Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy This Page Intentionally Left Blank Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy

Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy This page intentionally left blank Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy Edited by DIEGO ABENTE BRUN and LARRY DIAMOND Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore © 2014 Johns Hopkins University Press All rights reserved. Published 2014 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 2 4 6 8 9 7 5 3 1 Johns Hopkins University Press 2715 North Charles Street Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363 www.press.jhu.edu Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Clientelism, social policy, and the quality of democracy / Edited by Diego Abente Brun and Larry Diamond. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-4214-1228-3 (hardback) ISBN-10: 1-4214-1228-4 (hardcover) ISBN-13: 978-1-4214-1229-0 (paperback) ISBN-10: 1-4214-1229-2 (paperback) ISBN-13: 978-1-4214-1264-1 (electronic) ISBN-10: 1-4214-1264-0 (electronic) 1. Patronage, Political—Developing countries—Case studies. 2. Democratization— Developing countries—Case studies. 3. Developing countries—Politics and government—Case studies. 4. Political sociology. 5. Comparative government. I. Abente Brun, Diego. II. Diamond, Larry Jay. JF2111.C54 2014 324.2'04—dc23 2013018543 A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Special discounts are available for bulk purchases of this book. For more information, please contact Special Sales at 410-516-6936 or [email protected]. Johns Hopkins University Press uses environmentally friendly book materials, including recycled text paper that is composed of at least 30 percent post-consumer waste, whenever possible. Contents Contributors vii Preface, by Larry Diamond ix Acknowledgments xiii I ntroduction: Evaluating Political Clientelism 1 Diego Abente Brun Part i Lessons in Clientelism from Latin America 1 Partisan Linkages and Social Policy Delivery in Argentina and Chile 17 Ernesto Calvo and María Victoria Murillo 2 Chile’s Education Transfers, 2001–2009 39 Juan Pablo Luna and Rodrigo Mardones 3 The Future of Peru’s Brokered Democracy 65 Martin Tanaka and Carlos Meléndez 4 Teachers, Mayors, and the Transformation of Clientelism in Colombia 88 Kent Eaton and Christopher Chambers-Ju 5 Lessons Learned While Studying Clientelistic Politics in the Gray Zone 114 Javier Auyero 6 Political Clientelism and Social Policy in Brazil 130 Simeon Nichter Part ii Lessons in Clientelism from Other Regions 7 Patronage, Democracy, and Ethnic Politics in India 135 Kanchan Chandra vi Contents 8 Linking Capital and Countryside: Patronage and Clientelism in Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines 174 Paul D. Hutchcroft 9 Eastern European Postcommunist Variants of Political Clientelism and Social Policy 204 Linda J. Cook 10 The Democratization of Clientelism in Sub-Saharan Africa 230 Nicolas Van de Walle Conclusion: Defining Political Clientelism’s Persistence 253 Beatriz Magaloni Index 263 Contributors Javier Auyero Juan Pablo Luna University of Texas Catholic University of Chile Ernesto Calvo Beatriz Magaloni University of Houston Stanford University Christopher Chambers-Ju Rodrigo Mardones University of California, Berkeley Catholic University of Chile Kanchan Chandra Carlos Meléndez New York University University of Notre Dame Linda J. Cook María Victoria Murillo Brown University Columbia University Larry Diamond Simeon Nichter Stanford University Stanford University Kent Eaton Martin Tanaka University of California, Santa Cruz Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Paul D. Hutchcroft Nicolas Van de Walle The Australian National University Cornell University This page intentionally left blank Preface As we approach the fourth decade of the Third Wave of global democratization, global democratic progress remains at something of an impasse. Although the Arab Spring raised hopes for a new burst of democratic transitions, most Arab states remain mired in authoritarianism or stuck at various stages of transition that will probably work their way toward democracy only gradually, at best. Since 2005, the rest of the world has witnessed not a springtime of democracy but a democratic recession, in which levels of freedom have fallen for several consecutive years and democratic reversal has become more common. In fact, the rate of breakdown of democracy during the period 1999–2011 was nearly twice the rate of the preceding twelve-year period. In all, nearly a third of the democracies that have existed since the Third Wave began in 1974 have broken down. There are many reasons for the failure of democracy, but one of the most signifi- cant factors is bad governance. This can take many forms, but the underlying phe- nomenon is that state structures do not work fairly, efficiently, effectively, and trans- parently in their attempts to deliver public goods that are needed for socioeconomic development. Additionally, the individual benefits that collectively constitute social policy, such as income support, health care, educational access, jobs, and job train- ing, are not allocated based on need or ability. Rather, in each of these instances and in many other realms of public policy, something intervenes to undermine the fair and efficient distribution of public resources.U sually, that “something” prominently includes political clientelism, a persistent pattern in which officehold- ers exchange state benefits for political support and loyalty. As several authors make clear in the chapters that follow, clientelism is as old as politics itself, and it may in some respects be “functional” for the growth of democracy in that it provides a means for parties to mobilize support and for candidates to build resilient constituencies. Yet to the extent that clientelism distorts the distribution of state benefits in low-income and lower-middle income democracies in particular, it may exacerbate inequality, since anti-poverty programs are among the most commonly targeted for clientelistic (rather than truly need-based) distribution. x Preface These practices produce the double misfortune of making it more difficult to lift the poor out of poverty, which makes those democracies that are already the most fragile even more vulnerable to collapse. Hence, the logic of political clientelism—which is another way of saying favoritism based on political ties—seems directly in tension with the Weberian ideal of an impersonal, bureaucratic state efficiently delivering state benefits to those most in need of them, or at least to those for whom they are explicitly intended. When group ties distort the distribution of state resources, more egregious per- sonal considerations are often not far behind. Thus, individual corruption is often the handmaiden of clientelism. Both are departures from the model of the rule- based, bureaucratic Weberian state. And when politicians mobilize votes on the basis of particularistic ties—as patrons exchanging state benefits for continued political support—then voters become clients rather than citizens, and they are unable to use their vote to hold politicians accountable for their overall performance on behalf of the constituency or the country. If voters look the other way at inefficiency and unfairness because the system seems to work for them personally—and thus in a sense it is “fair” enough—then they are also likely to look the other way when the politician rewards himself in office with a generous share of “patronage” for himself. As a result, in systems where distribution happens largely through patron-client net- works, more resources often leak out through corruption than through clientelism per se. If clientelism provides a means in the short run—however suboptimal—of stabilizing politics and providing politicians with reliable bases of support, in the longer run it badly damages the rule of law, the accountability of government to citizens overall, and thus the quality of democracy. The result is often strong bases of support for certain individuals who corner control over the distribution of resources, but widespread general cynicism about parties, politicians—and democracy itself. There is also a further cost to pervasive clientelism: in multiethnic societies, ethnic resentments and conflicts will be stimulated, because the bonds that tie clients to patrons tend to be forged along ethnic lines. Just as the winners in the distribution game belong to certain ethnic groups, so do the losers. This is one reason that political violence is so common in states where public resources get appropriated to fuel and lubricate patron-client machines. It is also a reason that most political scientists—and civic activists—believe that democracy is better, fairer, and more sustainable when there gradually develops alongside it a Weberian bureaucratic state rather than a corrupt and clientelistic one. To explore more systematically how political clientelism works and evolves in the context of modern developing democracies—and with particular reference to social policies to reduce poverty—the International Forum for Democratic Studies Preface xi of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) organized a two-day conference in Quito, Ecuador, on November 5 and 6, 2010, along with our local host, the Ecuadorian think tank Grupo FARO. The conference brought together ap- proximately twenty scholars and practitioners from around the world, including several from South America and the Andean region in particular. The international character of the meeting was intended to generate a discussion that was not exces- sively self-

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