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The China Coast Guard: A New Maritime Power?

Chin-Hao Huang1 (corresponding author) [email protected]

Yale-NUS College 16 College Ave West Singapore 138527 Singapore

June 2017

1 Chin-Hao Huang is assistant professor of political science at Yale-NUS College. He is the recipient of the 2017-2018 Lee Kong Chian National University of Singapore-Stanford University Distinguished Fellowship on Contemporary Southeast Asia. His research focuses on the international relations of East Asia. He is author of the book Power, Restraint, and China’s Rise (forthcoming) and has published in The China Quarterly, The China Journal, International Peacekeeping, and in edited volumes through Oxford University Press and Routledge, among others. He received the American Political Science Association (APSA) Foreign Policy Section Best Paper Award (2014) and has testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on China’s foreign affairs. 2 Avery Simmons is a research assistant in the Global Affairs program at Yale-NUS College. ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE***

The China Coast Guard: A New Maritime Power?

Abstract The empirical focus on China’s coast guard leads to some fairly thought-provoking conclusions, and ones that run counter to the conventional wisdom about China’s increasing aggressiveness in the maritime domain. If territorial integrity, access to sea lanes, and power projection are at stake in the East and South China Seas, China’s decision to forego military deterrence as a first resort is intrinsically a puzzling and costly signal. Drawing from primary and secondary open-sources, the paper presents a newly assembled aggregate data of the coast guard’s deployment and enforcement activities in both the East and South China Seas. The emergent pattern of behavior in coast guard activities reflects a different kind of strategic deterrence against other claimant states, even as the use of force and costly military deployments are restrained to assert China’s territorial claims.

The tracking and analysis of the activities further shows that while the coast guard’s strength emanates from its non-military character, therein lies an inherent bureaucratic constraint as well. On the few occasions where naval and paramilitary forces were involved or supersede coast guard patrols, tensions in both the East and South China Seas ratchet up. The extent to which the coast guard is empowered to carry out its responsibilities thus remains in flux. In fact, a weakened civilian coast guard overshadowed by an increasingly active maritime militia that is armed and haphazardly trained could prove to be the more destabilizing complication to regional security.

Keywords Chinese Coast Guard; East China Sea; South China Sea

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Introduction In August 2016, a flotilla of 230 armed Chinese fishing vessels sailed into the waters surrounding the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Cutters from the China Coast Guard (CCG) accompanied the fishing militia. Even though China undoubtedly has the capacity to send naval assets into the disputed waters, battleships from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) were strikingly missing from the front lines of the scene. If power projection, territorial integrity, access to sea lanes and resources are at stake, China’s decision to forego military deployment as a first resort is intrinsically a puzzling signal. This paper examines how and why the coast guard has been deployed with increasing frequency in China’s ongoing maritime disputes in the East and Chin. As a civilian agency, the CCG’s functional activities include border patrols and maritime law enforcement to assert China’s territorial claims in the contested waters. A careful documentation of open-source reports of CCG activities since its formation in 2013 illuminates established patterns in the CCG’s encounters in the East and South China Seas and the distinct ways it operates with (and from) the maritime militia and PLAN. The preliminary data and results reveal that the CCG has emerged as an effective and strategic deterrence against rival claimant states. The increasing deployment of the CCG shifts the onus to other claimant states to either double down or retreat from confronting a civilian law enforcement agency, even as the use of force and costly military deployments are restrained to assert China’s territorial claims. The paper begins by reviewing the purpose and origins of the CCG, underscoring the rationale for a consolidated civilian agency to take the helms of China’s maritime policy. It examines how the coast guard fits into China’s overall maritime bureaucracy, its leadership and decision-making structure, and the occasional tension with paramilitary forces. The paper then takes a closer look at the CCG activities, categorizing its functions and activities in the East and South China Seas from July 2013 to May 2017 and discerning patterns across the ongoing maritime disputes through extensive open-source data and case studies. Lastly, the paper addresses the implications of the CCG’s increasing activism in the maritime domain, as well as the challenges and opportunities for managing maritime security in the region.

A New Maritime Authority Prior to the creation of the China Coast Guard, China’s maritime presence was fractured amongst multiple agencies with overlapping responsibilities. Ill-coordinated and ineffective as a maritime law enforcement, these agencies were labeled the ‘Nine Dragons,’

2 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** referencing the traditional Chinese myth of nine dragons stirring up the sea.3 Conflicting agendas among the wide array of agencies added to the discord. There was no overarching body to mediate between fishing, environmental protection, or maritime tourism interests, nor was there internal cohesion in law enforcement, since border control, customs, illegal fishing, and search and rescue operations were handled by different government ministries. With the South China Sea emerging as a hot-button issue, a strong and successful showing in a territorial dispute could bring attention to an agency or make the career of ambitious government officials. Provincial governors with control over local maritime paramilitary forces could activate and deploy them in the contested waters. As Linda Jakobson puts it, ‘under the auspices of ‘safeguarding rights’ and ‘maritime consciousness’, one can justify almost anything.’4 With different agencies angling and competing for power and resources, executing a coordinated policy on the maritime disputes was nearly impossible. Then-Director of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) Liu Cigui published an article emphasizing the necessity of a streamlined maritime law enforcement body in relation to China’s maritime goals. Liu indicated the priorities and criteria for a maritime power: ‘[One needs to] establish maritime administration and maritime law enforcement systems that are authoritative and highly efficient, have fairly concentrated functions, and have uniform responsibilities; that can perform overall planning for both internally oriented administrative law enforcement and externally oriented rights protection law enforcement; and that can provide organizational support for efforts to build China into a maritime power.’5 Likewise, China’s 2012 Defense White Paper reflected this new sense of urgency, indicating that it was ‘an essential national development strategy to exploit, utilize and protect the seas and oceans, and build China into a maritime power.’6 Michael McDevitt identifies maritime power as military, political, and economic influence exerted through the ability to use the sea, with an equal emphasis placed on the naval and civilian dimensions. As such, maritime power

3 Stirring up the South China Sea (I), report no. 223, Asia Report, International Crisis Group: Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide (Brussels, 2012), 8. Note: The “nine dragons” included the PLA Navy, Marine Safety Administration, Search and Rescue Centre, China Marine Surveillance, Environmental Protection Agency, the Maritime Police and Border Police (both under the Ministry of Public Security), Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (Ministry of Agriculture), and Customs Law Enforcement (General Administration of Customs). 4 Linda Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, report (Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014), 33. 5 Liu Cigui, “Some Considerations on Building China into a Maritime Power” (Guanyu Jianshe Haiyang Qiangguo De Ruogan Sikao), State Oceanic Administration Website, 26 November 2012. Available at: http://www.soa.gov.cn/xw/ldhd/lyx/201212/t20121204_19016.html. 6 Kimberly Hsu, Craig Murray, and Matt Wild, “China’s 2012 Defense White Paper: The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” Rep. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, 3 May 2013, Web, Accessed 28 June 2016.

3 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** encompasses not only ‘sea-based military capabilities’ but also ‘civilian capabilities such as a coast guard, port infrastructure, merchant shipping, fishing, and shipbuilding.’7 Possessing maritime power necessarily implies the capability to protect China’s maritime rights and interests, as the legitimacy of its presence on the seas draws from China’s ability to ‘legally regulate and effectively control ocean areas under its claimed jurisdiction.’8 A secure maritime power ensures safe transit of cargo and persons, protects its maritime borders, rescues distressed ships, and maintains the environmental sustainability of its seas. 9 To achieve these goals, China needed a strong, centralized, and legitimate maritime law enforcement force—in short, a well-functioning coast guard domain. In 2013, the State Council announced the government’s plan to consolidate the ‘nine dragons’ into the China Coast Guard (中国海警) (CCG), a single body housed under the newly reorganized State Oceanic Administration (海洋局) (SOA) under the leadership of Liu Cigui. The State Council bluntly explained the previous structural inadequacies were largely due to ‘repetitive instructions issued by existing maritime law enforcement forces, repeated occurrences of overlapping construction projects by the different bodies, and the consequent ineffective and low-capacity maritime law enforcement’ (‘现行海上执法力量分散，重复检查、重复建设问题突出，执法效能不高，维权能力不足’) .10 More pointedly, the unification under the CCG would serve to ‘strengthen the protection and rational utilization of marine resources, as well as to protect national maritime rights and interests’11 (emphasis added). As noted earlier, securing China’s maritime rights and interests are part and parcel to China’s ambition to become a maritime power, and the formation of the coast guard is a pivotal step in that direction. Under the new structure, the CCG combines the functions of the former Maritime Police, China Maritime Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and Anti-Smuggling/Customs Enforcement.12 The State Oceanic Administration (SOA) also houses the Maritime Safety Administration (which is also under the Ministry of Transportation and Communication) and various maritime environmental protection

7 Michael McDevitt, Thomas Bickford, Alan Burns, Ryan Martinson, Andrew S. Erickson, Conor M. Kennedy, Dennis J. Blasko, and Zhang Hongzhou. “Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream.” Publication. Strategic Studies Division, CNA. 2016, 2. 8 McDevitt, “Becoming a Great….,” 3. 9 McDevitt, “Becoming a Great….,” 3. 10 Gu Yue, ed. “Ma Kai: State Oceanic Administration, on Behalf of the China Coast Guard, Carries Out Maritime Law Enforcement (马凯:国家海洋局以中国海警局名义开展海上维权执法).” China.com.cn (中国网), 10 Mar. 2013, Web, accessed 23 June 2016. Available at: http://news.china.com.cn/2013lianghui/2013- 03/10/content_28192747.htm . 11 Gu, “Ma Kai: State Oceanic Administration.” 12 John Pike, ed. “Military,” China Coast Guard / State Oceanic Administration, Globalsecurity.org, 30 Dec. 2015, Web, accessed 23 June 2016.

4 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** agencies.13 The combined strength of China’s new maritime agency now boasts over 16,000 coastguard officers, with three branches that cover jurisdictions over the North, East, and South China Seas.14

Civilian-Military Administrative Structure

Distinct from the PLA, which is primarily responsible for China’s defense from external threats, the CCG is under the dual command of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), with law enforcement and security as the coast guard’s core mission.15 The MLR is referred to as the leading administrative agency of the CCG, while the MPS provides both ‘advisement’ and ‘operational guidance.’16 This dual management, however, has raised concerns about possible unresolved structural inefficiencies and power dynamics between the two ministries—and civil-military relations more broadly—over actual administrative and operational control of the CCG.17 For instance (see Figure 1), under the MLR, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) oversees the Maritime Police Command Center (中国海警指挥中心), which in turn serves as the command center of the CCG. A commentary in Southern Weekend in October 2014 states that each individual cutter in the CCG receives its orders directly from this centralized command center. According to a former Fisheries Law Enforcement officer, this greatly improves efficiency, as orders must be acted upon immediately.18

[Figure 1 here]

However, other sources point to the MPS as having greater operational control of the CCG.19 Prior to the formation of the CCG, the Maritime Police were under the command of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), with close ties to MPS. Observers of the CCG’s development opine that remnants of the former decision-making and operational structure

13 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, 16. 14 “Armed Police Reloading New Branch: China Coast Guard Implements an Active System, under the Dual Leadership of the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Land (武警再填新警种：警局实行现役制，由公安部和国土部双重领导，以国土部领导为主),” Tianya, 28 July 2013, Web, accessed 23 June 2016. Available at: http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-20-608102-1.shtml. 15 “Armed Police Reloading New Branch…” 16 Gu, “Ma Kai: State Oceanic Administration.” 17 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, 1. 18 “After a year, the China Coast Guard No Longer to Go It Alone (中国海警局组建一年察执行任务不再单打独斗了).” Southern Weekend, 9 Oct 2014. Available at: http://www.infzm.com/content/104611. 19 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, 19.

5 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** could still influence the way the CCG operates.20 The Southern Weekend further acknowledged that ‘Personnel changes and function adjustments will gradually clarify what is meant by ‘China Coast Guard will receive operational guidance from the Ministry of Public Security.’ (‘人事变动和职能调整，都逐步将’中国海警局接受公安部业务指导’清晰化.’)21 This ongoing civil-military tussle is further reflected in the leadership personnel. The SOA is run by a Director who concurrently holds the position of the Political Commissar of the CCG.22 Wang Hong (王宏), a career Party bureaucrat who has been working in the SOA since 1985, was appointed director in 2015 (see Figure 2 below).23 Interestingly, Meng Hongwei (孟宏伟), who has served as Director of the CCG and Deputy Director of the SOA since the 2013 restructuring, also holds the influential and senior role of a Vice Minister in the Ministry of Public Security, a post he has held since 2004.24 At the CCG’s formation in 2013, Meng made it clear who would be in charge of the CCG by demanding a larger office than former SOA Director Liu Cigui.25 With Meng’s extensive MPS experience, he is seen as a more experienced bureaucrat than SOA Director Wang Hong. While the MPS role is no clearer to external observers, it remains to be seen how, when, and the degree to which the MPS ‘operational guidance’ would influence or change the nature of the CCG law enforcement activities.

[Figure 2 here]

New Cutters on the Block The China Coast Guard is larger in both size and numbers compared to its regional counterparts. As a new maritime agency, many CCG vessels are re-outfitted vessels from other agencies, including former China Maritime Surveillance ships, retired PLA Navy vessels, and commercial boats. 26 But the CCG also continues to build new ships. In 2015, the

20 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, 17. 21 Shi Xiaohan, 师小涵. “中国海警局诞生 “不只是统一服装的问题” [The China Coast Guard Is Born: It’s Not Just a Question of Uniforms] Southern Weekend, 4 Apr. 2013, Web, accessed 28 June 2016. Accesible at: http://www.infzm.com/content/89391. 22 “Armed Police Reloading New Branch.” 23 “Wang Hong.” China Vitae. Web. Accessed 23 June 2016. 24 “Meng Hongwei.” China Vitae, Web, accessed 23 June 2016. 25 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, 18. 26 “China’s New Fishing Regulations Seek to Justify and Consolidate Control in the South China Sea.” US- China Economic and Security Review Commission. United States Coast Guard.

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CCG added 30 new ocean-going vessels and 100 smaller patrol boats,27 and in January 2016, the CCG began refitting three former PLA Navy Jiangwei-class guided missile frigates, two Luda-class guided missile destroyers, which will be completed by end of 2016.28 By 2020, the CCG plans to add ships with capability to embark helicopters.29 In total, the CCG currently has 205 cutters, 95 of which have a displacement of more than 1,000 LT.30 Most notably, the release of the CCG’s Haijing 2901 and Haijing 3901 in May 2015 and January 2016 respectively represents the largest coast guard ships in the world.31 It has been estimated that by 2020, the CCG will have ‘greater tonnage in ships than the coast guards of the United States and Japan combined.’32 By way of comparison, the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) has about half the tonnage of the CCG. The JCG has 13,422 coast guard officers,33 and of the 78 JCG ships, 53 are over 1,000 LT – considered ‘large boats’ – and 25 are between 500-1,000 LT – considered ‘small boats.34 Japan possesses the second-largest class of coast guard ships-- its pair of 6,500 LT Shikishima PLH patrol vessels, which are equipped with helicopter landing pads. 35 Southeast Asian coast guards, by contrast, are far smaller than both the CCG and the JCG (see Figure 3 below). The Vietnam Coast Guard has five large boats and 50 small boats while the Indonesia Coast Guard has three large boats and five small boats. The Malaysia Coast Guard has two large boats, whereas the Philippines Coast Guard’s capacity only allows for four small boats. To make a final comparison, CCG ships are far larger than the United States Coast Guard (USCG) vessels. The USCG has 238 cutters, but only 38 of the USCG’s ships qualify

27 “China’s New Fishing Regulations Seek to Justify and Consolidate Control in the South China Sea.” 28 “More Chinese Ships to Patrol Disputed Waters near Japan – Watchdog,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, BBC World Monitoring, 4 Jan. 2016, Web, 23 June 2016. 29 John Pike, ed., “Military,” China Coast Guard / State Oceanic Administration, Globalsecurity.org, 30 Dec. 2015, Web, accessed 23 June 2016. 30 “Coastguard Code in Choppy Waters,” South China Morning Post, US Office of Naval Intelligence, 8 May 2016, Web, accessed 26 June 2016. 31 “Are Maritime Law Enforcement Forces Destabilizing Asia?” China Power, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Sept. 2016. Web. Accessed 15 Sept. 2016. 32 Todd Crowell, “A Coast Guard Arms Race,” RealClearDefense, 23 May 2016, Web, accessed 30 June 2016. 33 William Colton, “The Japan Coast Guard: Resourcing and Responsibility | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 01 Apr. 2015, Web, accessed 26 June 2016. 34 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKenzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, The Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defence Council, Nov. 2006, Web, accessed 28 June 2016. 35 “Shikishima Class Patrol Vessels, Japan,” Homeland Security Technology, Kable Intelligence Limited, Web, accessed 26 June 2016. Available at: http://www.homelandsecurity-technology.com/projects/shikishima-class- patrol-vessels/ .

7 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** as ‘large boats,’ in comparison to China’s 95.36 Many USCG ships are too small to even qualify as small boats, having a displacement far less than 500 LT. In a telling contrast, USCG’s largest non-polar cutter, the National Security Cutter, is 4,306 LT—less than half the size of one of China’s ‘monster’ ships.37 Unlike the Japanese and Southeast Asian coast guards, the USCG has yet to come into direct contact with the CCG while on regular and routine patrol missions. Unlike the CCG, however, the USCG possesses 211 aircraft in its inventory dedicated for coast guard use.38 This lack of aviation assets is a major gap between the otherwise formidable CCG and other comparable coast guards patrolling the Pacific Ocean.39 The size of the CCG is matched by the size of its budget. A forthcoming article in the Naval War College Review estimates that China has averaged an annual coast guard budget of $1.74 billion over the past five years. In the same time frame, Japan has spent $1.5 billion per year, and the average yearly budget of Vietnam and the Philippines is between $100 million and $200 million.40 USCG, however, has an annual budget of approximately $10 billion each year for the last three years that dwarfs all regional coast guards, including the CCG.41

[Figure 3 here]

Most CCG vessels are lightly armed with high-pressure water hoses and machine guns and are not atypical for comparable regional coast guard vessels (see Figure 4 below).42 The former are also referred to as ‘water cannons,’ which can produce jets of seawater up to 100 meters,43 and their usage against Southeast Asian fishing vessels is common not only for the CCG, but also for the Japanese Coast Guard.44 The CCG’s most heavily armed ships are

36 “Aircraft, Boats, and Cutters: Cutters,” USCG: About Us, United States Department of Homeland Security,Web, accessed 26 June 2016. 37 “Aircraft, Boats, and Cutters: Cutters.” 38 “Aircraft, Boats, and Cutters: Cutters.” 39 McDevitt, “Becoming a Great...”, 123. 40 “Are Maritime Law Enforcement Forces Destabilizing Asia?” 41 United States of America. United States Coast Guard. Department of Homeland Security. Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional Justification. Accessed November 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.uscg.mil/budget/docs/USCG_FY2017_Congressional_Justification.pdf. 42 Jane Perlez, “Chinese, With Revamped Force, Make Presence Known in East China Sea,” The New York Times, 28 July 2013, Web, accessed 26 June 2016. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/world/asia/chinese-with-revamped-force-make-presence-known-in-east- china-sea.html. 43 McDevitt, “Becoming a Great...”, 58. 44 Perlez, “Chinese, With Revamped Force, Make Presence Known in East China Sea.”

8 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** its pair of ‘monster’ ships, completed in 2015, which are equipped with four cannons each; these Type 76A, 37 mm cannons launch shrapnel shells and armor-piercing ammunition, which can be used for anti-aircraft or close-range fire.45 The CCG’s deployment of its more sophisticated Haijing 31239 and Haijing 31241 in late 2015 have similar capabilities as the JCG and USCG. Japan’s largest cutters, for example, are each armed with a pair of 35mm twin Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannons and two 20 mm machine guns,46 and the USCG’s National Security Cutter has 57 mm cannons.47 To date, China has deployed these more sophisticated ships in the East China Sea, rather than in the South China Sea where its cannons would overwhelm and outmatch any of the Southeast Asian coast guard vessels. In short, in terms of armaments, the CCG is not exceeding the existing norms set by Japan’s or the United States’ comparable coast guard forces.

[Figure 4 here]

Delineation of Duties in the Maritime Domain

China’s coast guard is responsible for law enforcement in the maritime domain, and deploying a civilian agency to patrol disputed waters carries a number of strategic benefits. For example, since border control is commonly within the purview of similar agencies, patrols in disputed waters can be seen as a regularized law enforcement activity (see Figure 5 below). In fact, it is not uncommon for coast guards from different countries to patrol in areas where there are overlapping sovereignty claims. Equally important, the CCG’s patrol in disputed areas reduces the likelihood for military tit-for-tat actions, preventing the risk of a security dilemma spiraling out of control. The optics of sending CCG cutters into disputed waters is less hostile than deploying a PLAN battleship. In 2012, General Luo Yuan stated that by making the CCG the front line of asserting maritime interests, rather than the PLAN, China could avoid ‘raising the conflicts to the military level.’48 As discussed, CCG vessels are lightly armed, smaller than PLAN ships, and take on different operational roles than combatant gray hulls. The presence of the CCG in China’s immediate coastal waters frees up the PLAN to venture into deeper waters elsewhere, a point underscored in the 2015 Defense White Paper, which indicated that the navy will ‘shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’

45 “More Chinese Ships to Patrol Disputed Waters near Japan - Watchdog.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political. 46 “Shikishima Class Patrol Vessels, Japan.” 47 Pike, “Military.” 48 Stirring up the South China Sea (I), 18.

9 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** to a engage in more ‘open seas protection.’’49 Operations in ‘open seas’ (渊海) refer to power projection farther afield in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, the Arctic, and the Gulf of Aden.50 The task for law and border enforcement in the immediate coastline would thus fall under the CCG’s operational mandate.

[Figure 5 here]

Occasionally sailing alongside the CCG are maritime militias, which are paramilitary units trained by the PLA and funded by provincial and local governments (see Figure 6 below). Often called the ‘front-line fishermen,’51 these militiamen go about their commercial fishing activities on a day-to-day basis, but are given training and Beidou satellite navigation systems by the government.52 The training is rudimentary, haphazard, and lacks professional rigor.53 Although not all Chinese fishermen are militia members, the government has admitted that about 80% of Chinese fishermen are supplied with the navigation system, which facilitates coordination with official and naval forces when needed.54 The precise number of maritime militia members, however, remains unknown.55 Like other Chinese militias, the maritime militia has a dual civilian-military leadership structure, with responsibilities falling on both local military organs and their Party counterparts, beginning with the Provincial Military District (MD) level and going down to local People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD) level.56 Thus, both provincial leaders and the military play a key role in the militia’s formation. Maritime militias ships can be ‘hired’ for specific tasks by either the PLAN or the CCG. For example, if the CCG wishes to employ the maritime militia for a specific exercise,

49 “Document: China’s Military Strategy,” U.S. Naval Institute, 26 May 2015, Web, accessed 23 June 2016. 50 McDevitt, “Becoming a Great…..”, 27. 51 Simon Denyer,” China’s Front -line Fishermen,” The Washington Post, Newsweek Interactive Company, 13 Apr. 2016, Web, accessed 26 June 2016. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/fishing-fleet-puts-china-on-collision-course-with- neighbors-in-south-china-sea/2016/04/12/8a6a9e3c-fff3-11e5-8bb1- f124a43f84dc_story.html?wpisrc=nl_draw2 . 52 Jane Perlez, “Vietnamese Boat Sinks in Clash; Fishing Vessel Goes down near Chinese Oil Rig in Disputed Waters,” International New York Times, 28 May 2014, Web, accessed 26 June 2016. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/world/asia/vietnam-boat-sinks-in-clash-near-oil-rig.html. 53 McDevitt, “Becoming a Great...”, 76. 54 Perlez, “Vietnamese Boat Sinks in Clash; Fishing Vessel Goes down near Chinese Oil Rig in Disputed Waters.” 55 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Meet the Chinese Maritime Militia Waging a People’s War at Sea,” WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 31, 2015. Available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/ chi- narealtime/2015/03/31/meet-the-chinese-maritime-militia-waging-a-peoples-war-at-sea/ . 56 McDevitt and Erickson, “Becoming a Great...”, 74.

10 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** the CCG would have to provide funding for the mission.57 Andrew Erickson and Conor Kennedy also note that while some orders are relayed directly to ships from the provincial military district level, ‘units involved in law enforcement missions are commanded by the China Coast Guard with the cooperation of their MD, under the unified leadership of local government and Party officials.’58 The maritime militia is a key part of China’s ‘cabbage strategy,’ which aims to surround contested areas with layers of fishing boats, surveillance vessels, and CCG ships.59 This close level of coordination is only possible due to the navigation systems provided to the maritime militia, linking their ships to the PLAN and CCG. As part of their activities, militiamen frequently resupply PLAN and/or CCG vessels, provide logistical assistance for island reclamation projects in the South China Sea, and engage in reconnaissance activities.60 For example, the Maritime Militia Battalion of Yuhuan County in Zhejiang Province regularly supplies fuel and ammunition to the military and the CCG,61 while the maritime militia attached to Beihai City in the Guangxi Zhuang region participated in seven drills with the PLAN in 2015.62 Naval veterans have also been recruited to serve in the maritime militias.63 The maritime militia’s unique status as a paramilitary force provides a strategic advantage where it can harass foreign navies or coast guards with relative impunity, as it would be a high-risk endeavor for a foreign ship to fire upon an mere ‘fishing vessel.’ In other words, ‘putting on camouflage [maritime militiamen] qualify as soldiers, taking off the camouflage they become law abiding fishermen.’64

[Figure 6 here]

57 McDevitt and Erickson, “Becoming a Great...”, 71. 58 McDevitt and Erickson, “Becoming a Great...”, 94. 59 Jeff Himmelman, “A Game of Shark and Minnow,” International New York Times, 25 Oct. 2013, Web, accessed 26 June 2016. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/ 60 Simon Tisdall, “Little Blue Men: The Maritime Militias Pushing China’s Claims; Ostensibly Civilian Fishermen Are ‘buzzing’ US Navy Ships and Those of Neighbouring Countries with Rival Territorial Claims,” The Guardian, 16 May 2016, Web, accessed 26 June 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/16/little-blue-men-the-maritime-militias-pushing-chinas-claims- in-south-china-sea. 61 Erickson and Kennedy, “Meet the Chinese Maritime Militia Waging a People’s War at Sea.” 62 Tisdall, “Little Blue Men.” 63 Tisdall, “Little Blue Men.” 64 Cited in Andrew Erickson and Conor Kennedy, “Irregular Forces at Sea: Not merely Fishermen—Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 2 Nov 2015.

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Patterns of CCG Activities in the East China Sea

On July 24, 2013, just two days after the CCG was formally established, a Chinese Y- 8 turboprop early warning plane flew over the disputed islands in the East China Sea. As Japan scrambled its fighter jets in response, four CCG vessels entered the disputed waters: the CCG’s very first patrol. The CCG ships declared Chinese sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands via loudspeakers installed on their vessels, while the Japan Coast Guard responded in kind and demanded the ships leave immediately.65 Since 2013, CCG activities in the East China Sea have been predominantly border patrols, with an occasional rescue or survey mission. From October 2013 to May 27, the CCG has sent a minimum of 95 patrols into disputed waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain. While the final tally may be higher, the patrols have become so regularized that even data and official counts from the Japanese government have not been fully reported since first encountering the CCG in 2013. On average, the CCG patrols the disputed area two to three times per month, with some variation from year to year (see Figures 7 and 8 below). Generally, three to four CCG cutters patrol at the edge of what Japan claims as its territorial waters before entering in the early morning, maintaining a minimum distance of 0.28 nautical miles from the islands.66 The CCG ships are sometimes accompanied by survey or research vessels. Once inside territorial waters, CCG cutters often declare China’s sovereignty over the islands via loudspeakers, and are met with JCG demands to leave the area. These CCG incursions typically last two hours before the CCG withdraws. Following the introduction of the CCG’s new cannon-equipped ships in December 2015, it has also become a routine pattern for either the Haijing 31239 or Haijing 31241 to be present during the CCG patrols in the East China Sea.

[Figure 7 here]

[Figure 8 here]

The CCG activities of its East China branch appear relatively restrained for a number of reasons. Not only is the JCG a competent adversary with the potential to cause damage to

65 Laura Zhou. "Military Website Takes Readers on a Tour of Disputed Islands; Trip Promoted as Offering a Glimpse into Tourism Potential, but Also Reinforces Territorial Claims." South China Morning Post, 14 Apr. 2016. Web. Accessed 26 June 2016. 66 “Chinese Coast Guard Patrols Islands Disputed with Japan.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 June 2016.

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CCG ships, but a Sino-Japanese clash could incite a major international crisis. With Secretary of State Rex Tillerson publicly stating that the U.S.-Japan security treaty extends to the islands in dispute, Washington would be obligated to defend its treaty ally in the event of a military escalation leading to an attack.67 Consequently, the Chinese government gives far less leeway for militarized deployments in the East China Sea.68 As a result, CCG patrols around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have become rather regularized, with no incident of ramming or escalated altercations with the JCG occurring to date. Stock phrases like ‘inherent territory’ and ‘historical sovereignty’ are broadcast through CCG vessels’ loudspeakers, but it is merely part of the routine. On its part, the JCG reciprocates and demands that the CCG ships leave its territorial waters, occasionally followed up with the filing of official complaints with the Chinese embassy in Tokyo. After three years of CCG patrols, China has regularized its patrol behavior and minimized excessive reactions from entering Japanese waters in the disputed islands. In contrast to the coast guard’s routine patrols, the occasional deployment of naval assets reflects China’s ability to ratchet up tensions in regional waters. For example, in June 2016 China entered Senkaku/Diaoyu waters twice in two days: on June 8 with three CCG ships, and on June 9 with a PLAN frigate.69 While the CCG’s June 8 patrol spurred no reaction from Japan, upon the naval vessel’s entry the next day the Chinese ambassador to Japan was immediately summoned to the Foreign Ministry and warned that if the frigate did not leave, Tokyo would “take necessary action.”70 Although the PLAN ship left within the hour, its entry spurred Cabinet discussions about mobilizing the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) for maritime security operations. The Japanese Kyodo News Service remarked that while the “Chinese coast guard vessels have often sailed in contiguous zones near the group of islets and even in Japanese territorial waters” the presence of a naval vessel was rarer and more significant event.71 The difference in Japan’s reactions to the CCG and the PLAN is quite telling: it reveals that in the East China Sea the CCG is seen as an irritant but not

67 Ankit Panda, “East China Sea: Chinese Coast Guard Enters Disputed Waters Following Mattis’ Japan Trip,” The Diplomat, 7 February 2017, Web, accessed 22 May 2017. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/east-china-sea-china-coast-guard-enters-disputed-waters-following-mattis- japan-trip/. 68 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, 11. Available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/04/24/national/obama-tells-abe-security-treaty-covers- senkakus/#.V3KQLWOj9SU . 69 “China naval vessel enters Japanese territorial waters for first time in decades.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific- Political. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 June. 2016. Web. Accessed 27 Aug 2016. 70 “Japan warns China of action over East China Sea violation.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific- Political. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 June. 2016. Web. Accessed 25 May 2017. 71 Ibid.

13 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** particularly troubling; in contrast, the PLAN’s presence quickly escalates conflict, is less predictable in its actions, and reflects an overt military confrontation. There is a notable exception to regular CCG patrols in the East China Sea. On August 6, 2016, a fleet of 230 armed Chinese fishing boats mobilized and sailed around the disputed waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Six CCG cutters accompanied the fishing vessels and ventured further into the contiguous zone.72 Tokyo summoned the Chinese ambassador to protest the intrusion of CCG vessels in its contiguous zone, but the summons was ignored. The next day, a seventh CCG cutter entered the contiguous zone, with two venturing further into Japan’s territorial waters. Between August 5 to 10, the Japanese government lodged 30 protests with China over the flurry of incursions. That CCG vessels entered Japan’s territorial waters reflects the regular range of coast guard patrols since 2013. The August 2016 incident, however, did break the CCG patrol pattern in a number of ways. As discussed, patrols in the East China Sea usually involve two to four CCG cutters, only one of which is normally armed with a standard coast guard gun battery. This time, however, the number of CCG vessels was larger than normal, and at least four were equipped with gun batteries. The incident also stretched over three days, when CCG patrols in the past have generally lasted for approximately two hours. Most notably, the presence of 230 fishing boats was unprecedented. While the fishing boats were kept at a distance in the contiguous zone—an area in which they are allowed to operate—their overwhelming presence near the islands proved alarming. As Christopher Hughes notes, ‘Japanese policymakers have long worried that China might try to impose control on the Senkakus through using some type of large-scale civilian/paramilitary presence that it would be hard to counter with Japan Coast Guard resources or justify the use of force for.’73 Fortunately, neither side resorted to the use of force. The CCG treaded into Japan’s territorial waters, and its larger deployment could be seen as a way of keeping the fishing boats in tow within and not beyond the contiguous zone.74

72 The Chinese SOA only acknowledges that CCG 2166 and CCG 33115 were present. CCG 33115 is very likely armed. “Chinese Coast Guard Patrols Our Diaoyu Islands on August 7.” State Oceanic Administration Website, 7 Aug 2016. 73Jesse Johnson, “Chinese, U.S. coast guards perform joint operations in rare bright spot for Sino-American relations,” The Japan Times, 27 August 2016. Available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/26/asiapacific/chinese-u-s-coast-guards-perform-joint-operations-rare-bright-spot-sino-american- relations/#.WDhGHjJh2u4. 74 “Tokyo trying to draw attention to mass China ship incursion off Senkakus.” The Japan Times, 17 August 2016. Available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/17/national/tokyo-trying-draw-attention-mass- china-ship-incursions-off-senkakus/#.WDhGOzJh2u5

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This unprecedented event nonetheless reflects in part China’s concerns about a growing Japanese role in the South China Sea maritime disputes. Routine Chinese commentary warning against Japanese stirring up trouble in the South China Sea included a critique in early July that marked Japan’s start on July 1, 2016 as the one-month head of the UN Security Council. It sharply attacked an alleged Japanese effort to raise the South China Sea issues before the Security Council. Moreover, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also pointedly rebuked Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a meeting on the sidelines of the Asian-European (ASEM) summit on July 15, 2016. Li warned Abe that ‘Japan is not a state directly involved in the South China Sea issue, and thus should exercise caution in its own words and deeds, and stop hyping up and interfering.’75

Patterns of CCG Activities in the South China Sea In the South China Sea, CCG cutters assert their border claims through the use of bright lights, sirens, loudspeakers, water cannons, and ramming.76 CCG officers also have been reported to board fishing vessels from the Philippines and Vietnam, assault fishermen with electric batons, and take the vessels’ catch of fish in the disputed waters.77 Its activities extend beyond regular patrols, including clashes with Southeast Asian vessels, escort and blockade missions, as well as rescue and reclamation of Chinese fishing boats captured by regional authorities. The CCG has also been known to chase curious fishing vessels away from China’s land reclamation projects in the Spratly Islands.78 Such encounters reflect a greater degree of intimidation than the CCG patrols in the East China Sea, but they occur with less frequency. From July 2013 through May 2017, the CCG engaged in more than 95 encounters with Japan in the East China Sea alone. During the same time period, the CCG was involved in around 54 encounters with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia combined (see Figures 9 and 10 below).

[Figure 9 here]

75 Sue-Lin Wong, and Terrence Edwards. "China Tells Japan to Stop Interfering in South China Sea." Reuters, July 15, 2016. Accessed November 25, 2016. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea- ruling-idUSKCN0ZV06F. 76 “Philippines Protests China Stopping Troop Resupply,” The New Zealand Herald, 11 Mar. 2014, Web, accessed 27 June 2016. 77 “Are Maritime Law Enforcement Forces Destabilizing Asia?” 78 Felipe Villamor, “Philippines Sends Defense Chief to Disputed South China Sea Island,” The New York Times, 21 April 2017, Web, accessed 22 May 2017. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/world/asia/philippines-south-china-sea.html

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[Figure 10 here]

In March 2014, the CCG made international headlines when it prevented the Philippines navy from resupplying its lone outpost on the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Island chain.79 Since 1999, a few Filipino marines have manned a defiant outpost aboard the remains of a grounded ship, despite China’s relative control of the area.80 China does not usually interfere with resupply missions, but claims that this time the Philippines navy vessels were carrying construction supplies; CCG vessels consequently blocked the Philippines ships from approaching Second Thomas Shoal, deterring them with digital signs, sirens, and megaphones.81 Following a media storm of outrage, the U.S. Navy sent a plane flying over the Second Thomas Shoal, and a Philippines government boat slipped past the Chinese blockade to resupply the marines, ending the standoff.82 These tactics of intimidation are typical of CCG border enforcement in the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys and reflect the advantage its larger coast guard vessels have over Southeast Asian counterparts (see Figure 11 below). To date, the CCG has not used its gun batteries, choosing instead to use water hose or ramming to turn back Philippine fishing boats, coast guard ships, or naval forces. Remarkably, since 2013 there has only been one injury as a result of these border encounters between China and the Philippines with zero fatalities on either side.83 Recently, China-Philippines tensions over the islands have cooled dramatically after Philippine President Dutuerte and Chinese President Xi met in Beijing in October 2016.84 While neither party has abandoned their territorial claims in the contested waters, CCG vessels briefly withdrew from the Scarborough Shoal in October as a gesture of goodwill, which was followed by Dutuerte declaring the area a marine sanctuary in November.85 This

79 “Philippines Protests China Stopping Troop Resupply.” 80 “Philippines Protests China Stopping Troop Resupply.” 81 “BBC Monitoring Quotes from China, Taiwan Press 13 Mar 14,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 Mar. 2014, Web, accessed 27 June 2016. 82 “Philippine Supply Ship Evades Chinese Blockade.” The New Zealand Herald, 29 Mar. 2014. Web, accessed 27 June 2016. 83 “China Says Coast Guard Confronts Japanese Vessels,” The New Zealand Herald, 26 July 2013, Web, accessed 27 June 2016. 84 Richard C. Paddock, Buckley, Chris, and Villamor, Felipe., “Chinese Vessels Retreat From Disputed Fishing Zone,” The New York Times, 29 October 2016. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/world/asia/south-china-sea-scarborough-shoal.html 85 Ian Nicolas P. Cigaral, “Scarborough lagoon to be declared ‘no-fishing zone’ as unilateral policy,” BusinessWorld, 22 November 2016. Available at: http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Nation&title=Scarborough-lagoon-to-be-declared-‘no- fishing-zone’-as-unilateral-policy&id=136705

16 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** makes the shoal a ‘no-fishing zone’ even for Filipino fishermen, removing a major factor in border enforcement incidents. While the CCG still regularly patrols the area, the compromise has held thus far.

[Figure 11 here]

The CCG has steadily ramped up pressure on Vietnam in the Paracel islands. In May 2014, China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) moved its oil drilling rig, the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY-981), into waters claimed by both China and Vietnam.86 Accompanied by a convoy of 80-100 Chinese ships, the HYSY-981’s presence within Vietnam’s EEZ raised bilateral tensions. The Chinese convoy’s makeup displays a significant amount of internal coordination between Chinese state and non-state actors: there were at least 41 CCG vessels, 15 cargo ships and 19 tugboats – part of the Tanmen maritime militia87 – forming a blockade 10 miles in radius around the 40-story high HYSY-981, with seven PLAN battleships coordinating from behind the frontlines.88 In addition, Chinese helicopters and fighter planes periodically flew over the area.89 Around 30 Vietnamese Coast Guard (VCG) ships and a few naval warships were dispatched to engage the Chinese ships, and for two months China and Vietnam engaged in a series of ramming maneuvers.90 There were multiple reports of Chinese vessels firing water cannons and ramming Vietnamese fishing boats passing through the area, damaging the ships and injuring several Vietnamese citizens.91 On May 26, a Vietnamese fishing vessel sank after a ramming exchange, with sources disagreeing on which side initiated the activity. All ten crew members were rescued.92 The conflict also sparked anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam, and only ended when the HYSY-981 left the disputed waters in June 2014, despite initial plans to stay through July 2014. This conflict was significant on multiple levels. It marked the first time since the CCG formation in 2013 of a coordinated deployment between civilian, paramilitary, and naval

86 Lindsay Murdoch, “Beijing’s Maritime Moves Escalate Regional Tensions; Disputed Territory - Vietnam Caught off Guard,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), 17 May 2014, Web, accessed 27 June 2016. 87 Zhang, Hongzhou, “Chinese fishermen in disputed waters: Not quite a “people’s war,” Marine Policy, 68, June 2016, Page 65-73. [in direct response to Kraska article] 88 “Chinese Fishing Vessels Block Vietnamese Boats – Report,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 June 2014, Web, accessed 27 June 2016. 89 “Chinese Fishing Vessels Block Vietnamese Boats - Report.” 90 “Chinese Fishing Vessels Block Vietnamese Boats - Report.” 91 “Chinese Fishing Vessels Block Vietnamese Boats - Report.” 92 Perlez, “Vietnamese Boat Sinks in Clash.”

17 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** forces. Not only were all three groups present at the blockade, but the deployment of CCG vessels and the maritime militia at the frontlines revealed its strategy of credible deterrence without the use of militarized force. All of the altercations during the standoff, including ramming exchanges and firing of water hoses, were employed by the CCG or maritime militia vessels. The PLAN and the Vietnamese naval forces were present during the incident but refrained from opening fire or moving toward the frontlines of the scene. In addition, the presence of helicopters and other aircraft shows cooperation with either the PLAN or the PLA Air Force, as the CCG does not possess its own aircraft; indeed the PLAN emerged as a key coordinator of the 2014 blockade to protect its oil rig operations in the contested waters in the Paracels.93 While the PLAN does not make regular appearances in the disputed waters, it is regarded as the overall convener of joint interagency CCG-maritime militia-PLAN maneuvers. In 2014, then-Director of the SOA, Liu Cigui, called for a deepening of the military and CCG coordination in order to strengthen China’s presence on the seas.94 The PLA Daily reported that the PLAN is ‘actively building a joint military-police-civilian defense mechanism, in close cooperation with law enforcement forces.’95 Michael McDevitt characterizes the PLAN as the ‘over the horizon’ force, staying out of the public eye but ready to intervene and assist the CCG or the maritime militia.96 Even though Beijing managed to avoid using military force to settle the incident, the presence of PLAN and other armed forces pushed the conflict to the brink of precipice beyond regular CCG patrols in the disputed waters. The backlash from the oil rig incident incurred reputational costs for the Chinese government, as Vietnam’s diplomatic maneuvers with regional governments and through ASEAN led to the unprecedented issuance of the regional organization’s first public condemnation of the tensions in the South China Sea. More recently, as in the East China Sea, the CCG has also been involved with fishing vessels and militias in the South China Sea. On March 20, 2016, a CCG vessel rammed free a Chinese fishing vessel which had been apprehended Indonesian law enforcement boat for

93 Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, 1. 94 “Enthusiastically Deepening Reform, Promising to Promote Marine Power, and Continuously Making New Achievements (深化军队与海警海上行动协调配合机制，增强海上维权执法合力), State Oceanic Administration News, 17 Jan. 2014, Web, accessed 28 June 2016. Available at: http://soa.gov.cn/xw/ztbd/2014/gzhy/dhhy/201401/t20140117_30289.html. 95 “Navy Conducts Normal Patrol Through China’s Territorial Seas (我海军常态化巡逻覆盖万里海疆),” PLA Daily, 21 June 2014, Web, accessed 28 June 2016. Available at: http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2014- 06/21/content_5987350.htm . 96 Michael McDevitt, “China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas,” Testimony, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington DC, 4 April 2013.

18 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** fishing within Indonesia’s EEZ.97 Indonesia has been cracking down hard on illegal fishing in its territorial waters, and under the leadership of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti, Indonesia has destroyed around 120 ships caught poaching.98 In this instance, the Chinese fishing vessel, Kway Fey 10078, was spotted fishing near the Natuna Islands by the Indonesia Maritime and Fisheries Monitoring Task Force. Prior to its capture and detainment by Indonesian forces, the Chinese fishing militia activated its government-funded satellite navigation system to call for rescue and assistance. Although the Chinese crew was already aboard the Indonesian police vessel, the much larger CCG vessel arrived within hours and rammed the Kway Fey 10078 free, pushing it back out of Indonesia’s 12-nautical mile territorial waters and back into the open waters of the South China Sea.99 A similar vessel rescue operation occurred again in Indonesian waters in April 2016. These latest incidents of vessel recapture in the South China Sea illuminate several aspects of the CCG’s coordination with fishing vessels and the maritime militia. Chinese fishing vessels are in communication with the CCG, even when they are deep into disputed or foreign waters. This high connectivity is likely the result of the government-funded Beidou navigation systems. Chinese fishing vessels also appear confident in the CCG’s ability to rescue them from sticky situations, and consequently roam the South China Sea with relative impunity. Mr. Zhang, the engineer on the second boat rescued by the CCG, admits that it was ‘probable’ that he was fishing in Indonesia territorial waters, but that the moment he saw the CCG approaching, ‘[he] knew [he] was out of trouble.’100 The CCG appears to be tracking Chinese fishing boats, which includes increasingly active maritime militia vessels, keeping them in tow in order to prevent violent clashes, accidents, and armed exchanges in the disputed waters. In an interesting exception, while the CCG engages in intimidating behavior when it encounters vessels from the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, its interactions with Malaysia have decreased in intensity. In fact, the CCG’s behavior near Malaysia is relatively restrained to patrols; since 2013, the CCG has maintained a near-permanent presence near a small island in the South Luconia Shoals off the coast of Malaysian state of Sarawak.101 Scott

97 “Indonesia to Summon China Envoy over Fishing Boat Incident,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 Mar. 2016, Web, accessed 28 June 2016. 98 “Indonesia to Summon China Envoy over Fishing Boat Incident.” 99 Joe Cochrane, “Indonesia Protests Chinese Aggression,” International New York Times, 22 Mar. 2016, Web, accessed 27 June 2016. 100 Jane Perlez, Yufan Huang, and Joe Cochrane. “Harrowing Trip...” 101 Jenifer Laeng, “China Coast Guard vessel found at Luconia Shoals,” Borneo Post Online, 3 June 2015, Web, accessible at: http://www.theborneopost.com/2015/06/03/china-coast-guard-vessel-found-at-luconia-shoals/.

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Bentley, a researcher at the Australian Defence Force Academy, reports that “according to Liu Cigui, the former director of China’s State Oceanic Administration (SOA), regular patrols of South Luconia Shoals…began in August 2013 and were subsequently ‘reinforced’ in 2014.”102 Bentley explains that although Malaysian authorities are aware of the CCG’s presence in the South Luconia Shoals, CCG patrols go underreported in Malaysian media due to the Malaysian government’s increasing bilateral business, trade, and economic ties with China.103 China is Malaysia’s largest trading partner. Even though CCG patrols are rarely mentioned in the media, data from Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) confirms that up to 11 CCG vessels patrol the Shoals at a time.104 Malaysia’s determination to maintain good relations with China despite CCG activity in the Luconia Shoals has stayed firm. On March 24, 2016, up to 82 fishing vessels, escorted by two CCG ships, were spotted in the South Luconia Shoals by the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency. After the Malaysian Navy initially denied the reports, its Defense Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin later said that even if the sightings were confirmed, the issue could be “resolved bilaterally.”105 In a final statement on the matter, the Malaysian Foreign Affairs Ministry released a statement saying “the government believed that Beijing shared the sentiment that the close ties between Malaysia and China were anchored on respect for ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence…In this connection, Malaysia is confident that with goodwill and sincerity, Malaysia and China would be able to find (an) amicable resolution on any issues between both countries.’”106 Largely due to Malaysian forbearance, there are few public altercations between the CCG and Malaysian vessels, resulting in more moderated behavior and lower bilateral tensions in comparison to China’s relations with other claimant states.

102 Scott Bentley, “Malaysia’s ‘Special Relationship’ with China and the South China Sea: Not So Special Anymore,” The ASAN Forum, 31 July 2015, Accessible at: http://www.theasanforum.org/malaysias-special- relationship-with-china-and-the-south-china-sea-not-so-special-anymore/. 103 Ibid. 104 Oliver Holmes, “Chinese patrol ships keep presence around Malaysian reefs,” The Guardian, 5 April 2017. Web. Accessed 30 May 2017. 105 Shannon Teoh, “Chinese fishing boats 'did enter Malaysian waters'; Vessels left before navy arrived, says maritime enforcement chief,” The Straits Times, 30 March 2016. Web. Accessed 30 May 2017. 106 Syed Azahedi, “Chinese envoy called in over ships,” New Straits Times, 1 April 2016. Web. Accessed 30 May 2017.

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The CCG and Cooperation for Regional Security Since 2013, China’s State Oceanic Administration and the coast guard have increased participation and interaction with regional counterparts in the Asia-Pacific region to focus on functional dialogues on cooperation and training. Most prominently, at the past two U.S.- China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, officials from both sides have emphasized increasing coordination between the two coast guards. In 2014, officials discussed joint U.S.- China fisheries enforcement, and made plans for six CCG officers to embark on a U.S. cutter for a drill inspecting cargo.107 U.S.-China coast guard coordination has become an even higher priority in the bilateral strategic dialogue, with a special roundtable session in 2015 dedicated to ocean affairs. In attendance were U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, SOA Director Wang Hong, and State Councilor Yang Jiechi. In the closing remarks, Kerry stated that ‘United States and China will expand cooperation among our coast guard and maritime law enforcement authorities in order to uphold international laws and standards.’108 Yang elaborated that maritime law enforcement authorities would increase ties ‘through personnel exchanges, mutual visits of vessels, joint law enforcement, [and] skills training.’ 109 Implicit in the statement was an acknowledgment of a more professionalized coast guard. The North Pacific was highlighted as a practical and neutral area for joint patrols, and at the end of the bilateral meeting, U.S. and Chinese officials agreed to having Chinese officers embark on U.S. Coast Guard ships to enforce international laws related to ‘illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU)’ fishing in the high seas.110 They also committed to ‘professionalized behavior at sea in accordance with international law, and conducting vessel visits and senior-level exchanges over the next year [2016].’111 The plans for joint maneuvers were implemented in late August 2016, when the CCG and USCG patrolled the North Pacific together to deter illegal fishing. According to U.S. Coast Guard District 17 spokesman Lt. Brian Dykens, the two coast guards ‘rendezvoused and conducted a professional exchange, [focusing] on professional goodwill between coast guards.’112 The U.S. Coast Guard’s top official, Commandant

107 “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track U.S. Department of State,” U.S. Department of State, 14 July 2014, Web, accessed 8 July 2016. 108 John Kerry and Yang Jiechi, “Closing Remarks at the Strategic Track Oceans Meeting of the Strategic & Economic Dialogue / Consultation on People-to-People Exchange,” U.S. Department of State, 24 June 2015, Web, accessed 8 July 2016. 109 Kerry and Yang, “Closing Remarks...” 110 Kerry and Yang, “Closing Remarks...” 111 “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track U.S. Department of State.” 112 Jesse Johnson, “Chinese, U.S. coast guards perform joint operations in rare bright spot for Sino-American relations,” The Japan Times, 27 August 2016. Available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/26/asia-

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Admiral Paul Zukunft, further indicated that U.S. Coast Guard officials and rank and file have had more frequent interaction with Chinese counterparts than with those of other foreign countries, adding that ‘the U.S. Coast Guard has a very good relationship with the Chinese Coast Guard, with each side frequently boarding the other's ships to carry out joint maritime law enforcement activities.’113 Similarly, since 2006 the CCG has engaged in 12 joint maneuver exercises with the Vietnamese Coast Guard in the Gulf of Tonkin, a common fishing area. These missions have been held twice a year since 2016, with the most recent three-day patrols occurring in April and November 2016, and again in April 2017. 114 Two coast guard vessels from either country engage in a “joint patrol, maritime search and rescue exercise, and examination of fishing boats.”115 According Liu Tianrong, the Chinese commander of the mission, the exercise will “help the two sides’ maritime search and rescue abilities, and strengthen personnel communication and law enforcement cooperation.”116 Given past tensions between the two Coast Guards, the uptick in regular joint operations is a potential model for joint cooperation in the South China Sea. Most recently, China and the Philippines signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a Joint Coast Guard Committee on Maritime Cooperation in October 2016. Putting aside the sovereignty issue, the two sides agreed on functional cooperation between their respective coast guards, addressing such issues as maritime emergencies, humanitarian assistance, and the protection and preservation of marine environment.117

Expansion of Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) Not only has the SOA/CCG participated in regional security forums, but recently, China has indicated its willingness to extend the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to the coast guard. CUES’ original purpose was to establish rules of engagement for naval vessels, to prevent miscommunication and miscalculation, and was signed in April 2014 by all 21 member states of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, including China and pacific/chinese-u-s-coast-guards-perform-joint-operations-rare-bright-spot-sino-american- relations/#.WDhGHjJh2u4. 113 “U.S. Coast Guard Chief Seeks Expanded Asia-Pacific Role,” VOA News, 30 November 2016. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/a/coast-guard-chief-seeks-expanded-asia-pacific-role/3617856.html. 114 Mao Siqian. “China, Vietnam start joint fishery inspection in Beibu Gulf,” Xinhua, 19 April 2017. Available at: http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0419/c90000-9204859.html. 115 “China, Vietnam conclude joint patrol in Beibu Gulf,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political, 10 November 2016. 116 Ibid. 117 “Joint Statement of the Philippines and China,” PhilStar, 21 October 2016. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/10/21/1635919/full-text-joint-statement-philippines-and-china.

22 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** all ASEAN claimant nations in the SCS.118 In 2015, the U.S. and China agreed to expand CUES to apply to air-to-air encounters. 119 Although these agreements are non-binding, participating nations hope that it will prevent dangerous intercepts in disputed territory. 120 In light of coast guards’ relevance in the South China Sea maritime disputes, Singapore has proposed that CUES be extended to coast guards.121 Such an agreement would put into place safety procedures for such routine actions in coast guards’ law enforcement role as the use of water cannons and warning shots. The focus on safety protocols and establishing common understandings for maritime law enforcement practices would help prevent and manage the risks of incidents and accidents.122 China has agreed to a regional hotline for such purposes in August 2016 and has also indicated that it would consider Singapore’s proposal of an expanded CUES to mitigate untoward clashes among civilian law enforcement vessels in the South China Sea. Despite these promising signals, however, there are a few barriers to the coast guard CUES’ adoption. First, since China has not defined its geographical claims precisely, it will be difficult to determine where CUES applies. CUES applies in EEZs and neutral seas, but it is unclear if CUES will be respected in a claimant states’ territorial waters. In essence, even though CUES is being reintroduced to prevent border disputes, existing disagreements over territorial sovereignty may inhibit its efficacy. Second, given the increasing activism of Chinese fishing boats and maritime militia, the scope of CUES would also need to consider how such paramilitary forces would be bound by the regional agreement. A coast guard CUES nonetheless would be an important step forward towards regional coast guard cooperation and contribute to the eventual formalization of a binding Code of Conduct in mid-2016. More broadly, the involvement of the coast guard opens up the prospects for addressing overlapping sovereignty, economic, security, emergency response and law enforcement concerns in the ongoing maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. When the establishment of the CCG was formally announced in 2013, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk called the new coast guard a positive development,

118 Lee Yinghui,”ASEAN Should Choose CUES for the South China Sea,” East Asia Forum, 08 April 2016, Web, accessed 08 July 2016. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/08/asean-should-choose-cues- for-the-south-china-sea/. 119 Sandra Maler, ed, “Chinese Jets Intercept US Military Plane over South China Sea – Pentagon,” Channel NewsAsia, 19 May 2016, Web, accessed 10 July 2016. Available at: http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/chinese-jets-intercept-us/2799084.html . 120 “Chinese Jets Intercept US Military Plane over South China Sea - Pentagon.” 121 Kor, “China, Asean Agree to Examine S’pore Proposal on South China Sea.” 122 Kor, “China, Asean Agree to Examine S’pore Proposal on South China Sea.”

23 ***PAPER UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DISTRIBUTE*** commenting, ‘It’s good for China’s neighbors and the United States because we know who is responsible and who we can hold responsible. As they develop a sense of professionalism in accordance with international law, it should make for lower risk of accidents.’ Shirk is right to note that coast guards can serve a positive role in managing the ongoing maritime disputes in the region. Even with territorial integrity, access to resources and sea lanes, and power projection all at stake in the maritime dispute, China’s decision to forego military deployment and instead mobilize a new civilian maritime power could go a long way in reducing uncertainties and the risks of an armed confrontation in the South China Sea.

Word Count (excludes title page, biographical notes, and abstract) 10,186 words

Acknowledgments and Funding This work was supported by the Yale-NUS/Ministry of Education Tier-1 Large Research Grant under Grant #IG16-LR105.

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Figure 1: Structure of Chinese Maritime Authorities

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Figure 2: Leadership of the State Oceanic Administration

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Figure 3: Comparison of East and Southeast Asian Coast Guards

Regional Coast Guards

250

200

150

100

Number of Boats 50

0 China Japan Vietnam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines

Large Boats Small Boats

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Figure 4: United States, Japan, and China Coast Guard Asset Comparison

Number of Small Large Size of Largest Heaviest Personnel Ships Ships Ships Ship** Armaments United States 36,235 238* ~37 38 4,306 LT 57 mm guns China 16,296 205 110 95 10,000 LT 37 mm guns Japan 13,422 78 25 53 6,500 LT 35 mm guns

*Most USCG ships are very lightweight and have a displacement less than 500 LT. **Largest non-polar ship.

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Figure 5: Types of CCG Encounters

Scope of Activity Example Patrol Routine CCG cutters sail through Ongoing activities in the East China disputed or undisputed waters but Sea. leaves in a coordinated and timely fashion. Border Enforcing the rule of law over China’s Chasing away foreign fishing boats; Enforcement claimed maritime borders. Activities occupation of various outposts in are met with little to no resistance. the Scarborough Shoal, Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands; taking catch from foreign fishing vessels accused of trespassing. Includes ramming and the use of water canons. Border Clash Enforcing the rule of law over China’s Repeated ramming exchanges with claimed maritime borders. Activities rival coast guards or navies, leading are met with resistance from other to the involvement of military claimant states. assets as backup in the clash. Escort/Blockade Escort fishing vessels in deep sea HYSY-981 oil rig crisis in June missions in disputed territory. 2014 with Vietnam; coordinated with PLAN and maritime militia to defend Chinese personnel, boats, and/or property. Vessel Forcible reclamation of Chinese Ramming free the Kway Fei 10081 Recapture fishing ships captured by foreign from Indonesian custody. authorities. Search and Assist or search for sunken Ongoing search for missing Rescue vessels/persons missing at sea. Malaysian Airlines plane in 2014. Joint Operations Coordinated maneuvers between CCG and VCG joint patrol and Coast Guards, often for training search-and-rescue exercises in the purposes. Beibu Gulf, Nov 2016.

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Figure 6: Chinese Maritime Authorities

Unit Type Primary mission Secondary mission Chain of command China Coast Civilian Law enforcement Environmental State Council Guard protection Maritime Paramilitary External defense Commercial State Council Militias interests and Central Military Commission People’s Military External defense Domestic security Central Military Liberation Army Commission Navy

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Figure 7: Longitudinal Plotting of CCG Patrols in the East China Sea

Chinese Coast Guard Encounters in the South China Sea July 2013-May 2017

2 Number of Encountersof Number 1

0 14 15 16 17 14 15 16 17 13 14 15 16 14 15 16 17 13 14 15 16 13 14 15 16 ------Jul Jul Jul Jul Jan Jan Jan Jan Sep Sep Sep Sep Mar Mar Mar Mar Nov Nov Nov Nov May May May May Date

Open source data gathered from BBC Monitoring, Japanese Coast Guard reports, Chinese SOA reports, and other primary and secondary sources in LexisNexis.

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Figure 8: Minimum Aggregate Number of CCG Patrols in the East China Sea

Number of CCG Patrols in the East China Sea

Number of Patrols 10

0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Open source data gathered from BBC Monitoring, Japanese Coast Guard reports, Chinese SOA reports, and other primary and secondary sources in LexisNexis.

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Figure 9: CCG Encounters in Regional Maritime Disputes

Categories of CCG Encounters in the South China Sea and East China Sea July 2013- May 2017

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30

Number of Encountersof Number 20 10 0 Philippines Vietnam Malaysia Indonesia Japan

Border Enforcement Patrol Rescue/Joint Operations Border Clash Vessel Recapture

Open source data gathered from BBC Monitoring, Japanese Coast Guard reports, Chinese SOA reports, and other primary and secondary sources in LexisNexis.

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Figure 10: Breakdown of CCG Encounters in the South China Sea

Categories of CCG Encounters in the SCS by Country July 2013- May 2017

30 25 20 15 10 5

Number of Encounters 0 Philippines Vietnam Malaysia Indonesia

Border Enforcement Patrol Rescue/Joint Operations Border Clash Vessel Recapture

Open source data gathered from BBC Monitoring, Chinese SOA reports, and other primary and secondary sources in LexisNexis.

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Figure 11: China-Philippine Encounters in the South China Sea

China-Philippines Encounters by Year

14 12 10 8 6 4

Number of Encounters 2 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Border Enforcement Patrol Rescue/Joint Operations Vessel Recapture Border Clash

Open source data gathered from BBC Monitoring, Chinese SOA reports, and other primary and secondary sources in LexisNexis.