Civil Military Relations in Pakistan

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN:

MUSHARRAF’S ERA (1999 – 2003)

PhD DISSERTATION

Submitted by

Noel Israel Khokhar, HI (M)

Reg. No: NDU-IR/PhD- 11/F-008

Supervisor

Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema

Department of International Relations

Faculty of Contemporary Studies

National Defence University

Islamabad Pakistan

2016

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN: MUSHARRAF’S ERA (1999

– 2003)

Submitted by

Noel I Khokhar, HI (M)

Reg. No: NDU-IR/PhD -11/F-008

Supervisor

Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema

This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence University,

Islamabad in partial fulfilment for degree of PhD in International Relations

Department of International Relations

Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University

Islamabad – Pakistan

2016

Certificate of Completion

It is hereby recommended that the dissertation submitted by Noel Israel Khokhar titled:

‘Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: Musharraf’s Era (1999-2003)’ has been accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in the discipline of International Relations.

______

Supervisor

Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema

______

External Examiner

Countersigned by

______

Controller of Examination Head of Department

Tauqir Ahmed Dr. Mohammad Khan

SUPERVISOR’S DECLARATION

This is to certify that PhD dissertation submitted by Noel Israel Khokhar, HI(M) titled

“Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: Musharraf’s Era (1999-2003)” is supervised by me and is submitted to meet the requirements of PhD degree.

Dated______Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema

Supervisor

STUDENTS DECLARATION

I hereby declare the thesis submitted by me titled “Civil Military Relations in Pakistan:

Musharraf’s Era (1999-2003)” is based on my own research work and has not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree.

Dated:______Noel Israel Khokhar, HI(M)

PhD Scholar

DEDICATION

To my family

ABSTRACT

Military coups in Pakistan have recurred frequently. This research studies the case of Gen

Musharraf’s coup in the backdrop of conceptual framework for democratic consolidation witnessed after Gen Zia. It employs theoretical perspective furnished by approaches for democratisation with a focus on transition approach to understand contributions of political elite, the independent variable and the military, the dependent variable which resulted in military takeover and military rule. The research assesses, why Huntington’s

‘separation and objective control’ for rendering military apolitical has not been effective in Pakistan and explores alternative explanations to construct mechanisms for democratic control of military. Hypothesised on criticality of the role of political and military elite for democratic consolidation, it strives to answer four research questions, why political elite repeatedly created situations necessitating military intervention, why military took over in 1999, how successful was the military regime in realising its aspirations and why

Gen Musharraf did not return democracy to the country in 2002 as required by the

Supreme Court judgement. The research design employs mixed methods technique, acquires qualitative thematic data and validates it against conceptual framework.

Simultaneously it acquires quantitative numerical data to obtain societal perspectives from opinion makers in the country and then integrates the two through ‘concurrent triangulation method’ to extract findings and proffer recommendations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The process of earning a doctorate and writing a dissertation especially when you are also simultaneously heading a research institute is arduous and stressful. It cannot be done single handed for which I am thankful to my wife, Aksa for supporting me relentlessly throughout my service and this research, my children Zohair, Elishma and

Maresha for their unfailing support and especially my late parents, who envisioned. I would like to express my gratitude to Pakistan Army, National Defence University and

Faculty of Contemporary Studies for enabling me to realise my dream. Thanks are due to Dr Khan and Department of International Relations for facilitating me in completing the process and the dissertation. I am thankful to my staff and Research Associates

Beenish and

Qurat ul Ain for ensuring that the script is error free. I am especially indebted to

Research Associate Abdul Rauf for his excellent abilities, knowledge and diligence. I am hugely indebted to Dr Saif for his experience, guidance and painstaking support in conducting the field survey and to Sufian for collating survey data and testing it for reliability and validity. I am thankful to the NDU Library staff, Mr Obaid Anwar of

PASTIC for promptly meeting my constant craving for books and periodicals.

I wish to acknowledge that I have personally grown and developed in the process of the research and better understand my profession and its contextual relationship to national security and development. Most of all, I am hugely indebted to Dr Pervez Iqbal Cheema, my supervisor for his understanding, wisdom, patience and encouragement for pushing me farther than I thought I could go.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Serial Content Title Pages 1 Abstract vii 2 Acknowledgment viii

3 Table of Contents ix 4 List of Tables xii 5 List of Charts xiv 6 List of Abbreviations / Acronyms xv 7 Introduction Prelude 1 Problem Statement 16 Hypothesis 17 Research Questions 17 Research Objectives 19 Literature Review 19 Knowledge Gap 33 Significance of the Research 33 Scope and Limitations 34 Research Methodology 35 Organisation of the Study 39 Summation 42 8 Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Perspective 1.1 Prelude 44 1.2 Civil Military Relations: Conceptual Framework 44 1.3 The Core Question and Explanation 48 1.4 Democracy and Political Construction 49 1.5 Civilian Control of Military 65 1.6 Military Coups 74 1.7 Interests: National and Institutional Determinants 83

1.8 Summation 90 9 Chapter 2: Democratic Construction after Gen Zia 2.1 Prelude 91 2.2 Role of Military after Gen Zia 94

2.3 Benazir’s First Term: December 1988 – August 1990 97 2.4 Nawaz Sharif’s First Term: November 1990 – July 1993 104 2.5 Benazir’s Second Term: October 1993 – November 1996 109 2.6 Nawaz Sharif’s Second Term: February 1997 – October 1999 113 2.7 Trends in Democratisation and Civil Military Relations 125 2.8 Summation 128 10 Chapter 3: Breakdown of Civil Military Relations 1988 – 1999 3.1 Prelude 130 3.2 Gen Karamat’s Resignation and its Impact 132 3.3 Kargil Conflict 138 3.4 Coup and Counter Coup 150 3.5 Summation 157 11 Chapter 4: Military Regime’s Aspiration 4.1 Prelude 160 4.2 Military Government – A Conceptual Framework 161 4.3 Accruing Technical Expertise to Govern 163 4.4 Setting Political Agenda 164 4.5 Legitimacy 166 4.6 Endogenous Challenges 170 4.7 Exogenous Challenges 184 4.8 Civil Military Relations during Musharraf’s Regime 192 4.9 Summation 202 12 Chapter 5: Democracy and Civil Military Relations – A Survey 5.1 Prelude 204 5.2 Survey and its Interface with the Research 205 5.3 Characteristics of the Sample 208 5.4 Survey Respondents 209 5.5 Reliability and Validity 213 5.6 Principle Results 214 5.7 Summation 237

13 Findings and Recommendations Prelude 239 Democratic Consolidation 240 Responsibility of Judiciary 243 Civil Military Relations 245 Democratic Control of Military 252 National Security Architecture 254 Healing the Relations 255 Summation 256 14 Conclusion 257 15 Appendix A. Questionnaire 259 B. Interview Questionnaire 263 C. GALLUP Poll and its Linkage with Survey 264 D. Kargil Map 269 16 Bibliography 270

LIST OF TABLES Serial Table Page 1 Civil and Military Regimes in Pakistan – 1947-2002 2 2 Results of 1970 Elections 8 1.1 Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Perspectives 47 1.2 Approaches to Democratisation 64 1.3 Civilian Control Matrix 66 1.4 Old and New Professionalism 71 1.5 Structural Reasons for a Military Coup 77 1.6 Triggers for Military Coup 78 2.1 Results General Elections 1988 – National Assembly 97 2.2 Results of 1990 Elections 104 2.3 Results of 1993 Elections 110

2.4 Results of 1997 Elections 114 2.5 Economic Growth under Different Political Regimes 127 3.1 A Comparison of Versions among COAS, Foreign Minister 146 and Prime Minister about Kargil Conflict

4.1 Timeline for Return of Democracy 167 4.2 Changes in Key Macroeconomic Indicators – October 199 174 to September 2003

4.3 Defence Expenditure as % of GDP 174 4.4 Results 2002 Elections 197 5.1 Distribution of Questionnaire 208 5.2 Profession 209 5.3 Gender 210 5.4 Education 210 5.5 Age 211 5.6 Reliability Statistics 213 5.7 Key: Reliability Statistics 213 5.8 Response Question 5 215 5.9 Response Question 7 215 5.10 Response Question 1 218 5.11 Response Question 12 218 5.12 Response Question 3 220 5.13 Response Question 6 221 5.14 Response Question 8 222 5.15 Response Question 9 223 5.16 Response Question 11 225 5.17 Response Question 12 226 5.18 Response Question 13 228 5.19 Response Question 14 230 5.20 Response Question 15 232 5.21 Response Question 10 233 5.22 Response Question 4 235

5.23 Response Question 16 237

LIST OF CHARTS Serial Chart Page 5.1 Response Question 1 217

5.2 Response Question 2 219 5.3 Response Question 3 220

5.4 Response Question 6 221 5.5 Response Question 8 223

5.6 Response Question 9 224 5.7 Response Question 11 225 5.8 Response Question 12 227

5.9 Response Question 13 229 5.10 Response Question 14 231

5.11 Response Question 15 232 5.12 Response Question 10 234

5.13 Response Question 4 235 5.14 Response Question 16 237

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS / ACRONYMS ACE Anti Corruption Establishment ADP Agriculture Development Bank AG Adjutant General AIG Afghan Interim Government ANP Awami National Party BBC British Broad Casters BD Basis Democracies BJP Bhartia Janta Party CGS Chief of General Staff

CJCSC Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee CMLA Chief Martial Law Administrator CMR civil military relations COAS Chief of Army Staff CoD Charter of Democracy COP Combined Opposition Parties CRB Central Board of Revenue DCAF Democratic Control of Armed Forces Geneva Centre DCC Defence Committee of Cabinet DCO District Coordination Officer DG Director General DGMO Director General Military Operations ECP Election Commission of Pakistan EUEOM European Union Election Observation Mission FSF Federal Security Force GDP gross domestic product Gen General GHQ General Headquarters HDO Higher Defence Organization IHK Indian Held Kashmir

IJI Islamic Jamoori Itihad IMF International Monetary Fund ISI Inter Services Intelligence ISPR Inter Services Public Relation JSHQ Joint Staff Head Quarter KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa LFO Legal Framework Order LGO Local Government Ordinance LOC Line of Control Lt Lieutenant

MMA Mutihida Majlis-e-Amal MoD Ministry of Defence MoDP Minister of Defence Production MQM Mohajir Quami Movement MRD Movement for Restoration of Democracy NA Northern Alliance NAB National Accountability Bureau NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCAs National Command Authority NDU National Defence University NIC National Identity Card NLI Northern Light Infantry NPT Non Proliferation Treaty NRB National Reconstruction Bureau NSC National Security Council NWFP North West Frontier Province PAC Public Accounts Committee PASTIC Pakistan Scientific and Technological Information Centre PAT Pakistan Awami Tehrik PCO Provisional Constitution Order PDA Pakistan Democratic Alliance PIA Pakistan International Airlines PID Press and Information Department PILDAT Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency PKR Pakistani Rupee PML(J) Pakistan Muslim League Jamiat PML-N Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz PML-Q Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) PNA Pakistan National Alliance PNA Pakistan National Alliance PPP Pakistan People’s Party

PPP-P Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarian PTI Pakistan Tehrek- e-Insaf PTV Pakistan Television Network SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SBP State Bank of Pakistan UK United Kingdom UNSC United Nation Security Council USA United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic VCOAS Voice Chief of Army Staff VIP Very Important Person WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority

INTRODUCTION

“Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and

prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being

of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work

in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound

to succeed.”1

Mr Jinnah’s Presidential Address to Constituent Assembly 11 August 1947

Prelude

The study of civil military relations underscores two trajectories, in countries where people have not experienced a military takeover, the focus remains on civilian control of the military. In countries where people have witnessed military takeovers, the focus expands to incorporate issues related to military takeovers, military regime and transition to democracy besides civilian control over the military. Pakistan falls in the second country therefore the study of politics, power struggle and process of democratisation in Pakistan due to repeated military takeovers presents a dilemma.

Since inception, the political elite, military and judiciary have conflicted and colluded in a variety of ways to influence the process of state and nation building. Resultantly the country has regularly alternated between civil and military rules, Till 2002, the country has been directly ruled by the military for seventeen years and for fifteen years by an elected government under a military President. For seventeen years, there had been a civilian government under a civilian President and for eleven years, it had been

1 ‘Independence Day Supplement’, Dawn, 14 August 1999.

ruled by semi civilian non-elected governments during the first decade after the independence.

In the process of state building two competing binary trends are evident. The civilian political elite prefer a federation with parliamentary system of government (1956 and

1973 Constitutions). Contrarily, the military’s choice had been a presidential system of government (1962 Constitution). General (Gen) Zia-ul-Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf during their rule, while living with 1973 Constitution, had fostered division of power i.e. a de facto presidential system with emphasis on grass root democracy through local governments. 2 The alternations between civil and military rule and attempts to formulate and practice two different types of governments has had numerous adverse effects. It in the main has impeded the process of democratisation consolidation, maturing of democratic culture and values. These alternations are tabulated below.

Table 1: Civil and Military Regimes in Pakistan – 1947-20023

Structure of Leadership Duration Period

(1) 1947-1951: Liaquat Ali Khan (2) 1951-1953: Muhammad Ali Bogra Semi civilian (non- 11 Years 1947- (3) 1953-1955: Ch Muhammad Ali elected)government 1958 (4) 1956-1957: H.S. Suhrawardy (5) 1957-1958: Sir Feroz Khan Noon (1) 1958-1962: Ayub Khan (2) 1969-1971: Yahya Khan Direct military rule 17 Years (3) 1977-1985: Zia ul Haq (4) 1999-2002: Pervez Musharraf Elected government under a (1) 1962-1969: Ayub Khan 10 Years military president (2) 1985-1988: Zia ul Haq

2 The Constitution of 1971 was abrogated by Gen Zia and then restored as part of an agreement and later Gen Musharraf also maintained the constitution and worked within it. However in both cases the power was redistributed to render the Prime Minister accountable to the President with latter enjoying arbitrary powers to dismiss the prime minister and his government. 3 Siegfried O. Wolf and Seth Kane, ‘Democratic Ambitions under Praetorian Stress - Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan’, in Democracy under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia, ed. Paul Chambers and Aurel Croissant (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, 2010), 171–200. 17

Elected government under a civilian (1) 1971-1973: Zulfiqar Bhutto (President) president (2) 1973-1977: Zulfiqar Bhutto 17 Years (3) 1988-1990: Benazir Bhutto

(4) 1990-1993: Nawaz Sharif

(5) 1993-1996: Benazir Bhutto (6) 1997-1999: Nawaz Sharif The aforementioned history presents contradictory narratives. The political elite blame the military interventions and dominance for lack of democratic consolidation. The military on the other hand faults political elite for their undemocratic attitude, inept governance and corruption leading to institutional decay. Most importantly, in military’s opinion the political elite instead of delivering good governance and advancing national interests employ the façade of democracy to advance their personal interests with least interest in institution building. The intra elite conflicts and inability to resolve them through political institutions while weakens the country it also drags military into politics which sometimes leads to military takeover.

In the international and local academia, both sides have their own sets of exponents.

Scholars, studying the interventionist behaviour of the military, trace the problem to its initial formation and its class composition. 4 Others like Askari,5 Shafqat6 and Shah7 opine that involvement of military in internal and external affairs has created a military hegemonic system which consequences into military’s intervention in politics. 8 The military on the other hand, considers that “army could not remain unaffected by the conditions around it.”9 It has to respond to the political developments like Gen Jehangir

4 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, ‘“Punjabisation” in the British Indian Army 1857-1947 and the Advent of Military Rule in Pakistan’, Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies, no. 24 (2010): 1–32. 5 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Progressive Publishers, 1974). 6 Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zufikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 7 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 8 The monthly meeting of Corps Commanders keeps eye on political situation in the country and discuss remedial measures while the COAS brings these to the notice of incumbent prime minister when the need arises. 9 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967). ‘Nor was it conceivable that officers and men would react to all the political chicanery,

Karamat suggested the need for National Security Council (NSC)10 and Gen Musharraf opined that “if you want to keep them [military] out, bring them in”.10

A brief recount of history of civil military relations indicates that the first martial law was imposed before the partition after Jallianwala Bagh incident in 1919.11 The second occurred after independence in 1953 to quell disturbances related to Ahamdiya issue and food shortages in Punjab.12 However during these episodes the notion of civilian supremacy continued to hold sway both during the British Raj and even after the independence.14 The notion of civilian supremacy was progressively eroded because of civilian reliance on military for combating security and survival challenges, it reduced the distance between civilian and military domains.15 This inadvertent process of

‘political integration of the military’ commenced with the struggle for liberation of

Kashmir and during the ensuing Indian occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 13

The martial law of 1953, followed by induction of serving Army Chief, Gen

Muhammad Ayub Khan as Defence Minister, further reduced the distance. These

intrigue, corruption, and inefficiency manifest in every sphere of life.’ 10Tim Mcgirk, ‘The General Speaks Out’, Time, 19 October 1998; Sumaira Khan, ‘Battling Militancy: Govt Revives National Security Council’, The Express Tribune, 23 August 2013. 10 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006). 11 The 1919 Jallianwala Bagh massacre in the northern Indian city of Amritsar was ordered by General R.E.H. Dyer. On Sunday April 13, 1919, which happened to be 'Baisakhi', one of Punjab’s largest religious festivals, fifty British Indian Army soldiers, commanded by Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, began shooting at an unarmed gathering of men, women, and children without warning. He marched his fifty riflemen to a raised bank and ordered them to kneel and fire. He ordered soldiers to reload their rifles several times and they were ordered to shoot to kill. Official British Raj sources estimated the fatalities at 379, and with 1,100 wounded. Civil Surgeon Dr Williams DeeMeddy indicated that there were 1,526 casualties. However, the casualty number quoted by the Indian National Congress was more than 1,500, with roughly 1,000 killed. 12 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press Karachi, 2009). 14Wolf and Kane, ‘Democratic Ambitions under Praetorian Stress.’, 188. 15Ibid.190. 13 Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Pak Publishers, 1970). Kashmir issue arose between India and Pakistan in 1947 over accession of State of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the principals of partition. Comprising majority Muslim population, the State should have been allowed to join Pakistan however Maharaja Hari Singh delayed the decision which resulted into an uprising in the State and subsequent occupation of State by India premised on devise accession agreement. The matter was referred to UN by India and UNSC in accordance with its resolution asked plebiscite to decide the future of State. However till to date, plebiscite has been denied by India and the issue still persists as denial of self-determination to the people of Kashmir. 19

political decisions introduced army’s leadership very early into politics, policy formulation and governance arena.

Simultaneously the process of state and nation building witnessed acute turmoil. Four

Prime Ministers were prematurely removed and equal numbers of constituent assemblies were dissolved before finally agreeing to the first ever 1956 Constitution.

However, in order to pre-empt loss of power which he anticipated as a consequence of the forthcoming general elections, President Iskandar Mirza imposed a martial law. He appointed Gen Ayub as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) on 8 October

1958 and abrogated the constitution. 14 The arrangement for co-sharing of power between a President hailing from bureaucracy15 and military could not last for more than a few days. On 24 October 1958, Gen Ayub Khan ousted President Mirza and gained complete control of power which lasted till 25 March 1969.16 In summary, these events reveal that the first attempt for democratisation in the country ended in a failure.

Evidently the political elite could not develop consensus on application of 1956

Constitution, had they been able to put aside their differences and hold elections in accordance with the constitution, the first step towards democratic consolidation could

14 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. After nine years of effort, Pakistan succeeded in framing a Constitution which became effective on 23 March 1956. President kept on delaying the holding of general elections according to the constitution until it was finally decided that they will be held in November 1958. 15 Iskandar Mirza was born on November 15, 1899, in a feudal family of Bengal. He was inducted into the British Indian Army in 1919. In 1926, he left the army, joined the Indian Political Service and was posted as Assistant Commissioner in North West Frontier Province. He was promoted to District Officer in 1931. Before the creation of Pakistan, he served the Ministry of Defense, Government of India, as a Joint Secretary. Being the senior-most Muslim Civil Servant in the Indian Ministry of Defense, Iskandar Mirza was appointed as the first Defense Secretary of Pakistan at the time of Independence. He served at this position for about seven years. With the dismissal of the United Front’s Ministry in East Pakistan, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad decided to enforce Governor’s Rule in the province and appointed Iskandar Mirza as Governor in May 1954. 16 Khan, Friends Not Masters. He writes that martial law was imposed as ‘the central authority’ had collapsed’ after imposing martial law the President started dividing the armed forces and asked an air force officer to arrest Gen Ayub who had just returned from East Pakistan, the Gen and his steam assessed that since Martial Law had been imposed and Chief Martial Law Administrator had been appointed the office of President was redundant, therefore he was relieved and was settled in England.

have been taken early in country’s history. It indicates that the role of political elite is crucial for furthering democracy. The independent variable of politics generates pull and push effects on the dependent variable of military, which then responds in accordance with its own political views. The persistent political commotion in the country from 1947 to 1958 and repeated employment of military on a variety of tasks also pulled them into politics.17 On the other hand, poor governance created insecurity and instability, pushing the military commanders into action to take control and rectify the situation.18 Therefore, when Gen Ayub took over he was initially welcomed by a large segment of population as the only way out of the mess created by the politicians in the first eleven years.19

Gen Ayub’s ten years rule can be divided in two periods. The first (1958-1965), stands out for significant changes and all round achievements, while the second (1965-1968) reflects the undoing of these achievements by its own creator. He created a balance viz

India by joining the western alliance during the cold war and accrued assistance in different dimensions. He fostered green and industrial revolution and stood up to obscurantist forces. Although, he was not successful in undoing the feudal class, yet he diluted their effect by adding an industrialist class albeit comprising few families to the polity. He was called a benevolent dictator and despite all the shortfalls, his tenure is regarded as a period of stability in the history of Pakistan. 20 However, it was also detrimental to the consolidation of democracy. The “misadventure” of 1965 war marked

17 Ibid., 72. 18 Refer to Table 1.1; in eleven years six prime minister changed and between 1955 and 1957 four prime minister changed hands. 19 Kalim Bahadur, Democracy in Pakistan: Crises and Conflicts (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1998). 20 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. 195.

the beginning of his end.21 After the war dissatisfied by the behaviour of United States of America (USA) he pursued a more independent foreign policy and built a lasting relationship with China and attempted to normalise relations with Soviet Union.

In the context of civil military relations in Pakistan, Gen Ayub’s tenure raises number of issues. Firstly, he interrupted the process of democratisation and persisted with martial law with disastrous consequences. Secondly, the constitution of 1962 ran contrary to the political genius of the polity which preferred a federation, a parliamentary style of government hence the constitution of 1962 did not last beyond his tenure. Before Gen Ayub’s take over, civil military relations, despite active participation of military in security politics signified civilian supremacy in the country.

However, his take over severely undermined civilian control over military which climaxed in the in 1965 war. Besides, his decade long rule entrenched the military in the political system thus creating a new paradigm of “military politics.” 22 Thereafter, the military emerged as a competing force against which political elite and civil society contested.

Gen Ayub resigned from office under popular pressure, but instead of handing power to the speaker of national assembly as required by the constitution, he handed it to Gen

Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969. He sensing military’s alienation and unpopularity of the 1962 Constitution abrogated it on 28 March 1970 and announced a Legal

Framework Order (LFO) which laid down the basic structure for the new constitution.

However he assured that the new constitution would be formulated by the

21 M. Asghar Khan, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965 (Vikas Publishing House Private, 1979).After the failure of dialogue to resolve Kashmir issue, President Ayub exercised the military option to force a solution. 22 The term refers to military’s political role witnessed in the six decades of Pakistan’s history and not to politics within the military.

representatives of the people. Towards this effect, he promised direct elections based on universal adult franchise, the elections were held on 7 December 1970 and were judged as free and fair.23

The results mirrored differences between East and West wings which due to years of divisive politics persistent political issues had sharply polarised the polity. Awami

League propagated provincial autonomy articulated in six points24 of Sheikh Mujeebur- Rehman, emerged as the largest single party, winning all but two seats, from East

Pakistan but none in West. Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, emerged as the largest party in West Pakistan with could not win any seat in the East and in Baluchistan and only one in NWFP. The results are tabulated below.

Table 2: Results of 1970 Elections Party East Pak Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan Total Awami League 151 - - - - 151

Pakistan People Party - 62 18 1 - 81

Council Muslim League - 7 - - - 7

Ahle Sunnat - 4 3 - - 7

Jamaat-e-Islami - 1 2 1 - 4 Qayyum Muslim League - 1 1 7 - 9 Convention Muslim League - 2 - - - 2 Pakistan Democratic Party 1 - - - - 1 National Awami Party - - - 3 3 6 (Wali Group) Jamait ul Ulema-e-Pakistan - - - 6 1 7 (Hazarvi Group) Independent 1 5 3 7 - 16 153 82 27 25 4 291 Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

23 ‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan’s Transition from Democracy above Rule of Law to Democracy under Rule of Law: 1970-2013’ (Islamabad, August 2013).The report concludes that only 1970 elections were free and fair. 24 Muhammad Ibrahim and Razia Mussarat, “Electoral Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan (1947-1985),” Journal of Public Administration and Governance 5, no. 1 (2015): 72. 23

The election results warranted calling of National Assembly session and transfer of power to Awami League. However, it appeared that the political and military elite in

West Pakistan were not willing to do so.25 The delay in transfer of power sparked civil unrest in East Pakistan which soon snowballed into an Indian abetted insurgency and culminated into the disastrous Indo-Pak War of 1971. The war in its outcome resulted in creation of Bangladesh.29

Why East Pakistan chose to secede? From the perspective of civil military relations, these happenings raise number of questions. Firstly, was it the military or the irreconcilable behaviour of politicians, especially Bhutto who resisted handing over power to Awami League and thereby returning democracy to the country? The delay in calling session of national assembly by Gen Yahya was interpreted as non-acceptability of the six points of Sheikh Mujeeb to the military. Building on it, Bhutto refused to go to the national assembly session which was called by Awami League in Dhaka.

Cumulatively, the delay spiralled unrest in the East and both military (Yahya) and civil

(Bhutto) were responsible for it.26 The consequent political unrest in East Pakistan was interpreted by military as “law and order situation” which could be resolved by use of force.27 The rioting and violence led to rise of Mukti Bahini which was abetted by

India. 28 The increasing violence in East Pakistan sucked the military into counter insurgency operations and subsequently a brief war with India in December 1971. The war went badly and the military lost control of East Pakistan.

25 Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (University of California Press, 1991), 120. Bhutto is accused of preventing reconciliation with Mujeeb ur Rehman and his six point agenda for regional autonomy. 29Ibid., 122. 26 Steven I. Wilkinson, “Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan,” Democratization 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 223. 27 Aditya Bhave and Christopher Kingston, “Military Coups and the Consequences of Durable de Facto Power: The Case of Pakistan,” Economics of Governance 11, no. 1 (2010): 56. 28 ‘Indian Forces Fought along Mukti Bahini: Modi’, The News, 8 June 2015.

A detailed study of civil military relations during and after the war is beyond the scope of this research. Dismayed by the outcome of war, the military lost confidence in Gen

Yahya and asked him to step down. A meeting of officers stationed in Rawalpindi was called on 20 December 1971 in which it was decided that Gen Yahya should step down and transfer the power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. On the same day, Bhutto became the

President and the first civilian CMLA.29 The internal dynamics of military politics led to transfer of power and return to civilian control.

The 1970 elections were aimed at electing a constituent assembly to formulate th30e constitution for Pakistan (East and West). However, with secession of East Pakistan, the representatives lost authority and a fresh elections and mandate was now essential to elect a new constituent assembly to frame a constitution for residual Pakistan.34

Bhutto brought in an interim constitution 31 which was presidential in nature and remained in force till promulgation of 1973 Constitution. As per the spirit of democracy, a fresh election under the new constitution was essential but interestingly, the assembly elected to frame the constitution extended its own life under the new constitution till 14

August 1977.32

Bhutto was a charismatic leader with a populist style of politics. He employed the powers of CMLA to implement his socialist agenda to include nationalisation of basic industries, schools and land reforms.33 During Bhutto’s tenure, political government

29 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 246. He recounts that Gen Gul Hassan and Gen Abdul Hameed Khan went to Gen Yahya on 17 December and asked him to step down. Gen Yahya suggested continuation of military rule which was dismissed. A meeting of all officers of rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above was held in GHQ 20 December, in which it was decided to recall Bhutto from USA who arrived on 20 December and the same day power was handed over to him. 30 elections were held in a different environment wherein the Presidential system was not acceptable and a new constitution to accommodate the demand of East Pakistan was required, with loose of East Pakistan, the environment changed and a fresh election would have most likely yielded different results. 31 Nasir Hafeez, “Evolution of National Security Structures in Pakistan,” Strategic Studies 32, no. 2–3 (2012): 158. 32 Ibrahim and Mussarat, “Electoral Politics”, 76. 33 Bhutto political slogan stated Islam as the religion but socialism was his economic philosophy, his call for Food, Clothing and Shelter for all appealed to the masses. His major contributions were formulation 25

dominated politics and civil military relations were characterised by a robust civilian control.34 He employed a two prong strategy for strengthening civilian control over the military.35 First, by reforming the command structure of the armed forces36 and secondly by reducing reliance over the military for maintaining law and order by creating paramilitary forces. Federal Security Force (FSF) was created to this effect.

Dissatisfaction in military soon begun to surface and quell any trouble on 3 March 1972,

Bhutto suddenly replaced Gen Gul Hassan with Gen Tikka Khan as Army Chief (Gen

Tikka Khan was earlier by-passed when Gen Gul Hassan was appointed). Similarly Air

Marshal Raheem Khan was replaced by Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhary as Air Chief. 37

On 30 March 1973, Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that a small group of military officers had conspired to seize power.38 They were tried in a military court headed by the then Major General Zia-ul-Haq and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment. On completion of term of Gen Tikka in March 1976, Bhutto appointed General Zia-ul-Haq, a junior corps commander, as the Army Chief.

Under the new constitution, elections were to be held in 1977. On 7 January, Bhutto announced that elections will be held on 7 and 10 March 1977 for national and provincial assemblies respectively. On 21 January, nine opposition parties formed an electoral alliance namely Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against the ruling PPP. It was generally perceived that despite a strong opposition PPP would still win. 39 On 8

of 1973 constitution, land reforms, Simla Agreement and repatriation of prisoners of war and, Setting up of port Qasim and Steel mill and laying the foundations of Pakistan’s nuclear programme and holding of Islamic Summit in Pakistan. His major failure was the inability to stabilise the nationalisation process, electoral mal-practices which led to his down fall. 34 Bhutto ordered a judicial inquiry and appointed Justice Hamood ur Rehman to inquire into the military defeat in 1971. He kept the findings confidential and employed it as a coercive tool against the military rather than an instrument for reforms. 35 Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 174. 36 Large scale reshuffling and retirement were orchestrated in three services. 37 Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 175. 38 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 292. 39 Ibid. 308.

March, after national assembly election, PNA alleged massive electoral rigging and boycotted the provincial assembly’s elections. Resultantly, a very low turnout was witnessed on 10 March. The alleged rigging proved to be a turning point leading to another military coup on 5 July 1977.

In the context of civil military relations, the events during March- July 1977 once again reveal that political elite due to intra elite conflict, create situations of prolonged impasse, compromising national security and also involve military into politics which sometimes results in military takeover.40 The negotiation process started on 13 March and continued up till 4 July and comprised twelve rounds.4142 And even on the last day when the agreement was finalised, Bhutto said that he will sign it on the next day. In the process, widespread political agitation was witnessed leading to imposition of partial martial law in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad. Secondly, Bhutto kept military informed and also invited Gen Zia to attend the negotiating process and cabinet meetings. Under societal considerations and inconclusive political situation, Gen Zia imposed martial law on 5 July 1977 and remained in power till 17 August 1988.43 Gen

Zia ruled the country for more than a decade and his regime can be divided into four phases.47 In the first, 1977-1979, he worked for demobilisation of PPP and sought cooperation with PNA. In the second, 1979-1983, he distanced himself from political parties in general and the strengthened the military rule. During third phase, 1983-1985, he granted limited political activities by holding the party-less general elections in 1985 under the increased pressure from Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD).

40 Ibid. 309. 41 Tahir Amin, “1977 Coup D’état in Pakistan,” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 28, no. 2 (2007): 42 . 43 Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 218. 47Ibid., 218. 27

The last phase was of party-less parliamentary democracy with strong interventionist presidency during 1985-1988.

In the context of civil military relations, while the military enjoyed complete autonomy in the economic, political and social life, Gen Zia was not a revolutionary and substance of his policy was adhocism. His policy of Islamisation and his strategic alliance with

USA after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan were most detrimental for the national security. The increased role of military in politics and holding of non-party elections during his tenure adversely affected the possibility of return to democracy.

Accidental death of Gen Zia triggered phenomenal changes in the political dispensation in the country.48 Therefore, politics and operation of civil military relations in ensuing decade is of special interest to this research. After Gen Zia, the military took a back seat, facilitated general elections on party basis and fostered return to democracy albeit the constitutional amendment which distributed power between the prime minister and president. The political elite had two options; they could either unite for strengthening democracy or fight among themselves to aggrandize their personal and political gains at the cost of democracy. Unfortunately, they opted for the second option, offering opportunity to non-democratic forces to exploit their differences.

Twice Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had the opportunity to govern the country from

1988 to 1999. Ironically, this period was characterised for perennial political instability, consistent strife between government, opposition and judiciary and frequent direct and indirect intervention by President and military.49 In February 1997, Pakistan Muslim

League Nawaz (PML-N) led by Nawaz Sharif won general elections with two thirds majority. Despite relatively low turnout, Nawaz Sharif claimed it as a landslide victory with a heavy mandate. The nation fatigued by consistent instability hoped that the installation of new government would mark a new beginning. It was indeed a new

beginning but in ways different from that what they expected. Detailed study of this period is of interest to this research to ascertain the role of political elite in process of democratic consolidation after Gen Zia.

48 President Zia ul Haq died in an air crash on 17 August 1988 near Bahawalpur. He was accompanied by a number of senior army officers and the US Ambassador to Pakistan and military attaché. A meeting took place in Islamabad to decide on the issue of succession and it was decided to follow constitutional provisions. In accordance with the provisions of Article 49(1) of the Constitution Chairman Senate Ghulam Ishaq Khan took over as the President, General Mirza Aslam Beg was appointed as COAS. 49 1988-1990 and 1993-1996 Benazir Bhutto. 1990-1993 and 1997-1999 Nawaz Sharif, a total of 11 Years with a civilian President in place Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rapidly embarked upon a journey to concentrate power and was able to do so with considerable success.44 On other counts his performance in the second term was not much different from the previous. Confrontation with judiciary, storming of Supreme Court and forcing President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari to resign stand out as significant features. Also, his inability to sustain political alliances in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Sind and

Balochistan alienated smaller provinces and aggravated internal security situation.

Incidents of terrorism, rampant lawlessness and corruption multiplied and even special judicial arrangements like anti-terrorism courts could not bring them under control. His economic policies were equally not successful and his desire to concentrate power accentuated the systemic imbalances in socio-political structure of the country.

The deteriorating state of internal security situation prompted Gen Karamat, Chief of

Army Staff (COAS) to indicate that there was a need for taking note and instituting

NSC for handling and stabilising the situation. The suggestion irked Nawaz Sharif who

44 Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Resignation of President Leghari and tabling of Shariat Bill etc.

asked him to resign which he dutifully did. Gen Pervez Musharraf was handpicked by

Nawaz Sharif as his replacement on 8 October 1998.

On 12 October 1999, Gen Musharraf who was on a flight on his way back from Sri

Lanka was unceremoniously replaced with another handpicked Lieutenant (Lt) Gen Zia ud Din Butt, the then Director General (DG) of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). This decision triggered events which unfortunately led to fourth military take over and the country relapsed into the déjà vu paradigm.45 After announcing the appointment of new

COAS, Nawaz Sharif realised that COAS designate would need time to consolidate his command, the flight control staff on behest of Nawaz Sharif was ordered not let the deposed COAS land in Pakistan and when that was not possible they were asked to direct his aircraft to Nawab Shah and he should be detained there. The military reacted in favour of Gen Musharraf and took political control of the flight operations to safely land the commercial airliner which was running low on fuel and simultaneously seized political control which some termed as a ‘counter coup’.46 Gen Musharraf ruled till his resignation on 18 August 2008. His rule lasted for nearly nine years. “When he seized power he was welcomed by many political parties, elites and by urban middle class”. 47

In his address to the nation on night of 12 October, he said that Army has moved in as

45 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 472. He outlines the dismal performance in great detail. 46 Sartaj Aziz and Syed Babar Ali, Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan’s History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 287. They recounts the mistakes committed by Nawaz Sharif when he planned to remove General Pervez Musharraf and not allow the plane carrying him on his return from Sri Lanka to allow time to induct General Zia ud Din as new Chief of Army Staff. 47 Sadaf Farooq, ‘Rule by the Generals: The Influence of Military Regimes on Pakistan’s Internal Security’, in 60th Political Science Association Conference (Edinburgh: Political Science Association, 2010). 54 “Back to Future? Countdown to Oct 12 Coup”, Dawn, 13 October 1999. “You are all aware of the kind of the turmoil and uncertainty our country has gone through in recent times. Not only have all the institutions been played around with, and systematically destroyed, the economy too is in a state of collapse. We are also aware of the self-serving policies being followed, which have rocked the very foundation of the Federation of Pakistan. The armed forces have been facing incessant public clamour to remedy the fast declining situation from all sides of the political divide. These concerns were always conveyed to the Prime Minister in all sincerity, keeping the interest of the country foremost…I wish to inform you that the armed forces have moved in as a last resort, to prevent any further destabilization”. 55 The one requested by General Jahangir Karamat. 30

a last resort.54 In his speech on 17 October, he laid out a seven point agenda for rectifying the situation and announced his government. He asked President Rafiq Tarar to continue in office, formulated NSC and a cabinet of ministers to work under it.55 The provinces similarly were to function under their respective governors with a small cabinet under them. Six months later, premised on the law of state necessity, the Supreme Court in its judgment of 12 May 2000 validated the military takeover, granted him three years to achieve his seven point agenda i.e. to rebuild national confidence, strengthen federation, revive economy, improve law and order, depoliticise state institutions, devolve power to grass root level and ensure swift across the board accountability.48 The judiciary also vested in him the unprecedented powers to amend constitution but asked him to hold general elections before expiry of the three year period and transfer power to elected representatives.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s judgement Gen Musharraf did hold elections in 2002 but prior to that he signalled his desire to continue in power beyond his permitted tenure of three years by holding a Referendum in April 2002. After the elections, he engineered a loyalist coalition into power which passed Seventeenth Amendment to the

Constitution to provide constitutional cover to General Musharraf’s takeover. Later, a bill was passed in October 2004 which enabled him to simultaneously retain two offices i.e. of the President and COAS till December 2004.

From the foregoing brief historical review, two significant trends can be gleaned. First relates to the inability of the political elite to utilise opportunities for democratic consolidation and convert them into conditions fostering stable democracy in the country. Secondly, due to the repeated military takeovers followed by prolonged military and quasi-military rule, the perception about military as a competing political

48 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 149-150.

force had strengthened. The interface of political elite with the military in keeping with the two trends has resulted into a non-normative paradigm which merits investigation to understand the process of democratisation and its interface with civil military relations with a view to extract findings and proffer recommendations to rectify the situation.

Problem Statement

“Research is creating new knowledge”

Neil Armstrong

The study of military coups in general provides an opportunity to understand the political process which leads to military intervention, takeover and subsequent military rule. The casual relation between politics and military leading to Gen Musharraf’s takeover and rule makes an interesting case study for understanding the process of democratic consolidation in the third round49 and developments in the realm of civil military relations therein. The foremost problem relates to understanding the reasons for inability of political leaders to consolidate democracy, democratic institutions and values and why the process after Gen Zia once again resulted into a military takeover.

Secondly once military is in power how does it utilise political power and why it persists on retaining power instead of returning country to democracy at the earliest. This research is an endeavour to answer these questions.

Hypothesis

Civil military relations in Pakistan is an interplay of push and pull factors in which, the political elite create conditions which can trigger military intervention or coup and military rule.

49 The first round lasted from 1947 to 1958 and resulted in Gen Ayub’s Martial Law. Gen Yahya’s martial law is considered as continuation of Gen Ayub’s rule. The second from 1970 to 1977 and led to Gen Zia’s coup and Martial Law. The third form 1988 till 1999 and resulted in Gen Musharraf’s coup.

Research Questions

Evident from the problem statement cited above, the political elite, their interests and objectives (personal and political) and the political situation which consequences out of the decisions taken by them to advance these interests emerges as an independent variable. The main dependent variable for this research is the military and its reactions in form of intervention or coup d’état representing the interests, aspirations, world view and outlook of the military elite. In this context, four stands of inquiry emerge. First relates to of process of democratisation after the death of Gen Zia, secondly reasons of military takeover in 1999, thirdly the regime outcome of Gen Musharraf’s rule and fourthly why he failed to return democracy to the country after three years. These enable formulation of main research questions enumerated below.

1. Why the process of democratisation started after the death of Gen Zia

culminated into another military coup in just a decade?

2. How a gulf created in the civil military relations during the second tenure of

Nawaz Sharif ended up in the breakdown of civil control of military?

3. What was the regime outcome of Gen Musharraf’s rule?

4. Why Gen Musharraf failed to restore democracy in the allotted three years’

time?

To answer these questions, following areas are investigated.

1. The process of political reconstruction after Gen Zia with the focus on

democratisation and policies of political elite to gauge their effect on democratic

consolidation and civil military relations.

2. The political developments in the backdrop of civil military relations during

second tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999) to ascertain the

circumstances which led to takeover by Gen Musharraf.

3. The objectives and policies of Gen Musharraf to analyse the efficacy of his

regime.

4. The role of judiciary in validating Gen Musharraf’s takeover and his subsequent

failure to restore democracy, after the lapse of three-year period granted to him

by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

5. Gen Musharraf’s stance to “keep them [military] out, bring them in”, determine

its veracity or otherwise and suggesting ways how civil military relations can

be improved, democratic control over the military can be exercised effectively

and how military can be kept out of politics.

Research Objectives

This research studies Gen Musharraf’s takeover, also called an institutional response/ counter coup with a view to understand the interface between process of democratisation and civil military relations. It aims to achieve two main objectives.

Firstly, to understand the responsibility of political and military leaders in consolidating democracy, nurturing participatory democracy and mature democratic culture leading to positive regime outcomes. Secondly, how in a democratic framework, optimum civilian control over military can be achieved? What institutions, processes, measures and resultant culture would bring about such a change?

Literature Review

A variety of literature from primary and secondary sources from diverse subjects connected to civil military relations, democracy, democratic consolidation, military coups and regimes and methods for exercising democratic control over the military has been consulted in this research. Since, the thesis focuses on civil military relations, therefore the works related to this field is the starting point. Huntington in his seminal work analysed growth of military in Europe and U.S. and concluded that military is a

profession like any other profession. Contextualised in Cold War setting i.e. external threat paradigm, he developed institutional theory as a mechanism to control the difference between civil and military. He looked at separation of powers, autonomy to the military and objective control as the optimum methods for exercising civilian control. In his view, this arrangement would foster professionalism and render the military apolitical.50 He also views civil military relations as an interaction between the elites i.e. “the relation of the officer corps to the state” and disregards the relationship of military as a whole with the civil society which narrows its scope.59 His proposition of objective control has been practiced in Pakistan since inception but it has not been effective in preventing military’s repeated intervention in politics.

Janowitz, took a wider look on the military and its relations with the society as a whole and not just the elite. His “convergence theory” focuses on finding ways to diminish rather than accentuate or compartmentalize the differences between the civil and military. War (external or internal) in his opinion is a joint enterprise and in keeping with developments in the cold war setting, he went on to propose the constabulary concept as a model for addressing aspects of civilian control.60

Proximate to Huntington’s approach on professionalism as a mean for inhibiting military interventions in politics, Janowitz differed in method. He concludes that protection of democracy is a civic responsibility of the soldier which is achieved through greater interconnectedness. His theoretical and structural construct of fusion and connectedness is of interest to this study of civil military relations in Pakistan. In this context, the cooperation between civil and military elite can assure consolidation of democracy and effective control over military.

50 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Harvard University Press, 1957).; undertaken for United States when the country was

In terms of exercising the control over military, “structural theory” of Desch on civil control over military explains the parameters and methods of its operation. In his findings he asserts that, civil military relations is good when the external threat is high and internal threat is low, which did not work in Pakistan as all four military

looking to reorient its politics by shedding the effects of WWII and determining the future role of military in security system of the country. 59Ibid. 3. 60Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (USA: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), 418. interventions occurred in the similar settings.51 In the preceding years, other scholars have also deliberated on the subject. Some explained the phenomenon and suggest remedies e.g. Finer, provides insight into military interventions and their outcomes by connecting politico-cultural developments of a country to military interventions.52 His categorization of countries with minimal, low, developed and mature political culture provide the backdrop to understand the military interventions. The low political culture in Pakistan, characterized by authoritarianism, non-adherence to democratic values, corruption and absence of rule of law provides the backdrop to understand Gen

Musharraf’s coup and regime.

The end of cold war and dissolution of Soviet Union radically transformed the bipolar political landscape and led to the rise of a unipolar political order. The process unleashed new issues, challenges and threats. In the field of civil military relations, three areas of concern emerged, first the issue of crisis in civilian control as studied by

51 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Maryland.: JHU Press, 2001). 52 Samuel Edward Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, Third (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004).

Kohn,53 Weigley,54 and Bacevich.55 Second issue related to problem of likely military interventions and growth of resultant civil military relations in the newly liberated countries of Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The third concerned with the conflicting trend of autocracy giving way to democracies in many areas and simultaneous rise of dictatorship in other parts of the world, including Pakistan.56

With the onset of age of terror, scholars after events of 9/11 have studied the phenomenon of terrorism and its impact on civil military relations. Lyon asserts that the age of terror poses series challenges to the orthodox western civil military relations, investigating three particular challenges. The changing security environment, issues relating to use of force, and issues relating to the role of western militaries in the reconstruction of weak and failed states. He projects that in relation to each of these challenges one should expect an increase in civil military tensions.67 Reviewing developments in civil military relations from a generational sense (first age from total war to end of WWII, second during Cold War and third from 1990 onwards),68 it provides framework for making future projections which is employed in this research.

Similarly, Dr Wong examines the occurring changes in roles and responsibilities of civilian and military leadership and how they impact civilian control.69

Gen McChrystal’s affair emerged as the penultimate contemporary issue in civil military relations which focused attention of the polity in USA on the tensions between

53 Richard H. Kohn, ‘Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations’, World Affairs 170, no. 3 (2008): 69–80. 54 Russell F. Weigley, ‘The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell’, The Journal of Military History 57, no. 5 (1993): 27–58. 55 Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver’, Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 3 (1998): 447–53. 56 Addressing third aspect Huntington evaluated the revolution in forty countries from authoritarianism towards democracy and observed that the new democracies faced a daunting challenge and needed to reform their civil military relations. He analysed their success and failure in the context of his original assertions for objective civilian control and rise of military professionalism. Exploring the connectivity between military interventions / coup phenomenon and development he advanced the coup attempt ceiling in terms of per capita income i.e. Countries with per capita GNP of $1000 or more do not have 37

civil and military elite during conflict situations. Ulrich examined the issue from the perspective of “dissent over policy, and for failure to implement strategy”. He studied the willingness of the military to continue to subordinate itself to the preferences of political elite, adhering to norms of behaviour in civil military relations and maximizing the chances of success in Afghanistan are of interest to this research.70

successful coups and countries with per capita GNP $3000 or more do not have coups. If GNP is less than $1000 the coup are successful and between $1000-3000 the coups are not successful. 67Rod Lyon, “Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Terror,” in The Australian American Fulbright Symposium (Citeseer, 2004), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.188.9440&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed on 6 June 2015). 68Ibid. 69Dr Wong Leonard, “Civil-Military Relations in a Post 9/11 World,” Colloquium Brief (Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483557.pdf (accessed on 12 June 2015). 70Marybeth P. Ulrich, ‘The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations’ (DTIC Document, 2011). In the context of civil military relations, one serious issue relates to military coups/ takeovers. The first reference in this contest is made to John Locke’s explanation about pre-requisites of a society in context of civil military relation. He emphasised on interplay of societal and economic factors on civil military relations and their impact on the process of democratisation. Locke analyses their impact on society, alteration of legislature and reasons supporting dissolution of governments. In his views when the government fail to deliver their dissolution becomes inevitable. According to him,

“When he who has supreme executive power neglects and abandons that

charge, so that laws already made can no longer be put into execution;

this is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectively

dissolve the government”.57

57 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: Awnsham and John Churchill, 1965), 376.

Because of a large number of military takeovers in Latin America, Africa and Asia, the subject of civil military relations has evolved since WW-II and various scholars have examined these developments from a holistic perspective. The debate mainly focused on the role of military in nation-building. Forgoing in view, Foster examined the changes from epistemology, ontology and policy making perspective and developed a framework for security sector reforms in view of the changing nature of the state.58 The discourse further expands and Bruneau extended the conceptual breadth of the literature on civil military relations beyond civilian control to include two further dimensions namely effectiveness and efficiency. 59 Smith highlighted that security sector reforms needs to be an engaged, but gradual approach and it is not an “either/or” position.60

Within a decade after its creation, civil military relations in Pakistan evolved in a nonnormative manner when the political system failed to find answers to political issues, deadlocking politics, defying resolution and resulting into direct and indirect military interventions. Scholars researching in the field of civil military relations look at the military’s role in politics and how it has emerged as the predominant political player. Stephen P. Cohen, an expert of South Asian affairs, has extensively worked on

Pakistan and India. In Idea of Pakistan, he has evaluated the political dimensions in the backdrop of latent challenges to the security of state in the choice of policy options. 61

Its connection with the Pakistan military has been analysed in this research. Adding to

58 Anthony Forster, ‘New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agendas’, Connections 1, no. 2 (2002): 71–88. He has analysed these dimensions to identify new research agendas which will in focus during this section of research. 59 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, ‘Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations’, Democratization 15, no. 5 (2008): 909–29. 60 Chris Smith, ‘Security-Sector Reform: Development Breakthrough or Institutional Engineering?’, Conflict, Security & Development 1, no. 01 (2001): 5–20. 61 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 76 T.V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014). 39

it, scholars T.V. Paul,76 and Christine Fair, 62 have also depicted one sided story regarding the centrality of armed forces in Pakistan. On the other hand, both authors have ignored the geostrategic security compulsions faced by the state of Pakistan.

Consequently, their analysis lacks objectivity as it disregards the connection of Kashmir issue with politics in Pakistan and the existential threat from India. To balance these,

Pakistan has exercised different policy options at different times as evaluated by these authors. Exploratory and explanatory in essence, majority of these studies aim at substantiating ideas of western scholars about a garrison, praetorian state and a military hegemonic system. On the other hand, scholarly work Burki,63 Bahadur,79 studying the role of political elite and their failures do not establish resultant causal relationship with military interventions. The majority of scholars in Pakistan locate the causes of military intervention in the weaknesses in the political system in its political leaders.64 As Askari cites, political decay, weak institutions and inadequate legitimacy of civilian regimes and use of soldiers in administration as opportunities for military to expand its role in politics.65

Khan identifies the “military’s self-image of custodian of the state” as the basic reason for Pakistani military’s participation in politics. 66 According to him, the military differentiates state from the political elite, apparently due to the persistent weaknesses manifested by those in power to further their personal and party interests rather than those of the public and the state. On the other hand, Jalal discards the common view

62 C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014). 63 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999). 79Bahadur, Democracy in Pakistan. 64 K. K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958 (Sang-E-Meel Publications, 2007). 65 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000). 66 Aslam Khan, “Civil Military Relations: The Role of Military in the Politics of Pakistan” (Master’s Programme in Asian Studies, Lund University, 2012), 11.

that the weaknesses of political parties are the main variable explaining the military interventions in Pakistan.67 She gives a detailed account on how a state, maimed and mutilated at birth, managed to survive and how in the process of exercising Pakistan’s sovereignty, the bureaucratic and military institutions rose to the position of dominance.

Since this research studies the weakness in political system as the main variable therefore her work figures out as the alternative argumentative framework.

Shafqat explains “why Pakistan has continued to oscillate between military-hegemonic rule and the democratic propensities [and] why democratic processes and institutions have not gained ground in Pakistan and military’s hegemony has continued to prevail”.68 His conclusions significant to this research are;

“[first] breakdown in the social and political order in Pakistan has

occurred because of social and economic change, as well as the attitudes

and workings of the leaders-both in government and in opposition

political parties; [second] political parties and religious groups have yet

to accept elections and parliamentary democracy as legitimate

instrument of transfer of power; [third] greatest weakness of political

elites and political leaders is their inability to project democracy as a

preferable [to military led] alternative system of government”.69

He further narrates that “the greatest weakness of political elites and political leaders is their inability to project democracy as a preferable alternative system of government”.86

Siddiqa considers that, since military has emerged as an institution therefore it

67 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991). The frequency of military rule in Pakistan is commonly attributed to weaknesses in its political party system and to difficulties inherent in welding together a linguistically and culturally heterogeneous society. But such explanations have done more to obfuscate than to lay bare the complex dynamics. 68 Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 264. 69 Ibid., 265. 86Ibid., 266.

intervenes in politics at the time of crisis to protect its institutional interests; dictating the need to identify such interests and how are these protected. 70 Ahmed in a recent publication examines the role of military in politics in ‘post-colonial garrison state’ and projects that the direction Pakistan takes in coming months and years will depend on the role of military plays.71 Likewise, T.V. Paul classifies Pakistan as a garrison state in which the military has progressively moved from rulers to arbitrators.72 Shah examines the role of military and democracy and concludes that that the army now prefers to control politics indirectly.73

The military’s point of view in this discourse has not been adequately represented in scholarly literature, save through a few interviews and public statements. However, a few former military officers have deliberated on the issues related to politics and civil military relations. Ayub Khan in his autobiography explains the military mind and military’s approach to resolving political problems. His argument is in line with the military training of the officers i.e. appreciation of the situation and formulating policy options to solve Pakistan’s problems. His basic premise is that politicians are unable to put their act together, therefore military has to intervene.74 After 1971 debacle, Gen

Yahya had immense time at his disposal but he refrained to express his views. Gen Zia did not get an opportunity but Gen Musharraf did document his views about contemporary Pakistan and his role in shaping it.75 Being one of the central figures for

70 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto, 2007). 71 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Pakistan Military in Politics: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (New Delhi: Amaryllis, 2013). 72 T.V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 75-101. 73 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 74 Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography. 75 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

this research, frequent references have been made to him about his role and political views.

Two concepts of garrison and praetorian states, constructed by Lasswell and Perlmutter respectively somewhat also deserve attention as they are occasionally referred in context of Pakistan.76 Lasswell noting the trends in politics that in future politics will dominate by soldiers instead of the businessman. He predicted that “the future world will be dominated by garrison states; a mystic democracy, with all social activity governmentalized and military recruitment based on obedience rather than objectively and originality”.77 Presented as anti-thesis to the civilian dominance, such states were to evolve out of the democratic system and not imposed by the military through interventions. His projections were not entirely true but still many thinkers segment the concept and apply it selectively to Pakistan. Essentially to criticize the military without realizing that the concept finds greater applicability too many civilian regimes, where authoritarianism and oligarchy are defining characteristics.

Seen as the theory of the part, Perlmutter’s typology of states and soldiers led to the advancement of the idea of praetorian state, society and military. 78 Distinguishing professionalism from corporatism at the outset, he categorized the soldiers into three categories, to include professional, praetorian and professional revolutionary. The idea of praetorian state is also occasionally applied to Pakistan without realizing that

Perlmutter has preconditioned its rise to “collapse of executive power of civilian elite” and not to military interventions.79

76 Harold Lasswell, Essays on the Garrison State (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New York: Harvard University Press, 1979). 77 Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (January 1, 1941): 455. 78 Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, 90-94. 79 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State’, in The Military and

Surveying literature on democracy, its conceptual framework and theoretical perspectives, several themes stand out. Democratisation, edited by David Potter, David,

Margaret and Paul,80 covers diverse themes and aspects related to democracy. It studies causes and process of democratization and its literature is distributed in to six major parts contributed by different scholars. The first, discusses theoretical approaches to democratization, second, democratization in Europe and USA from 1760 to 1989, third, addresses distinctive story of democratization in Latin America and Asia from 1930 to

1990. In part four weaknesses and drawbacks of democratization are discussed on the basis of case studies of Sub Saharan Africa and Middle East. Part five gives a detailed account on democratization in communist and post-communist countries, whereas the last part provides detailed analysis of democratization as a whole. The approaches for democratic consolidation i.e. modernisation, structural and transition are of special interest to this research.

Two works of Ayesha Jalal merit attention, the first, The State of Martial Rule, examines political and economic history of Pakistan’s during first crucial decade in an effort to find root causes of Pakistan’s military and bureaucratic domination.81 The emphasis is on the dialectic between state construction and political processes in Pakistan and it focuses on ways that the initial problems of state construction were addressed, as these set the long-term political course of the country. Her study about role of religion and strong trends of authoritarianism and ethnicity were resourced by this research. Her second book, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia; A Comparative and

Historical Perspective, explains the democratic and authoritarian patterns in South Asia

Democracy in Asia and Pacific, ed. R.J. May and Viberto Selochan (Melbourne: ANUE Press, 2004), 88–100; Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Pakistan Military in Politics: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (New Delhi: Amaryllis, 2013); Shah, The Army and Democracy. 80 David. P, David. G, Margaret. K &Paul. L “Democratization” 81 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991).

through comparative study of historical perspective. 82 Her brief about prevalent political concepts and processes, political economy, central power and regional dissidence in South Asia provide backdrop to this research.

The process of democratic consolidation when evaluated from comparative perspective of South Asian countries the work of Philip Oldenburg, India, Pakistan, and

Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths, attempts to solve the puzzle by an in-depth analysis of India’s and Pakistan’s political trajectory since independence.83 It is thematically divided into two parts. The first, examines the colonial period, the years around the independence movement, and the three decades afterwards. In his opinion, a country is a democracy if its citizenry remains sovereign, in spite of a “political system that is undemocratic in some way or even in which day-to-day politics consists of rulers who are not held accountable, on the other hand, if a strong majority of citizenry concedes the right to rule to a person or institution, the country would have a “legitimate autocracy.”84 In the second part, he focuses on events from 1977 until the end of 2009.

In this section, the author examines the implications and aftermath of elections in

Pakistan and India, and the divergent paths of these two countries. Oldenburg places a particular importance on the year 1977; as he notes, “this is not just a convenient marker, but indicates a turning point in Pakistan and India’s political trajectories”. This was the year India was under emergency rule imposed by Mrs. Gandhi and the prospects for democracy seemed brighter for Pakistan than India, the reason being the military regime’s handover of power to a civilian government. Instead, India returned to democracy after the elections of 1977, while Pakistan returned to authoritarianism

82 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1995). 83 Philip Oldenburg, India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths (London: Routledge, 2010). 84 Ibid., 4.

marked by Gen Zia’s takeover. Assessing the role of religious and external factors in explaining political stability in India and a democratic deficit in Pakistan, he also reviews compatibility of Islam and Hinduism with democracy.

Building Democracy in South Asia by Maya Chada is an effort to reshape perceptions on the nature of democracy in South Asia. 85 An analysis of South Asia’s political experience with democracy in 1990s, she emphasises that, if democratic norms are to be universalized, they must first absorb the interpretations and experiences of the nonwestern countries. Especially those related to democracy. She argues that any discussion of democratization must be founded on mapping its course amid the constraints of state consolidation, national integration, and conflicting notions of individual and group rights. Within this context, she deconstructs four sets of developments; the repeated dismissals of elected governments in Pakistan, the dilemmas produced by changes in caste politics, separatist confrontations in Punjab and the northeast, and the end of Congress Party dominance in India; the political and ideological contest over Kashmir in both India and Pakistan; and the restoration of democracy movement leading to a constitutional monarchy in Nepal. She exposes the underlying goals and logic of these political events to identify regime objectives and priorities, capabilities, and responses to various types of challenges.

For cognizance of the politico-legal history of Pakistan for the period under review, two major works besides others are consulted. First the work of Hamid Khan which provides an objective and detailed account of the developments occurring during the period in focus of this research.86 The second work of Arshad Rizvi titled Political System of

Pakistan: A Constitutional Study, provides detailed account of political system of

85 Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). 86 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press Karachi, 2009).

Pakistan. 87 As a documented PhD thesis, it tries to establish a relation between constitutional development and political instability in Pakistan. The author has analysed the political system of Pakistan by highlighting the periodic political and ideological changes, which have marred the constitutional evolution in Pakistan from 1947 to 1971, during which the country faced four martial laws and three constitutions.

He also focuses on political and constitutional developments which occurred in Zia’s regime and subjects them to criticism.

The Daughter of East: An Autobiography by Benazir Bhutto is a well-known passionate account.88 Being one of major stake holder, during the period on which this research focuses, reference to it despite some inaccuracies is inescapable. It is about her struggles in which she presents detailed account of the misdeeds of others but glosses over her own mistakes. Yet she became prime minister during a period, in which peace and democracy appeared fleeting and fragile and securing of democracy was her main concern. In the last few chapters, she comments on a range of issues related to Pakistan possibly in retrospect, her criticism of Gen Musharraf is of interest to this research.

Work of Sartaj Aziz, being a close ally of Nawaz Sharif is of immense significance to this research. His book, Between Dreams and Realities, provides detailed and analytical account of many events investigated by this research. 89 His work stand out for neutrality, accuracy and objectivity. An autobiography it accounts for all major events up till 1999. Huntington’s second book titled, Political Order in Changing Societies, analyses economic development, political order and political decay in changing

87 Arshad Rizvi, The Political System of Pakistan: A Constitutional Study (Karachi: Paramount Books, 2014). 88 Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East: An Autobiography (London: Pocket Books, 2008). 89 Sartaj Aziz and Syed Babar Ali, Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan’s History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).

societies. 90 His argument about work of institutions and inevitability of economic growth and development in the sense of arrangement for sequencing is of interest to this research.

The literature reviewed for this research also brings out certain inadequacies which this research aims to fill. Although, a lot has been written on the subject of democracy, civil military relations, political elite and their contributions. Similarly there are many critiques of the role of military in politics in Pakistan but there is no doctoral level research done on the subject of Gen Musharraf’s coup in the country. Amina Ibrahim identifies that there is a general dearth of theory based research about military interventions in Pakistan. There are only a limited number of research works undertaken on civil military relations and only few experts Askari, Shafqat are available on the subject. Till Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) was established and focused on civil military relations there was no significant research work undertaken to evaluate the subject of civilian control over military. There is general neglect on part of political elite and academics about the subject of national security, no national security policy has ever been formulated and all significant suggestions about national security architecture have come from the military. Lastly there is near deficiency of research work on civil military relations which brings together theoretical and societal perspectives.

Knowledge Gap

Above discussion reveals that although a substantial literature exist on civil military relations, military interventions, role of political and military elite, performance of governments and military regime outcomes, yet there is a general dearth of theory

90 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 4th ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). 48

guided research and case studies about military interventions in Pakistan. The discourse on civil military relations in Pakistan mainly comes out as critique of either the military or the civilian leaders or the military hegemony in general. Few research works have explored the subject of civilian/democratic control over the military and understand why despite the existence of the constitutional arrangements i.e. the hardware, civilian regimes are largely unable to capacitate themselves and improve the effectiveness of their control over the military: above all what are the remedial measures keeping in view their consistent failure. Also it may be noted that there is near absence of doctoral level and theory guided research on the causes of military intervention in Pakistan and especially of Gen Musharraf’s intervention in 1999; this research aims to fill the gap.

Significance of the Research

The study is significant for a number of reasons. First, there is paucity of theory guided doctoral level research about military interventions in Pakistan and there is none related to military intervention of 1999.This research fills this gap. Second although the widely acclaimed Huntington’s framework for civilian control over the military is adopted and formalized in the constitution of Pakistan, yet it has failed to stop the military interventions and takeovers. This research not only explores the reasons of its failure but also provides a perspective and offers recommendations to optimise civilian control over the military, while applying the transitional approach in the civil military relations discourse. Thirdly, in the age of terror in which Pakistan’s internal security stands imperilled for a range of reasons and causes, this thesis also looks at security reforms so that the civil and military can work jointly to contribute democratic consolidation in the country.

Scope and Limitations

Emanating from the aim of the study, this research evaluates the time period from 1988 to 2003 through the prism of democratic consolidation and civil military relations. The term military in the context of this research includes the armed forces and law enforcement agencies in Pakistan, although Army takes a lead while interfacing with the political elite. The actions and preferences of political elite and military leaders have been studied in this time period but Gen Musharraf’s coup remains the focal point of study. The regime outcome of political leaders (1988-1999) has been discussed as a reference to determine their preferences. On the other hand, Gen Musharraf’s regime

(1999-2003) outcome has been discussed in detail to establish the preferences of military elite when holding political power. Role of institutions like judiciary and military are evaluated to understand the process and validation of military takeovers.

The events leading up to military takeover of 1999 and its aftermath have been examined from theoretical perspective as well as societal perspective. For the later, a survey and unstructured interviews of key politicians, military officers and academicians have been conducted. In the pre take over events, Kargil conflict and its impact also emerges as a contributory factor, therefore, from the perspective of civil military relations, it has been analysed.

During the conduct of study, two limitations emerged while collecting the primary information. First is related to the availability of key players for interview and second concerns the factoring in of the societal perspective. In this saga there are three key actors i.e. Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Gen Musharraf. Unfortunately, Benazir is assassinated before this study took place, while Nawaz Sharif is again elected as Prime

Minister and therefore not available for interview. Only Gen Musharraf agreed for an interview, findings of which are included in the study. For Benazir, her autobiography

and for Nawaz Sharif, the accounts documented by his close ally Sartaj Aziz have been resourced for evaluation of the events.

As far as the survey to gauge public opinion is concerned, there has been no census since 1998 and the statistics on demography are only estimates. Keeping in view the limited number of educated people in Pakistan who are also familiar with the subject a proportionate sample has been selected to ascertain the societal perspective from opinion makers in Pakistan.

Research Methodology

Research, in terms of reasoning, is classified into two types i.e. inductive and deductive.

Inductive research relates to investigation of a new phenomenon on which little literature is available. In this type of research, a specific issue is evaluated to understand the general behaviour of a certain event or phenomenon. In simple words, it is called as

“bottom up” approach where researcher begins with specific observations, detects patterns and regularities, formulate some tentative hypotheses and finally end up developing some general conclusions or theories. Contrariwise, deductive research starts from the more general to the more specific. It is also termed as “top-down” approach where the researcher starts with a theory, narrow sit down into specific hypotheses, collects data and tests the hypotheses for a confirmation or otherwise of the original theory. This research evaluates the civil military relations in a democratic framework which is a multidisciplinary subject and encompasses numerous theoretical explanations. Since the existing theories have been used to determine the patterns of democracy and civil military relations in Pakistan, therefore this research is deductive in terms of reasoning.

Similarly there are two types of research in terms of data analysis i.e. qualitative and quantitative research. Qualitative research, “also known as exploratory research is used

to understand the opinions and motivations behind a certain event or a phenomenon.”

It provides detailed and in-depth information by uncovering trends and thoughts about the objective of study. On the other hand, quantitative research focuses more “in counting and classifying features and constructing statistical models and figures to explain what is observed. It is used to quantify attitudes, opinions, behaviours, and other defined variables – and generalize results from a larger sample population.”

The subject of democratic consolidation and civil military relations is built around the trends, motivations and opinions which can be analysed by both quantitative and qualitative analysis i.e. mixed methods of research. The latter enables valuable conclusions related to validation or otherwise of the public opinion about political, social and psychological aspects of civil military relations especially the causal relationship between politics and the military interventions and regime outcomes.

While the former being interpretative and logical in nature assists this research in effectively discerning and corroborating the perceived reasons for military interventions and regime outcomes with public perception about host of casual factors i.e. the contributory reasons and identification of a single cause as the casus belli triggering an intervention. Therefore, a mix of the two approaches has been followed in this research to accrue objective and balanced outcomes. The use of mixed method approach indicates that the concept under research is neither deterministic (positivist) nor socially constructed (interpretivism), rather it is a blend of both ontological explanations. Since the research first evaluates the conditions followed by actions and resultant consequences therefore the ontological explanation of this research is rooted into pragmatism.

Research Design

Mixed methods of research involve integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches to generating new knowledge and can involve either concurrent or sequential use of these two classes of methods to follow a line of inquiry. The research design and main focus on either qualitative or quantitative approach depends on research proposition.

Generally, there are various types of research designs available in mixed method research and their selection depends upon the research problem. One of the types is

‘concurrent triangulation method’ in which data is collected in two concurrent phases.

The data can be integrated during interpretation or analysis phase. This method is primarily used for confirmation, corroboration or cross validation within a single study.

The literature review reveals that subject of civil military relations, majority of times, is studied either through qualitative approach or quantitative approach. Addressing this drawback, this research uses concurrent triangulation method. Firstly, it qualitatively analyses the topic as a case study while employing theoretical explanations. Secondly, quantitative approach is used to bring out the societal perspective on the issue. At the end, results of both methods are compared which cross validates the findings.

Data and Sources

The mixed methods of research require both primary and secondary data in terms of theoretical and numerical. The primary sources include Economic Surveys of Pakistan, data on census and elections available at Election Commission of Pakistan, judgements of Supreme Court from its archives and the reports and studies undertaken by PILDAT and the surveys conducted by GALLUP Polls. The content analysis of two important national newspapers i.e. Dawn and Jang from period January 1999 to December 2003 resourced from Press and Information Department (PID) of Pakistan has also been undertaken.

Field survey stands out as the primary instrument for obtaining numerical responses through a set of closed and open ended questions. The survey draws upon a considerable sample of informed and experienced respondents from all walks of life to inform this research about their opinions on the quality of democracy and reasons for military intervention etc. Forgoing in view, a survey is conducted to enable comparison and transportation of key findings, through questionnaire to draw upon the public opinion about civil military relations.

The survey is supplemented by interviews and discussions with notable actors from cluster of political, military and civil society entities including judiciary to validate the theoretical framework and the propositions. The interviews followed a standard process i.e. sharing of a questionnaire in advance and response lasting 30-40 minutes. To instil confidence and get the maximum output, given the general reluctance in Pakistan for recorded interviews, the interviews were not recorded and were instead transcribed later by the researcher. Besides the interviews, the personal acquaintance of this researcher with many leading academicians, military and some political actors and frequent interaction with them on the range of issues at the university enabled the researcher to add depth to the research with the information thus obtained.

On the other hand, the secondary sources include relevant books and writings on the subject and the journals published regularly by think tanks and institutions based in

Pakistan and internationally. The researcher has consulted a range of data banks from variety of sources. Access to National Defence University (NDU) library and Pakistan

Scientific and Technological Information Centre (PASTIC) and their ability to on-line access and consult through multiple search engines huge number of books and research work done in the field of civil military relations and relevant fields which is available in the leading libraries and universities of the world added depth to the study.

Data Analysis

The research problem of the study indicates two variables i.e. role of political elite as independent and role of military and military intervention as dependent variable. Both the primary and secondary data has been analysed keeping in view these two variables.

Qualitatively, a thematic analysis has been carried out to gauge the preference and actions of political elite and resultant military interventions. Quantitatively, IBM SPSS software has been used to calculate the societal response on the issue. The research employed Zotero, research tool to gather, organise, analyse and cite sources which are shared in this research. Moreover, United Kingdom (UK) English language has been used throughout the study.

Organization of Study

“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"

"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to.”

"I don't much care where –" "Then it doesn't matter which way you go.”

Lewis Carroll (Alice in Wonderland)

Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Perspectives

In this chapter foundational structures of this research have been expounded. In accordance with the core question, the conceptual framework for democratisation and its related theoretical perspectives i.e. modernisation, transition and structural have been explained. It identifies how the role of political elite in the context of transition approach is critical for democratic consolidation. Within the conceptual framework of state, civil society and civil military relations the theoretical perspectives set out the hypotheses which would be studied in the research. Civil military relations finds context in democratic system and is closely connected with the threat matrix. Identifying measures for exercising civil control over the military it explains the push and pull factors,

military’s interests and studies the phenomenon of military coup and its triggers. It identifies that Huntington’s framework of civil control of military i.e. objective control, separation and institutional autonomy practiced in Pakistan since inception has largely been ineffective in preventing military interventions in Pakistan. Chapter 2:

Democratic Reconstruction after Gen Zia

In this chapter death of Gen Zia and military’s support for moving the country from partial to liberal democracy during the two tenures of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif provide context and enables this researcher to test two hypotheses. First that political elite create situations of deadlock, involve military as arbitrator, which for want of reconciliation in the face of deteriorated security situation sometimes results in military takeover. The second that, in the process of democratic consolidation the transition approach and it application is most value able. The approach identifies political elite as the primary agency which through its actions fosters democratisation or otherwise. In this chapter interplay between the political elite during the decade 1988-1999 with a focus on interaction between the president, prime minister, chief justice and the joint and service chiefs and its impact on process of democratisation and civil military relations in the country.

Chapter 3: Breakdown of Civil Military Relations 1998-99

In the second tenure of Nawaz Sharif authoritarianism premised on heavy mandate led to creation of multiple political situations in quick succession heightened concerns of the polity and the military. These in the context of constitutional framework included undoing of Eighth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment to arrogate complete power.

Which was followed by forced ouster of president, physical assault on the Supreme

Court and engineered ouster of chief justice. Also the resignation of Gen Karamat

COAS on suggesting the need for setting up National Security Council as a forum for

addressing rising security concerns. The negative impact these developments had on the military, appointment of Gen Musharraf and the civil military divide created by the

Kargil conflict led to sacking of Gen Musharraf, which was interpreted by the military as a coup. It resulted in a counter coup by the military to protect its COAS. These aspects contextualised in the theoretical frameworks of civil military relations and coup theories would be studied in this chapter. The analysis of the Kargil conflict and the coup and counter coup focuses not merits and demerits but on the interpretative and explanatory powers identified in theoretical framework for extracting findings.

Chapter 4: Military Regime’s Aspiration

The counter military coup had led to installation of military regime. In this chapter the aspirations and outcome of military regime in the backdrop of conceptual framework set out by Finer will be studied. It will ascertain how, after incorporation of technically qualified individuals, the regime went about to set up the agenda, acquire legitimacy through a judgement by Supreme Court and dealt with endogenous and exogenous challenges. It also studies developments in the realm of civil military relations during the regime and identifies how the personal interests of Gen Musharraf became the primary determinant for the major policy decisions. The chapter focuses on the process related to extension of military in power in contravention of the Supreme Court judgement for returning democracy to the country after expiry of three years.

Chapter 5: Democracy and Civil Military Relations: A Survey

In order to ascertain societal perspective on civil military relations and elite responsibility for consolidating democracy in Pakistan, a survey through questionnaire comprising sixteen closed ended and one open ended question from a broad based sample comprising opinion makers from all segments of civil society has been conducted. The survey is tested for internal consistency through Cronbach Alpha

analysis. As a primary source, the results of the survey corroborates with the findings of the research. The chapter also compares the survey results with those conducted by

GALLUP Polls on same issues which add to its credibility and reliability. The interviews with leading key players and the scholars drew on their personal insights and opinions to understand elite interface and its impact on civil military relations and democratisation in the country.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter brings together the results of theory based qualitative thematic data for the period of 1988 to 2003 and collates it with the qualitative numerical data accrued through the field survey to ascertain public opinion and societal view on the subject of civil military relations. It taking into account developments since 2004 proffers recommendations in seven clusters of democratic consolidation, responsibility of judiciary, civil military relations, democratic control of military, national security architecture and lastly measures for eradicating contentious issues.

Summation

This chapter provides a comprehensive perspective about this research and what it wants to achieve in the context of civil military relations. Initially the description about the alternations between civil and military rules sets the stage to crystallise the problem statement and identify research questions. The research design elucidates how this research aims to bring together theoretical and societal perspectives in order to extract comprehensive findings and proffer practical recommendations. Types and sources of data, scope and limitations has also be identified. The literature review takes cognizance of the existing literature so as to benefit from the works undertaken up till now and also identify the gaps which this research aims to fulfil. In the end the organisation of research provides insight to the reader, what to expect in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

“Democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”91 Winston Churchill

1.1 Prelude

In this chapter, research structure formulated as conceptual framework and theoretical perspective is elaborated. Together, they provide direction and set parameters for exploring the core and ensuing research questions. Conceptual framework comprises the process of democratisation in Pakistan, exercise of civilian control over the military in a democratic framework, causes of military intervention (coup d’état) and what interests they serve. Correspondingly, theoretical perspective elaborates the conceptual framework and focuses on interplay of democratisation and politics to ascertain the efficacy of approaches for managing civil military relations and civilian control. The framework developed in this chapter establishes that the societal military and foreign influences create environment conducive for acceptance of military coups on account of national and institutional interests.

1.2 Civil Military Relations: Conceptual Framework

Civil military relations is defined as a “web of relations between the military and society within which it operate, and of which it is necessarily part. Such relations encompass all aspects of the role of the military (as a professional, political, social and economic institution) in the entire gambit of the national life. Civil military relations involve issues of the attitude of the civilians towards the military, the civilian society’s

91 Richard Langworth, Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of Quotations (London: Public Affairs, 2011), 574. 59

perception of, and attitudes of the military towards the civilian society. Moreover it involves the civilian society’s perception of, and the attitudes to the military and the role of armed forces in relation to the state.”92 Clausewitz visualised it as a relationship between the state, people and the armed forces.93 Civil military relations is not a separate academic area of study but draws upon the diverse fields of political science, international relations, economics, history, psychology, anthropology, and sociology etc. Scholars have and continue to study the evolving dimensions of these relations to identify challenges in general. They investigate specific cases to understand the dynamics or group the cases for comparative studies in an attempt to understand the non-normative behaviour of certain militaries i.e. their intervention in politics directly or indirectly. These studies are contextualized in global, regional and domestic settings.

A political system of a country exists in and responds to external and internal developments and is shaped by them. Analysing these developments in international security environment and system, Rod Lyon categorised evolution of civil military relations in western countries in three distinct ages.111 First, during the period of total war 1860-1945, second in the age of cold war 1946-1990 and third commencing form

1990 to-date which he labels as the age of terror. Since this research focuses on Pakistan therefore it will in the main emphasis on the second and the third age.

Conceptually, the discussion of civil military relations revolves around three major questions. First relates to the process of democratisation and political construction.

Second, how civilian control over military can be optimized and third, what inspires a

92 Adedeji Ebo, Towards a Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 2; Naison Ngoma, “Civil—military Relations in Africa: Navigating Uncharted Waters,” African Security Studies 15, no. 4 (2006): 98. 93 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. James John Graham (New York: Routledge, 2005), 281. 111Lyon, “Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Terror,” 4.

military intervention and coup and its relationship with the institutional interests of the military.

Civil military relations operate within the political process of the country. In a democratic system, pre-eminence of elected political elite and military subordination is considered essential. However, strengthening of democracy largely remains in the purview of the political elite. Studies for democratization 94 identify three main approaches95 i.e. modernisation, transition and structuralism which provide perspective to this research as it investigates the process of democratisation and construction of civil military relations in Pakistan.

In a democratic setting, civil control over the military is exercised by application of different methods. Huntington identified separation approach, in his view separation of the military from civil can help in building civilian control over the military while ensuring optimum professional growth. 96 On the other hand, Janowitz argues for an integrated approach.97 He perceives protection of democracy as a joint responsibility and integration of civil and military for a better civilian control. Another important question in civil military relation is what inspires the military to intervene in politics and launch a coup. To answer this question, scholars in Janowitzian sense identify three major perspectives, namely the pull factors (societal factors which pull the military towards politics). The push factors i.e. the factors indigenous to military’s institutional structures (also seen as interests) which forces military’s involvement in politics and

94 The research does not include a debate on the formal and participatory democracy yet it takes into account the process involved in strengthening either. 95 David S. Potter et al., eds., Democratization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 10. 96 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Harvard University Press, 1957). 97 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (USA: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961). 61

thirdly the factor of foreign influence i.e. on the society and the military. These aspects have been discussed in this chapter.

In summary this conceptual framework and the theoretical perspective is tabulated below.

Table 1.1: Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Perspective Conceptual Framework Theoretical Perspective

Democratisation and Political Construction 1. Modernisation Perspective (Interface between politics and military) 2. Transition Perspective 3. Structural Perspective

Civilian Control over Military 1. Separation: Huntington (why separation approach does not work) 2. Integrated: Janowitz Triggering a Military Coup d’état 1. Societal Perspective: Pull Factors (what inspires a coup in Pakistan) 2. Military Perspective: Push Factors 3. Foreign Influences

Interests 1. National 2. Institutional

The forgoing framework and perspective is employed in this research to study the civil military relations in Pakistan. Since Pakistan was created during the initial stages of cold war therefore these external settings influenced the civil military relations in the country while the process of state construction furnished the internal context. Later the onset of age of terror contextualised the relations. The evolution of civil military relations in Pakistan can be divided into these two sub-stages with two distinctions.98

First, although created in 1947, the polity in Pakistan maintains strong linkage with the

Islamic history, the Islamic political system in general and developments in the subcontinent in particular. Secondly, the interplay of persistent Indo-Pak rivalry due to

98 Lyon, ‘Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Terror.’ Corresponding with Lyon’s categorisation, these are cold war stage and age of terror and much of its external and internal politics is related to these stages. 62

unresolved Kashmir dispute (during cold war and age of terror), resulted into a cold war of its own, layering historic and existing rivalry with additional complexities.

After creation, domestic politics and civil military relations in Pakistan has witnessed two broad thrusts. The first relates to the process of democratic and political construction and second to intermittent military rules. Unfortunately the process of state and democratic construction in the first decade ended in imposition of martial law in

1958 by a civilian President. The second attempt for democratisation from 1971 to 1977 also ended in a martial law due to allegations of electoral fraud and similarly the third attempt from 1988 to 1999 again ended in Gen Musharraf’s military rule. The study of this decade and the consequent military takeover is of primary interest to this research.

1.3 The Core Question and Explanation

This research is a case study of the military takeover of 12 October 1999. It has been undertaken to identify reasons of its occurrence, how military utilised power from 1999 to 2003 and why Gen Musharraf did not restore democracy at the end of three year period permitted by Supreme Court of Pakistan. Consistent with the identified methodological approach, this core question comprises three main aspects elucidated below.

The first aspect concerns with the study of democratic interlude from 1988 to 1999.99

What role the political elite played in strengthening or undermining the process of democratisation in this period? The second relates to study of the efficacy of civilian control over the military in the process of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Third, what were the reasons which led to military takeover in 1999 and the influence of national and institutional interests on the decision of military takeover,

99 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A New History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 143.

on the consequent military regime and in the military’s failure to restore democracy within the permitted time period of three years?

1.4 Democracy and Political Construction

Consensus on democracy100 as the defining political thought and system of governance was achieved soon after creation of Pakistan which was later expressed in form of 1956

Constitution. The process of democratisation pursued thereafter refers to political changes moving in a democratic direction. Scholars identify three main approaches to study the process of democratisation i.e. modernisation, transitional and structural.119 It is generally perceived that democracy is strengthened by pursuing anyone or a combination of these approaches. Operating in a functionalist construct, modernisation approach focuses on socio-economic development as the key instrument for sustaining democracy. The structural approach focuses on the influence of state and societal structures on the process of democratisation.

The transitional approach locates the success or otherwise of the process of democratisation in the conduct of political elite: what they do, when, where and how. It distinguishes between the stages of transition and consolidation. In nutshell, the transition approach regards the political elite as primary agency for promoting or impeding the democratic process. These approaches are not mutually exclusive but overlap and intersect as the state and society evolves. Yet the emphasis of each approach

100 Democracy is understood as rule of the people, by the people and for the people. It comprises three aspects i.e. democracy, the rule of the people elected through free and fair elections, it operates on the principles of equality of all citizens and participation of citizens in governance and availability of alternate means of information. The second aspect is that of constitutionalism i.e. to limit the government by law and free and just judicial system. The third aspect of liberalism comprises different freedoms i.e. of religion, political, media and association etc. While the debate on the nature of democracy in Pakistan is beyond the purview of this research therefore it accepts the common practice of these three aspects in a manner that the democratic system sustains itself. 119Potter et al., Democratization. 64

is distinct. Within each approach, variety of explanations by different authors who differ from each other exist. Each approach is discussed in preceding sections.

1.4.1 Modernisation

The modernisation approach focuses on the socio economic conditions and their significance for sustaining democracy. Lipset in his seminal work established a theoretical link between the level of development and the probability of a polity being democratic.101 According to him, the level of development can be gauged in per capita income of a country and other indicators of economic wealth. He argued that various aspects of economic development i.e. wealth, education, industrialisation and urbanisation contribute in creating the continuing conditions which help in democratic transition and stability. Alternately “a society divided between large impoverished mass and small favoured elite would result either in oligarchy or in tyranny.”102

Moore, attributed five factors which determine the path to democracy and emphasised on the significance of middle class and advanced “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” thesis.103 The proposition of economic development sustaining democracy was studied by Prezwoski and others in their study concluded that while socioeconomic development may not help in transition to democracy, it certainly helps in sustaining it.104 The benchmark of $5000 per capita income was generally regarded as the threshold for sustaining democracy. According to them, no democracy fails if the gross domestic

101 Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review 53, no. 01 (1959): 69–105. 102 Ibid. 75. 103 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 1967). Power distribution amongst the elite 2, the economic basis of upper agrarian class, 3, the class constellation, 4, Distribution of power between the classes, 5, and the state’s autonomy viz a viz a dominant class. 104 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178.

product (GDP) per capita is above $5000; it is susceptible below that; and dictatorships persist if it is below $1000. It implies that wealth is a primary determinant of democracy, yet India and other such countries which do not fit the wealth and socioeconomic indicator criteria practice and exist as stable democracies.

In Pakistan, the GDP per capita income in 1947 stood slightly above $200 and after sixty seven years it increased to $1512 in 2014-15.105 Apparently, attainment of the goal of $5000 per capita income looks to be a distant objective. It implies that socioeconomic conditions in Pakistan are still not and will not likely to be for quite some time conducive for sustaining democracy. Contrarily, India which was below the wealth criteria continues to function as a stable democracy. Amrityia Sen, the Nobel laureate, attributes it to the history of India rather than socio-economic conditions.106 On the contrary, Singapore with high level of socio economic development and oil rich Middle

Eastern countries practice an authoritarian rather than democratic system. The inherent contradictions in the argument of the modernisation approach make it a weak analytical frame work for study of the process of democratisation in Pakistan.

Ishrat Hussain,107 while studying economic growth in Pakistan considers determinants for long term growth and counts initial conditions, investment in physical and human capital, macroeconomic policy, quality of institutions and governance and external environment facing a country. He makes an interesting observation:

“The inter-decade differences in economic performance halted the

secular rise of the growth rate. The 1960s, 1980s and 2000s

[authoritarian governments] witnessed robust economic growth with

105 Government of Pakistan, “Pakistan Economic Survey 2014-2015” (Islamabad: Finance Division, 2015), vi. 106 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity (London: Penguin Books, 2006). 107 Ishrat Husain, ‘Pakistan’s Growth Experience 1947-2007’, Business Review 5, no. 2 (2010): 11–33. 127Ibid. 16. 66

average annual rates exceeding 6 percent while the 1950s, 1970s and

1990s [democratic governments] were marked by a decline in the trend

growth rate to 4 percent”.127

In conclusion, the authoritarian regimes could not sustain perpetual rule and had to quit under public pressure generated by reasons other than prosperity. Similarly, democratically elected political actors who have focused essentially on development and prosperity for gaining legitimacy have also faltered. Therefore, it can be argued that when it comes to democracy, the polity in general manifests strong desire to move beyond formal to participatory democracy.

The focus of modernist approach is important for creating conditions (wealth) for sustaining democracy in the long run yet it is not the most appropriate instrument for promoting democracy especially in the developing countries. Wucherpfenning explores the economic development proposition of modernist and asks “are poor countries less likely to be democratic than rich countries and if yes, why?” 108 He states that

“democracy does not come about randomly, and for democracy to be stable it must come about from within.”109 His democracy from within proposition is an important indicator that for success of democratisation process the casual relationship resides somewhere else. Stephan in an effort to understand relationship between “citizens perceptions’ of socioeconomic efficacy of a democratic regime versus the legitimacy of the regime identifies that there are number of theory based reasons why a regime could be insulated for a range of reasons and concludes that the rule of law rather than socioeconomic performance is the vital asset of the new democracy. 110

108 Julian Wucherpfennig and Franziska Deutsch, “Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited,” Living Reviews in Democracy 1 (2009): 1. 109 Ibid., 3. 110 Alfred C. Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 140.

To summarise, if one goes by the modernist approach then the desirable sustaining conditions for democracy do not exist in Pakistan. They have not existed since inception and are not likely to be attained in the near future, yet people of Pakistan manifest strong desire for practicing democracy so what should be done to reconcile the contradiction.

There is a need to study the democracy from within proposition and look at other approaches to determine the most appropriate approach for promoting democracy in

Pakistan.131

1.4.2 Structural

The structural approach to democratisation envisages a long term process of change influenced by changes in structures of power. These structures relate to distribution of power amongst the individuals and social systems comprising groups, organisations, communities and societies. A state and society comprises many power structures and the basic premise of the structural approach is that:

“The particular interrelationship of certain structures of powereconomic,

social, and political as they gradually change through history provide

constraints and opportunities that drive political elite and others along a

historical trajectory leading towards liberal democracy. Other such

structural relationships lead historically in other political

directions.”132

Moore investigating social origins of democracy questioned why the slow change, from agrarian to industrialised societies during seventeenth to twentieth century, facilitated democratisation in some countries (England, France and USA), while others (Japan and

Germany) moved towards fascism, and still others (Russia and China) turned towards communism. While studying the interplay of four changing power structures i.e. the peasants, lords, urban bourgeoisie and the state, Potter concludes five general

131Liang-chih Evans Chen, “Development First, Democracy Later, or Democracy First, Development Later: The Controversy over Development and Democracy” (Annual Meeting of the Institute for the Study of Democracy, California: University of California, 2007), http://isia.ccu.edu.tw/isiaUpload/doc/English%20CV%20%28December%202012%29.pdf (accessed on 7 July 2015). He concludes that the controversy over development and democracy is inconclusive and will be continuing. 132Potter et al., Democratization., 18-19. conditions essential for development of democracy. First, the development of a balance between state and landed aristocracy (not too strong a state) and second the growth of appropriate forms of commercial agriculture. Third, the weakening of landed aristocracy, fourth, the prevention of aristocratic-bourgeoisie coalition and lastly a breakup from a bourgeoisie led past.111

The social structures also represent social classes and struggle between these classes produces different forms of government. Amongst these classes, the most prodemocratic is the urban working class and least, the landed aristocracy (feudal) while the position of others is ambiguous and varies according to prevailing political conditions and settings. If the fourth power structure represented by the state becomes powerful and autonomous from social classes then it is likely to impede the process of democratisation. Consequently “changing structure and form of state power is fundamental to democratisation.”134 Rueschemeyer and others studied the impact of transnational power on class alignment and changing nature of the state. They observe that if a state is economically dependent on other states, than it will delay industrialisation and urbanisation and consequently democratisation as the most prodemocratic class would remain weak.112

The state and societal power structures are also seen as institutions which either could be social, historical or political. The historical and political institutionalisms’ define

111 Ibid. 20. 134Ibid. 21. 112 Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 69

institutions as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions in the organisational structures of the polity or the political economy”. The social institutionalists “add cognitive scripts, moral templates and symbol systems” that may exist at supra-state or supra-organisational levels.113 These institutions impact politics by influencing policy or organising political action. The impact of political institutions on democratisation could be longstanding, systemic and structural influencing in terms of outcomes and interests. They may affect the interaction of actors who mainly work within institutional constraints but may sometimes choose to bypass them. Changes in state policies also set into motion processes that influence interests of such actors and determine the success of a program like democracy.114

Moore applied the structural approach to study the process of democratisation in India which started in seventeenth century and observes that India moved in a different direction. 115 Instead of industrialising and urbanising, it surrendered to become a colony, a supplier of resources and subsequently a market for industrialised countries.

The colonisers in two centuries of domination altered the indigenous social power structures. They created new power structures like a centralised bureaucracy, police force and armed forces, a district system of administration and a feudal class which could serve as the agents of the crown. They also altered the education system139 to produce a class which could serve the new power structures and aligned the tax collection system with the district system of administration. Greater home rule (i.e.

113 Edwin Amenta and Kelly M. Ramsey, ‘Institutional Theory’, in Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective, ed. Kevin T. Leicht and J. Craig Jenkins (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2010), 15–40. 114 Ibid., 27. 115 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 139Thomas Babington Macaulay, “Minute on Indian Education [1835],” in Bureau of Education. Selections from Educational Records, Part I (1781- 1839), ed. H. Sharp (Calcutta: Superintendent, Government Printing, 1920), 107–17, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/macaulay/txt_minute_education_1835.ht ml (accessed on 18 June 2015). 70

partial sharing of power) and independence was achieved after a long historic political struggle.

Pakistan on its inception inherited a milieu of such power structures which were spread in the society. Its most significant assets were the founding political party (All India

Muslim League) and the founding fathers (Quaid e Azam, Liaquat Ali Khan etc.). Other political actors who migrated from India to Pakistan lacked social roots and a therefore a political base and were forced to co-opt the local feudal and other power holders in the society. Jalal, 116 investigated how the weak state survived and bureaucratic and military institutions rose to the position of dominance in the country. She refutes the weaknesses of political parties as a contributory factor and explores the tensions between the centre and the provinces in a federation and observes that the collusion between the bureaucratic and military institutions and their interface with international centres of power in Washington and London facilitated the process.

Adeney and Wyatt while studying the structures of democracy in South Asia after decolonization contends the findings of Jalal.117 They are of the view that Pakistan and

India both inherited a formal democracy which had colonial roots. Both had structural and institutional capacities to facilitate the practice of formal democracy and progressively convert it into participatory democracy. The developments in India were encouraging while in Pakistan they were not satisfactory. All India Muslim League in

Pakistan mostly comprised elite with insignificant pubic roots. Even after the creation of Pakistan, it denied the membership to the minority, which was 22 percent of the total population at that time, hence becoming a non-inclusive party.142 On the other hand,

116 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1995). 117 Katharine Adeney and Andrew Wyatt, ‘Democracy in South Asia: Getting beyond the Structure– agency Dichotomy’, Political Studies 52, no. 1 (2004): 1–18. 142Ibid., 11. 71

Indian National Congress was not only having greater public support but also open for all the ethnic and religious groups.

It is also argued that the founding fathers (Gandhi and Nehru) in India lasted long enough to ensure the process of transition and consolidation. Contrarily in Pakistan, due to early demise of the founding fathers (Quaid e Azam and Liaquat Ali) without giving a constitution, transition towards democracy and democratic consolidation was stalled.

These differences created structural weaknesses in the overall political landscape of the country and gave birth to the elite-driven politics.

In the subsequent decades, the interplay between political actors and state institutions

(bureaucracy, military and judiciary) further distracted the polity and process of democratisation and despite opportunities available to political actors they could not consolidate the process of democratisation in the country. Rather, each democratic attempt ended in a military rule. If the structural aspects and role of institutions is taken into account then the outcome should have been different. The structural approach, while provides insight into the role of the institutions cannot fully account for the reasons of this inadequacy.

In historical structural dimension, there is also a debate on compatibility of Islam and democracy as political ideas. It may be noted that the debate within Islamic world and in Pakistan about democracy and process of democratisation right from the start was influenced by thought of Islamic exceptionalism i.e. the belief that “Islam offers a total and comprehensive model of life whose adoption in our time is not only possible or desirable but also mandatory”. 118 Such an Islamic state is neither an autocracy nor theocracy but a monocracy (rule of rules) and is seen simply as a vehicle for achieving security and duties of advocating good and preventing evil. However beyond that, there

118 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 345.

is no single model of Islamic State in existence which has been constructed on the basis of foregoing argument while autocracies of different types with authoritarianism as the defining feature exist. Resultantly, it is often asked “is democracy at all possible in the

Muslim world” while contrarily it is argued that “Islamic countries contains elements that are both congenial and uncongenial towards democracy” and democracy in Islamic countries is only delayed. In Pakistan, inclusive approach and process of reconciliation of democratic norms and institutions with the Islamic injunctions undertaken during

Zia’s regime by Islamic Ideology Council has settled the question to the satisfaction of polity and in the interest of democracy.

To summarise then, the importance of human agency in the process of democratisation emerges strongly and the criticality of political elite in creating and consolidating democracy stands out. State and societal structures do impact on the process of democratisation however it is long term in nature. Once democracy takes hold and becomes the societal norm, its importance becomes significant for its quality and substance. Since democracy in Pakistan could not take roots then only its focus shifts to its quality and substance. Therefore the role of political elite assumes critical dimensions. The wealth, structures and institutions only facilitate the process.

1.4.3 Transition

The process of democratisation aims at establishing liberal democracy in a polity. It implies that the binding rules and policy decisions are made by community representatives (political elite) who are accountable to the community. Such representatives are chosen through free and fair elections organised on adult franchise basis in which all members of the community and all communities have equal opportunity to compete. A polity in which people have the right to express themselves freely without danger of severe punishment, importantly on issues of politics and

ideology and enjoy the freedom to form organisations, independent political parties and interest groups.119

Transition approach is a theoretical and analytical construct which combines the influence of the historical process and the role of human beings for promoting liberal democracy.145 The former focuses on, and attempts to answer the question, as to how democracy is constructed in the first place; as opposed to what sustains democracy

(modernists approach). It sees human beings (political elite) as the primary agency and their initiatives and preferences as the principal means for creating and consolidating democracy.120 Adeney and Wyatt are also of the view that “elite politics and choices have clearly played a large role in the democratisation or otherwise of South Asia”. 121

Higley defines political elite as “persons who by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially”. 122 In political sense, elites are “restricted to persons who are at the top of the pyramid or pyramids of political, economic and social power.”123 Higely opines that the “presence or absence of stable political institutions is one of the major differences between political systems that can be explained on the basis of difference between elites.”124 He has also identified two types of elite namely

119 Potter et al., Democratization. 5. 145Ibid. 15. 120 John Higley, “Elite Theory in Political Sociology” (XX IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Fukuoka: International Political Science Association, 2006), http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_4036.pdf (accessed on 15 May 2015). Surveying the works of Mosca, Pareto, Michel’s on elites, Higley posits an elite theory. He defines elite as “persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organisations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially. The elite could be ideologically or consensually united. 121 Adeney and Wyatt, ‘Democracy in South Asia.’, 7. 122 Higley, “Elite Theory in Political Sociology,” 3. 123 Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 14. 124 Higley, ‘Elite Theory in Political Sociology.’ 149.

“ideologically united elite” and “consensually united elite”. The former is marked by a single and defined ideology by all or nearly all elite person. While the latter provides a set of rule under which the elite with conflicting ideologies struggle for decision making but avoid disruptive actions to keep the political situation manageable as a collective interest.

Rustow,125 in his influential case study determined that countries generally follow a four phased historic route to democratisation. The first phase aims at creating national unity in the territory in which the country is being established. Unity does not imply that agreement by all is essential, alternately a broad agreement i.e. all are Pakistanis and there are no secessionist movements is sufficient.126 The second phase is marked by a prolonged inconclusive political struggle i.e. “a family feud”. 127 Employing that

“democracy, is born of conflict, even violence, never as a result of simply peaceful evolution”.154 Democracy during this preparatory phase is fragile and the struggle continues till one group dominates others or the struggle can also tear the national unity apart.

In the third phase, first there is a transition to a decision to cohabit,128 compromise and adhere to democratic rules. It is also called the historic moment, a decision taken by political elite which leads to the fourth phase of habituation i.e. the conscious adoption of democratic rules and application of the decision arrived at historic moment. 129

125 Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics, 1970, 337–63. 126 Quaid e Azam in a public gathering, on his visit to Dacca, East Pakistan on 21 March 1948, asked the question whether everyone wants to be Pakistani. All agreed to become Pakistani besides minor issues. 127 Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy.’, 355. 154Potter et al., Democratization. 14. 128 Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 68. He uses the term ‘Elite Bargain’ and identifies its flaws. He studies the application of the term to Eighth Amendment and reviews the decade of 90’s for transition from authoritarianism to democracy. 129 Huma Baqai, ‘Transition to Democracy in Pakistan: A Comparison to Rustow’s Thesis’, Pakistan Vision 13, no. 2 (2012): 71–95. She studies the application of the thesis in Pakistan and concludes that

Adeney and Wyatt named this historic moment as “critical junctures” and according to them, decolonisation of subcontinent was a critical juncture.157 In a politically and ideologically fragmented polity, the historic moment accords with the consensus amongst the elite who have consensually united. Such elite may take divergent positions in public yet a general consensus on political rules of conduct i.e. not taking positions which could interrupt or endanger democracy is adhered to. Contrarily, it also ally’s to the fear that consensual unity may further and strengthen formal democracy and cement elite control of power while denying participatory democracy to non-elite.

Application of the transition approach to Pakistan brings out that the first phase of national unity i.e. establishing a Pakistani identity was quickly completed. It was possible due to historical reasons and decades long struggle for Pakistan i.e. antecedent

Pakistan Movement. However, in some areas like Kashmir and Junagarh etc. where the populace wanted to join Pakistan they were not allowed. The second phase described as intense inconclusive power struggle lasted from 1948 to 1956 and culminated in agreement and formulation of 1956 Constitution. However, when it came to putting the constitution into practice by conducting elections, President Iskander Mirza fearing curtailment in his powers imposed martial law in 1958.

The martial law lasted from 1958 to 1962 during which the military replaced the 1956

Constitution with 1962 Constitution. The latter envisaged a presidential form of government while the former was a parliamentary democracy similar to the one practiced in Great Britain. The presidential system lasted till 1968. President Ayub relinquished power and handed over to the military which remains an enigma. The martial law of Gen Yahya viewed itself as a transitionary government with a mandate

‘the country needs a functioning federal design’ and application of unity in diversity concept. 157Adeney and Wyatt, ‘Democracy in South Asia.’, 7.

to hold fresh elections, elect a constituent assembly and transfer powers. However the results of the 1970 elections manifested sharp division between East and West Pakistan as already discussed. The inability of military government to ensure transfer of power in accordance with the new mandate led popular unrest in East Pakistan leading to secession. Therefore as Rustow had indicated the second phase remained inconclusive and literally tore the country apart.

Arguably the second phase in remaining Pakistan ended in formulation of 1973

Constitution. Could the formulation of 1973 Constitution be equated with ‘historical moment’ of reconciliation remains a moot point, the allegations of rigging in elections of 1977 and imposition of another martial law certainly interrupted the process. The power struggle, witnessed from 1988 to 1999, however indicates that 1973 Constitution in some ways could be equated with the historical moment. However the real historic moment i.e. third phase did arrive on 16 May 2006 with the signing of Charter of

Democracy (CoD). The fourth phase began in earnest in 2009. The practices witnessed in the fourth phase will also be studied by this research to yield contemporary findings about civil military relations.

Contained within the overall process of democratisation is another sub process of transition from military led or authoritarian governments to liberal democracy. Scott reviewing the works of Levine, O’Donnell and Schmitter analyses their contrasting approaches for studying transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy. Two opposing models are evaluated i.e. when transition is undertaken by ‘regime leader’ or is undertaken ‘against him’.130 These contain two options i.e. gradual and rapid. Gen

130 Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues,” Working Paper, no. 130 (1989): 1–44.

Zia’s death created a situation in which neither of the two fit in. Although it can be argued that the efforts by Prime Minister Junejo, before his removal could in the broader perspective place this transition process as being undertaken against the regime, which initially was gradual but after Gen Zia’s death became sudden. The methods to study transition suggested by them have been suitably modified to suit the case with accent to the Smithsonian’s model where the individual makes decisions in his own interest under the utility maximizing approach.

The process of transition starts when an incumbent regime due to certain calamity decides to ease repression and liberalise the polity. The decision for change polarises political elite into hard and soft liners or modernists and extremists each striving to influence the process of change. The initiation of the process also divides opposition into opportunists, moderates or radicals who seek to further their interests. The change can trigger institution of an interim government which depending upon the political circumstances could be led by the opposition, shared by regime and opposition, the regime itself could become the caretaker or an international organisation like United

Nation may appoint an interim government setup. The second stage of transition is marked by the transfer of power form interim to a democratically elected government.

Since the modernist approach only explores the conditions which support democracy and not the process which creates democracy. While the structural approach examines the long term influence of the state and societal structures on the process of democratisation therefore this research determines that the transition approach is most apt to study the process of democratisation in Pakistan. While doing so it maintains cognizance of the cognitive aspects argued by other two approaches and their interplay with elements of transition approach. The three approaches and their main points are tabulated on the next page.

Table 1.2: Approaches to Democratisation MODERNISATION TRANSITION STRUCTURAL Lipset ‘Democracy is related to Rustow. What factors can best Long term process of historical a country’s socio economic preserve or enhance the health change. Democratisation development or level of and stability of democracy.160 process explained by changing modernisation.131 Five of fifteen structures of power. indices considered.

Variables considered: wealth, Historical approach, marked by Historical route to liberal industrialisation, urbanisation holistic considerations of a democracy is determined country provide sound basis for fundamentally by changing and education which have a analysis than for functional structures and form of state universal and linear casual prerequisites. All countries power. Moore’s132 five general travel on a four phased route for conditions for democratic correlation with democracy. democratisation Quantitative helps explain quality of democracy Socio-economic development Phases of national unity, Development: balance to avoid strengthens the middle class and inclusive political struggle, too strong a state or large middle class is good for decision marked by a historical independent landed aristocracy democracy moment and habituation. and their weakening overtime,

Rooted in a functionalist view Primary agency is political elite Other forms of commercial and democracy is produced by agriculture, prevention of and in contemporary social data. initiatives of human beings. aristocratic-bourgeois coalition Huntington’s waves of and revolutionary break from democracy from 1828-1974. the past led by bourgeois.

Foregoing in view, the reasons for choosing transition approach as primary analytical framework to study and interpret the process of democratisation in Pakistan are evident.

This process and politics surrounding the process stands out as the independent variable to which the dependent variable of military responds. Interestingly, after the military take over the dependency of the variables inverses as the military led rule emerges as the independent variable to which political elite responds in different ways. At a certain point in time of the military rule, the process of return to democracy commences. This

131 Potter et al., Democratization.11-22. 160Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy.’ 132 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.

marks the transition process elucidated above which will be employed to study the process of return to or otherwise to democracy during Musharraf’s era from 1999-2003.

1.5 Civilian Control of Military

“Now you have to stand guard over the development and maintenance

of Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and the equality of

manhood in your own native soil. You will have to be alert, very alert,

for the time for relaxation is not yet there. With faith, discipline and

selfless devotion to duty, there is nothing worthwhile that you cannot

achieve.”133

Quaid e Azam

The terms civil control and democratic control over the military are today used interchangeably. Understandably, the concept has not been satisfactorily defined. 134

The “field still lacks a universally accepted definition of civilian control”. 135 In terms of approaches and methods for exercising such control, Huntington explored subjective and objective methods as a mutually exclusive binary and preferred latter for providing optimum balance of power. Janowitz contrarily, proposed a convergence model; implying a societal control and power sharing at the state level.

Various theories have been formulated to optimise civilian control. The structural theory of civilian control postulates threat (external and internal) as the independent variable on which the dependant variable of civilian control depends. Different scenarios of internal and external threats and the correspondingly civilian control (Q) is highlighted in the following table (Table 2.3). This structure operates through the

133 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947-1948 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Directorate of Films & Publications, 1989) 153-154. 134 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80. 135 Paul Chambers and Aurel Croissant, eds., Democracy under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, 2010), 25.

mechanisms of socialization, emulation and competition. Although case studies by

Desch do not include Pakistan but they determine that if the external threat is high and internal threat is low than the civilian control is good. 136 This has been the case in

Pakistan till off late, yet contrarily the relations were not healthy and military coups occurred despite the similarity. This dichotomy is investigated in this research.

Table 1.3: Civilian Control Matrix Internal Threat External Threats High Low Threat High Threat (Q3) (Q4) Matrix Poor Civilian Control Worst Civilian Control Low Threat (Q1) (Q2) Good Civilian Control Mixed Civilian Control

The term “civilian control over the military centres around three crucial questions why to control, what to control, and how to control?”166 Why to control relates to civilian pre-eminence over decision making who are voted by public to exercise power and are constitutionally mandated to do so. Feaver, also emphasised on the right of the civilians to exercise control over military.137 In terms of what to control, five decision making areas are identified; “civil-military relations, elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defence, and military organisation.” 138 Irrespective of the difficulties faced in the exercise of such control, these areas stands out as important factors. What to control also relates to the degree and type of such control. The third question about how to control refers to the method to exercise such control over the military.

136 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 14. 166Ergun Ozbudun, “Civilian Control of the Military: Why and What?,” Study on Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Venice, September 2007), 2. 137 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Harvard University Press, 2009). 138 Chambers and Croissant, Democracy under Stress, 29.

It may be asked that “is civil military relations all about civilian control” and if so what constitutes civilian control and what is there to be controlled. Democratic Control of

Armed Forces Geneva Centre (DCAF)139 has defined eight key features that characterise an effective system of democratic control, wherein democratically elected authorities have control over: (1) military’s missions, composition, budget, procurement policies and that the military policy is approved by the civilians; (2) Democratic parliamentary and judicial institutions, a strong civil society, and an independent media oversee the performance of the military; (3) Civilians have the necessary military expertise to fulfil their defence management responsibilities; (4) Neither the military as an institution nor individual military leaders attempt to influence domestic politics; (5) The military is ideologically neutral; (6) The military has minimal role to play in the national economy;

(7) There is an effective chain of command; (8) the members of the military are free to exercise their rights. These aspects are legislated and enshrined into the state constitutions.

The constitutional provisions, state structures and institutions act as hardware to exercise civilian control. The degree of control i.e. the software part is perceived as a relative condition. It is a continuum of political decision making distributed between political leadership and military.140 It can be strong, when the civilians make all the decisions. It could be shared or weak when the decision making power is distributed between the civilian and military leadership. Waltz indicated that civilian control has to be maintained “through persistence and hard work” by the civilians. 141 Aziz interprets

139 DCAF is a centre for security development and the rule of law set up as an initiative of Swiss Confederation. The Centre contributes to security sector reforms. 140 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Philip Lorenz, “Breaking With the Past? Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia,” Policy Studies 63 (Hawaii: East West Centre, 2012), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ps063.pdf (accessed on 8 November 2014). 141 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 04 (1997): 913– 17; Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State (New York: Routledge, 2008), 73. 82

hard work as “informal politics” – a mechanism for interaction with military leadership to develop familiarity by employing a range of activities.142 The concept of informal politics is particularly important when the formal structures are weak.

Evidently, civilian control over the military sits at the heart of civil military relations. It signifies who is the master. In the decades preceding WWII, the research discourse was mostly focused on understanding causes, opportunities and motives of military coups.

Correspondingly, absence of military coup implied control of civilians over the military.

In countries where military interventions have taken place “the point of reference for comprehensive understanding of civilian control... [is].. whether the military yields political influence, but how and how much”.143

It is therefore necessary to think of civil-military relations as a continuum of political decision making power distributed between the civilian political leadership and the military. One extreme is where civilians make all decisions and have the power to change them at any time. They may delegate decision making and implementation to the military in certain policy areas where as the military has no autonomous power to make policy related decisions. It also implies the civilian capacity to effectively implement the decisions they have made. On the other end is a situation where military makes all the political decisions and civilian slack autonomy to make decisions which was witnessed during military and quasi-military governments in Pakistan. Huntington and Janowitz suggested two distinct ways of addressing the problem of civilian control.

In Huntington’s view, separating the military from the civil (separation), granting autonomy to the military and by exercising objective as opposed to subjective control would promote professionalism in the military, which would in turn render them

142 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan, 75. 143 Claude Emerson Welch, Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries (New York: State University of New York Press, 1976), 2.

apolitical. It facilitates exercise of civilian control over the military and also enables them to accomplish the assigned tasks efficiently. This mechanism aim at controlling the differences between the civil and military and became a standard which was imbibed in most democratic political systems including Pakistan.

The de facto practice of Huntington’s theoretical conception in Pakistan however did not render the military apolitical, as it repeatedly intervened in the politics. The framework did augment professionalism but the military did not disassociate itself from the political and security related developments within the country and its neighbourhood. Apparently, there is a need for inquiry as to why Huntington’s framework has not worked in Pakistan and what alternate arrangements are needed to render the military apolitical.

Janowitz, contrary to Huntington’s approach, looked at ways for diminishing the differences between the civil and military. He recognised that civil and military are part of one organic whole and cannot be separated. He opposed to separation and identified the need for greater integration of civil and military in the decision making process.

According to him, it is very dangerous to treat the military as an institution separate from the society and in his theoretical conception, civilian control is best achieved by participation and by encouraging competition for resources.

Noting the introduction of weapons of mass destruction in the arsenal for war, Janowitz advocated institution of constabulary concept for addressing military’s conceptual and organisational problems. He explains constabulary concept as under:

“The military establishment becomes constabulary force when it is

continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and

seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has

incorporated a protective military posture. The constabulary outlook is

grounded in, and extends, pragmatic doctrine”.144

Civilian control of such a constabulary can be fashioned as a standing professional force or through a system of universal public service (conscription) or a mix of the two. The narrowing gap between civil and military due to technological reasons (civilians are performing greater roles in many of the hitherto for military functions) necessitates greater integration.

Absorbing multiple environmental impacts, Janowitizan conception of integration has overtime emerged as a de jure model of civil military relations in Pakistan. Although it is biased towards military’s pre-eminence rather than that of civilian in the field of security and foreign policy. Pakistan’s political system, as it stood in the 90’s thereby, incorporated significant features of both Huntington’s and Janowitzian conceptions.

This study while exploring effectiveness of ‘separation’ will also explore the

‘integrationist view’ as means for restoring better balance in civil military relations.145

Stephan termed Huntington’s approach ‘old professionalism’ and contrasted it with

‘new professionalism’ which emerges when the threat variable is replaced with that of internal security and national development.176 His study corresponds with the de jure approach of Pakistan’s military which since inception has been involved in internal security and national development tasks. The salient features are tabulated on the next page.

Table 1.4: Old and New Professionalism Old Professionalism New Professionalism

144 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 418. 145 Rizvi, ‘Pakistan: CMR in a Praetorian State.’ He had observed that once military has intervened in politics the politics can no longer be the same or return to the pre-intervention stage it has to shape up in accordance with the changes that have occurred in the system and political thought. 176Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics, 27. 85

Function of military External Security Internal Security Civilian attitudes towards Civilians accept legitimacy of Segments of society challenge government government governments legitimacy

Military skills required Highly specialised skills Highly interrelated political and incompatible with political military skills skills

Scope of military professional Restricted Unrestricted action

Impact of professional Renders the military politically Politicizes the military socialisation neutral

Impact on civil military Contributes towards apolitical Contributes to military – relations military and civilian control political managerialism and role expansion

Nielsen, studying Huntington’s ‘separation’ as a weakness and its continued relevance to US military, revisited the main concept and identified issues related to autonomy, objective control, functional and societal imperatives. She identified challenges like

“when the military goes to war and state as a whole does not” and how it affects the military in its interface with the state and society”. She concludes that “a day may come when The Soldier and State becomes irrelevant”.146 Hooker Jr, similarly studied the impact of civil-military gap and erosion of civilian control in the US and opines that

“for military officers working at the level of politico military interface, the problem of civil-military relations exists in its most acute form”. 147 His observation accurately reflects the civil-military problematic in Pakistan.

Huntington’s concept of separation, autonomy and objective control for its productivity and effectiveness, as a theoretical construct will be studied in this research work with an eye on impact of integrationist approach of Janowitz as an alternative. Although, the

146 Suzanne C. Nielsen, “American Civil–military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State,” International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012): 369. 147 Richard D. Hooker Jr, Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations, Parameters (DTIC Document, 2004), 16. 86

focus of this research is Gen Musharraf coup and its aftermath, yet the study will take into cognizance the developments since than in the realm of state security in general and Pakistan in particular. This will enrich the findings with contemporary insights and render recommendations which are futuristic in nature.

Tracing the history of availability of constitutional mechanism for resolving political disputes and preventing military intervention, the 1956 constitution contained

“Emergency Provisions” in Part IX, for handling emergency situations. However, it did not contain any provision for breakdown of constitutional machinery in the centre; the exact problem faced by the country. A number of Prime Ministers148 resigned in quick succession leading to imposition of martial law in 1958 by a civilian president. 149

Similarly, 1962 constitution was based on presidential system in which President was directly elected while the other executive appointments were nominated by the

President. Also, there was no position of vice president. According to this constitution, the president if resigns, was to be succeeded by the Speaker National Assembly. Since executive appointments did not enjoy the public legitimacy therefore Gen Ayub, when resigned, handed power to the Chief of Army Staff rather than the Speaker. The

Constitution of 1973 has survived two direct military interventions and has rid itself of the redesigning done through Eighth Amendment. In this constitution, civil military relations manifest in three main areas; legislative, executive and policy. The constitution empowers National Assembly and Senate as apex forums entitled to handle civil military relation through their respective committees. Executive oversees military through ministry of defence and ministry of defence production, while the cabinet

148 Ali 1956, Suhrawardy 1957, Chundrigar, 1957, Noon 1958 149 Keith Callard who wrote before the military formally took over power, political parties have waxed, waned and suffered eclipse. Political leaders have argued and reduced each other to impotence. Men of religion have laid claim to complete authority and achieved almost none. In the meanwhile the state has been run largely by civil service, backed by the army, which was carried on much as did before independence. 87

committee of defence provides a forum where civil and military can discuss security issues, formulate policy options or oversee their implementation. Besides these formal mechanisms, civil and military elite can also meet informally to address security concerns. Ministry of Finance makes budgetary allocation through the finance bill and requests and requirements of the military are rooted through ministerial mechanisms.

The above elucidated hardware provides effective means for civilian control over the military by authorising size of the forces, budget, which approved by national parliament, financial oversight administered by accounts department and by Public

Accounts Committee of the Parliament. The question emerges that despite an elaborate mechanism for civilian control why it fails to exercise itself or does the issue of control resides elsewhere i.e. in politics of the country. What inhibits the civilians from exercising effective civilian control over the military?

Nuclearisation by India and similar response by Pakistan under compulsion in 1998 introduced another factor in the security construct of the country. Owing to the changing nature of external and internal security calculus, the need for redefining frame work for interaction between civil and military leaders with a focus on comprehensive national security has been growing. In fact, it is an accepted practice in many countries like US,

UK and Japan. India has constituted comprehensive national security architecture after

1998 nuclear tests. Similarly, National Security Strategy in US is issued on regular basis to coordinate the national policy overseen by national security advisor.

The need for National Security Council was identified after the debacle of 1971 in

Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report. Since the report was not made public therefore the council was not constituted. It was made part of the constitution first by

Gen Zia and later during Gen Musharraf’s era (Article 152-A) as a consultative and decision making body on strategic matters like sovereignty, integrity and security of the

state and democracy, governance and inter provincial harmony. On the contrary, politicians interpret National Security Council as an instrument of political control, coercion and power sharing by military and hence resisted. But is the institution of this council practical manifestation of Gen Musharraf’s claim i.e. “to keep them [the military] out bring them in” or otherwise?

1.6 Military Coups

“One thing more, I am persuaded to say this because during my talks with one or two very high-ranking officers I discovered that they did not know the implications of the Oath taken by the troops of Pakistan. Of course, an oath is only a matter of form; what are more important are the true spirit and the heart.”150 Quaid e Azam The term coup d’état or coup, according to Encyclopaedia Britannica, is defined as sudden and violent overthrow (illegal) of an existing government by a small group

(typically the military) of people. A coup consists of the “infiltration of a small, but critical, segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder”.151 It is change in power from top with a pre-requisite of control of military and police as well as para-military forces. Despite its abruptness,

“it rarely alters nation’s social and economic policies, nor does it significantly redistribute power among competing political groups”.152

Coup is perceived as an ‘exceptional event’, literally a blow to the state and marks unconstitutional transfer of the power. It refers “not to the takeover of the state but to successful and overt seizure of power by the military”.153 It has to be an overt event to

150 Jinnah, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 264. 151 Edward Luttwak, Coup D’état: A Practical Handbook (New York: Harvard University Press, 1979), 27. 152 Ibid, 27. 153 David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín (California: University of California Press, 1987), 7. 89

separate it from conspiracy. Welch opined that “a coup d’état is a sharp, clear event easy to date and (if successful) possible to document”. 154 Powell and Thyne have explored fourteen case studies and identified the target, perpetrator and tactics. They explain that the target is more or less the executive authority, government or regime i.e. the state’s primary leader.155 Number of studies conducted from 1998 onwards although limit perpetrators to the armed forces yet it is significant to note that coups may be undertaken by “any elite part of the state apparatus”.156 The tactics related to coup act has to be illegal while it may or may not be accompanied by violence. However, “near universal criterion for coups is that, violence does not have to be present”. 157 The first spike in military coups occurred in the decade between 1970 and 1980 with a success rate of 48%, while another spike started in 2003.

Perlmutter observing numerous military interventions in the new states and third world countries set about to explore reasons. To explain their findings they created models of civil military relations i.e. western, praetorian, communist and interventionist and developed typologies like pressure group, blackmail, displacers and categorised military interventions as palace, reform and revolutionary coups. 158 Comprehensive model relating to strengths and weaknesses of military institution, its coercive, political and organisational resources available at its disposal and boundaries between military and its socio-political environment were explored.159

154 Welch, Civilian Control of the Military, 1. 155 Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (2011): 249. 156 Ibid., 250. The middle ground includes non-military elites who perpetrate coup because...civilian members of the government alone with military playing a later role in deciding whether the putsch will be successful. This has been the case in Pakistan where civilian elite has instigated the military to act and when the coup is launched and is successful celebrating its success. 157 Ibid, 250. 158 Huntington, The Soldier and the State. 159 A. Robin Luckham, ‘A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations’, Government and Opposition 6, no. 01 (1971): 5–35.

The coup occurs when military officers challenge the oligarchy for waste, backwardness and corruption. It is also termed as benevolent modernisation by Huntington and

Janowitz regards it as heroic public service. Having seized power, the military promotes social class and economic reforms, national integration and some measures for extension of political participation. The evidence towards modernisation and commitment to national development can be witnessed in Chile, Brazil and Middle

East. Finer, presenting an alternative interpretation to Huntington’s professionalisation of officers to render them apolitical, argued that it was precisely the officer’s sense of their professionalism which might propel them to intervene in the political sphere. 160

1.6.1 Structural Reasons

Finer describes four categories and modes of intervention available to military officers in a political entity. Firstly to act constitutionally like any other pressure group, secondly to deploy threat of sanctions/blackmail, thirdly displace a civilian regime with another and lastly displace a civilian regime and govern themselves. In a purpose oriented typology of military coups, Huntington groups them into three categories i.e. palace coup, reform coup and a revolutionary one.

Aslam Khan while analysing the inspirations for launching a military coup, developed on the Allan Wells model and applied it to Pakistan. His work employed societal perspective i.e. pull factors, military perspective or push factors and foreign influence.

The combination of these factors provides structural reasons for a military coup as tabulated on the next page:

160 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 207.

Table 1.5: Structural Reasons for a Military Coup Societal Perspective: Pull Factors Social Dimensions Institutional Dimensions Political Dimensions Military Perspective: Push Factors Military’s role belief, custodian Structural Reasons for a Military Coup Officers grievances Role of civil society Ethnicity Foreign Influence Societal/ Military Foreign Influences/ Alliances Strategic Location

The first dominant perspective which explains triggers is the pull factor contained in domestic or societal perspectives. It has three sub dimensions, first, the social dimension which accords with Janowitz’s perspective that militaries do not operate in a vacuum; there is always a factor which pulls it towards politics (absence of preconditions of democracy i.e. poverty, literacy, economy, social disorder, ethnicity, mobility of masses etc.). Second relates to institutional dimension i.e. adherence to or otherwise to rule of law, constitution and institutional efficacy etc. The third comprises political dimensions which relate to nature and functional aspects of political government.

The push factors or in other words the military perspective (about politics) comprises three dimensions. The first looks at the reasons which reside inside the military institution and leads military out of barrack to civil offices.161 The second relates to officers personal grievances which deals with professionalism of the military, threat to the institutional integrity and corporate or economic interests of the officers. The third dimension deals with role of civil bureaucracy, sections of civil society and opposition

161 It comprises the military’s role belief which leads to custodian nature of military, high self-esteem in the society and internal and external threats to the country.

political leaders who themselves collaborate with military officials to stage a coup or facilitate it in the post-coup environment.

The foreign influence operates in both spheres of societal and military perspectives. It deals with the contagious effects of foreign influences on militaries and military or economic alliances with superpowers. Similarly, the strategic importance of the countries for international community also effects the democratisation of a country. In conclusion, it can be said that launching of a military coup can be best understood by evaluating following triggers:

Table 1.6: Triggers for Military Coup Domestic/Societal Perspective: Pull Factors Triggers Military Perspective: Push Factors Foreign Influence

A brief survey indicates that direct military rule in Pakistan lasted 17 years, civilian rule for 11 years, elected government under a military President for 15 years and non-elected government for 11 years. The government and national assembly have been dissolved till 2009 a dozen times. This analysis raises the question as to why military has conducted so many coups.162 Review of the literature suggests that push factors and foreign influence play limited role in triggering a military coup. On the other hand, pull factors play a greater role in inspiring a military coup. To justify this argument, dimensions of pull factors, push factors and foreign influence have been further elaborated to understand their relevance in case of Pakistan.

The studies in civil military relations, military interventions and Praetorianism focus on the socio-political conditions as contributing factors. These described as pull factors

162 Constitution other than appointment of Joint and Service Chief the functioning related to recruitment, promotion and employment remain the prerogative of the services with no interference from political authorities. 93

relate to social disorder, weak political institutions and economic crisis. 163 Such conditions found in formative years of state construction result into social conditions which pull militaries towards intervention in politics. 164 Political and democratic inadequacies create participatory crises and alienate polity. Weak national institutions are unable to control law and order situations and rely on military for restoring order as well as helping in times of natural calamities. Inadequate focus of political elite on economy and want of appropriate development policies impair economic growth create dissatisfaction amongst the masses, undermine legitimacy of political leaders.

Resultantly, militaries intervene in politics and assume a civil role to address political, administrative and economic problems.

Political crisis caused by preferences of political elite in policy and strategy framework also pull military towards politics. These relate to state’s external which do not accord with public sentiment and some internal policies which create crisis of legitimacy like rigging in elections, widespread agitations against political mal-practices delegitimising political elite. The national crises may force involvement of military in politics for resolution of political disputes etc. Practice of low level of political culture and reliance on formal democracy manifesting minimum desire for moving towards participatory democracy results in creating an oligarchy. Internal social conditions characterised by a dissatisfied polity thereby pulling military towards politics.

Amongst the push factors, firstly, it is military’s role and belief as a custodian of state.

Since the inception of Pakistan, political leadership has unfortunately failed to resolve their internal issues. Notwithstanding the security issues, civilian leadership time and

163 Gary W. Wynia, The Politics of Latin American Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 57. 164 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 4th ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). 94

again involve the military in the situations which should have been handled by the civil government. Reliance on military for handling civilian affairs not only undermines the civilian government but also raises the military’s stature in the eyes of the people.

Therefore, the people look towards military in crisis situation. Over the period of time, this reliance phenomenon has given birth to a belief in the military about their role as custodian of the state. This role and belief has been further strengthened by the prevalent massive corruption, nepotism and incompetency. Janowitz also feels that military is propelled into politics due to its high ideals of public service.

Second point relates to the officers grievance. It is worth mentioning that these grievances are not personal rather they are institutional in nature and can be divided into two categories i.e. direct and indirect. Direct grievances include the policies and actions which affect the military as an institution while the indirect grievances includes the efficacy of governance which affects the people and the military personals as an individual citizen of the state. But such grievances play insignificant role in triggering a military coup. For instance in 1998, Gen Karamat was forced to resign. Although it generated a lot of direct grievances yet the situation did not lead to a military coup and the military remained subservient to the politics.

Role of civil society as a third dimension is again linked with the governance factor and the leading figures of civil society involve the military for its solution. The governance factor is purely civilian affair and the failure of political leadership in providing good governance creates enabling situation for a military coup. Practically, the military tries to keep itself away from these issues. This direct interaction with the civilians may help in triggering but one cannot find any coup in Pakistan purely based on this issue.

Kukreja describes role of military in civil institutions and argues that long years of direct and indirect rule has enabled the military to spread out so widely in civil institutions,

and control the lever of power that civil society penetration of military emerges as the casual factor.165 Aziz argues that pervasive civil society presence makes military path dependant i.e. prone to coups.166 The presence of military does increase in post-coup environment but it also shrinks after the end of military government or quasimilitary government and the residual presence at the time of next coup can at best be accepted as a contributing factor, an enabler but not the primary cause.

Amongst the push factors, another important issue is ethnicity. Sometime, it is considered that since the Pakistan military is overwhelmingly Punjabi in its constitution, therefore ethnicity is a casual factor for coups in the country.167 Cohen argues that the army has so far failed to emerge as a unifying institution, in which the

Punjabi predominance is reduced in favour of greater representation of areas like Sind and Balochistan.168

Contrarily, Huntington opines that “it is equally fallacious to attempt to explain military interventions in politics primarily by reference to the internal structures of the military or the social background of the officers doing the intervening”. He questions that “what characteristics of the military establishment of a new nation facilitate its involvement in domestic politics?” According to him, “the debate is misdirected because the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political [which]

165 Veena Kukreja, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries’, India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 45, no. 2–3 (1989): 154–92; Veena Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (Sage Publications, 1991). 166 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan, 59. 167 Ann Gregory and Dewitt C. Ellinwood, ‘Ethnic Management and Military Recruitment in South and Southeast Asia’, Civil-Military Relations: Regional Perspectives, 1981, 64–119. 168 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 114-115. Since last decade, Pakistan army has made a visible effort to diversify its ethnic composition by incorporating more than the proportionate representation from Balochistan and Sind. Resultantly, the ethnic structures at the unit level has also been modified. However, irrespective of its ethnic composition, the military has been and remains a unified force, continuing its role to strengthen the federation. 200 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 193-194. 96

reflects not the social and organisational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structures of the society”.200

Mazhar reinforces the “case for the need to shift the focus of scholarship away from explanations driven by class, religion and or ethnicity-based interpretations”. 169 He deploys the argument that how could Urdu speaking COAS lead a predominantly

Punjabi Army and topple a Punjabi Prime Minister who commanded two-third majority in the parliament. Zaheer also ascribes foreign policy as a casual factor and argues that the first coup attempt in Pakistan occurred due to political (foreign) policy grievances. 170

1.6.2 Foreign Influence

The explanatory factor of foreign influence on incidence of military coup has three aspects which intersect pull and push factors. These aspects are categorised in political

(inter political elite relationship), foreign policy interests and the military to military contact.203 The proposition that “military training missions from foreign nations inculcate attributes favourable or unfavourable to military interventions in politics” 171 is the only well researched aspect of the foreign influence in military takeovers. A study about thirty two coups in South America that occurred in the period of fifteen years from 1951-65 disconfirms the proposition.172 Huntington has also falsified the role of

169 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan, 23. 170 Rawalpindi conspiracy of 1948 is generally seen as a consequence of failure to secure accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir through military and political means. Inept handling of political issues and reluctance to provide material support to volunteers and tribesmen mobilised to liberate the State added fuel to fire. Maj Gen Akbar, the architect of the Kashmir War in 1948, was the primary actor and his attempt was supported by few left wing activists and sympathetic officers against the then Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was due to personal reasons and feeling of betrayal. This attempt was a handiwork of few individuals which did not coincide with the institutional thinking (push factors) prevalent at that time and hence was unearthed and quashed. Similarly the 1980 plot by Maj Gen Tajamal Hussain to assassinate Gen Zia was exposed and thwarted and Maj Gen Zaheer ul Islam attempted coup against Government of Benazir Bhutto for furthering Islamic causes was foiled by the military itself. The aforementioned attempts permit inference that military as an institution does not allow individuals within its ranks to act on their own and for individual purposes. However, how much the Kargil conflict with India contributed towards the military coup of Gen Musharraf as a casual factor will be analysed later. 203Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. 171 Ikuo Kabashima and Lynn T. White III, Political System and Change: A “World Politics” Reader (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 193. 172 Ibid, 197.

American Military Assistance in prompting military coups in South America.173

Researched data for political and policy related foreign influence on military coups is not available but in the context of Pakistan it is considered that the US did play some role in inspiring the coups. Askari opines that couple of days before the coup Iskandar

Mirza had informed the US Ambassador to Pakistan and President of US Eisenhower had sent a letter endorsing the coup and also a member of his Cabinet visited Pakistan on 27 October 1958.174 Similarly, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had alleged in the Parliament that there was an “International Conspiracy” against him and US was flooding money into the country and backing up his political opponents in a bid to topple him however the US had denied any such involvement.175 These two cases do however point out to

US interest in Pakistan. Did US influence the aforementioned military coups and if yes to what degree has not yet been established? This research will study the influence of US factor in case of Gen Musharraf’s takeover in 1999.

1.7 Interests: National and Institutional Determinants

“Finally, let me appeal to you to keep together, put up with inconveniences, sufferings and sacrifices, for the collective good of our people. No amount of troubles, no amount of hard work or sacrifice contribution for the collective good of your nation and your State. It is in that way, that you will build up Pakistan as the fifth largest State in the world, not only in population as it is but also in strength, so that it will command the respect of all the other nations of the world. With these words I wish you God speed.”176

173 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Reforming Civil-Military Relations’, Journal of Democracy 6, no. 4 (1995): 9–17. 174 Wayne Ayres Wilcox, ‘The Pakistan Coup D’état of 1958’, Pacific Affairs, 1965, 142–63; Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Op-Ed: Significance of October 27’, Daily Times, 27 October 20003. Ayub Khan had written a paper A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan, which was also presented to closed military audience in The US and the Wilcox article appreciated the positive effects of the coup. 175 Amin, “1977 Coup D’état in Pakistan,” 44. 176 Jinnah, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 184-185.

Quaid e Azam

Interest generally implies a concern. It is something which draws attention, arouses curiosity, requires involvement and is of significance. In the context of civil military relations, interests have three dimensions; national, institutional and personal interests of the political and military elite. National interests are combined expression of interests of the citizens, groups or communities which constitute the state, and at international level those which are universal in nature or concern a group of states. National interests include political, security, economic and cultural aspects. In terms of their importance these are grouped in the categories of vital (for which a nation is ready to go to war), important and less important (also termed peripheral).

The conception of national interests corresponds with the process of evolution of nation state.177 In the formative years, “interests of Kings or Divine Interests” were perceived as a conceptual unity as seen in the writings of Machiavelli in Italy, Bodin in France,

Grotius in Holland, Hobbes in England. Rousseau, however questioned the notion with the alternate notion of ‘people’s sovereignty’, adopted later by nation states in general.178 In the contemporary perception, national interests emerge as a social concept with concrete and tangible dimensions.179 It also comports a moral dimension, wherein loyalty and service to state is concerned or wherein a decision, in case of conflict is required between national and personal interests.180

Modern nation state is recognised as a distinct territorial integrity with privileges and responsibilities. In the functionalist construct, the state structures and its polity organises political and administrative action through political and state institutions.

177 Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing National Interests’, European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (1 September 1996): 275–318. 178 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (Courier Corporation, 2012). 179 Miroslav Nincic, ‘The National Interest and Its Interpretation’, The Review of Politics 61, no. 01 (December 1999): 29–55. 180 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 99

Military is one such institution entrusted with safeguarding the vital interest of defence of the state. Its input is accordingly factored in state security policies. Huntington had recognised and argued that military has emerged as a profession in line with other reputable professions which serve the society and therefore it has developed its own set of interests. 181 Similarly, there are political institutions which serve interests of the political elite. Since the primary component of a state are its people therefore collective political interests of the populace are increasingly factored in when the national or institutional interests are defined or advanced.

In a democratic framework, the primary interests of political elite comprise winning elections, providing good governance and advancement of such policies through which their personal and political legitimacy is sustained and the chances of winning next elections are improved. They have to however reconcile these with the advancement of national interests and when there is a possibility that advancing a particular national interest intersects with their political interests, decisions are made in a manner that the latter do not suffer. It is this clash which when exploited by opposition sometimes create situations which undermine the basic functions of the state and politics and creates crisis in which military intervention becomes probable. In extreme circumstances, when a situation of political deadlock worsens, it leads to military intervention or a coup. The resultant sudden shift in power arrangement raises a range of questions. The foremost is, what inspired the coup? Was it to advance military’s institutional interests or serve the national interest of returning order, redistributing power or imposing military’s perceptions and policies on the polity?

This research argues that political elite focus on attainment of their political interest i.e. legitimacy, survival and regime continuation (winning elections). In case of Pakistan,

181 Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” 12.

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this has been witnessed repeatedly. For instance President Iskandar Mirza imposed a martial law to safeguard his presidential powers in 1958. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto allegedly conducted widespread election rigging to continue in power and in the face of strong street protests by opposition parties involved military into politics which ultimately led to imposition of martial law by Gen Zia. A similar conflict persisted from 1988 to 1999 in which two major political parties when in power focused on undermining the other to the extent of causing personal financial losses to the principal political leader. 182

In the context of civil military relations in Pakistan, the aspects of national and institutional interest are discussed below. Security for people of Pakistan since inception has been and continues to persist as a vital national interest. Security in contemporary anarchic world necessitates appropriate state power, a primary prerequisite for furthering other interests. Security concern for Muslim polity of Sub

Continent is of historic significance, emanating initially from the fear of political dominance in united India. It was followed by concerns about Indian aspiration to undo

Pakistan, witnessed in Kashmir war of 1948, creation of Bangladesh and continuing incessant strategic competition resulting in policies with emphasis on accentuating instability in Pakistan. Consequently, unresolved Kashmir issue has put Pakistan and

India in a bind, which each finds difficult to escape from.

Insecurity in Pakistan during the initial period of establishing ‘nationhood’ emanated from external as well internal sources and actors. Structural causes like early demise of founding fathers, especially without formulating a constitution and establishing national institutions. Intense competition between the two wings exacerbated internal insecurity and growth of diverse cultural and economic problems led to imposition of first partial

182 Raymond W. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 77-85. Benazir’s case of detaining the scarp ships bound for Nawaz Sharif’ steel mills reference.

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martial law under civil government.183 In such circumstances, military finds itself in difficulty and a dilemma as Gen Ayub indicates:

“Army could not remain unaffected by the conditions around it; nor was

it conceivable that officers and men would not react to all the political

chicanery, intrigue, corruption, and inefficiency manifest in every sphere

of life. The public pressure on the army was immense.”

While a ‘well-organised, trained and disciplined army would find it extremely distasteful to be turned into an instrument for securing political power, but as conditions are, the army could act as a coercive force and restore normalcy. He notes that the

“primary role of Martial Law was to give support to the civil authority so that it should be able to rehabilitate itself and cope with the new problems which should arise with introduction of reforms”.184

Insofar, protection of institutional interest is concerned the foremost interest for military remains solidarity and unity of its command. For instance, when President Iskandar

Mirza after imposing martial law and appointing Gen Ayub as CMLA found that he had lost relevance started subverting the Army. When Gen Ayub discovered it on his return from East Pakistan he relieved President from his appointment and moved him to London, UK.185

Askari explains Pakistan military’s major interests in six clusters. First national security as the paramount, overseas weapons and equipment procurement, military autonomy and civilian interference in internal organisational matters and service affairs,

183 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 71. The Ahemdiya riots which erupted all over Punjab and the food shortages led to imposition of first partial martial law on 6 March 1953 under Gen Azam. The Munir Report 1954 accurately portrays the reasons which led to imposition of Martial Law. 184 Khan, Friends Not Masters, 81. 185 Khan, Friends Not Masters, 82. Constitutionally it was argued that since martial law was declared the office of President had become redundant and military could function better sans him. 102

opposition to unilateral cut in defence expenditures, protection of perks and privileges acquired over time especially during periods of martial law and that the military expects the civilian government to ensure socio-political stability. 186 Two aforementioned clusters relate to national security and remaining can be categorised as institutional interests.

Siddiqa includes corporate interests i.e. protection of certain business concerns operated by the military in the institutional interests. 187 Nordlinger in his corporate interest hypothesis argues that “the military will intervene to protect or enhance its corporate interests defined as its share of national budget, its corporate autonomy, and its exclusive rights to bear arms in the defence of the country”.188 Chaitram Singh furthers the “corporate interest hypotheses”.189 The institutional interest theory and corporate interest hypothesis as casual factors leading to a coup are discussed in the research to reach a clear conclusion insofar coups in Pakistan are concerned.

Aziz in his enquiry into three military interventions in Pakistan argues that “these coups took place to protect and extend the institutional interests of the military”.190 He argued that the military removed the civilian government in two of its three military coups,

“pursuant to its economic interests”. To validate the hypothesis, however, he concedes that the definition of its corporate interests has been more expansive than that proffered by Nordlinger. In case of Pakistan, “it would mean interpreting corporate interests as a more elastic concept than that intended by Nordlinger” and concludes that “only one,

186 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan,” Survival 40, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): 99-100. 187 Siddiqa, Military Inc, 18. ‘The most noticeable and popular component of Milbus relates to the business ventures of the four welfare foundations: the Fauji Foundation (FF), Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Shaheen Foundation (SF) and Baharia Foundation (BF)’. 188 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (New Jersy: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 65. 189 Chaitram Singh, “Military Coups in Pakistan and the Corporate Interests Hypothesis,” Journal of Third World Studies 28, no. 1 (2011): 47. 190 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan, 1.

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the 1977 coup comports with the Nordlinger hypothesis”. 191 But the evidence he presents i.e. creation of Federal Security Force by Z.A. Bhutto which impacted directly on the corporate interest of the military is partial and inconclusive. He does not further expand on what these interests are and why did the military felt these interests would be compromised should it not intervene in politics.

In summary, the coup discourse in Pakistan revolves around the casual factors leading to the coup and then its consequences. Amina Ibrahim indicates that “attempts to analyse Pakistani coups d’état have rarely involved testing of any theory or the investigation of trends, particularly as scholars tend to focus on political events, personalities and institutional structure and interests. [and] there has been little empirical investigation of the preconditions or patterns that increase the risk of coup”. 192

She has referred to twenty one possible theoretical explanations of military coups in

Pakistan. Some are possible explanation of the events i.e. hypothesis, while others (e.g. implementing communist ideology) have lost relevance owing to changes in the sociopolitical construct of the exogenous factors.

Protection of institutional interests by the military in Pakistan and its casual relation with military takeover is however weak. Contrarily, its relation with national security stands out prominently. President Ghulam Ishaq opines that “in our system, the army

[military] intervenes when, in there and public perception, there is an imminent breakdown of the civilian system”.226 Cohen opines that there are militaries which defend the national borders, others defend their position in the society while others defend a cause or an idea but Pakistani military does all three.

191 Singh, “Military Coups in Pakistan and the Corporate Interests Hypothesis,” 49. 192 Amina Ibrahim, Guarding the State Or Protecting the Economy?: The Economic Factors of Pakistan’s Military Coups (Crisis States Research Centre, 2009), 9. 226Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan, 103. 104

The primary reason leading to military intervention is the structural perspective of national security situation while institutional interests only become significant in given situations and infrequently become triggers for military coup. In case of military’s counter coup in 1999,193 while the structural reasons persisted the military perspective and within that the officers’ grievances triggered the counter coup. How did this come about? This research aims to explore the casual relationship of military takeover of

1999.

1.8 Summation

Democracy is by and large accepted in Pakistan as the governing political thought. Its development and consolidation is dependent upon the conduct and efficacy of the political elite. There can be three forms this process i.e. structural, modernisation and transition. The process of democratisation in Pakistan can be best explained by the transition approach which locates the success or otherwise of the process in the conduct of political elite.

The conceptual framework and theoretical perspectives outlined in this chapter provides perspective to civil military relations in the democratic framework of Pakistan. Civilian control over the military is exercised through separation/institutional (Huntington’s) approach. Yet it has not been able to prevent military’s intervention in politics. What drives these interventions, national or institutional interests? The process of democratisation and interplay of civil military relations from 1988 to 1999 would be studied in the next chapter.

193 Counter Coup: Military’s response, as a dependent variable to the larger and independent variable of politics.

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CHAPTER 2

DEMOCRATIC RECONSTRUCTION AFTER GEN ZIA

“There are no people in the world who are more democratic even in their

religion than the Muslamans”

All India Muslim League Session, Lucknow 1916

2.1 Prelude

Consistent with the three approaches for democratisation elucidated in chapter 1, this research while taking account modernisation and structural approaches focuses on

‘transition approach’ to study the process of democratisation in Pakistan after the death of Gen Zia. This approach identifies a four phased democratisation process. First is

“national unity” phase in which government and nationhood is established within a given territory. It is followed by a prolonged second phase of “inconclusive political struggle” which lasts till one group gains prominence over all others. Alternately, lack of such a conclusion can tear national unity apart. The third, the decision phase, is marked by a “historical moment” in which political elite decides to compromise and adopt democratic rules. The compromise accords each player, some share in the polity.

In fourth follow up phase, a second transition called “habituation” occurs. It is characterised by conscious adoption of democratic rules agreed in the historical moment which are the widely practiced by the polity.

In Pakistan, national unity and nationhood establishment phase lasted from 1947 to

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1958.194 Despite early loss of the founding fathers and dissipation in stature of Muslim

League, the founding party, it was expected that the agreement on 1956 Constitution would mark commencement of the second phase during which different groups in the community would intensely struggle to secure their place and share resources under rule of law. However, imposition of martial law and prolonged military rule 1958-1971 arrested the transition and propelled the country from democracy into authoritarianism.

The hard approach adopted by the military government denied the possibility of political reconciliation between East and West Pakistan, tearing the country apart and resulting into secession of East Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh. Post 1971 democratic transition and formulation of 1973 Constitution marked re-commencement of second stage which was again interrupted by the military intervention of Gen Zia.

This research hypothesises that political transition after death of Gen Zia marked recommencement of the second stage as many political, extractive and re-distributive questions related to Pakistan were still not settled. Political developments from

19881999 will therefore be explored in light of this proposition contextualised in the transition approach. It postulates that the primary agency for democratisation is the political elite, and their actions decide the fate of the process of democratisation.

Understandably, decade long military rule of Gen Zia had considerably altered politicosocial landscape in the country. His policies had sown seeds of radicalisation, politically fragmented the society, encroached heavily on political consensus and deepened ideological chasms. 195 The Eighth Amendment which redistributing power between Prime Minister and President had altered the structure and character of

194 This phase included formulation of 1956 constitution however before it could be practiced, martial law was announced in 1958. 195 Talbot, Pakistan, 144.

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parliamentary democracy. 196 The thrust towards according greater powers to the

President as opposed to Prime Minister affected federalism and alienated smaller provinces especially Sind.

The process of Islamisation tilted state policies in favour of orthodox elements, interjecting intolerance and fanning spread of nationalist elements. The developments in Afghanistan and Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) solidified military’s pre-eminence over

Afghan and India policy. In such a backdrop, death of Gen Zia and support of his successor for restoring democracy was indeed a historic opportunity on which the political elite could have capitalised and converted it into an “historic moment”. After the elections of 1988, in which Peoples Party led by Benazir won a majority, the opposition and the newly elected government had two mutually exclusive options. The opposition led by Nawaz Sharif could have recognised the mandate of Benazir and bided time in opposition and Benazir could have respected Nawaz Sharif’s mandate in the provinces and emphasised on economic development (modernisation), focus on democratisation (transition) and develop consensus within the polity to undo Eighth

Amendment (structural).

Careful handling of such issues by political elite could have enabled the polity to transit later into fourth stage of cohabitation. Political leaders who strive for structural changes must first accrue substantive legitimacy in the polity as the political capital and then through personal charisma and mass mobilisation generate such changes. After free and fair elections, multi-fold legitimacy can be accrued through democratic functioning of the political parties, sound economic management and support of state institutions.

196 Gen Zia introduced Eighth Amendment to Constitution of 1973 Pakistan, under which eighteen articles of the constitution were amended as a bargain for lifting of Martial Law by Gen Zia. Most significantly President was endowed with the power to dissolve the National Assembly at his discretion, appoint chiefs of armed forces and Chief Election Commissioner and appoint Governors etc. while Article 152-A required establishment of National Security Council. The dissolution order of Prime Minister Junejo’s government was challenged in Supreme Court which was not upheld.

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Alternately, they could pursue a policy of confrontation (continuation of second phase) to secure greater political space and dominance over other groups and parties in the polity. Confrontation, friction, lack of economic development and reduced ability to bring about structural changes would be the cost such a policy could extract. Foregoing in view, this research hypothesises that political leaders create situations of political deadlock, provide opportunity to military to become arbitrator and intervene and if conflict resolution amongst political elite is not forthcoming, convert the intervention into a takeover. It examines the two tenures of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif as Prime

Ministers from 1988-1999 to establish causal relationship. It studies how political elite during the process of reconstruction and democratisation engendered repeated military interventions, shortening their tenures in government and ultimately leading to another military intervention in 1999. It will also study the role of military during this period and articulation of civil military relations.

2.2 Role of Military after Gen Zia

Gen Zia took over on 5 July 1979 when national crisis had erupted over allegations of massive rigging in general elections of 1977 and the ruling PPP and opposing Pakistan

National Alliance (PNA) had deadlocked themselves into a tight corner. Gen Jahan Dad

Khan notes that “on the advice of Bhutto and his Corps Commanders, Zia met with the political leaders of both sides and urged them to reach a mutually acceptable formulae to solve the political crisis confronting the country”.197 Opposing views state that an agreement between Bhutto and leaders of PNA was about to be reached and there was no need for the military to takeover while others state that military took over since an

197 Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 160. 232Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 185. Although Bhutto claims that his government was other thrown on behest of United States for his nuclear policy and the protest movement was also financed by United States. However the military despite the perception continued with nuclear programme. 109

agreement was not forthcoming.232 Shafqat concludes that the “accounts vary and are intensely personal, subjective and some are apparently an effort to exonerate oneself and further research is needed to understand the circumstances and motives of the coup makers”.198 Amin provides a detailed account of the negotiation process, in his opinion the inability to conclude an agreement led to the takeover.199 He states that the military was supportive of the government as the service chiefs’ issued an unprecedented joint statement in support of the Prime Minister.200

Gen Zia ruled the country from 1977 to 1988. In 1985, he organised general elections on non-party basis in which Prime Minister Junejo formed the government. Although he agreed to transfer the complete powers to the newly elected civil government yet the arrangement of transfer of power could not last. On 29 May 1988, Gen Zia, dismissed

Prime Minister Junejo’s government invoking article 58 (2) (b). On 20July, he set 16 and 19 November 1988 as dates for the general elections for national and provincial assemblies respectively. Given his aversion to political parties, it was expected that these elections will also be held as separate electorates and on non-party basis. However on 17 August 1988, he died in a mysterious plane crash.201 It ended an era of

“intolerance, bigotry and division” and provided hope for transition towards democracy in the country. 237

At this critical juncture, role of Gen Aslam Beg, the then Vice Chief of Army Staff

(VCOAS), the de facto army chief, became very important. Academics tend to gloss over it and even Talbot, while providing fresh perspective on Pakistan’s history has

198 Ibid, 189-190. 199 Amin, “1977 Coup D’état in Pakistan,” 50. 200 Ibid, 46. 201 Zia along with 19 military officers and US Ambassador to Pakistan were on a visit to Bahawalpur to witness a demonstration of Abram A1M1 tanks as a prospect for induction in the Army. C130 the air force aircraft crashed soon after taking off on 17 August 1988. 237Talbot, Pakistan, 144.

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over looked it. Hoffman, on the contrary, asserts that the “authoritarian elite agreed to allow the democratisation knowing that the prospects of democratic consolidations were dim”, he termed it as “a period of temporary democracy”. 202 Employing that the military had clairvoyants who could look ten years ahead and predict the future. It is easier to assert this ten years later. In a similar situation in 1969, President Ayub Khan after resigning under public pressure had handed the power to military instead of

Speaker of National Assembly and Gen Yahya resultantly took over. If institutional interest theory held credence, then Gen Beg should have also followed a similar trajectory. In fact this time, it was much easier as all major political and military offices were vacant. Mr Ghulam Ishaq was an acting President. There was a caretaker government without a Prime Minister and Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee

(CJCSC), Gen Akhtar Abdur Rehman, a close associate of Zia had also died in the accident. He himself was also acting as chief of the army. In such a delicate situation,

Gen Beg opted for democracy.

The supreme institutional interest for military is always a strong and vibrant Pakistan capable of furthering its national interests and playing a constructive role in the comity of nations while the military could differ with the political elite in ways and methods for achieving it at structural and the policy plane.203 Gen Beg opted for constitutional transition and went ahead with general elections.204 “The elections were held more or less in a peaceful atmosphere... they appeared, by and large, to be free and impartial as

202 Michael Hoffman, “Military Extrication and Temporary Democracy: The Case of Pakistan,” Democratization 18, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 75. 203 Khan, Friends Not Masters, 58. 204 There were apprehensions that elections could be postponed as an appeal in Lahore High Court titled Muhammad Sharif versus Federation of Pakistan was filed but court held the decision for dissolution of national and provincial assembly. An appeal before Supreme Court titled Haji Muhammad Saif Ullah versus Federation of Pakistan, Supreme Court upheld the decision of high court paving way for the conduct of elections as scheduled. 111

is evident from almost universal acceptance of the verdict by all political parties”. 205

Some analysts observed that due to the new requirement of national identity card, a significant number of [PPP] voters could not vote.242 PILDAT report observes that

“despite minor allegations, polling day rigging did not affect the outcome of the

Election on the National level”.243 “The low voter turnout i.e. below 50% in contrast to previous elections could be attributed to general public apathy towards politicians and political process”.206 PPP emerged as the largest single party by winning 93 out of 205 seats. Islami Jamhoori Itihad (IJI), an alliance purportedly cobbled by the establishment could only win 55 seats, and it could not prevent PPP from forming the government in the centre and two provinces. The results of 1988 elections are tabulated bellow.

Table 2.1: Result General Elections 1988 – National Assembly Province PPP IJI Other parties Independents Total Punjab 53 44 4 12 113 Sind 31 - 15 - 46 NWFP 7 8 7 3 25 Baluchistan 1 2 6 2 11 ICT 1 - - - 1 Total 93 54 32 17 196 Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

2.3 Benazir’s First Term: December 1988 – August 1990

In transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy, Benazir’s term was the first, but a crucial step as it would set direction and determine trends for inter-institutional relations, governance and establishing democratic norms. “PPP emerged as the largest single party but did not secure absolute majority”.207 Benazir had two options, one to

205 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 391. 242Tahir Mehdi, ‘An Overview of 1988 General Election: Triumph but No Glory’, Dawn, 11 April 2013. 243PILDAT, “A Dispassionate Analysis of How Elections Are Stolen & Will of the People Is Defeated: Reflections on the Electoral History of Pakistan (1970-2008)” (Islamabad: PILDAT, 2008), 14. 206 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 391. 207 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 98. 246Ibid, 98. 112

form a weak coalition government or to remain in opposition and let IJI consisting of

PML and eight other parties govern. She chose former and consistent with the power arrangements that had emerged during the prolonged military rule and due to the constitutional changes, conceded, that she would not “interfere with senior appointment in armed forces or try and alter the course of foreign policy in Afghanistan”. 246

As the first women prime minister in an Islamic state comprising heavily patriarchal society, she was bound to encounter numerous difficulties, yet she had Bhutto legacy and goodwill of the masses was behind her.208 Economy under Gen Zia had remained stable as GDP had grown at an average of 6.2% (4.1% agriculture, manufacturing 8.2% and services 6.6%), and inflation remained in single digit at 7.2%, poverty at 23.2% and unemployment at a low of 3.5%.248 As a Harvard graduate with majors in comparative government, it was expected that Benazir should have known that modernist approach for democratisation would require her to focus on economic development and good governance. The transition approach would underscore the need for consensus building and having delivered on these two counts she could then focus on restructuring of the constitution.

Benazir lasted twenty months as prime minister, during which she acted contrarily, undermined the role of parliament and other democratic institutions and mainly focused on expanding her political space. In an attempt to wrestle Punjab from IJI and Nawaz

Sharif by winning over twenty five members, she sacrificed a lot of political capital.

Her government deployed Peoples Works Programme as a parallel government and by passed the provinces in decision making. Owing to an autocratic style of governance,

208 Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East: An Autobiography (London: Pocket Books, 2008), 392. 248Farooq Rasheed, Eatzaz Ahmad, and Aqdas Ali Kazmi, “An Evaluation of the Performance of Government of Pakistan,” The Pakistan Development Review, 2006, 837. 249Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 229.

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she created an environment of conflict and distrust and four significant cases further alienated her from the President and the military. First, on appointment of a committee to review role of intelligence agencies in democratic establishment, second for appointment of service chiefs and CJCSC, third the incident of Pucca Qilla and lastly in the case of other senior military appointments.249

Based on the findings of the committee report on intelligence organisations, she exerted control over ISI by removing Lt Gen Hamid Gul and appointing Lt Gen (retired) Shams ur Rehman Kallu as its head (an unprecedented first). Secondly, on the issue of appointment of service chiefs and CJCSC, she contested with President who constitutionally prevailed over her. The incident tarnished her image as a leader, after these two incidents it “was expected that she would be more careful and cautious in dealing with military [and President] but proved illusory”.209

Victory of Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) in urban Sind during the elections had come as a surprise. PPP had won majority in Sind but formed an alliance with MQM which had won 15 out of 17 National Assembly seats in urban Karachi and Hyderabad but the alliance could not last for more than a year. Parting of way by MQM created political weakness which the combined opposition parties (COP) quickly exploited by moving a no confidence motion against her. COP had to win only four members to carry the motion. What followed was unprecedented saga of political bribery from both sides horse trading and herding of the members to safe houses in Swat till the time the motion was defeated. 210 This political process hugely tarnished the image of political elite, political parties and democracy.

209 Ibid., 229. 210 Najam Sethi, ‘Rock Bottom Is Quicksand’, accessed 2 September 2015, http://www.najamsethi.com/1993/04/29/.

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Benazir also disappointed her party and the people of Pakistan. Khan ascribes her failure to authoritarian and monarchical tendencies(like freeing of hardened criminals in the pardon on assumption of office), a direction less foreign policy, extensive corruption by her husband (who also alienated her from old guard of PPP), inability to manage economy and frequent recourse to horse trading for political gains etc.211 Benazir did not appoint a finance minister and retained this important portfolio. She centralised development works by creating a board of investment which was chaired by her and a placement bureau to adjust nearly 200,000 PPP workers. Khan opines that these led to her early exit, he concludes “Benazir had no economic programme, no future plans, and no clear idea about how to govern”.212 “During the twenty-odd months she hung on to power, not a single piece of legislation was placed before parliament by the treasury benches – a record that is unlikely to be surpassed easily”.213

Abundant literature on arguments for and against her rule is available. In a federal state, democratic transition entails adherence to rule of law, consensus building, patience and broad based consultations to maximise political capital. These were most needed as

Jalal observes that after Zia the “precarious condition of state finances and uncertain regional environment coupled with international pressures limited the possibility of any significant departures in economic and foreign policies”.214 Long years of dictatorship did result into sympathy vote for PPP. She could have built on it by furthering democratisation, adhering to democratic norms, focusing on governance, economy and law and order. She could have remained away from contentious issues till the time she

211 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, 407. She thinks that ISI invented ‘politics of personal destruction’ a deliberate and methodical programme to sully her name and suggest that my government was corrupt. My businessman husband was a key target of this conspiracy. Later evidence to the contrary surfaced. 212 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 403. On assumption of office, she accorded clemency to prisoners, reminiscing traditions of Mughal kings and freeing hardened criminals in the office. 213 Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, 111. 214 Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, 327-328.

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was politically strong enough to be able to rebalance the power in favour of elected institutions.

Wanting performance, confrontations and tussle with President over the appointment of

Judges to Supreme Court finally led to her ouster. It was argued by the Federal

Government that President while interpreting Articles 48, 177 and 193 of 1973

Constitution had to act on PM’s advice, while the President asserted that since Article

193 did not specifically mention PM, he was autonomous in appointing such Judges. 215

The differences with the President led to her ouster and President exercising Article

58(2)(b) dissolved National Assembly on 6 August 1990 (two days after Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). The charges against her government levelled by the President include corruption and incompetence, horse trading, usurping powers of the provinces, nepotism, deterioration in law and order in Sind and ridiculing superior judiciary and civil services of Pakistan. Dissolution of provincial assemblies followed.

The dissolution order was challenged in Lahore and Sind high Courts but both courts upheld President’s order. The decision was challenged in the Supreme Court which by a majority vote upheld judgements of High Courts, however there were two very strong dissentions.

On the contrary, it can also be vigorously argued that Benazir never got a level playing field and all odds were stalked up against her. During Zia’s era, establishment had developed strong anti-PPP attitude, she was not acceptable to them as a leader and was considered a security risk. She was even termed as a Kafir (apostate) by Minister for

Religious Affairs and Jam Sadiq (her ally in Sind) even called her a terrorist. 216 She did survive IJI sponsored no-confidence motion and the challenges were enormous but the

215 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 401. 216 Talbot, Pakistan, 149.

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option of biding time in opposition or working in harmony as hypothesised in the transition approach was equally attractive. Once in power, it is imperative for political elite to be mindful of the needed delicate balancing act.

In terms of civil-military relations, Prime Minister Benazir initially worked closely with the military as she recounts in her book Daughter of the East. During her interaction with military, she notes that mostly civilian preferences prevailed and even when military’s logic was accepted, it was implemented after a decision by the Prime

Minister. These policy decisions related to Afghanistan, India and Middle East.

However, she had misgivings about the political role of ISI. At that time, Afghan Jihad was succeeding and the Soviets were preparing to pull out from Afghanistan. For

Pakistan, choice was between providing face saving to Soviets and demand recognition of Durand Line in exchange or go for final putsch and install mujahidin government in

Kabul. On merit, she opted for the latter option. However, when Kabul did not fall quickly, her decisions for not augmenting mujahidin with resources from Pakistan military was upheld. Similarly, the decision for not forming a confederation with

Afghanistan as well as her preferred choice of leader for Afghan Interim Government

(AIG) were accepted and implemented by the military.217

Towards the end of 80’s, indigenous political unrest had erupted in IHK due to years of oppressive rule by India. Militarily, it was a defining moment for Kashmir struggle, making it possible to rethink military strategy with advantages stacked in favour of

Pakistan (absence of threat on western border and a destabilised IHK). Prime Minister

Benazir refers to series of such discussions in which military presented her the options and sought approval. Similarly, military is responsible for defence of their country.

Given the threat matrix and obtaining environment it analyses range of options and does

217 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, 392-431.

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contingency planning in an order of priority. She recalls that within the defensive construct, pre-emptive as an option was discussed with her by the COAS but when she did not agree to it as a leading option the war plans were amended accordingly.

However, her concerns relating to ISI and its role in undermining her government merit discussion. It is alleged that the organisation had grown in stature as it interfaced with

CIA and other intelligence agencies during the period of Afghan Jihad as the sole interlocutor with mujahidin. 218 It had developed foreign contacts, was awash with money and its position largely remained intact despite refocusing of US from

Afghanistan to Europe and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Benazir alleged that ISI initially interfered with the general election which was followed by efforts to undermine her government’s credibility and lastly its dominant influence on policy areas. The fact remains that PPP had comfortably won the elections and if requirement of national identity card (NIC) would not have been imposed it would have bagged a few more seats. In order to stem the influence of ISI, she installed her confidant as its chief. However her failure lay elsewhere. This research has hypothesised that political elite through their political decisions create an environment which facilitates military interference and secondly despite opportunities, military intervenes only out of extreme compulsion. In this case, opportunity was provided by the tussle between President and Prime Minister but military left it to them to find a solution to the problem, negating institutional interest theories. President Ishaq Khan confirmed the same.219

218 Bruce O. Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 130. 219 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 103. “In our system army intervenes when, in there and public perception, there is imminent breakdown of the civilian system”.

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In the context of role of judiciary as guardian of the constitution, it is to be noted that

Article 58(2)(b) had altered the essence of parliamentary democracy. Interestingly, when the President’s decision to dissolve Benazir government was reviewed by the

Supreme Court, the Judges interpreted the Article differently. Majority of them in both

(High and Supreme) Courts argued about validity of President’s decision or otherwise and did not noticed, expect the two dissenting judge’s debate, that the Article had distorted basic structure of democracy and constitution and merits a review. They could have stuck down the article declaring it ultra-virus. However, the judges as prisoners of the “doctrine of necessity” shied away from such a course.

Herein, consolidation of democracy, irrespective of performance and regime outcome was impeded and derailed by President and Judiciary and not by the military. The

Judiciary previously used to validate military takeovers now validated Presidential coup de grace undermining democratic consolidation.

2.4 Nawaz Sharif’s First Term: November 1990 – July 1993

Having ousted Benazir from government, it was evident that President Ishaq Khan would endeavour to keep her out of government.220 Exploiting his presidential powers, he accordingly appointed a caretaker cabinet comprising people who were opposed to

Benazir both in centre and Punjab and Sind, the two major provinces.221

Thereafter, the general elections were held in October 1990 during which the contest was between two main alliances. IJI in which PML led by Junejo was the main party, within it Nawaz Sharif had emerged as strong contender. On the other hand, Pakistan

220 Rahat Zubair Malik, ‘Elections of 1990: An Analysis of Electoral Manipulation’, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 32, no. 2 (2012): 43–70. 221 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 404.

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Democratic Alliance (PDA) was led by Benazir Bhutto. The results of the elections are appended below:222

Table 2.2: Results of 1990 Elections Province IJI PDA MQM JUI ANP PNP JUP PKMAP Indep Total (N) & JWP NWFP 8 5 - 4 6 - - - 3 26 FATA ------8 8 ICT 1 ------1 Punjab 91 14 - - - - 3 - 6 114 Sind 3 24 15 - - - - - 4 46 Baluchistan 2 2 - 2 - 2 - ½ - 11 105 45 15 6 6 2 3 ½ 21 206 Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

After a delay of two weeks, when National Assembly was convened, Nawaz Sharif was elected as the Prime Minister with 153 votes i.e. two third majority. Nawaz Sharif was perceived as the choice of the President and people considered that the mentorapprentice like relationship would last.223 Besides, it was for the first time that a person from business-industrial community had become the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Nawaz Sharif accordingly recognising the importance of economic development pursued modernist approach to strengthen democracy and declared that he will reform the economic policy and put Pakistan on the path to economic prosperity.

Sartaj Aziz, the Finance Minister recalls that he constituted six committees to initiate fast pace reforms in (1) privatization and deregulation (2) industrial policy (3) export policy (4) exchange and payments system (5) tax and resource mobilization and (6) self-reliance. The policy on privatization emphasised on nationalised industries, free

222 There were allegations by PDA that an election cell was set up in President’s Secretariat which together with caretaker government rigged the election, two decisions of Supreme Court (1990 and 2012) did find that such a cell was indeed established and money was distributed to influence the results. Friday Times observed that at least elections in 30 constituencies were rigged which the PDA could have won, NDI assessed 15% rigging etc. 223 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 414.

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movement of foreign exchange and measures to promote foreign investment in the country. Privatization commission was set up on 22 January 1991 to identify enterprises for privatisation and to lay down procedure to this effect.224 Protection of Economic

Reforms Act 1992 was enacted to facilitate and protect the process. A number of initiatives for deregulation of the economy, development of infrastructure, addressing water distribution and meeting of Federal Finance Commission including measures to address unemployment were undertaken. These measures generated economic activity on diverse fronts and Nawaz Sharif can take credit for them. The economy grew at an average of 5.2 percent annually from 1990-1993.

But soon irregularities in the privatization and deregulation process started to surface which tarnished Nawaz Sharif’s image. Kahn gives a detail account of these and concludes that “the process of denationalisation and privatization was contaminated by those involved in it, obviously out of consideration of their own interest or interest of their political bosses, without any regard for common national interest”. 225 Towards the end of his rule, when an overall assessment about his economic performance was made, it is observed that not much had changed due to governmental policies and during much of Sharif period, economic growth remained at the traditional 6%. Inflation too remained as before-within 10%. Similarly current account deficit remained close to its historic value – about 3% of GDP.226 For this economic performance, Sharif can take no credit.

224 Rehana Kouser, Toseef Azid, and Karamat Ali, ‘Emergent Thinking on Privatization: A Review Analysis’, Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) 31, no. 1 (2011): 79–93. During March to July 1991 25 units were offered while during August 1991, 100 units were offered for privatization. GoP accepted 26 bids amongst 235 bids for sale of 81 units. At the time of dismissal of the government the total number of completed. Transactions included 2 banks, 68 industrial units and 10% share of Sui Northern Gas Pipeline. Five Banks were also privatized later. 225 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 414. 226 Mahnaz Fatima and Qazi Masood Ahmed, ‘Political Economy of Fiscal Reforms in the 1990s’, The Pakistan Development Review 40, no. 4 (1 December 2001): 503–18.

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Nawaz Sharif’s desire for rapid structural changes by exercising his democratic autonomy as an elected representative pitched him against the President and finally led his downfall. Authoritative tendencies both in President and in Nawaz Sharif impeded consolidation of democracy. President’s desire to micromanage governance sowed the seed of misunderstanding and mistrust. The rift widened on appointment of new army chief due to untimely death of Gen Asif Nawaz. President and Prime Minister both wanted a person of their choice, in the tussle President prevailed and appointed a less likely candidate i.e. Gen Kakar without consulting anyone. Nawaz Sharif took it as an affront and their relationship worsened. These differences came into open on the issue of re-election of President Ishaq Khan scheduled in November 1993. It is observed that authoritarianism rapidly alienates leaders form the electorate, and President Ishaq exploited this weakness.227

On the other hand, PPP soon after the election had commenced a political campaign calling for ouster of President “Go Baba Go” was the choice mantra. Sensing the differences their focus shifted to Nawaz Sharif. The long March by PPP against Nawaz

Sharif did not succeed which emboldened him for a more vigorous confrontation with the President. In a speech on 17 April 1993, Nawaz Sharif declared “I would not accept dictation from the presidency. I would uphold the principles of democracy and constitution; he thundered”.269

As the differences widened, President Ishaq developed understanding with PPP and exercised article 58(2)(b). He dissolved National Assembly on 17 April 1993 and ousted

Nawaz Sharif from power. The charges President brought against Prime Minister

227 Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, 115. ‘Democracy and authoritarianism in Pakistani context are so thoroughly imbricated as to fore-close the possibility of any straightforward resolution following even a reasonably free and fair electoral exercise.’ 269Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 135.

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Nawaz Sharif included mass resignation of members from the opposition, making false and malicious allegations against the President, maladministration, corruption, harassing the opposition, extensive misuse of resources etc.

President appointed a caretaker government led by Balkh Sher Mazari and co-opted the opposition members who hithertofore were crying hoarse against the President for stealing the 1990 election. The dissolution order was challenged in the court and on 26

May 1993, the Supreme Court, in a historic ten to one judgement, restored the assembly.

Due to the need of preparing and presenting the budget before National Assembly, the confrontation between President and the restored Prime Minister halted for a short time.

It again picked up with President manipulating the chief ministers in Punjab and NWFP against Nawaz Sharif. The later could have shown the patience as President Ishaq was due for re-election. The confrontation ultimately led to governor rule in Punjab. In this confrontation between the provincial assembly, prime minister and president military was asked to intervene but it refused. 228 Resultantly, the political situation led to a constitutional deadlock and on 18 July Gen Kakar, COAS brokered a deal in which the

Prime Minister advised dissolution of National Assembly under article 58(2)(b),

President ordered dissolution and resigned under Article 43 and both relinquished power.

The mindless confrontation however continued dead locking the governance to an absolute stand still forcing the military to intervene calling for a fresh election and facilitating the election of a new government. The pattern of military’s behaviour for its impartiality (President had favoured Gen Kakar for his out of turn appointment as

COAS), supporting democracy and facilitating it when requisitioned for security and

228 Ibid., 138.

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even administrative duties as an expectation should be noted as efforts for supporting the democracy.

A care taker government under Moeen Quershi was installed and general elections were scheduled for 6 October 1993.A range of good governance measures were undertaken by Interim Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi in his brief ninety days tenure. He exposed the extant of corruption and maladministration and also demonstrated to the public that if intentions are positive a lot can be achieved even in ninety days. He brought into light the misdeeds of the previous government, published list of loan defaulters: people who had obtained huge loans exploiting their connections with no intentions of returning them. He published a list of taxpayers, exposing tax defaulters and imposed, though nominal yet an agricultural tax. Made State Bank of Pakistan and Pakistan Television and Radio autonomous bodies, abolished discretionary powers of the prime minister and chief ministers etc.

Khan opines the main reason [Nawaz Sharif] failed was due to inherent conflict between his and his families interests with national interests and due to his “mindless confrontation with outgoing president and sordid efforts to oust the Punjab government through horse trading, led to the fall of his government”.229 Sartaj Aziz attributes his failure to an impulsive personality and lax financial discipline.230

Military’s role during first tenure of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister reinforces the hypothesis that the political elite create situations of political and constitutional deadlocks forcing military to intervene. The political intrigues in Punjab created a similar situation and the military was asked to politically intervene but it restrained.

The military could have conveniently taken over when Gen Kakar relived both the

229 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 423-424. 230 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 140.

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Prime Minister and the President from their appointments, but it abstained.

2.5 Benazir’s Second Term: October 1993- November 1996

Elections were held on schedule. The voter turnout was low 40.54% indicating public apathy towards politics and fast eroding confidence in democracy. PPP emerged as the victor but was closely followed by PML-N of Nawaz Sharif (86 versus 72 seats in

National Assembly. She formed government in the centre and to secure Punjab formed an alliance with Pakistan Muslim League – Junejo (PML-J).231 The results are appended on the next page.

Table 2.3: Results of 1993 Elections Province PPP PML PML (J) (PIF) Pakistan ANP Others Total (N) Islamic Front Punjab 47 52 6 - - 2 107 Sind 33 10 - - - 1 44 NWFP 5 9 - 2 3 4 23 Balochistan 1 - - 1 - 9 11 ICT - 1 - - - - 1 Total 86 72 6 3 3 16 186 Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

PPP had absolute majority in Sind, while PML-N with its alliance partners formed government in NWFP and Balochistan. Benazir had two challenges to contend with, a

President armed with Eighth Amendment and the opposition. “Nawaz Sharif in his first speech as leader of the opposition in the National Assembly assured the government of

Benazir Bhutto that the opposition would respect the mandate of the people and would

231 Pakistan Muslim League, Junejo carved out from PML and led by the former Prime Minister Junejo.

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fully cooperate with government in affairs of the state”.232 In informal contacts between treasury benches and opposition, some areas were identified for joint legislative.

Benazir could have converted this opportunity into a “historical moment” to strengthen the process of democratisation. But as witnessed, she was more interested once again in expanding her political space rather than delivering good governance and democracy.

Having denied the opposition an opportunity for forming a government in Punjab, she also out manoeuvred President Ishaq Khan and contrary to general expectations nominated her party loyalist Farooq Ahmed Leghari for the elections of President.

Having her nominee elected as the President, Benazir felt safe and thought that Eighth

Amendment had become ineffective at least for next five years.

Second time in power, people expected that Benazir would have learnt from past mistakes and would this time deliver better governance. But far from it, her thrust still remained on petty politics. She concentrated on expanding her political base and the first effort was to install PPP’s government in NWFP. She blatantly used Article 245 to impose emergency, governor’s rule and through rampant horse trading installed her own chief minister in the province. Nawaz Sharif having learnt of government’s plan to arrest him, initiated a country wide protest movement “Tehrik e Najjat” (movement for deliverance) in September 1994. The movement destabilised the country and resultantly he was spared but his father was arrested. However, he had to be soon realised as he suffered a heart attack during custody.

Benazir’s tussle with chief justice on appointment of judges strained government’s relations with judiciary. Falling out with MQM in Sind followed by replacement of Mr

Watoo with Mr Nakkai as Chief Minister in Punjab greatly sullied the political atmosphere. In Punjab, the matter went to the high court, which restored Mr Wattoo on

232 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 149-150.

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3 November 1996. Similarly, the policy to improve law and order situation in Karachi through questionable means (extra-judicial killings) did initially meet a degree of success but soon came under public scrutiny.233

In arena of foreign policy, her efforts to maintain good relations with United States bore fruit. She leveraged these relations to restore macro-economic stability and rein in a budget deficit. Also, she strove hard to mitigate the effects of Pressler Amendment and sought return of payments made for purchase of F-16 aircrafts. On both these accounts, she did meet a certain degree of success.

However, PPP’s economic policy lacked coherence and her handling of economic matters was inept. In one of the first moves, she reconstituted privatization commission and appointed Mr Naveed Qamar, a close associate of Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, as its chairman. He lacked corporate sector craftiness. The bid to privatise different public sector concerns (United Bank, Saudi Fertilizer, Oil and Gas Development Cooperation and Pakistan Petroleum Limited) had to be abandoned due to hue and cry by public, stake holders and presidential intervention.234 The power purchase agreements signed with independent power producers at a very high capital cost was tantamount to bankrupting Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and compromising national interests. This also came under severe criticism.

Civil military relations worked well but were punctuated by an unsuccessful attempt for a coup by few army officers led by Maj Gen Zaheer-ul-Islam which was checked by the military itself. The coup makers intended to first take over command in GHQ followed a military coup of the government with a view to implement Islamist agenda in the country. The plot was uncovered and Gen Kakar tasked Lt Gen Javed Ashraf

233 Saeed Shafqat, “Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto,” Asian Survey 36, no. 7 (July 1, 1996): 670–71. 234 Shahid ur Rehman, Who Owns Pakistan (Islamabad: Aekia Communications, 2006), 44.

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Qazi, DG ISI to rid Islamists from the ranks of ISI, “a task he carried out with determination and courage”.235

Benazir precipitated her premature exit for a range of reasons. Frequent collaboration between judiciary and executive in Pakistan has been part of country’s political history.

“Appointment to Superior Courts in Pakistan [are made] generally on considerations other than merit, being decided on the basis of political affiliations, nepotism, or favouritism”. 236 Benazir was no exception, rather she even broke the tradition of appointing senior most judge as the Chief Justice and appointed Justice Sajjad Ali Shah who ranked number fourth in the seniority. Expecting that the beneficiary of out of turn elevation would remain compliant, she went on a rampage and had judges of her own choice placed in all high courts.237 The interventions by International Monetary Fund

(IMF) and inept handling of economy led to repeated devaluation of Pakistani Rupee

(PKR). Confrontation with judiciary, murder of Murtaza Bhutto, restoration of Wattoo as Chief Minister of Punjab and her machinations to once again de-seat him also created an environment of extreme dissatisfaction. Accumulatively, her actions led to the invocation of Article 58(2)(b) and dissolution of National Assembly on night 4-5

November 1996 by her own President.

The dissolution order charged her government for extra-judicial killings in Karachi, inability to maintain law and order, insinuating Presidency for hatching a conspiracy against her which resulted in murder of Murtaza Bhutto, ridiculing of Judiciary and sustained assault on judiciary, illegal phone tapping and corruption, nepotism etc. which became the legacy of her government. The dissolution was challenged in the Supreme

235 Ahmed, The Pakistan Military in Politics, 280. 236 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 433. 237 Ibid. For detail account of posting and transfers and Judges Judgement on appointment of Judges refer to pages 432-437. 128

Court which was upheld by a majority of six to one.238 Malik Meraj Khalid, a founder member of PPP was appointed as caretaker Prime Minister with mandate to hold elections on 3 February 1997.

2.6 Nawaz Sharif’s Second Term: February 1997 - October 1999

A low turnout was expected due to public fatigue and apathy and on polling day, 26% in urban areas and 27% in rural areas was reported but later it was adjusted to 36.1% percentage. 239 Military interference in these elections was absent.282 However the outcome was interpreted as heavy mandate which in reality was different, as 40% of

36.1% meant that only 14.44% of electorate voted for Nawaz Sharif and if Election Day reporting is kept in view then 27% of 36.1% equals to a paltry 9.75% of the total votes cast. The results are appended on next page:

Table 2.4: Results of 1997 Elections Province PPP PML-N MQM BNP ANP Others Punjab - 107 - - - 7 Sind 18 9 12 - - 4 NWFP - 14 - - 9 1 Balochistan - 3 - 3 3 1 ICT - 1 - - - 7 Total 18 137 12 3 10 21 Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

Gillani in his analysis, opines that these elections reversed the long term trend. In the past, PPP would poll 40% vote and 60% was distributed amongst the rest but in these elections due to PPP’s pathetic performance, its vote bank declined to 22% while

PMLN polled 40% vote. The outcome surprised many, suspecting election day malpractices, the results even surprised Nawaz Sharif. Sartaj Aziz attributes the victory

238 Pakistan Legal Judgement 1997, S.C. 27. Benazir Bhutto v Farooq Ahmad Leghari 239 PILDAT, “The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan’s Transition from Democracy above Rule of Law to Democracy under Rule of Law : 1970-2013” (PILDAT, 2013), 27. 282 The researcher was the key functionary to assist the conduct of election in Gujranwala Division and confirms this through personal experience.

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to methodical preparations but accepts that the result was even beyond their prediction. 240 The heavy mandate signified that new relationship between state institutions and political elite could now be cast. Aziz notes that “the heavy mandate, as the media repeatedly emphasized, had probably changed his [Nawaz Sharif’s} political mind-set forever”.241

On 18 February 1997, Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister for the second time.

PML-N had won a two third majority. In Punjab, it swept the polls and formed government on its own, in NWFP it formed a coalition with ANP, in Sind with MQM and in Baluchistan, Akhtar Mengal formed a government as no party was able to make majority. PPP was routed expect from Sind, it did not win even a single seat in any other province. People of Pakistan had placed their trust in Nawaz Sharif for the second time expecting a better deal. Contrarily, with governments in centre and three out of four provinces Nawaz Sharif considered his ‘heavy mandate’ an authorisation to redefine relationships, change structures and rule as he deemed fit.

At this stage, modernist approach would require greater focus on economic development. The transitionary approach necessitated to understand the context and tread with political prudence to develop a broad based consensus especially when

Benazir who had conceded defeat and indicated that she would perform her role as opposition leader effectively. The imperatives of structural changes however exerted a pull in a contrary direction i.e. expanding political space and maximising his power by altering the state structures.

On the socio-economic front, except for the first speech on assumption of the office of

Prime Minister, no government paper or a vision statement or projected policy

240 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 154-155. 241 Ibid., Chapter 10, The Perils of Heavy Mandate, 161-201.

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initiatives were announced. To distil reality, content analysis of national newspapers has been carried out in this research.242 The manifesto of PML-N stressed on satisfying the public need for good governance, a corruption free country, accountability and restoration of economy and industries.243 Nawaz Sharif took oath and stated that PMLN has learnt lessons from the past mistakes and would endeavour to serve the country in a better way by eliminating VIP culture,244 heavily cut non-developmental expenditure, reduce the size of bureaucracy, make no new recruitments and broaden the tax base by including agriculture sector as well as recover bad loans.245 He was enthusiastic that government will make drastic changes in the country’s socio-economic condition aimed at ameliorating the lot of common man.246

The lure of structural changes with two-third majority appeared equally attractive and he indicated that he was mandated to take decisions on issues like Eighth Amendment and increasing women seats etc. Interestingly, Nawaz believed that Allah had provided him a golden opportunity to introduce ‘Nizam e Mustafa’ in the country and provide justice to the people.247 He indicated his desire to build good relations with military and on 11 February 1997 called on Gen Jahangir Karamat COAS and formed Council for

National Defence and Security as an apex body for civil military consultations.

Despite these healthy developments, Sethi, given the past performance and persona of

Nawaz Sharif while appreciating the intentions, posed certain pertinent and profound questions “Does his [Nawaz Sharif’s] selection of cabinet colleagues inspire confidence

242 The researcher had consulted the major newspapers in English and Urdu, (Dawn and Jang) from the period 1997 to 1999 and constructed the intended policy initiatives. 243 ‘PML Kicks of Poll Drive’, Dawn, 4 January 1997. 244 VIP stands for ‘very important person’. 245 ‘The Agenda for Nawaz’, Dawn, 17 February 1997. 246 ‘Battle of Manifestos’, Dawn, 15 January 1997. Reduction in budget deficit, lessening dependence on foreign loans, support privatization, reform management if financial institutions, recover bad loans, launch a new health scheme etc. 247 Daanish Mustafa, ‘(Anti) Social Capital in the Production of an (Un) Civil Society in Pakistan*’, Geographical Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 328–47.

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in his ability to deliver? Will honest professionals be hired to man the Planning

Commission, Privatisation Commission and various banks and development finance institutions? Does Mr Sharif have the foresight to retain good relations with President

Farooq Leghari and General Jahangir Karamat? Do his actions promise good government and political stability? There is, finally, the question of good relations with donors like the IMF and World Bank which lend international credibility to Pakistan”. 248

Rooted in the feudal background, authoritarianism is a particular cultural characteristic of political elite in Pakistan.249 They cleverly guise their inbred authoritative tendencies in a facade of democracy and democratic values. Nawaz Sharif, a businessman was no different from the feudal and his first urge was to secure his rule and maximise power by removing Eighth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment which undid the Eighth

Amendment and took away the discretionary powers of the President was passed on 4

April 1997 in matter of minutes, by relaxing rules and without giving due time for debate. It can be rightly argued that in a parliamentary democracy, power is vested in the elected representatives and Nawaz Sharif only restored the constitution in its true spirit. Besides, it was also due to Eighth Amendment that four elected governments could not complete their tenures.250 Their premature removal, arguably, impeded the consolidation of democracy. However as events unfolded, it became clear that Nawaz

Sharif had plans which went far beyond the imagination of even a worst dictator.

Fourteenth Amendment which added Article 63-A to the Constitution on the issue of

248 Najam Sethi, ‘A Good Beginning but’, The Friday Times, 6 March 1997. 249 Sumit Ganguly and C. Christine Fair, “The Structural Origins of Authoritarianism in Pakistan,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 51, no. 1 (2013): 124. The article contends that early choices that culminated in military rule helped forge a political culture that did little or nothing to dismantle the feudal features of parts of the Pakistani state, bolstered the role of the civil service and above all the military. Once embarked on this path of constitutional and political development that viewed mass political participation with both disdain and distaste, it became exceedingly difficult for the state to instil a democratic political ethos and to reinforce democratic norms. 250 The governments of Junejo, two governments of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif were dissolved by the President using powers given by Eighth Amendment.

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defection from the political party was similarly passed on 3 July 1997 by relaxing rules without tabling the bill or allowing due discussion on the matter.251 Given the experience of horse trading in the previous tenures, it can be argued that the practice needed to be stopped. But the solution offered in form of the Fourteenth Amendment went far beyond the problem itself. In effect it “silenced dissent within political parties rather than defections there from”.252 Voting against and abstention from voting, a normal practice in established democracies, could now be equated with defection and lead to loss of assembly seat. The amendment effectively established political dictatorship in political parties: especially when such parties, would not even hold elections within their party.

Authoritarianism meant that any individual or state agency that resisted authority of

Prime Minister would be brought down.253 In the process of redefinition of relationship with state institutions, the first ire fell on the Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah who had taken suo motto action of freeing certain government functionaries whom Prime

Minister had ordered to be handcuffed in Faisalabad. Dissatisfied with the existing judicial system Nawaz desired to construct a parallel system of anti-terrorist courts and if need be military courts to deliver speedy judgements. The Chief Justice argued that instead of diverting money towards a parallel system, the existing be strengthened.

Progressively, differences between the two grew as an alternate view point would not be tolerated by the Prime Minister. He struck down the recommendations of the Chief

Justice to elevate five judges to the Supreme Court. Two out of the five were not acceptable to Nawaz Sharif as they in the past had given hostile judgements against him. Instead of giving reasons for disagreement, “once again, personal and family

251 Fourteenth Amendment added Article 63-A to the Constitution. For details refer to The Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 252 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 452. 253 Ganguly and Fair, “The Structural Origins of Authoritarianism in Pakistan,” 122. They argue that failure of civilian democratic institutions to fully abandon authoritarianism even when military is not power impedes democratisation. 133

interests stood in the way of decision making”.254 Prime Minister notified reduction in number of judges from seventeen to twelve but the Chief Justice stuck back and suspended notification, the government had to eat a humble pie and withdraw: with a heavy mandate such an outcome was not acceptable.

The events which followed the occurrence resulted into an open war between executive and judiciary with President unnecessarily becoming party to the issue and sucking the military (COAS) as the arbitrator in this three way tangle. Chief Justice went on to suspend the Fourteenth Amendment and invoked Article 190 asking the President to notify the judges. Government surrendered and Chief Justice considering it his personal victory became haughty and oppressive turning many judges against himself. The parliamentarians argued for supremacy of parliament and Nawaz Sharif gave statements which were construed as contempt of the court and once again the Prime Minister had to back down. In this open battle between Chief Justice and Prime Minster, the parliament amended the Contempt of Court through a bill to protect the Prime Minister at which point the President led Supreme Court to restrain him from signing the bill.

“At this point military leadership was sucked into the situation. It was the army chief who once again asked to become an arbitrator between the President, Prime

Minister and the Chief Justice”.255

The government misused the respite and instead of resolving the matter went on to divide the judiciary and get a verdict against the appointment of the Chief Justice. A bizarre battle ensued and resulted in once again involving the military. This time by the

Chief Justice, requesting for personal protection. He first requested the Prime Minister and then wrote directly to COAS. The military, however, time stayed away allowing

254 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 454. 255 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 454-455; “White Paper on the Role of Judiciary” (Islamabad: Pakistan Bar Council, 2012), 5-6.

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the contending parties to resolve their differences themselves as now three important organs of the state (President, Prime Minister and Chief Justice) were involved. In the final outcome, under threat of impeachment President resigned and the workers of

PML-N stormed the Supreme Court to oust the sitting Chief Justice from his office.

The episode amply reflects on the mind-set of authoritarianism not amongst the uninitiated and unlettered but amongst those holding public office. Who acted in complete disregard to the dictates of their offices and public decorum seriously damage the standing of democracy. Sethi in his editorial, opines that:

“Mian Nawaz Sharif should go home because he is guilty of the

premeditated murder of democracy in Pakistan. He is guilty of

destroying the legitimacy of the parliament. He is guilty of contemning

the Supreme Court of Pakistan and instigating attempted coups against

the Chief Justice of Pakistan. He is guilty of attacking the Supreme

Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan. He is guilty of spreading

institutional anarchy and political chaos across the length and breadth

of Pakistan. And he is guilty of the most abysmal mismanagement of

the economy which brought it to the brink of breakdown.”256

Nawaz Sharif in his first round of authoritarianism had effectively divided and politicised judiciary and made it a party to inter-institutional conflicts. He generated a situation of political deadlock and forced military to intervene in politics. The military did get him off the hook only to find that any further intervention would not be good for the country and military. Should military have not done so, the results would have been detrimental for democracy and the country.

256 Najam Sethi, ‘The Way out’, The Friday Times, 4 December 1997. In a gruelling six hour cabinet meeting on 20th November in which it was finally decided to impeach President Leghari and drag Chief Justice out of Supreme Court before national Assembly’s privileges committee.

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Parallel with quest for dominating all state institutions, victimisation of the opposition is another favourite hobby of the political elite in Pakistan. Passage of Ehtisab

(accountability) Act, expanding its scope to include government servants of grade 17 and above and creation of Ehtisab Cell to conduct inquires undermined the power of

Ehtisab Commissioner. It virtually turned the Cell into tool for coercion and persecution of political opponents rather than for processing objective accountability to check corruption. Khan notes:

“The developments that followed the Act prove that the Ehtisab

Commissioner and all resources had been placed at the disposal of the

Cell. It was headed by Saif ur Rehman a close confidant of Nawaz. This

precluded the accountability of Nawaz and his cronies, making it a

selective weapon used to victimize any member of the opposition that

the Cell chose to proceed against”.257

During second term of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister, significant developments in civil military relations occurred. These included decision for overt nuclear testing in response to Indian nuclear tests, forced resignation of Gen Jahangir Karamat COAS for identifying the need for NSC and appointment of Gen Musharraf as COAS. The initial bonhomie with military taking on non-military roles like Bhal Safai (annual cleaning of canals), supporting WAPDA in recovery of dues to bolster civilian government and facilitating holding of census in the country. These were followed by Kargil conflict and ultimately the counter coup by military in response to Nawaz Sharif’s attempt to oust Gen Musharraf while he was on a visit abroad. These events are studied in greater detail to understand development in civil military relations in the country.

257 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 453.

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On 25 May 1997, a day after Mazar-e-Sharif fell, Pakistan recognised Taliban

Government in Afghanistan which was followed by Saudi Arabia and United Arab

Emirates, confirming internal and external consensus about Pakistan’s Afghan policy. 258

Later, it turned out that the decision was taken in haste without allowing time to absorb the ramifications of these developments. 259 Reasons for such a decision could be attributed to pre-eminence of ISI on Afghan policy and initial days of Nawaz Sharif in governance. However, it could not be ascertained that MoFA was rushed into a prompt decision could not be found. Professionalism demanded that Minister for Foreign

Affairs should have taken time to deliberate on such an important development and the saved the country from embarrassment and subsequent need for policy re-adjustment.

An oft repeated political mantra tends to attribute military with such and many other ills of institutional decay and present it as an impediment to consolidation of democracy.

Perceptional in nature, such assertions lack credibility. This research argues that after exit of Gen Zia, military consistently supported democracy and if political elite would have focused on reviving economy and providing good governance and by such actions accrued greater legitimacy, there were no reasons that military would not stand with them.

The judicial crisis was initiated by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif which engulfed judiciary and later involved Presidency. Aziz gives a detailed account how, when

President before packing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif solicited support of military on

2 December 1997. Gen Karamat instead backed continuation of democracy and resultantly President had to resign. On all counts, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif should

258 A city in northern Afghanistan considered a strong hold of Northern Alliance, a group of forces opposing Taliban rule in Afghanistan. 259 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 211. Taliban were soon ousted from Mazar e Sharif and soon Saudi Arabia pulled out support due to differences with Taliban leader for handing over of Osama bin Ladin. The decision was to have immense consequences in times to come. 137

have been grateful to the COAS but it was not so. Another evidence of involving military in political decision making can be found in the process of selecting President

Lehgari’s successor when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif asked Gen Karamat to evaluate, short list and recommend most appropriate candidate for appointment as President and then took decision on political basis disregarding the institutional process. 260

The COAS is responsible for defence and security of Pakistan. If there are changes in security matrix, it is his duty to bring them in the notice of the government and recommend appropriate measures. Pakistan’s security was adversely challenged on 12

May 1998 by nuclear tests conducted by India. Although nuclear capability of China was cited as the primary reason for the tests by India, yet Pakistan was most affected by the decision. Meeting of the Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC) was scheduled on 13 May 1998 to deliberate on the diplomatic, economic, strategic and security dimensions of Pakistan’s response. Dilemma was to test, incur severe sanctions and further imperil the fledging economy or not to test and accept security and economic leverages being proposed by US. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in consultation with the military took the decision to test and till 28 May 1998 the military facilitated preparations and testing and stood with the Prime Minister.261

In the context of constitutional amendments to acquire greater powers for the Prime

Minister, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and approval of

Fifteenth Amendment by lower house for imposition of Islamic Rule in the country raised serious concerns in the political community. The bill even unnerved Jamat- eIslami, a strong proponent of Shariat, because of the perceived real objective of religiously sanctioned dictatorship. Gen Karamat identifying poor state of affairs in the

260 Ibid., 179. 261 Ibid., 194

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country and unrest amongst the political elite highlighted the need of setting up NSC in a lecture to Naval College. When the media published the news, Prime Minister Nawaz

Sharif perceived it as a challenge to his authority. Intoxicated in absolute power and having already removed the Chief Justice and the President, he thought it was an apt moment to subjugate military as well, the remaining bastion of political challenge. He asked Gen Jahangir Karamat to resign which he (surprisingly) did. However, if military seriously wanted NSC to be considered, the matter would have been discussed by the

COAS with Prime Minister or taken up as an agenda point in the DCC but that was not the case nor a military takeover was on the mind of Gen Jahangir Karamat, he chose to respect the constitution.262 Sartaj Aziz, states that he himself was working on a similar proposal of NSC and noted that “Nawaz Sharif’s decision to remove Gen Jahangir

Karamat as the most serious mistake rather a blunder”.263 Clearly, it was an irrational decision, emanating from hubris and it would have monumental consequences in future.

Historically, immense speculation precedes appointment of COAS in Pakistan and subsequently the personality and professional attributes of the new COAS are subjected to extensive analysis to understand the considerations and motivations behind choosing him for the appointment. There is no legal and constitutional bar on the Prime Minister to appoint senior most officers as the COAS or CJCSC nor there is any constitutional process specified for making such an appointment, save recommendation by the outgoing chief and procedural processing by Ministry of Defence. He can elevate any of the serving three star to these appointments. In appointing Gen Musharraf as the

262 Susan B. Maitra and Ramtanu Maitra, ‘Pakistan’s Sharif Gets yet another Opportunity to Set Things Right’, Executive Intelligence Review, 30 October 1998. “What Karamat said was neither wrong nor malicious considering the state of affairs that prevails in Pakistan, but it was construed as a warning to the present government and a clarion call for implementing a new period of military rule”. 263 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 200-202. Aziz was independently working on the proposal to convert DCC into Cabinet Committee on Defence and National Security and Gen Karamat agreed that the proposal would serve the purpose. 139

COAS, Nawaz Sharif had political rather than professional considerations on his mind.

Lacking an institutional process he only consulted his brother Shehbaz Sharif and

Chaudhary Nisar. Apparently, he opted for Gen Musharraf due to his political weaknesses.

He superseded Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan the senior most officer. He could have appointed him as CJCSC but intriguingly, he double hatted Gen Musharraf with the office of

CJCSC. By doing so, he also missed the opportunity to reform Higher Defence

Organisation (HDO). Nawaz Sharif used this opportunity to appoint his own man Lt

Gen Zia ud Din Butt as Director General (DG) ISI. This alerted Gen Musharraf and prompted him to make changes in the military hierarchy to safeguard his position. He appointed Lt Gen Aziz, on promotion as the Chief of General Staff (CGS). The officer was serving in ISI and he brought with him expertise of handling Kashmir affairs.

Gen Musharraf’s one year period between appointment and the takeover can be subdivided into two half’s; one prior to the Kargil conflict and one after that. The major issues in the context of civil military relations included handling India’s large scale coercive military exercises along her western border, her relentless demonstration and consolidation of nuclear and missile capability and the negative developments in

Afghanistan. Internally, the military’s support for shoring up WAPDA, sustaining governor rule in Sind and handling internal security troubles in the country can be noted.

Apparently, the military was doing all what the federal government expected from it but there were too many political issues on the table and the government did not look comfortable.

2.7 Trends in Democratisation and Civil Military Relations

Death of Gen Zia provided an opportunity for return to democracy to Pakistan. The political elite could have used the opportunity to consolidate democracy and make it

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attractive and sustainable. This research has hypothesised that the transition approach is most significant for consolidation of democracy. From the study of the period of democratic reconstruction from 1988 to 1999, significant trends are discussed below.

• Benazir in her two tenures had the freedom of choice for formulating

socioeconomic polices, constructing inter-institutional relationship in the realm

of foreign and security policies. According to her own account, she was

consulted by the military and her decisions were honoured. Confrontation with

President (one his own nominee), Judiciary and opposition led to her down fall.

The two dissolution orders against her have remarkable similarities where

corruption, mal-governance, nepotism and economic mismanagement are

concerned.

• Nawaz Sharif in his two tenures largely followed a similar trajectory

accentuated by strong authoritarian tendencies which made him clash with

President and Chief Justice. The military, in his first tenure, bailed him out of a

tricky situation but he used the opportunity to increase the level of

confrontation. Although he was more inclined towards socio-economic

development but his desire for rapid structural changes to maximise political

space created an environment of confrontation in the country.

• Nawaz Sharif’s desire to control the military by forcing resignation of Gen

Karamat and then creating an environment of uncertainty by keeping the post

of CJCSC vacant and posting his own man as DG ISI were not well received by

the military in general.

• Low economic growth under democratic regimes has not been acceptable to

common people. Giunchi argues that one of the “key internal factor that

hampered to government commitment to social welfare were the pre-eminence

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among elected representatives of social groups to invest in human capital of the

majority”. 264 “With return of democracy, people expected something very

positive and drew rosy picture of the future. Instead, what they saw were

rampant corruption in the public sector, deterioration in law and order, increase

in violent crimes, and so on. Still people put their faith in Nawaz Sharif and

expected him to bring the economy back on track. Unfortunately, he was also

not able to come up to their expectations”.265

Table 2.5: Economic Growth under Different Political Regimes 266

st nd rd Competitive 1 and 2 Civilian 3 Military Return of 2nd 2nd Parliamentary Military Dictatorship Dictatorship Parliamentary Nawaz Nawaz Democracy Dictatorships Bhutto (Zia) Democracy Regime Regime 1947-1958 (Ayub & 1971-1977 1977-1988 1988-1999 97/98 98/99 Yaha) 1958- 1971 GDP 2.9 5.3 5.4 6.7 4.1 4.3 3.1 Growth Population 2.5* 2.2 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.3 Growth Per Capita 0.4 3.1 2.2 3.9 1.6 1.9 0.8 GDP Growth Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, various issues. Note *Figures for the period 1950 to 1958

• In the context of structure of the constitution, the Eighth Amendment had

divided the power between the Prime Minister and President. The political elite

sought measures to safeguard their regimes for the use of the amendment against

them. Benazir sought relief by installing a President of her own choice while

Nawaz Sharif attempted to undo the amendment.

264 Elisa Giunchi, “Democratic Transition and Social Spending: The Case of Pakistan in the 1990s,” Democratization 18, no. 6 (December 1, 2011): 1270. 265 Ibrahim, Guarding the State Or Protecting the Economy? 266 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999); Ibrahim, Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy? 142

• Different presidents repeatedly employed the arbitrary power to dissolve the

political governments. The reference of the Presidential Dissolution Order to

Courts endowed the Judiciary with a political role. Besides judging the validity

of the order it could have also judged the validity of the Eighth Amendment and

facilitated consolidation of democracy. However it shied away from such a duty.

• The desire of political elite to control the Judiciary by appointing judges of one’s

own choice persisted as a malaise throughout the decade pitching the Prime

Minister and Chief Justice against each other to the extent of storming of the

Supreme Court by stalwarts of PML-N to remove a sitting Chief Justice.

In the context of civil military relations following trends can be noted.

• Sudden exit of Gen Zia opened two divergent options, a military takeover

(Ayub-Yahya precedent) or facilitate the interim structure to hold elections and

facilitate return to democracy. It opted for former and PPP which had been

politically excluded during Zia’s era and marginalised won the elections.

Benazir in recognition awarded a ‘democracy medal’ to the military.

• The study of the process of political reconstruction from 1988-1999 in the

context of independent variable (political choices and action) in its interface

with dependent variable (military response) validates this research proposition

that political elite generate situations of political dead lock and then directly or

indirectly involve the military in politics to which the military responds in

different ways.

• The defence budget which stood at 7% of GDP in 1988 was consistently

downsized to 5% in 1999. In terms of percentage of government capital

expenditure in 1990, it stood at 34.49% which progressively reduced to 26.34%

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in 1999 i.e. a reduction of 8.15%.267 The need for reforming the institutions for

civil military cooperation in wake of rapidly changing external and internal

situation was noticed not only by the military but also by the political elite.

However, asking Army Chief to resign for identifying the need humiliated the

rank and file in the military.

2.8 Summation

In the disposition and opportunity calculus where in despite varying but ever increasing levels of civilian dependency on military from tasks ranging from internal security to resurrecting civilian institutions to arbitration in situations of political deadlock and military’s persisting popularity, the military consistently demonstrated their disposition to remain away from politics. 268 Despite numerous opportunities i.e. pull factors it demonstrated that it had no desire to intervene directly in politics and wanted the political elite to do their jobs better. Contrarily, one can hardly trace the role of push factors in this decade except in second tenure of Nawaz Sharif where such tendencies started to emerge because of certain political decisions.

The argument that the Eighth Amendment had altered power in favour of the President and strengthen the hand of military initially held weight. But with the appointment of loyalist Presidents (Leghari and Tarar), it also progressively lost validity shifting the focus squarely on the preferences of political elite. In this chapter, the research investigated choices and preferences of political elite to govern the country and consolidate democracy in the context of three broad approaches with emphasis on the transition approach. The political elite did very little to improve elite interaction for strengthening democracy, rather preferred confrontational approach to bring about

267 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (OUP/Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook Series, 1999), 359. 268 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 72-85.

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rapid structural changes (which otherwise is slow and historical process) not to improve democracy but to increase their respective political space. They repeatedly involved the military in political situations as arbitrator. The process of democratisation undermined standing of democracy amongst the electorate. The development related to civilmilitary relations and its breakdown during the second tenure of Nawaz Sharif is focused in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

BREAKDOWN OF

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS 1998 – 1999

“Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people and you

do not make national policy, it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues

and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted”.269

Quaid-e-Azam

3.1 Prelude

Huntington’s framework for civil military relations characterised in objective control and institutional autonomy leading to professionalization and creation of apolitical military has largely been practised in Pakistan since its inception. In this context, the architecture for civilian control over the military laid out in 1973 Constitution comprises.313 President of Pakistan is the supreme commander and the prime minister as chief executive exercises control over military through parliament, cabinet and

269 Roedad Khan, ‘Quaid’s Visit to Staff College Quetta’, The Nation, 22 November 2012. 313 The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. 145

administrative services. Senate and National Assembly comprises standing committees on defence and the Cabinet Committee of Defence (DCC) is the highest consultative and decision making body related to military and security matters. Minister of Defence runs the affairs of the ministry while Minister for Defence Production (MoDP) ensures that the military’s needs for war munitions are adequately met. The ministry of defence

(MoD) is resourced with a mix of civil and military officers while secretary of defence manages MoD.

Federal government allocates the defence budget in accordance with the military’s needs. Capital requirements for purchase of major equipment are met through grants on required basis. An elaborate audit branch comprising civilian auditors is deployed in the military down to the lowest self-accounting unit. It ensures financial discipline which is overseen by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the parliament.

Military is responsible for territorial defence of the country and supports civilian government when requisitioned. The Constitution does not accord any political role to the military, however it was witnessed since 1988 that the military was frequently engaged in political matters as arbitrators, and for supporting the government in administrative tasks as well as internal security matters. Repeatedly, the military had demonstrated its desire to remain apolitical and assist the political elite (prime minister, president and chief justice) to resolve their disputes. And if not possible let the politics, under the law, take its course.270

The history of civil military relations in Pakistan had reinforced the military’s perception in which they saw “themselves as the servants of the sate rather than of the government in power.”315 They distinguished themselves from the political elite on

270 The perceptions about ISI’s role in politics and claims b Benazir Bhutto that ISI had rigged the 1998 election (although she won them) and then managed a coup with constitutional dressing. Also during her second term the military persuaded Farooq Leghari (a PPP stalwart) to dismiss her government. 315Finer, The Man on Horseback, 25. 146

grounds of moral and organisational proficiency. Consistent with theoretical perspectives developed by Finer, explaining military intervention in politics, this research analyses the process of breakdown of civil military relations and resultant military takeover.

It can be observed that political elite had considerably undermined their legitimacy for range of reasons elaborated in the previous chapter. Despite disposition and opportunities in shape of pull factors, the military had repeatedly demonstrated its lack of desire and mood to politically intervene and takeover. It preferred defensive interface with political elite for preserving the institutional interests.

During the second term of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, there were significant departures from the past which merit attention. First, as Sartaj Aziz opines, the burden of heavy mandate weighed heavy and affected his style of governance i.e. authoritarianism. Second, the country had acquired nuclear capability necessitating a nuclear policy and re-evaluation of defence policy. Third, the economy, due to the impact of post nuclear test sanctions, was in dire state meriting extensive emphasis and focus. Fourthly, the internal security situation had over a period of time deteriorated and the civilian security institutions were unravelling under such challenges. Lastly, the forced resignation of the President Leghari, his replacement with a Nawaz loyalist, and division of judiciary and ouster of chief justice had considerably disturbed and charged the political atmosphere.

Foregoing in view, the research in this chapter focuses on the political and operational aspects of civil military relations and the exercise of civilian control over the military both during peace and conflict. Consistent with the transition approach, it studies elite actions to ascertain how their choices and decisions affected civil military relations and finally led to its breakdown. It explores why Huntington’s framework for exercising

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civilian control over the military i.e. objective control, institutional autonomy leading to a professionalised and apolitical military could not prevent the Kargil conflict and subsequently the military takeover of 1999. It explores major theories and hypothesis proposed to explain the reasons for military interventions in Pakistan and ascertain their validity or otherwise to 1999 take over with a view to discern the primary reason and to extract findings which can be instructive for future.

3.2 Gen Karamat’s Resignation and its Impact

Gen Karamat in an address to Naval War College on 5 October 1999 had identified the emerging challenges faced by the state of Pakistan and recommended a few measures for improving governance and security management in the country including the need of NSC.271 Need for such an apex body for decision making in the past had mainly been identified by the military once included and then removed from the Constitution. The politicians, however, perceive it as power sharing and intrusion by the military into politics. Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz identified that in view of the emerging challenges he was himself deliberating on the need for such a body. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif without hearing about the merits of the suggestion asked Gen Jahangir Karamat to resign, to which he complied.272

In an already disturbed and charged political atmosphere, the resignation generated strong apprehensions in the military ranks and they felt humiliated. The trumpeting of the resignation as a personal triumph for Nawaz Sharif by media, calling him the most

271 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 741. National Security Council: A debate on institutions and process for decision-making on security issues, PILDAT Discussion Paper 2012, notes that by 2012 NSC is fully functional in USA, UK, India, Iran and Turkey etc. Hence Gen Karamat was merely identifying the growing need in view of the environmental changes. 272 Maitra and Maitra, “Pakistan’s Sharif Gets yet another Opportunity to Set Things Right,” 61. ‘What Karamat said was neither wrong nor malicious considering the state affairs that prevails in Pakistan, but it was constructed as a warning to the present government and a clarion call for implementing a new period of military rule’.

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powerful Prime Minister who had forced the President and Chief Justice to resign and secured his power by passage of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment further accentuated the apprehensions in the military. It is routine affairs that service chief are invited to the leading military institutions where they share their evaluation of the environment, identify the changes required and instruct next generation of officers. It was mistake on part of Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) to release such a statement to the press, which even after that should have been seen for its scholarly rather than political value. If such a suggestion would have been in active consideration for presentation to prime minister in a military brief or DCC meeting, then it would have been sent as an agenda point for acceptance or otherwise as is the practice.

Actions of political elite especially the prime minister for strengthening democracy in the context of transition approach are critical. Nawaz Sharif had a range of options open to him. He could have ignored statement by Gen Karamat, taken time to gather more details and ascertain facts, consulted his cabinet colleagues before making a decision, could have talked to Gen Karamat to ascertain institutional position, conveyed his unacceptability etc. But taking the extreme measure first, speaks volume about the nature of his personality and the cultural attitude. Seeking resignation was not in order however Gen Jahangir Karamat willingness to resign confirms the trend that military had taken a back seat, was professionalising and expecting the political elite to deliver.

Gen Musharraf notes that Gen Karamat’s resignation had caused great resentment in the army, as soldiers and officers alike felt humiliated. However, after the assumption of appointment of COAS, he states that “the resentment in the army was even greater than he had imagined”.273 The reasons for such strong feelings were multiplied by the comparative effect i.e. how do the soldiers perceive the political elite and their failures

273 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 84-85.

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especially their preference to advance personal interests at the cost of national interests etc. The widespread malpractices witnessed after 1988 and repeated reference to massive corruption and nepotism etc. documented in four Presidential dissolution orders accentuated such perceptions.

Thus Gen Musharraf had the difficult task of pacifying these feelings, consolidating his control over the army and focusing on professional matters. The later was important due to the scheduled Indian large scale military exercise in the winters of 1998. This exercise was significant due to the recent deployment of Prithvi Missiles along with

Pakistan’s border. He notes:

“One of the first things he did was to tell the army that our job was to

assist the government in all possible ways, particularly in areas where it

asked us to help. We should stop brooding over the forced resignation

of Gen Karamat and get on with our jobs.”274

It is perceived that trust is an important plank in developing intrapersonal relations especially amongst the governing elite. Such a trust builds confidence and results in greater organisational efficacy and helps maintaining societal order. Trust is described as “social capital, a quantifiable sector which relies on individuals, encourages networking and results in coordinated action needed for competitive economic function.

In addition, trust yields good governance, better education, lower crime and increased civic participation.”275 With regards to civil military relations, the interaction between political and military elite and their behaviour in “trust diagnostic situations” helps

274 Ibid., 85-86. In an interview to this researcher, Gen Musharraf had emphasised the same and explained his intent to support the prime minister and his government where ever the military can. 275 Khaled Ahmed, “Are We a Low-Trust Society?” in Political Developments in Pakistan: 1999-2008, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2010), 268. He evaluates and geographically places the varying standards of trust and the impact of emphasis on Islamisation on trust in the society. Civil Society is a matrix in which trust functions as a value

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strengthen trust and improves credibility. In Pakistan, its significance multiplies owing to “collectivist nature” of its polity.276

While appointing army chief, the primary consideration for prime minister is that he will not intervene in politics given Pakistan’s history of military interventions.

Accordingly, he selects the one who is least likely to do it while taking up professional credentials as supporting factors. Selection of Gen Musharraf as COAS carried similar considerations and one expressed by the Prime Minister that “since Gen Musharraf had not approached him for the job” and he came from an Urdu speaking family and therefore generating collective action for military intervention would be difficult for him as opposed to Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, who came from NWFP, was classmate of

President Leghri and politically well established.277 Owing to sudden resignation by Gen

Karamat, enough time was not available for more robust evaluation and institutional advice from military. Amongst the top three, Lt Gen Ali Kuli was not acceptable and

Lt Gen Khalid was not a strong candidate therefore Lt Gen Musharraf appeared to be the likely choice.

At this juncture, it was significant that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif should have invested in building trust and a comfortable interpersonal relation with Gen Musharraf.

This trust was significant in view of the anger and humiliation which prevailed in the army over forced resignation of Gen Karamat. Contrarily, Prime Minister made other moves which unsettled the polity. He kept the appointment of CJCSC vacant after resignation by Gen Karamat from November 1998 to March 1999. Second, within a

276 Masood ul Hassan et al., “Interpersonal Trust and Its Role in Organizations,” International Business Research 5, no. 8 (2012): 33; Jeffry A. Simpson, “Psychological Foundations of Trust,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 16, no. 5 (2007): 264–68. The article explains four core principles of interpersonal trust, since there was inadequate time to observe Gen Musharraf behavior prior to appointing him as COAS, therefore consultation to generate greater trust becomes critically important. 277 Pervez Musharraf, Civil Military Relations and 1999 Coup, interview by Noel I. Khokhar, 30 March 2015.

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few days he appointed Lt Gen Zia ud Din who was serving as DG ISI without consulting

Gen Musharraf.278 DG ISI reports directly to the Prime Minister but also enjoys the confidence of COAS therefore the army recommends a suitable officer who is experienced and can handle the challenges. Lt Gen Zia did not fit the bill, besides the move amounted to visible demonstration of lack of trust in Gen Musharraf and in violation of the organisational procedures, it stands out as an affront.

Since the country had developed nuclear capability therefore it needed an appropriate command structure. Perception was strengthening that there was a likelihood of Gen

Musharraf to be appointed as CJCSC and Lt Gen Zia promoted and appointed as COAS.

Surely, it concerned Gen Musharraf as he appeared to be only an interim choice.

Given the rising differences between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Gen Musharraf,

Chengappa claims that Gen Musharraf initially kept quiet but then expressed his dissatisfaction over the arrangements by missing the ceremonial part of the visit of

Prime Minister Vajpayee of India in Lahore.279 Sartaj Aziz provides opposite point of view and he clarifies that this happened due to the visit of Chinese Defence Minister on the same day. Since there was no defence minister, therefore it was decided that foreign minister (Mr Sartaj Aziz) along with the three service chiefs would receive the Chinese

Defence Minister, hold talks and join the Prime Minister next day in Lahore. He further states that:

“In light of this background the speculation in the media and the

statement of Qazi Hussain Ahmad on 21 February that General

Musharraf and other senior chiefs had refused to go to Wagha to receive

278 At that time, Lt Gen Zia ud Din was serving as Adjutant General (AG) in GHQ. 279 Bidanda M. Chengappa, “Pakistan’s Fourth Military Takeover,” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 9 (December 1, 1999): 1437.

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the Indian prime minister is not factually correct. They duly carried out

the decision which the prime minister had made in my presence.”280

Pakistani military over time has come to enjoy a unique status in the country. Its prestige and authority associated with the appointment of COAS is immense both among the civil and military. Repeated martial laws and prolonged tenures of military rules have reinforced this perception. In the history of Pakistan, no Prime Minister has ever demanded resignation from neither COAS nor any COAS has ever resigned, therefore resignation of Gen Karamat is a unique event which had far reaching impact on the overall political landscape of the country. Pursuant to the conceptual and theoretical framework, Gen Karamat’s resignation invoked push factors for the first time in the ranks of the military. The political moves by Prime Minister continued even after appointing Gen Musharraf as COAS. The immediate challenge for Gen Musharraf was to organise the military ranks which were dissatisfied with political actions but a web of uncertainty was built around him. The office of CJCSC was kept vacant and DG ISI was appointed without consultation him. In their combined effects, these events give air to the push factors in the military.

3.3 Kargil Conflict

The unresolved Kashmir issue which has genesis in the partition of sub-continent led to wars (1948, 1965) and conflicts along Line of Control (LoC) between Pakistan and

India. In this context, Kargil conflict should be seen as continuation of a struggle for right of self-determination for people of Kashmir. This in Pakistan is regarded as an important national objective. 281 Resolution through a dialogue in keeping with UN

Resolutions is the accepted way forward. But given Indian intransigence, occasionally

280 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 233. 281 Kargil town in IHK is habituated by Shia Muslims and has historically been part of Pakistan. It was occupied by India in 1971 war and after the conclusion of Simla Agreement they did not vacate it. Map of Kargil is attached as Appendix D. 327Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, 171. 153

recourse to quasi-military means was made in the past (1948, 1965 and post 1989 uprising in IHK) with a view to nudge the dialogue forward, albeit with a mixed result.

In 1948, the Laskhars did partially succeed in liberating a portion of Kashmir.327 But their inability to garner widespread popular support, seal the valley and secure airport allowed India to hoax an accession letter from Maharaja, launch a military offensive and consolidate control on much of Valley. In 1965, the limited action by the freedom fighters rapidly escalated into an all-out war without any political and military gains.

The indigenous uprising in IHK in late 80’s continued into 90’s, but India sustained the pressure and did not yield any concession. The brief parleys to find a solution to the issue died in April 1999 when BJP’s government fell due to a no confidence vote.

Geographically, the road connecting Srinagar to Leh in IHK runs perilously close to the

LOC.282 According to Simla Accord, signatories (Pakistan and India) were required to maintain the sanctity of LOC. 283 Indians however occupied Siachin glacier in 1985, exploiting interpretational differences in the agreement. The LOC was delineated up till

NJ9842 and the agreement identified the general direction of LOC as ‘thence north to the glaciers’ without specifying the exact terminus on the international border with

China. Historical practice located the terminus at Karakorum pass.284

The LOC between Dras and Siachin with average heights between 12000 to 18000 feet overlooked Srinagar – Leh road. As per practice, Indian Army would withdraw in

282 Kashmir is the long standing un-resolved dispute between Pakistan and India. Comprises three regions i.e. Hindu majority Jammu, the Muslim majority Srinagar valley and Buddhist majority Laddakh, overall the Muslims enjoyed majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir which according to the Partition Agreement should have joined Pakistan. However the Maharaja delayed the decision which led to Muslim uprising in the valley and Indian occupation under dubious instrument of accession. The resultant war between two countries was referred to UN by India and the UN Resolutions for peaceful settlement was to be administered through plebiscite which could not be realised due to Indian intransigence. The two countries have fought a major war in 1965 and have since remained in a state of conflict and instances of firing along LOC were frequent before 2003 ceasefire. 283 Simla Agreement was concluded after 1971 war between Pakistan and India. 284 Shireen M. Mazari, The Kargil Conflict, 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Islamabad: Ferozsons, 2003), 2-3. 154

winters to lower heights and return to re-occupy when the weather improved i.e. normally in April/May. This would also accord with opening of passes for moving of logistics from Srinagar to Leh and Siachin.

Kashmir freedom movement active in IHK in 90’s although was able to force substantial commitment of security resources yet it could not meaningfully contribute to resolve the issue. It could be argued that if mujahedeen (freedom fighters) could occupy the positions along Dras – Kargil and interdict the only supply route between

Srinagar and Leh, they could theoretically starve Leh region by limiting to air connection only with rest of India and IHK. Resultantly, a dialogue with India will not only become essential but can be held from a position of advantage.

The operation came out in open in first week of May when the Indians returned to occupy their position only to find them already occupied. 285 They discovered that intrusion comprised 130 square km area, 100 km wide and 5 to 14 km in depth in which

132 posts were located. India rushed in additional forces to IHK to evict the mujahedeen. Due to the Indian actions close to LoC, a conflict ensued. Shooting of

Indian aircraft and terrain difficulties soon precluded combat role of air force leaving it to Indian artillery (the newly inducted state of art BOFOR Guns) to turn advantage in their favour. From May to mid-June, Indian forces struggled for meaningful gains but after that under massive artillery support and increased numbers, they did manage to take two posts in one of the five intrusions.

India had to choose between three difficult options to evict mujahedeen form their positions. To evict with resources already committed to IHK or to induct additional

285 India Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2000). ‘The intrusion was detected on 3 May 1999 by Shepherds’. 332 P. R. Chari, Pervez Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2007), 123-128. 155

forces but compromise on her capability to escalate along international border. Or it could escalate in Kashmir to relieve pressure. It may be noted that should India want to enlarge the conflict in IHK, it enjoyed the advantage of interior lines with metalled roads while Pakistan was disadvantaged by exterior lines with rudimentary communication south of road Gilgit – Skardu. All these options had to be exercised in a nuclear environment.

The military advantage of the mujahedeen action was evident, but there were many unanswered questions about strategy.332 The foremost question was that if dialogue was intended out of conflict, what would be the political outcome of such a dialogue. The second question related to contingency planning. It is a common adage that no plan lasts beyond the first engagement. Therefore contingency plans are prepared to bring a conflict to a successful conclusion. It appears that was not so in the case of Kargil.

Strategies for conflict around built under certain assumptions, the basis of the assumption that India would accept the occupation as a fait accompli and at best would try to dislodge the positions with men and material already committed in IHK, or live with the problem is not known.286 The logic manifested in the planning reflected path dependent linear reasoning, witnessed earlier during 1965 war as well. In a similar situation, when lines of communication between Jammu and Nowshera were threatened

(Operation Grand Slam) resulted into escalation of the Kashmir conflict into a general war.287 The three weeks long war that ensued resulted only in a stalemate.

From the experience of 1965 war, it should have been considered that what if India does not accept fait accompli. Will then, Pakistan be willing to fight a larger war in Kashmir or across the international borders and that too in a nuclear environment. Will the

286 This is the common perception among the military officers who have been surveyed during the research. 287 Mahmud Ahmed, History of Indo-Pak War - 1965 (Karachi: Services Book Club, 2006), 81-128.

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political leadership be willing to go along if the need arises? Operational surprise can accrue an initial advantage but what after that? Benazir Bhutto from an experience during her second term as Prime Minister when invited by the military for a briefing at

Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) records that such a plan was presented to her by none other than Maj Gen Musharraf, then Director General Military Operations (DGMO), which she did not approve due to international ramifications of the adventure.288 But,

Mazari and Gen Karamat strongly refute this claim.289

In terms of civil-military relations, Clausewitz wrote that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means.”337 Although, the government decides on the policy for waging a war yet its execution falls in the ambit of the military. This division of labour is consistent with Huntington’s framework for pre-eminence of civil for deciding the policy and its final outcome. One of the doubts regarding Kargil conflict is its political sanctioning which has been discussed in detail in this study. Significant to this research is not the merits and demerits of Kargil Conflict. Choice of a limited incursion is contextualised as indirect approach and indirect strategy. It was not that, were the mujahedeen indigenous to Kashmir and that the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) was a second line force raised to defend Northern Areas but rather was the planning process subjected to rigorous inquiry. In this context, Kargil conflict raises numerous questions i.e. was the international environment conducive for such an undertaking, how the major powers will respond and who will support Pakistan, should the conflict escalate?

What were the political objectives? Will the people and national resources be mobilised by the political elite etc.

288 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, 418. 289 Mazari, The Kargil Conflict, 1999, 16-17. 337Clausewitz, On War, 23. 157

Kargil conflict was not a united effort of civil and military leadership. After the conflict, a conspiracy emerged about Prime Minister being taken on board by the military or otherwise.290 Gen Musharraf indicates that during preparatory stage from January to

May 1999, Prime Minister was informed during his visit to Skardu on 29 January, then on 5 February in Kel, followed by a formal meeting on 12-13 March in Islamabad and finally matter was discussed at length on 17 May.339 Sartaj Aziz, on the contrary, claims that no such discussion took place in Kel (he was not present during the Skardu visit) but he confirms the meeting on 12-13 March. In this meeting, Prime Minister was informed about intensification of mujahidin activity in Kargil area and a decision was sought for possibility of arming them with stinger missiles or otherwise. It was not approved by Prime Minister however the impact of development in Kargil and resultant peace talks was discussed.291

In the meeting on 17 May, when the conflict fully came into open, Prime Minister was then briefed in detail. During the meeting, inquiry by Gen (retired) Majid Malik,

Minister for Kashmir Affairs, about the possibility of escalation and an open war and his question that “are we prepared for an open war” should have sounded alarm bell with the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (if he was not briefed before, as he claims).341 A professional discussion should have ensued within the cabinet. However, no such thing happened and in fact Sartaj Aziz says that the Prime Minister awarded what looked like an ex post facto sanction to involvement of own troops and crossing of LOC.342 After the conflict, Prime Minister in an interview in 2006 to Suhail Warraich states:

290 Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning.‘The balance of probability suggests that he [Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif] was fully in the picture. This is borne out by the tapes referred to earlier and the repeated assertions of General Musharraf. Those who know Nawaz Sharif personally believe that he has a limited attention span and is impatient with detail. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that Nawaz Sharif was at least aware of the broad thrust of the Kargil plan when he so warmly welcomed the Indian Prime Minister in Lahore. The report calls it ‘Operation Badar’ 339Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 87-98. 291 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 253. 341Ibid., 257. 342Ibid p.255 343Ibid., 259.

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“I as prime minister was not taken into confidence about Kargil. Four months after the operation when some details were revealed they [military] also reaffirmed that this attack would not lead to any complications, no major loss of life would be expected and mujahedeen rather than Pakistan Army would be mostly involved in the operation.”343 In his autobiography, Gen Musharraf addresses five myths about Kargil

Operation. The first was that “the operation was launched without the army taking political leadership into confidence.” He terms it as an “unfortunate perception, because nothing can be farther from the truth” and claims that Prime Minister was briefed about the operation during his visit to Sakardu on 29 January 1999 and then on 5 February during his visit to Kel Sector.292 The details about remaining meetings corroborate with those documented by Sartaj Aziz the Finance Minister, who was not present in the 29

January meeting while he also recalls that no mention was made about Kargil on 5

February brief which he attended. However, in the meeting on 12-13 March, mujahedeen activity and the Indian response were discussed and decision for giving stinger missiles to mujahedeen was sought which was not accorded by the Prime

Minister. When the operation came into open on 2 May, Prime Minister was formally briefed on 17 May during which he got excited and inquired “will this road eventually lead to Srinagar?” Sartaj Aziz thinks that Prime Minister accorded “what amounted to ex-post facto approval.”293

The second myth that “military situation on the ground was precarious, and the Prime

Minister dashed to Washington to get the army out of it.” In Gen Musharraf’s assessment India, due to certain redeployment of forces to address the Kargil situation, was not in a position to expand the war by opening up along the international border.

292 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 95-98. 293 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 253-258.

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Sartaj Aziz on the contrary recounts his visit to India and states that the Indians had ample proof and were not willing to accept Pakistani side of story and warned to “vacate the aggression or be prepared for a wider conflict.” 294 However, after mid-June when

Indian position on ground slightly improved, their focus shifted towards harnessing international support (US and G8) in favour of their demand and ultimately succeeded in coercing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif into a unilateral withdrawal. It did not matter that Pakistan had strategic parity and India could no longer expand the war.

To the third myth, that military hierarchy was not involved, Gen Musharraf himself concedes that the operation was conducted on need to know basis. Against the fourth myth that the two countries were on the brink of nuclear war he argues that although the two countries had conducted nuclear tests a year ago but had not operationalised the nuclear capability or mobilised such elements to be on the brink of war. From the evidence available, it appears that his position is correct.295 In fact, this research opines that the US employed the nuclear escalation threat to coerce Nawaz Sharif into unilateral withdrawal.

In defence of the fifth myth about the casualties during the conflict, Gen Musharraf claims that actual figures of Indian causalities are much higher as reported by the Kargil

Commission Report of India which narrates 600 killed and over 1500 wounded. He does not state the number of Pakistani casualties and no official figures were released but the general estimates were that the number of our shaheeds (martyrs) was closer to the Indian figure.

294 Ibid., 273. The telephonic conversation taped by RAW between Gen Musharraf and Gen Aziz while the former was on a visit to China had exposed the truth about Pakistan army’s involvement in the mujahidin operation along LOC in IHK. He also quotes Gen Zinni of US who in stern words had warned Prime Minister before his visit to China on 25 June that ‘if you do not pull back you are going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your country’. 295 During the content analysis of this period, it was observed that no nuclear deployment has been made from both sides.

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For clarity, a comparison of different versions of top three leaders i.e. COAS, Foreign

Minister and Prime Minister is appended on next page.

Table 3.1: A Comparison of Versions among COAS, Foreign Minister and Prime

Minister about Kargil Conflict Gen Prime Minister Meeting Sartaj Aziz Remarks Musharraf 29 January 1999 Not present in PM was informed Not Informed Sakardu the meeting 5 February 1999 No mention of PM was informed Not informed Kel Sector, AJK Kargil The consequences of 12-13 March mujahedeen activity PM was informed Yes Yes 1999 Islamabad in Kargil sector were discussed in detail. Gen Musharraf was also appointed as CJCSC in March 1999. A conflict ensued when it came into lime light on 2 May 1999. All confirm that the 17 May 1999 Yes Yes Yes matter was discussed.

Favourable international environment and availability of interlocutors is essential for successful conflict. During Kargil conflict, the international arbitrators included China,

G-8 and US. Gen Musharraf (25-29 June), Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz (9-10 June) and

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (29 June) visited China to gather support but evidently the advice was to diffuse the situation. Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, also visited China (13-15 June) and National Security Advisor went to Geneva and was able to solicit a resolution from G-8 for vacation of the positions. Gen Zinni visited Pakistan on 25 May and issued a stern warning. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif approached US and solicited a statement about unacceptability of any un-constitutional action. Later he opted for a meeting with President Clinton on 4 July and agreed to a unilateral vacation of the area. The recourse by Nawaz Sharif to President Clinton on a holiday (4 July) was not well received in Pakistan. At the meeting, he succumbed to unilateral

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withdrawal without Indian Prime Minister even being present there and that too without any noticeable change in ground situation. It frustrated the military generating the

‘dolchstoss’ stab-in-the-back feeling.296

Apparently the prevailing international environment, reaction of major powers and acceptability of the conflict were not factored in during planning stage by the military or by the political elite. It had the most devastating impact. Generally, before proceeding for a foreign visit, extensive preparations are made and if the visit is of security significance, a DCC meeting helps in preparing for such a visit, despite its shortcomings. 297 During Kargil conflict, a DCC meeting in which an accurate assessment about the ground realities, Indian position and the external pressure could be taken into account and a national response with military on board appears essential.

Before the visit to US, instead the Prime Minister proceeded to Lahore for consultations

(ostensibly with his father and his siblings) and listen to the brief of Foreign Minister

Sartaj Aziz after his recent visit to India. Gen Musharraf proceeded to Murree for the weekend and the two only met briefly at the tarmac before departure of Prime Minister to Washington. These circumstantial evidences prove that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif travelled to US without contextualising a national response and hence unilaterally decided to vacate the occupied positions.

Without preparations and formal brief, Pakistan was politically and diplomatically out manoeuvred, international community and President Clinton placed the responsibility

296 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 69. The theory propounded by Ludendroff in case of German Army inn 1918 ‘The army had never been beaten; the home-front had crackled and had betrayed it.’ Drawing a parallel the problem was not in the military manoeuvre but in the political elite in owning it and accruing advantage through display of will after all conflict is a dialectic of wills. 297 There is structural inadequacy with the Senate, Parliamentary Standing Committees and the DCC as they take only on agenda items and are devoid of in-house expert input. Also, the absence of their secretariat leads to lack of institutional memory which is essential for recording the decisions and monitoring their implementation.

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of misadventure on Pakistan.298 At that critical juncture, a DCC meeting would have possibly been instrumental. It would have saved from misperceptions like the success on the battlefield was compromised by Prime Minister or that the myth that military was in difficult position and Prime Minister rushed to the US to save it.

During the conflict (May/June), the dialogue process being pursued through Foreign

Ministers and the scheduled meetings between the two Prime Ministers would have become essential. Should the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the political elite demonstrated political will and resolve and mobilised the nation in its support rather than plainly succumbing to the pressure from US. Perhaps the outcome of the conflict could have been different. The consequences of blowing of mujahedeen cover could have been dealt through an internal political discourse. The price the military paid in terms of casualties and loss of face and undertake withdrawal ordered by its own prime minister was nothing less than dolchstoss.

Leadership is about will, courage, determination and resolve to accomplish the given objectives. This irrespective of the merit of the Kargil plan was visible in the military but at the crunch time not displayed by the prime minister. In a contest situation, it is dialectic of wills and the stronger resolve which more often wins. An argument can be made that even if the operational details were shared only on 17 May, but the effects of the mujahedeen activity in that area was discussed on 12-13 March meeting and it was very much possible for the prime minister to politically deliberate on the importance of the issue and mobilise required political and national support to demonstrate resolve and bring the impending conflict to a favourable conclusion. It was possible because

298 Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Policy Paper Series 1 (2002): 14.Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was told to come to US only if he was prepared to withdraw and the other option was isolation. In fact the real beneficiary of the Summit was US as ‘Doors opened

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Indians had already displayed willingness for a negotiated settlement. Alternately, he could have asked the military to take measures that the activities of mujahedeen do not result into an open conflict between the two countries.

in New Delhi to Americans that had been shut for years. The Indian elite – including the military- and the public began to shed long held negative perceptions of the U.S’. In case of Kargil, a comparative analysis of responses of Pakistan and India makes an interesting study. The political leadership in India was surprised by the intrusion and

Nawaz Sharif also claims that he was unaware of the issue till it came to open on 2 May.

Both were surprised in a way but each responded differently. While the interim government in India, despite the disadvantages, clearly defined the nature of conflict it was willing to engage in and launched a strong external manoeuvre in support of its military efforts. Contrarily, the political leadership in Pakistan failed to seize the opportunity, could not effectively force a dialogue on India and quickly succumbed under the international pressure. Regime continuity appeared to be its sole interest.

Indian media acted as a cohesive force and rallied strong national support for Indian military and politicians urging them to evict the intruders. In Pakistan, such a resolve was missing mainly for want of a clear position and direction from the Prime Minister.

This resultantly led to the breakdown of the civil military relations and by end of June,

Prime Minister could clearly sense it. Probably, he lost legitimacy in his own eyes otherwise he would not have sent his brother to Washington for seeking regime continuity. 299 The bubble of heavy mandate had busted otherwise an elected leader should have made recourse to the electorate even if forcefully removed. It also belies the perception amongst the political elite about the US and its capacity to influence politics in Pakistan in a few months that myth was also broken.

299 Saeed Shafqat, ‘The Kargil Conflict’s Impact on Pakistani Politics and Society’, in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: Causes and Consequences of Kargil, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 164

In final analysis, even if not clearly informed, it was naive on the part of a head of state to accept the military’s brief on 11-12 march for its face value. Consistent with requirements of the secrecy, he should have asked for a formal brief at an appropriate forum. Equally, it was professionally required from the military leadership to provide such a brief highlighting the course of action after the surprise was over. Kargil conflict transformed civil military relations in many ways. It undermined the trust between civil and military leadership. The military felt grieved because of loss of face, fanning the push factors in the military.

3.4 Coup and Counter Coup300

The transition approach, identified in chapter one, emphasises that political elite are the primary agency, who through their actions/inactions either impede or foster democratisation. The process of democratic reconstruction from 1988-1999, explored in chapter two, concludes that the confrontationist policies of political elite resulted into intra institutional clashes and consequently three successive governments could not complete their tenure. Huntington has hypothesised that most important cause of military intervention in politics are not military but political with institutional structures of the society its primary contributor. This hypothesis remained very much valid in

Pakistan. During this period, the political elite frequently involved military as arbitrators between in a tussle between the prime minister, president and chief justice.

Resultantly, the political elite not only weakened democracy but also agitated pull factors for military’s involvement in politics. However, as history suggests, although military participated to resolve the political deadlocks but refrained from direct takeover.

300 Coup refers to the removal of Gen Musharraf from the office of COAS and then not allowing his plane to land in Karachi while he was returning from an official visit to Sri Lanka. The counter coup refers to the military’s response to force the landing of his plane (PIA Commercial flight) and removing the Prime Minister in the process offering him to resign. 165

Rapid deterioration in civil military relations was witnessed after Kargil conflict. On his way back from Washington, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stopped in London where he was interviewed by Tim Sebastian of BBC programme Hard Talk, who sensing the public and military mood in Pakistan asked him “how will you now go to Pakistan?” 301

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on his return had two broad options. He could order a judicial inquiry into Kargil conflict following Indian precedence or ask Gen Musharraf to step down. Sartaj Aziz opines that latter was doable as public opinion was divided and the decision would not have invoked a strong military response. Alternately, he could have taken the issue in the parliament and solicited political support.

Prime Minister, however, did nothing which allowed Gen Musharraf to garner support within the military and make contingency plans should he be removed. Instead, on 4

October, Gen Musharraf sensing the possibilities of his removal threatened that he is not Gen Karamat. Instead of taking action against him, Prime Minister extended his tenure as CJCSC up till 16 October 2001. 302 Apparently, it looked like a policy of appeasement on the part of Prime Minister. On the other hand, the decision undermined

Gen Musharraf’s position, who then had to clarify that he had not done any deal to get the extension. By stating so, Gen Musharraf implied that the threat of military takeover still persisted.

In a corps commander’s conference in early September, before leaving for a visit to Sri

Lanka, Gen Musharraf consolidated support in the event of his dismissal and built consensus on the response should he be ousted. Reportedly, the happenings in the

301 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 280. 302 Musharraf, Civil Military Relations and 1999 Coup; Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 110. Gen Musharraf explained that on his statement that he is not Gen Karamat, Shabazz Sharif and Chaudhary Shujjat intervened and later his tenure was extended. Some think that it was done to lull him into false sense of security. 166

conference were leaked to the Prime Minister by Lt Gen Tariq Pervez, brother of

Interior Minister, Nadir Pervez.303 Gen Musharraf called for his explanation on 7

October and later retired him. Three days later, he left for visit to Sri Lanka. Prime

Minister’s unscheduled visit to UAE while Gen Musharraf was in Sri Lanka with DG

ISI as part of entourage raised suspicion and alerted the military which was anticipating such an eventuality.

Enumerating the details of the happenings on 12 October leading to the coup and the counter coup are important to understand the breakdown in civil military relations.

Prime Minister was well within his right to ask the COAS to resign as he had earlier asked Gen Karamat to do so. But this time, he handled the proceedings in a very clumsy manner. Aziz observes that “unfortunately he [Prime Minister] did not follow a prudent course’ to remove Gen Musharraf.”304 Sacking Gen Musharraf while he was abroad and appointing Lt Gen Zia ud Din Butt as his replacement was not in order as per protocol.

Accordingly, GHQ informed the designate COAS that command will be handed over to him after return of Gen Musharraf. It implied that Gen Butt would need more time to consolidate his position and to facilitate this, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered that

Gen Musharraf’s aircraft be taken somewhere else. These happenings on 12 October look like a scene from a thriller movie rather than the decisions and actions of an elected

Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif directed to take the flight to Dubai or Islamabad on which

Gen Musharraf was travelling. When informed that the airplane had little fuel to go elsewhere, it was allowed to land in Nawab Shah. He did so to provide more time to

Gen Butt to consolidate his command. These decisions of Prime Minister backfired and

303 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 112. 304 Ibid., 290.

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the military moved in to launch a counter coup and seize power. It moved to take hold of Prime Minister and other important ministers in Islamabad. It prevented the transmission of the news about change of command on Pakistan Television Network

(PTV) in the evening news. In this saga, there were numerous normative breaches and no wonder military’s response was termed as a counter coup.305

The decision to appoint Lt Gen Zia ud Din Butt, DG ISI as COAS was also not well considered as prior to this, DG ISI due to the nature of his appointment was not promoted as COAS. Secondly, the appointment remains within the fighting arms

(armour, artillery and infantry) and Lt Gen Butt was not from fighting arms but from

Corps of Engineers. Third with respect to his suitability for the appointment, his competence can be gauged from the fact that as DG ISI he was oblivious of the Kargil operation and the preparations for a counter coup contingency which purportedly were developed in mid of September. He also failed to inform and alert the Prime Minister about these developments.

The counter coup, when analysed from societal perspective (pull factors), reinforces the proposition that military cannot disassociate itself from the society. It is affected by the national discourse but the casual relations with takeover remains weak and was not the overriding factor. It is also perceived that the Eighth Amendment acted as safety valve in the past and since it was removed therefore the situation resulted in a military takeover. The position is inaccurate, even if the amendment was in place, it is incomprehensible that in time compressed environment how military would have forced the President, whose sole claim to that appointment rested on loyalty to Nawaz Sharif to exercise the power bestowed on him.

305 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 289.

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In the context of the military perspective (push factors), the military’s self-image viz a viz the political elite and its very strong sense of grievance supplemented by the institutional resolve to prevent the repeat of Gen Karamat’s episode emerges as the primary motivating factor for launching a counter coup. However, in the absence of trigger, it would not have compelled the military to take over. The trigger was i.e. sacking of Gen Musharraf which was provided by the political elite which in its interface with pull and push factors led to the counter coup. Aqil Shah in his study confirms the same and states that “threat to integrity of military institution, politicisation of the army, sham democracy and to save the unity of the army”, military launched a counter coup.306

The breakdown of civil-military relations can be noted from the fact that after Kargil conflict, whenever Gen Musharraf used to go to meet the Prime Minister, GHQ would take appropriate measures to prevent repeat of Gen Karamat incident.307 The military high command was determined that they would not accept double humiliation at the hands of the Prime Minister. Due to these apprehensions, understandably, the protections of institutional interests cited above were important but not the primary reason for the military takeover. However, institutional affront suffered on the forced resignation of Gen Karamat for no significant reason and the resolve to not let it happen again, certainly was.308

306 Shah, The Army and Democracy, 183. 307 Musharraf, Civil Military Relations and 1999 Coup. 308 Aditya Bhave, “The Military: A ‘Strangelovian’ Arm of the State?” (Amherst College, 2006), 46. He analysed the military as an independent interest group in a game theoretical framework. Employing Acemoglu and Robinson model (interaction between the rich and poor) and interjecting military as the third independent player conclude, a three player model reveals the diversity of options available to a democratic government when it attempts to preclude regime change. As long as the government can safeguard the institutional interests of the military, democracy will be sustained irrespective of the preferences of the elites, because elite lack the power to oust the existing regime singlehandedly. 169

The counter coup did not face any opposition from the other political elite as Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif had isolated himself for range of reasons. The polity was already unnerved due to proposed imposition of Islamic rule under Fifteenth Amendment which had already been passed by National Assembly. The public was also critical on Kargil conflict as military had suffered causalities and its pride had been politically compromised. Instead of seeking regime continuity through public support, Prime

Minister’s effort to seek support from US through his brother was also not well received.

Resultantly, he could not establish control of the army and sacking of Gen

Musharraf triggered a counter coup.

The civil military relations post Kargil withdrawal marked a breakdown but the drama that surrounded coup and counter coup surprised everyone. PPP workers burnt posters of Nawaz Sharif, Benazir and even Jamat-e-Islami, allied with ruling PML-N, tacitly welcomed the takeover, hoped that democracy will soon be restored and she asked the

Western countries not to support Nawaz Sharif. Lawyers considered that Nawaz Sharif was himself responsible for the action and within two days it was noted that it was business as usual.309 Nawaz Sharif’s government had lost credibility and nobody came out in his support.

How did the civil society respond to the coup? On 13 October, a day after the takeover

GALLUP Polls conducted a snap poll on the military takeover. 75% were polled in major urban centres, they approved the action taken by the military but only one third favoured military rule, the remaining two third favoured other civilian alternatives.

Form within the other civilian alternatives, approximately 75% favoured a government comprising non-political reputable experts while the support for returning power to

Nawaz Sharif stood only at 10%. However Muslim League remained the single largest

309 The content analysis of Dawn 13, 14 and 15 October 1999 shows these findings.

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party.310

It was first ever military takeover in a newly nuclear armed country and there were lot of curiosity in the international arena. The Time, UK in its editorial titled “Distortions of Democracy” wrote that while “military coup was not a substitute of democracy the

[military] interference may be a less bad option for Pakistan.”363 The reaction from U.S. was cautious, as per their law, all aid to Pakistan was suspended which had already been curtailed earlier after the nuclear tests by Pakistan and India. U.S. State Department spokesman James Foley said, “[W]e join the rest of the international community in pressing for the rapid return to democracy in Pakistan.” 311 President Clinton also urged quick return to democracy and William Milan after meeting Musharraf said United

States is “confident that General Musharraf is a moderate man who is acting out of patriotic motivation and was provoked into what he is doing.” No one in the US administration called for the return of the Sharif government.312

Britain and European Union under rotating presidency of Finland suspended all aid to

Pakistan and Commonwealth suspended Pakistan’s membership. On one hand, this international reaction is typical whenever there is a military takeover. On the other hand, these countries were mindful of Pakistan’s nuclear status, the fragile economic situation and the rising extremism and terrorism in neighbouring Afghanistan and were willing to give time to new administration in Pakistan.

Due to the actions of political elite especially government the demise of democracy was long time coming and 12 October was only the formal burial day.313 Asking “What

310 GALLUP Pakistan, Poll Findings On Military Rule (Islamabad: GALLUP Pakistan, 1999). 363 Summary of media response in UK to the events of 12 October was reported in Dawn 15 October 1999. 311 U.S. State Department Briefing October 15, 1999 312 Ken Guide, Case Studies in Collective Response, 313 Najam Sethi, ‘Saviours?’, The Friday Times, 21 October 1999. ‘It is clear that majority of the people of Pakistan had had enough of the Sharif’s and the hangers-on. They were repressive, deceitful, corrupt, incompetent and dangerous. Not too many tears are going to be shed at the passing of their rogue regime. 171

Now” Ayaz Amir opined that:

“first a few words, by way of obituary, regarding the dolt (no other

description fits him) who took a step too far and who had not the wit to

understand that it is only so much incompetent audacity the furies can

stand.”367

The military takeover as a response to a political decision by political elite reconfirms the main proposition of this research that it is the political elite which creates circumstances that either result into situations of political deadlock or in confrontational situations forcing military to intervene as arbitrators.

After the takeover on 13 October 1999, Gen Musharraf announced that PML-N government was removed and the armed forces had moved in and taken control of the affairs of the country as a last resort. He stated that the Armed Forces would preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the country at all costs. It was indicated that Martial

Law would not be imposed, next day Emergency was imposed in the country and Gen

Musharraf assumed the office of Chief Executive. Constitution was held in abeyance and President was asked to continue in his office. The national assembly, senate and four provincial assemblies along with their speakers and chairmen were suspended. A

Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) was promulgated, all courts were to continue to function however they were restrained from passing any order against the Chief

Executive. The fundamental rights provided in the Constitution and not in conflict with the emergency order would remain in force. All laws other than the constitution would

And as for democracy, it died in Pakistan when the supreme court was stormed and the judiciary humiliated and undermined, when the parliament was gagged, when provincial governments were arbitrarily removed, when the press was attacked, when bureaucracy was politicised, when checks and balances on power of the prime minister were systematically removed and the sword of impending Shariah Bill was waved to scare away conscientious dissenters. If a formal burial of this long – decaying corpse was ordered on the day of successful counter-coup, does it matter?’ 367Ayaz Amir, ‘What Now’, Dawn, 15 October 1999. 172

continue to remain in force until altered, amended or replaced. All persons who were members of the services would continue to remain in office.314 It was noted that Gen

Musharraf is not an innate, politically ambitious coup maker. The sincerity in his short but emphatic four minutes address to the nation on October 13 rings true, every word of it.

3.5 Summation

As hypothesised by transition approach, it has been established that the political elite play a pivotal role in consolidating or undermining democracy. Actions of political elite during the period under review at numerous occasions created situations that military’s involvement in politics became inevitable i.e. dictates of pull factors. In such situations of political deadlock, although the military repeatedly played a role yet it refrained from directly taking over. During the second tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, however, civil military relations started to deteriorate and certain decisions of the Prime

Minister also led to germination of push factors in the military for the first time.

The first instance in this case was forced resignation of Gen Karamat for highlighting the need for NSC, an apex body which could aptly handle the changing security matrix.

The reason appears to be trivial as some elements of political leadership were also working on the same idea. Yet Gen Karamat’s statement was perceived as a political challenge. It was the first time such an event had taken place, the incident generated strong reservations in the rank and file of military, as they felt humiliated. The trumpeting of the resignation as a triumph by media further aggravated the feelings in the military. The second issue related to key appointments in the military. Nawaz Sharif appointed Gen Musharraf as COAS and kept the appointment of CJCSC vacant. The

314 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 479.

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move generated apprehensions that appointment of Gen Musharraf as COAS was a transitionary arrangement. Secondly Lt Gen Butt was appointed as DG ISI without consulting the new COAS which further strengthened the feelings of distrust between civil and military leadership.

Third relates to contradictory claims about Kargil conflict and its outcome. Political leadership claims that they were not been taken on board before the issue came into lime light. Contrarily, Gen Musharraf provides an account of the various meetings in which the issue had been discussed. Owing to the lack of availability of Nawaz Sharif for interview it cannot be accurately ascertained if he was on board from the outset or otherwise. Irrespective of the contradictory claims, it is noteworthy that when such an event can also accidently occur, political leadership reacts in a manner to convert disadvantages into an advantage. The interim government in India was also surprised, but despite the disadvantage, it was able to harness the situation into its favour while in

Pakistan, despite the advantages and a legitimate cause (Kashmir issue) the political leadership compromised the pride and prestige of the nation.

The post Kargil events further aggravated the now evident, political military divide. The actions of political elite generated a situation in which the combined effect of pull and push factors affected feelings within the military. But even then, the military did not directly intervene in politics. The dramatic sacking of Gen Musharraf however acted as a trigger, the military perceived it as a political coup and it reacted, as a counter coup to protect its institutional honour. It was an institutional reaction, as Gen Musharraf was out of the country and not in a position to directly influence the events. Should the Prime

Minister had not acted in a manner as he did, the military coup would have never happened. The counter coup was bloodless and orchestrated with negligible violence.

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Its effect will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY REGIME’S ASPIRATION

“Democracy must be something more than two wolves and a sheep voting

on what to have for dinner.”

James Bovard315

4.1 Prelude

In the previous chapter, this research has explored the construction and breakdown of civil military relations leading to the military counter coup. This research has argued that in a democratic political structure politics acts as the independent variable whose operation is shaped by multiple endogenous and exogenous factors. Civil military relations and military politics act as a dependent variable which impelled by push and pull factors responds to the political developments in the country in constitutional and sometimes extra constitutional ways. In an event of military takeover, the paradigm is notionally inversed. The military politics, a sub part of the larger polity attains dominance and acts as an independent variable to which the larger variable must now respond.

It is argued by this research that the political elite, the primary agency, by its preferences and decisions strengthens or undermines the democratic process. In case of the Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif’s political decisions and the manner in which they were articulated led to the military takeover by Gen Musharraf on 12 October 1999. After the takeover, it is the military elite which assumes a predominant political role and incur upon themselves the rights, privileges and responsibilities once enjoyed by the political

315 James Bovard, Lost Rights: The Destruction of American Liberty (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 333.

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elite. From that point onwards, it is their preferences and decisions which either can return to better form of democracy or retard the process by prolonging military rule.

Civil military relations become military civil relations with focus on military attempting to control the civil trough constitutional or coercive means. Foregoing in view, in this chapter the research explores the construction of military elite, the options it had for returning to better democracy or otherwise and to what effect.

4.2 Military Governments – A Conceptual Framework

At the instance of a military takeover, a military regime is seen as a “set of techniques used by the military to carryout policies rather than as a political or constitutional structure.” 316 Finer argues that three forms of governments can emerge after the takeover, first an indirect rule in which (another set of) civilians take constitutional responsibility and govern, such arrangements consequence out of blackmailing by the military. Second is a dual system comprising civilian and military rulers and third a direct military rule.317 Whatever the case may be, the approach of decision making changes according to the situation. Theoretically, there are two major types of decision making i.e. consultative and unilateral. In a democratic setting, the decisions are to be taken after a rigorous consultative process in which the policy moulders, political parties, pressure groups, press and public opinion contribute towards the decision making. On the other hand, in a military led setting, it is mostly a top down approach.

Military in 1999 had essentially deployed the threat of takeover to pre-empt Gen

Musharraf’s removal from the appointment of COAS due to the differences which had arisen between him and Prime Minister after the Kargil conflict. The earlier unfortunate saga of Gen Karamat’s resignation provided the background and acted as the motivation

316 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 164-167. 317 The forms of intervention can lead to indirect (limited/complete), dual, direct (complete/quasicivilianized).

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for the military to not to be humiliated twice. Beyond that it had no revolutionary or pre-prepared political agenda to implement.318 The contingency planning of takeover therefore did not proceed beyond streamlining the tactics of the takeover and rudimentary compilation of information about political and former military elite who could be incorporated in the military regime. The opposition parties were although apprehensive about Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s authoritarian style of governance and his attempts for arrogation of absolute power, yet none had displayed their preference for siding with the military after the takeover. Benazir Bhutto although tacitly accepted the takeover yet demanded that elections be held within ninety days as stipulated in the Constitution.319

Given the position of the polity in general and the suddenness with which the events unfolded, it appeared that declaring of the martial law was the most likely option i.e. a direct military rule.374 The military suffers from two crippling weaknesses. One of technical inadequacy to rule and second lack of legitimacy and for political survival has to rapidly make up for these shortcomings.375 History of previous military takeovers in

Pakistan indicates that after takeover, military has to rapidly and simultaneously work in multiple directions to gain legitimacy by de-legitimising and criminalising the ousted regime and its key leaders. Make recourse to the Supreme Court for validating its actions, “doctrine of state necessity” exercised in the past and makeup for technical shortcoming by co-opting civilian experts in regime administration. It was no surprise

318 Gen Musharraf in an interview had said that he had said he was not Gen Karamat meaning that he will contest the decision of his removal. 319 The content analysis of the newspapers (October 1999) indicates Benazir’s acceptance of the takeover. 374Finer, The Man on Horseback, 179. ‘In its brute form, unjustified by any other principles than its own success and its vague promises to do well by for the people is short lived form of rule’. 375Ibid., 14.

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that it went about setting a dual form of government which also indicated that it was in no mood for an early election (90 days) for variety of reasons.

4.3 Accruing Technical Expertise to Govern

Precedent in view (Gen Zia’s martial law), after the takeover it was perceived that Gen

Musharraf will impose martial law but he had dual governance model in mind, in which technocrats would govern but the military would monitor. 320 The first task was to convince his closest aides Gen Aziz and Gen Mahmud who were somewhat surprised at his preference.321 The next task was to take corps commanders on board who in this case were more or less willing to go along with their Chief. Having secured a consensus among the military, Gen Musharraf went on to declare his governance agenda and government structure to the nation on 17 October 1999.

The adhoc governmental structure formulated was presidential in nature although

President Rafiq Tarar (nominee of Nawaz Sharif) was requested to continue as the

(nominal) head of the State. Gen Musharraf would be the Chief Executive as opposed to Martial Law Administrator and would govern through a NSC comprising six members: the chiefs of navy and air force, a specialist each in legal, finance, foreign policy and national affairs. NSC would be supported by a think tank of experts to provide institutionalised advice and input. A cabinet of ministers would be appointed which would work under guidance of NSC while each province would be headed by a

Governor functioning with small provincial cabinet. The Chief Executive would be assisted by two secretaries, one from military and one from civil service.

These appointments were filled on the basis of professional competence, merit and repute. The government was rapidly put into place and mandated to be functional with

320 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 143. 321 Gen Aziz was Chief of General Staff (CGS) and gen Mahmud was Commander 10 Corps, Rawalpindi.

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effect from 15 November 1999. It included three governors from the military (retired officers, two from army and one from the navy) and one from judiciary. NSC comprised experts as indicated and was supported by a think tank named as National

Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) which was led by a military officer. The cabinet comprised one military and five civilian technocrats. A renowned expert was appointed as head of State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). In essence, it was direct military rule, a quasimilitary government with a civilian face.

Gen Musharraf set about to govern the country in which of the three pillars of state legislature at federal and provincial levels was missing. Judiciary was intact and was permitted to function in accordance with the constitution but was restrained from acting against the Chief Executive and his appointees. An adhoc executive at federal and provincial government level was put into place. The civil society and the international environment were by and large permissive and were willing to give some time to Gen

Musharraf to return to democracy and preferably a better democracy.

4.4 Setting the Political Agenda

For want of pre-prepared revolutionary agenda, Gen Musharraf contemplated for a few days on the problems the country faced and possible remedial measures. He formulated seven point agenda and priority areas for policy and strategy consideration which include; rebuild national confidence and morale; strengthen federation, remove interprovincial disharmony; revive economy and restore investor confidence; ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice; depoliticise state institutions; devolution of power to grass roots level; and ensure swift and across the board accountability. The policy and related priority areas placed revival of economy, introduction of good

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governance, alleviation of poverty and political restructuring to introduce a sustainable democracy at the highest pedestal.322 These policy priority areas are explained as under:

• Revival of economy was crucial which would be revitalised by measures like

recovery of looted national wealth, rebuilding of investor confidence through

stability and consistency in economic policies and economic security and

encourage local investors and Pakistani’s abroad and foreign investors who

were accorded priority.

• Introduction of good governance to include all elements of social development

i.e. health, education, and the emancipation of women.

• Pragmatic tax reforms, turning around state enterprises towards profitability,

boosting agriculture and revival of industry while exercising strict austerity

measures.

• Accountability in its true essence, cementing federation, freedom of media, and

practice of a tolerant and inclusive Islam.

• On external relations strengthening of brotherly ties with the Islamic countries

as a central pillar of foreign policy, search of a just and a peaceful solution in

Afghanistan, strengthening of time tested relations with China. International

security, disarmament and relations with India were the key feature with an

unconditional, equitable and result oriented dialogue as the way forward.

The obtaining international, regional and domestic environment in 1999 that provided perspective to policies and actions of Gen Musharraf and his regime characterised following. At the international plane, after the end of cold war, a unipolar world emerged as the basis of power polarity. Russia was reeling from consequences of dismemberment of USSR and the threat of international terrorism from Al Qaida was

322 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 149-150.

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rapidly taking shape. Pakistan’s foreign policy was faced with four major issues. There was a significant drift in Pakistan USA relations. The Afghanistan problem where the failure of mujahidin factions to reconcile on power sharing had given birth to Taliban and presence of Osama bin Laden had become an international problem. Kashmir issue in the aftermath of Kargil conflict and insurgency in IHK provided perspective to tensions in Indo-Pakistan relations and nuclear explosions.323 In the context of economy, during 1980’s, Pakistan grew at an average of 6.3%, however during first half of 1990’s it fell to 4.9% and further to 4% during the second half. Resultantly, inflation rose to peak rates, debt burden escalated substantially, macroeconomic imbalances widened and worst of all the incidence of poverty almost doubled.324

4.5 Legitimacy

The foremost issue which military faces after takeover is of legitimacy. In the past (Gen

Ayub and Gen Zia), the takeovers were initially legitimised by Supreme Court and then at the time of transfer of power constitutional cover was provided by a new constitution

(1962) or appropriate amendments in the constitution i.e. Eighth Amendment. Gen

Musharraf after takeover did not suspend the constitution and only constrained it for acting against him as Chief Executive and authorities under him. The judiciary was allowed to function normally. The legal question first came into focus on retirement of

Chief Justice of Peshawar High Court in January 2000 and it was agreed that the incoming Chief Justice will take oath on the Constitution.

PML-N leaders had filed a number of petitions in Supreme Court challenging the military takeover which had been entertained and the hearing was fixed for 31 January

2000. The military government perceived these developments as a threat. Apprehending

323 PILDAT, “The Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan” (Islamabad: PILDAT, 2004), 35. 324 Khawaja Amjad Saeed, Pakistan’s Economy 1999/2000 – 2007/2008 : An Objective Appraisal (Karachi: Institute of Business Management, 2000), 1. 181

possibility of restoration of assemblies and government of Nawaz Sharif, it started to get unnerved and took a decision to promulgate Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) on 25 January 2000. According to which the judges to superior courts were required to take a fresh oath that they would discharge their duties and perform their functions in accordance with the Proclamation of Emergency dated 14 October 1999. A time frame was fixed to administer oath and those who fail to do so would cease to hold their offices. The move angered the judiciary and Chief Justice and five

Supreme Court judges refrained from taking oath while seven judges took the oath,

Justice Irshad Hussain, the senior most judge was appointed as Chief Justice. The judges of the four high courts also took oath and no one abstained. The move did protect

Gen Musharraf’s government but did not accord him legitimacy.325

The petitions against the military government were heard by a bench of twelve judges and after several months of hearing it issued judgement on 12 May 2000. The judgement validated Gen Musharraf’s takeover by extra constitutional means. It entitled him to perform all legislative functions and even granted him the power to amend 1973

Constitution to promote good of the people.326 The judgement however, constrained him from altering the salient features of the constitution and fundamental rights. The court considered the military government a constitutional deviation and transitory in nature.

It granted Gen Musharraf a three year period from the date of takeover for achieving his stated objectives and then transfer power through general elections.

Table 4.1: Timeline for Return of Democracy Military Takeover 12 October 1999 Return to democracy by 11 October 2002

325 It is alleged that intelligence agencies had made inroads into judiciary and had won over sufficient number of judges who will side with military. Evidence affirming the allegation could not be gathered. However Hamid Khan states that the Chief Justice was put under virtual house arrest so that he could not interfere with the process of fresh oath taking. Khan, ibid, p.480 326 Declared by him in his speech dated 13 and 17 October 1999.

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The date for these elections was required to be Election scheduled announced 12 July 2002 determined ninety days before the expiry of the by three year period.

The three year period ended on 11 October 2002 hence elections were to be announced ninety days before that i.e. by 12 July 2002. Gen Musharraf had total of thirty six months out of which eight months had already elapsed and he was left with twenty eight months to achieve the objectives which Supreme Court had referred in its judgement.

Given the protracted nature of the political issues and administrative issues, there was hardly any time available and it is not understood why Supreme Court did not take into cognizance the practicability aspects of its order.

Gen Musharraf had identified the centrality of financial viability of the country to his success. It implied correcting the fundamentals to prevent default, undertaking tax reform to enhance the tax base and documenting the undocumented economy. Also, improving internal security and business environment to enhance foreign direct investment was essential. Across the board accountability would be an ongoing process which would be achieved by providing constitutional framework, protection against political interference and required authority to the institution created for the purpose.

Pakistan is a two tiered governance state (federal and provincial) and local governments are not part of the constitutional framework. Requisite constitutional amendment and a local government system which suits the genius of people, is protected from disruption after return of democracy was needed. For the remaining objectives which were amorphous in nature, the requirement was to identify the prevalent standard, significant problems and the set of standards which the military government would work to achieve in the available time. Apparently no such exercise in entirety was carried out before setting the agenda.

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The case of promulgation of PCO explained above and the need for fresh oath provides important insight into functioning of judiciary and yields important lessons which could be replicated in the military for greater common good. The oath of office for Chief

Justice is laid out in Third Schedule (Article 178 and 194) of 1973 Constitution. 327 The most significant clause is “That I will preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of

Islamic Republic of Pakistan” which imposes a duty on the Chief Justice and Judges of superior courts an obligation to defend the constitution. When a case of military takeover and disruption is brought to them, the judges are honour and oath bound to take a decision which would protect the constitution and render the takeover illegal. An oath under PCO liberates the judges from their constitutional duty allowing them to employ expediency and validate takeovers under the doctrine of state necessity. The question arises that can new oath supersede the first oath and liberate a judge from the original bindings? Since the constitution is silent therefore the military succeeds in legitimising its takeovers with the help of Judiciary. An amendment to the constitution and oath to office schedule can prevent recurrence of such a phenomenon in future. A similar oath to office is also laid out for the members of the military (Article 244) which is administered on commissioning into the armed forces.328 The oath binds the officers to uphold the Constitution and not indulge in political activities. Despite taking the oath, why officers have repeatedly violated it with impunity is an issue which merits attention. Experience 329 indicates that the oath is administered on the day of commissioning and is not preceded by any formal education/ explanation during their stay in the academy. Therefore its implications are not fully absorbed and then are lost in time. Secondly, there is no separate oath for the service or joint chiefs like the office

327 The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 328 Ibid. 329 It is the personal experience of the researcher while having served at Pakistan Military Academy.

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of Chief Justice and Prime Minister which is administered to them on promotion and appointment to these offices. In complex political environment of Pakistan such initiatives if taken as part of security sector reform may be helpful.

It is sometime argued that Eighth Amendment provided a “safety valve against imposition of martial law.” Despite being an undemocratic proposition, it enabled continuation of democracy albeit at the peril of incumbent regime. 330 In 1999, even if the amendment would have been intact could it have prevented military counter coup on 12 October i.e. President Tarar acting against Nawaz Sharif and in favour of COAS.

As in a similar situation, President Leghari, in the case of tussle between Benazir and

Chief Justice had acted in favour of the latter and dissolved her mentor Benazir’s government in 1997. Would President Tarar had reacted in the same manner as

President Laghari did remains an open academic question?

On 12 October, in order to increase its options the military did ask Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif to resign which he declined. Had he resigned the military’s options would have increased; either the parliament could have chosen a new leader, which in any case would have come from PML-N but would have been acceptable to the military or the parliament would have been dissolved on the advice of Speaker to National Assembly and elections called after ninety days as required by the constitution. It would have saved the country from the military rule. Evidently, the solution lies not in distributing powers of prime minister but in developing institutions and mechanisms for conflict management and resolution between power centres.

330 Aziz and Ali, Between Dreams and Realities, 294. The passage of thirteenth amendment to undo the eighth amendment was a major blunder, despite being an undemocratic practice. 185

4.6 Endogenous Challenges

Finer identified military government as a set of techniques to carryout policies rather than conduct politics or construct constitutional structures. This research explores how military government employed these techniques to handle endogenous challenges, how they were different form the ones employed by the civil governments and what was the outcome.

Gen Musharraf had identified the criticality of the economic revival in his seven point agenda and chose Shaukat Aziz as his Finance Minister (for being a self-made man from middle class family). Razzak Dawood, an entrepreneur as minister for commerce and Tariq Ikram, a businessman as head of export promotion bureau. The team formulated an integrated strategy for economic stabilisation with four areas of emphasis.331 (1) achieve macroeconomic stability (2) make structural reforms to remove microeconomic distortions (3) improve the quality of economic governance and (4) alleviate poverty.

Reviewing economic performance in the areas listed above, Dr Ishrat notes that

“comprehensive programme of reform was designed and implemented with vigour and pursued in earnest, so as to put the economy on the path of recovery and revival.” 332

Macroeconomic stability was fostered through growth in export and resurgence in workers remittance by the efforts to minimise hundi and the impact of 9/11 together contributed towards the resurgence.333 External debt burden was reduced in absolute terms from $38 to $35 billion (from 62.5% to 46% as portion of GDP). Risk of default

331 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 182. Announced on 15 December 1999. 332 Ishrat Husain, ‘The Role of Politics in Pakistan’s Economy’, Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009): 1. 333 Hundi is the local name for informal banking which is used by the workers abroad to transfer the money to their homes where banking services are not available or even if available for reason of convenience. The operators of hundi make profit on the difference between the interbank transfer rates thereby depriving the government from the much needed foreign currency. 390Husain, “Pakistan’s Growth Experience,” 15.

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was mitigated and country’s capability to service its restructured debt was considerably improved.390

Central to structural reforms was deregulation of the economy. To encourage investment, foreign exchange regime was liberalised. Foreign Portfolio Investors were enabled to enter and exit market without restrictions. Karachi Stock Exchange registered 15% increase during the period. Non-resident and residents were allowed to maintain foreign currency accounts. Banking sector was opened to competition resultantly the banking sector was able to increase the market share by 60%. Tax reforms aimed at broadening the tax base, bringing in evaders under the tax net, minimising personal interaction between the tax payer and tax collector, eliminating multiplicity of taxes and ultimately reducing the tax rate over time. The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) was restructured to improve tax administration including taxpayer facilitation but at the lower level the business community remained dissatisfied due to attitudinal issues.334

Gen Musharraf’s government focused on promoting good governance. Transparency, consistency, predictability and rule based decision making was emphasised.

Discretionary powers were minimised and the freedom of press, devolution of power and accountability process impacted positively on the overall economic governance.

The Agriculture Development Bank (ADB) in its review for performance of Pakistan’s economy concludes; the economy’s overall performance improved significantly in fiscal year (FY) 2003. The GDP growth rate is estimated at 5.1% compared with 3.4% in FY2002. The higher growth was made possible by strong performance in all sectors of the economy i.e. 4.1% growth in agriculture, 5.4% in industry, 7.7% in

334 Ibid., 11.

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manufacturing, and 5.3% in services. Supported by the sharp fall in interest rates, total investment increased to 15.5% of GDP in FY2003, and the fiscal deficit declined to

4.6% of GDP. For the first 9 months of FY2003, inflation declined to 3.3%, exports and imports increased by 16.6% and 21.9% respectively and workers’ remittances increased to $3.1 billion from $1.5 billion during the same period. As a result, the current account surplus, excluding official transfers, increased to $2.6 billion compared with $1.0 billion during the same period. The foreign exchange reserves with SBP, at

$9.3 billion on 31 May 2003, have increased to 8 months of imports.335

The overall economic picture displayed all round signs of positivity when compared with the performance of two Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments and the difficulties

Pakistan had plunged into after the mishandling of economy after nuclear tests and given that the sanctions were still by and large in place.

On the negative side, despite the fact that poverty reduction was the stated fourth objective yet incidence of poverty remained high. It stood at 30% in 1999 and jumped to nearly 32% in 2001.336 Similarly, unemployment jumped from 6% to 8%. Comparing with similar low income countries in the education sector, Pakistan has 20% fewer boys and 40% fewer girls going to elementary school and infant mortality rate stood at 84 per thousand which was astonishing. The report identified extreme political volatility

(ten governments changed from 1990-2003), economic cost of conflict with India, power of feudal, the problem of ethnic, religious and other divisions. Resultantly in

2003-2004, the government planned to spend merely 0.5% and 1.8% of GDP on health and education. Development expenditure fell from 6.4% of GDP in 1999 to 3% in 2003.

335 Asian Development Bank, ADB Annual Report 2003 (Asian Development Bank, 2004), 71. 336 Nancy Birdsall, Adeel Malik, and Milan Vaishnav, “Poverty and the Social Sectors: The World Bank in Pakistan 1990-2003.,” World Bank’s Operations Evaluation, 2005, 19.

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The table 4.2 indicates the change in key macroeconomic indicators is on the next page.337

Table 4.2: Changes in Key Macroeconomic Indicators October 1999 to September 2003

1999 2003 Change in indicator GDP growth rate 4.2% 5.3% Positive Inflation 5.7% 3.3% Positive Fiscal Deficit/GDP -6.1% -4.0% Positive Current account/GDP -3.2% +5.0% Positive Domestic Debt/GDP 52.0% 43.4% Positive External Debt $ 38 billion $ 35 billion Positive Remittances $ 88 million per month $ 300 million per Positive month Exports $ 7.8 billion $ 12 billion Positive Tax Revenues Rs 391 billion Rs 510 billion Positive Rupee-Dollar Parity Depreciating Appreciating Positive Foreign Direct Investment $ 472 million $ 500 million Positive Foreign Exchange Reserves $1.6 billion $ 12.0 billion Positive Poverty Incidence 33% Data not available but Negative perhaps rising Poverty related expenditure Rs 133 billion Rs 161 billion Positive Unemployment 6% 8% Negative

During this period, defence budget was also curtailed which negates the institutional interest hypothesis. Some scholars (Jalal, Nordingler, Chitram Singh) identify the institutional interests as a reason and motivation for military takeovers in which protection of the defence budget figures out prominently. Conversely, Gen Musharraf endeavoured to bring down the defence expenditure which in early 1990s stood at 7% of GDP was brought down to 3.8% of GDP in 2003.338 The slide was even steeper as portion of government revenue and total expenditure as indicated in the following table.

337 Husain, “Pakistan’s Growth Experience,” 13. All indicators in Column 1 pertain to 1998-99 or October 1999. All indicators in Column 2 pertain to 2003-04 or end September 2003. 338 Ahmed Rizwan Raheem, Parmar Vishnu, and Meenai Yaseen Ahmed, “Comparison of Key Economic Indicators of Pakistani Economy: Democratic Governments (FY89-FY99) with Military Regime (FY00FY05),” Research Journal of Recent Sciences 3, no. 6 (June 2014): 47.

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Table 4.3: Defence Expenditure as % of GDP Year % of GDP % of Revenue % of Expenditure 1990-91 6.9 39.4 24.8 1991-96 5.6 32.5 23.1 2000-2001 4.0 23.7 18.3 2003-2004 3.8 22.7* 19.5* *increase due to the expenditure incurred on logistical support provided to U.S troops

4.6.1 Local Government

Governance and structural reform agenda point “putting the system right” emphasised on devolution of power to grass roots level. NRB under Lt Gen Naqvi was tasked to formulate a devolution plan which aimed at empowering people at the grass root level and transferring power to the masses. It intended to lay foundations for an enduring democracy. The plan was unveiled on 23 March 2000, disclosed to public for discussion on 14 August 2000 and the new system of local governments under Local Governments

Ordinance (LGO) 2001 were installed one year later on 14 August 2001.

The local government comprised a three tiered structure, the district (zila) government, the tehsil (sub district) government and the union administration. The district government comprised Zila Nazim (district administrator) and district administration with district offices including sub offices at tehsil level. The erstwhile office of deputy commissioner was restructured as district coordination officer (DCO) who was to be appointed by the provincial governments.

The zila nazim was responsible to the people through the elected members of the zila

Council. It had its secretariat under the niab (deputy) zila nazim with a separate budget allocation. Adequate checks and balances were incorporated in the system. Seats were reserved for women, peasants, workers and minority. The second tier comprised the tehsil administration and was headed by the tehsil nazim, tehsil municipal officer, tehsil officers and other officers of local council services and those posted to the tehsil municipal administration were entrusted with functions of administration, finances and

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management of offices of local and rural development and other subjects at the lower level. The third tier was that of union council, which was a corporate body covering the urban and rural areas. It consisted of the union nazim, his deputy and three union secretaries’ along with supporting staff.

The elections were held on non-party basis in five phases for members of union councils, union nazims and naib nazims. After these direct elections, indirect elections were held for nazims and their deputies at zila and tehsil levels. The minimum age of local government election was reduced from 21 years to 18 years and one third of the seats were reserved for women. In 2002, the local governments were allocated a budget of Rs 32 billion and they were also allowed to raise their own revenues.

The British introduced local government system in India (1843 Sindh and 1849 Punjab) not by building on the native system of village based panchayat (council of elders) but by constructing a district system to co-opt the local elite for extending their nonrepresentative rule to grass root level. Later with introduction of representative governments in centre and provinces, the focus of nationalist parties shifted away from the local governments to these upper bodies where greater political power lay and progressively local governments became dormant in areas that later constituted

Pakistan.339

The first push for setting up local governments came during martial law of Gen Ayub through Basis Democracies (BD) Ordinance 1959 and The Municipal Administration

Ordinance 1960. They segregated the rural from urban areas and envisaged a four tiered system with union councils in rural and town and union committees in the urban areas as the lowest tier. The next tier in rural areas was represented by the thanas (police

339 Ali Cheema, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Adnan Qadir, “Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes,” Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective, 2006, 410.

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stations)/ tehsil councils and municipal/ cantonment boards in urban areas. The subsequent two tiers were identical for rural and urban at the district and division councils. Members to the lowest tier were elected while others comprised a mix of elected and nominated with bureaucracy enjoying overarching powers.340 The system perceived as an exit strategy for the military actually resulted in constructing a presidential system of governance but owing to its close association with military, the system lost credence after the general elections of 1970.

Gen Zia replicated the local government system of Gen Ayub by promulgating Local

Government Ordinance (1979) through which local bodies was elected in all four provinces in 1979 and 1980. In a significant departure, it abolished the role of bureaucracy and stipulated that members including chairmen of all four tiers be elected through adult franchise on non-party basis. The system however, continued with the rural–urban divide and financial functions as constructed during BD system. However due to changes in demographic and economic features of the country, the urban areas enjoyed a significant financial advantage over rural areas limiting latter’s capacity to deliver common good. Later, when the elections to provincial and federal governments were conducted in 1985 on non-party basis, the representatives of local government found avenues to these assemblies, transporting the culture of local body politic to these legislative bodies.

Gen Musharraf’s devolution plan although consistent with the previous features was implemented in the absence of representative governments at federal and provincial levels. It comprised significant departures from the past. First, related to closure of

340 Marco Mezzera, Safiya Aftab, and Sairah Yusuf, “Devolution Row: An Assessment Of Pakistan’s 2001 Local Government Ordinance,” Report for the Research project: “The ‘Political Economy ‘of State-building–The Pakistan Case Study”, Netherlands Institute for International Relations, The Hague, 2010.

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deputy commissioner office and making DCO (without magistracy and revenue collection powers) answerable to the elected mayor. Second, devolution of services previously arrogated to the district administration to local governments. Third is related to creation of political linkages between provinces and local governments through electoral reforms. These signalled a desire for greater devolution of functional and financial powers as well loosening of the bureaucratic control. Some departments could however not be entirely devolved due to cross district/ divisional spill over jurisdiction.

Education department as well as some budgetary heads of expenditure were retained at provincial level.

Based on the experience accrued from the local governments functioning from 2001 to

2005, a series of amendments were introduced in the LGO accommodating preferences of political parties but fundamentally opposed to the spirit of devolution. Provincial governments once again regained control and power over the local governments.

It is observed that the military when in power prefers to promote local governments as opposed to the political elite’s preference for a strong centre and the provinces administered through mixed administrative structures. What is the underlying reason between the difference in approaches and what is the remedy? It is perceived that the military pursuing divide and rule policy employs local government for gaining widespread legitimacy and weakening civil institutions and political elite. The exercise losses focus when more representative governments are installed in the centre and provinces. Contrarily, the political elite in absence of devolution of power to provinces prefer arrogation of power at centre and in the provinces for retaining political authority and manoeuvring conditions to enhance the possibilities of their re-election.341 The 1973

341 Junaid Qaiser, ‘Pakistan: Main Challenges and Constraints in Local Govt’, LUBP, 1 August 2013, https://lubpak.com/archives/279693. He concludes, political parties don’t believe in decentralisation / local democracy, their mind set is over-centralised, there is no constitutional and legal recognition for local democracy, economic constraints and lack of infrastructure and bureaucratic hurdles, grant of 193

Constitution envisages Pakistan a two tiered governance state, leaving institution of local government to the provinces. 342343 In the absence of specific constitutional provisions, the provinces tend to employ a local administration system which maximises their powers. The financially endowed political elite use the facade of elections to get elected in whatever ways they can and then employ the state’s financial collection and distributive powers to indulge in personal expansion at the cost of general masses. Local government does not suit the entrenched political elite. They oppose such governance systems and undo it at the first opportunity. Gen Musharraf perceived a financially and functionally empowered local government as a political game changer which would transform the formal democracy into a more participatory democracy. If allowed to develop roots, it would lay foundations of sustainable democracy thereby changing the political landscape of the country.

Research report prepared to assess the comparative performance of the local governments across 19 districts of Pakistan yielded certain significant findings. Larkana achieved highest score and Nawabshah the lowest. The elected representatives felt that the honorarium given to them was satisfactory, women participation was sub optimal and the number of bye-laws passed was mixed. Score on number of sub committees formed was encouraging, Faisalabad and Sanghar produced best district reports and the relations with lower tiers ranged from average to good while determination on internal audit was satisfactory. More training for elected representatives need for greater democracy throughout the country, budget formation and the monitoring system emerged as major weaknesses.400

development funds to MNAs and MPAs and Senators undermine the role of local governments, lack of public participation and growing urbanisation impede democracy. However he concludes that local government is the basic pre-requisite for effective democracy. 342 The provisions for the local government were inserted vide Eighteenth Amendment dated 20th April 343 [Article 140A – (1) Each province, shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve

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political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local governments. (2) Elections to the local governments shall be held by the Election Commission of Pakistan]. Since 2009 two democratic governments have been in power till date and each has shied away from holding elections to local governments and are now appear to be acting only after the intervention of Supreme Court. 400Syed Mohammad Ali, ‘Ranking Local Government Performance in Pakistan through Scorecards’ (Lahore: South Asia Partnership - Pakistan, 2007). 4.6.2 Accountability

Ensure swift and across the board accountability was the seventh policy objective. The incidence of corruption in public sector is generally attributed to the ruling elite which comprise feudal class, industrial clique, incumbent bureaucrats and some military persons involved in politics. Corruption has social, legal and impact dimensions.

Tracing the history of the legal dimensions, first time the term corruption was included in Penal Code of 1860 which after the independence was adopted by Pakistan. Although it did not use the word corruption and bribery but “allurement to unduly influence or corrupt the conduct of a person were deemed illegal” was seen as criminal activity.344

With passage of time, terms like allurement etc. were considered inadequate and on 11

March 1947 Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 was passed. It introduced the offence of “criminal misconduct” and expanded the scope of the term corruption to include bribery, illegal gratification, obtaining anything of value dishonestly, fraudulently misappropriating. It implied that even before creation of Pakistan, corruption had become considerably nuanced and widespread. Quaid e Azam in his 11 August speech to the Constitution Assembly called it a curse and urged the members to deal it with an iron hand.

344 Penal Code of 1860.

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The West Pakistan Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) Ordinance of September

1961 and Federal Investigation Act of 1974 consolidated the offences punishable as corruption. The Martial Law order No 7 of 1977, later amended in 1978 elaborately defined corruption and deemed that all such cases be tried by the military courts. The

Ehtisab Ordinance of 1997 promulgated on 1 February 1997 during the second tenure of Nawaz Sharif spread the net wide to include holders of public office in its ambit and expanded the scope of the term to include rigging in elections. 345 After the military takeover, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance 1999 was promulgated and the NAB was set up to eradicate corrupt practices from the society. In this ordinance, the first five clauses were same as the Ehtisab Ordinance and four more clauses were added.

NAB started functioning as Pakistan’s apex anti-corruption organisation and was charged with the task of elimination of corruption through a holistic approach of awareness, prevention and enforcement. In the initial three years, it focused on detection, investigation and prosecution of white collar crime.

Transparency International’s system country study report formulated for Pakistan in

2003 elaborates the process followed to energise accountability and stem corruption. 346

NAB was set up as an anti-corruption agency, it formulated a National Anti Corruption

Strategy in 2001 which envisaged:

• Undertake a review and assessment of the causes, nature extent and impact of

corruption from a broad perspective,

345 The use of this act as a political instrument by the Ehitasab Cell during second tenure of Nawaz Sharif has been discussed at length in previous chapter two. 346 Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor, ‘National Integrity Systems: Transparency International Country Study Report - Pakistan 2003’ (Berlin: Transparency International, 2003).

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• Develop a broad based high level and integrated strategic framework for

tackling corruption, focusing on prevention as well as monitoring and

combating corruption, ensuring consistency with good governance reforms,

• Create an implementation plan based on strategic framework to tackle

corruption,

• Create a broad coalition of stakeholders committed to implementing the strategy

and rooting out corruption.

NAB organised an international workshop to seek views and proposals from different segments of the society and obtain recommendations from Transparency International and fifty plus other stake holders. It prepared a post conference report which was approved by Cabinet of Ministers on 5 October 2002. The short run objective of the strategy was to set into motion systemic improvements that will strengthen the national integrity system. Long run objective was to eliminate corruption by engaging all stakeholders. It was divided into two main phases; diagnostic and strategy development and implementation of action plan developed from the strategy.

NAB was considerably successful which could be attributed to the 800 plus staff of technical, financial and administrative personnel, its relative autonomy and access to the President and later to the Prime Minister.

The process of construction of democracy in Pakistan has been turbulent, impacted by political and military forces. Pakistan “was conceived as a progressive, democratic welfare state for the tormented Muslim masses of the sub-continent, with not the slightest touch of theocracy.”347 But in reality, the rule by the people for the people was

347 Dr. Arshad Rizvi, The Political System Of Pakistan: A Constitutional Study (Karachi: Paramount Books, 2014), 314. 405Ibid., 315 197

not allowed to take root, the meaning of progressive nature was lost due to absence of participatory democracy and the same happened to the objective of welfare state.405

After the early demise of founding fathers, the political elite emanating from areas which became Pakistan (mostly comprised colonial era constructed feudal class) have repeatedly exploited the facade of democracy to expand their personal and political space and fill their coffers instead of delivering common good. Military interventions to undo the doings of political elite only aggravated the problems and consequently a democracy characterised by free and fair elections, predominance of rule of law, public accountability with focus on good governance has since remained elusive.

Unfortunately the polity in Pakistan has not been able to find the right balance between executive and state institutions. Once in power the executive work to secure their rule by removing challenges irrespective form where they arise. They either co-opt judiciary by appointing judges to superior courts on political basis and when that is not possible they orchestrate change through political and if required by physical means: so much for rule of law in democratic Pakistan. The bureaucracy prior to the partition provided flesh and blood to the iron structure of colonial sub-continent still continues to do so in

India. In Pakistan the bureaucracy initially tried to govern on their own, when military took control it co-opted with them and since their successful subordination by Bhutto now political elite strives to have the thanaydar (police station in-charge) and deputy commissioner their own choice to conserve their fiefdoms.

Yet continuation of democracy irrespective of its quality is semantically a cherished objective. Consequently whenever there is a disruption in form of military takeovers it is resisted at home and abroad, the erring country is isolated with the hope to return it to democracy sooner than later. The democratic government of Pakistan was isolated after the nuclear tests of May 1999. US had imposed sanctions conveniently obscuring

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the close cooperation between the two in the fight against the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan. The isolation was reinforced after the military takeover, Commonwealth suspended Pakistan’s membership and major powers regretted military takeover urging early return to democracy. Gen Musharraf recognising the challenge visited nineteen countries in first sixteen months after the takeover to dilute its effects and succeeded to a certain degree.

The judgement of Supreme Court dated 12 May 2000 legitimising Gen Musharraf’s takeover acted as a dampener making his regime acceptable. Supreme Court’s order to restore democracy after three years from the date of takeover satisfied domestic and external audience. It was expected that the military interruption has a time limit which will be respected. Promulgation of LGO 2001 followed by elections and setting up of the local governments in 2002 reinforced these expectations. A large number of established political elite participated in these elections not wanting the field left to new entrants and also be in a position to influence the projected general elections of 2002.

4.7 Exogenous Challenges

Because of nuclear explosions and the military coup, Pakistan was internationally isolated to certain extent. Externally, the strongest challenge to keep Pakistan isolated came from India. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led government, which had returned to power courtesy in the aftermath of Kargil conflict, pursued this policy actively. It emphasised on denying dialogue to Pakistan and accentuating its economic and political difficulties. While many countries desired Pakistan’s early return to democracy, none wanted Nawaz Sharif back, save India.348

348 Except for Prime Minister of India, PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee at Durban Summit of Non Aligned Movement at Durban stated that India still recognised Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister. Reported in Pakistan Chronology Vol VI (1997-2001), 93. 199

The analysis of India’s Pakistan policy under BJP led government merits evaluation. It was observed that due to US diplomatic intervention in Kargil conflict had brought the two countries closer, there is a strong likelihood that New Delhi decided to exploit these new found relations. It exploited weaknesses of military government and the internal fault lines and started projecting Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism which gained intensity after the events of 9/11. The policy manifested in multiple arenas. Initially, it focused on IHK, incidents of cross LoC firing multiplied and many resulted in killing of innocent Kashmir’s. Indian Army Chief threatened that Indian Army will if required cross LOC. In such circumstances, focus on dialogue for encouraging stability was lost.

Hijacking of Indian Airline airbus on 24 December 1999, its diversion to Lahore and accusations that Pakistan was involved in it added weight to the propaganda. Another dimension related to developments in Afghanistan where Indian support for the

Northern Alliance (NA) was relentless.349 Gen Musharraf recognised that the relations between these two countries were at the lowest ebb and Cohen feared that an accidental war could occur.350 The paradigm would change after Pakistan became a non NATO ally in US war against terrorism but would be discussed later.

The second area related to continuing instability in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal.

Pakistan with little international support had endeavoured to reconcile mujahidin on power sharing and bring stability to Afghanistan. It succeeded to a certain extent but the instability and infighting accentuated after Rabbani violated Peshawar Accord and extended his term of Presidency beyond 15 December 1994.351 The breach of trust led

349 Mohib Ullah Durani and Ashraf Khan, “Pakistan-Afghan Relations: Historic Mirror,” The Dialogue 4, no. 1 (2002): 45. 350 Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 129. 351 Peshawar Accord was signed on 25 April 1992 and Professor Rabbani will remain as the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the head of the Leadership Council for four (4) months. He will commence his work officially at the time when the two months of the transfer of power will be elapsed. 200

to rise of Taliban. They were supported by Pakistan with the hope to stabilise and unite

Afghanistan. India and Iran supported Northern Alliance which redrew conflict lines between these two entities on sectarian and ethnic lines. The Taliban installed emirate in Afghanistan and appointed Mulla Omar as the Amir (leader). In 1996, Osama moved to Afghanistan, financially supported Taliban and enjoyed their hospitality. The style of governance of Taliban and their protection of Osama Bin Laden soon became significant international issue and reoriented U.S focus on the region. 352 To stabilise

Afghanistan, UN Security Council (UNSC) through their resolution number 1214 dated

9 December 1998 called for a cease fire and negotiations between the Taliban and NA.

A meeting was held form 10-14 March 1999 which ended in a fiasco. Later, UNSC adopted Resolution Number 1267 dated 15 October 1999 asking Taliban to hand over

Osama bin Laden failing which economic sanctions were imposed on them on 14

November 1999 i.e. soon after the takeover by Gen Musharraf.

Pakistan’s Afghan policy before Gen Musharraf had emphasised on the need for multiethnic broad based government in Kabul which remained unchanged under him.

Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar reiterated that there was no change in the Pakistan’s

Afghan policy and assured that Pakistan will continue to pursue the idea of an Afghan

Government in which all ethnic groups are represented and emphasised the same on

Taliban. Pakistan desired that Taliban should develop better relations with US and arranged a meeting between the Taliban leadership and US under Secretary Thomas

Pickering in which both sides agreed to talk and understand each other’s position better.

Resultantly Taliban, to honour their commitment closed down number of training

352 The Tahreek-i-Islami-i-Taliban had emerged in 1994 around Kandhar and captured Kabul on 11 September 1996 and set up Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (although was not able to gain control of 27 out of 32 provinces by May 1997). It refused to endorse Durand Line as International border and since then the relations remained uneasy. 201

camps, cracked down on narcotic trade and placed restrictions on movement of Osama related Arab fighters in Afghanistan.353

The events of 9/11 however, diametrically altered the international security environment. On that unfortunate day, a group of hijackers hijacked four aircrafts and crashed one each in the twin towers in New York, another in the Pentagon while a fourth went down in Pennsylvania. The attacks were attributed to Al Qaida and Osama bin

Laden who was being sheltered in Afghanistan by Taliban. These developments had grave political and security implications for Pakistan. Gen Musharraf noted that

“September 11 marked an irrevocable turn from the past into an unknown future.” 354

Pakistan was faced with a decidedly changed reality and had to rapidly make adjustments in its foreign policy.

It was for the first time that homeland of US, the only super power was attacked. NATO invoked its Article 5 (collective defence and response) to facilitate a response. 355

Accordingly, the matter was reported to UNSC and it adopted Resolution 1373 on 28

September 2001. The resolution condemned the attacks and Article 3 called upon all states to:

“work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators of,

organisers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those

responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators,

organisers and sponsors of these acts will be held responsibly.” 356

353 Durani and Khan, “Pakistan-Afghan Relations,” 50. 354 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 200. 355 The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), dated 4 April signed in Washington D.C. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack them all and consequently they all agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such as it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 356 UNSC Resolution Number 1373 dated 28 September 2001

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The resolution placed acts of terrorism in the ambit of UN Chapter VII which authorises use of force. The resolution did not authorise any specific military action but it was apparent that US had decided to punish the perpetrators specifically Al Qaida in

Afghanistan. In such circumstances, Pakistan’s position as a neighbour of Afghanistan which maintained strong linkages with Taliban would be critical and US wanted her to be on its side. To ensure this, its leaders resorted to blatant coercion. Colin Powell rang up Gen Musharraf and said “You are either with us or against us” and later as he was too learn from DG ISI who was visiting US at that time Richard Armitage had gone much further and said “not only that we had to decide whether we were with Americans or with the terrorists, but if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the stone age.”357

The situation was akin to what Gen Zia had faced when Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan on 25 December 1979. Gen Zia had taken over on 5 July 1977 and had to make a foreign policy decision after nearly two and half years. Gen Musharraf had to do so one month less than two years. In both situations, parliament was not in place and the decisions had to be made without factoring in the public opinion. Gen Zia was not threatened by any super power and had the luxury of time to consider pros and cons.

He chose to join US in its covert war against Soviet Union to expand his political space and ensure continuity in power. What were Gen Musharraf’s considerations? Gen

Musharraf writes that he took the decision to join United States “based on wellbeing of my people and the best interests of my country-Pakistan always comes first.”416 He argues that if Pakistan would not have joined US, it would have to face double jeopardy.

India would have joined the alliance and would then utilise the strategic advantage to

357 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201. 416Ibid., 202. 203

alter situation in Kashmir and put Pakistan under military pressure. Secondly, US would treat Pakistan as an adversary and should it expand the zone of operation to include

Pak-Afghan border belt or Pakistan, then the country would have been devastated. Its infrastructure would have been destroyed and its parity (owing to nuclear capability) would be undermined. These are reasonable calculations but it meant jettisoning

Taliban in favour of US which was beneficial as it would help Pakistan eradicate terrorism from its own soil with technical support from US. Pakistan will have to pay the economic cost as front line state yet it would help in loosening stranglehold of debt and lifting of economic sanction. Thirdly, it would help ending the international isolation incurred due to the nuclear tests. 358 Gen Musharraf did not mention the international obligation mandated under UNSC Resolution 1373 in support of his decision. Although his considerations were logical and rationale yet he did not gauged the sentiments of some segments of the society who had affiliation with the Taliban owing to historical nature of Pashtun relations on both sides of Pak-Afghan border.

Pakistani’s in general, perceived US as an un-trustable ally due its role in 1971

IndoPakistan war and abandonment in Afghanistan after a decade of collaboration. Her policies in Middle East for supporting Israel to the detriment of Palestinians and her dubious role in Gulf War of 1990-91 provided the general background which had shaped anti-US opinions in Pakistan. Interestingly, the public opinion in US about

Pakistan was also similar. “Prior to September 11, 2002, American policy towards

Pakistan was quite critical.... Pakistan was framed as a ‘foe’ before 9/11 and remained a ‘foe’ after 9/11 even though it chose to support US.”359

358 Ibid., 203. 359 Muhammad Ashraf Khan, “The Image of Pakistan in Prestigious American Newspaper Editorials: A Test of the Media Conformity Theory,” Strategic Studies XXVIII, no. 2 & 3 (2008): 15. The author tests the theory in case of Pakistan i.e. after 9/11 when US policy enlisted Pakistan as an ally, the domestic public opinion should have according to the theory also changed. But it did not and Pakistan was continued to be perceived as a foe. 204

Policy preferences which do not conform to public sentiments are not well received, are resisted and lead to a discourse and efforts advocating change. The decision to support

US in view of the international and domestic considerations would not be a popular decision and would generate strong domestic response from right-wing sections of the society. Gen Musharraf accurately assessed that there would be adverse reaction from right wing political parties and in NWFP. In Sindh specially Karachi and in Balochistan the reaction would be neutral or lukewarm but he was not certain about Punjab and thought that he will be able to convince the Punjabis.360 Gen Musharraf addressed the nation on 19 September, explaining the rationale and his expectations he said “they

[India] want Pakistan to be declared a terrorist state and thus damage our

Kashmir cause, I want to tell them to layoff”.361

Simultaneously, the military planners in US were working on a military response. On

13 September, Armitage met Pakistani ambassador to United States, Maleeha Lodhi and DG ISI, Gen Mahmud who was then visiting US and asked that Pakistan should take seven steps. The same demands were presented by U.S. ambassador to Pakistan

Wendy Chamberlain to Gen Musharraf on 13 September. These include; 1) “stop al

Qaida operatives at its borders and end all logistical support for Bin Laden; 2) to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operation; 3) to provide territorial access to US and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against al Qaeda; 4) to provide the United States with intelligence information; 5) to continue to publically condemn the terrorist act; 6) to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and, 7) if evidence implicated bin Laden and al Qaeda and

360 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 204. 361 ‘Text: Pakistan President Musharraf’, The Washington Post, 19 September 2001.

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Taliban continued to harbour them, break relation with Taliban government.”362

Constructed in the theory of state and elite approach to decision making, U.S. and

Pakistan present two contrasting models in which different processes were led to different decisions.422 The consultative process followed in U.S. since 9/11 till 25

October started from a limited action against al Qaeda titled “game plan for a politicalmilitary strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.” It expanded into a larger objective of “defeating the terrorist threat to United States i.e. a global war against terrorism” focused at “elimination of terrorism as a threat to our [U.S.] way of life” by

25 October.363 It is not clear whether anybody in Pakistan was mindful of the changes taking place in U.S. However in Pakistan, Gen Musharraf made the decision himself, took it to the cabinet and then to the corps commanders meeting. At both places, concerns and reservations were expressed. He addressed the nation on 18 September and thereafter till 3 October he engaged a cross section of society to explain his decision to the society.364 Such are the perils of non-democratic governments that the burden of the decision and the consequences rested on him.365

Catharsis of the decision indicates that Pakistan had agreed to support U.S. military action against Taliban and al Qaeda. Gen Musharraf expected that he will have to pay political cost and expected recompense.366 It also implied that Pakistan will abandon its

362 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 331; Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 204. Demands as listed in the Commission Report, however there are add on in what Gen Musharraf has listed, probably to amplify the understanding to the common reader but the essence remains the same. 422 While it may be argued that in both cases the elite make the decision and the difference may not be in kind but degree yet degree is important in politics. 363 The 9/11 Commission Report, 334. 364 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 206. 365 Ibid., 207. Gen opines that some of the clauses of the demands were ludicrous and he did not accede to all and curtailed the support to non-sensitive areas, yet the charge against him was that he crumbled on a phone call. 366 The 9/11 Commission Report, 331. ‘Pakistan will need full US support as it proceeds with us, Musharraf said the GOP was making substantial concessions in allowing use of its territory and that we would pay a domestic price. His standing in Pakistan was certain to suffer. To counterbalance that he needed to show that Pakistan was benefitting from his decisions.’ 206

Afghan policy and support U.S. Afghan policy instead, what will be the new Afghan policy was not discussed. The intermediary role which Pakistan attempted to play by asking Taliban to accept U.S. demands and hand over Osama bin Laden did not succeed, indicating limited residual influence Pakistan had on Taliban.

Operation “Infinite Justice” later renamed to “Enduring Freedom” comprised four phases. In the first phase, forces were deployed to the region. The second phase comprised air strikes and special operations attacks that would hit key al Qaeda and

Taliban targets, this phase began on 17 October 1999. In the third phase, decisive operations using all elements of national power including ground troops would be carried out by U.S. In this phase, Mazar-e-Sharif fell on 9 November, four days later

Kabul fell and by early December all major cities had fallen. Afghan forces (Northern

Alliance) supported by U.S. engaged Tora Bora cave complex in early December and on 22 December, Hamid Karazai was installed as the chairman of Afghanistan’s interim administration. The largest military engagement took place in March 2002 in Shah-iKot area south of Gardez in which al Qaeda forces were decimated. The fourth phase comprised the security and stability operations which continued till 2003.367 368

4.8 Civil Military Relation during Musharraf Regime

In the first two years of Musharraf regime, Gen Musharraf remained quiet popular and non-controversial. At the start of 2002, he had two options available. First, to work for optimising of EC and NAAB and then hold free and fair elections in accordance to the constitution as it stood on 12 October 1999 and transfer power to the elected representatives by end of October 2002. He could have then negotiated an agreement with the political parties for expos facto legalisation of his actions as Chief Executive.

367 Ibid., 337-338. 368 The 9/11 Commission Report p.337,338

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This option had number of advantages. The foremost that the military would have returned the country to full fledge democracy in accordance with the judgment of

Supreme Court. The second option in consonance with Gen Zia’s rule would be that of continuation of military rule with limited transfer of power to the elected representatives while retaining military supremacy. Exercise of this option would have implied serving the personal interest of Gen Musharraf who was now acting as political elite. The second option was detrimental to return and consolidation of democracy as well as civil military relations. Unfortunately, he chose to exercise the second option.

4.8.1 Prolongation of Military Rule

One of the research questions aimed at understanding the reasons why Gen Musharraf did not return democracy to the country and hand over power. It can be argued that the system of local governments despite its shortcomings was a genuine attempt to transfer democracy to the grass roots level. After the local government reforms and the elections the natural course in 2002 would have been to hold elections for national and provincial assemblies in October and then let the elected representatives elect their own leader and the president (option 1 as elaborated above). He could have made a mark in history by holding free and fair elections and enabling the election commission to perpetually do so to consolidate real democracy. However the manipulations witnessed in the elections to local bodies did send out mixed signals about the intent to exercise option one. His actions related to option two and their outcome on civil military relations is discussed below.

4.8.2 Presidency, Referendum and Legal Framework Order (LFO)

Earlier in 2001, in response to the question of status of Gen Musharraf during the upcoming visit to India in July 2001, he, on 20 June 2001 promulgated Presidents

Succession Order 2001 and relived President Rafiq Tarar from his appointment. Gen

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Musharraf assumed the office of President on June 2001 and became the President as well as the Chief Executive. The events of 9 September 2001 provided an opportunity to Gen Musharraf to prolong his rule in Pakistan. The US invasion of Afghanistan had created a unique situation. While it challenged Pakistan in many ways sit also propelled

Pakistan in an alliance with US as a non-NATO ally. Gen Musharraf employed this opportunity to his advantage. Having removed Taliban and decimated Al Qaida, US installed Hamid Karzai in conjunction with Northern Alliance and shifted its focus to

Iraq. Gen Musharraf exploited the opportunity to validate his presidency and continuation in power. It was announced on 8 April that a referendum would be organised on 30 April 2002. The question he put to the electorate stated:

“For continuation of the system of local government, establishment of

democracy, continuation and stability of reforms, elimination of

sectarianism and extremism and attainment of the ideals of Quaid-

iAzam, do you want to make General Pervez Musharraf President for

next five years?”

Election Commission was assigned the responsibility to conduct the Referendum.

Unlike the practice no electoral lists were prepared and everyone was free to vote where ever he or she wanted to vote. In the run up to the referendum Gen Musharraf made a public spectacle when he went about campaigning in uniform. It embarrassed the military and the polity alike. Reportedly, the turnout was low yet when Election

Commission announced the final result 71% of the electorate had voted and 97.5% gave verdict in favour of Gen Musharraf.429

The exercise was a clear signal of Gen Musharraf’s intent to continue in power for next five years i.e. up to 2007. The research has argued that political elite by their preferences and decisions consolidate democracy. The same applied to Gen Musharraf, a military

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leader who now had assumed a political office after the coup. He was popular, people then expected that he would restore democracy as desired by Supreme Court and would step down. He, contrary to the expectations followed a route already carved by Gen

Ayub and Zia and thus could not claim any morale ascendancy. The referendum was

429Massoud Ansari, ‘How the Referendum Was Won’, Newsline, 15 May 2002.As per the 1998 census, there were then 61.2 million people 18 years of age and above in the country, a number estimated to have increased to 61.9 million at present. A total of 87,074 polling stations and 163,641 additional polling booths were set up across the country and 414,356 public sector employees appointed to carry out electoral duties on polling day. The entire country was designated one constituency and all citizens aged 18 and above were deemed eligible to vote by establishing their identity through any reasonable means. “A total of 43,907,950 votes were polled, out of which 42,804,030 were in the affirmative, while the rest – 833,676 – said ‘no’. These numbers translate into a 71 per cent voter turnout – the highest in the history of Pakistan,” announced Chief Election Commissioner, Justice (Retd) Irshad Hasan Khan. challenged in the Supreme Court. It was argued that the constitution lays down special provisions for election of the president, referendum was not one of them and was therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court declared that it was premature to judge the consequences and left it to the future parliament to debate the matter. The role of the honourable court was questionable as the short and detailed order differed.369

The Economist noted that “normally, such a bogus attempt to win democratic support would result in widespread howls of international protest, instead of just the muted response it has provoked”.370 The reason of course was the support of US and the west due to his role in toppling the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan. In the country, major political parties PPP and PML-N and many others from the civil society opposed the referendum. The state was employed to gather support and silence those in opposition.

Undeniably, the referendum damaged Gen Musharraf’s and military’s credibility and commenced the process of downslide in his popularity which continued thereafter.

369 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 484. 370 ‘Musharraf’s Referendum’, The Economist, 25 April 2002.

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The process of perpetuating Gen Musharraf’s rule and limited transfer of power was next orchestrated through promulgation of LFO 2002.371 Lt Gen Naqvi retired was given the task to formulate the constitutional amendments. On 26 June 2002 NRB published a 58 page documents titled “Establishment of Sustainable Democracy” in Pakistan. The

78 Amendments in 29 Articles looked at ways for promoting sustainable democracy and strengthening institutions.372 These amendments were premised on the conception that the balance of power was lacking in 1973 Constitution which actually allowed prime minister to arrogate too much power as witnessed during the second term of

Nawaz Sharif in office. These amendments were actually designed to legalise Gen

Musharraf’s presidency for next five years, the elections of 2002 and the divide powers between president and the prime minister. The amendments accorded the president and the governors appointed by him the powers to dissolve the federal and provincial government as well critical appointments like CJCSC and service chiefs, chief justice etc. It also confers constitutional status to the local governments and constitutes NSC.

In the aggregate, the constitutional engineering in Gen Zia’s stead led to weakening the parliamentary system, it also rewarded the judiciary for the favourable judgements. The

LFO was promulgated on 21 August 2002.Gen Musharraf had reversed the process of political construction and democratisation to mid-1980’s firstly by the coup and then more substantially by the LFO 2002.

4.8.3 General Elections 2002

The general election set for 10 October 2002, seemingly were scheduled to implement the judgements of Supreme Court to return democracy to the country. All political

371 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 485-488. Detailed analysis of the LFO and its effects. 372 Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 226. The study provides a comprehensive analysis of the elections and its outcome as well as the observable trends. 211

parties participated in the elections. Two notable factors, first formulation of Pakistan

Muslim League, Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) with Chaudhary brothers in lead and comprising political elite who could be coerced due to their past misdeeds through NAB and ISI. The second was formulation of electoral alliance of six religious parties titled

Mutihida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). Thirdly, the election commission posed a new restriction of graduation degree to be the members of national and provincial assemblies.373 The results of 2002 elections are elucidated below:

Table 4.4: Results of 2002 Election Parties National Punjab Sind NWFP Balochistan PML-Q 78 128 10 07 10 PPP-P 62 63 51 08 02 MMA 45 07 15 47 13 IND 28 34 05 14 07 PML-N 14 37 - 05 - MQM 13 - 31 - - NA 12 12 10 - 04 PML-F 04 - 04 - - ANP - - - 08 - PPP-Sherpao 02 - - 09 - Other 10 06 02 01 11 Total 268 287 128 99 47 Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

During the elections, the voter turnout was 41.68 percent. The turnout manifests consistent decline and apathy towards politics. 374 PML-Q won the maximum votes mainly due to the effects of establishment.

373 Ibid., 115. The political parties argued that the requirement was against the principal of genuine public representation and given the past history of Pakistan, a number of legislators who are not graduate, have gained a lot of experience which will now be excluded. The new entrance could not be experienced in electorate politics as well as legislative experience. Besides the country had poor literacy rate, with no more than 3% of population holding graduation degree. While the government argued that the requirement for holding government jobs is bachelor degree, so how the legislative could be any different. 374 In 1970 elections, the voter turnout was 63.42% which declined to lowest (35.4) in 1997. It did pick up approximately 6 percent in 2002. But during this time, the registered voters also increased 30.59%. 436Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan, 156. 212

All the mainstream political parties participated in the elections. However they

“contributed to overall disillusionment by linking the fortunes of their parties with the political destine of their leaders who were transformed into icons at the expense of party programme”.436 In the pre-poll forecasting, a hung parliament with a weak prime minister was predicted. The significant development as evident from the results was the meteoric rise of MMA which won seats in NWFP and Balochistan and also a few seats in Karachi and one in Punjab. This was attributed to a clear religious agenda – anti

Americanism (due to continuing presence of US and NATO in Afghanistan) and a proTaliban attitude. PPP was wiped out in 1997 elections due to poor performance managed to stage a comeback mainly as the Muslim League votes were divided between

PML-Q and PML-N. MQM which has boycotted the local government elections also lost seats as it failed to generate the required momentum due to previous boycott. However, ANP suffered the heaviest defeat as it could not win a single seat in the National Assembly.

A large number of foreign agencies and domestic groups were engaged as observers during the electioneering process. It was the largest monitoring exercise ever carried out in the country. In their reports, 22 members group from 18 commonwealth countries termed the polls as well organised and for the most part transparent. European Union

Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) to Pakistan using standard 7 point criteria for judging electoral process found faults on several accounts and termed it seriously flawed. It criticised the misuse of state resources in favour of political parties particularly the PML-Q. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) observer group in its final report judged the elections positively. The two main stream political parties PML-N and PPP-P in their election reports highlighted the instances of

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irregularities and rigging. 375 Waseem observes that the “main complaint of foreign observers focused on pre-election phase. Although they did express some reservations on actual polling of votes, the same were generally regarded as relatively fair and transparent. The political environment leading up to the elections, however, was far from satisfactory”. He further observes that “the general context of 2002 elections can be defined in terms of non-issues and non-politics, which was underlined by political de-alignment in general”.376

During the elections, role of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) under Chief

Election Commissioner, Irshad Hassan Khan was also criticised. He was the one who previously as chief justice has validated the takeover of Gen Musharraf. ECP failed to fully implement the code of conduct issued for electronic media issued on 8 Aug 2002 which resulted in bias coverage of PML-Q. It also failed to check the influence of

District Nazims and state bureaucracy. By reducing the electioneering period from 90 to 40 days, major political parties which were banned after the military takeover in 1999 suffered setback as they did not had enough time for popular mobilisation.

Another significant aspect relating to women participation in national and provincial assemblies favoured Gen Musharraf. In 2002 elections, the reserved seats for women were restored and its ratio was increased to 26 percent. The total number of women parliamentarian was now 74 out of the 342 house. It signalled attitudinal and structural change in largely patriarchal society.

Despite all the governmental efforts, the two pro Musharraf parties, PML-Q and

National Alliance (NA) could not secure majority and had to be helped by compelling independents and creating a forward block comprising ten members within PPP-P

375 Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan, 192-195. 376 Ibid., 196

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called patriots. On 24 November 2002, Zafar Ullah Jamali from Balochistan was elected as Prime Minister. He secured 172 votes in a house of 342 members. The division between PPP and MMA, as each fielded its own candidate, helped his election.

However, he remained ineffective during his term, accepting the military pre-eminence in the governance.

4.8.4 Legitimising Powers through Seventeenth Amendment

In the scheme of things, the next logical step for Gen Musharraf was to get the provisions of LFO incorporated in the constitution through an amendment approved by the newly elected National Assembly and Senate to consolidate his hold of powers as

President. The role of political parties and elected representatives and their efforts for restoration of full democracy derailed Gen Musharraf’s plans. Firstly, they desired to take oath under the 1973 Constitution as it stood on 12 October 1999 refusing to accept the LFO. This resulted in delay of 36 days for convening the first session of National

Assembly and consequent delay (till February 2003) in senate elections scheduled on

12 November 2002. The strong resistance from the opposition in the parliament led to a dialogue with the government in May 2003 but did not yield any result. The process of negotiations continued and during the entire year, no serious business could take place in the parliament. On 24 December, PML-Q and MMA signed an agreement for package on constitutional amendment. The significant provisions of the seven point package included deletion of NSC and subjecting presidential powers of dissolution of national and provincial assemblies to Supreme Court review. Gen Musharraf was required to take a vote from national and provincial assemblies and he would give up the power by 31 December 2004. A sunset clause of six years for local government, removal of three years extension in retirement of judges of superior courts and the

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requirement of non-binding consultation for appointment of service chiefs was also part of the package.

Consequently, a constitutional bill was tabled on 26 December 2003 in National

Assembly. But once again, a dispute rose on the difference of wordings of bill and the agreement with MMA. The reworded bill as seventeenth amendment was finally passed on 29 December in which 248 out of 342 voted in favour. It was passed by Senate on

30 December 2003. Hamid Khan notes that LFO had amended/ added 29 articles in the constitution out of which 20 were left untouched by seventeenth amendment. Only the provisions of 9 articles were amended by the seventeenth amendment. Although “LFO was never submitted before the parliament and seventeenth amendment bill only contained amendments which were being made to the constitution under the assumption that LFO had become part of the constitution”. 377 This allowed Gen Musharraf to consolidate his powers.

As elucidated earlier, Gen Musharraf exercised option two to consolidate his hold on power. After general election of 2002, it took him one year to do so i.e. by end of

December 2003. Yet in the final outcome, the contest between civil and military, the military in power and having state intuitions at its disposal finally prevailed to inverse the framework from civilian to military supremacy. The political leaders and representatives initially presented a joint opposition. If they would have continue to do so then there was likelihood that seventeenth amendment and by implication LFO would not have been passed by the house. This would have resulted in departure of Gen

Musharraf and restoration of full democracy.

377 Hamid Khan 492.

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4.8.5 Civil Military Integration

Like his predecessors, Gen Musharraf’s perception that military is an integral part of the civil society remains strong. In order to keep them out of the politics he had suggested “to bring them in”. During his regime, he employed various mechanisms to integrate military into governance. Firstly, through formulation of NSC; secondly, by incorporating military for monitoring the performance of technocrats and local government at multiple levels; thirdly by appointing military officers in important civilian institutions thereby extending military’s influence in executive and political domain. While as expected, after the elections and return to partial democracy, the military’s role for monitoring would terminate, it is the reaming two which merit consideration. History is indicative that military officers’ secondment to civil appointments is time bound and reduces proportionately with the return to full democracy.

However, the formulation of NSC was hotly contested by the civilian political elite.

They consider NSC as an encroachment in the democratic framework and the powers of Prime Minister and hence resisted its inclusion in seventeenth amendment.

Contingent upon the security situation, NSC as a consultative and decision making body is instituted and practiced in many developed and developing countries. In Pakistan, this role of NSC is contested. As a consultative body it would be acceptable and fit into

Janowitisian paradigm of integration for formulating security policies while remaining in the framework of democracy.440 Interestingly, National Command Authority (NCA) with a similar composition as NSC exists as a decision making body. In a democratic framework, civilian supremacy is normative and existence of such arrangements like

NSC and NCA are part of political system but not as constitutional bodies. In Pakistan, formulation of national security architecture is yet in its formative stage and opens to

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assessment. Military’s integration into formulation and execution of security policies has to be in accordance with the aforementioned framework and political culture.

4.9 Summation

In this chapter, Finer’s theoretical framework for formation of military government coopted with technical expertise from the civil society was employed for analysis of

Gen Musharraf’s regime from 1999 to 2003. It was observed that in first two years, the regime despite political, financial and societal challenges was able to deliver favourable outcomes and Gen Musharraf remained popular up till 2002. However, as hypothesised in the research that consolidation of democracy or otherwise rests on preferences and decisions of political elite. Gen Musharraf acting as the primary political elite took decisions to prolong his regime, based on his personal interest contrary to the judgement of Supreme Court. It was not only detrimental to democracy but also subverted the civil

440 1973 constitution formulated DCC, which is also a kind of consultative body for defence issues. military relations. In the struggle between civil and military to impose its preference on each other after 2002, Gen Musharraf ultimately succeeded in amending the constitution to distribute powers between President and Prime Minister. He consolidated his hold on power and reversed the normative civil military relations paradigm to one of military domination over the civil.

The formulation of quasi-military regime resulting from 2002 elections adds to Finer’s classification and substantiates the options available to military after intervening in politics. Finer pointed out four types of military intervention but the case of Pakistan presented another type of military intervention i.e. quasi-military regime. The same quasi-military regime was witnessed during Gen Zia and Gen Musharraf’s era. The concept of quasi-military regime surfaces when the military tries to prolong its regime and also opts to share limited powers with the civilians. The personal interest behind

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prolongation of military regime resulting into quasi-military regime is a theoretical addition to Finer’s explanation by this research.

CHAPTER 5

DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS:

A SURVEY

“Not everything that can be counted counts, and everything that counts

can be counted”

Albert Einstein

5.1 Prelude

This research contextualises civil-military relations in democratic framework and politics of Pakistan. In this regard, the study hypothesised that amongst various approaches to consolidate democracy, transition approach is the most significant. The approach emphases that political elite are primary agency, who by their preferences, actions and inactions consolidate or impede process of democratisation. It focused on the process of political reconstruction and democratisation from 1989 to 1999 and confirmed that while the military favoured the continuation of process of democratic consolidation, the political elite regularly created situations of political deadlock. They then provided opportunity to or themselves involved military for arbitration. During the period under review, the military did engage itself in arbitration but refrained from directly taking over the country, preferring continuation of democratic process instead.

During the second term of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif however, certain decisions by political and military elite led to premature removal of COAS, Gen Musharraf. The affront was perceived by the military as a political coup to which it responded with a military coup. The resultant takeover and military rule lasted till 2007. However, Gen

Musharraf did not return the country to democracy in 2002 in accordance with the

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judgement of the Supreme Court. Reaffirming the proposition that military elite which had replaced the political elite, acting in self-interest impeded the process of democratisation, substantiating the hypothesis.

To gauge the public opinion on the contested subject of democratic consolidation and civil military relations, a survey was conducted. The data in this chapter represents perceptions and behaviour of respondents on the important issue of role of political and military elite in consolidation of democracy or otherwise. Their decision leading to military’s involvement in politics and arbitration, reasons for military takeover and their governance.

5.2 Survey and its Interface with the Research

In the previous chapters, this research provides a link between the theoretical construct of civil military relations and its practical manifestation in Pakistan. In chapters 2, 3 and 4, the hypothesis of the study has been validated. To understand the societal perspective, an independent survey was conducted to examine the public opinion on civil military relations.

5.2.1 Identification of Variables

To ascertain the attitude of the variety of respondents (societal view), irrespective of the findings of the research (theoretical proposition), a broad based structured questionnaire comprising sixteen multiple choice and one open ended question was formulated.

Provocative and loaded questions were avoided but instead the questions were formulated in a manner that the desirable response could be extracted. The open ended question focused on bringing out respondent opinion based i.e. augment qualitative method of research. The multiple choice questions were graded into five shades of response. The questions were formulated with structural and attitudinal perspectives but were distributed randomly in the questionnaire in order to solicit variety in response. In

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both cases, the independent variable i.e. criticality of the preferences of political elite for consolidation of democracy and dependent variable of attitude of military were targeted. The key questions are enumerated below:

• Q5: The military is forced to intervene in politics because of inaptitude of the

civilian politicians and public pressure.

• Q7: Politicians themselves precipitate military takeovers.

• Q10: The military (in power) provides better administration, improves security

and economic situation and living standards of common people.

• Q11: The civilian leaders are unfamiliar with mechanisms of democratic

civilian control of the armed forces.

• Q14: The civil and military need to work in close harmony and develop strong

trust and confidence for consolidating democracy.

Questions 5 and 7 in the main and questions 1, 2, 3 and 9 as supplementary were designed to reflect attitude and expectations of civil society from the larger independent variable of political elite. These questions also gauge the relationship with the dependent variable of the military to identify reasons of military intervention and takeover. Question 10 in the main and questions 4, 6 and 16 as supplementary cover structural, organisational and attitudinal aspects of the respondents towards the dependent variable of military. Questions 11 and 14 relate to the current and future dimensions of civil military relations. Questions 8, 12, 13 and 15 are secondary questions to tease out solution to the complex problem of civilian control over the military and security of the country from respondents. The supplementary questions are structured in a manner to draw independent responses on the issues in order to add depth to the understanding on the subject.

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Question 17 was however open ended. It aimed to extract comments and remarks about the role of political and military elite in the country. The open ended question is considered important as it provided opportunity to respondent to independently express opinion on the subject, irrespective of the questions posed. Understandably, the opinion could substantiate response to the closed questions, it could either contradict or bring out new ideas on the subject.

“The one who asks questions doesn’t lose his way”

African Proverb

In summary, the questions are clustered in areas of democracy and military intervention, civil military relations, and military regimes. The questionnaire is provided at Appendix

5.2.2 Survey Population and Sample

Civil military relation is a technical and complex subject. It pre-requisites understanding of democracy, governance, comparative political systems etc. and practices prevalent in the world. It also requires experience and exposure of the civil military interface in practical term i.e. in terms of knowledge which moves beyond the theoretical understanding and relates to the practical aspects related to the problem. It is expected that various age groups would have a different expectations and perspectives. Keeping in view these factors, a typical respondent emerges as a person who is educated, has good knowledge base and is exposed to the subject. Variety in professional background, gender, age and education would enable the research to benefit from a profound societal perspective.

Unfortunately, there has been no census in Pakistan since 1998 and the exact figures about the demography of the country are projections. According to Ministry of

Education in 2013, the literacy rate in Pakistan stood at 49 percent and 1,349,000

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persons had post-secondary qualification. Therefore, the total population for this survey is 1,349,000, however names and professions of this body of people are not available.

Keeping in view the limitations, four clusters of professions i.e. military officers, civil officers, academia and civil society were purposively developed. An equal number of questionnaires were sent to the each cluster. It is worth mentioning that the latter three clusters represent the civilian population of the country. A total of 300 questionnaires were distributed as under:

Table 5.1: Distribution of Questionnaire

Distribution of Questionnaires Category Number Percent Military Officer 75 25 Civil Officer 75 25 Academia 75 25 Civil society 75 25 Total 300 100

5.3 Characteristics of the Sample

Having determined the parameters and limitations of the population, the respondents categorised as opinion makers were sampled from National Defence University for the category of military and some civil officer. For academia, respondents were chosen from a variety of universities in Islamabad. The participants from civil society in workshops and seminars organised in Islamabad over a period of time were approached for voluntary participation in the survey. To ensure that the respondent can reply conveniently, questionnaire in print and via e mail was provided. The questionnaire was constructed in a manner that the respondents were only needed to tick the shade which would not take more than a few minutes. However to document comments to the open ended question, more reflection and time was needed. The convenience resulted in a high percentage of recall. From the 300 respondents approached 151 responded, making

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it slightly more than 50% which is considered satisfactory. Many respondents also engaged with the researcher via email and in person for more profound discussion on the subject.

Since the subject of democratic consolidation and civil military relations cuts across ethnic and majority-minority boundaries therefore the sample population was not clustered along these lines. However, the uneducated and under educated population of the country who regularly involve in the political process were inadvertently excluded from the survey. The weakness was overcome by consulting the Gallup Poll on similar or closely related questions conducted during the same period. The aspect of gender was factored in while formulating the sample, but since female population in Pakistan is included in four clusters therefore a separate category is not created. Given the limited number of educated females engaged in different professions in the country, the recall was correspondingly limited. The survey was conducted in Islamabad on the basis of non-random purposive sampling.

5.4 Survey Respondents

The research hypothesis presented a theoretical proposition which supplemented by a societal perspective would make conclusions and findings wholesome. These categorisation and distribution of the respondent in professional, gender, age and education basis is explained below.

5.4.1 Profession

The respondents were clustered into four Table 5.2 Profession Category Number Percent categories in accordance with their Military officers 23 15.2

professional background. These Civil Officers 31 20.5 Academia 42 27.8 comprised military 15.2 %, civil service Civil Society 55 36.4 Total 151 100 20.5%, students and teachers belonging

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To the academia 27.8% and civil society in general 36%. The latter comprised variety of respondents to include members of parliaments, businessmen, journalists, lawyers and those from private sector. Together, they represent majority of politically active segments of the civil society, politics and governance in Pakistan. It was ensured that majority should reflect the views of civil society i.e. 63.6% without officers from civil services and 84.15% including them.

5.4.2 Gender

Secondly, an effort was made to distribute the questionnaire to equal number of male and female members of civil society. It was expected that the female respondents would respond proportionately, however lesser than expected responded. A majority of female respondents were frequently reminded, yet for cultural reasons they did not oblige. The percentage of replies from Table 5.3: Gender Category Number Percent female respondents included in the Male 123 81.5 survey, however exceeds the number Female 28 18.5 that is educated and engaged Total 151 100.0 in some professional activity.

5.4.3 Education

Thirdly educated respondents, who were considerably better informed about the constitution, mechanics of democracy and public policy formulation as well as the global, regional and domestic Table 5.4: Education environment in the country were Category Number Percent preferred. In terms of education PhD 29 19.2 qualifications 12.6% are MPhil, 19.2% M. Phil 19 12.6 PhD and 68.2% graduates and above. Others 103 68.2

Total 151 100.0

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5.4.4 Age

Lastly, respondents were selected to represent all age groups from the society. Age groups between 20 and 70 years were Table 5.5: Age targeted to draw upon variety of Category Number Percent response. The younger segment had seen 20-30 21 13.9 democracy at work in previous decade 31-40 43 28.5 under PPP and PML-N and those with 41-50 55 36.4 51-60 29 19.2 more age had greater experience and 61-70 3 2.0 exposure. They were capable of Total 151 100.0 comparative analysis of civil as well as military regimes in previous three to five decades and could comment more profoundly.

5.4.5 Environmental Variable

The obtaining political environment impacts on perceptions about democracy and civil military relations. It is significant to understand the political environment prevailing in the country and most significantly Islamabad during the survey as it may have contributed to perception formation process. To recall, owing to the unfortunate death of Benazir Bhutto during the election campaign for general scheduled in 2008 elections, the elections were delayed by a month. When these elections were conducted, the electorate returned PPP to power with President Musharraf still the President. In the ensuing months, the military withdrew support from the ex COAS President Musharraf which led to his departure and installation of Mr Zardari, the co-chairman of PPP as

President. The PPP hold over power was considerably weakened when Gen Kayani, the then COAS intervened to get Iftikhar Ahmed Chaudhry, the deposed CJ of Pakistan

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reinstated.378 After assumption of the office, the Chief Justice kept PPP’s government under considerable and consistent pressure. The interplay of PML-N, Judiciary and the military is a subject for analysis for follow up research in the field of civil military relations. Here it suffices to say that the democratic government of PPP completed its tenure, gave way to an interim government under which election were held in 2013.

Although the threats from terrorists to PPP and Awami National Party (ANP) to desist from open campaigning, otherwise their rallies and meetings would be targeted with suicide bombers is another subject for research. Thereby a perception was created that

PML-N will be able to win the elections but not two third majority.

During the elections, two significant developments took place. Firstly the youth which now comprised bulk of Pakistan’s population mobilised young and old to get out and vote, nearly 60 percent voted. Secondly, Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf (PTI) led by Imran

Khan drew lot of support from urban areas and emerged as a serious contender.

However immediately after the elections, perceptions of massive electoral irregularities and rigging surfaced and with time more and more allegations started to come fore.

Consequently, PTI decided to take their protest to streets in combination with Tahir- ulQadri and his Pakistan Awami Tahreek (PAT). Indexed in rising political polarity and attitudinal differences, the political situation was charged because of public mobilization and “sit ins” by PTI and PAT with calls for resignation of Prime Minister and mid-term elections. Understandably, the respondents may have been polarized to some degree by the political environment prevailing in the country. But considering that the respondents are well informed, educated and belong to different professions,

378 Since the military was engaged in operations along the western borders against terrorists, Gen Kayani had done so to maintain stability as PML-N had taken to the streets and had started a long march from Lahore to Islamabad to get the deposed CJ reinstated. 227

they did bear in mind the political situation and endeavoured to remain objective in their responses.

5.5 Reliability and Validity

5.5.1 Reliability

Psychometric reliability of the survey has been tested through Cronbach Alpha

Reliability Test and the outcome was Table 5.6: Reliability Statistics found to be acceptable, the test data is placed opposite Cronbach's Cronbach's N of Alpha Alpha Based Items and the key is appended below. on Standardized Items .650 .668 16 Table 5.7: KEY Cronbach's alpha Internal consistency

α ≥ 0.9 Excellent (High-Stakes testing) 0.7 ≤ α < 0.9 Good (Low-Stakes testing)

0.6 ≤ α < 0.7 Acceptable 0.5 ≤ α < 0.6 Poor α < 0.5 Unacceptable

5.5.2 Validity

Validity relates to the degree, to which the tool measures what it claims to measure. It is important for this research since the survey aims to independently draw upon the societal perspective about the subject. In a survey attempting to accrue qualitative assessments and opinions related to human behaviour, content and face validity assumes greater significance.379 Prior to composing the questions, precedents for similar surveys were consulted and Gallup Polls Pakistan stood out for authenticity. Questions

379 Anne Anastasi and Susana Urbina, Psychological Testing (New York: Prentice Hall, 1997), 114. ‘The systematic examination of the test content to determine whether it covers a representative sample of the behaviour domain to be measured’.

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designed by Gallup Poll on subjects of politics, governance and civil military relations were consulted for guidance. This was followed up by consultations with experts on civil military relations in Pakistan, thereafter leading to careful formulation of a questionnaire which should bring out all aspects of the phenomenon under study. Face validity as an extension of content validity stands out as a starting point and relates to the question, whether the test appears to be a good measure or not in testing the phenomenon being studied. A comparison of findings of this survey (explained later) with those of Gallup Polls Pakistan on similar questions further validates this survey.

Similarly to prevent duplication, those questions which had already been included by

Gallup Poll Pakistan in different surveys over a period of time were excluded including those concerning the military takeover and governance of Gen Musharraf. A detailed survey on this had already been carried out by Gallup Poll on 13 October 1999, a day after the takeover.

“Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts”

Daniel P Moynihan

5.6 Principle Results

Questions 5, 7, 10, 11 and 13 of the questionnaire were the critical questions response to which related to the variables and hypothesis tested and confirmed in this research.

Therefore the response to these questions assumes greater significance. This has been explained below.

5.6.1 Democracy and Military Intervention: Response

The first theme is democracy and military intervention for which questions 5 and 7 are posed. The former looked at the military intervention resulting out of weaknesses and ineptitude of political elite and the latter reflected on the political elite themselves precipitating military intervention through their faulty preferences. The target was the

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political elite, their faulty preferences and inability to consolidate democracy resulting into military interventions. The first presented them as victims.

Table 5.8: Response Question 5

Question 5 Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %

Incompetence of Strongly Disagree 13 8.6 8.6 8.6 political elite provides Disagree 38 25.2 25.2 33.8 opportunity to the military to intervene Neutral 25 16.6 16.6 50.3 Agree 60 39.7 39.7 90.1 Strongly Agree 15 9.9 9.9 100.0 Total 151 100.0 100.0

In case of question 5, nearly 50% agreed with the proposition, while one third (33.6%) disagreed with it. Of those who agreed, majority come from age group 31-60 years. In response of question 7, the 67.6% was of the view that political elite themselves precipitate military takeovers. Of those who agreed, the qualification of majority of the respondents is graduation. In both questions, there was similarity in population who chose to remain neutral. At a closer look, it becomes apparent that a lesser number places blame on incompetence and ineptitude of political elite but a far greater number of respondents opine that political elite are responsible for military intervention.

On the other hand, nearly 39% disagreed with proposition in question 5.The disagreement percentage reduced to about 18% in case of question 7. The response of question 7 is tabulated below.

Table 5.9: Response Question 7 Question 7 Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative % Political elite Strongly Disagree 4 2.6 2.6 2.6 themselves precipitate Disagree 23 15.2 15.2 17.9 military takeovers Neutral 22 14.6 14.6 32.5 Agree 93 61.6 61.6 94.0 Strongly Agree 9 6.0 6.0 100.0 Total 151 100.0 100.0

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The result confirms the hypothesis of the research. The latter could also be interpreted that Nawaz Sharif’s actions led to a counter coup. Further insight in this regard can be drawn from contributory questions 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9.

There is a general perception that elections in Pakistan are not free and fair and state in various forms has and continues to influence the outcomes. Secondly, the landholding and later the elite emerging from business community have by and large dominated the political scene irrespective of their political merit. Since large sum of money is required to contest elections therefore a common man is generally excluded resulting into apathy toward politics and participation in politics.

In a democratic system, elections are primary step through which voters elect their representatives. Elections are held regularly since creation (indirect elections between

1947 and 1948, direct elections to provincial assemblies between 1951 and 1954 and since then 1970, 1977, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2008 and 2013 elections).Waseem notes that elections in Pakistan “are held in social milieu which is characterised by continuing domination of the tribal or landed elite ”He identifies three distinct features, first rather than legislation elections are regarded as means for gaining primacy over “administrative authority for allocating resources” a way to control the district administration and central focus on district politics in which extra local influence input through [political] party was minimal.380 Countries have developed a variety of mechanisms to conduct free and fair elections under different oversight mechanisms. Shafqat notes that political parties have not contributed to strengthening of the party system, with each election the ideological centre of political parties has

380 Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan, 1.

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shifted towards religious right and increasingly political parties have become instruments of bradari (cast)/ tribal affiliations and criminal mafias that acquire power.381

Chart 5.1: Response Question 1

Question 1 gauges the electioneering process in

Pakistan. It has been noted that more than two third (78.8%) respondents are not satisfied with the electioneering

process. Neither they consider it free and fair, nor do they get to elect most suitable candidates.

On the other hand, only 12.6% of respondents agreed that the elections are free and fair and 8.6% remained neutral on this issue. This response is reflective of nature of politics and credentials of political elite. The Gallup Polls has also reflected the same results.

According to their survey, against a global average of 42% about elections being fair and free in their respective countries, in Pakistan 49% consider that elections are not free and fair. One of the respondents said that “free, fair and transparent elections can only improve and take over country out of crisis”. Another respondent pointed out that

“fairness of elections process in Pakistan and people electing most suitable credentials need to be viewed separately. While electioneering process could be taken as more or less fair or on election to election basis, people almost never elect or get to elect the

381 Saeed Shafqat and Maheen Saleem Khosa, “Electoral Politics and Electoral Violence in 2013 Elections: The Case of Punjab,” Monograph, December 2014, 5.

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leaders with suitable credentials due to weakness of social and political culture”. Details of the response of question 1 are elaborated in the following table.

Table 5.10: Response Question 1 Question 1 Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative % Electioneering process is Strongly 40 26.5 26.5 26.5 fair and people get to Disagree elect legislators with most suitable credentials Disagree 79 52.3 52.3 78.8 Neutral 13 8.6 8.6 87.4 Agree 16 10.6 10.6 98.0 Strongly Agree 3 2.0 2.0 100.0 Total 151 100.0 100.0

The results further explain and reinforce the findings of question 2 which relates to contemporary nature of political culture in Pakistan. Politics is perceived to be dirty word and political elite are the ones with money who use politics as a means for enhancing their financial gains. Secondly, it is perceived that those who get elected use the power to have government functionaries (police and administration) of their choice.

This question aimed at ascertaining the primary motivation of aspirants for participating in politics i.e. money and greed for power. While it can be argued that the quest for power is inbuilt in any political system the reference in this question relates to the illgotten wealth and use of political position to advance personal interests. The response is reflected as under:

Table 5.11: Response Question 12 Question 2 Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative % Greed for Strongly Disagree 8 5.3 5.3 5.3 money and Disagree 11 7.3 7.3 12.6 power impels aspirants into Neutral 17 11.3 11.3 23.8 politics Agree 70 46.4 46.4 70.2 Strongly Agree 45 29.8 29.8 100.0 Total 151 100.0 100.0

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Chart 5.2: Response Question 2

More than two third of respondents

(76.2%) agree that greed for money and power impel people to participate in politics at different levels. Of those who agreed, majority belong to academia because of their comparative knowledge and rich experience. Slightly more than 11% chose to remain neutral and 12.6% think otherwise perhaps having better political figures as role models. It can be argued that not all aspirants join politics for greed yet if not individually corrupt they by their silence ascribe to the systemic failure of democracy to deliver better quality of life to the people. This includes the military rulers as well. In response to a similar question of Gallup Polls, 53% of Pakistanis are highly sceptical about the sincerity of the rulers. One of the respondents said that

“selfcenteredness is the curse of Pakistani decision makers. Intolerance to others’ point of view and unwillingness to experiment also contribute in bad governance”.

Question 3 referrers to the public service by political elite. Since politics is perceived as public service, therefore the aspirants inspired by their political vision and motivations join to serve the country and fellow countrymen. Politics in Pakistan has noble roots as people like Sir Syed, Allama Iqbal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and others were inspired by the plight of Muslims and nature of Indian state which would emerge after decolonisation. They perceived the need for a separate homeland for Muslims of sub-continent, a country in which they can realize their potentials and make a name for

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themselves in the comity of nations. It was therefore expected that leaders and politicians succeeding him would carry the vision and continue with similar nobility in zeal and purpose. At least that was the expectation irrespective of the de facto position.

Secondly due to host of reasons, Pakistan today has slipped considerably down on the scale for measuring efficacy of governance and policies to improve state and human security in the country. The question 3 therefore also reflects on the potential need for matching quality of governance with the requirement of the people. Another respondent told that “the civilian leadership has not had a prolonged period of maturity to breed the best quality within their ranks, unlike the military, which has regular programme of enrolment and education. As such the civilian leadership is not considered too bad.

However, to gain personal advantage in politics should be regulated”. The results are enumerated on next page.

Table 5.12: Response Question 3 Question 3 Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative % civilian political Strongly Disagree 23 15.2 15.2 15.2 leaders work for Disagree 69 45.7 45.7 60.9 serving the Neutral 34 22.5 22.5 83.4 common people Agree 22 14.6 14.6 98.0 Strongly Agree 3 2.0 2.0 100.0 Total 151 100.0 100.0 Chart 5.3: Response Question 3

While responding to the question, 60% of the respondents agreed with the proposition. In their view civilian political leaders when in power do not work to serve the common man. The perception is created and reinforced due to inadequate regime outcomes as

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successively human security situation in Pakistan has deteriorated. Major policy areas concerning health, education and law and order have witnessed considerable downslide.

Also, institutions related to these policy areas are not functioning at par with the requirement. On the other hand, less than one fifth (18.6%) are of the view that the civilian political leaders work for serving the common people. Almost 22.5% of the respondents remained neutral on this question.

The response on the above stated questions reflects the perceptions of respondents about the aspirations and functioning of political elite. The criticality of response about the political leaders means support for military intervention. In this context, question 6 aimed at inquiring the people support for military takeover and subsequent rule. The military rulers to perpetuate their rule frequently claim that common people support them. The response is reflected as under.

Table 5.13: Response Question 6 Question 6 Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative % Most people support Strongly Disagree 17 11.3 11.3 11.3 military takeover and Disagree 48 31.8 31.8 43.0 some extent military rule Neutral 26 17.2 17.2 60.3 Agree 54 35.8 35.8 96.0 Strongly Agree 6 4.0 4.0 100.0 Total 151 100.0 100.0

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Chart 5.4: Response Question 6

Contrary to the claim, the support for democracy or otherwise is quite divided on the response spectrum. A slight majority (43%) disagreed with the proposition and supported the continuation of democratic system.

Inversely, almost equal (39%) agreed with it. Interestingly 17.2% chose to remain neutral. Apparently they represent the undecided ones who swing the vote depending upon the prevailing public sentiment either way. They could be the ones who would support takeovers and later support the return to democracy when the military regimes failed to measure up to their perceptions or fail to find a political role in the military setups. It is to be noted that democracy has returned in Pakistan since 2007 and after the lapse of almost seven years, still the political elite is unable to favourably win the majority of the common people.

One respondent said that “in the past, masses always appreciated the military over politicians. Now though time has changed and it is a recognised fact that military coup cause more damage not just to the civilian setup but also the military itself. Because of its political endeavours, the military has also become much politicised and we also see that within the military, there is an increase of politics”.

Shifting focus from civilian politicians to military, question 8 is a direct question to accrue a direct response about the military’s responsibility for creating hurdles in the way of democracy. The question in view of the peculiar history and construct of civil

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military relations in Pakistan assume special significance and understands the reasons of gap between the legal and real position of the respondents.

The response is tabulated below.

Table 5.14: Question 8 Question 8 Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative % Military is Strongly Disagree 21 13.9 13.9 13.9 responsible for Disagree 45 29.8 29.8 43.7 creating hurdles in the way of political Neutral 28 18.5 18.5 62.3 culture/democracy Agree 45 29.8 29.8 92.1 in Pakistan Strongly Agree 12 7.9 7.9 100.0 Total 151 100.0 100.0

Chart 5.5: Response Question 8