La Rothiere - 1St February 1814
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La Rothiere - 1st February 1814 The Emperor was as good as beaten unless he were invincible. Last Updated: 6th July 2020 This scenario was developed for Volley & Bayonet by Martin Soilleux-Cardwell. It has been updated for Volley & Bayonet – Road to Glory by Keith McNelly. THE HISTORICAL BATTLE At Brienne on 29th January 1814 Napoleon had given the Allies, and Blucher in particular, a severe fright even though he gained only a tactical victory and had not, as he intended, smashed the Army of Silesia to the extent that it was incapacitated for any extended period. The quality of his men was not what it had been even twelve months earlier. After the battle Napoleon said "If I had veteran troops I might have done more, but with the troops I have, I am happy with what occurred". Blucher fell back on Trannes a few miles to the south where the high ground with open fields of fire in front made a strong position. Schwarzenberg ordered III and IV Corps of the Army of Bohemia to support Blucher and I Corps was directed toward Troyes to prevent Mortier moving around the Army of Bohemia's flank. Barclay de Tolly's Reserve of Russian Guard Cavalry, V Guards Corps and III Grenadier Corps was brought forward to follow up on the expected defeat of Napoleon. The weather continued foul with intermittent rain and snow with the clay roads almost impassable. Uncharacteristically Napoleon spent two days at Brienne inactive while the Allied Corps moved on him. On the 31st Napoleon decided on his next move. His army would march to Troyes, joining Mortier from where it could strike the flank of either allied army if it attempted to move on Paris by way or Arcis-sur-Aube. Unfortunately, the damaged bridge at Lesmont meant he could not begin this move for another 24 hours. Meanwhile Marmont responded to orders to join Napoleon at Brienne by way of Morvilliers. Scwarzenberg, seeing the French still inactive on the Brienne battlefield, decided to attack. Field command for the attack was again given to Blucher who had directly available to him Sacken's, Olsuviev's, Gyulai's and Wurttemburg's Corps while Barclay de Tolly held the Russian reserve. Wittgenstein and Wrede's Bavarians were ordered to St Dizier to prevent intervention by MacDonald. Wrede suggested that Wittgenstein was strong enough to achieve this task and that he should move on Brienne from the east. Thus the scales tilted even more against Napoleon. Unknown to either Napoleon or Blucher a crushing Allied victory was not what Schwarzenburg or his Austrian masters wanted. Blucher's control of events was limited as unknown to him Gyulai and Wurttemburg had orders not to pursue beyond Brienne and Wrede's plans were unknown. Politically everyone would be pleased if Blucher won, but not decisively. In many respects another defeat for the Prussian marshal would be welcomed by the high command as a way of gaining control over his single minded intention to take Paris. Downloaded from “The Volley & Bayonet Page” at: http://volleyandbayonet.wordpress.com Nonetheless Napoleon with 45,000 faced 80,000 with another 30,000 threatening his flank. The murky stage was set. It was noon on 1st February. GAME LENGTH AND VICTORY The game starts at 1:00 PM. Dusk descends at the start of game turn 6 (6:00 PM) when visibility reduces to 8". Darkness falls at the start of game turn 7 (7:00 PM) when visibility reduces to 4". The last game turn is 13 (1:00 AM on the 2nd February). The Allies are the attackers. French aim to hold the line Dienville-La Gibervie-Chaumesnil and inflict serious losses on the enemy. They win decisively if they still occupy all five towns/villages along this line by midnight and have two commands unexhausted. They win tactically if they occupy at least two of these places and still have five commands unexhausted. The Allies wish to inflict a reverse on Napoleon and force the French from their position. The Allies win decisively if by midnight they occupy the five towns/villages of the French line and they still have eight commands unexhausted and no more than four French commands are unexhausted. The Allies win tactically if the French still occupy any two of their front line towns/villages or three or more of their commands suffer morale collapse or if more than five French commands are unexhausted. The Russian Reserve Cavalry, V Guards or III Grenadier Corps are under personal command of Barclay de Tolly and are the Allies final reserve in this campaign. Blucher must request their release from the umpire. DEPLOYMENT The armies are deployed as follows. FRENCH DEPLOYMENT Facing South: Dufour - in/adjacent to Dienville. Ricard - prolonging Dufour's left. Picquet - between and in advance of Ricard and La Rothiere (WSW-SW of La Rothiere). Duhesme - in and around La Rothiere. Forestier - in reserve N of and within 12" of La Rothiere. Colbert - left of Duhesme. Guyot - left of Colbert, resting his left near Petit Mesnil. Facing East: Joubert - holding Chaumesnil with detachments in Petit-Mesnil & La Gibervie. Pire - west of Chaumesnil and North of Petit-Mesnil and within 9" of them. Briche & L'Hertier - north of Pire in that order. L'Hertier left flank rests on Ajou forest. Doumerc - between south end of Ajou forest and south end of Morvilliers. Fournier - north of Doumerc and within 12" of him. Marching: Rottembourg - on road E of Brienne-le-Ville. Downloaded from “The Volley & Bayonet Page” at: http://volleyandbayonet.wordpress.com Arrivals: Meunier, turn 2 - in Brienne-le-Chateau. Decouz, turn 7 - in Brienne-le-Chateau. ALLIED DEPLOYMENT The allies enter the table using the following schedule with the turn number in brackets followed by the point of entry. 1:00pm (1) / 2 - Hohenloe-Bartenstein Div, Czollich Brigade & Resv Artillery. 2:00pm (2) / 1 - Pfluger Brigade. 2:00pm (2) / 3 - Scherbatev Corps, Wassiltchikov Cav Corps. 2:00pm (2) / 5 - Stockmeyer Adv Guard. 3:00pm (3) / 3 - Olsuviev Corps. 3:00pm (3) / 6 - Wrede Bavarian Corps (-Spleny). 3:00pm (3) / 5 - Doring Brigade. 4:00pm (4) / 6 - Spleny Div. 4:00pm (4) / 5 - Hohenloe Brigade, Adam Cav Div. 7:00pm (7) / 4 - Paskevitch Gren Div. 8:00pm (8) / 4 - Balance of Reserve Corps. BATTLEFIELD The battlefield measures 7 ½’ x 7 ½’. The river Aube is unfordable. North of Dienville it forms the west map edge. All woods can be considered forest. Towns and villages can be considered stone buildings. The French have loopholed and prepared Dienville, La Rothiere, Petit Mesnil, La Gibervie and Chaumesnil for defence. Attackers receive a -1 morale modifier when meleeing defenders in these places. Downloaded from “The Volley & Bayonet Page” at: http://volleyandbayonet.wordpress.com SCENARIO NOTES Movement: The ground was soft in places and snowfalls varied randomly all day from sleet to impenetrable blizzard. As each division is moved, roll a die. On a 1-3 halve it's movement, on a 4-6 it may move at full speed. Further, some artillery units became bogged down in the mud and deep snow therefore all artillery units must be stationary to fire, in addition to the movement rule above. Due to snow, roads give no movement advantage. Visibility: Brief but heavy snow flurries were a feature of the battle. On occasion gunners laid their pieces on a target only to loose it in the 'soup'. This particularly affected the Russian reserve artillery which was sited too cautiously. After targets have been allocated but before firing is resolved, roll a die for each firing unit: 1-2 visibility is 4", 3-4 visibility is 8", 5-6 visibility is normal. There were several instances of artillery being overrun by cavalry charges, both limbered and deployed. This seemed to hamper the gunners but not the cavalry charge, hence visibility for moving to contact is not affected by the above visibility rule. Firing: The Russian infantry in front of La Rothiere found that the snow had dampened their powder. Deduct one die roll from each infantry brigade firing unless in a town or village. This does Downloaded from “The Volley & Bayonet Page” at: http://volleyandbayonet.wordpress.com not apply to skirmishers who are assumed to use small areas of cover and shelter such as copses and isolated farms and who are considered to posess enough initiative to keep their power dry. UMPIRE NOTES: Information not to be given to either side. For political reasons the Allied high command gave tactical command of the battle to Blucher. While the Allies sought to inflict a reverse on Napoleon, they did not want Blucher to soundly beat him since he would then have more fuel for his personal fire to get to Paris and occupy it. Even a reverse for the Allies (such is the strangeness when politics influence the battlefield) would not be unwelcome since another defeat for him would lessen Blucher's political clout. Therefore the Allies win decisively if by midnight they occupy the five towns/villages of the French line, they still have eight commands unexhausted, no more than four French commands are unexhausted and no stands of Russian Reserve Cavalry, V Guards or III Grenadier Corps have made attacks and/or advanced more than 18" from the south map edge. The Allies win tactically if the French still occupy any 2 of their front line towns/villages or three or more Allied commands suffer morale collapse or if more than five French commands are unexhausted. If any stands of Russian Reserve Cavalry, V Guards or III Grenadier Corps have made attacks, the Allies may only draw, regardless of the success on the ground.