DOCSLIB.ORG

FM 3-13.4. Army Support to Military Deception

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
FM 3-13.4. Army Support to Military Deception FM 3-13.4 Army Support to Military Deception FEBRUARY 2019 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard). FM 3-13.4 Field Manual Headquarters No. 3-13.4 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 26 February 2019 ARMY SUPPORT TO MILITARY DECEPTION Contents Page PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... v Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS ..................................................................................................... 1-1 Overview of Army Military Deception Planning ......................................................... 1-1 Functions of Military Deception ................................................................................. 1-1 Categories of Deception ............................................................................................ 1-1 Key Terms of Military Deception ............................................................................... 1-3 Principles of Deception .............................................................................................. 1-5 Types of Military Deception ....................................................................................... 1-6 Tactics ....................................................................................................................... 1-7 Techniques ................................................................................................................ 1-8 Deception Maxims ..................................................................................................... 1-8 Deception Means ..................................................................................................... 1-11 Information Quality .................................................................................................. 1-13 Roles and Responsibilities ...................................................................................... 1-13 Chapter 2 PLANNING ................................................................................................................ 2-1 Preplanning ............................................................................................................... 2-1 The Army Tactical Deception Planning Process ....................................................... 2-4 Deception Plan Approval ......................................................................................... 2-14 Intelligence Support to Deception Planning ............................................................ 2-14 Legal Considerations ............................................................................................... 2-17 Operations Security and Deception ......................................................................... 2-19 Military Deception as an Information-Related Capability ........................................ 2-20 Integration with Other Information-Related Capabilities .......................................... 2-21 Coordination Requirements ..................................................................................... 2-23 Risk Assessment ..................................................................................................... 2-23 Chapter 3 PREPARATION AND EXECUTION ......................................................................... 3-1 Preparation ................................................................................................................ 3-1 Execution ................................................................................................................... 3-1 Managing the Execution of the Deception Plan ........................................................ 3-3 Terminating Military Deception Operations ............................................................... 3-5 Chapter 4 ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................... 4-1 Assessment Responsibilities ..................................................................................... 4-1 Assessment Plan ....................................................................................................... 4-2 Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance Development ................ 4-2 Appendix A COUNTERDECEPTION ........................................................................................... A-1 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. i Contents Appendix B INPUT TO OPERATION PLANS AND ORDERS .................................................... B-1 Appendix C DECEPTION EVALUATION CHECKLIST ............................................................... C-1 SOURCE NOTES ............................................................................... Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1 REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1 INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1 Figures Figure 2-1. Planning steps ........................................................................................................... 2-12 Figure 3-1. Monitoring activities .................................................................................................... 3-4 Figure B-1. Sample Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) ........................... B-1 Tables Table 1-1. Deception differences ................................................................................................... 1-2 Table 1-2. Sample deception techniques ...................................................................................... 1-8 Table 2-1. The Army tactical deception planning process in the military decisionmaking process 2-4 Table 2-2. Sample terminations ................................................................................................... 2-14 ii FM 3-13.4 26 February 2019 Preface This field manual aims to provide techniques to assist planners in planning, coordinating, executing, synchronizing, and assessing military deception (MILDEC). While the means and techniques may evolve over generations, the principles and fundamentals of deception planning remain constant. FM 3-13.4 applies to all members of the Army profession: leaders, Soldiers, Army Civilians, and contractors. The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders, staffs, and all leaders. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication as a guide for teaching MILDEC. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.) FM 3-13.4 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. FM 3-13.4 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIOP) Office. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (FM 3-13.4), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org- [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. 26 February 2019 FM 3-13.4 iii This page intentionally left blank. Introduction When properly resourced and integrated, deception has the potential to deter or induce actions that are favorable to the force and can increase the success of friendly activity. In the same way that operations transition from one phase to the next, deception plans integrated into each phase and through each transition will strengthen the ability of commanders to retain initiative throughout the operation. Successfully planned deceptions give commanders the ability to act faster than the enemy can make decisions, creating positions of relative advantage. Deception, as part of a broader strategy, is present in military case studies. While deception has its roots in the earliest military strategies, the modern day practical study of deception relies largely on case studies from World War I to present day. The availability of actual participants for interviews combined with detailed
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Threat Defense: Cyber Deception Approach and Education for Resilience in Hybrid Threats Model
    S S symmetry Article Threat Defense: Cyber Deception Approach and Education for Resilience in Hybrid Threats Model William Steingartner 1,* , Darko Galinec 2 and Andrija Kozina 3 1 Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Informatics, Technical University of Košice, Letná 9, 042 00 Košice, Slovakia 2 Department of Informatics and Computing, Zagreb University of Applied Sciences, Vrbik 8, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia; [email protected] 3 Dr. Franjo Tudman¯ Croatian Defence Academy, 256b Ilica Street, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] Abstract: This paper aims to explore the cyber-deception-based approach and to design a novel conceptual model of hybrid threats that includes deception methods. Security programs primarily focus on prevention-based strategies aimed at stopping attackers from getting into the network. These programs attempt to use hardened perimeters and endpoint defenses by recognizing and blocking malicious activities to detect and stop attackers before they can get in. Most organizations implement such a strategy by fortifying their networks with defense-in-depth through layered prevention controls. Detection controls are usually placed to augment prevention at the perimeter, and not as consistently deployed for in-network threat detection. This architecture leaves detection gaps that are difficult to fill with existing security controls not specifically designed for that role. Rather than using prevention alone, a strategy that attackers have consistently succeeded against, defenders Citation: Steingartner, W.; are adopting a more balanced strategy that includes detection and response. Most organizations Galinec, D.; Kozina, A. Threat Defense: Cyber Deception Approach deploy an intrusion detection system (IDS) or next-generation firewall that picks up known attacks and Education for Resilience in or attempts to pattern match for identification.
    [Show full text]
  • Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Counterintelligence - Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty
    #RSAC SESSION ID: CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - DECEPTION, DISTORTION, DISHONESTY Jeff Bardin Dr. Khatuna Mshvidobadze Chief Intelligence Officer Principal Treadstone 71 Cyberlight Global Associates @Treadstone71LLC [email protected] 5 2 Agenda Taxonomy Types of Denial Deception Dimensions of D&D Tactics Deception Chain (see your handout) and Deception Planning D&D Russian Historical Information Criminals & Kids Notable Events Georgia US Election Background Warfare Dis-information / France – Information Complexity of Formation of cyber Troll Factories Major Players TV5Monde Warfare on Social Outsourcing troops Media Forming public Interagency Socio-Cultural Conclusions - opinion Rivalries Differences Recommendations 3 Denial and Deception - Lifecycle Types of Denial and Deception Resource Diversion Uncertainty Intelligence Proactivity Depletion • Direct an • Waste an • Cause the • Monitor and • Use adversary’s adversary’s adversary to analyze deception attention time and doubt the adversary techniques to from real energy on veracity of a behavior detect assets toward obtaining and discovered during previously bogus ones. analyzing vulnerability intrusion unknown false or stolen attempts to attacks that information. information. inform future other defense defensive efforts. tools may miss. 4 Deception Planning Consideration of all critical components of the operation. Deny, deceive, create propaganda RSA Conference - Bardin and Mshvidobadze Western Dogs Dogs Lie Like Dotards - We will hack their sites and bring them down 5 Dimensions
    [Show full text]
  • Emergency Operations Center How-To Quick Reference Guide August 2021
    National Incident Management System Emergency Operations Center How-To Quick Reference Guide August 2021 This page intentionally left blank Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 9 1. Purpose ...................................................................................................................................... 9 1.1. NIMS Compliance and Integration ................................................................................. 9 What Is an EOC? ........................................................................................................................ 10 1. Hallmarks of an EOC ............................................................................................................... 10 Preliminary Assessments .......................................................................................................... 12 1. Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment .................................................................................... 12 2. Resilience Analysis and Planning Tool ................................................................................... 12 3. Capability Assessment ............................................................................................................ 13 3.1. Interagency Coordination ............................................................................................. 13 3.2. Multiagency Coordination Groups ..............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Cues to Deception
    Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 2003, Vol. 129, No. 1, 74–118 0033-2909/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74 Cues to Deception Bella M. DePaulo James J. Lindsay University of Virginia University of Missouri—Columbia Brian E. Malone Laura Muhlenbruck, Kelly Charlton, and University of Virginia Harris Cooper University of Missouri—Columbia Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? The combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported. Results show that in some ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They also make a more negative impression and are more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents. However, many behaviors showed no discernible links, or only weak links, to deceit. Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed, especially when the motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material. Cues to deception were also stronger when lies were about transgressions. Do people behave in discernibly different ways when they are Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1986; Zuckerman & Driver, lying compared with when they are telling the truth? Practitioners 1985), but the number of additional estimates was small. Other and laypersons have been interested in this question for centuries reviews have been more comprehensive but not quantitative (see (Trovillo, 1939). The scientific search for behavioral cues to Vrij, 2000, for the most recent of these). In the present review, we deception is also longstanding and has become especially vigorous summarize quantitatively the results of more than 1,300 estimates in the past few decades.
    [Show full text]
  • Rptr Bryant Edtr Rosen Americans at Risk
    1 RPTR BRYANT EDTR ROSEN AMERICANS AT RISK: MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION IN THE DIGITAL AGE WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 8, 2020 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jan Schakowsky [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Schakowsky, Castor, Veasey, Kelly, O'Halleran, Lujan, Cardenas, Blunt Rochester, Soto, Matsui, McNerney, Dingell, Pallone (ex officio), Rodgers, Burgess, Latta, Guthrie, Bucshon, Hudson, Carter, and Walden (ex officio). Staff Present: Jeff Carroll, Staff Director; Evan Gilbert, Deputy Press Secretary; Lisa Goldman, Senior Counsel; Waverly Gordon, Deputy Chief Counsel; Tiffany Guarascio, 2 Deputy Staff Director; Alex Hoehn-Saric, Chief Counsel, Communications and Consumer Protection; Zach Kahan, Outreach and Member Service Coordinator; Joe Orlando, Staff Assistant; Alivia Roberts, Press Assistant; Chloe Rodriguez, Policy Analyst; Sydney Terry, Policy Coordinator; Anna Yu Professional Staff Member; Mike Bloomquist, Minority Staff Director; S.K. Bowen, Minority Press Assistant; William Clutterbuck, Minority Staff Assistant; Jordan Davis, Minority Senior Advisor; Tyler Greenberg, Minority Staff Assistant; Peter Kielty, Minority General Counsel; Ryan Long, Minority Deputy Staff Director; Mary Martin, Minority Chief Counsel, Energy & Environment & Climate Change; Brandon Mooney, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel, Energy; Brannon Rains, Minority Legislative Clerk; Zack Roday, Minority Communications Director; and Peter Spencer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member, Environment & Climate Change. 3 Ms. Schakowsky. Good morning, everyone. The Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce will now come to order. We will begin with member statements, and I will begin by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
    [Show full text]
  • Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives
    Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives by Lani Kass and J. Phillip “Jack” London Lani Kass, Ph.D., is a Corporate Strategic Advisor at CACI International. Kass previously served as a Senior Policy Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She was the first woman to serve as Professor of Military Strategy at the National War College. J. Phillip London, Ph.D., is Chairman of the Board of CACI International. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he spent 24 years on active and reserve duty. London is the recipient of numerous industry awards and serves on several boards, including the U.S. Naval Institute and CAUSE. The views presented here are the authors’ alone. This article is a tribute to the National War College’s distinguished graduates, among them Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and literally hundreds of senior diplomats, warriors and statesmen. Abstract: This article frames the highly complex national security challenges of surprise, denial and deception. These ultimate asymmetric threats exploit vulnerabilities, capitalizing on hubris, complacency and self-delusion. Such actions prevent the full and accurate assessment of opponents’ capabilities and intentions, and hinder appropriate actions. The long and frequent history of surprise, denial and deception suggest that these are essentially psychological phenomena. They are effective because they challenge and exploit perceptions that fill the gap between what is known and unknown. The authors present decision superiority as the fusion of information dominance and decisive action. Technology and intelligence can enhance decision superiority by ameliorating, but not eliminating, the limits of human perception.
    [Show full text]
  • International Spy Museum
    International Spy Museum Searchable Master Script, includes all sections and areas Area Location, ID, Description Labels, captions, and other explanatory text Area 1 – Museum Lobby M1.0.0.0 ΚΑΤΆΣΚΟΠΟΣ SPY SPION SPIJUN İSPİYON SZPIEG SPIA SPION ESPION ESPÍA ШПИОН Language of Espionage, printed on SCHPION MAJASUSI windows around entrance doors P1.1.0.0 Visitor Mission Statement For Your Eyes Only For Your Eyes Only Entry beyond this point is on a need-to-know basis. Who needs to know? All who would understand the world. All who would glimpse the unseen hands that touch our lives. You will learn the secrets of tradecraft – the tools and techniques that influence battles and sway governments. You will uncover extraordinary stories hidden behind the headlines. You will meet men and women living by their wits, lurking in the shadows of world affairs. More important, however, are the people you will not meet. The most successful spies are the unknown spies who remain undetected. Our task is to judge their craft, not their politics – their skill, not their loyalty. Our mission is to understand these daring professionals and their fallen comrades, to recognize their ingenuity and imagination. Our goal is to see past their maze of mirrors and deception to understand their world of intrigue. Intelligence facts written on glass How old is spying? First record of spying: 1800 BC, clay tablet from Hammurabi regarding his spies. panel on left side of lobby First manual on spy tactics written: Over 2,000 years ago, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. 6 video screens behind glass panel with facts and images.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Watches the Watchmen? the Conflict Between National Security and Freedom of the Press
    WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN WATCHES WHO WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN WATCHES WHO I see powerful echoes of what I personally experienced as Director of NSA and CIA. I only wish I had access to this fully developed intellectual framework and the courses of action it suggests while still in government. —General Michael V. Hayden (retired) Former Director of the CIA Director of the NSA e problem of secrecy is double edged and places key institutions and values of our democracy into collision. On the one hand, our country operates under a broad consensus that secrecy is antithetical to democratic rule and can encourage a variety of political deformations. But the obvious pitfalls are not the end of the story. A long list of abuses notwithstanding, secrecy, like openness, remains an essential prerequisite of self-governance. Ross’s study is a welcome and timely addition to the small body of literature examining this important subject. —Gabriel Schoenfeld Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Author of Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law (W.W. Norton, May 2010). ? ? The topic of unauthorized disclosures continues to receive significant attention at the highest levels of government. In his book, Mr. Ross does an excellent job identifying the categories of harm to the intelligence community associated NI PRESS ROSS GARY with these disclosures. A detailed framework for addressing the issue is also proposed. This book is a must read for those concerned about the implications of unauthorized disclosures to U.S. national security. —William A. Parquette Foreign Denial and Deception Committee National Intelligence Council Gary Ross has pulled together in this splendid book all the raw material needed to spark a fresh discussion between the government and the media on how to function under our unique system of government in this ever-evolving information-rich environment.
    [Show full text]
  • ATP 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis
    ATP 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis JANUARY 2020 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes ATP 2-33.4, dated 18 August 2014. Headquarters, Department of the Army This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (https://armypubs.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard). *ATP 2-33.4 Army Techniques Publication Headquarters No. 2-33.4 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 10 January 2020 Intelligence Analysis Contents Page PREFACE............................................................................................................. vii INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... xi PART ONE FUNDAMENTALS Chapter 1 UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS ............................................. 1-1 Intelligence Analysis Overview ........................................................................... 1-1 Conducting Intelligence Analysis ........................................................................ 1-5 Intelligence Analysis and Collection Management ............................................. 1-8 The All-Source Intelligence Architecture and Analysis Across the Echelons ..... 1-9 Intelligence Analysis During Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations ........... 1-11 Intelligence Analysis During the Army’s Other Strategic Roles ........................ 1-13 Chapter 2 THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PROCESS ..................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Untitled Essay, 1946 Intelligence Overload These Days
    CONTENTS OVERVIEW ................................................................. vi INTRODUCTION: The Name of the Game: Let’s Define Our Terms ........... vii CHAPTER 1 HOW TO DECEIVE: Principles & Process 1.1 Deception as Applied Psychology....................................... 1 1.2 The Basic Principle: Naturalness........................................ 6 1.3 The Structure of Deception ............................................ 7 1.4 The Process of Deception............................................ 13 CHAPTER 2 INTERFACE: Deceiver versus Detective 2.1 Weaving the Web .................................................. 16 2.2 Unraveling the Web................................................. 17 CHAPTER 3 HOW TO DETECT: 10 General Principles 3.1 Cognitive Biases that Inhibit Detection .................................. 20 3.2 Overcoming Information Overload...................................... 20 3.3 The Analysts: Minimalists versus Compleatists ........................... 22 3.4 The Analyst’s Advantage............................................. 23 3.5 Categories ........................................................ 24 3.6 Know Your Enemy: Empathy & Inference................................ 32 3.7 Channels ......................................................... 34 3.8 Senses & Sensors.................................................. 35 3.9 Cultural Factors.................................................... 39 3.10 Asymmetries: Technological & Cognitive ................................ 40 CHAPTER 4 HOW TO DETECT: 20
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception
    BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34,1–56 doi:10.1017/S0140525X10001354 The evolution and psychology of self-deception William von Hippel School of Psychology, University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia [email protected] http://www.psy.uq.edu.au/directory/index.html?id¼1159 Robert Trivers Department of Anthropology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 [email protected] http://anthro.rutgers.edu/ index.php?option¼com_content&task¼view&id¼102&Itemid¼136 Abstract: In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived.
    [Show full text]