DE PRAEDESTINATIONE ET PRAESCIENTIA

AN ANONYMOUS I4TH-CENTURY TREATISE ON PREDESTINATION AND JUSTIFICATION

by DR. H. A. OBERMAN

Since Augustine's battle with the Pelagians and semi-Pelagiansl the problem created by the tension between God's predestination before the foundation of the world and the Christian's moral re- sponsibility has rarely left the Church in pace. - A balance between these two points of departure is evident in the letter of Pope Hadrian2 where he, in agreement with Fulgentius, 3 quotes: "Opera ergo misericordiae ac justitiae praeparavit Deus in aeternitate incommutabilitatis suae ... praeparavit ergo justifi- candis hominibus merita; praeparavit iisdem glorificandis et praemiis ...": merits and rewards are both determined in eternity. We find, however, a different attitude in the Council of Quiersy 4: "Deus aztec bonus et justus eligit ex eadem massa perditionis secundum praescientiam suam quos per gratiam praedestinavit ... ". The plan of election, i.e. the choice, is made according to God's foreknowledge; the accomplishment of this plan is effected by means of grace.5 Even less equivocal is the statement of the third Council of Valence6, quoting Florus Diaconus ? : "Deum praescire et prae- scisse aetemaliter et bona, quae boni erant facturi, et mala, quae mali sunt gesturi", which is founded on the Psalmist's utterance, "Ut reddat unicuique secundum opera sua".8 1 The medieval tradition concerning predestination derives, in spite of the many Pauline quotations, not from Paul but from Augustine. Cf. G. Nygren, Das Praedestina- tionsprobumin der TheologieAugustins, Göttingen, 1956, p. t36 f., has correctly pointed to the Augustinian shift of emphasis, which we can best designate as philosophical. 2 PL 98, 383; Denz. 300. 3 The passage is lost, but cf. his De veritatepraedestinationis, 3, 6, 9 (PL 65, 656). 4 853; cf. Denz. 316. 5 The precise ninth-century interpretation of the terms "electio" and "praedestinatio" has not yet been analyzed. Though Lombard was not clear in his use of these terms, I Sent. dist. 35 c 4 seems to point in the indicated direction: "Praedestinavit autem ab aeterno Deus homines ad bona eligendo, et praedestinavit eis bona praeparando ... Ergo ab aeterno praedestinavit quosdam futuros bonos et beatos, id est eligit, ut essent boni et beati, et bona eis praedestinavit, id est praeparavit". While Thomas clearly differentiates the two terms - I Sent. d q.x,q x, a x- the nominalists ignore this problem as irrelevant. For the interpretation of the treatise it seemed more clear to use the terms "election" and "damnation" as the two alternatives of "predestination". 8 85 5 cf.; Dens. 321x 7 Sermo de praedestinatio-ne,PL IIg, 97. 8 Vulg. Ps 6 1,T 2. 196

It is evident to us that it is unreasonable to blame the four- teenth-century theologians for allowing but little space, in their observations on predestination, for the more subtle position of Hales(ius) and Bonaventura and for the markedly theocentric analysis of Thomas Aquinas.1 The council declarations quoted above, indeed, had to overshadow the opinions of a Doctor Mo- dernus or at least force an examination of the justification of such 2 a definitely Augustinian doctrine of predestination.2 In addition, it is necessary to consider a second development. Thomas' treatment of the ordo, in the elaboration of his conclusion on election, and his emphasis on the sapie-ntia Dei gave rise to synergistic interpretations which, being the reverse of what he had intended, naturally qualified his direct influence. It is precisely on these two issues that the thought of Duns Scotus takes a different path. Thomas may well be correct in saying that the ordo of the development is electio - gratia - gloyia, but God has determined the eternal glory of the elect in instanti aeternitatis, quite independently of and prior to the effects of grace.3 Closely linked with this is Duns' opinion that predestination is a building, not indeed erected with architectonic skill, but on the contrary founded on God's immutable will, with which He both chooses and accepts man.4 On this point it seemed also possible to interpret Thomas in such a way that the contrast between his doctrine of predestination and that of Duns must again be sought in the ordo. Then in Thomas the reward would precede the decision, while in Duns the decision would precede the reward. Thomas' great reluctance to ascertain God's motives and the sequence of His decisions make this, however, impossible. It is not until the observations of the later Molinists, such as Vasquez and 1 That we are dealing in those cases with theologicalmock battles and philosophical hair-splitting is repeated by author after author. \1Against A. D. R. Polman, De praedestinatieleervan A ugustinus,Thomas Aquinas en Calvijn, Franeker, 1936, and H. Buis, Historic Protestantism and Predestination, Grand Rapids, 1958,p. 18 ff., one need only point to the defence of God's sovereignty in Summa Theolog.ia,I, 23, 5, where Thomas deals with the question whether merit also may, at times, be the cause of predestination. Further, on the much neglected problem of the predestination of Christ: "Praodestinatio est d%v%riapl'ae01'dinatio ab aeterno do his quae per gratiam Dei sunt fienda in tempore(ib., III, 24, 1). 3 Cf. R. Seeberg, Die Theologiedes Joh. Duns Scotus,Leipzig, 1900,p. 296. 4 Cf. W. Pannenberg, Die Praedestinationstehredes Duns Skotus, Göttingen, r954, p. 42, and P. W. Dettoff, Die Lehre von der Aceepta.t%obei Johannes Duns Scotus mit besondereBeriicksichfigung der Rechtfertigungslehre,Werl, 1954.