UNHCR POSITION on RETURNS to MALI – Update II
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POSITION ON RETURNS TO MALI – UPDATE II UNHCR POSITION ON RETURNS TO MALI – Update II July 2019 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................. 1 Political Developments ............................................................................................................................ 1 Security Situation in Mali ......................................................................................................................... 2 Human Rights Situation .......................................................................................................................... 4 Humanitarian Situation ............................................................................................................................ 5 Refugees and Internal Displacement ...................................................................................................... 6 International Protection Needs and Non-Return Advisory ...................................................................... 7 Voluntary Returns ................................................................................................................................... 7 Introduction 1. This position supersedes and replaces UNHCR’s Position on Returns to Mali – Update I from January 2014.1 Despite concerted multilateral engagement and a 2015 peace agreement, the north and centre of Mali continue to be affected by conflict.2 Due to persistent violence, intercommunity-clashes, human rights violations and a deteriorating humanitarian situation, increasing numbers of Malians have fled abroad or have become internally displaced since the publication of UNHCR’s 2014 position.3 Political Developments 2. On 15 May 2015, the Government of Mali signed the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali with the “Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad” (CMA), an alliance of armed groups, and with the Platform, a loose coalition of pro-government militias.4 The Agreement aimed to create a roadmap to establish a governance system that would take into account local characteristics and foster national unity while respecting territorial integrity and cultural diversity.5 In October 2018 the UN and the government signed the Pact for Peace, which “reaffirms the Government’s commitment to the full implementation” of the Agreement.6 In an annex to the Pact the armed groups that are signatories to the Agreement equally stated their full adherence to the Pact.7 However, little progress has been achieved in implementing the peace agreement, and the 2018 reaffirmation of the 2015 peace agreement has not succeeded in addressing the ongoing violence throughout the country.8 Some 1 UNHCR, Position on Returns to Mali – Update I, January 2014, www.refworld.org/docid/52cc405a4.html. 2 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, 28 December 2018, https://undocs.org/en/S/2018/1174. 3 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019, 10 May 2019, www.internal- displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2019-IDMC-GRID.pdf, pp. 2, 45. 4 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 22 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 31 January 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1802709-1.pdf. 5 UN Security Council, Identical Letters Dated 19 May 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Mali to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, 22 May 2015, S/2015/364, https://undocs.org/S/2015/364, and UN Security Council, Letter Dated 20 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 21 August 2015, S/2015/364/Add.1, https://undocs.org/en/S/2015/364/Add.1. 6 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, 28 December 2018, https://undocs.org/en/S/2018/1174, para. 5. 7 Ibid. 8 UN General Assembly, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Mali, 21 January 2019, A/HRC/40/77, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/G1901202.pdf. 1 POSITION ON RETURNS TO MALI – UPDATE II armed groups that are affiliated with either the CMA or the Platform have failed to respect the peace agreement and hindered its implementation.9 Additionally, certain currently active armed Islamist extremist groups, which have been linked to Al-Qaida and Islamic State (IS), were not parties to the 2015 peace agreement and are not compliant with its terms.10 3. On 28 June 2018, the Security Council unanimously extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was first established in 2013,11 for an additional year, until the end of June 2019.12 4. Presidential elections took place in July and August 2018. The incumbent president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, was re-elected for a second term.13 UNHCR supported Malian refugees’ right to cast their vote out-of-country. The parliamentary elections were postponed in October 2018 and again in April 2019, with the government deciding in June 2019 to extend the current parliament’s mandate until May 2020, citing the current “political and security situation.”14 In April 2019 the Prime Minister and his cabinet resigned in response to a public outcry following the massacre of 160 Fulani villagers (see also para. 10 below).15 The President appointed the finance minister, Boubou Cissé, as prime minister; Cissé formed a cabinet in early May 2019.16 Security Situation in Mali 5. The security and humanitarian situation in Mali has not fully stabilized and has even deteriorated significantly in some respects in recent years.17 In particular, ongoing conflicts have continued in the North, while spreading to central Mali and the surrounding countries.18 Violence affecting Mali includes intercommunity violence, sporadic violence by armed groups who were party to the peace agreement, and escalating conflict caused by Islamist extremist armed groups.19 On 31 October 2018, the Government extended the state of emergency first declared in November 2015 for a further year.20 In 9 “Despite the 2015 peace accord, elements within the platform—including the Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-defense Group (GATIA), the Arab Movement for Azawad-Platform (MAA-PF), and the Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Forces and Movements (CMFPR)—and elements in the CMA—including the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), and the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)—committed serious human rights abuses….” US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 – Mali, 13 March 2019, www.ecoi.net/en/document/2004170.html. 10 US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 – Mali, 13 March 2019, www.ecoi.net/en/document/2004170.html. The Secretary General noted in March 2019 that ex-combatants from “signatory armed groups” and “non-signatory but compliant armed movements” had begun to demobilize, yet the security situation “…in northern Mali remained complex, while it continued to deteriorate in the Centre, and in Koulikoro region in the West.” UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, 26 March 2019, https://undocs.org/S/2019/262. See also, International Crisis Group, "Speaking with the “Bad Guys”: Toward Dialogue with Central Mali’s Jihadists, 28 May 2019, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/276-speaking-with-the-bad-guys%20(1).pdf. 11 UN Security Council, Resolution 2100 (2013), 25 April 2013, S/RES/2100, https://undocs.org/S/RES/2100(2013). 12 UN Security Council, Resolution 2423 (2018), 24 June 2018, S/RES/2423, www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/s_res_2423.pdf. 13 UN News Service, UN Security Council Welcomes Results of Mali's Presidential Elections, 24 August 2018, www.refworld.org/docid/5bc4952f2e.html. 14 Bloomberg, Mali Extends Parliament's Mandate as Legislative Vote Delayed, 8 June 2019, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-08/mali- extends-parliament-s-mandate-as-legislative-vote-delayed. See also RFI Afrique, Mali: Le mandat des députés prolongé jusqu’en mai 2020, 28 June 2019, www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190628-mali-le-mandat-deputes-prolonge-jusqu-mai-2020; and Deutsche Welle, Mali: Les vraies raisons du report des législatives, 16 October 2018, www.dw.com/fr/mali-les-vraies-raisons-du-report-des-l%C3%A9gislatives/a-45913480. 15 Al-Jazeera, UN to Probe 'Horrific' Mali Attacks as Death Toll Jumps to 160, 26 March 2019, www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/united-nations- investigate-horrific-massacre-mali-190326135707656.html. 16 Gulf Times, Mali Gets New Government after Protests, 6 May 2019, www.gulf-times.com/story/630806/Mali-gets-new-government-after-protests; Deutsche Welle, Mali Names New Prime Minister after Ethnic Massacre, 22 April 2019, www.dw.com/en/mali-names-new-prime-minister-after- ethnic-massacre/a-48438158. 17 UN General Assembly, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Mali, 21 January 2019, A/HRC/40/77, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/G1901202.pdf. 18 The Secretary-General stated in his report to the Security Council in December 2018 that the security situation “remained of grave