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DEMOCRATIC

OFFENSE 535 AGAINST

DISINFORMATION 154

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CONTENTS ABOUT THE AUTHORS Executive Summary...... 2 Dr. Alina Polyakova is the President and Chief Defense Against Disinformation: Executive Officer of the Center for European A Mixed Report Card ...... 3 Policy Analysis (CEPA). She serves on the A Burgeoning Sector of Disinformation board of the Free Russia Foundation and the Institute of Modern Russia and is professor of Research Groups...... 7 European studies at the Johns Hopkins School Stop the Whack-a-Mole Approach: of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Dr. Get on the Offense ...... 10 Polyakova was the founding director for global Cyber Options ...... 11 and emerging technology at the Sanctions (and Other Financial) Tools...... 15 Brookings Institution. ‘The Shall Set You Free’: Ambassador Daniel Fried is Ambassador Daniel Support for Free Media...... 17 Fried is the Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow Recommendations...... 20 at the Atlantic Council. Ambassador Fried Conclusion...... 25 served as Assistant Secretary of State for Endnotes...... 26 and as NSC Senior Director under President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush, and as Ambassador to . He most recently served in as State Department Coordinator for Sanctions under President Barack Obama. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This three-part series on how can defend against and get ahead of disinformation would not have been possible without help ABOUT CEPA from many colleagues in the The Center for European Analysis (CEPA) and Europe. This paper, and the ones before is a non-partisan think-tank dedicated to it, would not have become a reality without strengthening the transatlantic relationship. Geysha González, who remained committed to Headquartered in Washington, D.C. and led by the work since the first paper was published seasoned transatlanticists and young leaders in 2018. We also received valuable feedback from both sides of the Atlantic, CEPA brings and support from colleagues at the Atlantic an innovative approach to the policy arena. Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab and Our cutting-edge analysis and timely debates the Center for European Policy Analysis. Many galvanize communities of influence while others from the public, private, and nonprofit investing in the next generation of leaders to sectors across the Atlantic lent their expertise understand and address present and future in the review process. Alexander Wirth of the challenges to transatlantic values and principles. Center for European Policy Analysis stepped in at just the right moment to move this project forward. The authors also thank the Delegation of the to the United States for its generous support without which this report would not have been possible. This report is part of CEPA’s Digital Innovation Initiative, which receives generous support from Craig Newmark Philanthropies.

All opinions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Cover: Assets from freepik.com were used.

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The intentional use of misleading its efforts globally. Moreover, Russia is to influence societies, or no longer the sole threat in the foreign disinformation, presents a serious threat influence game. The Chinese Communist to the integrity of democratic systems. Party (CCP) has far greater resources Authoritarian states regularly use it to than Russia and a long track record of exploit democracies’ open information information manipulation and aggressive systems, presenting a significant intervention in Taiwan and Hong Kong. national security threat that demands a With the Covid-19 pandemic, China purposeful and concerted response. This entered the global disinformation space, paper is the third in a series of papers targeting Europe, NATO, and the United that deals with how democracies can States, working from the Kremlin’s build resilience against disinformation. playbook. There is now growing evidence The first installment, Democratic that Russia and China are working Defense Against Disinformation,1 together to amplify anti-democratic and its follow-up, Democratic Defense narratives.4 Against Disinformation 2.0,2 unpacked the challenge of foreign-origin Democracies have aimed to identify, disinformation and suggested practical expose, and build greater public steps to deal with it, including actions by awareness of state-sponsored , social media companies, disinformation with the goal of building up greater long-term resilience to and . The core argument was 5 that defense against disinformation has information influence operations. But to be rooted in democratic principles and the adversaries adapt and evolve their values: transparency, accountability, and strategies and tactics to circumvent respect for freedom of expression. We exposure and attribution. Companies, must not become them to fight them. researchers, and governments are playing whack-a-mole — responding While domestic-origin disinformation to each disinformation campaign as it is a more widespread (and growing) arises while trying (and failing) to keep challenge, the tools to deal with foreign up with new threats. To get ahead of state-sponsored disinformation are foreign disinformation, democracies must broader. The Russian government was the develop a proactive strategy to prevent first mover and innovator in exploiting state-sponsored information operations the digital information environment to in the first place.6 That means getting off carry out influence operations against our back foot and getting on the . democracies, targeting the United States, This paper, written principally for the Europe, and countries beyond.3 United States but hopefully applicable in adapted form to other countries, is But while Russian interference in the a road map for how countries can get 2016 U.S. elections awoke Americans ahead of foreign disinformation. The and Europeans to the threat of new U.S. administration should lead the disinformation, the response has not democratic community in this effort. deterred the Kremlin, which has extended

1 Democratic Offense Against Disinformation

We, therefore, recommend Executive Summary supplementing defense with offense. Our The United States and other democratic recommendations are designed for the countries have made progress United States; some may be adaptable by defending against foreign and domestic European governments and the European disinformation. Unevenly, but steadily, a Union (EU) as well. Offense does not mean structure for democratic defense against spreading disinformation (that would not disinformation is emerging, consistent be consistent with democratic values and with the principles of transparency, democracies aren’t good at it anyway). It accountability, and respect for freedom of does mean building up: expression. It includes: • Cyber tools to identify and disrupt • a growing network of disinformation foreign disinformation operations. The detectors (led by civil society U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) sometimes informed by government has already launched this option — the agencies); U.S. terms it “hunt, surveil, expose and disable.” It has the appeal • social media companies (responsive of immediacy and directness, but at to public and legislative pressure) its harder-edged end it has drawbacks. that constrict disinformation on their The “disable” option needs to be platforms; implemented with care.

• an informed media that exposes • Sanctions (and other financial) tools disinformation; and against disinformation actors and their sources of funding, and development • potentially, at a next stage, a regulatory of contingent retaliatory sanctions framework that seeks to filter out as a deterrent. Use of the sanctions inauthentic and deceptive behavior. tool requires persistence to apply well and its impact will be moderate While defensive measures cannot rather than decisive. It will be more block all disinformation, they can limit effective if carried out in parallel by the disinformation as more people learn United States, the EU, and the United to filter it out on their own (“social Kingdom. resilience”). • Support for free media in the broad But defense is working against a moving sense, including journalists, activists, target. Purveyors of disinformation have and independent investigators, can grown more sophisticated and their tactics be the most effective tool of counter- continue to advance. The line between disinformation. It is asymmetric domestic and foreign disinformation — it does not directly counter has blurred, with Russian agents using disinformation — but plays to the local actors as proxies to carry out greatest strengths of free societies disinformation operations. “” are dealing with authoritarian adversaries: progressing beyond the ability to detect the inherent attraction, over the long such content in real time. China and other run, of truth. This was a key lesson foreign players (Iran, for example) have also of the Cold , when 20th century entered the disinformation game. methods, e.g., support for independent Defensive tactics based on democratic values broadcasting at Radio Free can mitigate the impact of disinformation, Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), proved but there remains a mismatch between effective in reaching societies inside the the fast-evolving threat and the slow and Soviet Bloc. Today, implementation of efforts to manage it. updated technologies, including direct,

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although unofficial, support for activist journalists working both inside and Defense Against outside Russia (and China) may become Disinformation: A a 21st century equivalent. China’s Mixed Report Card media and internet landscape is more restrictive than Russia’s but options exist there as well. These activities can The good be slow to yield measurable results Emerging whole-of-society counter- but can have strategic impact over disinformation activities: Transatlantic time, if applied with creativity and democracies — governments, researchers, determination. and the private sector/social media The United States and, to some degree, companies — have generally moved the EU, NATO, and some European beyond denying the disinformation national governments, are already challenge (or describing disinformation applying versions of these tools, but often in awestruck terms as insurmountable) to haphazardly, without integrating them testing solutions. into a policy framework and with only • EU’s actions: spotty coordination. For the first two levels of tools, governments will have the lead; ʑ 2015: The European External for the third, civil society groups will be Action Service (EEAS) established critical and, in some cases, leading actors. the EastStratCom Task Force to identify and raise awareness around Russian disinformation campaigns against EU member While defensive measures states. Initially deeply underfunded cannot block all disinformation, with few members, the task force finally received significant EU they can limit disinformation budget support and expanded to 16 members by 2020. The EUvsDisinfo as more people learn to filter it database now holds almost 10,000 out on their own examples of disinformation.8 But the future of the taskforce remains uncertain as it is not a permanent unit and relies on staff seconded The new U.S. administration under from EU member states. President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. is likely to be more committed to developing a ʑ 2018: The European Commission strategic response to disinformation, and developed an Action Plan Against be more effective generally, in crafting Disinformation9 and concluded and implementing policies. U.S. President a voluntary Code of Practice Donald J. Trump’s mixed signals with on Disinformation with major respect to Russian disinformation, attacks social media companies, which on free media, and distracting fights with lays out policy norms to restrict European allies prevented a coordinated disinformation. The enlisted response and set the United States back7. companies, initially including Recovering from these setbacks will not be Facebook, Google, , and easy, but the new Biden administration will Mozilla, now joined by Microsoft have a roadmap for what to do. and TikTok,10 have been providing monthly reports to the European Commission. The results appear

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France’s President Emmanuel Macron gestures as he speaks to the press after a plenary session at the Bellevue centre in Biarritz, August 25, 2019. Ludovic Marin/Pool via .

mixed in terms of the detail of data Services Act (DSA) — to be finalized provided, independent verification, at the end of 2020. The former and lack of standard terminology will likely lay out next steps on and report structure.11 the Code of Practice and may help turn currently voluntary measures ʑ 2019: In preparation for the into regulation. The DSA, on the EU parliamentary elections in other hand, takes an expansive May 2019, the EU established a view of digital regulatory policy, Rapid Alert System to facilitate including the likely establishment information sharing, expose of an independent body to regulate disinformation in real time, and everything from data use to rules coordinate with other multilateral of the road around emerging efforts by the G-7 and NATO. technologies and e-commerce. Critics have noted that the system has yet to issue an alert, but EU • Notable actions by European national officials assert that the system is governments: working. ʑ : Most European ʑ 2020: The EU is integrating lessons governments have established learned from previous efforts into counter-disinformation teams two broader policy initiatives — to coordinate governmental the European Democracy Action efforts to identify and respond to Plan (EDAP) and the Digital disinformation operations, but

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Sweden has long been ahead in blow to the Macron government’s identifying the threat, analyzing counter-disinformation policy. its societal vulnerabilities, committing significant resources, ʑ : Following the and developing a strategic plan. poisoning of former Russian The Counter Information Influence spy Sergei Skripal by Russia’s Section at the Swedish Civil military service, Contingencies Agency (MSB) leads the GRU, in Salisbury in 2018, the effort and a newly expanded the UK government developed a Psychological Defense Agency is whole-of-government approach in the process of being established to responding to disinformation by 2022.12 The agency has trained attacks. The effort is led by the more than 14,000 Swedish Department for Digital, Culture, public servants in the subject of Media and Sport (DCMS) which information influence since 2016. coordinates efforts to expose foreign disinformation, alert the ʑ France: In 2018, French President public, and assess appropriate Emmanuel Macron launched the responses through a counter- Paris Call for Trust and Security in disinformation cell that engages Cyberspace that seeks to establish intelligence agencies, tech experts, international cyber norms. It has, the Foreign Office, as well as as of this writing, attracted backing other government agencies. from 78 governments, civil society The UK’s broadcast regulator, groups, and a number of major Ofcom, is involved in an ongoing European and U.S. corporations investigation of China Global (including Facebook, Google, and Network (CGTN) for its Microsoft).13 Notably, Amazon, broadcasting of illegally obtained Apple, and Twitter have not joined “confessions.”15 the Paris Call. And while the United States opted out of it, its • Multilateral institutions’ actions: platform provides a valuable space ʑ NATO: The NATO Strategic for multi-stakeholder discussions. Communications Center of 16 France’s domestic initiatives to Excellence in Riga, established in regulate disinformation through 2014, and the European Center of content moderation have been Excellence on Countering Hybrid 17 far less successful. In June 2020, Threats in (the Helsinki a French court struck down as Hybrid CoE, established in 2017, unconstitutional a hate speech that works with both the EU and passed by Parliament and supported NATO) are active in identifying by Macron’s government.14 The so- disinformation among other hybrid called Avia Law would have forced threats and sharing best practices social media platforms to take for countering them. Both have down content reported by users added Chinese disinformation to as hateful within 24 hours or face their areas of responsibility. Their fines of up to €1.25 million ($1.46 focus is primarily on research million) among other stringent and coordination, however, and provisions. The French court’s neither has the power to affect and ruling saw the law as infringing on mandate policy. free speech. The ruling was a major

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ʑ G7: In 2018, the G7 established the Europe and elsewhere to carry out Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) counter-disinformation research at ’s initiative. The RRM and develop monitoring tools. aims to coordinate information sharing and respond to “malign and ʑ The U.S. Cyber Command evolving threats to G7 democracies” (USCYBERCOM) has gained and grew out of the Charlevoix prominence through its Commitment on Defending actions targeting purveyors of Democracies from Foreign Threats.18 disinformation and a new proactive posture that USCYBERCOM calls ʑ : In the wake “persistent engagement” as part of disinformation campaigns of the Department of Defense’s around the Covid-19 “infodemic,” “defend forward” framework.21 the United Nations launched an initiative called Verifiedto ʑ The U.S. Congress has been counter the spread of misleading considering legislation that information on the public health would constrict the space for crisis. It relies on individuals to disinformation. The 2017 Honest sign up as volunteers to receive Ads Act would mandate social verified content and share in their media platforms to keep a public communities and social media. database identifying purchase of This “crowdsourcing” approach is paid political ads while preventing a public-private partnership and foreign entities from purchasing takes on a novel approach that online political ads (as is the case relies on private citizens to be with non-digital ads). While the bill KFOR providing assistance to local communities in Kosovo to help fight the COVID-19 pandemic. trusted community messengers.19 has stalled in Congress, companies Credit: NATO. Though its sustainability remains have de facto implemented its in question, the program had main provisions through their recruited 10,000 volunteers own policies. The 2019 Digital worldwide as of July 2020.20 Citizenship and Media Literacy The U.N. and the World Health Act would allocate $20 million Organization (WHO) have in funding for media and digital also partnered with Facebook, literacy education in U.S. public WhatsApp, and other messaging schools. This bill has also not services and telecom operators to passed Congress. deliver accurate information about • Notable private sector actions: the pandemic. ʑ Coordination among companies: • U.S. actions: Social media companies and ʑ The U.S. government’s Global others are implementing counter- Engagement Center (GEC, housed disinformation policies regarding at the State Department) has a issue and other political ads, taking mandate to counter state-sponsored down coordinated inauthentic disinformation, adding to its behavior, labeling misleading original mandate to counter terrorist information and state-sponsored and Islamist . With media outlets, working more significant congressional funding closely with civil society groups of $64.3 million and an additional concerned about disinformation, $138 million requested for 2021, and generally engaging more with the GEC has provided funding to researchers and governments. independent research groups in

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ʑ Ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections, aimed at reducing disinformation with LinkedIn, Pinterest, Reddit, respect to the 2020 U.S. elections.25 Verizon Media, and the Wikimedia Foundation joined Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft A Burgeoning Sector to coordinate with the U.S. of Disinformation intelligence community to identify disinformation campaigns.22 This led Research Groups to several takedowns of coordinated What was once a niche specialty has inauthentic behavior, including evolved into a burgeoning field of research, the removal of a network linked to in both the nonprofit and private sectors. the Kremlin-connected troll farm Early responders from frontline states, (IRA) 23 such as the Baltic Elves and ’s from Facebook. StopFake, are now part of a large global • Twitter, once seen as the most network of universities, think tanks, problematic of the platforms given nonprofit research groups, consultancies, 26 the extent of the IRA’s activities and and independent media organizations. the ease of access, is now an industry Governments and foundations have leader in setting the policy agenda. The increased funding for counter- company has banned: disinformation efforts, while companies ʑ by all state-controlled and political campaigns now recognize media, including RT and Sputnik24 the need to understand the threat and and respond. Groups long devoted to counter- disinformation are developing ties with ʑ all political advertising. other civil society groups new to the topic, including U.S. domestic civil right It has extended and refined policies, groups (e.g., the Congressional Black including: Caucus Foundation and the Leadership Conference on Civil and ) ʑ labeling state-controlled media and which have discovered that Russian-origin key government accounts, initially disinformation is linked to U.S. right-wing from the United States, the UK, extremist groups and others with a bigoted Russia, France, and China; policy agenda (e.g., restricting minority ʑ a framework for labelling and voting rights).27 The ability to monitor, removing manipulated or synthetic identify, and expose disinformation media and misleading information operations is rapidly improving as intended to undermine public information sharing between these groups confidence in an election; and grows.

ʑ a policy framework for limiting coordinated harmful activity, which A whole-of-society has reduced the reach of such response is still in content. nascent stages Twitter continues to be the only social The abovementioned efforts constitute media company to publish a full an emerging structure for democratic archive of the information operations defense against disinformation: a it has removed, including all the tweets growing network of disinformation and related media. In October 2020, detectors (led by civil society sometimes Twitter announced additional policies informed by government agencies), social

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media companies (responsive to public They set up shell media and social and legislative pressure) constricting media companies, attempted to disinformation on their platforms, convince unsuspecting individuals to informed media alert to disinformation “rent out” their social media accounts campaigns and exposing them, and a and contracted local journalists careful regulatory framework (reflecting to publish misleading content.28 a developing set of international norms) Such tactics obfuscate detection by targeted less at content control and more blending in with domestic voices and at filtering out inauthentic and deceptive taking away a telltale sign of foreign behavior. interference: the use of foreign-based accounts whose location gives away Defensive measures cannot filter out all their true identity. disinformation. No doubt, some individuals will believe even exposed falsehoods if they As China has entered the disinformation tend to confirm preexisting biases. But at game, its approach has not simply copied their best, defensive measures can limit the Kremlin’s playbook. Rather, Beijing is disinformation as societies slowly learn to deploying a more far-reaching and deeply filter it. embedded set of tools to sway public opinion in democratic societies, using the full scope of China’s economic and The bad news political power. China’s “” Defensive efforts are still at an early stage, strategy, documented by the National sometimes in sketch form only, and often Endowment for Democracy, aims to merely attempting whack-a-mole against penetrate the political and information an evolving threat. environments in target countries.29 With China’s mishandling of the early A rapidly evolving threat: Disinformation stages of the Covid-19 pandemic facing campaigns have grown more sophisticated. international , Beijing has For instance: stepped up its information influence • The production of increasingly operations aimed at Western democracies, credible disinformation content using highlighting shortcomings in their artificial intelligence (e.g., “deepfakes” public health systems, promoting its own or “synthetic media”) is rapidly efforts to provide medical and personal progressing far beyond the ability to protective equipment, and attempting to detect such content in real time. curb international political contacts with Taiwan. • Foreign state-sponsored disinformation operations, no longer restricted to the Policy responses frontline states of Central and in the case of Russia or Taiwan woefully lag and Hong Kong in the case of China, In the meantime, policy steps taken by key pose a global threat. players remain uneven.

• The line between domestic and foreign • Notwithstanding constructive disinformation has blurred. Working steps, social media companies have through local proxies, disinformation inconsistent approaches to the challenge purveyors are able to hide the true of disinformation. For example, Twitter source of online content. In Ukraine, bans political ads while other social Africa, and America, Russian media platforms do not. In another agents used local actors as proxies to inconsistency, when confronted in carry out disinformation operations. May 2019 with a deceptively altered

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Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey is seen testifying remotely via videoconference as U.S. Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) listens during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing titled, «Breaking the News: , Suppression, and the 2020 Election,? on Facebook and Twitter’s content moderation practices, on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S., November 17, 2020. REUTERS/Hannah McKay/Pool.

video of Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the • Implementation of the EU’s U.S. House of Representatives, YouTube policy framework for combating removed the video, Facebook de- disinformation remains spotty. ranked it, and Twitter let it stand.30 European critics have characterized Inconsistent standards can be exploited the EU’s Rapid Alert System (RAS) on by purveyors of disinformation, who disinformation as being neither rapid can tailor their tactics to exploit the nor alert nor a system; that may be gaps and opportunities. unfair, but the RAS does seem off to a slow start. Social media companies have concentrated on takedowns of inauthentic content. • The United States still lags the EU That is a good (and publicly visible) step (and many EU member states). While but does not address deeper issues of the United States has sometimes acted content distribution (e.g., micro-targeting), with strength against purveyors of algorithmic bias toward extremes, and lack disinformation, e.g., by indicting IRA- of transparency. The EU’s own evaluation connected individuals,31 U.S. policy of the first year of implementation of its is inconsistent. The U.S. government Code of Practice concludes that social media has no equivalent to the European companies have not provided independent Commission’s Action Plan Against researchers with data sufficient for them to Disinformation and no corresponding make independent evaluations of progress Code of Practice on Disinformation, against disinformation. and there remains no one in the

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U.S. government in overall of Some can raise the costs and may disinformation policy; this may reflect change the incentive/risk calculus for the baleful U.S. domestic politics and governments contemplating disinformation Trump’s mixed or worse messages campaigns and perhaps establish a on the problem of Russian-origin measure of deterrence. Others can disinformation. weaken technical capabilities to conduct disinformation operations and thus • Aside from funding the State serve as tactical supplements for defense Department’s Global Engagement against disinformation. Still other forms Center, congressional work on of offense can challenge regimes that countering disinformation has slowed, use disinformation in strategic ways: with even the Honest Ads Act stalled. Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia seems to use disinformation to weaken its • Longer-term tools to encourage public democratic adversaries by attacking their sophistication about disinformation and social cohesion; democratic countries can thus social resistance to it are being answer this through support for free media developed in some European countries inside Russia, China, and other purveyors (e.g., and Sweden), but barely of disinformation, working nationally or beginning in the United States. together. • A lack of coordination between Care and caution are still required. The Europe and the United States on principle of remaining true to democratic policy responses to disinformation has produced two different tracks: values holds as much for offensive as We must not Europe focuses on identifying and for defensive options. become them to fight them. Democracies exposing disinformation, while the should not attempt their own version of United States investigates, names, and disinformation. Doing so would undermine shames, though inconsistently. Neither the values that democracies seek to defend, has sought to develop a regulatory creating a moral equivalence (one that framework to increase authenticity and would bolster the cynical arguments of integrity in the social media space. Russian propagandists about democracy A combination of defensive tactics based being mere fraud). Besides, if the history of on democratic values can be effective in at the is any guide, democracies are mitigating the impact of disinformation in no good at disinformation. the short term. But the fast-evolving threat Democratic countries have options. and the slow implementation of policies, Democratic offense against disinformation practices, and long-term social antibodies (so can draw on three levels of tools: to speak) to manage it are still mismatched in favor of disinformation; defense needs to • Cyber tools to identify and disrupt be supplemented with offense. disinformation operations. This option is already in use and has the Stop the Whack-a- appeal of immediacy and directness. It is essential but at its harder-edged Mole Approach: Get end has drawbacks, e.g., the risk of on the Offense escalation.

Democracies also need to go on offense: • Sanctions (and other financial) tools to take the fight more directly to the against disinformation actors and their purveyors of disinformation and the sources of funding, and development regimes that sponsor and direct them. of contingent retaliatory sanctions as Effective offense can take many forms. a deterrent. Use of the sanctions tool

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requires persistence to apply well and its impact will be moderate rather than Democracies should not decisive. attempt their own version • Support for free media in the broad of disinformation. sense, including journalists, activists, and independent investigators. With respect to Russia, this could include IRA, the St. Petersburg troll farm which had those operating both inside and outside long been identified as a major source of the country. This option can be slow to Russian disinformation targeting the United 34 yield measurable results but can have States. This information, probably leaked strategic impact over time, if applied by USCYBERCOM itself, remains the United with creativity and determination. States’ most notable publicly reported counter-disinformation offensive operation. The United States and to some degree the USCYBERCOM appears to be continuing EU, NATO, and some European national such efforts, including reportedly against a governments are applying versions of criminal Russian botnet.35 these three levels of tools, but often haphazardly, without integration into a Cyber offensive operations (rightly) policy framework and with only spotty remain classified, but Gen. Paul Nakasone, coordination. For the first two levels of simultaneously director of the National tools, governments will have the lead; Security Agency (NSA) and commander of for the third, civil society groups will be USCYBERCOM, has outlined the basics of 36 critical and, in some cases, leading actors. the strategy publicly. USCYBERCOM has offered a set of Cyber Options offensive actions meant to disrupt and disable the internet infrastructure behind The Department of Defense’s Cyber major disinformation operations. The Strategy summary issued in September concepts reflect intelligence capabilities, 2018 stated that the United States would such as reconnaissance, gaining deep “defend forward” and “persistently access and adversary awareness. Nakasone’s contest” malicious cyber activity, with statements37 and people familiar with the specific reference to Russia and China, program see options for actions on four and emphasized Russian disinformation levels: “hunt, surveil, expose, and disable.” operations as a particular challenge.32 The National Security Presidential • Hunt includes actively seeking out Memorandum, NSPM-13, issued around adversarial activities and entities before that time, reportedly gave new authorities an attack takes place. to the U.S. military, with USCYBERCOM • Surveil includes probing foreign in the lead, to engage in certain cyber disinformation systems to identify offensive actions below a certain bad actors and the details of related 33 threshold. software, malware, and viruses used in While the new cyber strategy covers far disinformation and related operations. more than the disinformation challenge, • Expose includes the release on what the policy could mean with respect to a selective basis of the details of offensive counter-disinformation operations disinformation operations, including became clear when personnel, methods, and specific reported that around the time of the 2018 campaigns. This information could be U.S. mid-term elections, USCYBERCOM provided to internet service providers had attacked and temporarily disabled the (ISPs), social media companies, and

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friendly third countries. Exposure seems to exist. Recognizing that much could also include conveying such of the policy and operations is classified, information to the media or to civil we offer the following assessment and society groups that follow and combat recommendations with respect to the disinformation, either directly or reported cyber tools: through third parties, to out bad actors and expose networks and operational Deploy the “hunt” and “surveillance” tools. habits. Exposure will have different Use of the U.S. government’s cyber capacity outcomes depending on the actor: to gain intelligence on state-sponsored whereas Russia simply denies any disinformation operations, technical accusations, regardless of the evidence details, and actors appears valuable. The presented, China has, in the past, leads for such actions might have been responded by reducing its attacks on placed elsewhere, e.g., in the intelligence U.S. companies. community rather than in the military, but it is important that they exist and are being • Disable could include disrupting employed. the infrastructure used to wage disinformation operations through Expose (with tactical forethought) foreign a variety of means (e.g., redirecting disinformation operations, especially to of adversary friendly governments, ISPs, social media malware, degrading the infrastructure companies that are active and responsible of prime Russian disinformation in countering disinformation, and civil sites, and other means to target or society activists. In some cases, it may be compromise systems). This was the advisable to filter such information so it level of attack reportedly chosen reaches some (e.g., foreign civil society against the IRA. activists) through third parties rather than the U.S. government. USCYBERCOM or the Under NSPM-13, as reported, NSA may not always be best placed to do USCYBERCOM (with additional input liaison work with non-U.S. (and even some from policy agencies) has a degree of U.S. non-U.S. government) partners, so a latitude regarding which targets to choose. smooth interagency process for providing Reportedly, the threshold for targeting relevant information to outside groups Russian government entities, e.g., the GRU will be important. The NATO Strategic cyber units responsible for the hacking Communications Center of Excellence operations against the Democratic National in Riga and the Helsinki Hybrid CoE, Committee’s computer system in 2016, especially by linking up with civil society is higher than that for nominally non- activists, should organize themselves to act Russian government bodies such as the IRA as early warning centers. or proxies of the Russian government or Kremlin. If accurate, this would be a wise Providing U.S., European, and other media distinction to make, especially with respect with general information about Russian to disabling operations. (and Chinese) disinformation operations — exposing operational details, individual bad Russian actors, and Russian organizations Opportunities and and their foreign collaborators — seems cautionary notes like sound policy. The IRA is now widely known and the GRU’s cyber units are The general appeal of applying cyber becoming so, but these are unlikely to offense options to go after foreign be the only Russian entities engaged in disinformation targets is clear, more or less disinformation and related activities. The on the grounds of “they have it coming,” exposure of new names and organizations and the capacity for effective action can limit future disinformation operations.

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A subset of exposure can include reaching know that the U.S. government was aware out directly to individuals engaged in of their activities and identities. That disinformation (as USCYBERCOM is operation received broad support from reported to have done with respect to those who follow disinformation because employees of the IRA). According to the target was notorious, unofficial (though various reports, many of these individuals a tool of the Kremlin), and had a long track are ordinary, tech-savvy Russians not fully record of disinformation, including in the aware of the impact or nature of their own United States. activities. Letting them know that their identities are known, that they can be It will be important to maintain this exposed, and that sanctions (e.g., bans on relatively high bar for such operations visas to the United States and Europe and/ going forward: targets chosen for active or asset freezes) can be applied may have a disabling operations should be nefarious deterrent effect. (i.e., major and not peripheral players in disinformation, whether publicly known Such operations must be carried out with or not). A high degree of confidence on care. Decisions about when and how much attribution is key — while the Kremlin (or to reveal about certain individuals associated Beijing) will likely deny any involvement with disinformation, especially third- in information influence operations even country enablers of Russian disinformation when presented with undeniable facts, that operations (either witting or “useful idiots”), attempt at plausible deniability should not should be considered on an interagency prevent our ability and intent to act. basis, incorporating input from regional experts from the State Department about While not familiar with the details of the how to make best use of such revelations, classified NSPM-13, we recommend that especially those involving third-country senior U.S. government interagency sign nationals. In some cases, revelations about off be required for any cyber disabling Russian disinformation operations can be operation against any foreign target. Using provided discreetly, in small batches, to cyber means to go after Russian or other credible media. In other cases, it might be countries’ assets carries risks of escalation more effective to prepare bespoke counter- and retaliation beyond the disinformation disinformation campaigns intended to blunt realm, potentially into targeting or preempt specific Russian campaigns. infrastructure more generally. This is not Such decisions, and preparation for such an argument for inaction, but for care and campaigns, should likewise be made with discipline. strong interagency input. Get organized. USCYBERCOM may be the U.S. intelligence agencies are increasingly lead element of the U.S. government’s cyber cooperating with both social media action, including counter-disinformation, platforms and researchers to flag suspicious but it should not be responsible for operations. A September 2020 takedown strategic decision making, including of a (relatively small) IRA operation was an with respect to counter-disinformation. example of successful cooperation between According to many in the U.S. government, the U.S. government, platforms, and the interagency structure for counter- researchers.38 disinformation remains weak, with lines of authority unclear. This is especially true Be judicious about disabling and disrupting with respect to Russia, for reasons related disinformation targets. Few shed tears to Trump’s own benign views about Putin over reports that in 2018 USCYBERCOM and resistance to accepting the facts about temporarily shut down the IRA and let Kremlin disinformation operations during some of the individuals working there the 2016 elections and those ongoing.

13 Democratic Offense Against Disinformation

Ft Meade, MD - U.S. Cyber Command is employing a new virtual training platform, the Persistent Cyber Training Environment, during Cyber Flag 20-2. Over a period of two weeks, Cyber Flag 20-2 will host more than 500 personnel worldwide, spanning nine different time zones and 17 cyber teams. Credit: U.S. Cyber Command photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Jon Dasbach.

No private cyber “disabling” action. disinformation targets, risk triggering Involvement of civil society in countering unwanted cycles of escalation and should disinformation — offense as well as not be part of the menu of offensive tools. defense — can be critical. Civil society and research groups, e.g., , Cyber offense is an essential, not decisive, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic tool in the counter-disinformation tool kit. Research Lab, the Stanford Internet The tools of cyber offense, already in play, Observatory, EU DisinfoLab, and private are apt to be useful to limit the threat and companies such as Graphika have played thus worth pursuing. But we also suspect a key role in defense against Russian that their effectiveness will be at the disinformation by uncovering campaigns margins. This is often as good as it gets, but and exposing methods. They are already we should not expect that cyber offense significant actors helping to surveil and against disinformation will prove decisive. expose Russian disinformation operations. We have entered a shadow world of move As noted above, we recommend robust and countermove in the cyber realm and (and hopefully real-time) exchange its disinformation subset. USCYBERCOM’s of information. Disabling operations and other U.S. government cyber tools initiated by private cyber actors, however, are useful but, as they themselves would even directed against non-official state acknowledge, incomplete.

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Ukraine-related sanctions authorities, but Sanctions (and Other by that time Prigozhin was publicly known Financial) Tools to be a supporter of the IRA. EO 13757 was more usable than its 2015 predecessor, EO Sanctions have been used since the end 13694, which it amended, but still provided of the Obama administration against a high bar to sanctions against malicious Russian purveyors of disinformation, cyber actors engaged in disinformation though not with a focus commensurate operations. with the threat. Headroom remains for additional action using existing authorities The Trump administration has had its and options exist for other forms of own challenges addressing Russian financial pressure against purveyors of disinformation directed against the disinformation. By sanctions, we mean United States (not least due to Trump’s exercise of the Treasury Department’s reluctance to acknowledge its existence). authorities under the International Nevertheless, in September 2018, the Emergency Economic Powers Act Trump administration issued EO 13848 (IEPPA), which essentially allow the U.S. providing broader authority for the government to freeze the assets of a foreign U.S. government to impose sanctions person — physical or legal — within the against those interfering in a U.S. election United States and to cut off that person (EO 13848’s preamble explicitly notes from use of and access to the U.S. dollar. “covert distribution of propaganda and Because of the extent of the dollar’s use disinformation” as part of the national in global finance, being placed under full security threat that the EO seeks to Treasury blocking sanctions means that address).41 One year later, the Trump the sanctioned person is effectively cut off administration imposed its first sanctions from the global financial system. using this EO: it designated the IRA as a whole, six of its employees (four of whom A slow start for sanctions options. Aware had been previously designated under of Russian disinformation operations EOs 13694 and 13757), and identified some during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Prigozhin-owned companies and property, the Obama administration issued such as luxury aircraft and a yacht.42 Executive Order 13757 on December 28, 2016 (well after the elections) and used To escalate pressure on purveyors of it to impose full blocking sanctions on disinformation, we recommend the Russian targets which had engaged in following: malicious activities against the United States, including election interference. • Intensify the use of existing sanctions These targets included three small authorities after the 2020 election Russian cyber companies, four Russian cycle. EO 13848 should be deployed individuals, the Russian intelligence as post-election analysis reveals the service (FSB), and the GRU.39 These latter extent of disinformation operations. targets are prominent, but unlikely to Potential targets should include suffer much due to sanctions. Around individuals engaged in disinformation the same time, the U.S. government also operations, organizations that generate imposed full blocking sanctions on Yevgeny disinformation (the IRA is probably not Prigozhin, nicknamed “Putin’s chef,” who the only such Russian outfit), and their has functioned as a conduit for funding funding sources. Any financial dealings aggressive Russian operations in Ukraine, with already-sanctioned individuals Syria, and (more recently) Africa.40 The and organizations would provide Obama administration designated (i.e., grounds for derivative sanctions against sanctioned) Prigozhin using separate such persons. So, collaborators, agents, funders, and business partners of

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disinformation operators or operations, DETER and DASKA mandate strong whether Russian, U.S., or third-country financial and other sanctions should nationals, would be subject to being the administration determine that sanctioned. Discretion, especially when election interference has taken place. contemplating third-country or U.S. DETER mandates sanctions on major individuals, is wise; sanctioning on Russian state banks and energy auto pilot would not be. The net result companies (potentially including of a such a Russia-focused sanctions Gazprom), new sovereign debt, and program, if applied rigorously (at the Russian oligarchs. DASKA (in the level of the current Iran sanctions version approved in December 2019 program, for example), could be by the Senate Foreign Relations to expose and isolate the Russian Committee) includes sanctions on disinformation apparatus. individuals with corrupt ties to Putin, their family members who benefit To implement such a program, resources at from such dealings and persons who Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control facilitate such ties; investments in (OFAC), which administers financial Russian LNG projects outside Russia; sanctions, would need to be increased new sovereign debt; and financial to allow for targeting research. The institutions that support election intelligence community and USCYBERCOM interference. could also furnish OFAC with potential targets, as could the State Department, In general, DASKA’s sanctions provisions drawing on its contacts with civil seem more practical than DETER’s. society groups that monitor the Russian DETER’s full blocking sanctions against disinformation network. major Russian state banks risk financial and its full blocking sanctions • Develop new sanctions authorities. against Russian energy companies could Pending legislation, including the disrupt world energy flows and expose Defending Elections from Threats by European customers. The sanctions Establishing Redlines Act [DETER, authorities should be refined if and as introduced by U.S. Sens. Marco Rubio the bills advance. (R-FL) and Chris Van Hollen (D- MD)]; and the Defending American • Establish powerful but contingency Security Against Kremlin Aggression sanctions to deter future Russian and Act [DASKA, introduced by U.S. Sen. Chinese election interference. This is a Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Robert sound approach (and a better practice Menendez (D-NJ)] include provisions than imposing sanctions for past for escalating sanctions and other malicious behavior). But while election economic pressure in response interference, the target of these bills, to interference in the 2020 U.S. can include disinformation, it is a elections.43 DETER explicitly includes far bigger and broader category of disinformation in its definition of malicious action than disinformation. election interference. DASKA, in its Strong sanctions can be imposed current iteration, does not. Instead, it for the first time only once, and focuses more on the administration to establish deterrence, the bar for of elections, though its definition action should either be placed high or could include certain forms of with some flexibility to impose some disinformation, e.g., if it impeded sanctions in response to disinformation voting rights. New versions of these and more in response to additional, acts are likely to be introduced in the aggressive election interference, such as next session of Congress, which starts attacks on election infrastructure. in January 2021.

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• Apply additional tools of financial Cyber offense and sanctions can put statecraft. Sanctions are not the only pressure on disinformation networks options in the offensive arsenal against and may provide a measure of deterrence disinformation. Putin’s ruling elite against election interference that includes and their supporters are known to disinformation. Support for free media, keep their personal wealth hidden in if sustained, can be a strategic tool that offshore accounts. Those who attack the challenges the brittleness, and exposes the democratic West appear to have more and brutality of the Russian and confidence in it and its financial system Chinese systems that use disinformation than that of their own country. Working in aggression abroad and to sustain with the UK and the EU, the United themselves at home. Disinformation is States should develop and implement a of authoritarians; support for authorities to restrict hidden Russian freedom of information is part of the wealth flowing anonymously to high- arsenal of democracy. We have options, end real estate (in London, Miami, but they must be curated to each country’s New York, and other locations) and media landscape. through anonymous limited liability companies (LLCs) into the United Russia’s media landscape. One of Putin’s States. For reasons of good financial first steps as he imposed authoritarian practice and anti-corruption, the United governance on Russia was to seize control States, together with key allies (the UK, of independent television networks, especially), should develop and enforce forcing some of its leaders out of the 44 standards of transparency. The United country. State-owned/Kremlin-controlled States and key allies could, however, media, both television and radio, dominate prioritize identifying and exposing broadcasting and have for many years. the funds and money flows of key The last remaining independent television players in the Kremlin disinformation network — Dozhd (rain in Russian) — is world and respond asymmetrically under pressure from Russian authorities to disinformation campaigns by but has not yet been shut down. Some constricting Putin and his cronies’ independent (or semi-independent) radio financial freedom. Financial forensics stations, such as Ekho Moskvy (Echo of can also reveal proxy networks and Moscow in Russian), continue to function, infrastructure preparations for future also under pressure. Print has influence campaigns, which can greater latitude for free expression, e.g., enhance preemptive measure to disable Moskovskiy Komsomolets and especially such networks before an attack is Novaya Gazeta (recalling to some extent carried out. the Soviet practice of allowing some publications somewhat greater editorial latitude in an effort to limit disaffection). ‘The Truth Shall Set The internet in Russia, however, You Free’: Support for remains a space of contested freedom, Free Media with independent journalists and civil society struggling with state attempts to Support for free media — in this case exert control and massive state trolling for the purpose of fighting Russian and operations. Using social media platforms Chinese disinformation with support for (YouTube is currently popular), a new true information — may sound naïve. It generation of Russians is creating a shouldn’t. In fact, of the offensive options proliferating community of pointed, we regard it as having the greatest long- independent, and investigative online term potential against disinformation. journalism. For example, Roman

17 Democratic Offense Against Disinformation

Dobrokhotov, editor in chief of the deemed sensitive, including content critical online publication The Insider, has of the government of China and the CCP. published exposes on some of the hottest As a result, China is one of the most topics imaginable: the GRU’s attempt to restrictive countries in the world for press assassinate Skripal, the former Russian freedom, and Beijing has only accelerated spy, in the United Kingdom in March its repression of independent voices in 2018 using a nerve agent; the shootdown the internet age while clamping down on of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over access to Western independent media.47 Ukraine in July 2014 by Russian-controlled This year, in retaliation for U.S. limits separatists; and, in cooperation with on the number of Chinese journalists in Bellingcat, the UK-based investigative the country, China expelled journalists journalism group, the role of the GRU employed by , The in hacking e-mails of then French Washington Post, and .48 presidential candidate Macron. Each of these stories was a major embarrassment Still, the advent of digital communications to the Kremlin. Dobrokhotov is only one of opened the door for a diversity of many Russian online journalists currently information sources to enter the Chinese active.45 As Russian state control intensifies, public sphere. Chinese vloggers sometimes former journalists from once-independent command a huge audience at home traditional media have been migrating to and increasingly abroad. Diversity of online journalism, deepening its expertise information should not be mistaken for and experience. freedom of expression, however: private companies and individuals must work While analogies are inexact, Russia’s within the CCP’s defined lines. Crossing digital space can be considered the new these redlines, which shift frequently and “samizdat,” or self-published, the term of randomly, carries severe consequences.49 art for underground publications during the Soviet period. It is decentralized, China is ushering in the era of nimble, widespread, and more resistant to “splinternet” with its control of digital suppression.46 It is thus the most promising information at home and export of element of Russia’s remaining free media digital abroad. The to support. While offensive tools against “ of China” — a series of disinformation, such as cyber offense, governmental efforts to control digital sanctions, and other financial policy tools, information flows — was launched in are principally official, support for free parallel with the arrival of the commercial media under Russia’s current conditions internet in China in the 1990s. Rather than must involve civil society as much as providing opportunities for independent governments. voices and dissent, as is the case in Russia, in China the internet has become an arena China’s media landscape. Unlike in Russia, to further censorship, root out dissent, and where the internet penetrated society in an develop sophisticated digital surveillance open and relatively unencumbered way in tools. Content on popular Chinese social the 1990s, in China, state-controlled media media apps such as WeChat, Sina Weibo, has dominated the information landscape and Baidu Tieba is filtered through since 1949. Large state-run media agencies, algorithmic and human review. News including Xinhua, aggregation applications such as Toutiao (CCTV), and People’s Daily, are leading limit content not only as it pertains outlets in , television, to politics, but also subjects deemed and print news. While private media exists “generally degrading” to society.50 The in China, it must comply with government result is a Chinese-specific internet, which regulations that effectively prohibit content is blocked to many Western companies

18 Democratic Offense Against Disinformation

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend an energy and bu- siness forum on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), Russia June 7, 2019. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov. such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google, and state-controlled media into local news functions outside any international norms around the world by entering into creative or rules around human rights or freedom partnerships with local news stations. of expression. Beijing’s model is an CGTN, the international branch of CCTV, enviable one to other autocracies, including broadcasts around the world in five Putin’s Russia, that are actively importing languages.51 Chinese state-controlled media Chinese surveillance technology with is widespread and easily accessible in the hope of reproducing Beijing’s digital many parts of the developing world where authoritarianism. CCTV is included in the cheapest television packages, while other international news Abroad, the Chinese government has services are not.52 The Chinese media make expanded its reach in foreign languages. particular use of “cooperation agreements” English-language publications, such as The with Western media outlets, which can , push messaging developed by seem innocent (e.g., sharing picture the CCP’s Propaganda Department (and, libraries and sports results) but easily at times, go beyond the official line to become vectors for influence. take on an extremely nationalistic tone). China Radio International broadcasts The tools for countering the CCP’s grasp on from more than a dozen radio stations information flows in China domestically in the United States. Chinese newswires, are limited, and certainly more so than which compete with Western newswires in Russia. Still, there is an expanding such as the , have pushed toolkit for trying.53 Despite restrictive

19 Democratic Offense Against Disinformation

policies, citizens in Hong Kong and The information provided to people Taiwan are finding ways to maneuver of the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc around government censors. Hong Kong’s was vulnerable to interruption and independent media has been the target of outnumbered by the regime-controlled police investigations following the passage print and electronic media. Free media of the so-called Hong Kong national support programs were frequently security law, but of Hong Kong’s Apple derided in the United States and Europe Daily still skyrocketed after the arrest of as being of no consequence because of owner Jimmy Lai in August 2020.54 the then-consensus that communist regimes in Europe were effectively Taiwan has been a prime target of Chinese beyond challenge and that dissidents, the influence efforts for decades, just as presumed, numerically small audience Ukraine has been for Russia. Following for such efforts, were and would be of Chinese disinformation campaigns around no significance. Soviet propaganda and 55 the 2018 Taiwanese elections and a 2019 disinformation (the term of art of the time investigation that found Taiwanese news was “”) were regarded as outlets to be taking editorial direction from more effective. As it turned out, however, 56 the Chinese mainland, the Taiwanese support for free media was a significant government passed legislation that factor in the fall of communism, as leaders heightens the penalties for attempted of the new, democratic governments that Chinese influence of elections. Under tech- came to power after 1989 often told U.S. savvy government officials such as Audrey diplomats.58 Tang, Taiwan has also worked to revamp its technology governance, and built dedicated channels for disinformation reporting and Recommendations volunteer groups of fact-checkers, meme- makers, and designers.57 We recommend the following:

Lessons learned. The long-term benefit of • Build on U.S. government “media support for free media emerged from the support” programs. In the 1990s, U.S. experience contending with the Soviet U.S. government media support Union. The United States sustained free programs reflected the then- media outside the Soviet Bloc, famously reasonable but ultimately mistaken at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty assumption that Russia was on a (RFE/RL) headquarters then in Munich, path of systemic democratization. As which employed journalists originally Putin’s authoritarian system emerged from Soviet-dominated Central and Eastern in the first decade of the 21st century, Europe and the Soviet Union to act as however, individual U.S. government surrogates for free media forbidden inside agencies slowly adapted their thinking their own countries. The United States and programs. This, for the most part, supplemented these efforts with support remained the case during the Trump for independent, underground journalism administration, despite mixed signals inside the Soviet Bloc, increasingly in from Trump himself about Russia the 1980s and especially in Poland after policy and even about media freedom. the rise of the dissident trade union • The U.S. government should expand Solidarity. These efforts were suited to the programs and agencies to support a technology of the age: radio broadcasts sustained and top-level commitment and, occasionally, primitive technological to back free media. Appointing support (e.g., provided through a variety of new leadership at the U.S. Agency channels parts for mimeograph machines for Global Media (USAGM) that is for use by the Polish underground press).

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committed to its mission and not to the imposition of partisan controls The U.S. government should seems a first step. In combination, expand programs and these U.S. government programs, which grew independently, would be agencies to support a critical elements of a strategy of offense against Russian disinformation and sustained and top-level part of a more consistent Russia policy. commitment to back The incoming Biden administration will likely be prepared to push back free media against Russian aggression generally and would implement the programs noted above with greater consistency, Russia especially given the damage the Trump • Increase media support funding. In administration inflicted on USAGM and Russia, such support would allow its constituent elements. for a greater commitment across the The Biden administration should mobilize board, and especially to more technical the individual agencies already active in training, in anticipation of intensified support of Russian and Chinese-language efforts by the Russian regime to control free media to advance that objective. These access to the internet, and support for efforts will need top-level leadership. bringing together sometimes isolated The State Department’s currently empty individual online journalists in remote position of under secretary for public Russian towns and cities. diplomacy, once filled, could play a role in • USAGM, the successor to the leading the disparate interagency elements Broadcasting Board of Governors, involved, working with a National which oversaw RFR/RL and other Security Council staff likely to be stronger, U.S. broadcasting arms, has a mandate particularly on Russia and China. that includes support for independent The U.S. government should avoid short- journalists from authoritarian countries term thinking or the trap of false metrics operating both offshore and in- and impatience. Investment in free media country. Unfortunately, its current is long-term and impact is unlikely to leadership seems focused on imposing occur in even increments and almost partisan conformity to the detriment never on an annual budgetary cycle. of independent journalism (its core By way of analogy: from 1983-86 the mandate) and has replaced capable usual metrics suggested that media (and leaders of RFE/RL, democracy support) programs in Central (VOA), and .59 and Eastern Europe were failures. From • In November 2019, USAGM 1987-90, the metrics indicted spectacular elevated the success. In fact, investment early led the (OTF), created during the Obama way to eventual success, but outside the administration by then Secretary usual time cycle of program evaluation. of State Hillary Clinton, to a self- Political support for such programs needs standing unit under USAGM with a to be steady enough to avoid abandoning $15 million budget. OTF’s mandate them prematurely, while operational includes support for technologies management needs to be flexible enough to help independent media actors to direct and redirect resources to what evade censorship and other forms works best. of contemporary internet blockage (The Trump administration has cut

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OTF’s funding, however.) In-Q-Tel • Civil society groups should have the (IQT), a high-tech venture capital firm operational lead inside Russia. We chartered by the Central Intelligence define civil society broadly, including Agency with a mandate to support the groups with a mandate to advance free U.S. intelligence community with high media and civil society, such as the technology, especially information National Endowment for Democracy,62 technology, and the Defense Advanced public interest media groups such Research Projects Agency (DARPA), as OCCRP and online analysts with which helped fund basic research that a public interest purpose, such as made the modern internet possible, Bellingcat and the Atlantic Council’s may be able to contribute to this Digital Forensic Research Lab. process.60 • Experience suggests that such groups, • RFE/RL’s television program, “Current and their European counterparts Time,” is an ambitious program to offer such as the European Endowment Russian-language television content for Democracy, are generally more produced by Russian journalists (along nimble than the U.S. government. the old RFE/RL radio model), directed They have advantages in working one- at Russian speakers inside Russia (in on-one with free Russian media and Russia it is available through activist journalists, especially those or the internet) and in neighboring inside Russia, who are understandably countries. The audience of “Current sensitive to receiving U.S. government Time” inside Russia is relatively small support and for whom any foreign (estimates range from 1.9 million to support needs to be discreet. As the just under four million), though once regime intensifies its effort to lock entering the Russian digital conversation down the internet, these and other stream, its reach is likely larger than the civil society groups with technical direct audience numbers.61 expertise should be enlisted to provide technical support to Russian journalists • USAID’s Bureau for Europe and Eurasia — such as support for Virtual Private has launched an initiative, “Countering Networks (VPNs), platforms accessible Malign Kremlin Influence.” In recent on mobile phones, and techniques to years, it has also increased its support evade attempts at internet controls and for investigative journalism outlets and even shutdowns (that are in fact now digital security programs. This includes being prepared and tested by the Putin support for local and international regime). investigative reporting organizations that focus on exposing corruption with • Increase support for offshore Russian- links to the Kremlin and its impact in language media platforms. A number of the region. USAID’s programs include Russian independent journalists have training in financial viability of media relocated their activities to neighboring outlets, audience analysis, and digital countries, e.g., , which have security, among others. Organizations Russian-speaking populations and such as the Organized Crime and cultural familiarity (even if the result Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), of Soviet ) with Russia. the private, investigative journalism They have been welcomed and are organization which focuses on exposing able to set up free media platforms corruption and has a broad mandate available to Russian speakers inside and and deep expertise on Russian and outside Russia. The online news portal former Soviet Bloc corruption, deserves Meduza63 is one of the best regarded of further support. these free media platforms, which in

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a sense are independent, civil society not control) Russian-language free counterparts of the old RFE/RL model media based in Ukraine and directed at of offshore free media. Russian audiences could be a powerful element of democratic offense against Support can take a number of forms, Russian disinformation. including journalistic collaboration, technical and security support, and financial support through grants. China Civil society groups can collaborate • Prepare for a sophisticated tech-driven more closely on substance; the U.S. China. Learning from the experience government should maintain a distance in Russia in the 1990s, we should be from journalist output. wary of repeating the same mistakes in China. Beijing sees the use and • Support free Russian-language media of information as a vector for control in Ukraine. Ukraine is a bilingual at home and influence abroad. The country and, despite the growing use CCP’s efforts to control information of Ukrainian as a national language, flows have grown rapidly in their is likely to remain so. Ukraine thus sophistication in the last 5-10 years. To has advantages as a platform for free stay ahead, democracies cannot afford Russian-language media. Kremlin a failure in imagination. Rather, the propaganda (and common Western United States and its allies must plan to misunderstandings) aside, speaking be better prepared for where China will Russian in Ukraine is not necessarily be in the medium and long term.64 an indication of pro-Kremlin sympathies. • Radio Free Asia’s (RFA) current work in Mandarin is greatly underfunded The United States (and European at approximately $20 million when countries and the EU) could expand compared with China’s multibillion support for Russian-language media global media operations through in Ukraine — both traditional and CGTN, Voice of China, United Front online — with two objectives: to target institutions, and many other actors. Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens The U.S. Congress should expand in occupied Donbas and to RFA’s domestic language media compete with Russian propaganda efforts targeting Chinese, Tibetan, there and to target Russians both inside and Uighur audiences and invest in and outside Russia. a digital Chinese-language platform Free Russian-language media based on the model of “Current Time” to in Ukraine and the welcoming of counter CCP efforts at targeting young Russian journalists fleeing Russia, as Mandarin speakers abroad. Latvia does with respect to , • While it is difficult, if not impossible, could have a special appeal to a Russian to support independent media in audience. In invading Ukraine in 2014, China, support for independent Putin sought to forestall Ukraine’s media around the world where China potential future as a free, successful is actively working to co-opt and and free-market democracy integrating influence the media space should be a with Europe. Because Putin claims top priority. that Ukraine is not in fact a separate nation, a democratic Ukraine would • Invest in efforts be an especially powerful blow against in Taiwan by establishing a center Putinism. Working with Ukraine and of excellence in combatting Ukrainian institutions to promote (but disinformation based on the model

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Protesters rally to remember the deaths and injuries during the months of , in Edinburgh Place in Hong Kong, China, December 30, 2019. REUTERS/Lucy Nicholson.

of the Centers of Excellence in to challenge and disavow Beijing’s Europe. As the primary target of . While the Covid-19 Chinese information operations and pandemic is causing enough immediate a Mandarin-speaking country, Taiwan problems and challenges for the world, could be a bright example of how to ignoring Beijing’s disinformation efforts counter Chinese influence beyond could haunt the United States and the China’s borders.65 world once this health crisis ends.66

• Congressional leaders and the new • Increase support for independent U.S. administration should raise Chinese-language media. U.S. and public awareness in and beyond the allied support for media development United States about China’s human should include Chinese-language rights with respect to Beijing’s media organizations outside of China, repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang and including organizations that cater to other minorities (notably Tibetans and diaspora communities and outlets that Mongolians), as well as the nature of offer independent content. Support China’s censorship activities. could include direct partnerships, increased access for interviews or • Develop a comprehensive strategy to exclusive coverage, or resources such expose and counter China’s efforts to as technical or financial support. dominate international organizations. Governments should increase work The United States should coordinate to resist Chinese government efforts with its allies and partners to unify to sideline or co-opt independent their diplomatic messaging in order Chinese-language media.67

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• Facilitate increased collaboration troll farm. This is precisely the sort between advocacy groups. Specialized of investigative journalism directed advocacy organizations and campaigns against the Russian disinformation already work in several issue areas, apparatus that the U.S. government including support for oppressed should be supporting. For uncovering groups such as Uighurs, Tibetans, this story, in cooperation with and Christians. The United States and independent Russian journalists,71 Aro its allies should endeavor to act as a was subjected to Russian trolling and convening agent for advocacy groups otherwise harassed. In 2019, to honor to share best practices and information her work, the State Department offered on respective organizations, efforts, and her its International Women of Courage tactics, and support efforts to increase Award but rescinded the award upon independent advocacy within China.68 learning that Aro had criticized Trump. The State Department’s decision was a • Push back against Chinese global state shameful act that undercut the policy media. The United States and its allies purpose behind U.S. government’s should seek to halt abuses by Chinese support for media freedom.72 state media and related organizations, particularly as they expand further into • The U.S. government should recognize the global sphere. For example, media and honor those fighting to maintain regulators can amend broadcasting an independent voice to expose rules to limit certain ownership the CCP’s repression. Lai, the Hong practices, or to forbid activities such Kong entrepreneur and founder of as airing forced confessions. The U.S. Apple Daily who was arrested amidst Congress could pass new legislation pro-democracy protests, should be increasing transparency requirements considered for such an honor. for state-owned media, and could hold hearings or otherwise scrutinize the scope and activities of state-owned Conclusion media within their .69 The United States and its democratic allies Governments can support civil society have started tackling the disinformation approaches to documenting state- challenge. The Biden administration will owned media activity — for example, be well placed to do so with far greater the ChinfluenCE project seeks to map consistency than the Trump administration Chinese state influence in several managed. To be sure, much more needs to Eastern European countries.70 be done for democracies to get off the back • Send consistent messages with respect foot and actively push back against foreign to U.S. government support for media influence, more broadly, and information freedom, in general, and in Russia influence operations, in particular. and China, specifically. The Biden Offensive measures, as they are framed administration will be more credible here, are not a substitute for investment and consistent in this regard than was in long-term societal resilience, but our the Trump administration. short-term defensive efforts thus far have not deterred Russia, China, and others. The • Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro was one suggestions above are intended as a menu of the first journalists to report on the for U.S. policymakers and, hopefully, of use workings of the IRA, the St. Petersburg to Europeans as well.

25 Democratic Offense Against Disinformation

Endnotes

1 Daniel Fried, Alina Polyakova, “Democratic Defense Against Disinformation”, Atlantic Council, February, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Democratic_Defense_Against_Disinformation_FI- NAL.pdf 2 Daniel Fried, Alina Polyakova, “Democratic Defense Against Disinformation 2.0”, Atlantic Council, June 13, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/democratic-defense-against-disinforma- tion-2-0/ 3 Lara Jakes, “As Protests in South America Surged, So Did Russian Trolls on Twitter, U.S. Finds,” New York Times, January 19, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/us/politics/south-america-russian-twitter.html 4 Jakub Kalenský, “Russian Disinformation in 2019 - Review” Disinfo Portal, January 7, 2020, https://disinfoportal. org/russian-disinformation-in-2019-review/ 5 Today, the broadly accepted industry term for disinformation activities, foreign or domestic, is “information influence operations,” which captures the malign intent and comprehensive nature of such activities. In the interest of readability, we use the terms (disinformation and information influence operations or information operations) interchangeably throughout. 6 Laura Rosenberger, “Making Cyberspace Safe for Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2020, https://www.forei- gnaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-13/making-cyberspace-safe-democracy 7 Daniel Fried and Alina Polyakova, “Europe is starting to tackle disinformation. The U.S. is lagging.,” Washington Post, June 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/17/europe-is-starting-tackle-disinforma- tion-us-is-lagging/ 8 Link to the EUvDisinfo database: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/ 9 Action Plan Against Disinformation § (2018)., https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/action_plan_against_disin- formation.pdf. 10 Assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation - Achievements and areas for further improvement § (2020)., https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=69212; James Pamment, “EU Code of Practice on Disinformation: Briefing Note for the New European Commission,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 3, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/03/eu-code-of-practice-on-disinformation-brie- fing-note-for-new-european-commission-pub-81187 11 James Pamment, “EU Code of Practice on Disinformation: Briefing Note for the New European Commission,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 3, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/03/eu- code-of-practice-on-disinformation-briefing-note-for-new-european-commission-pub-81187 12 Christina la Cour, “Governments countering disinformation: The case of Sweden” Disinfo Portal, August 9, 2019, https://disinfoportal.org/governments-countering-disinformation-the-case-of-sweden/ 13 Link to the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace: https://pariscall.international/en/ 14 Aurelien Breeden, “ French Court Strikes Down Most of Law,” New York Times, June 18, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/world/europe/france-internet-hate-speech-regulation.html 15 Alex Hern, “ UK-based Chinese news network CGTN faces possible ban,” , July 6, 2020, https:// www.theguardian.com/media/2020/jul/06/uk-based-chinese-news-network-cgtn-faces-possible-ban 16 Link to NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence in Riga: https://www.stratcomcoe.org/ 17 Link to the European Center of Excellence on Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/ 18 Link to the Rapid Response Mechanism website: https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_develop- ment-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/rrm-mrr.aspx?lang=eng 19 Abdarahmane Wone, “VERIFIED: UN launches new global initiative to combat ,” United Nations, May 21, 2020, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/coronavirus/covid-19-united-nations-launches-global-ini- tiative-combat-misinformation 20 Amy Lieberman, “UN enlists 10,000 digital volunteers to fight COVID-19 misinformation,” devex, July 2, 2020, https://www.devex.com/news/un-enlists-10-000-digital-volunteers-to-fight-covid-19-misinformation-97615

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21 Paul M. Nakasone and Michael Sulmeyer, “How to Compete in Cyberspace: Cyber Command’s New Approach,” Foreign Affairs, last modified August 25, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-25/ cybersecurity; Michael Sulmeyer, “How the U.S. Can Play Cyber-Offense: Deterrence Isn’t Enough,” Foreign Af- fairs, last modified March 22, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-03-22/how-us-can-play- cyber-offense.; 22 Mike Isaac and Kate Conger, “Google, Facebook and Others Broaden Group to Secure U.S. Election,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/technology/google-facebook-coalition-us-election.html. 23 Ben Nimmo, Camille François, C Shawn Eib, Léa Ronzaud,“IRA Again: Unlucky Thirteen,” Graphika, September 1, 2020, https://graphika.com/reports/ira-again-unlucky-thirteen/. 24 “Updating Our Advertising Policies on State Media,” Twitter, last modified August 19, 2019, https://blog.twitter. com/en_us/topics/company/2019/advertising_policies_on_state_media.html. 25 Vijaya Gadde and Kayvon Beykpour, “Additional steps we’re taking ahead of the 2020 US Election,” Twitter, last modified October 9, 2020, https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-changes.html. 26 Notable organizations in this space include: Stanford’s Internet Research Observatory, the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy, the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, the Center for European Policy Analy- sis’s democratic resilience program, EUDisinfoLab, and private sector firms such as Graphika. 27 Žilvinas Švedkauskas, Chonlawit Sirikupt, and Michel Salzer, “Russia’s disinformation campaigns are targeting African Americans,” Washington Post, last modified July 24, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli- tics/2020/07/24/russias-disinformation-campaigns-are-targeting-african-americans/. 28 Alina Polyakova, “The Kremlin’s Plot against Democracy: How Russia Updated Its 2016 Playbook for 2020,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2020-08-11/ putin-kremlins-plot-against-democracy. 29 Laura Rosenberger of the German Marshall Fund and Christopher Walker of the National Endowment for De- mocracy have described this in detail in this and the following footnote: Laura Rosenberger, “Laura Rosenberger on Chinese Information Operations,” June 18, 2020, in ’s Arbiters of Truth, podcast, audio, https://www. lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-laura-rosenberger-chinese-information-operations.; Juan Pablo Cardenal et al., Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence, December 5, 2017, https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-autho- ritarian-influence-forum-report/. 30 Makena Kelly, “Distorted Nancy Pelosi Videos Show Platforms Aren’t Ready to Fight Dirty Campaign Tricks,” The Verge, last modified May 24, 2019, https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/24/18637771/nancy-pelosi-congress-deep- fake-video-facebook-twitter-. 31 United States v. Internet Research Agency, 2018 D.C. Dist. 32 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, September 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/ Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF. 33 Ellen Nakashima, “In Georgia, a Legal over Electronic Vs. Paper Voting,” Washington Post, last modified September 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-georgia-a-legal-battle-over- electronic-vs-paper-voting/2018/09/16/d655c070-b76f-11e8-94eb-3bd52dfe917b_story.html. 34 Marwa Eltagouri, “The rise of ‘Putin’s chef,’ the Russian oligarch accused of manipulating the U.S. election,” Washington Post, February 17, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/16/the-rise- of-putins-chef-yevgeniy-prigozhin-the-russian-accused-of-manipulating-the-u-s-election/ 35 Ellen Nakashima, “Cyber Command Has Sought to Disrupt the World’s Largest Botnet, Hoping to Reduce Its Po- tential Impact on the Election,” Washington Post, last modified October 10, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost. com/national-security/cyber-command-trickbot-disrupt/2020/10/09/19587aae-0a32-11eb-a166-dc429b380d10_sto- ry.html#click=https://t.co/eVm0zAnZbI. 36 Paul M. Nakasone, “A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 92 (Spring 2019): https:// ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-92/jfq-92_10-14_Nakasone.pdf. ; Statement of General Paul M. Nakasone Commander United States Cyber Command before the Senate Committee on Armed Services (2019) (statement of Paul M. Nakasone). 37 Nakasone and Sulmeyer, “How to Compete,” Foreign Affairs. 38 Ben Nimmo, Camille François, C Shawn Eib, Léa Ronzaud,“IRA Again: Unlucky Thirteen,” Graphika, September 1, 2020, https://graphika.com/reports/ira-again-unlucky-thirteen/.

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39 “3 CFR 13757 - Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016. Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,” govinfo, last modified on January 1, 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CFR-2017-title3-vol1/CFR-2017-title3-vol1-eo13757/summary. 40 “Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities In Connection with Russia’s Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine,” Press Center, Department of the Treasury, December 12, 2016. 41 “Executive Order on Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Elec- tion,” White House, issued on September 12, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/execu- tive-order-imposing-certain-sanctions-event-foreign-interference-united-states-election/. 42 “Treasury Targets Assets of Russian Financier who Attempted to Influence 2018 U.S. Elections,” Press Releases, U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 30, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm787. 43 Daniel Fried and Brian O’Toole, “Pushing Back Against Russian Aggression: Legislative Options,” At- lantic Council, March 16, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/ pushing-back-against-russian-aggression-legislative-options/. 44 Alan Cullison, “Two Russian Media Moguls Summoned for Questioning,” The Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2000, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB97311271799579685. 45 Nataliya Rostova, “Saving Their Profession: Russian Journalists and Their New Media,” The Wilson Center, De- cember 17, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/saving-their-profession-russian-journalists-and-their- new-media. 46 Recent amendments to Russia foreign agents law applies registration requirements to individual Russian jour- nalists who receive funding from abroad or distribute foreign-sourced material, a law that may have a chil- ling effect on some journalists, but past experience suggests that haphazard enforcement and habits of social resistance will mean that this latest regime leverage will have a marginal rather than decisive impact. “Russia’s New ‘Foreign Agent’ Law, Explained,” , December 2, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes. com/2019/12/02/-new-foreign-agent-law-explained-a68311. 47 “China,” Countries & Regions, Reporters Without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/china. 48 Marc Tracy, Edward Wong, and Lara Jakes, “China Announces That It Will Expel American Journalists,” The New York Times, March 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/business/media/china-expels-ameri- can-journalists.html/. 49 “The Long Arm of China: Exporting Authoritarianism With Chinese Characteristics,” Congressional-Execu- tive Commission on China, December 13, 2017, https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/ CECC%20Hearing%20-%2013%20Dec%202017%20-%20Long%20Arm%20of%20China%20-%20Kalathil.pdf. 50 Raymond Zhong, “A Saucy App Knows China’s Taste in News. The Censors Are Worried,” The New York Times, January 2, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/business/china-toutiao-censorship.html. 51 Glenn Tiffert, Renee DiResta, Carly Miller, Vanessa Molter, John Pomfret, “Telling China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign to Shape Global Narratives,” The Hoover Institution, July 21, 2020, https://fsi-live. s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/sio-china_story_white_paper-final.pdf. 52 Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s Global Megaphone,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-re- port/2020/beijings-global-megaphone#footnote28_6sjbbeq. 53 “Tiananmen at 30: Examining the Evolution of Repression in China,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, June 4, 2019, https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Kalathil%206-4- 19%20CECC%20testimony%20_0.pdf. 54 Tiffany May and Austin Ramzy, “‘We Will Persevere’: A Newspaper Faces the Weight of Hong Kong’s Crackdown,” The New York Times, August 12, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/world/asia/hong- kong-apple-daily-jimmy-lai.html. 55 Chris Horton, “Specter of Meddling by Beijing Looms Over Taiwan Elections” The New York Times, November 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/world/asia/taiwan-elections-meddling.html. 56 Nick Aspinwall, “Taiwan Passes Anti-Infiltration Act Ahead of Election Amid Opposition Protests,” The Diplo- mat, January 3, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/taiwan-passes-anti-infiltration-act-ahead-of-election- amid-opposition-protests/.

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57 Rorry Daniels, “Taiwan’s Unlikely Path to Public Trust Provides Lessons for the US,” The Brookings Institution, September 15, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/09/15/taiwans-unlikely-path-to-pu- blic-trust-provides-lessons-for-the-us/. 58 Daniel Fried was Polish Desk Officer at the Department of State from 1987-90, Political Counselor at Embassy Warsaw from 1990-93, and NSC Director and Senior Director for Central and Eastern Europe from 1993-97; and was told this by numerous visiting Poles and others from Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. 59 Josh Lipsky, Daniel Fried, “US Government Broadcasters Have Long Advanced the Cause of Freedom. Now They’re Under Threat,” Atlantic Council, June 23, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ us-government-broadcasters-have-long-advanced-the-cause-of-freedom-now-theyre-under-threat/. ; Jackson Diehl, “Trump’s Continuing Vandalism of the Voice of America,” The Washington Post, October 11, 2020, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trumps-continuing-vandalism-of-the-voice-of-ameri- ca/2020/10/11/82799d5a-0984-11eb-859b-f9c27abe638d_story.html. 60 “In-Q-T,” In-Q-Tel, https://www.iqt.org/; “DARPA,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, https://www. darpa.mil/. 61 The smaller estimate is from “Current Time,” Current Time TV Channel, https://www.currenttime.tv/; The larger from “Current Time” staff. 62 Daniel Fried is a member of the NED Board 63 “Meduza,” Meduza, https://meduza.io/en. 64 The authors would like to thank Christopher Walker of the National Endowment for Democracy for this idea. 65 Dan Blumenthal, “China’s Censorship, Propaganda and Disinformation,” American Enterprise Institute, March 5, 2020, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DBlumenthal-Testimony-on-Chinese-Censorship-1.pdf. 66 Mathew Ha, Alice Cho, “China’s Coronavirus Disinformation Campaigns Are Integral to Its Global Informa- tion Warfare Strategy,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 30, 2020, https://www.fdd.org/analy- sis/2020/04/30/chinas-coronavirus-disinformation-campaigns-are-integral-to-its-global-information-war- fare-strategy/. 67 “Policy Recommendations: China,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations-china. 68 “Policy Recommendations: The Battle for China’s Spirit,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/2017/ policy-recommendations-battle-china-spirit-religious-freedom. 69 “Policy Recommendations: China,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations-china. 70 “About the Project,” ChinfluenCE, https://www.chinfluence.eu/about/. 71 Jessikka Aro, “Yle Kioski Traces the Origins of Russian Social Media Propaganda – Never-before-seen Material from the Troll Factory,” Yle, 20 February 2015, https://kioski.yle.fi/omat/at-the-origins-of-russian-propaganda 72 Jennifer Haslan, “State Department revoked award for journalist over social media posts critical of Trump and lied about it, watchdog finds,” CNN, September 25, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/25/politics/jessik- ka-aro-iwoc-trump-state-department/index.html

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