Course Syllabus

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Course Syllabus UNCLASSIFIED As of: 28 April 2017 National Intelligence University MSI 579 - Chinese Intelligence Summer Quarter 2017 Instructor: Joseph P. O’Neill, LTC, USAR-Retired Contact Info: (301) 243-2301; Joseph.O’[email protected]; Joseph.P.O’[email protected] Send all official correspondence to/from government email addresses only. Class Times: Wednesday, 1800-2120 (QAC) Office Hours: Tue, 1300-1500, ICC-B // Wed, 1400-1700, QAC // Fri, 0930-1130, ICC-B Course Description: This course examines the organization, missions, capabilities, and operations of China’s intelligence, influence, cyber, and internal security organizations. A primary objective is to enable students to assess the nature of the threat to U.S. national security and economic interests posed by PRC intelligence and information operations. The course also includes discussion of the role of intelligence and IO in PRC national security policy. In addition, the course covers U.S. efforts to counter PRC intelligence and IO activities. The course draws on readings from a variety of perspectives, including U.S. intelligence community products, other government publications, academic writings, and Chinese documents. Learning Outcomes Students will be able to: □ Recognize, understand, and analyze the organizations that make up the PRC intelligence, influence, cyber, and internal security apparatus and their respective missions. □ Recognize, understand, and analyze the role played by intelligence and IO in PRC strategy and policy for national security and economic development. □ Recognize, understand, and analyze the PRC intelligence/IO threat to the United States. □ Recognize, understand, and analyze efforts to counter PRC intelligence and IO. Course Requirements: Students are responsible for reading assigned material before each class in order to facilitate meaningful, substantive seminar discussion and dialogue. Readings are assigned from materials posted on Blackboard on NIPR and JWICS. Student performance will be assessed in terms of comprehending, critical thinking, synthesizing, and applying of the course content to “real world” issues and intelligence challenges – using essay examinations, presentations, and class participation. Student Performance Measures: Students’ performance will be measured based on their: Substantive participation in seminar discussions demonstrating that they have read and comprehended the assigned readings Ability to logically and persuasively present an oral critique of an assigned reading using supporting facts and evidence Ability to articulate in writing a coherent, evidence-based set of analyses and conclusions. Writing will be graded for proper spelling/grammar as well as content. Course Requirements – Graded Deliverables: Class Participation 25 % (Each session) Reading Critique and Presentation 25 % (Once per course on date assigned) Mid-term Exam 25 % Final Exam 25% UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED As of: 28 April 2017 All deliverables will be submitted to the instructor electronically via NIPR, JWICS, or Blackboard email. The file-name of all e-documents will begin with the student’s last name (E.G.: Smith 579 exam). Reading Critique and Presentation: Each student will present a critique of one reading during the course. Students will be assigned sequence numbers corresponding to readings designated [RC 1], [RC 2], [RC 3], etc. in the syllabus. The student will present the critique in a power-point presentation and will use the presentation to lead the class in a discussion of the reading. The student’s prepared remarks will not exceed 10 minutes. A template for the critique presentation is posted on Blackboard. The summary will be submitted in soft copy to the instructor NLT 23:59 the night before the class session via Blackboard message or dodiis email. Essay Exams: The exams are open book, and consist of essay questions with a four page, double-spaced page limit for each question. Citing of sources using endnotes is required (notes do not count toward the page limit); no bibliography is required. The exam questions are based on material from the readings, lectures, and class discussions. Use of classified sources and research outside of the assigned course material is encouraged. The exams are due via Blackboard Message or NIPR/JWICS email by the start of class sessions #3 and #7. Save essays in ONE document. Put your name in a header on each page. Include a standard NIU title page. Late exams will be penalized 5% per day. Class Participation: In-class discussion is an important part of graduate level education. In order to participate fully in seminar discussions, students must complete all readings before each session. The instructor will assign each student a participation grade based on the student’s level of participation and preparation. Class Participation Self Assessment: The instructor will consider student input when assigning class participation grades. Using the rubric at the end of the syllabus, give yourself a numeric score (e.g.: 89) for in-class participation. Provide a brief description (bullets) of your contributions to each class discussion. Keep track of your participation throughout the quarter. Turn in your input (using the form posted on Blackboard) at the end of Session 10. This is not optional. Absences: On rare occasions a student will miss a class for a compelling reason. In order to be considered “excused,” absences must be coordinated with the instructor prior to the session. Unexcused student absences will result in the automatic loss of one letter grade (e.g., A to A-) for the overall course per absence. To make up for the participation grade for an excused absence, a student will produce a text-only version of a Reading Critique (see guidance above and format on BB) for each of the readings designated with a [RC 1], [RC 2], [RC 3], etc. in the syllabus for the missed session. Critiques are due by the following class session. All assigned readings are posted on the course Blackboard (BB) sites: (NIPR) https://niu.blackboard.com ; (JWICS) https://blackboard.dodiis.ic.gov UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED As of: 28 April 2017 Course Outline Session Topic 1 (17 May) Origins, Organization, & Missions of the PRC Intelligence Apparatus 2 (24 May) Political-Military HUMINT Collection 3 (31 May) Economic and S&T HUMINT Collection 4 (7 June) IMINT, SIGINT, and ISR 5 (14 June) Cyber Espionage and Sabotage (CNE and CNA) 6 (21 June) Influence Operations and Propaganda 7 (28 June) Counterintelligence, Counter-subversion, and Internal Security 8 (5 July) Taiwan (ROC) Intelligence and CI issues Session 1: Origins, Organization, and Missions of PRC Intelligence (106 pp): Sawyer, Ralph. Subversive Information: The Historical Thrust of Chinese Intelligence, 2013, 17 pp. [RC 1] -- Zhang Xiaojun. The Science of Military Intelligence, Dec 2001, pp 26-37, 75-78. (16 pp) Guo Xuezhi. “The Intelligence Apparatus and Services under the People's Republic of China,” 2012. Ch. 9, pp 342-373. (31 pp) Inkster, Nigel. China’s Cyber Power, June 2016, pp 51-57. Hoffman, Samantha and Peter Mattis. Managing the Power Within: China’s State Security Commission, 18 July 2016, 6 pp. Mattis, Peter. Modernizing Military Intelligence: Playing Catch-Up (Part One), 5 Dec 2016, 6 pp. Mattis, Peter and Elsa Kania. Modernizing Military Intelligence: Playing Catchup (Part Two), 21 Dec 2016, 8 pp. [RC 2] Costello, John. The Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview, March 2017, 5 pp. (U) Intelligence document 1a, 2013, 9 pp. [JWICS BB] UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED As of: 28 April 2017 Session 2: Political-Military HUMINT Collection (100 pp): Zhang Xiaojun, The Science of Military Intelligence, Dec 2001, pp 89-93. Mattis, Peter. Five Ways China Spies, 6 March 2014, 4 pp. Schindler, John R. The Unpleasant Truth about Chinese Espionage, 22 April 2016, 4 pp. (U) Intelligence document 2a, 2013, 9 pp. [JWICS BB] [RC 3] (U) Intelligence document 2b, 2014, pp 3-29. [JWICS BB] (U) Intelligence document 2c, 2015, 9 pp. [JWICS email] [RC 4] (U) Intelligence document 2d, 2016, pp 3-36 (34 pp). [JWICS email] (U) Intelligence document 2e, 2017, 8 pp. [JWICS email] Session 3: Economic and S&T HUMINT Collection (HUMINT) (82 pp): China’s Program for Science and Technology Modernization: Implications for American Competitiveness, USCC, Jan 2011, pp 27-28, 92-98, 104-108. [14 pp] Hannas, William C., James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi. Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernisation, 22 May 2013, pp 1-3, 186-188, 204-208, 230-242 (20 pp). [RC 5] (U) FBI, Chinese Talent Programs, Sept 2015, 5 pp. (U) Intelligence document 3a, 2014, 3pp. [JWICS BB] (U) Intelligence document 3b, 2014, 10 pp. [JWICS BB] (U) Intelligence document 3c, 2016, pp 18-25. (6 pp) [JWICS BB] (U) Intelligence document 3d, 2016, pp 3-26. [JWICS BB] [RC 6] SCAN: U.S. Department of Justice, Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and Embargo-Related Criminal Cases, 17 Feb 2017. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED As of: 28 April 2017 Session 4: China’s Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) (66 pp) Zhang Xiaojun, The Science of Military Intelligence, Dec 2001, pp 94-98. Stokes, Mark A. and Dean Cheng. China's Evolving Space Capabilities, 25 April 2012, pp 28-43 (16 pp). Easton, Ian and Russell Hsiao. The Chinese PLA’s UAV Project, 11 March 2013, pp 2-3, 5, 11- 15 (8 pp). Easton, Ian. China’s Evolving Recon-Strike Capabilities, Feb 2014, pp 5, 9-15, 20-21. (U) Intelligence document 4a, 2014, 8 pp. [JWICS BB] (U) Intelligence document 4b, 2015, 11 pp. [JWICS email] [RC 7] (U) Intelligence document 4c, 2017, pp 4, 7-9, 14-17, 22 (8 pp) [JWICS BB] [RC 8] Session 5: Cyber Espionage and Sabotage (94 pp): FireEye. Redline Drawn: China Recalculates … Cyber Espionage, June 2016, 12 pp. [RC 9] Raud, Mikk. China and Cyber: Attitude, Strategies, Organisation, Sep 2016, 23 pp. (U) Intelligence document 5a, 2013. pp i-v. [JWICS BB] (U) Intelligence document 5b, 2014, 10 pp [JWICS BB] (U) Intelligence document 5c, 2016, 7 pp.
Recommended publications
  • What Is Counterintelligence? and How Lessons on Counterintelligence Might Enrich Their Courses
    Association of Former Intelligence Officers From AFIO's The Intelligencer 7700 Leesburg Pike, Suite 324 Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Falls Church, Virginia 22043 Web: www.afio.com , E-mail: [email protected] Volume 20 • Number 2 • $15 single copy price Fall/Winter 2013 ©2013, AFIO measure what an adversary knows about us? How do we determine whether or not we are successful in keeping our secrets and projecting the image we wish Guide to the Study of Intelligence to project? How do we know what and whom to trust?3 This article is a short cut to some basic concepts about counterintelligence: what it is and is not. Educa- tors in history, government, political science, ethics, law and cognitive psychology should consider whether What is Counterintelligence? and how lessons on counterintelligence might enrich their courses. Recommended additional readings are suggested in the footnotes. A Guide to Thinking A general introductory course on U.S. counter- and Teaching about CI intelligence should have five key learning objectives: Understanding the meaning of counterintelli- gence, its place within intelligence studies, and by Michelle K. Van Cleave its role in international relations as an instrument of statecraft.4 Understanding the difference between tactical WHY STUDY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE? and strategic CI,5 the difference between CI and security,6 and the range of foreign intelligence he study of “counterintelligence” is rare in aca- 3. Consider for example the deception paradox: “Alertness to demia. While modern courses on international deception presumably prompts a more careful and systematic relations often include intelligence, they usually review of the evidence.
    [Show full text]
  • Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • US Intelligence on the Soviet Economy and Long-Term Competition
    Response Essay Rubles, Dollars, and Power: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Economy and Long-Term Competition Austin Long Rubles, Dollars, and Power: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Economy and Long-Term Competition This response essay explores some of the key areas of agreement and disagreement between two recent articles on Cold War-era assessments of the Soviet economy. Andrew W. Marshall and Abram N. Shulsky, Similar questions are being asked today about the “Assessing Sustainability of Command Chinese economy, making this more than an issue Economies and Totalitarian Regimes: The of historical interest.4 Soviet Case,” Orbis 62, no. 2 (Spring 2018), Fortunately, two recent articles revisiting Cold https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2018.02.011. War-era intelligence on the Soviet economy provide an accessible entry point for those Marc Trachtenberg, “Assessing Soviet grappling with such questions today. The first Economic Performance During the Cold War: is by two participants in the original debate A Failure of Intelligence?” Texas National about the Soviet economy. Andrew Marshall was Security Review 1, no. 2 (March 2018), founding director of the Office of Net Assessment http://hdl.handle.net/2152/63942. in the Office of the Secretary of Defense after more than two decades as an economist at the he 2018 National Defense Strategy RAND Corporation. Abram Shulsky was minority articulates a clear vision that “[t]he staff director for the Senate Select Committee on central challenge to U.S. prosperity and Intelligence before joining the Defense Department security is the reemergence of long- during the Reagan administration.
    [Show full text]
  • Educação Histórica: Perspetivas De Investigação Nacional E Internacional
    EDUCAÇÃO HISTÓRICA: PERSPETIVAS DE INVESTIGAÇÃO NACIONAL E INTERNACIONAL COORD. ISABEL BARCA LUÍS ALBERTO MARQUES ALVES FICHA TÉCNICA TÍTULO Educação Histórica: Perspetivas de Investigação Nacional e Internacional (XV Congresso das Jornadas Internacionais de Educação Histórica) COORDENAÇÃO Isabel Barca Luís Alberto Marques Alves EDIÇÃO: CITCEM Centro de Investigação Transdisciplinar «Cultura, Espaço e Memória» DESIGN: by Scala | Graphic Performance (de acordo com as normas CITCEM) ISBN 978-989-8351-60-9 Porto, 2016 — Trabalho cofinanciado pelo Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER) através do COMPETE 2020 – Programa Operacional Competitividade e Internacionalização (POCI) e por fundos nacionais através da FCT, no âmbito do projeto POCI-01-0145-FEDER-007460. ENSINAR COM A SÉTIMA ARTE – O ESPAÇO DO CINEMA NA DIDÁTICA DA HISTÓRIA TIAGO DOS SANTOS REIGADA18 RESUMO A apresentação desenvolverá a temática do cinema sob o ponto de vista da sua relação com a História e com o Ensino da História. Através de um olhar retrospetivo, pretendemos perceber qual a relação estabelecida entre cinema e História, e vice-versa, com o objetivo de encontrar pontos de ancoragem que nos permitam enquadrá-la no âmbito da didática, fazendo do filme o ponto de partida para aprendizagens significativas em História. Com este propósito em mente, faremos uma breve contextualização teórica que incorpora os vetores cinema, História e Didática, que nos permitirá depois traçar o perfil de utilização do filme na sala de aula de História, analisar as suas potencialidades
    [Show full text]
  • Strategically-Motivated Advanced Persistent Threat: Definition, Process, Tactics and a Disinformation Model of Counterattack
    Strategically-Motivated Advanced Persistent Threat: Definition, Process, Tactics and a Disinformation Model of Counterattack Atif Ahmad Jeb Webb School of Computing and Information Systems Oceania Cyber Security Centre The University of Melbourne Melbourne, Australia Parkville, Australia [email protected] [email protected] Kevin C. Desouza James Boorman QUT Business School Oceania Cyber Security Centre Queensland University of Technology Melbourne, Australia Queensland, Australia [email protected] [email protected] Abstract Advanced persistent threat (APT) is widely acknowledged to be the most sophisticated and potent class of security threat. APT refers to knowledgeable human attackers that are organized, highly sophisticated and motivated to achieve their objectives against a targeted organization(s) over a prolonged period. Strategically-motivated APTs or S-APTs are distinct in that they draw their objectives from the broader strategic agenda of third parties such as criminal syndicates, nation-states, and rival corporations. In this paper we review the use of the term “advanced persistent threat,” and present a formal definition. We then draw on military science, the science of organized conflict, for a theoretical basis to develop a rigorous and holistic model of the stages of an APT operation which we subsequently use to explain how S-APTs execute their strategically motivated operations using tactics, techniques and procedures. Finally, we present a general disinformation model, derived from situation awareness theory, and explain how disinformation can be used to attack the situation awareness and decision making of not only S-APT operators, but also the entities that back them. Keywords: Advanced Persistent Threat; APT; Cybersecurity; Information Security Management; Situation Awareness Theory; Strategic Disinformation 1.0 Introduction • On 3 October 2018, FireEye published an article on what is thought to be a state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) team dubbed “APT38” (Fraser et al 2018).
    [Show full text]
  • US Economic Policies and the End of the Cold
    Trading with the Enemy: U.S. Economic Policies and the End of the Cold War A dissertation presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy Tyler P. Esno April 2017 © 2017 Tyler P. Esno. All Rights Reserved. 2 This dissertation titled Trading with the Enemy: U.S. Economic Policies and the End of the Cold War by TYLER P. ESNO has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Chester J. Pach, Jr. Associate Professor of History Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT ESNO, TYLER P., Ph.D., April 2017, History Trading with the Enemy: U.S. Economic Policies and the End of the Cold War Director of Dissertation: Chester J. Pach, Jr. This dissertation argues that U.S. economic strategies and policies were effective means to wage the Cold War during its final years and conclude the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. Using recently declassified U.S. and British government documents, among other sources, this analysis reveals that actions in East-West economic relations undermined cooperative U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1970s, contributed to heightened tensions in the early 1980s, and helped renew the U.S.-Soviet dialogue in the late 1980s. Scholars have focused on the role arms control initiatives and political actions played in the end of the Cold War. Arms control agreements, however, failed to resolve the underlying ideological and geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
    [Show full text]
  • Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Form Approved Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2. REPORT TYPE JUN 2012 00-00-2012 to 00-00-2012 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One 5b. GRANT NUMBER Interagency Group Made a Major Difference 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER 5th Avenue Ft. Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.
    [Show full text]
  • Cold War Days: Lies, Deaths and Aggression
    COLD WAR DAYS Lies, Deaths and Aggression Fidel Castro Ruz Almost four decades ago scientists living in the United States discovered the Internet, the same way that Albert Einstein, born in Germany, discovered in his own time the formula to measure atomic energy. Einstein was a great scientist and humanist. He contradicted Newton's laws of physics, held sacred until then. However, apples continued to fall due to the laws of gravity that had been defined by Newton. These were two different ways of observing and interpreting nature, with very little information on this in Newton's day. I remember what I read more than 50 years ago about the famous theory of relativity elaborated by Einstein: energy is equal to mass times the speed of light, called C, squared: E=MC². The United States money existed and the resources necessary for such expensive research. The political climate resulting from the generalized hatred against the brutalities of Nazism in the richest and most productive nation in the world destroyed by the war, transformed that fabulous energy into bombs that were dropped over the defenseless populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths and a similar number of people who were exposed to radiation and subsequently died in the following years. A clear example of the use of science and technology with the same hegemonic goals is described in an article written by the former official of United States National Security, Gus W Weiss; it originally appeared in the magazine Studies in Intelligence, in 1996, even though it was more widely distributed in 2002 under the title of Deceiving the Soviets.
    [Show full text]
  • The Farewell Dossier (Gus W. Weiss)
    Duping the Soviets The Farewell Dossier Gus W. Weiss We communists have to string substantive topics. The Soviets along with the capitalists for a viewed détente as fpeaceful coexist while. We need their credits, encef and as an avenue to improve their agriculture, and their tech their inefficient, if not beleaguered nology. But we are going to economy using improved political relations obtain continue massive milita~y pro to grain, foreign credits, and 1 In sci grams and by the middle 1980s technology. pure the Soviets deserved their we will be in a position to return ence, and their to a much more aggressive for impressive reputation, demonstrated eign policy designed to gain the space program original ity and accomplishment in rocket upper hand in our relationshsp lacked with the West. engineeringŠbut they pro The Soviets viewed détente duction know-how necessary for long-term competition with the as fpeaceful coexistencef Leonid Brezhnev. Remarks in United States. Soviet managers had 1971 to the Politburo at the and as an avenue to difficulty in translating laboratory beginning of détente. improve their inefficient, if results to products, quality control was poor, and plants were badly During the Cold War, and especially not beleaguered economy organized. Cost accounting, even in in the 1970s, Soviet intelligence car the defense sector, was hopelessly using improved political ried out a substantial and successful inadequate. In computers and micro clandestine effort to obtain technical relations to obtain grain, electronics, the Soviets trailed and scientific knowledge from the and Western standards by more than a foreign credits, West.
    [Show full text]
  • FAREWELL a Film by Christian Carion
    NORD-OUEST and LE BUREAU Present Emir Kusturica Guillaume Canet FAREWELL A film by Christian Carion Running time: 1h52' World Sales Pathé International Paris Office London Office 2 rue Lamennais Kent House, 14 – 17 Market place 75008 Paris London, W1W8AR Phone : +33 1 71 72 33 05 Phone : + 44 207 462 4427 Fax : +33 1 71 72 33 10 Fax : + 44 207 436 7891 www.patheinternational.com www.pathepicturesinternational.co.uk [email protected] [email protected] US/International press contact: Sophie Gluck Sophie Gluck & Associates Cell: +1 917 593 8159 [email protected] FAREWELL Synopsis In 1981, Colonel Grigoriev of the KGB (real name - Vladimir Vetrov), disenchanted with what the Communist ideal has become under Brezhnev, decides he is going to change the world… Discreetly, he makes contact with a French engineer working for Thomson in Moscow and little by little passes on documents to him - mainly concerning the United States - containing information which would constitute the most important Cold War espionage operation known to date. During a period of two years, French President, François Mitterrand, was to personally vet the documents supplied by this source in Moscow, to whom the French Secret Service gave the codename “Farewell”. Then master of the White House, Ronald Reagan, set aside his reluctance to work with a French Socialist to put this unhoped-for information from the very heart of the KGB to use. Farewell would in fact decapitate the network which enabled the KGB to gain in-depth knowledge of scientific, industrial and military research in the West. Once the USSR had been deprived of these precious sources of information, Ronald Reagan’s announcement of the new “Star Wars” military programme sounded the death knell of the Soviet Union.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Perspectives No. 11
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • Industrial Espionage Today and Information Wars of Tomorrow
    Industrial Espionage Today and Information Wars of Tomorrow Paul M. Joyal President To be presented at the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference Baltimore Convention Center Baltimore, MD October 22-25,1996 INTEGER Security Inc. Information and Analytic Services 725 15th Street, NW, Suite 908 Washington, DC 20005 Tel: (202) 347-2624, Fax (202) 347-4631 Industrial Espionage Today and Information Wars of Tomorrow. October 22-25, 1996 Baltimore, Maryland Paul M. Joyal President INTEGER Security Inc. Information and Analytic Services 725 15th Street, NW, Suite 908 Washington, DC 20005 Tel: (202) 347-2624, Fax (202) 347-4631 ABSTRACT In this report we review case histories of industrial espionage publicized in the media and in Congressional hearings. The threat to the United States as the world's largest investor in R&D is magnified by the transition from a cold war military confrontation of the super powers to economic competition in global markets. To sustain their market share, France, Japan and Russia have initiated national programs to acquire U.S. technical know-how. Former intelligence staff now distill fragments of sensitive information into meaningful intelligence to guide industrial and national efforts towards dominance. This threat is amplified by the exponential proliferation of global communication networks, like the INTERNET, that reach into corporate America and permit unseen adversaries to probe the vast U.S. data stores for unprotected intelligence. Counter intelligence in industrial espionage by the United States on a national level is virtually impossible because of public scrutiny in our open society. On the positive side, the upheaval of a rapid transition from the global political high-tension and high stability of the Cold War to the low-tension and high instability of the so-called new world order has prompted increased international collaboration against international terrorism and organized crime.
    [Show full text]