Validating Security Protocols with Cloud-Based Middleboxes
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Installing Fake Root Keys in a PC
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Royal Holloway - Pure Installing Fake Root Keys in a PC Adil Alsaid and Chris J. Mitchell Information Security Group Royal Holloway, University of London Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX fA.Alsaid, [email protected] Abstract. If a malicious party can insert a self-issued CA public key into the list of root public keys stored in a PC, then this party could potentially do considerable harm to that PC. In this paper, we present a way to achieve such an attack for the Internet Explorer web browser root key store, which avoids attracting the user's attention. A realisation of this attack is also described. Finally, countermeasures that can be deployed to prevent such an attack are outlined. 1 Introduction As is widely known [10], most web browsers (e.g. Microsoft Internet Explorer or Netscape) have a repository of root public keys designed for use in verify- ing digitally signed public key certi¯cates. These public keys are bundled with distributions of the web browser, and are used to verify certi¯cates for applet providers [13]. Speci¯cally, web-sites may download applets to a user PC without the PC user knowing it. Depending on the security settings selected by the PC user, these applets may be executed with or without further checks. Typically, the browser will only execute the applet if the following conditions are satis¯ed. 1. The applet must be digitally signed, and the signature must verify correctly. 2. -
Opportunistic Keying As a Countermeasure to Pervasive Monitoring
Opportunistic Keying as a Countermeasure to Pervasive Monitoring Stephen Kent BBN Technologies Abstract This document was prepared as part of the IETF response to concerns about “pervasive monitoring” (PM) [Farrell-pm]. It begins by exploring terminology that has been used in IETF standards (and in academic publications) to describe encryption and key management techniques, with a focus on authentication and anonymity. Based on this analysis, it propose a new term, “opportunistic keying” to describe a goal for IETF security protocols, in response to PM. It reviews key management mechanisms used in IETF security protocol standards, also with respect to these properties. The document explores possible impediments to and potential adverse effects associated with deployment and use of techniques that would increase the use of encryption, even when keys are distributed in an unauthenticated manner. 1. What’s in a Name (for Encryption)? Recent discussions in the IETF about pervasive monitoring (PM) have suggested a desire to increase use of encryption, even when the encrypted communication is unauthenticated. The term “opportunistic encryption” has been suggested as a term to describe key management techniques in which authenticated encryption is the preferred outcome, unauthenticated encryption is an acceptable fallback, and plaintext (unencrypted) communication is an undesirable (but perhaps necessary) result. This mode of operation differs from the options commonly offered by many IETF security protocols, in which authenticated, encrypted communication is the desired outcome, but plaintext communication is the fallback. The term opportunistic encryption (OE) was coined by Michael Richardson in “Opportunistic Encryption using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)” an Informational RFC [RFC4322]. -
Software-Defined Networking: Improving Security for Enterprise and Home Networks
Worcester Polytechnic Institute Digital WPI Doctoral Dissertations (All Dissertations, All Years) Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2017-04-24 Software-defined etN working: Improving Security for Enterprise and Home Networks Curtis Robin Taylor Worcester Polytechnic Institute Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/etd-dissertations Repository Citation Taylor, C. R. (2017). Software-defined Networking: Improving Security for Enterprise and Home Networks. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/etd-dissertations/161 This dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations (All Dissertations, All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Software-defined Networking: Improving Security for Enterprise and Home Networks by Curtis R. Taylor A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science by May 2017 APPROVED: Professor Craig A. Shue, Dissertation Advisor Professor Craig E. Wills, Head of Department Professor Mark Claypool, Committee Member Professor Thomas Eisenbarth, Committee Member Doctor Nathanael Paul, External Committee Member Abstract In enterprise networks, all aspects of the network, such as placement of security devices and performance, must be carefully considered. Even with forethought, networks operators are ulti- mately unaware of intra-subnet traffic. The inability to monitor intra-subnet traffic leads to blind spots in the network where compromised hosts have unfettered access to the network for spreading and reconnaissance. While network security middleboxes help to address compromises, they are limited in only seeing a subset of all network traffic that traverses routed infrastructure, which is where middleboxes are frequently deployed. -
Analysis of SSL Certificate Reissues and Revocations in the Wake
Analysis of SSL Certificate Reissues and Revocations in the Wake of Heartbleed Liang Zhang David Choffnes Dave Levin Tudor Dumitra¸s Northeastern University Northeastern University University of Maryland University of Maryland [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Alan Mislove Aaron Schulman Christo Wilson Northeastern University Stanford University Northeastern University [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT Categories and Subject Descriptors Central to the secure operation of a public key infrastruc- C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Net- ture (PKI) is the ability to revoke certificates. While much work Protocols; C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Net- of users' security rests on this process taking place quickly, works]: Network Operations; E.3 [Data Encryption]: in practice, revocation typically requires a human to decide Public Key Cryptosystems, Standards to reissue a new certificate and revoke the old one. Thus, having a proper understanding of how often systems admin- istrators reissue and revoke certificates is crucial to under- Keywords standing the integrity of a PKI. Unfortunately, this is typi- Heartbleed; SSL; TLS; HTTPS; X.509; Certificates; Reissue; cally difficult to measure: while it is relatively easy to deter- Revocation; Extended validation mine when a certificate is revoked, it is difficult to determine whether and when an administrator should have revoked. In this paper, we use a recent widespread security vul- 1. INTRODUCTION nerability as a natural experiment. Publicly announced in Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Secu- April 2014, the Heartbleed OpenSSL bug, potentially (and rity (TLS)1 are the de-facto standards for securing Internet undetectably) revealed servers' private keys. -
How Can We Protect the Internet Against Surveillance?
How can we protect the Internet against surveillance? Seven TODO items for users, web developers and protocol engineers Peter Eckersley [email protected] Okay, so everyone is spying on the Internet It's not just the NSA... Lots of governments are in this game! Not to mention the commerical malware industry These guys are fearsome, octopus-like adversaries Does this mean we should just give up? No. Reason 1: some people can't afford to give up Reason 2: there is a line we can hold vs. So, how do we get there? TODO #1 Users should maximise their own security Make sure your OS and browser are patched! Use encryption where you can! In your browser, install HTTPS Everywhere https://eff.org/https-everywhere For instant messaging, use OTR (easiest with Pidgin or Adium, but be aware of the exploit risk tradeoff) For confidential browsing, use the Tor Browser Bundle Other tools to consider: TextSecure for SMS PGP for email (UX is terrible!) SpiderOak etc for cloud storage Lots of new things in the pipeline TODO #2 Run an open wireless network! openwireless.org How to do this securely right now? Chain your WPA2 network on a router below your open one. TODO #3 Site operators... Deploy SSL/TLS/HTTPS DEPLOY IT CORRECTLY! This, miserably, is a lot harder than it should be TLS/SSL Authentication Apparently, ~52 countries These are usually specialist, narrowly targetted attacks (but that's several entire other talks... we're working on making HTTPS more secure, easier and saner!) In the mean time, here's what you need A valid certificate HTTPS by default Secure cookies No “mixed content” Perfect Forward Secrecy A well-tuned configuration How do I make HTTPS the default? Firefox and Chrome: redirect, set the HSTS header Safari and IE: sorry, you can't (!!!) What's a secure cookie? Go and check your site right now.. -
The Danger of the New Internet Choke Points
The Danger of the New Internet Choke Points Authored by: Andrei Robachevsky, Christine Runnegar, Karen O’Donoghue and Mat Ford FEBRUARY 2014 Introduction The ongoing disclosures of pervasive surveillance of Internet users’ communications and data by national security agencies have prompted protocol designers, software and hardware vendors, as well as Internet service and content providers, to re-evaluate prevailing security and privacy threat models and to refocus on providing more effective security and confidentiality. At IETF88, there was consensus to address pervasive monitoring as an attack and to consider the pervasive attack threat model when designing a protocol. One area of work currently being pursued by the IETF is the viability of more widespread encryption. While there are some who believe that widely deployed encryption with strong authentication should be used extensively, many others believe that there are practical obstacles to this approach including a general lack of reasonable tools and user understanding as to how to use the technology, plus significant obstacles to scaling infrastructure and services using existing technologies. As a result, the discussion within the IETF has principally focused on opportunistic encryption and weak authentication. “Weak authentication” means cryptographically strong authentication between previously unknown parties without relying on trusted third parties. In certain contexts, and by using certain techniques, one can achieve the desired level of security (see, for instance, Arkko, Nikander. Weak Authentication: How to Authenticate Unknown Principals without Trusted Parties, Security Protocols Workshop, volume 2845 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 5-19. Springer, (2002)). “Opportunistic encryption” refers to encryption without authentication. It is a mode of protocol operation where the content of the communication is secure against passive surveillance, but there is no guarantee that the endpoints are reliably identified. -
Trust Me, I'm a Root CA! Analyzing SSL Root Cas in Modern Browsers
Trust me, I’m a Root CA! Analyzing SSL Root CAs in modern Browsers and Operating Systems Tariq Fadai, Sebastian Schrittwieser Peter Kieseberg, Martin Mulazzani Josef Ressel Center for Unified Threat Intelligence SBA Research, on Targeted Attacks, Austria St. Poelten University of Applied Sciences, Austria Email: [pkieseberg,mmulazzani]@sba-research.org Email: [is101005,sebastian.schrittwieser]@fhstp.ac.at Abstract—The security and privacy of our online communi- tected communications is dependent on the trustworthiness cations heavily relies on the entity authentication mechanisms of various companies and governments. It is therefore of provided by SSL. Those mechanisms in turn heavily depend interest to find out which companies we implicitly trust just on the trustworthiness of a large number of companies and governmental institutions for attestation of the identity of SSL by using different operating system platforms or browsers. services providers. In order to offer a wide and unobstructed In this paper an analysis of the root certificates included in availability of SSL-enabled services and to remove the need various browsers and operating systems is introduced. Our to make a large amount of trust decisions from their users, main contributions are: operating systems and browser manufactures include lists of certification authorities which are trusted for SSL entity • We performed an in-depth analysis of Root Certifi- authentication by their products. This has the problematic cate Authorities in modern operating systems and web effect that users of such browsers and operating systems browsers implicitly trust those certification authorities with the privacy • We correlated them against a variety of trust indexes of their communications while they might not even realize it. -
The Trip to TLS Land Using the WSA Tobias Mayer, Consulting Systems Engineer BRKSEC-3006 Me…
The Trip to TLS Land using the WSA Tobias Mayer, Consulting Systems Engineer BRKSEC-3006 Me… CCIE Security #14390, CISSP & Motorboat driving license… Working in Content Security & IPv6 Security tmayer{at}cisco.com Writing stuff at “blogs.cisco.com” Agenda • Introduction • Understanding TLS • Configuring Decryption on the WSA • Troubleshooting TLS • Thoughts about the Future • Conclusion For Your Reference • There are (many...) slides in your print-outs that will not be presented. • They are there “For your Reference” For Your Reference Microsoft and Google pushing encryption • Microsoft pushing TLS with PFS • Google, FB, Twitter encrypting all traffic • HTTPS usage influencing page ranking on google • Deprecate SHA1, only SHA2+ • Browser Vendors aggressively pushing https • Problems with older TLS versions leading to upgrade of servers to newer protocols and ciphers • Poodle, Freak, Beast, …. Google Search Engine • Google ranking influenced by using HTTPS • http://blog.searchmetrics.com/us/2015 /03/03/https-vs-http-website-ssl-tls- encryption-ranking-seo-secure- connection/ Understanding TLS TLS Versions • SSLv3, 1996 • TLS 1.0, 1999, RFC2246 • TLS 1.1, 2006, RFC4346 • Improved security • TLS 1.2, 2008, RFC5246 • Removed IDEA and DES ciphers • Stronger hashes • Supports authenticated encryption ciphers (AES-GCM) • TLS 1.3, currently Internet Draft Attacks… • POODLE • SSLv3 Problems with Padding, turn of SSLv3 • BEAST • Know issues in CBC mode, use TLS 1.1/1.2 with non-CBC mode ciphers (GCM) • CRIME/BREACH • Compression Data Leak, disable -
SSL Insight Certificate Installation Guide Deployment Guide | SSL Insight Certificate Installation Guide
DEPLOYMENT GUIDE SSL Insight Certificate Installation Guide Deployment Guide | SSL Insight Certificate Installation Guide Table of Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................3 Generating CA Certificates for SSL Insight ...................................................................................................................................................................3 Importing a CA Certificate and Certificate Chain onto the A10 Thunder SSLi Device .....................................................................5 Installing a Certificate in Microsoft Windows 7 for Internet Explorer..........................................................................................................6 Installing a Certificate in Google Chrome ................................................................................................................................................................10 Installing a Certificate in Mozilla Firefox .....................................................................................................................................................................13 About A10 Networks ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................15 -
Certificate Authority Trust List
Certificate Authority Trust List First Published: January 31, 2020 Certificate Authority Trust List The following is the list of trusted Certificate Authorities embedded in the following devices: Cisco IP Phone 7800 Series, as of release 12.7 Cisco IP Phone 8800 Series, as of release 12.7 For Mobile and Remote Access through Expressway, the Expressway server must be signed against one of these Certificate Authorities. Fingerprint Subject 342cd9d3062da48c346965297f081ebc2ef68fdc C=AT, L=Vienna, ST=Austria, O=ARGE DATEN - Austrian Society for Data Protection, OU=GLOBALTRUST Certification Service, CN=GLOBALTRUST, [email protected] 4caee38931d19ae73b31aa75ca33d621290fa75e C=AT, O=A-Trust Ges. f. Sicherheitssysteme im elektr. Datenverkehr GmbH, OU=A-Trust-nQual-03, CN=A- Trust-nQual-03 cd787a3d5cba8207082848365e9acde9683364d8 C=AT, O=A-Trust Ges. f. Sicherheitssysteme im elektr. Datenverkehr GmbH, OU=A-Trust-Qual-02, CN=A- Trust-Qual-02 2e66c9841181c08fb1dfabd4ff8d5cc72be08f02 C=AT, O=A-Trust Ges. f. Sicherheitssysteme im elektr. Datenverkehr GmbH, OU=A-Trust-Root-05, CN=A- Trust-Root-05 84429d9fe2e73a0dc8aa0ae0a902f2749933fe02 C=AU, O=GOV, OU=DoD, OU=PKI, OU=CAs, CN=ADOCA02 51cca0710af7733d34acdc1945099f435c7fc59f C=BE, CN=Belgium Root CA2 a59c9b10ec7357515abb660c4d94f73b9e6e9272 C=BE, O=Certipost s.a., n.v., CN=Certipost E-Trust Primary Normalised CA 742cdf1594049cbf17a2046cc639bb3888e02e33 C=BE, O=Certipost s.a., n.v., CN=Certipost E-Trust Primary Qualified CA Cisco Systems, Inc. www.cisco.com 1 Certificate Authority -
Practical Issues with TLS Client Certificate Authentication
Practical Issues with TLS Client Certificate Authentication Arnis Parsovs Software Technology and Applications Competence Center, Estonia University of Tartu, Estonia [email protected] Abstract—The most widely used secure Internet communication Active security research is being conducted to improve standard TLS (Transport Layer Security) has an optional client password security, educate users on how to resist phishing certificate authentication feature that in theory has significant attacks, and to fix CA trust issues [1], [2]. However, the attacks security advantages over HTML form-based password authenti- mentioned above can be prevented or their impact can be cation. In this paper we discuss practical security and usability greatly reduced by using TLS client certificate authentication issues related to TLS client certificate authentication stemming (CCA), since the TLS CCA on the TLS protocol level protects from the server-side and browser implementations. In particular, we analyze Apache’s mod_ssl implementation on the server the client’s account on a legitimate server from a MITM side and the most popular browsers – Mozilla Firefox, Google attacker even in the case of a very powerful attacker who has Chrome and Microsoft Internet Explorer on the client side. We obtained a valid certificate signed by a trusted CA and who complement our paper with a measurement study performed in thus is able to impersonate the legitimate server. We believe Estonia where TLS client certificate authentication is widely used. that TLS CCA has great potential for improving Internet We present our recommendations to improve the security and security, and therefore in this paper we discuss current issues usability of TLS client certificate authentication. -
Create Decryption Policies to Control HTTPS Traffic in Asyncos 10.0 for Cisco Web Security Appliance
Cisco Web Security Appliance How-To Guide Create Decryption Policies to Control HTTPS Traffic Cisco Public Create Decryption Policies to Control HTTPS Traffic in AsyncOS 10.0 for Cisco Web Security Appliance ©1 2017© 2017 Cisco Cisco and/or and/or its affiliates. its affiliates. All rights All rights reserved. reserved. Cisco Web Security Appliance How-To Guide Create Decryption Policies to Control HTTPS Traffic Cisco Public Contents About This Document 3 Introduction to HTTPS Decryption 3 Enabling HTTPS Detection on the WSA 3 HTTPS Detection on the WSA in Action 4 WSA Certificate Use for HTTPS Decryption 5 Introduction 5 Certificate Overview 5 Root Certificates 6 Server Certificates 6 2 © 2017 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Web Security Appliance How-To Guide Create Decryption Policies to Control HTTPS Traffic Cisco Public About This Document Decryption policies can handle HTTPS traffic in the following ways. This document is for Cisco engineers and customers who will deploy They can: HTTPS decryption on the Cisco® Web Security Appliance (WSA) using • Pass through encrypted traffic AsyncOS® 10.0. • Decrypt traffic and apply content-based access policies defined for This document covers: HTTP traffic. This process also makes malware scanning possible • Introduction to HTTPS decryption • Drop the HTTPS connection • Enabling HTTPS detection on the Web Security Appliance • Monitor the request (taking no final action) as the web proxy continues to evaluate the request against policies that may lead to a • HTTPS detection on the Web Security Appliance in action final drop, pass through, or decryption • Web Security Appliance certificate use for HTTPS decryption Enabling HTTPS Detection on the WSA Introduction to HTTPS Decryption Step 1.