3 IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin JANUARY 2010

by N’Zita Tiago, an exiled FLEC leader In Luanda, António Bembe blamed Angola: Cabinda’s living in Paris. Any violent clashes the attack on a group of criminals, were now regarded as acts of crimi- only to change his statement later by miscalculations nal groups and the FLEC ceased to accusing FLEC/FAC (Frente de Liber- be recognized. Beyond this self-as- tação do Enclave de Cabinda / Forças André Monteiro sured stance, the CAN was designed Armadas de Cabinda), based in Paris Researcher, IPRIS to symbolize national unity, peace under N’Zita Tiago, of carrying out and progress, so the central govern- the attack. The attack was claimed Since the end of the civil war in 2002, ment wanted to promote Cabinda as a by another faction as well, the FLEC/ Angola has been well on its way to be- peaceful region freely integrated with PM (Frente de Libertação do Estado de coming a strong, stable and respect- the rest of the country. Cabinda / Posição Militar), led by Rod- able state led by the ruling MPLA The attack on the Togo national team’s rigues Mingas, also living abroad. Party and, above all, the Presidency. bus in early January proved those pre- Although the attackers claimed they The legitimacy of these perceptions sumptions wrong. Worse, it highlight- had no intention of targeting foreign- is premised on the basic assumption ed that the situation in Cabinda was ers, they obviously knew who they that Angola lives in peace. However, never dealt with honestly. In trying to were attacking. This was meant to at- the end of a war and the beginning of portray a strong, united and peaceful tract foreign attention and it achieved peace do not always coincide. Angola, the government consistently its goals: a mostly unknown conflict The Coupe d’Afrique des Nations (CAN) downplayed security risks. However, for the last three-decades suddenly football tournament, held in January an analysis of the political and secu- vaulted onto the world’s front pages. in Angola, was meant to be the culmi- rity situation in the oil-rich province This obviously embarrassed the An- nation of eight years of peace, almost would never support such assertions. golan government, but it managed to like a collective catharsis and a golden Following the end of the civil war, the move forward with the tournament, opportunity to showcase the country government established military oc- even in Cabinda. to outsiders. Along with Luanda, Ben- cupation of the province and used the Luanda’s reaction was swift and guela and Lubango, the city of Cab- usual methods of bribing and co-op- strong. It sent in military reinforce- inda was selected to be a host of the tation to buy off potential adversaries. ments, arrested civil-rights cam- competition. Why choose Cabinda, an Moreover, it viewed one FLEC official paigners and urged France, where enclave besieged by a decades-long – António Bembe – as a spokesman FLEC leaders are exiled, to act against low-intensity separatist conflict? for the whole organization. It was pure these “terrorists”. It turned an em- On one hand, the central government wishful thinking to assume that FLEC, barrassing situation into an occasion did not acknowledge any tensions in which was formed in 1963 from three to be shown as a member of the fight the region. The conflict officially end- separate liberation movements, was against terrorism, with the blessing ed in 2006 when António Bembe, a a single and coordinated entity. of the international community, thus leader of the FLEC/Renovada (Frente Indeed, at first the source of the attack managing to reinforce its internation- de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda / on the Togo bus was not clear. The al legitimacy. Renovada), signed a peace deal with Angolan military in the region identi- If the attack did cast a light on the Luanda, though this was denounced fied the attackers as FLEC members. Cabinda situation, this conflict will IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 2

soon return to the backburner. How- Bilateral relations between Russia and with several African countries. This is ever, Luanda should address Cab- many African countries have devel- why Russian President Dmitry Medve- inda’s problems openly. It is clear that oped within the previous framework dev and more than 100 Russian busi- the province will never gain independ- of cooperation with the Soviet Union. nessmen were ‘on tour’ in Africa in the ence. Most critically, it holds the oil Beginning in the 1950’s, colonial Af- summer of 2009, targeting oil, gas, di- that guarantees the Presidency’s grip rica was transformed into an intense amonds and uranium, in a tour which over the country. Nonetheless, this ideological battleground between the included high profile meetings in An- should be no excuse to avoid address- ‘scientific socialism’ of the Soviets and gola, Egypt, Namibia and Nigeria, the ing the legitimate grievances of the the open markets of the West, leading longest ever business mission in the people of Cabinda. If Angola aspires both blocs to support several anti-im- short history of the new Russia. to be a modern state, why not recog- perialist movements in the former Eu- In Angola, Russia is fighting to capture nize the problem? Spain and the Unit- ropean colonies. Angola in particular market share alongside many emerg- ed Kingdom had similar separatist is- was the stage of ‘gives and takes’, a ing economies and older developed sues and managed to solve them, by continuous jockeying for influence be- ones. Although primarily concerned and large. Unless local development tween the two powers. Today, the Rus- with resources, Russian investments is taken seriously, the government sian Federation, heir by default to the in Angola reach far beyond mineral is only handing arguments to FLEC various legacies of the Soviet Union, is wealth, directed at both state owned splinter cells to act violently. playing the West’s game, by entering and private Angolan companies. Dur- Placing a stadium in the province did into capitalist competition in this post- ing the summer tour in 2009, both not solve anything. This was the most Cold War era. However, like any open Medvedev and Angolan President recent miscalculation in a series of market, African resources are subject José Eduardo dos Santos made the errors, the gravest ones being hiding to fierce state competition, especially priorities for the future exceptionally the real issues and failing to address among the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India clear: mining, energy, transportation, legitimate local concerns. Peace has and China) nations. telecommunications, military-techni- many faces, but those who have her- Russia and China are doomed to have cal cooperation, education and health. alded peace in Angola, both within conflicting geopolitical interests in Of particular import was Medvedev’s and outside the country, may want to Africa, as the two countries have an US$300 million loan to support the think twice. economic expansionist agenda and Angolan Satellite Communications colossal financial reserves to invest in System (Angosat) project, one way in the continent’s economy. While Rus- which Russia has sought to surpass sia intends to expand its investments its competitors. by focusing primarily on resources, But where there is smoke, there might China views the exploitation of these be incendiary fires. Russia and China’s markets as inevitable, as its soil is immense cash reserves could prove to BRICing Angola: deprived of resources and its domes- have devastating effects in a country tic market famished. One of the core with one of the highest corruption lev- Russia steps in reasons for Russian interest in Africa els in all of Africa. Ranking 142nd out of is to safeguard its market shares in 163 countries in Transparency Inter- the European gas sector. By invest- national’s Corruption Index, a massive Vasco Martins ing in Nigeria, Russia’s state-owned inflow of capital into Angola would Gazprom is eager to check Europe’s further perpetuate this disastrous way Researcher, IPRIS political attempts to avoid a situation of conducting business – especially of gas dependency on Russia. Invest- in an open market – and continue to In 1999 while still in office, Yevgeny ment in the future Trans-Saharan gas submerge the country in debilitat- Primakov, one of Boris Yeltsin’s prime pipeline, which is planned to pump ing corruption. Notwithstanding Rus- ministers and the predecessor of gas from Nigeria to Algeria and from sia’s same predisposition for corrup- Vladimir Putin, an avid proponent of there to Europe, will allow Moscow to tion, private investment between both multilateralism, advocated a doctrine reinforce its position as a major sup- countries could become a haven for based on the countering of U.S. hege- plier of gas and control part of this mismanaged funds and resource ex- mony and the expansion of Russian new supply. ploitation without any practical gains influence towards the MiddleE ast and But Russia’s overall trade with Africa to each country’s civil society. the former Soviet countries. Ten years is minimal compared with China’s. In- Angola is not choosing any political later, the Kremlin is attempting to re- deed, African countries might not be sides and nor are its investors. While assert itself as a global actor and to very enthusiastic about making deals opening its markets to autocratic Chi- expand its influence further afield, to with Russia when the three other BRIC na and Russia, oil-rich Angola main- the resource-rich lands of Africa. nations have held high-level summits tains a “business as usual” stance IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 3

with all the other Western democra- interconnected ways: first, promot- Investments from private Brazilian cies. Investment in Angola is indeed ing exports; second, supporting Bra- companies, following a pattern that flourishing, due in part to Russia’s zilian firms willing to invest in and can be observed all over Africa, are interest. The trick will be to step for- outsource to such countries (and, at mostly concentrated in the infrastruc- ward in an already win-win situation, the same time, benefiting from a net- ture and mining sectors. Brazil’s big- underpinned by cautious planning and work established between Brazilian gest construction companies, such as conditioned use of both financial and firms that are already doing business Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa, and An- mineral resources. abroad); and, finally, providing credit drade Gutierrez, all have projects in lines both to Brazilian companies go- Angola and Mozambique. They range ing abroad and to the target-market from roads, airports, hydroelectric governments. power, ports, the production of pet- In the past seven years, Brazilian rol and ethanol, electric energy and exports to Angola and Mozambique sugar. Companhia Vale do Rio Doce increased over 400% and were ac- (CRVD) has a multimillion dollar con- Brazil: companied by the diversification of tract with the Mozambican govern- Brazilian exports, moving from pri- ment for exploitation of the coal mine A Partner for mary products and some manufac- of Moatize. tured goods to shoes, automobiles, The internationalization of Brazil- and airplanes. In part, this can be at- ian private companies, as can be ob- the Development tributed to the increasing credit lines served, is still restricted to a limited offered by the Brazilian government number of firms – mostly transna- of Angola and to encourage exports. The role of the tional – though this picture is slowly Brazilian Trade and Investment Pro- changing. Consultancy firms, as well Mozambique motion Agency (ApexBrasil) is also as companies from the clothing and noteworthy. Through country profiles food sectors, are gaining more market and their publication series, Apex- share and setting up offices in Angola Marina Biancalana Brasil offers Brazilian entrepreneurs and Mozambique. Also, whereas An- Masters candidate in Local Economic a complete set of data for those will- gola possesses more direct and indi- Development, LSE ing to expand their markets abroad. rect investment from Brazil – mainly Similarly, it also promotes business because the two countries have had trips. Last year approximately 70 Bra- longer-established political and eco- On 21 July 2009, during the visit of zilian entrepreneurs represented 150 nomic relations and therefore possess Mozambican President Armando national firms in a business trip or- better-established networks requir- Guebuza to Brazil, Brazilian Presi- ganized to Angola, resulting in US$26 ing thus less governmental support – dent Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva an- million in business contracts. Mozambique is still a destination to be nounced the construction of a Capac- Among Brazilian firms that have in- further explored by Brazilian entrepre- ity Building Centre for the National vested in Angola and Mozambique, we neurs. Both sides have been working Service of Industrial Apprenticeship must distinguish between public and on strengthening their ties, and Presi- (SENAI) in Maputo. In the words of private ones. Among the former, three dent Guebuza himself criticized the Lula, it should “qualify the necessary main state-owned companies are slowness of the Brazilian bureaucracy professional staff for the construction currently developing activities in the for promoting investments in Mozam- of a competitive and modern [Mozam- two countries in question: Petrobrás, bique. And, in a gesture to express his bique]”. Embrapa, and Fiocruz, which have appreciation to Lula, Guebuza stated These words are emblematic of been developing important projects in his wish that the antiretroviral drug a major component of Lula’s for- the technology-transfer sector. Since plant (which will utilize Fiocruz’s tech- eign policy during his mandate: the 1979, Petrobrás has extracted and re- nology), is finished before the end of strengthening of Brazilian economic fined oil, and is progressively gaining 2010 so that Lula can attend the in- ties with Africa’s biggest Portuguese- a larger share in the Angolan pre-salt auguration ceremony. speaking countries, Angola and Mo- oil consortium. Embrapa and Fiocruz Though this Brazilian expansion in zambique, in order to fulfill Brazil’s – both devoted to research, the first Angola and Mozambique is not com- desire to become an important part- in the agricultural field and the latter pletely due to governmental action, ner in their development. The fight in healthcare – have been transfer- we cannot help but recognize the ef- against common national problems ring their respective technologies to forts made under Lula’s watch. The and shared cultural aspects are as- boost agricultural productivity in An- shift towards South-South coopera- sets that not many investors posses. gola and produce antiretroviral drugs tion has been truly effective and must Brazil is investing in Africa in three in Mozambique. be incorporated as part of a broader IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 4

strategy. What remains to be seen is and Ambassador Marianne Myles re- ‘second home for foreigners’ sectors”. whether Brazil’s next president – to affirmed that Cape Verde “practices The same report also brings to light be elected this year – will follow the good governance with a stable demo- the government’s fatigue, especially same pattern or will opt for a return cratic system, promotes the rule of law on widespread discontent with a de- to the obsolete North-South foreign and protects human rights and civil teriorating economic situation, as well policy orientation. liberties”. This status was underlined as frustration at the government’s in November 2009 by the selection of weak handling of the crime wave af- Cape Verde for a second Millennium fecting the capital, Praia. Challenge Account compact. Whether Cape Verde’s economy moves Yet all good things eventually come to smoothly from recession to a sustain- an end. Recently, the ruling party has able recovery depends on how well the not shown the vision necessary to bring post-crisis challenges are met. The Cape Verde: about post-crisis solutions in a period remedies are obvious. Yet, it is likely in which the global economy suffered that, in the near future, the govern- An urgent change its deepest slump since World War II. ment will adopt a formula that buys Governments worldwide sternly em- the party short-term comfort at the braced fiscal stimulus and other mea- expense of long-term stability. of government sures to rescue their suffering private Cape Verde needs an urgent change sectors, thus curtailing the risks of a of government to consolidate its econ- is needed serious economic downfall. omy. The next government will face However, in Cape Verde, José Maria unprecedented challenges, of which Carlos Veiga das Neve’s government seems to have restoring investors’ confidence and President, Movement for Democracy run out of ideas and energy. Rather, as revitalizing the local private sector an escape route, it prefers to flirt with are the most important, but these are Cape Verde’s 1992 Constitution set the the idea of an ever more substantial challenges that need to be met. stage for a free democratic regime, inflow of donor aid, failing to under- and for nearly the past two decades, take actions that could guarantee eco- the island nation has been rather well- nomic growth. governed by succeeding governments. Unemployment has reached new First, the center-inspired Movimento heights (40% among the young), while para a Democracia (MpD) undertook the tourism sector shows signs of dis- a range of important reforms includ- tress. There are also new threats from Mozambique: ing the enactment of modern laws, a criminal gangs made up of despaired successful privatization program, the youth from chaotic urban peripheries. Dhlakama’s formation of local governments, and IMF reports have repeatedly warned culminating in the agreement peg- that the “government’s fiscal stimulus ging the currency to the euro. During in 2009 could push the level of public despair is nation’s the MpD’s tenure, Cape Verde also en- debt close to the Fund’s debt burden joyed an impressive rate of economic threshold, raising the prospect of a gain growth. More recently, though, the for- debt crisis if the country were to suf- merly Marxist-inspired Partido Africa- fer another large exogenous shock. no para a Independência de Cabo Verde In such an eventuality the Fund has Kai Thaler (PAICV), while embracing the rule of urged the government to rein in public Affiliated Researcher, IPRIS law and good governance, has failed to spending and has warned against con- entice both the local private sector and tracting further debt, as this could en- Ever since the death in 1979 of An- international investors through com- danger the level of foreign-exchange dré Matsangaissa, the movement’s prehensive reforms and stimulus that reserves that are needed to maintain founder and first leader, during the could enable Cape Verde to cope with a the currency peg with the euro”. Mozambican civil war, the Resistên- contracting world economy. A recent Economist Intelligence Unit cia Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) For much of this period, Cape Verde report reveals that “after growing by has been led by only one man, Afonso has been the one African country an average of 7.5% in 2005-08, real Dhlakama. Dhlakama initially gained widely held up as a model for Africa. In GDP growth is estimated to have fallen control of the movement in a bloody 1998, former U.S. President Bill Clin- to 1.8% in 2009 owing to the sharp fall struggle for succession which saw the ton referred to the nation as “beacon in tourism arrivals and delays to sev- assassination of Renamo co-founder of democracy in Africa”. More recently, eral large private construction proj- Orlando Cristina, and as Renamo U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ects associated with the tourism and has evolved since the end of the civil IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 5

war in 1992 from an armed insurgent fraudulent, and then stated in early its constituents, and the people of Mo- group into a legitimate political party, January 2010 that Renamo depu- zambique as a whole. Dhlakama has maintained a strong- ties would not take the 51 seats they It is true that Frelimo leaves much to armed, confrontational stance. This is had won in the 250-member Parlia- be desired as a governing party. There a man, after all, who commemorated ment when it opened its session on is still a lack of transparency in govern- the 14th anniversary of the signing of 12 January, “because that would mental procedures, as shown by the the Rome accord that ended the civil mean legitimizing the elections and secrecy with which the CNE acted, and war by threatening a “return to the the government”. However, 16 Re- Frelimo must do more to reach across bush” to fight another war. namo deputies were sworn in at the party lines to build consensus not only Dhlakama has stood as the Renamo opening of Parliament, including Luís with Renamo, but also with the new candidate in all three presidential Gouveia, Viana Magalhães, and José Movimento Democrático de Moçambique elections since the peace agreement, Manteigas, all formerly high ranking (MDM). After victory by such a wide but he has always been defeated by officials within the party. Additionally, margin, complacency must be avoided, the candidate of the ruling party and Dhlakama’s bodyguards were ac- and Frelimo needs to continue to bring Renamo’s former military rival, the cused of forcibly preventing another social and economic progress to Mo- Frente de Libertação de Moçambique deputy, Mário Naula of Niassa, from zambique. (Frelimo). Over the past fifteen years, travelling to Maputo for the swearing While it appears unlikely that Renamo Dhlakama has seen his share of the in ceremony. will unseat Frelimo any time in the presidential vote rising and falling, Dhlakama was quick to condemn the near future, it does still have an im- but mostly falling. In 1994, in Mozam- 16 seated deputies as treasonous, portant role to play, critiquing Frelimo bique’s first multiparty presidential and threatened to take action against and working with the MDM to form a election since independence, Dhlaka- them, but his boycott quickly collapsed coherent opposition that can give voice ma received 33,7% of the vote, climb- around him. By 20 January, 30 Renamo to those not represented by the ruling ing to 47,7% in 1999, and then falling deputies had taken their seats, and nine party. However, this cannot be done again to 31,7% in 2004. more joined them the next day. Dhlaka- with such an intransigent and self- In the latest presidential election in ma continued to insist that the boycott important figure as Dhlakama at Re- Mozambique, in late October 2009, was the official policy of Renamo, but namo’s head. For the good of the party Dhlakama was soundly defeated by the already other party officials had begun and the people, it is time for Afonso incumbent, President Armando Guebu- to strike a more conciliatory tone, with Dhlakama to either step down or be za of Frelimo, who received a full 75,0% Renamo spokesman Fernando Mazan- forced out as Renamo’s leader. of the vote, compared to only 16,4%, a ga saying that the boycott remained the new low, for Dhlakama. A Southern Af- party line, but that deputies were free rican Development Community (SADC) to act according to their own wills, as observer mission was present dur- Dhlakama “is not a dictator”. ing the election process and declared Dhlakama has, however, acted like a that the elections had been conducted dictator, only this time, after three de- freely and openly. Renamo immedi- cades of largely unchallenged control The end ately protested the results, arguing of Renamo, he discovered that his pow- that there had been widespread vot- ers of persuasion and coercion have of a cycle: ing fraud, and the National Elections weakened, and he is no longer able Commission (CNE) did later disqualify to be an effective leader for his party. over 100,000 votes due to suspicions of Despite Dhlakama’s pronouncements, Rebalancing and ballot stuffing. Observers noted an ex- his planned boycott collapsed, and cess of secrecy surrounding the CNE’s the promised public demonstrations redefining of vote-counting process, especially given against the election results have yet to Guebuza was likely to win a landslide take place. As the Agência de Informa- Portugal’s foreign victory anyways, given Mozambique’s ção de Moçambique wittily put it when success in economic growth and pov- Dhlakama refused to attend a lunch for policy erty reduction under his leadership, opposition leaders organized by Gue- but regardless, it was clear to all in- buza, “[Dhlakama] may be unable to volved that Frelimo had won both the organise a boycott of parliament, but Paulo Gorjão presidential and parliamentary elec- he certainly knows how to boycott a Researcher, IPRIS tions by a wide margin. lunch”. Dhlakama has become a cari- Dhlakama, however, was not satis- cature, unable to see past his own am- fied. He called for demonstrations bitions and the divisions of the civil war The Portuguese Minister for Foreign to protest the election results as in order to effectively serve his party, Affairs, Luís Amado, said in an inter- IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 6

view this month with the newspaper square (Brasília, Luanda, Lisboa and Fifth, relations with the Maghreb are Público that, when the Treaty of Lis- Washington DC), Portugal must de- also important for political reasons. bon entered into force in December vise a strategic pentagon, one that Inevitably, if the Maghreb is important 2009, Portugal symbolically closed a includes the Maghreb as its fourth for the European Union (EU), thus it foreign policy cycle. In other words, pillar and the fifth corner of the new is important to Portugal. Lisbon has the focus given to Portugal’s Europe- pentagon. been involved in formulating and sup- an integration, at least in its previous Economic, military, security, politi- porting all multilateral initiatives to- form, was now over. cal and strategic reasons justify it. wards the Maghreb, namely the Union Between 1974 and 2009, Portugal’s First, and without being exhaustive, for the Mediterranean, and before that foreign policy was structured along the Maghreb is an increasingly im- the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. three main pillars. Transatlantic rela- portant economic partner. Between Moreover, the Maghreb is an increas- tions were one of them, in particular 2002 and 2008, Portuguese exports to ingly important player within the Afri- the relationship with the U.S. on bi- Algeria and Morocco rose from 0,15% can Union. Thus, bearing in mind Por- lateral level, as well as within multi- to 0,49%, and from 0,43% to 0,74%, tugal’s strategic interests in Africa, it lateral structures, such as NATO. The respectively. In 2008 the Maghreb was is inevitable that more attention to be second pillar included relations with Portugal’s fifth trading partner, as paid to the Maghreb. the Portuguese-speaking countries, far as exports were concerned, just All the above does not mean that Por- Brazil in Latin America; Angola, Cape behind the European Union, the Por- tugal should ignore other areas of Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique tuguese speaking countries, North foreign policy. Indeed, as Amado also and São Tomé and Príncipe in Africa; America and Southeast Asia. More- pointed out in the interview, more at- and Timor Leste in Southeast Asia over, there is still large potential for tention must be paid, for example, to since its independence in 2001. Last more growth both in exports and im- Asia. However, history and geography but not least, Portugal’s European in- ports, not only regarding Algeria and compel a closer look at the Maghreb, tegration was the third pillar. Morocco, but also Libya, following and, as a consequence, the core of Several reasons explain the unbal- that country’s political agreement in Portugal’s foreign policy focus cannot anced equilibrium between the three 2003 with the U.S. and the UK, as well and should not ignore it. The new pen- pillars. Here it is sufficient to point as the end of UN sanctions. tagon is not the output of an impulse. out that there was a disequilibrium Second, bilateral military cooperation It is the result of the circumstances. working against transatlantic and is also gaining further importance. Lusophone relationships. Indeed, it The Portuguese government estab- is this imbalance that Amado wishes lished, with each one of the Maghreb to correct. Thus, he emphasizes that countries, a pluriannual program of Portugal needs to pay more attention cooperation, similar to the one cur- to the North and South Atlantic, i.e. rently ongoing with each of the Portu- the strategic square that connects guese-speaking countries. São Tomé Lisbon to the U.S., Brazil and Angola. Third, since 9/11, the Maghreb became This rebalancing is more than wel- a pivotal region within the overall and Príncipe: come, since, as Amado also recog- fight against transnational terrorism, nizes and points out, Portugal’s rel- especially concerning the increas- evance within Europe will reflect its ing power of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Particularities of influence elsewhere. Thus, the main Maghreb (AQIM). So far, Portugal has challenge consists in identifying stra- not had any known al-Qaeda threat, the presidential tegic, political, diplomatic and eco- but interagency cooperation, namely nomic niches Portugal can fill. The in the field of intelligence, has be- party deepening of the transatlantic and come a strategic priority since 9/11. Lusophone relations fits in this over- Fourth, the Maghreb, and Algeria in Gerhard Seibert all approach. In particular, Portugal particular, is a major player regarding Researcher, Centre of African Studies must renew its emphasis on strategic energy security. The Portuguese con- (CEA)/ISCTE – Lisbon University Institute relations with Angola, Brazil and the sumption of natural gas has grown United States. considerably in the last ten years, de- However, Portugal’s foreign policy spite the fact that the country lacks Portuguese constitutionalists were needs more than to be rebalanced any commercially viable reserves. divided about the question of whether along the classic three-pillar struc- Thus, Algeria is the key strategic the election of President Fradique de ture. A new, fourth pillar must be gas partner for Portugal. More than Menezes as leader of the Democratic introduced in the conceptual strate- 90% of the gas consumed in Portugal Movement Force of Change (MDFM) gic picture. Rather than a strategic comes from Algeria. party on 19 December was unconsti- IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 7

tutional or not. Jorge Bacelar Gouveia cially he always dissociated himself party membership and electoral sup- argued that according to the coun- from the party. port, but it is very unlikely that the try’s semi-presidential constitution, In December 2001, five months after MDFM will win a majority in the legis- the President could not exercise any Menezes was elected President with lative elections this year. In the archi- other public or private function, in- the support of Trovoada and the ADI, pelago, only twice, in 1991 and 1998, cluding the post of party leader. How- his own followers constituted the has a party won an absolute majority ever, Jorge Miranda asserted that the MDFM. Contrary to Trovoada, Men- in legislative elections; however, in two positions were not incompatible, ezes has never denied his de facto those years, only two and three ma- as party leadership was not a public, leadership of the MDFM and publicly jor parties respectively competed. but a political function. Meanwhile, in declared himself to be the party’s The MDFM has never participated in- São Tomé, the Liberation Movement “virtual leader”. dependently in elections, but in 2002 of São Tomé and Príncipe/Social- One characteristic of the presiden- and 2006 formed a joint list with the Democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD) and tial party is that it is not founded on PCD. Given the cleavages between the the Democratic Convergence Party programmatic political differences, two parties that emerged in May 2008 (PCD), the two partners of the MDFM but on the president’s personal inter- when – against Menezes’s will – the in the coalition government headed by ests. Consequently, the cohesion and PCD helped to remove Prime Minis- Rafael Branco (MLSTP/PSD), fiercely sense of belonging within the MDFM ter Patrice Trovoada by a motion of no criticized the election and announced is rather weak. Besides, unlike the confidence, a new edition of this elec- an appeal to the constitutional court. MLSTP/PSD and the PCD, its mem- toral alliance seems improbable and In turn, Menezes retaliated by with- bers are not tied to the party by a com- further political discord quite likely. drawing the four MDFM ministers mon political history either, but rather from the coalition. However, two of by their own clientelist interests. As a the ministers, Justino Veiga and Cris- result, the MDFM has repeatedly been tina Dias, declared that they would plagued by divisions within its leader- continue in the government. This was ship. In late 2002 the MDFM deputies impeded by Menezes, who vetoed annoyed President Menezes by ap- Branco’s intention to maintain the proving a revision of the constitution two ministers in a reshuffled cabinet. that reduced the executive powers of On 12 January, President Menezes in- the president, as they had disagreed augurated Branco’s new government with the dismissal of the then-Prime composed by the MLSTP/PSD and the Minister Gabriel Costa by Menezes PCD, which together have a majority in September that year. In November of 31 seats in parliament. 2008, the two MDFM leaders, Manuel Unexpectedly, two days later, Men- Deus Lima and Agostinho Rita, who ezes resigned the MDFM leadership, had been elected only two months be- but denied that his decision had been fore, were dismissed from their posts influenced by any outside pressures. following disputes over whether the However this may be, this episode MDFM should leave the government has shed light on the inner work- after Rita had been sacked as natural ings of the presidential party in São resources minister by Prime Minister Tomé. Branco due to allegations of corrup- With Menezes’s resignation as de jure tion. The latest example is the two party leader, the country has returned ministers who refused to leave the to a political consensus based on the government. semi-presidential system, according Another characteristic of the presi- to which the President cannot be si- dential party is that it is autocratically multaneously party chairman. How- ruled by the party patron. Compared ever, there has been a tacit agree- with the MLSTP/PSD and the PCD, ment that the President can be de there is less inner-party democra- facto party leader. The country’s first cy within the ADI and the MDFM. In presidential party appeared in 1992 2001, Miguel Trovoada appointed his when the followers of ex-President son Patrice as ADI leader, while in Miguel Trovoada (1991-2001) created December 2009, Menezes selected the Independent Democratic Action the four current MDFM leaders. Men- (ADI). While everybody knew that Tro- ezes’s presidency and his financial re- voada was the true ADI leader, offi- sources guarantee a relatively strong IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 8

Obstacles on the way up: Brazil, the clay footed Colossus Leonardo Paz Neves Researcher, Group of Analysis on Conflict Prevention (GAPCon), UCAM and Professor, IBMEC

“Brazil, the country of the future”, this motto has been markable variety and quantity of natural resources, one repeated in Brazil like a mantra throughout the nation’s of the largest potable water reservoirs in the world, im- history. My generation grew up listening to it, as did my mense fields of rich arable lands, a large and well posi- father’s. More slogans, such as “Great Brazil” and “For- tioned coast line, impressive mineral reserves, among ward Brazil”, have supported many huge projects from other natural attributes. multiple Brazilian governments. The idea of Brazil as an Thanks to these characteristics, we have had govern- international power has been in our dreams for a long ment after government promising to put Brazil on the time. It seems that we are expecting Brazil to take its track to greatness. In fact the current government of “rightful” place among the world’s leaders. President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva has been selling In fact, Brazil possesses a large set of the domestic and this image not only abroad, but to the Brazilian people, external characteristics that are required or would at too. We have probably never felt so close to the core of least help a nation to become a world power. Through world power. Important reforms, both political and eco- the years Brazil has developed a very renowned diplo- nomic, have been made, and we like to believe that we matic record; we are proud of being among the founders have today one of the most consolidated democracies of the major international initiatives since the League of on the region, along with a robust and relatively indus- Nations. Our diplomacy, rested on beliefs of self deter- trialized economy, ranked around the 10th largest in the mination and non-intervention (with the recent addition world. of our policy of solidarity and reciprocity toward the na- Many foreign observers also believe that Brazil could tions of the global South), seems to have given us cre- be, in fact, the country of the future, but when will this dentials to represent the “underprivileged” (as we like future arrive? Why are we not an undisputed world to believe) and/or to negotiate under a more even basis power already if we have many extraordinary charac- in the international arena. Frequently we have assumed teristics that might help us to be one? What are those an active role in multilateral negotiations. constraints that hold us back and do not permit us to In our region, we carry great weight in almost all as- “fulfill our destiny”? pects of international relations. Firstly, Brazil has man- Unfortunately, we have many important and critical ob- aged to solve all border disputes with its neighbors and stacles in our way. Therefore, to answer the questions has not fought any wars for over a century. Most of the above, I have selected four groups of obstacles that I be- South American regional initiatives were led by the Bra- lieve are blocking Brazil’s ascent. Naturally, those obsta- zilian government, and we currently possess more than cles represent my own views, and others might consider half the territory, economy and population of the South different problems more urgent. The point is, Brazil suf- American continent, which grants us relative weight in fers from many issues in many spheres, and addressing most agreements. The sum of all this makes us believe them is not an easy job. To deal with these issues will that we are the natural representative of the continent. require unity, hard work and much political will. Domestically, we have an even more important group of I shall discuss briefly the four groups of obstacles on the features. Despite our large geographical size and popu- Brazilian way. The first is related to infrastructure and lation, we have an impressive unity; in Brazil, everyone the immense “logistical bottleneck” that the productive considers him or herself Brazilian and speaks the same sector has been struggling with; the second concerns language, preventing internal conflicts. In the view of social issues and our structural public problems; the many, this was one of the main reasons preventing ter- third regards domestic policy; and the last is related to ritorial disintegration in the past. Brazil possesses a re- foreign policy. IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 9

Growing quickly in spite of slow investment One might say that the practical solution is greater in- One of the most problematic issues constraining further vestment, but, regrettably, throwing loads of money at rapid development of the Brazilian economy is a lack of the problem also has not been working. The Brazilian investments and the poor management of this area. On Ministry of Transport’s 2008 budget had R$11,3 billion this matter, I aim to highlight two central sectors that (US$6,45 billion) for investments in infrastructure, but have been suffering with an exponential demand that until July only R$3,8 billion had been spent. In fact, this nearly cannot be met: energy has been a recurring prob- and transportation. lem: in the five years from Approximately R$46 billion In our region, we carry 2004 to 2008, the Brazilian (US$ 26 billion): that is the Government failed to invest size of the loss in Brazil great weight in almost all approximately R$20 billion due to the poor shape of the (US$11,4 billion) from its au- road system, low quality of aspects of international thorized budget. According ports and the tiny railroad, relations. Firstly, Brazil to experts, there are many according to a report from problems, but the most criti- the Board of Infra-Structure has managed to solve all cal ones are the low quality of from the Brazilian National the proposed projects, which Industry Confederation. This border disputes with its makes the approval difficult; is 3,5 times larger than the environmental licensing; and investment in the sector. neighbors and has not public accountability to fed- Technicians say that Brazil eral agencies that control is on the brink of a “logisti- fought any wars for over governmental spending. Thus cal blackout”. Poor manage- a century. Most of the one of biggest factors caus- ment, lack of investments ing this “bottleneck” is the and misguided strategies South American regional bureaucracy that imposes a have prevented the country complex obstacle for our de- from growing faster, and now initiatives were led by the velopment. In fact, it is curi- they risk halting the econo- ous that we are still growing my. “Luckily, Brazil has not Brazilian government, and in spite of all these difficul- grown up more. Luckily the ties. But until when? (2008) crisis cooled down we currently possess more In the energy sector, things the economy”, said Flávio than half the territory, seem to be better. This is Benatti, president of the Na- the sector that receives the tional Transportation Con- economy and population largest part of the invest- federation. Otherwise, if a ments of the National Bank collapse happened, in only of the South American for Economic and Social De- five days Brazil would expe- velopment (BNDES), far more rience food shortages. continent, which grants than the transportation sec- This is the dark underbelly of tor. From the R$730 billion a country that has 1,7 million us relative weight in most (US$417,14 billion) that the kilometers of roads, the third agreements. The sum of BNDES plans to invest be- most in the world, but with tween 2009-2012, the energy only 10% of them properly all this makes us believe sector will consume approxi- paved. According to a study mately 55%, while only 5% will by the Logística e Supply that we are the natural be invested in the road sys- Chain Institute (ILOS) Brazil tem. Energy in South America has one of the worst infra- representative of the always plays an important structures among the BRIC role in influencing politics, (Brazil, Russia, India, and continent. as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ec- China) countries, the U.S. and uador also show. In Brazil, it Canada. For example, Brazil is in last place in the paved seems that energy is assuming an even greater role as road rank. In contrast, with the huge road system length, new oil discoveries affect governmental calculations. the railroad network is one of the smallest, comprising Recently, energy issues have been shifting from the eco- only 28.587 kilometers, most of them over 100 years old. nomic sphere to also dominate the political arena, and Unfortunately, the greatest similarity between the road the energy sector has reaffirmed its strategic impor- system and the railroad network is their poor state. tance for the following reasons: i) Brazil has an enor- IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 10

mous demand for energy that will only grow; ii) heavy trailing only Swaziland, 0,609 in inequality. That means investment transformed Brazil into one of the leading by the year 2000, Brazil was the second most unequal countries in both biofuel technology and production; country in the whole world, beaten even by many of the iii) spectacular hydroelectric potential; iv) the cleanest so called failed states. In 2004, Brazil managed to im- energy matrix in the world; and v) despite the fact that prove slightly and its coefficient lowered to 0,591, and Brazil already had considerable oil reserves, we re- in 2008 to 0,544; however, this means, we still are the cently discovered that we might have the sixth-largest tenth most unequal country. reserve of oil in the world. However, despite this terrible inequality, in recent years As some politicians said, the enormous pre-salt oil almost all social indicators in Brazil have been improv- discovery was a gift from above that came at the right ing. It appears that the social programs carried out by time, when Brazil was beginning to worry with its en- Lula have lifted millions from poverty. His strong social ergy security due to doubts about the stability of some policies, combined with an orthodox economic policy of our neighbors. The impact that protected the country’s of the new discovery was so stability, have expanded both great that it almost crippled Many foreign observers the formal and the informal the biofuel project and other sector, increasing the middle clean energy investments (al- also believe that Brazil class. The practical result is though some critical invest- that, from 2004 to 2006, one ments remain in the agenda, could be, in fact, the third of the people that lived such as the inauguration of country of the future, below the poverty line saw the first thermoelectric plant their situation improve. Yet fuelled by biofuel – an initia- but when will this future 31% of the Brazilian population tive that aims for a reduction still lies below the poverty line, of oil dependency). The dis- arrive? Why are we not nearly one third of the 194 mil- covery also spawned disputes: lion Brazilians. among the federation and the an undisputed world Other indicators have also states, among producers and shown improvement, but il- non-producers, among gov- power already if we have lustrate as well the problems ernment and opposition. Ac- many extraordinary that remain. The UN Human cording to the government the Development Report (HDR), pre-salt oil will not be export- characteristics that might the most popular indicator to ed, or at least Brazil will not measure the conditions of the become a major oil exporter. help us to be one? What population, has finally shown The capital generated from improvements. After decades this resource will be invest- are those constraints that of Brazil’s struggles in the ed in education, health and, group of countries with me- above all, to eradicate poverty. hold us back and do not dium development, in 2007, Noble intentions, indeed, but permit us to “fulfill our Brazil broke through into the the question is whether future group of countries with high governments will follow these destiny”? development, and in 2008 we instructions properly. were rated with an indicator of 0,813, though with the modest rank of 75th. Further sta- tistics also show “improvements”: The weak structure of the social pyramid • Unemployment rate – from 12,3% in 2003 to 7,9% in As the destinations for the oil money suggest, Brazil’s 2008, ranked 109th; the second most fundamental problem lies in its so- • Infant mortality rate – from 32/1000 in 2000 to cial structure. Since the 1960’s, Brazil has been more 22/1000 in 2009, ranked 97th; or less the tenth-largest economy in the world, but we • Live expectancy rate – from 71,13 years in 2003 to have never been able to translate all this wealth into 71,99 in 2009, ranked 121st. social development. Many believe that our social issues All those numbers seems to converge to one conclu- are our largest anchor, holding us back and prevent- sion; yes, things are improving, the Brazilian popula- ing Brazil from reaching the “first world”. The most tion is less poor, more infants have chance to survive dreadful example of our social issues is the Gini index after birth, people are living a little longer and the abyss measure of the distribution of wealth: in the year 2000, between the poorest and the richest has gotten a little the Brazilian coefficient was 0,607 (1 being the most bit narrower, but the scale of these improvements has unequal possibility and 0 the best scenario possible), been minor. IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 11

Our economic growth was achieved without great social study, even a president, Fernando Collor, was removed improvements, following the 1970’s motto, “let the cake from office, in 1992. grow, then we divide it”. The cake is already big enough, Lastly, the Global Competitiveness Index 2009-2010 of and now it appears that we are beginning to share it. the World Economic Forum, pointed out some impres- Unfortunately it took too long and the result is a wealthy sive data about the Brazilian ability to compete world- country, both in capital and in resources, but with terri- wide. Among 133 countries examined in the report, Bra- ble social indicators that are comparable with countries zil is ranked as: that are usually known as failed states. 127th – Public thrust of politicians 121st – Deviation of public funds 129th – Wastefulness of government spending The burden of domestic politics 132nd – Burden of government regulation If the Brazilian society’s weak 133rd – Extent and effect of regu- foundations are considered If the Brazilian society’s lation the second most serious 126th – Number of procedures problem facing Brazil, do- weak foundations are required to start a busi- mestic politics is definitely the ness most forceful constraint to its considered the second 128th – Time required to start a development. As mentioned business above, almost everything in most serious problem 117th – Total tax rates Brazil seems to be improv- ing, but not at the same pace. facing Brazil, domestic While its economy is putting politics is definitely the Brazil on the world map as an Finally a global player emerging power, most of the most forceful constraint Brazil has always sought a lead- Brazilian population still lives ing place in the international in a “third world” situation, or to its development. As society. Backed by a very strong even in a failed state. diplomatic body, Brazil has been It is my belief that our domes- mentioned above, almost part of most large international tic politics are the prime cul- initiatives, being a founding prit in our constrained social everything in Brazil member of inter-governmental development. Far from being seems to be improving, organizations. Finding its way an agent of transformation, to the top has not been an easy the political class has acted but not at the same task, though. Trying to achieve as an agent of hindrance. one great dream, permanent Widespread corruption, lack pace. While its economy seat on the UN Security Coun- of political will, and heavy cil, we have increased our pres- and inefficient bureaucracy, is putting Brazil on ence in peacekeeping missions, among others things, have culminating in Brazil’s lead- always prevented the transla- the world map as an ership of the United Nations tion of our remarkable quanti- emerging power, most of Stabilization Mission in Haiti ty of resources into our social (MINUSTAH). The achievement development. the Brazilian population of a permanent seat has been As above, a few statistics help an obsession since the time of to illustrate this argument, or still lives in a “third the League of Nations, when at least show the negative im- Brazil abandoned the group af- pact of the domestic political world” situation, or even ter “our” permanent seat was climate in Brazil. The first and given to Germany after the first the grimmest matter is cor- in a failed state. reorganization. ruption. According to the NGO In the economic realm, we have Transparency International, Brazil is ranked as the 75th managed, after many years, to erase our strangling least corrupt country in the world, of 180. Yet, accord- debt to the International Monetary Fund. In fact, Lula ing to the Movimento de Combate à Corrupção Eleitoral claims to have turned the table on it, when we ceased to (MCCE), a Brazilian NGO that studies electoral corrup- owe more debts than our reserves. Moreover, the 2008 tion, from 2000 to 2007 over 623 politicians were im- financial crisis gave Brazil a new prestige, since we had peached. Among them there were federal and district one of the best economic performances and, more im- deputies, senators, mayors and governors. Prior to this portantly, we lent money to the IMF. In short, for the IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 12

first time after a financial crisis, Brazil has managed and legitimacy, and travelled around the world spread- not to ask money, but lend it. ing his message of social justice and poverty/hunger re- Yet, reaching the pinnacle of power requires more than duction. He also engaged African states with a policy of our own efforts; somebody else will have to either lose Solidarity and Reciprocity, and changed our traditional power or at least share it. Therefore, the Brazilian strat- non-intervention posture to one of “non-indifference” egy seems to focus on gaining more bargaining power to toward the internal crises of other countries. advance our interests in multilateral forums. However, Yet in addition to his virtu, Lula also counted on the Brazil’s limited success in World Trade Organization ne- beautiful lady, fortuna. During his time as president, gotiations indicates lingering limitations to our bargain- Lula has experienced an bonanza, as commodities were ing power. increased in value; there were easy access to credit; there were no economic crisis within Brazil; the eyes of the international investors were turned to Brazil’s high What the future holds interests rates and stability; new amazing discoveries of Brazil has historically experienced periods of turbu- offshore oil were made; and Brazil was even granted the lence and then adaptation to transformative economic 2014 Football World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. plans. In 2002, when Lula was elected, many believed In spite of all these advances, though, our domestic that a new cycle of “pharaonic” plans and inconsistent politics have remained the most damaging constraint policies would begin, due to the new president’s leftist to our development. While almost all social indicators bent and the economic and political changes observed have shown some improvement, the political ones could in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. Instead, Lula man- hardly get any worse. Brazil has been not only a sleep- aged to implement a mix of what Maria Regina Soares ing giant, but also one that was chained. Now, I believe de Lima called an orthodox economic policy and a het- that the giant is awakening and breaking his interna- erodox foreign policy. In this way, Lula’s government tional bonds, but he still very well confined by domestic took advantage of the reforms of his predecessor, con- chains. Brazil, more than ever, could be the country of tinued his policy of fiscal austerity and pursued stability the future thanks to its excellent economic prospects. above all. On the international level, Lula sought a more Now it is up to Brazilian society to fight for this future active role, took advantage of his personal background and claim for its right of a better Brazil. IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 13

Timeline of Events

rejected any involvement of his organization. opening ceremonies in Luanda and condemned Angola Later, a communiqué was published by the dis- the attack in Cabinda. sident cell FLEC/PM (Frente de Libertação do 3 January 2010 (Cabinda): Estado de Cabinda – Posição Militar), through its 11 January 2010 (London): Chevron will invest US$2,3 billion to curb natu- leader, Rodrigues Mingas, claiming responsi- The 2009 Mo Ibrahim Foundation Index of Afri- ral gas flaring in the oil-production province bility. can Governance was released. Measuring the over the next five years. The company aims to delivery of public goods and services to citizens gain economic and environmental advantages 8-11 January 2010 (Luanda): by government and non-state actors, Angola with this move. The government’s response to the incident was ranked 42nd out of 53 countries. in Cabinda was mixed. At first, Military Forces 4 January 2010 (Uíge): in the province acknowledged that the attack 14 January 2010 (Maputo): Martyr’s Day celebrations were headed by Min- came from FLEC members. However, later, Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma attended Ar- ister of Territorial Administration, Virgílio de António Bembe blamed the events on a group mando Guebuza’s inauguration as President of Fontes Pereira, who remembered those who of criminals. Finally, Bembe formally accused Mozambique. fought against colonial oppression and praised FLEC/FAC and urged Congo and the DRC to recent diplomatic efforts by President José help Angola to capture and deal with rebels 14 January 2010 (Luanda): Eduardo dos Santos to solve the refugee crisis launching attacks from those countries. He In a interview with Radio Ecclesia, lawyer Fer- with DRC. also accused FLEC/FAC leader, N’Zita Tiago, of nando Macedo called the Constitutional draft- hampering peace talks. ing process, its methods of public consultation 7 January 2010 (Maputo): and the model to be approved “a parody” that Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos attended 10 January 2010 (Cabinda): will establish an “authoritarian” law. SADC’s Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy After some hesitation, Togo’s delegation left Committee extraordinary meeting, where for- Angola for security reasons. The CAN’s conve- 15 January 2010 (Paris): mer Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano ners deemed the security measures sufficient Following pressures from Luanda, the French informed its members about the evolution of and the tournament commenced in Luanda. government launched a judicial procedure the Madagascar crisis. Assunção dos Anjos Ivory Coast’s coach, the Bosnian Vahid Halil- against FLEC members allegedly in its terri- criticized Andry Rajoelina for pursuing a unilat- hodzic, compared the situation in Cabinda with tory, in particular N’Zita Tiago (FLEC/FAC) and eral solution. Bosnia in 1992, stating that “everything recalls Rodrigues Mingas (FLEC/PM). war”. 8 January 2010 (Cabinda): 17 January 2010 (Cabinda): Just ahead of the Cup of African Nations (CAN) 11 January 2010 (Cabinda): Human Rights Watch denounced the arrest of football tournament kick-off, the bus trans- After promising more attacks targeting only priest Raul Tati, university professor Belchior porting Togo’s national team was ambushed military personnel, FLEC/PM members in the Tati, former police officer Pedro Fuca and law- and shot when crossing the border from province, through lieutenant-general Estanis- yer Francisco Luemba in Cabinda. They are all Congo-Brazzaville into the oil-rich enclave, lau Boma, announced a truce in the province human-rights activists but with no-known links killing two and wounding eight. This incident during the CAN. to FLEC. Angola’s Military Special Forces, the happened just a week after former FLEC rebel ‘Ninjas’, have been spotted in the province. and Minister without Portfolio, António Bembe, 11 January 2010 (Luanda): claimed that stability and security had been The majority of the new articles of the Constitu- 20 January 2010 (Luanda): achieved in the province. The military arrested tion were approved by the Constitutional Com- In the preliminary reading of the new Constitu- two alleged FLEC members shortly after the mission. Yet, no consensus was reached on the tion, the opposition party, UNITA, walked out of attack. method for the presidential election, as UNITA the plenary session of the National Assembly and the Partido da Renovação Social (PRS) still in protest. Nonetheless, the MPLA, with Prime 9 January 2010 (Cabinda): objected to the model proposed by MPLA. Minister Paulo Kassoma present, approved the It was not totally clear who was responsible for document. the 8th January attack. At first, the ambush was 11 January 2010 (Luanda): blamed on the main cell of FLEC, the FLEC/ President José Eduardo dos Santos met his 21 January 2010 (Luanda): FAC (Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda counterparts from the DRC, South Africa, Na- The National Assembly ratified Angola’s new – Forças Armadas de Cabinda), whose leader- mibia and Zambia to discuss African and bi- Constitution. 186 deputies out of 220 voted fa- ship is exiled in Paris. FLEC/FAC’s Joel Batila lateral issues. The leaders attended the CAN vorably. No vote against was registered because IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 14

UNITA boycotted the ballot. This Constitution 30 January 2010 (Luanda): United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti eliminates the post of Prime Minister, making The name of the National Assembly Speaker, (MINUSTAH). the President the Head of Government, replac- Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, known ing the Prime Minister with a Vice-President. as “Nandó”, was brought up by the newspa- 13 January 2010 (Brasília): The head-list of the most voted party in the leg- per Semanário Angolense as a possible Vice- Minister of Mines and Energy, Edison Lobão, islative elections will be automatically elected President under the new Constitution, hence a told reporters that Petrobrás is in talks to buy a as President. Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma possible candidate to succeed to José Eduardo stake in Portugal’s Galp Energia. downplayed the absence of UNITA and stated dos Santos by 2012. Although a heavyweight that the approval of the Constitution marks the inside the MPLA, Nandó must face Manuel 13 January 2010 (Brasília): end of the transition period. Vicente, Sonangol’s current president, who Celso Amorim announced that Brazil would seems to be the preferred contender by José send US$15 million to help rebuild Haiti. 22 January 2010 (Paris): Eduardo dos Santos. Current Prime Minister, French authorities assured Angola that they Paulo Kassoma, may also assume the post of 14 January 2010 (Brasília): will prosecute Rodrigues Mingas, the alleged Vice-President. President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva signed a leader of FLEC/PM who holds a French pass- new decree changing the wording of the pro- port, accusing him of inciting violence. 31 January 2010 (Addis Ababa): posed National Program for Human Rights, Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos partici��������- which includes a future Truth Commission to 23 January 2010 (Luanda): pated in the sixteenth session of the Executive investigate the crimes of the military dictator- UNITA’s leader, Isaías Samakuva, stated that the Council of the African Union. ship, but which was heavily criticized by the new Constitution creates a “state of tyranny”. military authorities and some government of- ficials.T he new phrasing now makes it possible 27 January 2010 (Luanda): to investigate the crimes committed by leftist President Eduardo dos Santos headed a Coun- militants as well. cil of Ministers meeting where some €5 billion worth of investment projects were approved. 20 January 2010 (Brasília): The main areas targeted were commerce, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva met with Qa- energy and transportation, while the least fa- Brazil tar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani voured sector was agriculture. to foster bilateral economic ties, in the pres- 1 January 2010 (New York): ence of the respective Foreign Ministers. The 27 January 2010 (Lisbon): Brazil formally took its seat as a non-perma- possibility of Qatari investments in Brazilian Portugal will lend US$200 million to Angola nent member of the United Nations Security companies was also discussed. within the US$1,4 billion IMF funding program Council for the period of 2010-2011. agreed to between the IMF and Luanda. Brazil 20 January 2010 (Brasília): also signalled it will grant a similar amount. 4 January 2010 (Ankara): The Ministry of Defense confirmed that Bra- Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Turk- zil will send another 1,300 troops to Haiti, re- 28 January 2010 (Luanda): ish President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Re- sponding to the United Nations’ request for a India and Angola signed a memorandum of un- cep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Trade Minister doubling of troops in the country; Brazil already derstanding in the oil sector. The deal, agreed Zafer Caglayan, with the objective of promoting has the military command of the United Na- to by Oil Minister Botelho de Vasconcelos and commercial relations between the two coun- tions Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) his counterpart, Murli Deora, ties together So- tries. Amorim also participated in the Turkey- with a contingent of about 1,300 troops. nangol and Indian firms. Brazil Joint Economic Commission. 25 January 2010 (Montréal): 29 January 2010 (Luanda): 6 January 2010 (Geneva): Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim at- After the President’s call for a zero tolerance Celso Amorim held a meeting with the Minister tended a conference, chaired by Canadian For- policy on corruption, ten people have been of Foreign Affairs of the Palestinian National eign Minister Lawrence Cannon, to coordinate arrested over a €72 million embezzlement Authority, Riyad al-Maliki, addressing bilateral international aid to Haiti. scheme in the country’s Central Bank. issues and the Israeli-Palestinian peace pro- cess. 26 January 2010 (Porto Alegre): 30 January 2010 (Cabinda): Lula will join President Hugo Chávez of Ven- António Bembe embarked on a two-day visit to 13 January 2010 (Port-au-Prince): ezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, Fernando Lugo the enclave of Cabinda, where he held meet- Brazilian’s Army top officer, General Enzo of Paraguay, and Jose Mujica of Uruguay for a ings with local officials to be informed of the Peri, and Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, special commemoration of the 10th anniversary “criminal” situation in the province. Meanwhile, traveled to Haiti, in the aftermath of the re- of the World Social Forum. in Switzerland, a Cabinda activist, Jean-Claude cent earthquake to assess the situation of the N’Zita, complained that he has been receiving Brazilian contingent of 1,266 army and navy 27 January 2010 (Geneva): anonymous death treats. troops who are in the country leading the Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim at- IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 15

tended the 13th special session of the UN Hu- Foreign Minister José Brito unveiled the inten- 11 January 2010 (London): man Rights Council, devoted to the review of tions of Cape Verde to be classified as one of The 2009 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Gover- the situation in Haiti. EU’s outermost regions, thus gaining access to nance was released. Measuring the delivery of communitarian funds for development. public goods and services to citizens by govern- 28 January 2010 (Davos): ment and non-state actors, Guinea-Bissau was Lula da Silva was represented in the World ranked 40th out of 53 countries. Economic Forum by Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, after he fell ill with high blood 12-27 January 2010 (Bissau): pressure. Amorim was also expected to hold A two week long IMF mission, headed by Bra- talks with his Iranian and Singaporean coun- zil’s Paulo Drummond, arrived in Bissau to terparts, Manouchehr Mottaki and George Yeo, prepare with the local government a three year respectively. Guinea-Bissau poverty reduction plan. At the end of the visit, Drummond stated that the Bissau-Guinean 1 January 2010 (Bissau): government is making the right efforts at the Bubo Na Tchuto’s situation was discussed be- macro-economic level to stabilize the country’s tween UN Representative in Guinea-Bissau, Jo- finances, hence the country is well placed to re- seph Mutaboba, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes ceive further support. One of the aspects under Júnior and Attorney General Amine Saad. A negotiation is the cancellation of the US$700 possible solution envisaged was a new forced million debt of Guinea-Bissau. Cape Verde exile to the former Navy Chief of Staff, while the UN stated that it granted protection to Na 12 January 2010 (Bissau): 11 January 2010 (London): Tchuto having in mind Human Rights concerns. Brazil will finance the construction of Guinea- The 2009 Mo Ibrahim Foundation Index of Afri- Bissau’s National Police Academy. The three can Governance was released. Measuring the 6 January 2010 (Lisbon): year project is estimated at US$3 million. delivery of public goods and services to citizens Portugal’s Secretary of State for Cooperation by government and non-state actors, Cape stated that Bubo Na Tchuto’s case exposed 13 January 2010 (Timbuktu): Verde was ranked 2nd out of 53 countries, only the deep fragilities of the Bissau-Guinean Reuters obtained access to a 2008 U.S. Depart- behind Mauritius. state. Prominent civil rights activist, Fer- ment of Homeland Security report describing nando Casimiro, rebuffed these allegations the growing network of illicit air traffic between 21 January 2010 (Praia): as shallow and disconnected to the reality in Latin America and West Africa used for drug Before the start of the XII Congress of Cape the ground. trafficking, viewed as “the most significant Verde’s ruling party, PAICV, current Prime development in the criminal exploitation of air- Minister José Maria Neves guaranteed that he 8 January 2010 (Bissau): craft since 9/11”. In Guinea-Bissau, airstrips would not run for President in the elections of Following days of negotiations, the UN agreed in Cacine, east of Bissau, and Bubaque, in the early 2011, maintaining his focus on the legis- to hand-over to Guinea-Bissau’s government Bijagós Archipelago, have been used by those lative session of the same year. Bubo Na Tchuto. If the former admiral is im- flights. prisoned, the UN may visit him to monitor his 23 January 2010 (Praia): conditions of confinement. Nevertheless, Na 18-21 January 2010 (Bissau): Cape Verde received a US$100,000 donation Tchuto may be allowed to leave the country on The Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Configura- from the People’s Republic of China to help health issue grounds. tion of the Peacebuilding Commission visited prevent the return of the dengue epidemic. Guinea-Bissau to discuss with several local 10 January 2010 (Bissau): actors the Commission’s activities for 2010, as 26 January 2010 (Brussels): Secretary of State for Fisheries Mário Sami well as to monitor peace building efforts in the Foreign Minister José Brito met with EU diplo- stated that Guinea-Bissau’s waters must be country. matic officials to review the existing EU-Cape better managed, as the fisheries sector is of Verde partnership. paramount importance to the country’s econ- 20 January 2010 (Bissau): omy. He also urged the development of a local Preparation for the Municipal Elections started 29 January 2010 (Lisbon): private fisheries sector, instead of solely rely- in Guinea-Bissau. Although no date has been Cape Verde’s Finance Minister, Cristina Du- ing on foreign agreements. set, the National Elections Committee’s Presi- arte, travelled to Portugal to sign a credit line dent, António Sedja Mam, praised Portugal’s of €200 million for the construction of social 11 January 2010 (Bissau): cooperation in supporting legal reforms and lo- housing with her Portuguese counterpart, Fer- Speaking in the National Parliament, both Pres- gistical support, while calling for other partners nando Teixeira dos Santos. ident Malam Bacai Sanhá and Prime Minister to get involved. Carlos Gomes Júnior claimed that 2010 would 29 January 2010 (Praia): see economic recovery and the consolidation of 21 January 2010 (Bissau): In the wake of his meeting with EU officials, institutional reforms in the country. American Ambassador Márcia Bernicap signed IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 16

a deal with Guinea-Bissau’s Foreign Ministry 5 January 2010 (Maputo): the northern Nampula province, announced envisaging cooperation between the countries Defying their leadership’s announced boycott that the party will take disciplinary action in judicial affairs. The U.S. will send in February in protest against the results of the 28 October against 16 of its members of Parliament who a Justice Department official to advise the gov- general and provincial elections, nine members defied party leader AfonsoD hlakama’s order to ernment on anti-drug trafficking policies. of Renamo took their seats in the newly elected boycott the Parliament swearing in ceremony provincial assemblies, although the majority of in Maputo. 25-27 January 2010 (Bissau): the Renamo provincial deputies still refuse to An African Development Bank delegation take their respective seats. 14 January 2010 (Maputo): headed by the Bank’s West Africa Operations President Armando Guebuza was sworn in for director, Frank Perrault, visited Bissau to as- 7 January 2010 (Maputo): a second five year term. In his speech to leg- sess projects financed by the Bank, such as the Minister of External Affairs and Cooperation, islators, Guebuza pledged to work with them fisheries harbor and the central hospital. Oldemiro Baloi, in his capacity as the Chair of and called for improvements to the country’s the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Secu- electoral laws. 27 January 2010 (Paris): rity, hosted a meeting of the SADC Political and President Malam Bacai Sanhá returned to Paris Diplomatic Committee meant to prepare for the 14 January 2010 (Maputo): where he underwent medical exams to deter- next African Union summit in Addis Ababa and After his inauguration ceremony, President mine his illness. to debate the situations in Madagascar, Zimba- Armando Guebuza met with Chinese Minister bwe and the DRC. of Commerce Chen Deming. Both pledged to 28 January 2010 (Bissau): promote bilateral ties and further enhance the Although an agreement was signed between 8 January 2010 (Maputo): friendly cooperation between the two coun- the UN and the Government for the release The Mozambican government decided to send tries. A new loan, worth US$14,7 million, was of Bubo Na Tchuto, the former Navy Chief of humanitarian assistance to Malawi in solidar- later agreed to by the Chinese representative Staff’s situation remains unclear, as it seems ity with the victims of a series of earthquakes and Mozambican Finance Minister Manuel he remains in the UN offices. However, neither that shook the Malawian district of Karonga in Chang. side confirms the situation. December. 14 January 2010 (Maputo): 29 January 2010 (Madina de Baixo): 11 January 2010 (Maputo): SADC leaders met with the Presidents of the The Armed Forces arrested four suspects Frelimo’s Verónica Macamo was elected unop- DRC, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and of drug trafficking in the southern region of posed as chairperson/speaker of the country’s Zambia, all urging a return to dialogue in the Guinea-Bissau. Among them, two had German newly elected Parliament. The opening of the ongoing political crisis in Madagascar and citizenship. Another suspect was an Interior Parliament was boycotted by 35 of the 51 Re- praising the efforts to revive a stumbling unity Ministry official. namo deputies in protest of the alleged election government in Zimbabwe. fraud. 31 January 2010 (Addis-Ababa): 16 January 2010 (Maputo): Malam Bacai Sanhá participated in the six- 11 January 2010 (London): President Armando Guebuza appointed former teenth session of the Executive Council of the The 2009 Mo Ibrahim Foundation Index of Afri- Education Minister Aires Ali as Prime Minister African Union. The president signaled his wor- can Governance was released. Measuring the in his new government. Although the great ma- ries about internal conflicts in Guinea-Bissau’s delivery of public goods and services to citizens jority of ministers who served in the previous neighbors. by government and non-state actors, Mozam- term were reappointed, former Prime Minister bique was ranked 26nd out of 53 countries. Luísa Diogo was excluded.

11-13 January 2010 (Maputo): 20 January 2010 (Maputo): Germany’s Federal Minister of Economic Co- A further four parliamentary deputies from operation and Development, Dirk Niebel, Renamo took their seats in defiance of Afonso headed a delegation of about 60 members, on Dhlakama, who insisted on boycotting the new a two day visit to assess the current state of parliament because of alleged fraud in the Mozambique bilateral cooperation and of projects financed elections. by his government. Niebel announced that 4 January 2010 (Maputo): Germany may reduce its support for the Mo- 21 January 2010 (Maputo): Afonso Dhlakama, leader of Mozambique’s zambican state budget, with the final decision Another nine Renamo deputies ignored the main opposition party, Renamo, proposed ne- belonging to the German Parliament in May. calls to boycott the newly elected Parliament gotiations between himself and President Ar- Lack of progress in political reforms is cited as and took their respective seats, totaling 39 of mando Guebuza to avoid the demonstrations the main reason. the opposition’s 51 elected members. which he proposed to call in protest of the re- sults of the 28 October general elections, which 13 January 2010 (Maputo): 26 January 2010 (Maputo): were validated by the Constitutional Court. Arnaldo Chalaua, Renamo’s spokesperson in Finnish Ambassador Kari Alanko, acting as the IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 17

president of the G19 (the 19 donor countries 18 January 2010 (Brussels): São Tomé that directly fund Mozambique’s State Budget), João Gomes Cravinho attended an extraordi- met with Prime Minister Aires Ali to review the nary meeting of the EU Development officials, G19-Mozambique partnership. to assess the reconstruction process in Haiti. and Príncipe

28 January 2010 (Maputo): 19 January 2010 (Budapest): 7 January 2010 (São Tomé): The governor of the Bank of Mozambique, Er- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Coop- São Tomé’s President, Fradique de Menezes, nesto Gove, called on the country’s government eration, João Gomes Cravinho, travelled to Buda- vetoed the presence of two ministers from his to be prudent in its financial management. pest to meet with Hungarian officials, to discuss own MDFM-PL party in the cabinet of Prime bilateral ties, the EU-Africa relations and the Minister Rafael Branco after they refused to forthcoming Hungarian EU presidency in 2011. comply with the party’s directions to leave the current government. 20 January 2010 (Lisbon): The International Monetary Fund released a 7 January 2010 (São Tomé): new report, warning Portugal of the critical im- President Fradique de Menezes pardoned 63 portance of getting its public finances in order, people, the largest number ever to benefit Portugal as fears over rising debt levels in the eurozone from the traditional end of year amnesty. In- hit markets. Fiscal consolidation is considered cluded was opposition leader Arlécio Costa, 3 January 2010 (Lisbon): critical to prevent further deterioration and head of the Christian Democratic Front, in jail Foreign Minister Luís Amado revealed the main preserve hard-won credibility. since February 2009, following an attempted priorities for Portuguese foreign policy in the coup d’état. coming years, with a clear intent to focus on 24 January 2010 (Brussels): the Washington-Brasília-Luanda axis. He also Foreign Affairs Minister Luís Amado travelled 8 January 2010 (São Tomé): announced that further reinforcement of the to Brussels where he attended the EU General The new government of Prime Minister Rafael Portuguese contingent in Afghanistan was be- Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Coun- Branco was inaugurated. ing considered. cil, covering such issues as the Spanish presi- dency presentation, the situation in Haiti and 11 January 2010 (London): 4 January 2010 (Lisbon): Somalia. The 2009 Mo Ibrahim Foundation Index of Af- Luís Amado presided over the Diplomatic Sem- rican Governance was released. Measuring inar, the annual gathering of all Portuguese 26 January 2010 (Addis Ababa): the delivery of public goods and services to ambassadors spread around the world, which Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Coop- citizens by government and non-state actors, this year included the presence of Spanish For- eration João Gomes Cravinho met with Ethio- São-Tomé and Príncipe was ranked 10th out of eign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos. pian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to discuss 53 countries. ways to enhance bilateral relations. EU-Africa 7 January 2010 (Paris): cooperation, Sudan, Somalia and support for 14 January 2010 (São Tomé): Portuguese Prime Minister José Socrates the Portuguese candidacy to a non-permanent President Fradique de Menezes announced travelled to Paris, where he participated in the seat in the UN Security Council were also that he would renounce his presidency of the symposium “New World, New Capitalism”, fol- among the issues covered. MDFM-PL. lowed by a meeting with French President Ni- colas Sarkozy. 28 January 2010 (London): 14 January 2010 (São Tomé): Foreign Affairs Minister Luís Amado attended Japanese Ambassador Motoi Kato and Foreign 9 January 2010 (Lisbon): the Afghanistan London Conference, designed Minister Carlos Tiny signed an agreement for a Portuguese police detained two suspected to review the security and development situa- Japanese donation of over €1,9 million in food aid. members of the Basque separatist group ETA tion in the country. in northeast Portugal along the Spanish border. Spanish authorities quickly requested swift ex- 30 January 2010 (Lisboa): tradition procedures. Portugal has approved the setting up of a mis- sion to prepare and organize the summit of 13 January 2010 (Lisbon): NATO Heads of State and Government sched- Luís Amado sent his condolences to his Haitian uled for November in Lisbon. counterpart, Marie Michele Rey, following the Timor Leste earthquake that struck the Caribbean nation. 30 January – 1 February 2010 (Addis Ababa): 5 January 2010 (Díli): 14 January 2010 (Maputo): Foreign Affairs Minister Luís Amado represent- Ameerah Haq, a humanitarian official from Ban- Luís Amado attended Mozambican President ed Portugal as an observer country at the 14th gladesh with over three decades of experience Armando Guebuzas’s inauguration. African Union Summit, in Ethiopia. with the United Nations, arrived in Timor Leste to IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 18

take up her post as the UN Secretary-General’s Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) processing plant signed a cooperation agreement with Timor Les- new Special Representative to the country. in Darwin or to a floating LNG plant, were the te’s Human Rights and Justice Ombudsman to main concerns. find missing persons from the post-referendum 13 January 2010 (Díli): riots in 1999. Secretary of State Agio Pereira released a 20 January 2010 (Kuala Lumpur): statement saying the Timorese government Malaysian Petronas has been invited by Timor 28 January 2010 (Díli): had rejected Woodside’s plan to develop the Leste’s government to invest in the develop- President José Ramos-Horta asked Prime offshore Sunrise field without building an on- ment of the Greater Sunrise gas field. Minister Xanana Gusmão to reshuffle the exist- shore plant to liquefy gas. Doubts about the ing coalition government of the Alliance of the commercial viability of Woodside’s proposal 26 January 2010 (Jakarta): Parliamentary Majority, amid ongoing allega- to pipe gas from the field to either an existing Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission tions of corruption.

Reading List

Andrea Molnar, Timor Leste: Politics, History, and Culture (Routledge, 2010).

Editor | Paulo Gorjão

Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) Rua Vitorino Nemésio, 5 - 1750-306 Lisboa PORTUGAL http://www.ipris.org email: [email protected]

IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin is a publication of IPRIS. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of IPRIS.