High-Level Meeting on the Sahel
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High-Level Meeting on Mali and the Sahel Wednesday, 26 September 2018, 3:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. United Nations Headquarters, New York (Conference Room 3, CBR-3) Concept Note I. BACKGROUND 1. The High-Level meeting on Mali and the Sahel is taking place a few weeks after the second round of the presidential elections in Mali and more than three years after the signature of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation (Peace Agreement) at a decisive moment for the future of the Malian peace process. The full implementation of the Peace Agreement has been limited by persisent delays and frequently renegotiated timelines. Consequently, important institutional and political reforms, such as security sector and state reforms have not be fully implemented, compounding governance challenges in Mali. State authority remains weak in the north and centre of the country, where the population is yet to reap tangible peace dividends. Terrorist and criminal groups, as well as local militias have propagated and expanded their area of influence into neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso. 2. Earlier this year, the Government and the signatory armed groups renewed their commitment to the peace process and on 22 March, when they agreed to a new roadmap for the implementation of the outstanding provisions of the Peace Agreement. Since, progress was made on the establishment of interim authorities at cercle level in the northern regions of the country and on the launch of mixed units for the Operational Coordination Mechanism (MOC) in Kidal and Timbuktu, as well as the on the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes through the pre-registration of combatants. However, the implementation of the agreement slowed down amid preparations for the presidential elections. Now that the electoral period has concluded and President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was re-elected for a second term, reinvigorating the peace process, and ensuring its inclusiveness will be of utmost importance, with 2019 being the key year. 3. On 29 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 2423 (2018), which extended the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2019. In the resolution, while applauding recent efforts undertaken by the signatory parties to accelerate the implementation of the Peace Agreement, the Council conveyed a strong sense of urgency. As such, the resolution requests the acceleration of the implementation of the Peace Agreement and requests the prioritization of a number of its key provisions, outlined in operative paragraph four, by March 2019. These include progress in the decentralization process and the establishment of interim authorities, security sector reform, progress in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and cantonment processes, the full operationalization of the MOCs, progress on socio-economic development and enhancing inclusivity, particularly the participation and representation of women in the peace process. 4. In order to create new momentum in the peace process, and building on the recommendations of the MINUSMA independent strategic review, the Council requests, in 1 operative paragraph five of the resolution, the conclusion of a pact for peace, between the Government of Mali and the United Nations, with the aim to hold the Malian authorities and the signatory armed movements accountable, while strengthening the coherence of international efforts in Mali to support the stabilization of the country. This pact should be concluded swiftly and not duplicate existing efforts. It would serve as a framework to accelerate the implementation of the Peace Agreement, by clearly defining mutual commitments by all actors involved related to governance, the above-mentioned reforms, rule of law, socio-economic development and national reconciliation. The pact could serve as a particularly useful tool if it included other Malian stakeholders beyond the Government, such as the signatory armed movements, the political opposition and representatives from civil society, thus underscoring the need for inclusivity and preventing potential spoilers from obstructing the peace process further down the line. The sanctions regime for Mali, which was renewed for another 12 months on 29 August, when the Security Coucnil adopted resolution 2432 (2018), as well as the Independent Observer have an important role to play in this regard, in identifying potentially hostile actors and helping to exert pressure to bring them back into the fold. 5. At the regional level, the Sahel continues to finds itself in a cycle of mutually reinforcing factors of vulnerability and instability. The spill-over of insecurity and the propagation of transnational criminal networks and of terrorist groups outside Mali continue to threaten peace in the region. Populations in the Sahel, including youth, remain vulnerable to violent extremism and terrorism as a number of factors, including underdevelopment, deprive them of education, employment and economic opportunities. Many are affected by poverty and socio-economic exclusion and deprivation, exacerbated by environmental degradation and the rampant effects of climate change. Over the years, efforts to efficiently address these challenges have been at the forefront of national, regional and international agendas, supported by the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) framework, in line with a number of Security Council resolutions, most recently 2391 (2017). 6. The challenges confronting the region have had a significant destabilizing impact, underscoring the importance of renewed and strengthened efforts to address the core structural causes of instability and vulnerability in a holistic and sustainable manner and bystrengthening the humanitarian-development nexus and its linkages to peace. Against this backdrop, the recalibration of UNISS and the development of the UN Support Plan for the Sahel, provide a renewed framework for a more coherent, coordinated, comprehensive and integrated engagement in the region. The UN Support Plan for the Sahel targets 10 countries, namely Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. While showcasing the significant opportunities in the Sahel, the Support Plan aims at providing greater support to the Governments of the region; improving coordination and strengthening collaboration with all partners in the region, including national and regional institutions, bilateral and multilateral organizations, the private sector and civil society organizations; and mobilizing resources and investments in the Sahel. 7. Meanwhile, the G5-Sahel, both through its Priority Investment Plan (PIP) and its Joint Force constitutes an important sub-regional partner that require sustained support by the international community. The Joint Force is a timely initiative that can play a critical role in providing security in the region and a more conducive operating environment for 2 MINUSMA. It will require a sound institutional framework to guide its operations, mutual support between the security presences on the ground as established by resolutions 2391 (2017) and 2423 (2018), as well as more predictable and sustainable funding in order to expand and maintain its presence in the region. Donor confidence can be further enhanced , by more clarity on the future end-state of the Joint Force, continuing to address concerns over human rights related issues through the continued implementation of the compliance framework, and development of an institutional framework and a Support Group (Groupe de Soutien). The African Union-led Nouakchott Process could serve to address the last point, by providing the framework for coordinating regional responses to tackle terrorism and transnational crime, including but also going beyond the G5-Sahel and by fostering intelligence sharing. II. OBJECTIVES 8. The United Nations proposes to host and co-chair with the Government of Mali, the African Union (AU), the Government of Niger in its capacity of acting presidency for the G5-Sahel, the Government of Algeria, the Government of France, the European Union (EU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a High-Level Meeting on Mali and the Sahel, in the margins of the General Debate of the United Nations seventy-third session of the General Assembly. 9. Building upon the Ministerial Meeting held on 20 September 2017 and the visit of the Secretary-General to Mali on 29-30 May 2018, the event will seek to renew the commitment of all the signatory parties, with the support of the international community, to launch a new dynamic for the implementation of the Peace Agreement and conclude the pact for peace in the shortest delay. The meeting will further provide an opportunity to revitalize and coordinated support by regional actors and international partners, including the UN, AU, ECOWAS, EU and bilateral partners, for the stabilization of Mali, the extension and restoration of state authority and the provision of peace dividends. Taking into account the regional dimension of the Malian crisis, and the important role that the G5-Sahel Joint Force can play in stabilizing the region, the event will also help to mobilize additional support for the full operationalization of the joint force. 10. The event will also provide an opportunity to showcase the UN Support Plan for the Sahel, as an opportunity to continue to strengthen governance, security and development in the region. The event will seek to galvanise, at the highest level, support towards the