digital innovation initiative digital innovation initiative DEMOCRATIC OFFENSE 535 AGAINST DISINFORMATION 154 Share @apolyakova @AmbDanFried Music #russia #china #EU #US #disinformation Democratic Offense Against Disinformation CONTENTS ABOUT THE AUTHORS Executive Summary ....................................... 2 Dr. Alina Polyakova is the President and Chief Defense Against Disinformation: Executive Officer of the Center for European A Mixed Report Card .................................... 3 Policy Analysis (CEPA). She serves on the A Burgeoning Sector of Disinformation board of the Free Russia Foundation and the Institute of Modern Russia and is professor of Research Groups ............................................. 7 European studies at the Johns Hopkins School Stop the Whack-a-Mole Approach: of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Dr. Get on the Offense ........................................ 10 Polyakova was the founding director for global Cyber Options ................................................ 11 democracy and emerging technology at the Sanctions (and Other Financial) Tools ....... 15 Brookings Institution. ‘The Truth Shall Set You Free’: Ambassador Daniel Fried is Ambassador Daniel Support for Free Media .................................. 17 Fried is the Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow Recommendations .......................................... 20 at the Atlantic Council. Ambassador Fried Conclusion ........................................................ 25 served as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Endnotes ........................................................... 26 and as NSC Senior Director under President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush, and as Ambassador to Poland. He most recently served in government as State Department Coordinator for Sanctions under President Barack Obama. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This three-part series on how democracies can defend against and get ahead of disinformation would not have been possible without help ABOUT CEPA from many colleagues in the United States The Center for European Analysis (CEPA) and Europe. This paper, and the ones before is a non-partisan think-tank dedicated to it, would not have become a reality without strengthening the transatlantic relationship. Geysha González, who remained committed to Headquartered in Washington, D.C. and led by the work since the first paper was published seasoned transatlanticists and young leaders in 2018. We also received valuable feedback from both sides of the Atlantic, CEPA brings and support from colleagues at the Atlantic an innovative approach to the policy arena. Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab and Our cutting-edge analysis and timely debates the Center for European Policy Analysis. Many galvanize communities of influence while others from the public, private, and nonprofit investing in the next generation of leaders to sectors across the Atlantic lent their expertise understand and address present and future in the review process. Alexander Wirth of the challenges to transatlantic values and principles. Center for European Policy Analysis stepped in at just the right moment to move this project forward. The authors also thank the Delegation of the European Union to the United States for its generous support without which this report would not have been possible. This report is part of CEPA’s Digital Innovation Initiative, which receives generous support from Craig Newmark Philanthropies. All opinions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. Cover: Assets from freepik.com were used. 2 Democratic Offense Against Disinformation The intentional use of misleading its efforts globally. Moreover, Russia is information to influence societies, or no longer the sole threat in the foreign disinformation, presents a serious threat influence game. The Chinese Communist to the integrity of democratic systems. Party (CCP) has far greater resources Authoritarian states regularly use it to than Russia and a long track record of exploit democracies’ open information information manipulation and aggressive systems, presenting a significant intervention in Taiwan and Hong Kong. national security threat that demands a With the Covid-19 pandemic, China purposeful and concerted response. This entered the global disinformation space, paper is the third in a series of papers targeting Europe, NATO, and the United that deals with how democracies can States, working from the Kremlin’s build resilience against disinformation. playbook. There is now growing evidence The first installment, Democratic that Russia and China are working Defense Against Disinformation,1 together to amplify anti-democratic and its follow-up, Democratic Defense narratives.4 Against Disinformation 2.0,2 unpacked the challenge of foreign-origin Democracies have aimed to identify, disinformation and suggested practical expose, and build greater public steps to deal with it, including actions by awareness of state-sponsored governments, social media companies, disinformation with the goal of building up greater long-term resilience to and civil society. The core argument was 5 that defense against disinformation has information influence operations. But to be rooted in democratic principles and the adversaries adapt and evolve their values: transparency, accountability, and strategies and tactics to circumvent respect for freedom of expression. We exposure and attribution. Companies, must not become them to fight them. researchers, and governments are playing whack-a-mole — responding While domestic-origin disinformation to each disinformation campaign as it is a more widespread (and growing) arises while trying (and failing) to keep challenge, the tools to deal with foreign up with new threats. To get ahead of state-sponsored disinformation are foreign disinformation, democracies must broader. The Russian government was the develop a proactive strategy to prevent first mover and innovator in exploiting state-sponsored information operations the digital information environment to in the first place.6 That means getting off carry out influence operations against our back foot and getting on the offensive. democracies, targeting the United States, This paper, written principally for the Europe, and countries beyond.3 United States but hopefully applicable in adapted form to other countries, is But while Russian interference in the a road map for how countries can get 2016 U.S. elections awoke Americans ahead of foreign disinformation. The and Europeans to the threat of new U.S. administration should lead the disinformation, the response has not democratic community in this effort. deterred the Kremlin, which has extended 1 Democratic Offense Against Disinformation We, therefore, recommend Executive Summary supplementing defense with offense. Our The United States and other democratic recommendations are designed for the countries have made progress United States; some may be adaptable by defending against foreign and domestic European governments and the European disinformation. Unevenly, but steadily, a Union (EU) as well. Offense does not mean structure for democratic defense against spreading disinformation (that would not disinformation is emerging, consistent be consistent with democratic values and with the principles of transparency, democracies aren’t good at it anyway). It accountability, and respect for freedom of does mean building up: expression. It includes: • Cyber tools to identify and disrupt • a growing network of disinformation foreign disinformation operations. The detectors (led by civil society U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) sometimes informed by government has already launched this option — the agencies); U.S. military terms it “hunt, surveil, expose and disable.” It has the appeal • social media companies (responsive of immediacy and directness, but at to public and legislative pressure) its harder-edged end it has drawbacks. that constrict disinformation on their The “disable” option needs to be platforms; implemented with care. • an informed media that exposes • Sanctions (and other financial) tools disinformation; and against disinformation actors and their sources of funding, and development • potentially, at a next stage, a regulatory of contingent retaliatory sanctions framework that seeks to filter out as a deterrent. Use of the sanctions inauthentic and deceptive behavior. tool requires persistence to apply well and its impact will be moderate While defensive measures cannot rather than decisive. It will be more block all disinformation, they can limit effective if carried out in parallel by the disinformation as more people learn United States, the EU, and the United to filter it out on their own (“social Kingdom. resilience”). • Support for free media in the broad But defense is working against a moving sense, including journalists, activists, target. Purveyors of disinformation have and independent investigators, can grown more sophisticated and their tactics be the most effective tool of counter- continue to advance. The line between disinformation. It is asymmetric domestic and foreign disinformation — it does not directly counter has blurred, with Russian agents using disinformation — but plays to the local actors as proxies to carry out greatest strengths of free societies disinformation operations. “Deepfakes” are dealing with authoritarian adversaries: progressing beyond the ability to