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The Farewell Dossier (Gus W. Weiss) Duping the Soviets The Farewell Dossier Gus W. Weiss We communists have to string substantive topics. The Soviets along with the capitalists for a viewed détente as fpeaceful coexist while. We need their credits, encef and as an avenue to improve their agriculture, and their tech their inefficient, if not beleaguered nology. But we are going to economy using improved political relations obtain continue massive milita~y pro to grain, foreign credits, and 1 In sci grams and by the middle 1980s technology. pure the Soviets deserved their we will be in a position to return ence, and their to a much more aggressive for impressive reputation, demonstrated eign policy designed to gain the space program original ity and accomplishment in rocket upper hand in our relationshsp lacked with the West. engineeringŠbut they pro The Soviets viewed détente duction know-how necessary for long-term competition with the as fpeaceful coexistencef Leonid Brezhnev. Remarks in United States. Soviet managers had 1971 to the Politburo at the and as an avenue to difficulty in translating laboratory beginning of détente. improve their inefficient, if results to products, quality control was poor, and plants were badly During the Cold War, and especially not beleaguered economy organized. Cost accounting, even in in the 1970s, Soviet intelligence car the defense sector, was hopelessly using improved political ried out a substantial and successful inadequate. In computers and micro clandestine effort to obtain technical relations to obtain grain, electronics, the Soviets trailed and scientific knowledge from the and Western standards by more than a foreign credits, West. This effort was a suspected by decade. technology. few US Government officials but not documented until 1981, when French intelligence obtained the ser Soviet S&T 9, vices of Col. Vladimir I. Vetrov, Espionage fFarewell,f who photographed and supplied 4,000 KGB documents on The leadership recognized these the program. In the summer of shortcomings. Toaddress the lag in 1981, President Mitterrand told Pres technology, Soviet authorities in ident Reagan of the source, and, 1970 reconstituted and invigorated when the material was supplied, it the USSR™s intelligence collection for led to a potent counterintelligence science and technology. The Council response by CIA and the NATO of Ministers and the Central Com intelligence services. mittee established a new unit, Directorate T of the KGB™s First President Nixon and Secretary of Chief Directorate, to plumb the State Kissinger conceived of détente R&D programs of Western econo mies. as the search for ways of easing The State Committee on chronic strains in USŠSoviet rela Science and Technology and the Gus W. Weiss has served as a Spe tions. They sought to engage the Military-Industrial Commission Directorate T and cial Assistant to the Secretary of USSR in arrangements that would were to provide its Defense and as Director of Interna move the superpowers from confron operating arm, called Line X, with tional Economics for the National tation to negotiation. Arms control, collection requirements. Military Security Council. trade, and investment were the main Intelligence (GRU), the Soviet 121 Farewell Dossier Academy of Sciences, and the State States to visit firms and laboratories higher grain prices for consumers, and Committee for External Relations associated with their commissions. taxpayers provided for a 25-percent-a completed the list of participants. Line X, ever alert, populated these bushel export subsidy. Those of us The bulk of collection was to be delegations with its own people: in observing these arabesques began to done by the KGB and the GRU, an agricultural delegation of 100 question the USSR™s total commit with extensive support from the East about one-third were known or sus ment to the spirit of détente. European intelligence services. A for pected intelligence officers. On a midable apparatus was set up for visit to Boeing, a Soviet guest scientific of adhesive his shoes espionage; the scale this applied to to US Computer Export Policy structure testified to its importance. obtain metal samples. In another epi The coming of détente provided sode, the ranking scientists and In late 1973, President Nixon asked access for Line X and opened new managers of the Soviet computer and his Council on International Eco avenues for exploitation. Soviet intel electronics industry obtained a visa nomic Policy to determine which ligence took full advantage. for the specific purpose of visiting and associated the Uranus Liquid Crystal Watch computers production technology might be prudently sold In the early 1970s, the Nixon admin Company of Mineola, Long Island to Communist countries. This study (a firm not the Fortune 500). istration had no comprehensive among was necessary because détente for economic relations with Three days before the delegation™s policy implied the expansion of commercial the USSR. The sale of arrival, they requested an expansion strategic opportunities with Eastern Europe of the itinerary to include nearly all goods to Communist countries was and the USSR; a new and more lib governed by the Coordinating Com US computer and semiconductor eral set of COCOM rules was mittee of NATO which firms. This maneuver was done to (COCOM), fit these how observe (that is, collect) the latest required to prospects, administered an Alliance-agreed list ever illusory they may have been. of products and data embargoed for technology, and it was executed at Data processing was the most impor sale. Nixon™s policy worked within the last minute so that the Defense tant review. I was would not have time to product requiring this system, and, for the export of Department put in charge of the project, and I products exceeding the approved list, object. It was legalŠLine X had stud was also made for the ied our regulations and turned them responsible special exceptions were necessary. broader of trans to its problem technology And, in a new set of commercial and advantage. fer. The study was the first scientific the United computer arrangements, review of within To the latest aircraft technol technology policy States and the USSR set up joint acquire détente; it to assess the eco the Soviets in 1973 sought technical commissions to assess pros ogy, proposed nomic to the United States Lockheed if gain pects for cooperation. Topics purchasing 50 transports from computer sales set against the included agriculture, nuclear the firm, then in financial difficulty, energy, national risk from those sales. would build and modern fair security computers, and the environment. equip a As Kissinger noted: craft cityf in the USSR. A similar Not the concluded proposition was put to Boeing (it surprisingly, study the that the USSR was short of Over time, trade and investment besieges imagination to ponder comput Brezhnev from the cabin of ers and the means to for leaven the autarkic tenden appearing pay may substantial Our an Aeroflot 747). Line X practiced the computer imports. cies ofthe Soviet system, invite venerable capitalist technique of play analysis presumed that the Soviets gradual association of the Soviet ing off competitors, and, from this intended to use their foreign exchange economy with the world econ bidding, the Soviets sought to gain to best advantage by purchasing the omy, andfoster a degree of technical data for use at home. On most powerful computers, those that interdependence that adds an ele a less lofty technical plane, in 1972 also held the most national security ment to the ofstability political the Soviets risk were used for 2 surreptitiously bought (large computers relationship. 25 percent of the US grain harvest, nuclear weapons calculations and using phone intercepts of the grain cryptography). The report concluded Beginning in 1972, delegations of dealers™ network to listen to both sides that the export potential for American Soviet specialists came to the United of the market. The purchase led to data processing to the USSR was 122 Farewell Dossier In the early 1970s, there were no US intelligence collection requirements for small and the risk great if the more technology transfer and no evidence does not mean it is not powerful computers were allowed for true. The system defied movement. sale. The study recommended raising scientific espionage, and the of machines moderately power A few alert were few, if any, reporting colleagues dispersed allowed for COCOM release, while at among the executive departments. In the time the sale of sources. same restricting one episode, the Department of of the com technology. Export largest Commerce discovered a Line X to be In puters was prohibited.. ‚9 effort to obtain an embargoed com National Decision Memoran Security puter through a dummy corporation dum (NSDM) 247, 14 March 1974, set up for this one transaction; dotal hand. In their U S. Policy on the Export ofComputers clues were at officials intercepted the shipping to Communist Countries, President intelligence history, the Soviets could container and substituted sandbags. Nixon these recommenda to the success of the atom approved point (A note was enclosed, but it would tions, and became the new bomb and also had to they spies, they not be politically correct to quote it.) export guidelines. As a result, the Sovi their credit collection against indus In 1975, the Apollo-Soyuz spacecraft ets were excluded from trial in importing technology Germany during docking was used to gain intelligence Western com the 1920s. After World War the significantly powerful II, access to the US space program. This détente Soviets the American B-29 puters, notwithstanding. copied project was conceived by the Nixon and the Nene Rolls-Royce administration as part of détente, the If the Soviets were to reach compara jet engine (the copy powered and President Ford had no choice MiG- Two former members of bility with the United States in 15).
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