives were transferred to refurbished premises close to the Villa "Täcka Udden" at Djurgården in Stockholm. The archives have been made available for research within those areas supported by the Foundation. Since the 1950’s these archives are among the most useful and well-used for different business history monographs.
    [Show full text]
  • Era of Regulation
    ERA OF REGULATION post-war fears eacetime prospects were discussed well in advance. According to 323 finance minister Wigforss (1954), ‘as of 1942, opinion shifted fairly P steadily towards expectations of a final victory for the Allies’. On 19 March 1943 the government authorised him to assess how the economy would perform after a cessation of hostilities. The government had acquired instruments for increased intervention and economic policy was more coordinated. Housing controls were intro - duced on rents and mortgage interest rates. The Riksdag approved emer - gency powers to control credit and foreign exchange. In autumn 1943 the government sent Gunnar Myrdal to Washington. Keeping in touch with the Americans was important because neutral coun - tries were viewed with suspicion. Myrdal’s impressions were published the During the crises in the 1930s and the Second 1951 Sweden joins the Bretton Woods World War, international economic activities system. Mats Lemne is appointed are increasingly regulated. Sweden’s domestic governor of the Riksbank. policy focuses on full employment and hous - 1952 Liquidity ratios are introduced. ing. The Riksbank administers controls for 1955 Per Åsbrink is appointed governor achieving internal and external balance. of the Riksbank. More and more market intervention is 1957 Åsbrink’s interest rate coup. needed to keep interest rates down. When 1958 The krona becomes convertible. the Bretton Woods system collapses in the 1964 The Riksdag institutes the Bank of early 1970s, the regulated economy becomes Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. harder to manage. The closing years of the era 1968 The Riksbank’s tercentenary. of regulation are marked by the first oil crisis, The Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize wage inflation and a growing budget deficit.
    [Show full text]
  • The Art of Cloaking Ownership
    The Art of Cloaking Ownership The Art of Cloaking Ownership The secret collaboration and protection of the German war industry by the neutrals The case of Sweden by Gerard Aalders and Cees Wiebes Amsterdam University Press Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation Cover Design: Erik Cox, Den Haag Typesetting: S&B Office Services, a member of the Boekmaat'Groep, De Meern ISBN 90 5356 179 x © Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 1996 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the editors of this book. Table of Contents Introduction 1 I The Setting 7 1. THE ART OF CLOAKING. A SURVEY. 9 2. STOCKHOLMS ENSKILDA BANK AND THE WALLENBERG FAMILY. 29 II The Facts 35 3. ENSKILDA AND GERMAN BOSCH. 37 4. ENSKILDA AND IG FARBEN. 55 5. SVENSKA KULLAGER FABRIKEN (SKF). 71 6. SECURITIES AND GOLD. 93 III The Aftermath 105 7. THE U.S. EMBARGO AND THE SOVIET-SWEDISH TRADE AGREEMENT. 107 8. THE HUNT FOR THE WALLENBERG BROTHERS. 119 IV Epilogue 155 Notes 163 Sources 187 Index 205 v Abbreviations ADMF Archives Dutch Ministry of Finance, The Hague ADMJ Archives of the Dutch Ministry of Justice, The Hague ADNB Archives of De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam ANMD Archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Oslo ARAB Labour Movement Archives, Stockholm ARAB/TEA Tage Erlander Archives, Stockholm CAA City Archives Amsterdam, Amsterdam COC Archives of the Chamber of Commerce, Amsterdam DDEL Dwight D.
    [Show full text]
  • Stockholms Enskilda Banks Historia 1856-1971
    Stockholms Enskilda Bank 1856 - 1971 Ulf Olsson INNEHÅLLSFÖRTECKNING I - Grundande, expansion och kris, 1856-1879 Banken grundas Expansion och kris II - Familjebank och finansgrupp, 1880-1919 K.A.Wallenbergs bank Industriella satsningar Banken, familjen och företagandet III - Befästandet av en sfär, 1920-1938 Att förvalta ett arv Banken och industrin IV - Förändrade villkor, 1939-1971 Nya vindar, nytt befäl Marcus Wallenbergs bank Ett vägval V - Fusionen Förutsättningarna Förhandlingarna Källor I - Grundande, expansion och kris, 1856-1879 Banken grundas I Sverige inleddes på 1820-talet en långvarig ekonomisk utveckling, som skulle leda till att landet blev en modern industristat. Jordbruket moderniserades, exporten av trävaror sköt fart och industriella produktionsmetoder började tillämpas. På 1850-talet stimulerades ekonomin ytterligare av Krimkriget, som ökade efterfrågan och pressade upp priserna på de råvaror som Sverige kunde erbjuda världsmarknaden. Behovet av olika typer av kredit stegrades i ännu snabbare takt än den ekonomiska aktiviteten som sådan. Ett modernare samhälle, i allt högre grad baserat på penninghushållning, industriell produktion och långväga handel, krävde också andra finansiella institutioner. Handelshus, bankirer och förmedlare av privatlån utökade sina aktiviteter, men framför allt utvecklades affärsbanker, dvs institutioner som var helt specialiserade på kreditaffärer och vars pålitlighet garanterades genom någon form av statlig övervakning. 1850-talet blev en brytningstid när det gällde banksystemet i Sverige. Sedan 1830-talet hade det vid sidan av de banker som var filialer till riksbanken grundats privata så kallade enskilda banker. De hade rätt att trycka egna sedlar inom fastställda ramar och på så sätt disponerade de medel, som visserligen drog omkring två procent i omkostnader, men i övrigt var räntefria.
    [Show full text]
  • Socialists at the Gate: Swedish Business and the Defense of Free
    SOCIALISTS AT THE GATE Rikard Westerberg Twice in the last century, organized capital in Sweden clashed with organized labor on the issue of private ownership and state intervention. First, in the 1940s following proposals on increased regulation, higher taxes, and potential nation- alization. Thirty years later, when business interests felt pressured by radical- SOCIALISTS AT THE GATE ized politics and a threat of losing ownership to union-controlled wage-earner funds in the midst of an economic crisis. For the captains of industry, the perils SWEDISH BUSINESS AND THE DEFENSE of socialism were to be fought by convincing the general public of the benefits OF FREE ENTERPRISE, 1940–1985 of free enterprise and assisting the non-socialists parties to return to power. This study analyzes business counter-reactions: its attempt to influence public opinion through PR-campaigns, public protests, research financing, press sub- sidies, and political donations. Applying theories on interest group formation and with access to previously closed archives, it finds that it was the level of radicalism within the internationally uniquely strong Swedish labor movement which incentivized business to act. It also analyzes the previously unresearched connections between Swedish employers and pro-market organizations abroad, including the relationship between prominent free-market economists and pub- lic-relations experts within the Swedish business community. In addition to shedding new light on how organized business tried to reach its Westerberg Rikard political goals during the Cold War era, the thesis helps us understand how ideas of deregulation, competition, and individual choice got a foothold in a country so characterized by social democracy.
    [Show full text]
  • Extracts from the Investor Anniversary Book on Eight
    MARCUS “THE DISTRICT JUDGE” WALLENBERG On December 28, 1902, 38-year-old Marcus “the District Judge” Wallen- berg (1864–1943) invited Sigfrid Edström, a graduate engineer and tramway director from Gothenburg, to his home at Strandvägen 27. He had decided, following an earlier meeting in Gothenburg, that the young Sigfrid Edström, who was a few years his junior, had exactly the right qualities to sort out the problems at the com- pany Allmänna Elektriska AB (Asea) in Västerås. Edström, who was very much aware of his worth, held off for a long time and negotiated a higher salary in the process. In the light of the bank’s involvement in this loss-making company, Edström was to be Marcus Wallenberg’s most important recruit, in part because he saved Asea, but also because he introduced the “com- pany doctor” Emil Lundqvist into the circle. The latter was not only involved in the technical transformation at Asea but also at Scania-Vabis, Kopparfors and Stora Kopparberg. The fact that Edström was never invited to the Wallenbergs’ home ever again whilst Lundqvist was a frequent visitor remains a mystery. Perhaps it was significant that one was more sociable, self-aware and vain whilst the other was humble, nonconformist and slightly reserved. It was said that Wallenberg’s wife Whilst basically that was what he This was more than sufficient to Amalia hated the one and loved the wanted, he was not totally devoid of manage and build on the foundation other. Perhaps her husband, who vanity. Being made a Knight of the laid by his father and half-brother often met Edström at work, also had Swedish Royal Order of the Sera- and give his two sons solid ground something to do with it.
    [Show full text]
  • The Institute for Economic and Business History Research
    Breaking the Industrial Logic – a Comparative Study of Swedish Family Dynasties Hans Sjögren Professor in Economic History and Institutional Economics, Linköping University Adjunct Professor in Financial and Business History, Stockholm School of Economics1 The Institute for Economic and Business History Research Research Report No 24 Address for correspondence: Department of Management and Engineering Linköping University SE-581 83 Linköping Sweden [email protected] 1 The survey has been possible thanks to financial support from Jan Wallanders and Tom Hedelius Foundation as well as Marcus and Amalia Wallenbergs Foundation. 1 Abstract The article treats the context and inner life large family firms. The dominant question posed is what characterizes the largest Swedish family firms, some of which fully meet the definition of family dynasties while others only partially do so. The goal is to create a deeper understanding of the owners‟ motives and behavior without, however, determining whether or not it is an effective form of ownership. The empirical comparison, based on a set of new concepts, includes problems associated with generational transfers and evolving public economic policy. One finding is that the first generations of the dynasties broke with the accepted institutional rules and industrial logic of the time. In opposition to, or in cooperation with, the controlling authorities, they changed market conditions, thereby creating opportunity space that allowed them to become established and to grow. In order to achieve these changes in market conditions, they had to function as lobbyists or created strong relationships with those possessing political power. Through their enterprises, they created new markets. Once the firms became large employers, and thus important for the country‟s labor market, they also attracted the attention of politicians.
    [Show full text]
  • ABOUT US “To Move from the Old to What Is About to Come Is the Only Tradition Worth Keeping.”
    ABOUT US “To move from the old to what is about to come is the only tradition worth keeping.” Marcus (Dodde) Wallenberg wrote this in a letter to his brother Jacob in 1946 in an attempt to convince his brother to leave the family’s interests in the railroad industry and focus instead on founding the airline SAS. SINCE 1856 Thomas Laurell and his research team are working on developing a method that uses a simple blood test to diagnose and establish a prognosis for prostate cancer. The photo was taken in the laboratory at Lund University. COMMITTED FOR THE LONG TERM Why would a sea captain, the son of a bishop from Linköping, they can reach leading positions internationally. Dividends development of what earlier generations of our family have important for us to clarify the core values on which our work decide to establish Sweden’s first private bransch bank in generated by these companies, through the holding companies created and we consider this our mission. is based and to openly describe how we think and act. Like Stockholm in the year 1856? While traveling the seas, Investor AB and FAM AB, are utilized to finance world-class the companies in which we have ownership interests, the André Oscar Wallenberg became intrigued by the banking research with grants from the Wallenberg Foundations. All Today, the 15 Wallenberg Foundations, which have been Foundations are accounting for their operations in a way that business. A.O. envisioned major business opportunities for a activities of the Foundations are for the betterment of Sweden established by family members, or in memory of them, is more and more open and accessible.
    [Show full text]
  • Marcus ”Häradshövdingen” Wallenberg
    MARCUS ”HÄRADSHÖVDINGEN” WALLENBERG Den 28 december 1902 bjöd den 38-årige Marcus ”Härads- hövdingen” Wallenberg (1864– 1943) hem den några år yngre civilingenjören och spårvägs- direktören i Göteborg, Sigfrid Edström, till sitt hem på Strand- vägen 27. Han hade bestämt sig, efter ett tidigare möte i Göteborg, för att det unga stjärnskottet Edström hade just de rätta egen- skaperna att kunna reda upp de svåra problemen i Allmänna Elektriska AB i Västerås. Edström, som förstod sitt värde, tvekade länge och förhand- lade upp sin lön. Bankens engage- mang i förlustföretaget blev Häradshövdingens viktigaste rekrytering, inte bara för att han räddade Asea, utan också för att han drog in ”bolagsdoktorn” Emil Lundqvist i sfären. Den senare medverkade inte bara i den tekniska omdaningen av Asea utan också i Scania-Vabis, Kopparfors och Stora Kopparberg. Att Edström aldrig mer var gäst hemma hos paret Wallenberg medan Lundqvist var det ofta har aldrig förklarats. Kanske betydde det något att den ene var säll- skaplig, självmedveten och fåfäng Sådan ville han vara. Helt utan och halvbrodern hade lagt och medan den andre var prestigelös, fåfänga var han dock inte. Att till- att ge de båda sönerna fast bohemisk och lite skygg. delas Serafimerorden var en mark under 1930-talets kriser. Det sades att Häradshövdingens stor sak för honom. För dem blev fadern en så hustru Amalia avskydde den ene Häradshövdingen kallades han stor auktoritet att den ene och älskade den andre. Kanske för att han, likt andra jurister i skämtsamt vid ett styrelsemöte hade maken, som ofta träffade sin tid, hade examenstiteln vice för Stora Kopparberg frågade Edström på jobbet, också ett häradshövding.
    [Show full text]
  • Governance of and by Philanthropic Foundations
    European Review, Vol. 29, No. 5, 672–698 © 2020 Academia Europaea. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. doi:10.1017/S1062798720001052 Governance of and by Philanthropic Foundations LARS ENGWALL Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden. Email: Lars. [email protected] Philanthropic foundations have become increasingly important in present-day soci- eties. In relation to governance, they represent some specific features. Like corpora- tions, they are subject to regulation, but they differ by having neither owners nor customers. This makes the governance of foundations an important issue for study. At the same time, governance by foundations is likewise of importance. It includes the role of foundations in corporate governance based on their ownership in corpo- rations and their role in resource allocation based on the returns of their assets. Against this background, this article addresses three research questions: (1) What are the characteristics of the governance of foundations? (2) What role do founda- tions play for corporate governance? (3) What role do foundations play for resource allocation? In order to contribute to answering these questions this article provides an analysis of the first centenary (1917−2017) of a major Swedish philanthropic foundation, the Knut and Alice Wallenberg
    [Show full text]