University at Albany, State University of New York Scholars Archive Philosophy Faculty Scholarship Philosophy 6-2010 Inductions, red herrings, and the best explanation for the mixed record of science P.D. Magnus University at Albany, State University of New York,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/cas_philosophy_scholar Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons Recommended Citation Magnus, P.D., "Inductions, red herrings, and the best explanation for the mixed record of science" (2010). Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 49. https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/cas_philosophy_scholar/49 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Inductions, red herrings, and the best explanation for the mixed record of science P.D. Magnus∗ December 22, 2009 This is the author's final draft of a paper forthcoming The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. e-mail: pmagnus(at)fecundity.com web: http://www.fecundity.com/job Abstract Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to sci- entific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic In- duction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra Anjan Chakravartty's suggestion that the NI is a \red herring", I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls short, and so it might figure in the most coherent account of scientific practice.