Examining the Consequences of Mortgage Irregularities for Fi- Nancial Stability and Fore- Closure Mitigation
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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT * EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FI- NANCIAL STABILITY AND FORE- CLOSURE MITIGATION NOVEMBER 16, 2010.—Ordered to be printed * Submitted under Section 125(b)(1) of Title 1 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343 VerDate Mar 15 2010 02:17 Dec 02, 2010 Jkt 061835 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6012 Sfmt 6012 E:\HR\OC\A835.XXX A835 tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS E:\Seals\Congress.#13 CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT VerDate Mar 15 2010 02:17 Dec 02, 2010 Jkt 061835 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6019 Sfmt 6019 E:\HR\OC\A835.XXX A835 tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS with DSKG8SOYB1PROD on tjames 1 CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT * EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FI- NANCIAL STABILITY AND FORE- CLOSURE MITIGATION NOVEMBER 16, 2010.—Ordered to be printed * Submitted under Section 125(b)(1) of Title 1 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 61–835 WASHINGTON : 2010 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. VerDate Mar 15 2010 02:17 Dec 02, 2010 Jkt 061835 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5012 Sfmt 5012 E:\HR\OC\A835.XXX A835 tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS E:\Seals\Congress.#13 CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL PANEL MEMBERS SEN. TED KAUFMAN, Chairman RICHARD H. NEIMAN DAMON SILVERS J. MARK MCWATTERS KENNETH TROSKE (II) VerDate Mar 15 2010 02:17 Dec 02, 2010 Jkt 061835 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 E:\HR\OC\A835.XXX A835 tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS C O N T E N T S Page Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 Section One: A. Overview ....................................................................................................... 4 B. Background .................................................................................................. 5 C. Timeline ........................................................................................................ 6 D. Legal Consequences of Document Irregularities ....................................... 10 1. Potential Flaws in the Recording and Transfer of Mortgages and Violations of Pooling and Servicing Agreements ................................. 12 2. Possible Legal Consequences of the Document Irregularities to Various Parties ...................................................................................... 19 3. Additional Considerations .................................................................... 27 E. Court Cases and Litigation ......................................................................... 28 1. Fraud Claims ......................................................................................... 29 2. Existing and Pending Claims under Various Fraud Theories .......... 33 3. Other Potential Claims ......................................................................... 35 4. Other State Legal Steps ....................................................................... 36 5. Other Possible Implications: Potential ‘‘Front-end’’ Fraud and Doc- umentation Irregularities ...................................................................... 38 F. Assessing the Potential Impact on Bank Balance Sheets ........................ 42 1. Introduction ........................................................................................... 42 2. Foreclosure Irregularities: Estimating the Cost to Banks ................. 48 3. Securitization Issues and Mortgage Put-backs ................................... 52 G. Effect of Irregularities and Foreclosure Freezes on Housing Market ..... 59 1. Foreclosure Freezes and their Effect on Housing ............................... 59 2. Foreclosure Irregularities and the Crisis of Confidence .................... 64 H. Impact on HAMP ......................................................................................... 65 I. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 68 Section Two: Correspondence with Treasury ........................................................ 71 Section Three: TARP Updates Since Last Report ................................................. 72 Section Four: Oversight Activities .......................................................................... 96 Section Five: About the Congressional Oversight Panel ...................................... 97 Appendices: APPENDIX I: LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN TED KAUFMAN TO SPE- CIAL MASTER PATRICIA GEOGHEGAN, RE: FOLLOW UP TO EX- ECUTIVE COMPENSATION HEARING, DATED NOVEMBER 1, 2010 ................................................................................................................ 98 (III) VerDate Mar 15 2010 02:17 Dec 02, 2010 Jkt 061835 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 0483 E:\HR\OC\A835.XXX A835 tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS VerDate Mar 15 2010 02:17 Dec 02, 2010 Jkt 061835 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 0483 E:\HR\OC\A835.XXX A835 tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT NOVEMBER 16, 2010.—Ordered to be printed EXECUTIVE SUMMARY * In the fall of 2010, reports began to surface alleging that compa- nies servicing $6.4 trillion in American mortgages may have by- passed legally required steps to foreclose on a home. Employees or contractors of Bank of America, GMAC Mortgage, and other major loan servicers testified that they signed, and in some cases backdated, thousands of documents claiming personal knowledge of facts about mortgages that they did not actually know to be true. Allegations of ‘‘robo-signing’’ are deeply disturbing and have given rise to ongoing federal and state investigations. At this point the ultimate implications remain unclear. It is possible, however, that ‘‘robo-signing’’ may have concealed much deeper problems in the mortgage market that could potentially threaten financial sta- bility and undermine the government’s efforts to mitigate the fore- closure crisis. Although it is not yet possible to determine whether such threats will materialize, the Panel urges Treasury and bank regulators to take immediate steps to understand and prepare for the potential risks. In the best-case scenario, concerns about mortgage documenta- tion irregularities may prove overblown. In this view, which has been embraced by the financial industry, a handful of employees failed to follow procedures in signing foreclosure-related affidavits, but the facts underlying the affidavits are demonstrably accurate. Foreclosures could proceed as soon as the invalid affidavits are re- placed with properly executed paperwork. The worst-case scenario is considerably grimmer. In this view, which has been articulated by academics and homeowner advo- cates, the ‘‘robo-signing’’ of affidavits served to cover up the fact * The Panel adopted this report with a 5–0 vote on November 15, 2010. VerDate Mar 15 2010 02:17 Dec 02, 2010 Jkt 061835 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A835.XXX A835 tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS 2 that loan servicers cannot demonstrate the facts required to con- duct a lawful foreclosure. In essence, banks may be unable to prove that they own the mortgage loans they claim to own. The risk stems from the possibility that the rapid growth of mortgage securitization outpaced the ability of the legal and finan- cial system to track mortgage loan ownership. In earlier years, under the traditional mortgage model, a homeowner borrowed money from a single bank and then paid back the same bank. In the rare instances when a bank transferred its rights, the sale was recorded by hand in the borrower’s county property office. Thus, the ownership of any individual mortgage could be easily dem- onstrated. Nowadays, a single mortgage loan may be sold dozens of times between various banks across the country. In the view of some market participants, the sheer speed of the modern mortgage mar- ket has rendered obsolete the traditional ink-and-paper recordation process, so the financial industry developed an electronic transfer process that bypasses county property offices. This electronic proc- ess has, however, faced legal challenges that could, in an extreme scenario, call into question the validity of 33 million mortgage loans. Further, the financial industry now commonly bundles the rights to thousands of individual loans into a mortgage-backed security (MBS). The securitization process is complicated and requires sev- eral properly executed transfers. If at any point the required legal steps are not followed to the letter, then the ownership of the mort- gage loan could fall into question. Homeowner advocates have al- leged that frequent ‘‘robo-signing’’ of ownership affidavits may have concealed extensive industry failures to document mortgage loan transfers properly. If documentation problems prove to be pervasive and, more im- portantly, throw into doubt the ownership of not only foreclosed properties but also pooled mortgages, the consequences could be se- vere. Clear and uncontested property rights are the foundation of the housing market. If these rights fall into question, that founda- tion could collapse. Borrowers may be unable to determine whether they are sending