Casting the Shadow of Power: Explaining the Proliferation and Endurance of Overseas Military Basing

by Jiayu Zhang

B.A. in International Politics, June 2018, Fudan University

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of The Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

May 16, 2021

Thesis directed by

Alexander B. Downes Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

Abstract of Thesis

Casting the Shadow of Power: Explaining the Proliferation and Endurance of Overseas Military Basing

States keep maintaining and seeking overseas military bases despite many predictions of their decline and potential political and economic risks. This paper argues that states’ pursuit of overseas bases is motivated by different imperatives in different eras and contexts while all these incentives are rooted in their desire to muster their power. The case of U.S. basing in Japan illustrates the persistence of traditional basing logic that originated from the Cold-War preparation for wars. On the military dimension, access to overseas military posts enhances the projection of military power and improves military effectiveness, both promoting basing states’ capabilities to wage war. On the political dimension, basing strengthens alliance assurance by consolidating the credibility of security guarantees to defend allies should they are attacked. With the end of the Cold War that led to the change of the international structure and diversification of militaries’ missions, second-tier powers and rising powers begin to pursue bases according to emerging basing logic. In the cases of Turkey, Japan, and China, overseas bases are sought for the purpose of asserting great power status, participating in global governance, and safeguarding broad political and economic agendas, all of which promote states' hard and soft power. Basing states also mitigate potential backlashes by adapting and choosing proper forms of bases ranging from large permanent presence to cheaper and low-profile light footprints.

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Table of Contents

Abstract of Thesis ...... ii 1.Introduction ...... 1 2. A Brief History of Overseas Basing ...... 6 3.Literature Review ...... 11 4.Therotical Framework ...... 17 4.1 Traditional Basing Logic ...... 19 4.1.1 Military Dimension...... 19 4.1.2 Political Dimension ...... 25 4.2 Emerging Basing Logic ...... 29 4.2.1 Status Assertation ...... 30 4.2.2 Global Governance ...... 34 4.2.3 Economic and Value Interests ...... 36 4.3 Form of Basing ...... 39 4.4 Summary ...... 43 4.5 Testing Theory ...... 44 5. Discussion ...... 46 5.1 Traditional Logic in U.S. Basing ...... 46 5.1.1 History of U.S. Basing in Japan ...... 47 5.1.2 Structure of U.S. Basing in Japan ...... 53 5.1.3 Analysis of U.S. Basing in Japan ...... 56 5.2 Overseas Basing in the New Era ...... 64 5.2.1 Turkey: Empire Strike Back ...... 65 5.2.2 Japan: Borrowing the Boat to Sail ...... 75 5.2.3 China: The Dawn of a New Superpower? ...... 86 6. Conclusion and Looking Forward ...... 97 Bibliography ...... 102

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1.Introduction

Establishing Overseas military bases and maintaining access to essential installations in strategic locations are crucial instruments for great powers to interfere in regional affairs, consolidate alliance relations, project military forces, demonstrate national strengths, and safeguard economic interests. They frequently appear in the analysis of international politics issues such as great power competition, grand strategy, alliance politics, and force posture. However, to some extent, overseas military bases are like stage props: essential to the show, but never commanding center stage. As the experts from U.S. Naval War College claimed, “the ongoing reconfiguration of America’s foreign military ‘footprint’ abroad …… has so far received little systematic attention from national security specialists and still less from the wide public.”1

Modern overseas military bases are the legacy of colonial expansion and the Cold War.

Born with the demand of imperialist powers to dominate their vast colonies, overseas bases networks reached the peak during the Cold War when both rival superpowers used forward basing for functions ranging from nuclear deterrence to alliance assurance. After the Cold

War, a radical reduction of the scale of global military bases networks was anticipated by both the officials and the public. According to the Department of Defense’s report, the

United States was ready for “reducing overseas base structures to the minimum level” in

1994.2 C.T. Sanders indicated that the U.S. was showing an appreciation of the fact that

1 Andrew I. Yeo, “The Politics of Overseas Military Bases,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 2017), p. 129. 2 Department of Defense Report to the President and Congress, January 1994. 1 good guests should not outstay their welcome.3

Meanwhile, academic and journalist pieces echoed such anticipations by illustrating the global resistance against U.S. overseas deployment and how overseas military bases of great powers harm the world.4 Evidence including financial burden, ideological resistance, grassroots opposition, jurisdiction disputes, and external countermeasures are provided by these efforts to prove basing is a costly, vulnerable, and doom action.5 By reviewing the rise and fall of the empires in history, Paul Kennedy proposed “imperial overstretch”, arguing that overextension of global interests and obligations will lead to the decline of great powers. 6 He even made a dire prediction that American’s worldwide military presence would collapse from imperial overstretch.7 The challenges and troubles caused by overseas basing seem to have already overwhelmed the strategic benefits brought by it.

Yet after about three decades, counties are still attempting to maintain their remaining bases and seeking new posts. In 2018, the official document released by the Pentagon indicated that the United States possessed 514 bases on foreign soil all over the world.8

Due to the lack of a wide-accepted definition of “military bases”, some analysis estimates

3 C. T. Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 19. 4 David Vine, Base Nation: How American Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015). 5 See Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennifer Kavanagh, Access Granted: Political Challenges to the U.S. Overseas Military Presence, 1945-2014. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016) and Michael J. Lostumbo, Michael J. McNerney, Eric Peltz, Derek Eaton, David R. Frelinger, Victoria A. Greenfield, John Halliday, et al. Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013). 6 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 515. 7 Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons, p. 18. 8 U.S. Department of Defense, Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2018), p. 18. 2 that the actual number of U.S. military facilitates in other countries is more than 800.9

After founded its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, China keeps seeking overseas outposts in other strategic locations. Through so-called “port diplomacy”, China invested heavily in port facilitates and infrastructure abroad, which have the potential to be used as naval bases. Protecting its access to Khmeimim Air Base and Naval facilitates at

Tartus port is one of the considerations that drive Russian interventions in the Syrian Civil

War. As a rising polar in the struggle of regional hegemony in the Middle East, Turkey’s military footprints have expanded to Syria, Iraq, Qatar, and Somalia.

Obviously, there is a gap between the prediction of analytical studies and the real dynamics of facts. While the challenges, risks, and troubles related to overseas basing have been widely studied and illustrated, the decision-makers still refuse to give up their overseas military assets and plan to expand the scale of such presence. Therefore, the puzzle here is why great powers pursue and maintain overseas bases even though they may become the quagmire that burying empires. If Paul Kennedy is true about the statement that overseas basing is one of the origins of imperial overstretch, why countries never learn the lessons? If the traditional powers have problems with getting rid of their legacy bases, why the rising powers like China, India, and Turkey still follow the old path of seeking overseas bases? To explore these questions and close the gap between analysis and reality, this paper intends to explain the endurance and proliferation of overseas military bases.

9 John Glaser, “Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous”, Cato Institute Policy Analysis, No. 816, July 18, 2017, p. 2. 3

Explaining the practice of overseas basing is important for several reasons.

Theoretically, it will contribute to many aspects of base studies as a sub-discipline. A comprehensive analytical framework to examine countries’ motivations for overseas basing is still lack. Answering this question will help the intellectual understanding of countries’ pursuit of overseas bases. Furthermore, it will supplement the studies and expand the literature of this field, which is heavily U.S.-centric, by exploring cases of rising powers like China and Turkey. More importantly, understanding of basing actions will offer a new angle to test existing theory and then contribute to the understanding of more broad issues like national security strategy, alliance assurance, and defense policy. On the practice level, it can be used to inform sound policy-making. When more countries are pursuing overseas military presence, proper response to others’ basing action depends on accurate examination of their intent. A deeper study may not only prevent policymakers from underestimating other’s resolve of basing but also avoid overreaction that may cause tension and escalation.

This paper argues that countries’ pursuit of overseas bases is motivated by different imperatives in different eras and contexts while all these incentives are rooted in states’ desire to increase their power. The traditional logic of modern basing, which originated in the Cold War, has two dimensions. On the military dimension, access to overseas installations enhances the projection of military power and improves military effectiveness, both promoting basing countries’ capabilities to wage war. On the political dimension, basing strengthens alliance assurance by consolidating the credibility of the commitment

4 to defend allies should they are attacked. With the end of the Cold War that led to the change of international structure, rising and second-tier powers seek overseas bases for new reasons to pursue different forms of power in military operations other than war. In this emerging logic of basing, countries deploy bases to facilitate participation in global governance, symbolize their status, and safeguard different types of overseas interests.

Basing countries’ practices to adapt the form of their bases also help to mitigate potential backlashes and risks.

This paper proceeds as fellows. First, this paper provides a brief history of overseas bases to illustrate various basing patterns. Second, existing literature of base studies is reviewed so that the insightful findings can be highlighted and their weakness can be critiqued. The subsequent section forms the theoretical basis to explain the continuous seeking of overseas bases by countries. Third, case studies are provided to test the theory.

The practice of U.S. basing, mainly focus on its base complex in Japan, Japanese base in

Djibouti, Turkey’s expansion in the Middle East, and China’s base in Horn of Africa and

“seaport diplomacy” is investigated. The final section summarized the findings of this paper and look forward to the future of overseas basing.

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2. A Brief History of Overseas Basing

Kent Calder indicated that today’s basing profile is a legacy of previous empires, wars, foreign occupations, and technological advances. 10 Although the standard military histories seldom provide a coherent, comprehensive portrayal of basing networks, 11 seeking overseas military bases and deploying troops on the soil of independent countries has never been a novel phenomenon. The history of overseas military bases can be traced back to the era of ancient Greek. During the Peloponnesian War, Delian League and

Peloponnesian League built forts and ports on their allies' soil, which influence the course of the war from both political and military aspects.12 Bases also prompted the control of landmass routes and conquered territory for the rulers of large ancient empires. During

Darius’ Persian Empire, garrisons containing food warehouse and lodging for messengers were built every 29 kilometers along the imperial route. 13 Alexander the Great also established logistic chains and outposts to bolster its decisive victory against Persians.14

Such basing networks upgraded the military capabilities of armies through assisting communication and supporting logistics.

However, compared to the modern overseas military bases, such arrangements are more like a domestic network of military support facilitates under the power structure of

10 Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism. Princeton: (Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 10. 11 Robert E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 14. 12 See Thucydides, The Peloponnesian Wars. Trans. Thomas Hobbes. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 13 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, p. 7. 14 James R. Blaker, United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma. (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 59. 6 ancient empires because the relationship between the empire and its conquered colonels and vassal states is vague before the concept of sovereignty state emerged. What’s more, given the low level of administrative power and serious technological constraints at that time, these costly networks are not endured and the projection of power is hard to maintain.

The intensive emergency of overseas military bases echoed the rise of colonialism and maritime empires in the 15th century. At the dawn of the “Columbian Age”, expansionist pioneers like Spain, Portugal, and Britain began to set up different types of overseas installations to support long-range exploratory voyages and secure foreign trade.

According to Boxer, The Portuguese founded the first empires on which the sun never set thanks to a widespread network of points d’appui where small flotillas were based.15

The era dominated by colonialism and mercantilism added new dimensions to overseas presence, making it go beyond simple warfighting supporting missions. On the one hand, commercial importance required the establishment of overseas installation to secure trade routes and promote foreign trade by providing bases for naval escorts and mercenary fleets to have access to the international market. On the other hand, overseas bases played a crucial role in the mission of empire policing, which aimed at managing the order at new colonels. The technological advance of industrial revolution also highlighted the importance of having access to overseas coaling stations for global reach. Accordingly, the transnational basing network serves as a force multiplier amid intensified competition

15 C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 51. 7 among imperialist countries during the 19th and 20th Centuries. As the linchpin of Pax

Britannica, they allowed Brain to concentrate the Crown’s capabilities at strategic points and draw considerable political-economic resources all over the world to leverage its own strengths.16 By Contrast, those states that lacked extensive bases, such as Germany and

Russia, had to suffer the loss of their overseas colonies.

The end of two great world wars changed the dynamics of overseas basing, pushing it beyond the context of formal empire. 17 First, bases took new political-economic functions such as stabilizing ties across the Atlantic and the Pacific, promoting trade and investment interdependence, and consolidating alliances. 18 What’s more, nuclear deterrence, overseas intervene, global communication and intelligence, and even space operations were all supported and enabled by installations and facilitates deployed on foreign soils. Second, the problem of base politics emerged with the liberation of nations because Overseas bases began to be regarded as the uncomfortable legacy of colonial rule.

Nevertheless, amid the intensive atmosphere of the Cold War, establishing bases became a strategic choice for East-West competition. The superpowers gained access to military facilities on allies’ soil to expand their influence and enhance their military projection. For the recipients of the bases, hosting forces for superpowers granted their security and functioned as a tripwire to deter adversarial aggression. At its heyday, one-

16 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, p. 7. 17 Robert E. Harkavy, Base Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 2. 18 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, p. 8. 8 third of U.S. military personnel were deployed in more than 1000 overseas military bases, most of them were located in Western Europe and North-East Asia.19 The Soviet Union also succeeded in having access to bases in Syria, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Cuba, Somalia,

Yemen, Ethiopia, and Vietnam to form buffer zones and project influence to strategic locations.20

The total amount of overseas military bases shrank with the pressure of superpower- conflicts loosened after the Cold War. The United States responded to the collapse of

Soviet blocs by embarking on a run-down of its global military presence. The Department of Defense's annual report to the Congress in 1994 spoke of “reducing overseas base structure to the minimum level”.21 Russia lost its bases in Vietnam, Germany, Poland,

Cuba, and the Horn of Africa region. Meanwhile, its troops deployed on the territory of other Commonwealth of Independent States members became its overseas military presence.

The overseas basing in the post-Cold War era is faced up new factors that may generate new uncertainties and backlashes. First, the bases are highly politized due to the struggle for regional influence, domestic nationalist emotion in host states, and other concerns. Second, the shrinking of the defense budget in peacetime leads to financial hardship to maintain bases. Although the U.S. resorts to “offset payment” approaches,

19 Joseph Gerson and Brue Birchard ed, The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the Networks pf Foreign Military Bases. (Boston: South End Press, 1991), p. 30. 20 Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases, pp. 175-198. 21 Department of Defense Report to the President and Congress, January 1994. 9 there’s still controversy regarding why money is allocated to basing rather than public welfare. Third, emerging nontraditional threats require militaries to perform both combat and non-combat missions. Fourth, technological development suggests a new way to employ military assets, including overseas bases. Finally, in a multipolar system dominated by the United States, overseas basing is not the privilege of superpowers. Various rising and second-tier powers have the space to cast their shadows through basing.

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3.Literature Review

Although the phenomenon of overseas basing by great powers has been around for thousands of years, the theoretical analysis of overseas military bases and basing policies attracted only a little attention from academia. Based on the specific topics focused on and the methodology used, all previous researches can be divided into three generations.

The early scholarship on overseas basing emerged during the Cold War period and was relatively thin compared to the studies of other national security issues like nuclear deterrence. This generation of research offered macro-historical studies outlining structural trends in U.S. global military presence or presented policy pieces examining the dynamics of overseas basing in specific countries.22 Hans W. Weigert and Townsend Hoopes’ article in the early year of the Cold War reflects the process of the U.S. to rethink its security strategy and adjust its military posture. Their works not only illustrate how bases reinforced

U.S. strategic deterrence and alliance system but also founded the basis for future research.23 Many researchers at that time, including Duncan Campbell, John Gaddis, and

Philip Klass, focused primarily on how the changes of military technology influence U.S. basing options.24

Robert E. Harkavy’s works are the flagships of the first generation of base study,

22 Yeo, “The Politics of Overseas Military Bases”, p. 130. 23 See Hans W. Weigert, “U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1947, pp. 250- 262; Townsend Hoopes, “Overseas Bases in American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1958, pp. 69-82. 24 See Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain. (London: Michael Joseph, 1984); Philip J. Klass, Secret Sentries in Space. (New York: Random House, 1971); Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941); Patrick J. McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973). 11 which provides encyclopedia guidance for following researchers. Although his studies did not follow the pattern of today’s theoretical-oriented social science, he founded the cornerstone of the whole base studies field. His first book Great Power Competition for

Overseas Bases not only presented the history of overseas basing but also incorporate the analysis of basing policies into the context of geopolitical theories.25 In 1989, Harkavy presented a systematic descriptive analysis of U.S. overseas bases during the Cold War era by categorizing them into seven forms in his second book.26 His latest book covered the

800-year history of great powers’ acquisition of overseas bases and foresee the future dynamics.27 The logic underlying Harkavy’s analysis is that the feature of basing policy is the interaction of technological factors and political factors.

The first generation of base studies did not terminate with the end of the Cold War.

The policy-oriented analysis that aimed at providing recommendations for the U.S. overseas basing continued to occupy the central stage of base studies. These works reflect the lessons learned from the Cold-War practice and focus on how to adjust U.S. military posture to deal with emerging threats like terrorism, rogue states, the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, and rising powers.28 In all, the development trajectory of first-generation mirrors the U.S policy community’s perception of national security threats.

25 Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases. 26 Harkavy, Base Abroad. 27 Robert E. Harkaby, Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000. (New York: Routledge, 2007). 28 See Joseph Gerson and Brue Birchard ed, The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the Networks pf Foreign Military Bases. (Boston: South End Press, 1991); Carnes Lord ed. Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-First Century. (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2006); Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson ed. Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014). 12

The second generation of base studies was marked by the emergence of base politics studies. This generation of scholarship is more theoretical-oriented and focuses on the causal mechanism of basing policies, especially how domestic factors of host states influence basing. “Base politics” is defined by Kent Calder as “the interaction between basing nations and host nations on matters relating to the status and operation of local military facilitates in the host nations, together with related transnational interactions involving non-state actors.” 29 Calder first explored different patterns of base management by leaders in host nations through identified four paradigms of base politics based on whether coercion or material benefits are used to stabilize the bases. Alexander

Cooley’s approach to base politics shed light on the impact of regime type and political structure in host countries. He found that the ultimate goal of political elites of host nations is their own political survival and they will leverage on foreign bases to maximize political outcomes.30 His case studies of U.S. bases in the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, South Korea,

Italy, and Spain reveal that consolidation and institutionalization of young democracies can commit more credible to their external basing agreements, which makes them more predictable and stable base hosts than authoritarian states.31 Although the volume of the second generation of base politics is not as huge as the early generation, it is a meaningful effort to integrate base studies into comparative politics discipline and employ rigorous

29 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, p. 65. 30 See Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas. (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 2008). 31 Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, 2005, p. 90. 13 social science methodologies. However, as Cooley himself points out, base politics “is not easily slotted into either of the established political science subfields of international relations or comparative politics”, students of base politics should intentionally blur disciplinary boundaries.32

The third generation of base studies has only taken shape in the last decade. This generation of scholarship has two characteristics in terms of methodologies and themes.

First, the theoretical arguments have become nuanced, electric, and inter-disciplinary.33

Researchers managed to break the disciplinary boundaries and combine insights from sociology, jurisprudence, and other fields. Second, increasing attention is shifted from political institutions to the societal and individual level. Grassroot movements, local communities, and social activists capture the interest of scholars and the research themes are centered on the resistance to bases and their closure. This reflects not only the increasing political opening in host nations, but also shifting relations between the U.S. and its allies.

Andrew Yeo’s Activists, Allies, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests analyzed the effectiveness of social protests in host nations against U.S. bases through combining alliance theory and social movement theory. He concludes that the political and security cognition of policy- makers determines the outcomes of anti-U.S. bases protests.34 The Base of Empire, which is edited by Catherine Lutz, outlined how U.S. overseas bases caused troubles for local

32 Cooley, Base Politics, p. xii. 33 Yeo, “The Politics of Overseas Military Bases,” p. 130. 34 Andrew I. Yeo, Activists, Allies, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests. (London: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 14 people including pollution, noise, and loss of land. 35 Other authors like Amy Austin

Holmes, Roland G. Simbulan, and Yuko Kawato respectively studies the cases of Turkey,

Germany, Japan, and the Philippines. Their researches demonstrate that similar anti-base protests can occur in very different historical and cultural settings.36 Additionally, Mark L.

Gillen explored this issue from the aspect of architecture and urban design. As a former architect, his experience of participating in U.S. overseas military construction inspired him to track how the use of land by the U.S. in host nations invoke domestic resistance.37

Although these three generations cover a very wide range of issues related to overseas basing, there are three major gaps and weaknesses needed to be addressed by the following studies. First, almost all the existing literature is centered on U.S. practice of overseas basing during the Cold War. A few pieces about the basing practices of other great powers like Britain and the Soviet Union are distributed in the discussion of other broad issues or analysis about U.S. response to those basing policies. However, there are totally 18 countries that own overseas military installations or have access to military sites on foreign land. Among them, some are middle powers like Japan and Australia and the others are rising powers like China and India. The question about how the basing actions of these countries are different from great powers in history is still waiting for answers.

35 Catherine Lutz ed. The Base of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts. (New York: NYU Press, 2011). 36 See Geoffrey F. Gresh, Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015); Amy Austin Holmes, Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Yuko Kawato, Protests against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015); Roland G. Simbulan, The Base of Our Insecurity: A Study of the US Military Bases in the Philippines. (Philippines: BALAI Fellowship, 1983). 37 Mark L. Gillen, American Town: Building the Outposts of Empire. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota State, 2007). 15

Second, theoretical paths established by second- and third-generation base researchers mostly focus on how factors in host countries force the reaction of deploying countries.

Theoretical efforts aimed at explaining deploying countries' active action, both seeking bases and maintaining bases, are still rare. As an issue that is closely related to the policy practice, the major purpose of most base studies is to inform sound decision-making rather than contributing intellectual advance. What’s more, the explanation of basing actions focuses narrowly on rational calculation while other theoretical paradigms are overlooked.

Third, existing literature fails to answer the question of “imperial overextension” raised by Paul Kennedy. Historical records have proved that overseas military presence might be one of the burdens that buried the empires in the past. Recent analysis also contended that U.S. overseas military bases were no longer strategic assets and disclosed how they harmed America and the world.38 However, the U.S. and other great powers still refuse to give up their overseas posts. If the traditional powers have problems with getting rid of their legacy, why the rising powers like China still follow the old path of seeking overseas bases?

38 See John Glaser; “Withdrawing from Overseas Base,” and David Vine, Base Nation: How American Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015). 16

4.Therotical Framework

This paper argues that traditional necessities for basing during the Cold War persists and new incentives for pursuing overseas military outposts emerge, leading to the proliferation and endurance of overseas bases. The logic behind these motivations is rooted in the states’ desire to muster their power. Additionally, they can also mitigate potential pressures and risks by adjusting different forms of bases.

Sun Degang contended that expanding power is the implicit logic behind overseas basing.39 Mustering power may be the most important task imposed on states by the international political system. 40 However, there are some controversies about how to define and measure power. Mearsheimer focuses narrowly on material capabilities, especially socio-economic ingredients that constitute the war-waging potential and military power centered on land supremacy.41 Ray Cline’s formula combines traditional material elements with the national strategy coefficient and national will.42 Joseph Nye highlights that non-coercive soft power can also help states to obtain their desired outcomes. Thus, the power pursued by states is diversified.

Furthermore, the ultimate power of a country is not merely determined by how much capability it has. Countries also need sound employment of power. This includes two aspects. The first one is the ability to project power. It is defined as the ability of a nation

39 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 40 Barry R. Posen, The Source of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p.61. 41 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), pp. 55- 56, p. 135. 42 Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift. (Boulder: Wesview, 1975), p. 35. 17 to apply its elements of national power effectively and rapidly in and from multiple dispersed locations.43 Such demand is generated by the fact that the reach of power may be restrained by spatial distance. The power possessed by a nation will only take effect when it can reach the destination of employment.

The second issue is about transforming and translating power. On the one hand, resources should be translated into real power. Taking military power as an example,

Mearsheimer highlights the difference in countries’ levels of efficiency in converting their wealth into military power.44 Millett and Murray defined this process of conversion as military effectiveness.45 On the other hand, inter-power conversion enables countries to transform one type of power to another. Art illustrates that some types of power are fungible so that a single power asset can be employed across different policy domains. 46 An empirical example of the importance of inter-power conversion is that the U.S. did not grant the status of superpower until the end of WWII because its economic power did not transform into enough political and military strength at the beginning of the 20th century.

In all, states pursue various types of power and power employment abilities. Overseas military basing is essentially a practice of power as well. The specific imperatives of overseas basing vary across the eras due to the changes of the international structure. The

43 Barry Leonard ed. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, January 2011, p. 367. 44 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 79. 45 Allen R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 2. 46 Robert J. Art, “American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force,” Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996), p. 8. 18 following sections dive into the traditional basing logic that originated in the Cold War and the emerging basing logic that appeared in the Post-Cold War era.

4.1 Traditional Basing Logic

The traditional logic of basing is the pattern of arranging overseas bases network to meet the requirement of superpower competition during the Cold War. The major character of this era is the bipolar structure of the international system that is dominated by the United

States and the Soviet Union. This structure had two implications on superpowers’ basing practice. First, most of the countries were involved in the competition by joining either of the two blocs, making them a part of base politics consideration. Second, due to the long- lasting tension between the two blocs that may cause hot armed conflicts, basing plays a crucial role in preventing and waging wars. Therefore, traditional basing logic highlights military and political preparation for war, both to conduct it and prevent it.

4.1.1 Military Dimension

On the military dimension, overseas bases first promote deploying countries’ military power projection, which helps countries to seize the dominance of war by expanding the reach of military power. According to the U.S. definition, the goal of power projection is to effectively deploy and sustain forces abroad. Its synonymous in British doctrine, expeditionary warfare, emphasizes the projection of military power over extended lines of communication into a distant operational area.47 Thus, there are two basic elements of

47 Robert Fry, ‘Expeditionary Operations in the Modern Era,’ RUSI Journal, Vol. 150, No. 6 (December 2005), p. 60. 19 military power projection, the capabilities to convey troops beyond significant distance from one’s own borders and the sustainment of those projected troops.48

To project forces far beyond one’s own borders and expand the reach of military power, a state will be faced up with many problems on the operational level because spatial distance acts as a resisting force.49 Kenneth Boulding coined the term “loss-of-strength gradient” (LSG) to describe how the military strengthen is weakened with the increase of distance. In short, this concept points out that the further from the homel and any nation must operate, the longer will be its line of communication and the less strength it can put in the field.50

The reason for such loss of strength is primarily the complicated and expensive transport of troops. Boulding indicates that LSG is a cost of transport of strength, whatever strength is.51 First, the capacity for long-range transportation is limited. As Mearsheimer contended in his discussion of stopping power of large bodies of water, there are significant limits on the number of troops and amount of firepower that a navy can bring to bear in an expeditionary operation.52 This is not only because of the relatively limited carrying capacity of airlift and sealift measures but also due to the advantage of local opponents to outnumber the projected troops. Second, even though military power can be projected by land, whose carrying capacity is better, geographic features of certain topography and

48 Kieran Webb, ‘The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding’s Loss of Strengthen Gradient,’ Comparative Strategy, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 2007), p. 295. 49 Patrick Porter, The Global Village Myth: Distance, War, and the Limits of Power. (London: Hurst, 2015), p. 10. 50 Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 231. 51 Ibid., p. 231. 52 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 114. 20 terrain like mountains, forests, and swamps also create barriers for projectors and favor the local defenders.53 Last but most important, Fuller regarded the movement as “the soul of war”.54 However, it is always a hard problem for military planners to enhance the speed of mobilization and transportation of troops, partially because of the two reasons mentioned above. During the Persian Gulf War, it took the U.S. more than 6 months to field enough troops, especially those heavy armor divisions, in the theater. Thus, states will lose strength in an out-of-area operation because the slow speed of movement restricts their power.

Another problem that leads to the LSG is the sustainment and logistic issues of long- range projection. Sound logistic support capability is an indispensable component of intact military power projection. However, the farther military strength is projected, the longer its line of communication will be, and then the more difficult it to supply. Sun Tzu pointed out that providing troops with enough provisions to match thousands of miles will exhaust a country’s strength and attrite its resources. Besides, long lines of logistic supply are vulnerable to enemies’ raid and harassment. Thus, Sun Tzu himself suggested to “get supply from the enemies in the local theaters.” 55 In ancient times, long-range expeditionary war like Alexander the Great’s invasion of Persia fed their troops by plundering local wealth. Russia’s scorched-earth policy, which deprived the French armies of getting local supply, caused Napoleon’s defeat in 1812. British was also placed in a

53 Shipin Tang, “A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 2004), p. 4-5. 54 J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History: The Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the End of the Second World War. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1945), p. 24. 55 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Lionel Gellis. (New York: Open Road Integrated Media, 2014), pp. 15-16. 21 disadvantaged position in the Falklands campaign due to the lack of forward-located supplies in the South Atlantic.56

The way proposed by Boulding to reverse the loss-of-strength gradient is secondary centers of home strength, which are overseas military bases. 57 In general, forward- deployed overseas military installations bring countries with the advantages of proximity to improve movement.58 For those countries who have access to overseas military posts, they can preposition troops, ordnance, and supplies in these positions, helping them to overcome the problems of long-range transportation, geographic resistance, and logistic costs. Military forces do not need to overcome spatial and geographic barriers, which impede their movement speed and limit the carrying capacity, to reach the destination of power employment. Peacetime preposition of ordnance at overseas bases and such bases’ access to local resources also serve as logistic hubs to organize supplies without solely relying on supports from the homeland. In other words, by shortening the line of communication, overseas basing makes expeditionary operation easier. States are allowed to respond to the contingency rapidly and decisively rather than resorting to the slow and long mobilization process at home. As a result, military power is expanded to remote theaters. An analysis conducted by RAND Airforce Project regarding the capabilities of rapid deployment reveals the significance of having bases in strategic locations, whose projection capabilities cover the main battlefields of the U.S. military. According to the

56 Webb, “The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding’s Loss of Strengthen Gradient”, p. 298. 57 Boulding, Conflict and Defense, p. 262. 58 Webb, “The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding’s Loss of Strengthen Gradient”, p. 295. 22 report, regional prepositioned site in Diego Garcia and Guam offers the ability to deploy the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams by sea or air to key areas in five to nine days. By contrast, if the same troops are mobilized and deployed from the continental United States, it may take up to a few months to ensure that they are fully ready to fight59

Overseas basing also promotes military effectiveness. The training, research, and technique functions of overseas military bases can promote the conversion of resources to fighting power. The most significant way of overseas basing to facilitate military effectiveness is training. Although most literature of military effectiveness studies takes high-politics factors as the primary variable, many of them mentioned training as an intermediate variable where salient training implementation or planning generated by high- politics design can directly bolster militaries’ fighting power.60 Overseas military bases can provide militaries with unique training environments and terrain that it cannot find within their own territory due to the restrictions of natural and climate conditions. The

United States has used locales in Latin America for jungle special warfare exercises and

Norway for cold-weather training.61 The Soviets also used its bases at South Yemen’s

Socotra Island in the Indian Ocean for amphibious assault practice, there being no equivalent natural conditions within the U.S.S.R.62 Bases also provide opportunities for

59 Alan Vick, David Orlesky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones, The Stryker Combat Brigade Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002), p. xv. 60 See Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds., Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2007); Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). 61 Sun Degang and Deng Haipeng, “A Theoretical Analysis of Overseas Military Base” International Forum, Vol. 14, No. 6 (November 2012), p. 25. 62 Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases, p. 19. 23 stationed troops to train in the same geographic environment in which they may have to fight. Furthermore, Overseas bases can be used to host joint military exercises, giving the chance for militaries to learn from each other. U.S. Marines conduct periodic joint exercises with allied forces at bases in Okinawa, Busan, and Subic Bay. Troops of hosting nations can benefit from the joint training and exercises with advanced militaries as well. The purpose of some specialized units deployed to overseas posts is to improve the fighting power of allied forces so that the military power of the alliance as a whole is strengthened.

What’s more, the technical functions of overseas bases also contribute to the process of polishing combat capability by reinforcing command and control (C2) and situational awareness. Basic technical support that enables the connection between low-level fighters and senior-level commanders is indispensable for salient command and control. Although the advance of information technology allows militaries to communicate through different terminals, the physical principles of signal and radio waves determine that smooth commanding flows and situational awareness need a wide dispersed infrastructure network to secure communication. Harkavy’s survey illustrates that overseas technical facilities serve a critical function of command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR). 63 By conducting the mission ranging from signal transmission to data processing, from satellite tracking to fire detection, overseas bases serve the establishment of a network that integrate groups of monitors, sensors, and

63 Harkavy, Base Abroad, p. 149. 24 communication nodes and relay points, which founding a rigorous technical basis for command and control and situational awareness.

4.1.2 Political Dimension

Among the discussion of strategic justifications or rationale for overseas basing and forward policy of the United States, alliance assurance is the most prominent one. Indeed, the linkage between overseas basing and alliance politics underlay U.S. basing posture during and after the Cold War. As if seeking and maintaining alliance still favor the interest of a state, and as if alliance diplomacy is still a major component of international politics, overseas basing will keep playing a role in states’ policy and strategy.

Allying is a common balancing practice for states to advance their security.64 The most comprehensive database on alliances shows that there were totally 648 alliances between 1815 and 2003.65 Formulating coalitions promotes states’ power. In the view of capabilities aggregation model, alliances serve as a substitute for internal sources of power by increasing the likelihood that the allies will send their military forces to defend one another. The increased credibility of military intervention advances the allies’ mutual interest in the deterrence of a common threat, and the massing of their military forces increases their ability to defeat such a threat should it materialize.66 What’s more, forgoing

64 See Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics. (New York: Wiley, 1957); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: Knopf, 1973); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (New York: Random House, 1979). 65 Brett Leeds, Jeffrey Ritter, Sara Mitchell, and Andrew Long, “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815- 1944,” International Interactions, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2002), pp. 237-260. Database is available at: http://www.atopdata.org/data.html 66 James Morrow, “Alliance and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991), p. 909; Glenn Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990), p.110. 25 alliance relations with like-minded states will not only enhance the domestic legitimacy of a regime by suggesting that it is part of a broader, popular movement but also increase the international influence of its ideology by consolidating the strength of this movement.67 In this sense, a military alliance functions as a power transformer that convert military capabilities into soft power. As Posen suggests, coalition formation not only musters real power but also enlarges perceived power.68

Nevertheless, alliances are not static once established. They require different ways of management for endurance and persistence. Overseas basing provides a consolidated solution for alliance assurance through deterring aggressors and appeasing allies. Since the major goal of coalition formulation is to balance common enemies, the expected success of deterring or defeating potential aggression determines whether an alliance will persist or collapse. Overseas bases thereby demonstrate the trustworthiness of member’s promises to join the fight and thus to bolster the credibility of the commitment to other members.69

To deter potential aggressors, bases enhance the credibility of a country’s willingness to fight should an adversary attack its ally. In Schelling’s view, overseas bases lay a trip-wire that is plainly visible and manifestly connected up to the machinery of war by putting the lives of forward-deployed soldiers at risk.70 It would be very difficult politically for the deploying countries to renege on a security guarantee if its own troops were already caught

67 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 34-35. 68 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 62. 69 John Glaser, “Withdrawing from Overseas Bases”, p. 5. 70 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence. (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 99. 26 up in the fighting. Moreover, large, permanent garrisons require a lot of time and resources to abandon. For the leaders who responsible for the tax-payers, it is hard to explain why the expensive equipment, facilities, and assets are given up without firing a single shot.

Thus, the existence of overseas bases is able to make adversaries’ attempt to manipulate brinkmanship futile because it makes deploying countries difficult to withdraw amid conflict, no matter how peripheral the strategic interests at stake. In the struggle of resolve, overseas military presence sends a strong signal of determination that is invulnerable to the change of personality of different decision-makers or specific circumstances, forcing potential rivals to give up their fluke mind.

As a result, overseas basing appeases allies and prevents them from hedging or exiting.

The deterrent mechanism created by overseas military presence consolidate the confidence of allies, convincing them that the deploying country will honor its commitments. In their latest research, Castillo and Downes argue that patrons who wish to preserve their alliances must maintain the capabilities and communicate the willingness to defend their allies. They need to take concrete steps to signal their intention to come to the rescue of their proteges.71

Deploying forces on the territory of their proteges is an effective instrument. They find that the risk of defection by U.S. allies in East Asia is relatively low because the large amount of forward-deployed American forces stationed in the bases on allies’ soil demonstrate U.S. willingness to honor its security guarantees. 72 The security provided by the alliance

71 Jasen Castillo and Alexander Downes, “Exit, Hedging, or Loyalty: Alliance Options for Non-Great Power Allies of Declining Great Power”, working paper. 72 Ibid. 27 attracts states to maintain their loyalty.

What’s more, Overseas basing can appease allies because such agreements always bring many other benefits for both the local political elites and the host country’s people.

Basing agreements always come with a package of security and economic assistance. By allowing foreign powers like the U.S. and Soviet Unions to use the military facilities on their territory, host countries are offered a variety of “sweeteners” including qualitative upgrading of arms transfers, intelligence sharing, trade concessions, low-interest loan, peaceful nuclear cooperation, and political deals that secure the ruling regimes.73 James

Kurth discloses that U.S. presence in Japan and South Korea reduced their military budget to the minimum level, enabling them to focus on economic development.74 Cooley also illustrates that foreign bases have a positive economic impact on host states through stimulating small businesses to supply deployed troops.75

On the other hand, alliance formulation can be consolidated by the coercive aspect of overseas basing that threatens the negative consequence of exit. The troops deployed on proteges’ land demonstrate basing states’ power and serve as the warning of potential punishment should they exit the alliance. Especially for some alliance relations transferred from the occupation of defeated states, overseas basing is used to make sure these proteges will not attempt to escape from the alliance and become enemies again. Such an effect

73 Harkavy, Bases Abroad, p. 321. 74 James R. Kurth, “The Pacific Basin versus the Atlantic Alliance: Two Paradigms of International Relations,” Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 505, 1989, pp. 34-35. 75 Cooley, Base Politics, p. 12. 28 promotes the security of the alliance by eliminating internal threats. For instance, U.S. bases in Germany not only deter Soviet aggression but also prevent a reemerged Nazi

Empire from threatening Europe again.

4.2 Emerging Basing Logic

The changes of the international structure after the end of the Cold War led to the emergence of new basing patterns. First, the bipolar system collapsed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The United States became the only superpower. However, the U.S. is to some extent self-restraint so that there are many vacancies for other actors to struggle for power. Second, non-traditional security threats that are not related to waging conventional war emerged. The missions of military power are no longer limited to fighting a conventional war with hostile states and armed forces are required to conduct increasing military operations other than war. Accordingly, overseas bases are anticipated to support these emerging tasks. In this context, middle powers can pursue overseas basing as well though they may be motivated by different imperatives. As Sun indicates, great powers’ overseas basing after the Cold War changed in terms of posture and functions.76

This paper identifies three major incentives for countries’ basing decisions in the new era. Countries pursue overseas military bases to symbolize their status, to facilitate global governance efforts, and to bolster the expansion of their economic and soft power interests.

While traditional basing logic persists in cases like the United States, emerging basing logic

76 Sun Degang, “On the Conditions of Great Powers’ Overseas Military Base Deployment,” World Economics and Politics, No. 7, 2015, pp. 40-67. 29 is more suitable for explaining the basing of second-tier powers like Japan and rising powers like China whose strategic environments are different from the Cold-War ones.

4.2.1 Status Assertation

Peter Katzenstein points out that issues dealing with norms and identities, and cultures are becoming more salient in terms of affecting national security with the end of the Cold

War.77 Finnemore emphasizes that states are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world.78 As a result, identity and norm, rather than material power or structural constraints play important roles in constructivists’ explanation of the behaviors of countries in international politics. 79 Such constructivist approaches have been used widely to explore international relations issues. Scott Sagan investigates the norm model of nuclear proliferation and contends that nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapon acquisition provides an important normative symbol of a state’s modernity and identity.80

Eyre and Suchman argue that weapons spread because of the highly symbolic, normative nature of militaries and their weaponry.81 Among them, international status also has strong explanatory power. Barnhart’s examination of France and Germany’s involvement in the

77 Peter Katzenstein ed, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 2. 78 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 24. 79 According to their theories, identity is the representation of an actors’ understanding of who it is, including what kind of status they deserve to enjoy in international society. Norm is used to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. Countries follow certain patterns of behavior regulated by norms because they embody the expectation of a relevant audience. 80 Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? : Three Models in Search of A Bomb,” International Security, 81 Dana P. Eyre and Mark C, Suchman, “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 30

Scramble for Africa suggests that states are likely to engage in acts of status assertation to demonstrate their capabilities and intention to secure their status if their international standings have been called into question.82

Similarly, overseas basing can be investigated through this constructivist paradigm.

Overseas bases, like the proliferation of nuclear weapons and acquisition of advanced conventional ordnance, are more than tools of military operation. They are political objects of considerable importance in the social process, serving as international normative symbols of status. Basing actions sometimes are made because they strongly help to assert basing states’ status as great powers and respected stakeholders in regional affairs.

In the long history of great power politics, norms regarding what defines great power status are formed by interactions between states. These norms are the collective expectation of what a great power should have and how a great power should act. Therefore, if a country wants to be a great power or bluffs to pretend to be a great power, it needs to follow these norms to convince relevant international audiences so that it can enjoy the prestige, privilege, and influence of great powers. These norms are evolving during different eras.

In the early times, pure material power like large territory, big-size population, and abundant wealth, which are always used to describe Roman Empire or Ancient China, is the most direct and prominent standard to determine whether a country reach the status of great power. In modern times, more symbolic actions or assets are added to the expectation

82 Joslyn Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the Scramble for Africa,” Security Studies 25, No. 3, 2016, pp. 385-419. 31 of great power identity. Germany’s naval programs before the First World War was designed to secure recognition by Britain of its identity as a world power.83 Recent popular discussion of great power status of the United Kingdom, France, and China frequently invoke procession of nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers. 84 Among them, overseas basing is a normative action anticipated by relevant audiences as well.

Overseas military basing is a normative symbol of a country’s status as great power for two reasons. First, from the empirical perspective, almost all the great powers in history exercised basing actions. As Harkavy commented, the history of strategic basing is a history of great powers’ rise and fall. According to his macro-historical review, the record of overseas basing can be tracked from Athens’ fights during the Peloponnese War to

Alexander the Great’s campaign towards the east, from Great Britain’s empire where the sun never sets to basing competition during the Cold War. Second, overseas basing, like carriers and nuclear bombs, is a mix of many other normative symbols of great power status.

Thus, it will have stronger symbolic effects than merely having material power. Possession of carriers and nuclear weapons need advanced technological know-how, a comprehensive industrial basis, and profound political and military skill to afford and employ them.

Deploying overseas bases also requires countries to have various material capabilities and resources, some of which are seen as the symbol of great power status, to obtain access and maintain the operation of overseas military presence. Sun summarizes that a country must

83 Michelle Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War,” Security Studies 19, No. 4, pp. 656-688. 84 Shashank Joshi, Indian Power Projection: Ambitions, Arms, and Influence. (Melton Park: Routledge, 2015), p. 12. 32 have the ability to project military forces, influence host countries’ standpoints, provide sustainable financial support, and resolve legal disputes to successfully grant its access to overseas posts.85 To some extent, pursuing overseas bases is one of the highest forms of status assertation acts.

By asserting status through basing, states’ perceived power can be enlarged. Seeking bases to symbolize a country’s status as a great power can be categorized into Robert Art’s definition of swaggering use of force. A state swaggers to look and feel more powerful and important, to be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decision making, and to enhance the nation’s image in the eyes of others.86 If its image is enhanced, the nation’s ability to defend and coerce may also be enhanced without cultivating real combat capabilities. More importantly, great power status means the military power swaggered by basing will be translated into political power as well. According to Art, swaggering is pursued because it offers to bring prestige. There is a connection between the military might that a nation is thought to possess and the success that it achieves in attaining its objectives.

If such practice causes other actors in the international system to take one’s interests more seriously into account, then the political influence of it is radiated. By convincing others of its status through basing, a state will be regarded as a respected player in regional or global affairs whose stake should never be ignored. The military-political power translation effect also works in the domestic context because swaggering can promote the national

85 Sun Degang, “On the Conditions of Great Powers’ Overseas Military Base Deployment,” p. 40-67. 86 Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power,” International Security, Vol. 4 (Spring 1980), p 10. 33 pride of people.87 When the public realizes that their dream of national rejuvenation or rise comes true due to the success of having overseas military presence, the legitimacy of leaders and the domestic cohesion are consolidated, which reinforcing the national strength as well.

4.2.2 Global Governance

Global Governance is an emerging concept that is increasingly popular in international relations discussion. According to the United Nations’ proposal and the proponents of global governance, the central idea is to solve transnational challenges and provide public goods through global-scale cooperation and stable and predictable institutions, norms, and procedures.88 Security efforts like peacekeeping, anti-piracy, anti- drug, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) all lie in the context of global governance.

Some liberal theorists contend that global governance originates from the belief that international institutions can manage transnational problems with low transaction costs.89

Therefore, countries have incentives to contribute to such common well-being so that their own prosperity and security can be achieved. What this paper intends to emphasize is that countries’ involvement in global governance can also be regarded as an instrument for mustering power. Participants can take these opportunities to develop their military

87 Ibid., p10. 88 Ann Florini, “Global Governance and What It Means”, Brookings Interview, February 16, 2009: https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/global-governance-and-what-it-means/ ; Committee for Development Policy, Global Governance and Global Rules for Development in the Post-2015 Era, (New York: United Nations Publication, 2014), p3. 89 Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald, eds, Security Studies: An Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 43. 34 capabilities and expand their international influence and reputation.

Participating in global governance regarding security issues bolsters countries’ efforts to cultivating military power. First, it gives states legitimate justification to participate in certain military activities, pursue certain armaments, and create certain military units.

Some countries may either be restricted by treaties, laws, or norms from seeking particular military goals or afraid that such actions may trigger international audiences’ concerns. So they need to borrow the boat of global governance to sail the sea of military power mustering. For instance, Japan is restricted by its constitution which prevents it from building armies and deploying troops abroad. Its neighbors in Asia will worry about its growing military power. As a result, participating in UN peacekeeping and international anti-piracy operations will ease others’ concerns and justify its overseas deployment.

Second, many global governance missions regarding security issues involved many military missions including actual combat, providing participants a good opportunity to train and practice their troops in real fighting environments. In the post-Cold War era, states have rare chance to train their troops on real battlefields. Instead, leaders may look to global governance issues that involve potential military operations to practice military skills.

Peacekeeping missions, anti-piracy, and anti-terrorism all contain some combat or combat- related elements so that states can take the opportunities to practice subjects like special operations, urban warfare, and mine clearance. For example, the Chinese navy’s anti-piracy and escort missions offer it the precious experience of far sea naval operation.

Besides, participating in global governance promotes countries’ soft power as well.

35

Participants will get the chance to influence international agenda-setting and reshape current international institutions. Especially for those rising powers who failed to catch up with the design of existing order last time, they may be unsatisfied with current ones and hope to revise them in their favor. Global Governance in nature is a process for participants to take responsibility and provide public goods for the whole international society. Their involvement in global governance will earn them credibility and reputation, contribute to their discursive power and international voice, improve their international image, and finally get them enough influence to bolster their desired new order. China is an active contributor to global governance. It is believed that such participation will help to change the impression of many westerners that China is a threat. As a result, a better international image and reputation can bolster China’s proposal of a new international order.

In this context, states may seek access to overseas military facilities to support their involvement in global governance. The nature of many contemporary instabilities determines that most of them are far away from powerful countries homeland. As a result, secondary centers of strength are needed to enable and sustain the overseas operation of global governance participants. In this sense, overseas bases are formed to solve operational-level issues like providing military infrastructure and logistic support. But they serve broad strategic goals to promote military strengths and soft power.

4.2.3 Economic and Value Interests

Countries may capitalize on overseas bases to reinforce political and economic agendas, which will promote their economic interests and soft power. In terms of promoting

36 soft power, overseas bases can be platforms to demonstrate a certain way of life and spread particular values to attract others’ yearning. They can also serve as the instrument of propaganda to make a certain narrative or discourse more persuasive.

One of such functions is pushing political reconstruction. It refers to the deploying countries’ reliance on overseas military presence to push domestic reform of host nations through progressive approaches or encourage the transformation of host nations’ political institutions through peaceful evolution.90 After World War II, Washington established bases in many nondemocratic states that resisted Soviet influence. U.S. officials consistently defended their deals with those states by claiming that engagement could gradually lead to their democratization.91 Although there are still many debates about the effects, its base network contributes to the progress of democratization and liberation in

South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Spain, and Greece. After the Cold War, the U.S. intended to keep leveraging its foreign bases to promote democratic values, especially in Arab authoritarian states. In 2004, the Bush administration launched the Greater Middle East

Initiative, where military presence on the territory of Arabic and Islamic states will be a force to push political democratization. Tamara Cofman Wittes suggested that the U.S. troops deployed abroad could urge political change in Arab states by training their professional military officers. Through military training and exchange programs, these office corps will not be the tools of authoritarian regime any longer and contribute to

90 Sun and Deng, “A Theoretical Analysis of Overseas Military Base”, p. 25. 91 Cooley, “Base Politics”, p81. 37 democratic transformation.92

The economic incentive is another consideration that motivates countries to pursue overseas military bases. A country’s economic power can be bolstered by overseas basing in two ways. The first and the traditional one is leveraging on overseas military presence to safeguard the international trade including access to market and maritime trade routes.

For those countries that have large investments in an unstable host nation, overseas military presence will be helpful to protect its economic interests in the region.

What’s more, the overseas military installations themselves can be platforms for economic expansion. Annie Parker portrays how the advent of foreign military bases reshape the local economic order. On the one hand, what comes with the foreign bases is not just soldiers, but also their way of life: food industry, shopping complex, entertainment facilities, and different business that serve the stationed troops and their families.93 Many

American service industries are brought abroad by U.S. military bases and then spread all over the continent of Europe. According to Mark Gillen’s observation, cities with U.S. military bases are constructed into American towns where American restaurants, shopping malls, and even colleges, which should only be found on continental America, become usual and common all over the land where U.S. military footprints placed.94 On the other hand, overseas bases also act as consumers and investors. Large foreign forces consume a

92 Tamara Confman Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March: American’s Role in Building Arab Democracy. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2008), p. 119. 93 Anni Baker, American Soldier Overseas: The Global Military Presence. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004). 94 Gillem, America Town, p. 171. 38 lot of things ranging from strategic resources like fuel to daily commodities like coffee.

Foreign militaries will also award contracts to local businesses or invest in local development like infrastructure programs. Such demands generate jobs for local people and shape a series of industrial ecosystems that serve foreign bases and make the local economy rely on the consumption of foreign military presence. As David Vine noted, bases can help advance business interest by providing “privileged U.S. access to foreign markets, resources, and investment opportunities…… (and) create stability for the working of capitalism.”95

4.3 Form of Basing

Although the pursuit of overseas military bases endures, the brutal fact they must face is how to dealing with the considerable political and economic pressure brought by basing.

The change of basing posture is one of the most significant ways for countries to adjust to the shift of international system structure and avoid certain backlashes. To do so, countries will arrange proper forms for bases and do some adaptations when the situations changed.

There are different types of bases in terms of how “heavy” they are. While traditional large permanent bases are quite dominated during the Cold War, there are emerging light- footprint options available for deploying nations to choose and adjust. According to U.S. official documents regarding basing and authoritative researches, there appear to be five basic types of military bases: main operation bases (MOB), forward-operation sits (FOS),

95 Vine, Base Nation, p. 367. 39 cooperative security locations (CSL), joint preposition sites (JPS), and en-route infrastructure (ERI).

MOB will be deployed at locations of enduring strategic value and involve

“permanently stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure.” 96 DOD publication indicates that they are “characterized by C2 structures, family support facilities, and strengthened force projection measures.”97 Those large bases during the Cold War period like Ramstein Airbase in German and Kadena Airbase in Japan typically fit the definition of MOB. FOSs are barebones facilities that can be expandable as needed.98 They are exclusively controlled by basing states with a limited troops presence and necessary support systems. The major difference between MOB and FOS is that the latter support rotational rather than permanently stationed forces. As a result, these facilities prohibit family housing sites. Harkavy also points out that FOSs focus on bilateral and regional training and ad hoc operation rather than long-term combat readiness.99

CSLs are host-nation owned facilities with little or no basing states’ military presence but enough prepositioned equipment and supporting infrastructures. They provide

“contingency access and are focal points for security cooperation activities.”100 JPSs share a similar profile with CSLs while particularly focusing on the storage of military supply.

They are set up as large storehouses where incoming units can quickly pick up equipment

96 Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Under Secretary of Defense, 2004), p. 10. 97 Ibid. 98 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, p. 53. 99 Harkavy, Strategic Basing and Great Powers, p. 155. 100 DOD, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture, pp. 10-11. 40 without being compelled to rely on scarce airlift capabilities. Obviously, the function of

CSLs will be more versatile and retain some power projection measures while JPSs are pure logistic installations. ERIs are “strategically located, enduring assets with infrastructure that provides the ability to rapidly expand, project, and sustain military power during times of crisis.”101 Therefore, ERIs are not necessary to be military posts.

They can be civilian ports or airfields in peacetime but have full military potential to be run as military bases if needed. China’s vast investment in Gwadar port can be interpreted as constructing an ERI or in other analysts’ words, a dual-use base.102

The basing patterns of traditional powers have changed since the end of the Cold War.

Harkavy points out that U.S. basing structure is in the direction of a very limited number of MOBs to lessen its overseas footprint, and an expanded number of FOBs and CSLs to accommodate lighter and mobile forces for a variety of emerging contingencies.103 The shift of basing posture to light footprints also ease the economic pressure and keep overseas military presence low-profile to avoid sensitive problems. Pentagon’s “lily pad” strategy is aimed at using extensive CSLs to replace costly and problematic large bases that always bring the U.S. with political risks.104

Sun coins a term called “soft military presence” to describe similar basing patterns.

According to his definition, the soft military presence is different from traditional overseas

101 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, p. 53. 102 Guifang Xue, “The Potential Dual Use of Support Facilities in the Belt and Road Initiative” in Nadege Rolland ed, Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads. (The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2019), p52. 103 Harkavy, Strategic Basing and Great Powers, p. 156. 104 Vine, Base Nation, p. 347. 41 basing on four aspects. First, deploying countries do not seek extraterritoriality for their presence. Second, deploying states do not pursue institutional arrangements for their overseas deployment. Third, soft military presence takes both military and civilian missions like search and rescue, evacuation, and peacekeeping. Fourth, the soft military presence is mission-oriented and aiming at solving specific problems.105

Based on the discussion above, this paper categorizes all types of bases into hard presence, semi-hard presence, and soft presence. Hard presence is the traditional approach that deploys large MOBs. It is characterized by enormous permanently stationed forces, systemic military infrastructures, and other supporting facilities. Hard presence provides strong military strength and salient power protection measures, satisfying both military operational requirement and political symbol need. Thus, if the deploying nation has both military and political imperatives, they will seek hard military presence. Semi-hard presence basically refers to FOSs and other bases that have most functions of MOBs but have neither family stationed with troops nor facilities supporting non-military life. Semi- hard presence is lighter but more affordable. Soft presence includes CSLs, JPSs, ERIs, and other forms mentioned by Sun. They are cheap, low-profile, and easy to grant while still serve a range of military functions. When military imperative dominated basing states’ calculation, they will choose semi-hard presence like FOSs or soft presence like CSLs because they can achieve military ends at low cost and without triggering political

105 Sun Degang, “On China’s Soft Military Presence in the Middle East in the New Era”, World Economy and Politics, No.8, 2014, p 10. 42 problems. While coalition formulation is present in basing considerations, states will have to choose hard presence because only such arrangements can fully assure allies.

4.4 Summary

The pursuit of overseas military bases is aimed at mustering power by states. Such practice will not only strengthen various real power but also cultivate abilities to project power and converse power. Since seeking power is the basic mean for states to survive and ensure their security in an anarchic international environment, the practice of basing will persist and overweigh other political and economic risks.

The traditional logic of basing, which originated from the Cold War, is centered on preparing for and waging war against the hostile bloc. On the military dimension, overseas bases increase basing states’ military power by reinforcing the capability to project power, offering training conditions, and enhancing technological functions. On the political dimension, basing serves as a strong signal that the security guarantees made by deploying countries will be honored and therefore consolidates the alliance relations. After the Cold

War, with the power vacuum and the advent of new missions for military organizations, new basing logic emerged. Overseas military presence can be regarded as a symbol to convince others of the status of deploying countries. It can also support states’ participation in global governance regarding security issues, which promote both military and soft power.

Furthermore, military bases on foreign soil can safeguard broad political and economic agenda so that the economic and soft power of basing countries’ can be secured.

43

Choosing the proper form of bases can help to mitigate backlashes and pressures against basing practice. When military and political imperatives both exist in countries’ consideration, hard presence, which is characterized by large, permeant forces, is necessary.

Otherwise, light footprints like FOSs and CSLs that can achieve military and political ends with low prices are more suitable. For countries do not have heavy political obligations and face direct threats, soft presence is an appealing option because such bases can stun many political risk and economic burden.

4.5 Testing Theory

To test the theory constructed above, empirical evidence should be provided to prove its credibility. The method of case studies is employed to test the theory of overseas basing proposed by this paper. Four cases, which are the U.S. base complex in Japan, Turkey’s increasing presence in the Middle East and North Africa, the Japanese base in Djibouti, and China’s expansion of overseas military footprints, are studied.

The United States provides the most abundant experience for the research of overseas basing. The U.S. base clusters in Japan are selected for testing the theory regarding traditional basing logic. The direct reason for choosing this case is that it fits the description of base endurance. U.S. bases in Japan were established after WWII and persisted till the contemporary era amid long-standing disputes and backlashes. The stability and resilience of these bases offer the opportunity to explore the traditional basing logic that originated from the Cold War and test its continuity in the new era. Turkey, Japan, and China are either

44 rising powers or second-tier powers that pursue overseas military presence after the Cold

War. The motivations, strategic environments, foreign policy goals, and resource constraints of them are quite different. Thus, studies of these cases will help to demonstrate the difference between traditional basing practice and the new ones and test the explanatory power of the theory of emerging basing logic.

Both primary and secondary materials are used to explore evidence. To track the process of states’ overseas basing actions, documents released by governments like Base

Structure Report issued annually by U.S. Department of Defense, Defense of Japan published by Japanese Ministry of Defense, and China’s defense white papers, treaties or agreements concerning basing signed by states, and other official materials regarding basing powers’ strategy, foreign policies, military records provide authoritative evidence and data. However, due to the sensitiveness of this issue, official records are far from enough. This paper, as a result, rely on secondary literature including the works of military historians, products of media reporters, and academic or policy analysis produced by other researchers as well. Some first-hand observations from those who had foreign deployment experience are obtained through interviews and used as supplementary in this paper.

45

5. Discussion

5.1 Traditional Logic in U.S. Basing

Japan is the country that stationed most U.S. overseas military personnel in the world.

It is the home to more than 50,000 American fighters, both ashore and afloat, over 80 military facilities owned by the U.S., a carrier strike group, the Fifth Air Force, and III

Marine Expeditionary Force. There is no doubt that Japanese bases are nothing short of essential to U.S. strategy in Asia and its national security.

Though its significant importance to U.S. interests and some benefits for Japan, the military bases in Japan meet almost the most radical resistance and opposition by Japanese people. Those protests against U.S. military presence in Japan combine grassroots movements that focus on their civil rights and the elite’s concern for Japan’s autonomy.

The disputed issues are concentrated on the bases in Okinawa. The struggle against U.S. military presence in Okinawa has lasted for decades. For some Japanese people, the U.S. bases mean the continued military occupation of their homeland rather than the symbol of security partnership. The first issue that invoked resistance against U.S. bases in Japan is about crimes and extraterritoriality. The records regarding the behaviors of U.S. servicemen stationed in Japan released by the Japanese Ministry of Defense show that U.S. personnel committed more than 210 thousand crimes from 1952 to 2016, causing 1,092 deaths of

Japanese citizens.106 More importantly, although the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty

106 “旧安保以降，在日米軍犯罪，死者 1092 人”，しんぶん赤旗，2017 年 2 月 15 日（“After the Old US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, 1092 people died due to crimes committed by U.S. troops in Japan”, Shimbun Akahata, February 15, 2017）： https://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik16/2017-02-15/2017021502_02_1.html

46 admits Japan’s jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers on their territory, more than 80 percent of them managed to escape legal punishment by being turned over to the U.S. military.107

What’s more, American military presence caused a variety of negative soc-economic impacts on the life of Japanese people. In Okinawa, U.S. bases mean the seizure of farmers’ land, decades of prostitution, and little room for the growth of the city on the island. The presence of foreign militaries also inflicts the crushing noise of low-level flight exercises, threatens Japanese lives by military accidents, and pollutes the natural environment.

Given these enduring oppositions, the arrangement of U.S. force posture and basing structure remain unchanged for decades. The history of U.S. basing in Japan reflects the evolution of U.S. strategy in the post-WWII era. It marks the shift of Japan’s role from a defeated enemy to a firm ally. As the pillar of U.S. active influence in the Western Pacific, its base complex in Japan reinforced U.S. forces in almost every conflict and founded

American command of the commons. Though the missions of U.S. bases in Japan have been adjusted to respond to changing U.S. priorities, the scale and importance of U.S. forces in Japan have remained nearly constant.

5.1.1 History of U.S. Basing in Japan

The United States did not determine to exercise sole control of Japan and envisage permanent military bases on its soil at the very beginning. The decision-making process was marked by the competing visions and interests of policymakers who shared different

107 “米軍犯罪 8 割超不起訴”， しんぶん赤旗，2019 年 5 月 29 日 https://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik19/2019-05- 29/2019052902_05_1.html 47 views of how America should establish its strategic posture in the post-war era. 108

Although many senior military and foreign affairs officials like MacArthur merely envisaged a short, punitive, period of occupation to eradicate the culture of militarism, they did see the Ryukyus, a string of islands stretching south-west from the main islands of

Japan, a key strategic location.109

Nevertheless, a significant shift in the thinking of Japan’s role emerged with growing concern over Soviet post-war policies and communist expansion. The fall of China to the communist not only triggered internal chaos marked by McCarthyism but also overruled the plan of reliance on China to establish U.S. hegemony. 110 Viet Minh’s nationalist campaign raised Washington's concern of a domino effect in South East Asia. Finally,

North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, which is backed by the Soviet Union and China, persuaded the State Department to accept a Japan-centric posture of America in East Asia.

Japan’s contribution during the war, both its industrial power that supplied allied troops and bases on its soil as launching pad for operations, consolidated American determination to make Japan the bridgehead for counter communism. Therefore, the punitive occupation should be replaced with a peace treaty that justifies American military presence on Japanese soil.111

108 A group of Foreign Service officers proposed to make China as the gravity of U.S. power in the eastern wing of Eurasia continent and form special relations with it through supporting Chang Kai-Shark’s nationalist government. Another faction “Japan crowd” sought to maintain much of Japan’s pre-war economic structure, especially controlling the Zaibatsu, and reduce Japanese military power, making Japan the keystone of U.S. interests in Asia. 109 Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrison, p. 153. 110 The signing of Treaty of Friendship between Soviet Union and China eliminated State Department’s last hope of an independent Chinese Communist Party who will break with the Soviet Union like Tito’s Yugoslavia. 111 M. Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 90. 48

The road from occupation to alliance passed through four major stages: 1) the end of the occupation and the signing of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1951; 2) the traumatic 1960 treaty revision; 3) the 1969 Nixon-Sato communique which provided for the revision of Okinawa to Japan and a growing role for the emerging Japanese military under the Nixon Doctrine; 4) and finally, the institutionalization of the alliance throughout the late Cold-War era, which aimed at reflecting Japan’s enormous economic power and incorporating Japanese military power into American military structures.112

The peace treaty between the allied powers and Japan was signed by 48 nations in San

Francisco in 1951. Meanwhile, a bilateral security treaty was signed between the United

States and Japan. It acknowledged that Japan could not defend itself, gave the United States sweeping rights to maintain its own armed forces in Japan to respond to both external threats and Japanese internal disturbances, but did not impose America a binding obligation to use these forces for the defense of Japan.113 The first article of the treaty offered the U.S. considerable rights and freedom to set up bases and deploy troops for any purpose under the banner of international security and Japanese internal stability. 114 The treaty also granted the United States with extraordinary power to veto any arrangements the Japanese government might make with other countries to bring other foreign military forces into

112 Joseph Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific,” in Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard, eds., The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases. (Boston: South End Press, 1991), pp. 174-175. 113 Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrison, p. 157. 114 “Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right……to dispose of U.S. land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down largescale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.” 49

Japan. At this stage, the United States still treated Japan as a defeated enemy whose geographic location and war-waging potential can serve broad U.S. strategy though the punitive occupation has been transferred into military presence legitimized by mutual treaty.

As Assistant Secretary of State Graham Parsons testified, “this first treaty of 1951 was not one which entered into by Japan voluntarily”115

The security treaty of 1951 raised concerns from both Japanese elites and the mass public. While the former was deeply anxious about the lack of provisions for the United

States to defend Japan, the latter were humiliated by continued Japanese de facto status as an occupied defeated state that offended Japanese national sensibilities. After several years of hard bargaining, Kishi Administration signed a new Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and

Security with Washington in 1960, which has remained in effect until today. The negotiation of this new security treaty focused on the defense of Japan and the presence of nuclear weapons at the expense of many other concerns. The new treaty contains three major modifications. First, Article V brought the United States defense commitment to

Japan into line with those afforded to the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan. Second, Article II allowed Japan to maintain and develop its own capacity to resist armed attacks and confirmed the legitimacy of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense

Force formed in 1954. Accordingly, the right of the United States to intervene in Japan’s internal security matters was dropped and the U.S. ground combat troops would no longer

115 Fred Greene, Stress in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 25-26. 50 be stationed in mainland Japan. This is the reason why today’s U.S. Army Brigade Combat

Teams and Marine Expeditionary Force in East Asia are all stationed in South Korea and

Okinawa. Third, the United States agreed ambiguously to prior consultation with the

Japanese government before major deployment of its forces to Japan or major changes in

U.S. equipment including nuclear weapons.116

In sum, there was no fundamental change to the rights of the United States to maintain bases in Japan and the U.S. occupation of Okinawa continued. Yet, Japan’s role began to change. After urging the born of JSDF and commit to Japan’s defense, the United States incorporated Japan into its regional military alliance system. Although the bilateral relationship was unequal and the United States still enjoyed many privileges, Japan reached the first stage of being the hegemonic United States’ ally. During the Vietnam War, bases in Japan supported U.S. operations actively and decisively. The first dispatch of U.S. forces landed in Da Nang is the 3rd Marine Division that assembled and departed from Okinawa.

Kadena Airbase served as Pentagon’s key transport hub and racked up 1 million flights including B-52s’ bombing operation during the war. Naha naval port processed 75 percent of supplies including fuel, food, and ammunition, and handled the maintenance and reparation of damaged vehicles from the war zone.117

The U.S.-Japan alliance was deepened amid the context of declining American power.

116 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 178 117 Jon Michell, “Battle Scars: Okinawa and the Vietnam War,” The Japan Times, May 7, 2015: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/07/national/history/forgotten-history-okinawa-vietnam- war/#.XuGr90BFyuU 51

The United States was tied down in Vietnam and facing a tide of popular opposition to the war while Japan’s economy recovered. Nixon developed a doctrine to compensate for the relative decline in U.S. power. It was designed to create a structure of sub-imperial powers, from Iran to Indonesia, to fight for maintaining American global empire while pursuing their own foreign policy interests. Japan is designated to play a crucial role in the Nixon

Doctrine.

In 1969, Nixon and Sato issued a communique at their summit. In addition to the reaffirmation of the continued presence of U.S. military power in Japan, the communique promised to return the sovereignty of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 and allowed the JSDF to share some military installations controlled by American troops. In return, Sato pledged that the JSDF would play a larger regional role.118 The effort to reduce the asymmetries and institutionalize the alliance continued through the Carter Administration and Reagan

Administration. From the U.S. perspective, such efforts were centered on so-called

“burden-sharing” that require more Japanese contribution. In 1978, Joint US-Japan

Guidelines on Defense Cooperation were drawn up to encourage more bilateral exercise, intelligence-sharing, and military planning.119 Both administrations placed pressures on the Japanese government to increase its defense budget and attempted to form a division of labor between two militaries. Japan began planning how to respond to crises in the

Korean Peninsula and preparing to block strategic straits to contain communist navies.

118 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 179. 119 Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrison, p. 171. 52

With these, the U.S. 7th Fleet could more easily be committed to the contingencies in the

Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf.120 Japan was also required to share more financial burdens to reflect its increasing economic power and trade surplus with

America. this included an increase in Japan’s payment to American troops stationed on its territory.

After the Cold War, the immediate threats from the Soviet Union were dismissed. The

United States made some concessions to maintain its strategic relationship with Japan amid increasing opposition to U.S. presence in Okinawa triggered by a rape case and emerging commercial disputes between two countries. The Clinton administration agreed to return the naval port of Naha and airfield at Yomitan to Okinawa’s local authorities. Plans were also made to revert Futenma Airbase and other sites to Japanese control and transfer some

American troops to other places.121 However, the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 raised concerns. The incident underlined the relevance of the U.S. military presence in Asia following the end of the Cold War and the importance of access to secure bases from which

American forces could be deployed.122

5.1.2 Structure of U.S. Basing in Japan

According to the latest Base Structure Report, there are 86 military sites that are larger than 10 acres or have a Plant Replacement Value (PRV) greater than 10 million dollars, and

120 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 179. 121 Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrison, p. 175. 122 Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrison, p. 176. 53 another 34 posts that do not meet that criteria in Japan under exclusive American control.123

The U.S. militaries also have access to some installations owned by JSDF and civilian airfields like Camp Kisarazu and Fukuoka Airport. There are 62,572 U.S. personnel in

Japan, including 55,165 active-duty military personnel and 7,124 appropriated fund (ADF)

DOD civilian employees. The replacement value of the U.S. bases group in Japan exceeds

45 billion dollars, constituting nearly a third of the total value of all overseas facilities.124

Today’s U.S. base complex in Japan can be divided into two major base clusters with one concentrated on the island of Okinawa and another stretch over the four main islands of Japan. The most important base on the home islands is the Commander Fleet Activities

(COMFLEACT) Yokosuka, which is a permanent naval base located at the Tokyo Bay, 50 kilometers south-west of the capital city. COMFLEACT Yokosuka is the core of the U.S. forward-deployed base network in the Western Pacific and the largest naval facilities in the

Far East. It is the homeport of the U.S. 7th Fleet and the only American overseas installation that can host aircraft-carriers.125 COMFLEACT Sasebo and Naval Facilities at Yokohama are two logistics centers for naval operations in Asia. They provide auxiliary, replenishment, and transportation and sometimes serve as the assemble point for visiting forces.126

Multiple airbases and air stations are distributed through Japanese main islands to defend aerospace and coordinate air operations. Yokota Airbase is the headquarter of U.S.

123 Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Base Structure Report-Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline, 2018, p82. 124 Toshi Yoshihara, “Japanese Bases and China Missiles,” in Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific. (Annapolis: Naval Institution Press, 2014), p. 42. 125 Harkavy, Strategic Basing and Great Powers, p. 156. 126 Zhang Jun, A Study on the U.S. Military Overseas Bases. (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2018), p. 164. 54

Forces in Japan and the 5th Air Force and plays an important role in air command and control and airlift.127 Misawa Airbase is the only American joint operation airbase in the

Western Pacific where U.S. militaries and JSDF all have units there.128 Due to its location in northern Japan, Misawa Airbase is responsible for air operations like SEAD against potential threats from North Korea and Russia. Other sites like Naval Air Facility (NAF)

Atsugi are important intelligence posts in the region to operate land-based SIGINT installations and satellite control stations. Although Japan is not the gravity center of the ground forces of the U.S. Army, Camp Zama still plays a crucial role in U.S. military activities in the region. The I Corps established its forward command at Camp Zama in

2007, making the base a C2 hub for coordinating ground operations.129

In addition to the base cluster established on the Japanese main islands, the greatest concentration of U.S. troops and bases in Japan is located in Okinawa, where about 75 percent U.S. installations and half troops in Japan occupies 20 percent of the land.130 For the bases in Okinawa, the Kadena bases group is regarded as the keystone of U.S. military presence. It contains COMFLEACT Kadena, Kadena Airbase, Kadena Ammo Storage

Annex, and other supporting detachments. During Korea and Vietnam War, Kadena served as the operational base for fighter and bomber units. Today, it hosts the Okinawa Fleet of the 7th Fleet and multiple air force and naval aviation units.131 MCAS Futenma is the

127 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 182. 128 Ibid., p. 163. 129 Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces, p. 28. 130 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 183. 131 Zhang, A Study on the U.S. Military Overseas Bases, p. 179. 55 biggest airfield of Marine in Japan. In 2010, the U.S. and Japan reached an agreement to relocate this air station to Camp Schwab and move the marines to Guam by 2022. Naval facilities at White Beach responsible for logistic support of naval operation in Okinawa. It constitutes large docks and maintenance installations for large amphibious warships, destroyers, and nuclear submarines.132 What’s more, A group of camps that are collectively called Camp Smedley Butler hosts the 3rd Marine Division as “a combat reserve force for amphibious or other operations throughout the U.S. Pacific Command areas”.133

5.1.3 Analysis of U.S. Basing in Japan

As illustrated in the previous section, the U.S. basing in Japan has remained essentially unchanged given various frictions and pressures. Even with today’s isolationist administration, U.S. bases in Japan are immune to the risk of closure or major shrink. This paper argues that the reason for these bases’ endurance is their role in promoting U.S. power.

American bases complex in Japan augments U.S. power, bolsters its military power projection capabilities, and facilitates alliance assurance. Due to the significance of these effects, the U.S. needs to maintain a hard military presence to secure its power.

On the military dimension, the American bases complex in Japan is a hub for power projection. As the Military Posture Statement prepared by DOD Joint Staff in 1989 revealed, “United States bases in Japan…… provide operational and logistic bases for U.S.

132 Harkavy, Strategic Basing and Great Powers, pp. 156-157. 133 Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, Report for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 177. 56 operations throughout North-East Asia.” 134 First, Japan’s geographic proximity to strategic points or regional flashpoints like the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan island, and

Vladivostok, helps to mitigate the LSG effect and enable the ability of rapid intervention of American forces. On the southern side, Okinawa is little more than 300 miles east of the central Chinese mainland and the aircraft that take off from Kadena Airbase need to travel about only 400 miles to engage in the combat over Taiwan island. For the main response units, which are equipped with F-15C, it takes about 30 minutes to arrive at the battlespace.

On the northern side, three of the main islands of Japan, Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu, stretch around and past the Korean Peninsula and to a point just 250 miles east of the Soviet

Union’s major Pacific port, Vladivostok.135 The amphibious fleet launched from Sasebo naval base can land at Busan, the biggest port city of South Korea, within 7 hours. By contrast, the continental United States is at least 6,000 miles away from these flashpoints.

Even though departing from Anderson Airbase at Guam, U.S. troops still need to travel more than 1,700 miles before they can engage enemies. The territory of Japan forms the backbone of the first island chain that lockdown Soviet and Chinese military power within the littoral area of North-East Asia. U.S. base sites in Japan, together with an anti- communist regime in Taipei and American presence in South Korea, form an “iron triangle” at the tip of the island chain, concentrating air and ground power at China’s eastern portal and Soviet Far East back yard and reinforcing intervention to the south and west.136 They

134 United States Military Posture for FY 1989. (Washington, D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989), p. 26. 135 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 171. 136 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 170. 57 allow Washington to maximize early warning, rapid crisis response, and wartime mobilization throughout the region.137

Moreover, basing in Japan enhances the efficiency of logistic supply, therefore promoting the projection of U.S. military power. During the Korean War, Japan served as a warehouse and an arsenal for U.S. ground operations. Three Army storage sites in

Hiroshima prefecture stored enough ammunition for 5 divisions to use in 12 days at the rate of 10,000 tons a day.138 80 percent of the fuel consumption during the first Gulf War was provided by the stock in Japan.139 Today, 12 sites that are on the Pentagon’s list of

U.S.-owned bases in Japan are used specifically for ammunition storage and as POL depot. 140 The extensive drydocks and other maintenance facilitates not only support increasingly frequent naval operations in the region but also serve a unique function: taking care of nuclear-powered carriers and submarines.

More importantly, as Joseph Gerson contends, U.S. bases in Japan are not only a remnant of the Cold War, but they are well placed for post-Cold War U.S. power projection.141 In the emerging context of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD), granting access to land bases is increasingly indispensable for U.S. power in the Pacific. Biddle and

Oelrich argue that previous U.S. command of the commons in the Western Pacific will be replaced by a differentiated pattern of control, with a U.S. sphere of influence around allied

137 Yoshihara, “Japanese Bases and China Missiles”, p. 40. 138 Ibid., p. 181. 139 Zhang, A Study on the U.S. Military Overseas Bases, p. 222. 140 U.S. DOD, Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline, pp. 79-82. 141 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 171. 58 landmasses and a Chinese sphere of influence over its mainland.142 Therefore, controlling the island landmass along the Asian continent determines the security of American regional interests. What’s more, if Biddle is true about traditional naval power projection will determine the attribution of sea control, bases that support naval operation in Japan will be something the United States cannot give up.143 With Japan’s bases in hands, the American military is able to respond to sudden changes on the Korean Peninsula and any contingency in the Taiwan Strait, which is crucial to its security posture and hegemonic status. Without

Japan, the U.S. would lose a critical, irreplaceable foothold from which to radiate its political power and influence along the Asian littoral.

In terms of enhancing military effectiveness, the training functions of bases in Japan reinforce the conversion of military potential to combat capabilities. On the one hand, bases and installations owned by the U.S. militaries are jointly used by JSDF. For instance,

JMSDF’s fleet command, 11th Escort Squadron, and minesweeper Squadron 1 are stationed in Yokosuka with the U.S. 7th Fleet. As a result, American commanders and fighters can have daily contact with their Japanese counterparts, reinforcing the ties between the two militaries. 144 Furthermore, allied interoperability benefits enormously from regular interactions, training, and joint exercises that a substantial U.S. military presence affords.

U.S. and Japanese have conducted various bilateral annual exercises like “Sharp Sword”,

142 Stephen Biddle and Oelrich Ivan, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Anti-access/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 12-13. 143 Ibid. 144 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 181. 59

“Iron Fist”, and “Yama Sakura” and have organized multiple multilateral drills that include other allies in the region. A survey of CSIS indicates that such a joint command relationship that increasingly characterizes the maturing U.S.-Japan alliance will dissuade hostile adventurism and aggression.145 On the other hand, the U.S. militaries themselves can capitalize on the sites in Japan to conduct specific training. The islands of Ryukyus are used by the Marine Corps to conduct amphibious drills. Training for counter-insurgency warfare has been a staple of the U.S. troops in Japan, particularly in Okinawa.146

On the political dimension, the U.S. basing in Japan plays a critical role in alliance assurance. Japan has become an important military ally since communist expansion threatened the existence of members of the western bloc during the Cold War. Such role did not fade away after the Cold War because rogue states like North Korea and ambitious rising China posed new challenges and uncertainties to U.S. interests in the region. Indeed, an unchallengeable consensus is shared by the policymakers in Washington that Japan, and the American military troops deployed on its territory, are the pillar of U.S. hegemony.

Michael Green praised Japan as the indispensable linchpin of U.S. forward military and diplomatic presence in Asia and the foundation of a stable strategic equilibrium in the region.147 Hillary Clinton portrayed U.S. presence in Japan as “the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region”.148

145 Yoshihara, “Japanese Bases and China Missiles”, p. 40. 146 Gerson, “Japan: Keystone of the Pacific”, p. 181. 147 Michael J. Green, Prepared Statement for Hearing on the Future of Japan, Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House of Representatives, 11th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 2011, 2. 148 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, 58. 60

However, the United States has every reason to worry about the survival of this alliance relationship. First, concern about its own security in the broad context of the long- term relative decline of U.S. power and China’s rise may alter Japan’s attitude towards the future of alliance relationship. The unremitting Chinese military build-up, territorial disputes in the East China Sea, and increased Chinese naval activism heightened Japan’s anxiety. Japan now needs to worry about both being attack by China in a Taiwan scenario because it is the springboard of potential intervention and being dragged into a U.S. campaign against China. Second, Japan confronts daunting challenges that have manifested its fears of marginalization in the region and uncertainties about its role and status in Asia.

Yoshihara heightened Japan’s heavy public debt, aging problems, and economic interdependence between China and Japan as socioeconomic pressure on the U.S.-Japanese alliance.149 Japan may choose to hedge and exit, especially when its unequal status within the alliance is constantly criticized by some domestic groups. In fact, the attempts to establish a direct exchange between their currencies as the first steps of China-Japan economic integration in 2012 is regarded as a shift to a pro-China stance.

As a result, U.S. troops and bases serve as the stabler of America-Japan relations that assure Japan the commitment of the United States. According to Castillo and Downes’ theory, American forward-deployed forces is the most important way to signal its continuous commitment that the U.S. will defend its allies.150 Just like what is revealed in

149 Yoshihara, “Japanese Bases and China Missiles”, pp. 40-41. 150 Castillo and Downes, “Exit, Hedging, or Loyalty”. 61 the historical section, every step of the consolidation and deepening of U.S.-Japanese during the Cold War came with the reaffirmation of the security treaty signed in 1960 that confirmed U.S. obligation to protect Japan. U.S. presence in Japan reassures an increasingly jittery Tokyo whose interests and security were threatened by the Soviet Union in the past and are under the shadow of China’s rise and North Korea’s hostility. The bases are thus a symbol of American security commitments to Japan and a barometer of Japanese confidence in Washington’s credibility.151 The significance of the U.S.-Japanese alliance has been highlighted by almost every national security-related document in the 21st century and forward military presence is regarded as a key approach to support it. Even Trump

Administration, who seriously planned to reduce forward-deployed forces in South Korea and German to punish their incompliance, praised Japan as a “critical ally” that perform strong leadership and emphasized forward-deployed bases’ role to defend the alliance in its National Security Strategy in 2017.152

Besides, the political content of U.S. basing in Japan also has a coercive dimension.

Allied occupation and supervision of defeated axis powers is the keystone of the post-

WWII world order. It is the U.S. prerogative and responsibility to ensure that Japan will never again threaten America or its Asian and Pacific neighbors. U.S. presence in Japan is supposed to prevent Tokyo from picking up fascism again and assure the continuity of the post-WWII legacy for those who suffered the catastrophic war.

151 Yoshihara, “Japanese Bases and China Missiles”, pp. 42. 152 National Security Strategy of the United States. (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2017), pp. 46-47. 62

While U.S. basing in Japan is motivated by both military and political imperatives, the deployment of some sites in its global network of overseas bases is driven by a single incentive on either military or political dimension. After the threats of Soviet aggression were dismissed with the end of the Cold War, the military functions of U.S. bases on the territory of some European countries are downplayed. Although defending NATO members against potential Russian hostility is still a mission for U.S. troops abroad, it does not need such a large network with more than 200 bases concentrated in Europe. Many of these bases are set up mainly for alliance assurance rather than directly reinforce military operations. For instance, U.S. bases in countries Spain, Netherlands, and Belgium are not located in strategic places that can significantly generate combat power. In fact, with the existence of many large base clusters in Germany, Italy, and Britain, these bases only provide a marginal contribution to U.S. power projection and military effectiveness.

Nevertheless, they are still indispensable because they consolidated NATO, which is the pillar of U.S. presence in Europe. By stationing forces and military assets on these counties’ soil, U.S. credibility to stand with NATO members is improved.

By contrast, some bases do little with alliance politics but are mainly motivated by military considerations. In addition to bases in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, which traditionally draw U.S. military planners’ attention, the United States also has dozens of bases in Africa. The specific number of U.S. bases on this continent is unclear because a new map released by Africa Command shows some secrets sites that did not appear in

63 previous documents regarding base structure.153 Although developing relationships with

African countries is a part of U.S. security strategy, it does not the same formal military alliance as NATO. Basing in Africa does not need to consider alliance assurance factors.

Accordingly, the major purpose to seek these posts is to bolster U.S. military power. Camp

Lemonnier in Djibouti is a large MOB whose combat capabilities radiate not only the

African continent but also the Middle East. Other U.S. bases in Africa are quite small, echoes commander of AFRICOM Stephen Townsend’s line of maintaining a “light and relatively low-cost footprint”.154 Pentagon’s “lily pad” strategy is aimed at using a large number of small bases to supplement large permanent bases like Ramstein Airbase to ensure U.S. power projection can cover all the areas where it may need to fight.155 Some of these African bases not only facilitate power projection but also reflect the new way of war. Since 2007, the Pentagon has quietly created a dozen air bases in countries including

Niger, Chad, and Ethiopia for drones’ operation and ISR missions over Africa and the

Arabian Peninsula.156

5.2 Overseas Basing in the New Era

This section contains three mini-case studies respectively explore the basing practice of Turkey, Japan, and China. With the power vacuum created by the end of the Cold War

153 Nick Turse, “U.S. Military Says It Has A Light Footprint in Africa. These Documents Shows A Vast Network of Bases,” The Intercept, Decemver 1st, 2018: Documents Show Vast Network of U.S. Military Bases in Africa (theintercept.com) 154 Statement of General Stephen J. Townsend Before the Senate Armed Service Committee, January 20, 2020: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Townsend_01-30-20.pdf 155 Vine, Base Nation, p538. 156 Micah Zenko and Emma Welch, “Where the Drones Are: Mapping the launch pads for Obama’s Secret Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 29, 2012: https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/29/where-the-drones-are/ 64 and diversification of military power’s function, rising powers and second-tier powers begin to pursue overseas presence. Under the flag of reviving Ottoman glory, Turkey expands its military footprints extensively across the Middle East and North Africa. Japan’s base in Djibouti and its anti-piracy maritime operations bring it the chance to polish military power and enhance international reputation through participating in global governance. What underlying China’s basing practice and its growing overseas presence is the broad vision of an ambitious rising power about how to manage its military, economic, and political power.

5.2.1 Turkey: Empire Strike Back

It may be surprising to find that Turkey maintains multiple military bases abroad since it has been excluded in the discussion of great power politics since the collapse of the

Ottoman Empire. Turkey has established several military bases in the Middle East and

North Africa, which enable Ankara to exercise military power at strategically important locations beyond its borders. Not since the days of the Ottoman Empire has the Turkish had such an extensive military footprint. Under its ambitious leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan,

Turkey is capitalizing on the expansion of such military footprints to rebuild the glory of the empire.

Turkey has different types of military installations in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the Caucasus. Levent Özgül, a Turkish defense analyst, noted that

Turkey has “formal expeditionary bases” in Qatar, Somalia, northern Cyprus, and Sudan along with informal activities in Iraq, Syria, and Libya to support local allies. Although

65 there is no official report about the exact number of Turkish overseas bases and troops, the media estimate that 60,000 armed Turkish soldiers will be deployed abroad.157

Turkey has a long-term military presence in neighboring northern Iraq. In the early

1990s, a group of mechanized infantries, special forces, and military intelligence officers are stationed in the Kurdistan region of Iraq as a joint effort against Kurdistan Workers’

Party (PKK). Such presence was formalized in 1997 as a ceasefire monitoring mechanism between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.158 Due to the enduring instability related to Kurdistan issues, Turkish military presence persisted to serve as a strong deterrent against PKK’s violent activities and a check on the independence aspirations of Iraq’s Kurds. Besides, with the rise of Islamic States in 2014, the Iraqi government approved Turkey to open two military bases in Dubardan and Bashik area near

Mosul and deploy 2,000 troops to train Sunni fighters and Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga as resisting force against IS.159 According to Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, Turkey had 11 temporary bases in Iraq by 2018 for the objective of eliminating terror.160

In the same name of countering extremists and terrorists, Turkey also grants its access to military sites in Syria. Its military intervention in Syria is one of its largest foreign

157 “Turkey to Deploy 60000 Soldiers in Bases Abroad Including in Qatar,” Middle East Monitor, January 18, 2018: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180118-turkey-to-deploy-60000-soldiers-in-bases-abroad-including-in-qatar/ 158 Gareth Jenkins, “Unwelcome Guests: The Turkish Military Bases in Northern Iraq,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue 6 (2008): https://jamestown.org/program/unwelcome-guests-the-turkish-military-bases-in-northern-iraq/ 159 Verda Özer, “What Is Turkey Doing in Iraq,” Hurriyet Daily, October 18, 2016: https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/verda-ozer/what-is-turkey-doing-in-iraq-104733 ; Sangar Ali, “Iraqi Government Approved Turkish-Bashik Military Base: KRG,” Kurdistan 24, October 06, 2016: https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/35b0184b-47b9-470e-8a00-9aa6f9ba0a3b/Iraqi-government-approved-Turkish- Bashik-military-base--KRG 160 Vahap Munyar, “Turkey has 11 Regional Bases in Northern Iraq: PM Yildirm,” Hurriyet Daily, June 4, 2019: https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-has-11-regional-bases-in-northern-iraq-pm-yildirim-132762, 66 operations since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Erdogan sent troops to fight both IS jihadists and U.S.-backed Kurdish forces, which are linked to PKK militants. In November 2016, Turkey established a base about 50 kilometers north-east of

Aleppo. The Turkish Army also maintains 12 observation posts around the Syrian province of Idlib that were established under the Astana Agreement with Russia and Iran. After several-year of the campaign, especially the offensive launched from 2016 to 2017, Turkey and its militia proxies occupy swathes of northwest Syria that captured from the Islamic

State and Syrian Kurdish forces.

However, the Turkish military presence is not welcomed in Iraq and Syria. Although its bases in Northern Iraq are justified by mutual agreement and approved by Iraqi officials, former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi asked Ankara many times to withdraw its troops when he was in office. Turkey’s military presence in Syria is staunchly opposed by the

Syrian regime as well. Syrian government requires Turkey to return the land it captured unconditionally.

By contrast, Turkey’s bases in Qatar, Somalia, and Azerbaijan are more welcomed and stable. In 2014, Ankara and Doha signed an agreement for the deployment of Turkish forces in Qatar. Turkish military installation in Qatar opened in October 2015 as a presence for stability after the situation in Syria became complicated due to Russian and Iranian involvement.161 The base was reported to have the capacity to house 3,000 ground forces

161 “Seeing Shared Threats, Turkey Sets Up Military Base in Qatar,” Reuters, April 29, 2016: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-turkey-military-idUSKCN0XP2IT 67 plus units from naval, air, and special operation branches of the Turkish military. This gives its troops a foothold in the Gulf and marks the strengthening of cooperation between two countries. About 200 Turkish soldiers were stationed in this base and run the joint training programs like the “Iron Shield” military exercise. The base was renamed Qatar-Turkey

Combined Joint Force Command at the end of 2017.162 Turkey also obtained a new base, which is named after Muslim commander Khalid bin Walid, near Qatar’s Tariq ibn Ziyad

Base at Doha in 2019. According to Erdogan’s announcement, 5,000 soldiers are deployed at the new base.163

In Somalia, Turkey opened its largest military base in the capital Mogadishu to train

Somali soldiers. It costs an estimated $50 million, occupies 400 acres, and contains educational, housing, and logistic facilities.164 200 Turkish soldiers have been deployed in

Somali since the opening of the base.165 The main mission of the Turkish military presence in Somalia is to train Somalian officers and soldiers. The base can host and train about

1,500 Somali soldiers at a time to help Mogadishu to rebuild the country devastated by decades of clan warfare and an insurgency by the Islamist group Al-Shabaab.166 Current

Turkish Minister of Defense and former Army Chief of Staff said Turkey’s base in Somalia

162 Hande Firat, “New Military Base in Qatar to Inaugurate in Autumn,” Hurriyet Daily, Aaugust 14, 2019: https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-military-base-in-qatar-to-inaugurate-in-autumn-145760 163 “Erdogan: Turkey-Qatar Military Base Serves Regional Stability,” Al Jazeera, Nov mber 25, 2019: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/erdogan-turkey-qatar-military-base-serves-regional-stability- 191125154550144.html 164 Paul Iddon, The Significance of Turkey’s Overseas,” Ahval News, July 13, 2019: The significance of Turkey’s overseas military bases | Ahval (ahvalnews.com) 165 “Turkey to Deploy 60000 Soldiers in Bases Abroad Including in Qatar,” Middle East Monitor, January 18, 2018: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180118-turkey-to-deploy-60000-soldiers-in-bases-abroad-including-in-qatar/ 166 Iddon, “The Significance of Turkey’s Overseas”. 68 is an educational institute, which makes it different from other countries’ basing practice and therefore can last for 50 even 100 years. However, other analysis points out that the potential to enlarge Turkey’s arms sales market and Somalia’s strategic location at the Gulf of Aden also constitute Ankara’s basing incentives.

Common religious belief, similar ethnic structure and language, and long-lasting military cooperation grant Turkish access to military installations in Azerbaijan. After the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh clash in 2016, Ankara supported the Azerbaijan government firmly and began to plan for basing in the area. After signing a protocol in the same year, facilities in Gizil Sherg military town, and one terminal building located in the airfield in Haji Zeynalabdin Tagiyev settlement was allocated for the use of the Turkish

Armed Forces.167

There are also reports that the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya may provide Turkey with access to al-Watiya Airbase and Misrata Base since Turkish troops have fought within Libyan territory against UAE-backed Libyan National Army (LNA) since January this year.168 Turkey may deploy air-defense systems, drones, and naval warships at these sites.

There is no doubt that Turkey’s basing decisions are driven by both military and diplomatic imperatives. However, military power projection and enhancing Turkish armies’

167 Anadolu Agency, “Turkey to Eestablish Military Base in Azerbaijan,” Hurriyet Daily, July 21, 2016: https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-establish-military-base-in-azerbaijan-101906 168 https://thearabweekly.com/fall-al-watiya-base-ushers-era-permanent-turkish-presence-western-libya, http://sputniknews.cn/military/202006131031627992/ 69 military effectiveness are not prominent considerations. Turkish overseas bases contribute little to its projection of military strength abroad. It maintained dozens of forward operation bases and observation sits that are associated with combat operations against PKK and IS.

But these bases are located in neighboring northern Iraq and northern Syria, which is quite close to Turkey’s border. Although the mountain area may become barriers for Turkish ground forces to launch assaults from its own territory, these major target areas are within

Turkish air power’s reach. Turkey’s recent use of airstrikes and UAVs to attack PKK’s activities shows they can achieve the same effect as ground operations. Thus, the military outcome is not the major motivation of these overseas presences.

The first major political consideration of Turkish basing is alliance assurance, to reinforce and consolidate its relationship and cooperation with Qatar. The game of power in the Middle East is very complicated due to extensive disagreement regarding political, ethnic, religious, and economic issues among regional actors. As a result, the alliance is hard to forge and maintain. Qatar is an ideal choice for Turkey to formulate a coalition.

Both Turkey and Qatar provide support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and backed rebels fighting to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. This makes the Egypt-

Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates alliance, which intends to eliminate the Muslim

Brotherhood, a common adversary of Turkey and Qatar. They also view the Saudi-led coalition as a competing force of their efforts to promote their own influence and leadership in the region. Second, Qatar has a close relationship with Iran, which is the major competitor of Saudi Arabia. While Turkey and Iran have come to many disputes about

70

Assad’s regime, Kurdistan problems, and Israeli status, there is still much space for them to counter Saudi Arabia together. Strengthening security and military ties with Qatar will to some extent promote Turkey’s cooperation with Iran and mitigate the tension. Third, backing up Qatar brings Turkey with economic interests. Michael Tanchum concludes

Turkey-Qatar's strategic symbiosis as “Turkey provides the boots and Qatar provides the banks”.169 It not only supports the Turkish economy through direct financial assistance and investment but also by cooperating on energy business. In all, allying with Qatar facilitate is a crucial geostrategic decision that aimed at strengthening Turkey’s power position in the regional political competition.

Military basing, which is a high form of security cooperation, is employed to consolidate this alliance by Ankara. The assurance effect is especially significant after the

Saudi-lead coalition isolated Qatar diplomatically. In the summer of 2017, the Saudis and

Emiratis spearheaded a major blockade against Qatar due to its support of the Muslim

Brotherhood and close ties with Iran. As a response, Turkey bolstered its troop presence there as a clear show of support for its ally. The troops stationed at Tariq bin Ziyad were increased from 200 to 1000 and Turkey planned to formulate a combat brigade at the base to be jointly commanded by Ankara and Doha. These measures signaled the clear message that Turkey will stand with Qatar. When visiting the new base in Qatar in 2019, Erdogan dubbed the military base "the symbol of brotherhood, friendship, solidarity, and

169 Michael Tanchum, “Turkey’s String of Pearls: Turley’s Naval Installation Reconfigure and Security Architecture of Mediterranean-Red Sea Corridor.” Austria Institute for European and Security Policy, Fokus 4/2019: https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2019/fokus-19-04.php 71 sincerity.170

Turkish basing in Somalia combines more imperatives on multiple levels. It extends the reach of Turkey’s military influence to the Gulf of Aden, therefore strengthen the power of the anti-Saudi coalition. As Tanchum notes, Turkey’s Mogadishu base provides Ankara with a position close to the strategic eastern entrance to the Red Sea, which is critical for the operation of the Turkey-Qatar maritime partnership. More importantly, Turkey’s military presence in Somali is an important instrument for soft power that aims at competing with the expansion of the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE alliance’s economic influence. Its military involvement is accompanied by wide-ranging soft power initiatives.

The training programs conducted at the Turkish base help to build the national capability of the Somalian government. This effort not only contribute to stabilizing the Horn of

Arica’s violate coast but also shape the Somalian National Army based on the Turkish military model. Accordingly, Turkey’s friendship with and influence in Somalia will be dramatically promoted, reinforcing its position in the regional game of power. What’s more, basing also contributes to Turkey’s construction of hospitals, schools, and other basic infrastructures that serve the purpose of competing with Saudi Arabia and UAE’s increasing economic involvement in the country. Altogether, Somali can be another pearl on the string formed by Turkey to challenge the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-United Ara Emirates alliance.

170 “Erdogan: Turkey-Qatar Military Base Serves Regional Stability,” Al Jazeera, Nov mber 25, 2019: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/erdogan-turkey-qatar-military-base-serves-regional-stability- 191125154550144.html 72

More importantly, Turkey’s basing actions should be understood in the context of

Erdogan’s big-picture foreign policy agenda to take Turkey closer to the status of global power and the rising political ideology among Turkish elites that aims to restore the glory of the Ottoman Empire. Barnhart reveals that when a country’s great power status is called into question, it will take actions to demonstrate its power and reassert its international stand.171 As the inheritor of the Ottoman caliphate, Turkey’s status as an influential great power and powerful player of regional affairs is quite vulnerable after WWI. During the

Cold War, Turkey leaned to the West and joined NATO in 1952. To some extent, it was a protégé of the U.S.-led coalition whose national interests may be sacrificed rather than a respected independent player. Turkey’s new “sultan” Erdogan, who is a pragmatic Islamist and views Turkey as a global power with global reach, intends to forge an economically and politically independent Turkey.172 In a rally of the ruling Justice and Development

Party, Erdogan stated that the old Turkey was no longer exist and a new Turkey would be built under his power. His first foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, who is often described as “the Turkish Henry Kissinger”, wrote that Turkey needed to move from a “wing state” of the West to a “pivot state”, taking advantage of its location at the intersection of the

Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Europe to lead Islamic nations.173 Davutoglu changed his precoders’ pro-western foreign policy doctrine and attempted to shift the marginalization of Turkey’s role in regional affairs. Such goals also align with the “Neo-

171 Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territoral Agreeion”, p. 385. 172 Asya Akca, “Neo-Ottomanism ”https://www.csis.org/neo-ottomanism-turkeys-foreign-policy-approach-africa 173 Kaya Genc, “Erdogan’s Way,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, Issue 5 (Semptember/October 2019), p. 37. 73

Ottomanism” ideology that calls for expanding the reach of Turkey’s power across the globe, especially the areas of former Ottoman influence.174 Some of Turkey’s ambitious behaviors in international politics that caused disputes between itself and either the U.S. or

Russia, including its involvement in the Syrian War and Nagorno-Karabakh clash, indicate its intention to act independently rather than comply with other powers.

Overseas basing, along with those military interventions abroad, relax Turkey’s muscle to convince other actors in the region that the empire is coming back. For some

Turkish policymaking elites, overseas basing resurrects the vestige of the former Ottoman

Empire and signals Turkey’s return to the areas that are under the influence of the former empire.175 Turkey’s active interventions in Syria and Libya also serve a similar purpose of demonstrating Turkey’s interests in the region and its power to defend these interests by use of force. Overseas basing and military intervention are the privileges of great powers who have a strong will and powerful capabilities. The prestige of the former empire for extensive regional reach faded away in the times of the Republic. Therefore, when the empire strikes back, overseas bases, together with other muscular turns of Turkish foreign policy, is an important normative symbol of its status as a great power and a stakeholder of regional affairs whose interests should not be overlooked.176

Both the persistence of traditional basing logic and the advent of emerging basing

174 Asya Akca, “Neo-Ottomanism ”https://www.csis.org/neo-ottomanism-turkeys-foreign-policy-approach-africa 175 Olivier Decottignies and Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s New Base in Qatar,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch No. 2545, (January 11, 2016): http://www.washingtoninstitute. org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys- new-base-in-qatar. 176 Rossiter, Ash, and Brendon J. Cannon. “Re-Examining the ‘Base’: The Political and Security Dimensions of Turkey’s Military Presence in Somalia.” Insight Turkey 21.1 (2019): p167. 74 logic are witnessed in Turkey’s practice. Overseas bases play important roles in Turkey’s management of its coalition against the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE alliance. These military facilities on the soil of Qatar and Somalia consolidate alliance assurance, deepen economic ties, and counter the influence of the competing coalition. Moreover, basing demonstrates

Turkey's intent and ability to interfere in regional affairs and therefore symbolizes its status as a respected power. By pursuing ambitious and extensive overseas military footprints,

Turkey attempts to convince the international audiences that it is no longer the protégé of western powers and the empire is striking back.

5.2.2 Japan: Borrowing the Boat to Sail

Japan’s engagement in war is restricted by Article Nine of its constitution. However, the protocol does not suspend all military operations and does not forbid Japan from having overseas bases. Japan now operates a forward-operation base in Djibouti to support anti- piracy, UN peacekeeping, and HADR missions. Furthermore, Japan was reported to be in discussion with India about Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement on military logistics in the Indo-Pacific region, which potentially granting Japan access to Indian facilities.177

Compared to the final establishment of a formal overseas base, Japanese military footprints spread abroad early in the 1990s. President George W.H. Bush once asked the

Japanese government to send JSDF to participate in the Gulf War but was declined by

177 Christopher Woody, “2 of Asia’s Biggest Militaries Are Working on A Deal That Could Give Them An Edge over China”, Business Insider, 22 October, 2018: https://www.businessinsider.com/japan-india-talk-logistics-and-base- sharing-deal-amid-china-tensions-2018-10?IR=T 75

Toshiki Kaifu. After the Cold War, Japan began to ease the restriction on JSDF’s overseas operations by passing temporary laws. The passage of PKO Law in 1992 authorized JSDF to participate in UN peacekeeping and international rescue missions. Japanese servicemen joined the UN Disengagement Observation Force at Golan Height in 1996 to be responsible for logistic transportation, infrastructure construction, and humanitarian assistance.178 The onset of 9/11 urged Japanese law-makers to pass the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law that allows JSDF to support U.S. operations abroad and use violate force for self-defense purposes during these missions. Two warships and an oil tanker were deployed to the

Indian Ocean to refuel and collect intelligence for U.S. naval operations.179 These bills founded the legitimate basis for Japanese military presence in the Middle East and Africa in the 21st century.

Japan’s involvement in the Iraq War accumulated experience of using overseas facilities and managing military presence abroad. After the breakout of the Iraq War in

2003, the Japanese Diet passed the Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law to allow

JSDF to be deployed to the theater to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi government and logistic and intelligence support to U.S. militaries.180 During the war, 300 servicemen of the Maritime Self-Defense Force were deployed at Um Qasr Port, and 150

Air Self-Defense Force crews were distributed among 4 airports in Kuwait and Iraq to

178 Yakiko Miyagi, “Japan Middle East Security Policy: Rethinking Roles and Norms,” Ortadogu Etütleri, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011, p22. 179 Yakiko Miyagi, “Japan Middle East Security Policy: Theory and Cases, London: Routledge, 2008, pp 51-52. 180 David Fouse, “Japan’s Dispatch Of The Ground Self-Defense Force to Iraq: Lesson Learned,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, July 2007: https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Japans-Dispatch-of-the-GSDF-to- Iraq.Fouse_.doc.pdf 76 conduct airlift for the United States. This is the first time Japan send combatant forces abroad outside the framework of UN missions after the Second World War. Since then, the

Japanese government began to actively encourage JSDF’s overseas military involvement.

In 2006, Japan’s Defense White Paper stated that it would strengthen military deployment to participate in international cooperation.181 The 2009 version of Defense of Japan’s further emphasis on maritime strategy implied the urgency of granting access to overseas outposts.182

Sending patrol troops for anti-piracy missions was Japan’s first step towards formal and long-term overseas basing. The Gulf of Aden is one of the busiest areas of global trade and international shipping. However, piracy activities impose threats to the security and stability of the regional business. The hijack of Japanese chemistry tanker MV Golden Nori in 2007 and the incident of oil cargo Takayama in 2008 draw much attention from the

Japanese public and reinforced the proposal of the Taro Aso administration.183 In 2009,

Japan committed JSDF to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Japanese defense minister Yasukazu Hamada announced in March that two warships of Maritime Self-

Defense Force would be deployed to escort civilian commercial ships in the regions. Two months later, two P-3C aircraft joined the escort tasks. The aircraft operated from the US base at Camp Lemonnier.184 About 150 service members of JSDF were also reported to be

181 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2006, Tokyo, Japan, 2006, p. 2. 182 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2009, Tokyo, Japan, 2009, p. 4. 183 “Japan To Build Navy Base in Gulf of Aden”: https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2010/05/11/Japan-to-build- navy-base-in-Gulf-of-Aden/60511273596816/ 184 Nell Melvin, “The Foreign Military Presence in The Horn of Africa Region,” SIPRI Background Paper, April 2019, p 10. 77 stationed at this site.

Japan soon reached an agreement with Djibouti after JSDF going abroad in 2009 to establish a military base at the crossroad of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to support its commitment to international counter-piracy efforts. To prevent triggering anxiety of other neighboring countries in East Asia or leaving the impression of imperial expansion, the term “base” is avoided to be used in Japanese official documents when mentioning its new posts in Djibouti. Instead, “facilitate”, which expresses more defensive intent, is employed to stress that this post, Japanese Facility for Counter-Piracy Mission in Djibouti, is ad hoc and specific mission-oriented.185 The official treaty of Japan’s basing is signed by Japanese defense minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Djiboutian foreign affairs minister

Mahamoud Ali Youssouf in May 2010.

Japan’s first overseas military base after the end of WWII was officially operated in

2011. The base is located adjacent to U.S. Camp Lemonnier and north-east to Djibouti’s

Ambouli International Airport. It had an initial area of 12 hectares, an aircraft apron, and an aircraft hangar. The reported cost of construction was $40 million and the PRV was 4.7 billion Japanese yen. 186 After established its own base, troops of JSDF stationed in

Djibouti increased from 150 to 180.187 Among them, 100 are MSDF crews who were responsible for maritime early-warning and surveillance and 50 are soldiers from the GSDF

185 Yoichi Kato, “SDF’s New Anti-Piracy Baes Creates a Dilemma,” Asahi Shimbun, August 5, 2011. 186 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Response Paper to Questions regarding JSDF’s ‘New Activities Hub’ for Anti-Piracy Operations Offshore of Somalia, 2010. 187 Alex Martin, “First Overseas Base since World War II to Open in Djibouti,” Japanese Times, July 2, 2011. 78 quick response units that served as security guardians of the base.188 Since 2011, Japan has deployed a destroyer and two P-3C maritime reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft at the base to conduct anti-piracy missions. Additionally, JSDF also rented two ports owned by the U.S. military and had access to Ambouli International Airport. According to the naval captain of JSDF Keizo Kitagawa, who was responsible for Japanese operation in the

Horn of Africa, JSDF soldiers were deployed to fight piracy and for their own self-defense because Japan is a maritime nation and the increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden through which 20,000 vessels sail every year is worrying.189 Japanese deputy defense minister

Katsuya Ogawa pointed out that the posts in Djibouti have tremendous meaning for JSDF’s conducting of overseas mission and demonstrate the Japanese government’s strong determination to fight piracy. The latest white paper issued by the Japanese Defense

Minister illustrated that the Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement

(DSPE) has escorted 4,005 vessels by 2019. Under the protection of the SDF destroyers, not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and these vessels have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden.190

Over time, the functions of the base have evolved beyond its original anti-piracy mandate. The base was used to support Japanese participation in UNMISS from 2012-

2017.191 This task was added to a package of security-related legislation passed in 2015 to

188 Sun Degang and Chen Yongjun, “Japan’s Military Base in Djibouti and Its Implications” Global Review, Vol. 3, 2015, p149. 189 “Japan Opening First Military Base Since World War II”: https://justinwrites.wordpress.com/2010/05/04/japan- opens-first-overseas-military-base-since-world-war-ii/ 190 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2019, Tokyo, Japan, 2019, p389. 191 Deutsche Welle, “Japan to Expand Djibouti Base Despite Decline in Piracy,” November 19, 2018: 79 expand the overseas role of the JSDF. In 2013, the base was used to distribute medical aid following a terrorist attack on a natural gas plant in Algeria and the killing of 10 Japanese nationals.192 In July 2016, the base was used to evacuate Japanese citizens from South

Sudan.193 Subsequently, Japan announced that it would increase the area of the base to 15 hectares and construct facilities to house Japanese nationals during crises. In 2017, exercises on evacuation operations were conducted at the base.194 In 2018, plans were announced to further broaden the mission of the JSDF in Djibouti as part of the new

National Defense Program Guidelines to be published in 2019. Djibouti will become an operational center for JSDF troops in the Horn of Africa region, with additional military capabilities at the base. Japan plans to step up training efforts with East African nations and to increase military cooperation with the U.S. in the region. Due to constitutional limitations, Japan is restricted from training African troops in combat tactics, but it is able to provide instruction in areas such as disaster response, engineering, and humanitarian relief.195 These activities form part of Japan’s changing focus in Africa from peacekeeping to security capacity building.

Obviously, most missions conducted by JSDF stationed at its base in Djibouti are more associated with providing public security goods than traditional combat power

https://www.dw.com/en/japan-to-expand-djibouti-base-despite-decline-in-piracy/a-46356825 192 Ibid. 193 Tim Kelly and Kaori Kaneko, “Japan Send Military Planes for Evacuation of Citizens in South Sudan,” Reuters, July 11, 2016: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-japan-evacuation/japan-sends-military-planes-for- evacuation-of-citizens-in-south-sudan-idUSKCN0ZR189 194 Nell Melvin, “The Foreign Military Presence in The Horn of Africa Region,” SIPRI Background Paper, April 2019, p 11. 195 John Vandiver, “The Pirates Are Mostly Gone, But Japan Sticks Around in Djibouti,” Stars and Stripes, November 23, 2018: https://www.stripes.com/news/the-pirates-are-mostly-gone-but-japan-sticks-around-in-djibouti-1.557739 80 projective operations. Japanese base in Djibouti plays an important role in the country’s active involvement in global governance. While its original purpose is to protect maritime civilian and trade routine that is strategically crucial to Japan’s economy, the military base now supports a wide range of international security cooperation including UN peacekeeping and international disaster relief for African countries. Participating in global governance and providing public security goods for the whole international community has been a new mission assigned for JSDF since the new century. This mission is highlighted by the official Japanese defense documents. In its first white paper Defense of Japan issued in 2005, JSDF is encouraged to “undertake diverse overseas missions on top of the international peace cooperation alignment and international emergency assistance activities.”196 The latest one describes the Japanese military as a proactive contributor to world peace and stability and outlines Japan’s records of conducting various mission ranging from protection of civilians to the promotion of political processes, from assisting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) into the society of former soldiers to Security Sector Reform (SSR).197

Japan’s active participation in global governance regarding security issues is due to its potential to bolster its pursuit of power. Participating in global governance can not only give JSDF chances to polish their military capabilities, but also promote Japan’s international image and reputation, both contribute to the “normal nation” status Japan has

196 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2005, Tokyo, Japan, 2005, p54 197 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2019, Tokyo, Japan, 2019, p397. 81 long sought. In terms of cultivating military power, JSDF’s chances to participate in real military operations, especially overseas non-self-defense combat missions, are very limited due to the restrictions of its peaceful constitution. Such restrictions are not just self- constraint to prevent fascism, they are assurance to the United States and other Asian countries that Japan will not invade them again. However, these regulations impede the development of Japan’s military power. Global governance missions provide Japan the opportunities to practice the use of force. Although most of them are not combat operations, militaries can still learn something about theater policing, logistic management, and long- range maneuver. Anti-piracy operations and UN peacekeeping enable militaries to practice multiple maritime ISR capabilities and get experience from the actual battlefield environment.

In the case of Japan’s global governance efforts backed by its overseas base, the maritime patrol aircraft P-3C based in Djibouti facilities make use of their excellent cruising capability in conducting surveillance operations in the Gulf of Aden, which covers an area as large as the territory of Japan. Since commencing duties in June 2009, the aircraft have flown 2,288 missions with their flying hours totaling 17,230 hours. Information collected by DSPE has been provided to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in anti-piracy operations on around 14,070 occasions.198 Such extensive and frequent sorting practiced MSDF While all three branches of JSDF served at the base, a

198 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2019, Tokyo, Japan, 2019, p389. 82 joint force and its related organizational structure was formed, which was the first time in the history of the Self-Defense Forces.199 What’s more, the interaction with other militaries and actors, especially the U.S. troops, in anti-piracy missions or on other occasions improve the Japanese military’s ability to coordinate and interoperate with other allies. All these benefit Japan’s military power that can be employed in defense of itself or other military operations. In short, through the process of getting involved in global governance activities,

Japan’s overseas basing support the normalization and enhancement of its military capabilities.200

Global governance efforts and basing in the Horn of Africa also contribute to the growth of Japan’s political influence. While Japan became the second-largest economy in the 1960s, its political influence has never marched its economic power. To some extent, this is due to Japan’s identity as defeated Axis power of World War II and its unequal status within the US-Japan alliance that hinder the autonomy of Japanese foreign policy. Japan’s contribution to maritime security, international peace, and humanitarianism reshape its international image as an indispensable pillar of global peace and stability and award it with a good reputation. Japan also hence gains a bigger voice in global affairs and has the right to set agenda for international cooperation. Japan’s early contribution to the war on terror was appreciated by many leaders like Afghan President Hamid Kharzai. Its anti- piracy operations are also highly praised widely by the international community, with

199 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013, Tokyo, Japan, 2013, p246. 200 Ra Mason, “Djibouti and Beyond: Japan’s First Post-War Overseas Base and the Recalibration of Risk in Securing Enhanced Military Capabilities” Asian Security, Vol.14, No. 3, p341. 83 national leaders and others expressing their gratitude. Japanese MOD showed in 2013 that

2,370 messages were received from captains and shipowners of the vessels that MSDF had escorted.201 The new Djibouti Local Coordination Center opened in July 2012 to deal with the increase in local liaison and coordination duties with the government of Djibouti and the various foreign military units and organizations makes Japan’s base the communication hub of other anti-piracy actors in the region. Thus, global governance efforts backed by overseas basing transform Japan’s military power into political influence and soft power.

While Japanese basing in the Horn of Africa reflects enduring efforts to pursue a

“normal nation” status with political influence and military capabilities that march its economic power, it is well fitted to Abe-led administration’s “diplomacy with a bird’s view of the globe”. In this new thinking of Japanese foreign policy, the importance of the Middle

East and Africa is stressed. Abe's administration seeks to deepen Japan’s relations with countries in the Middle East and Africa. As the strategic point that connects these two regions, Djibouti enables Japan to radiate its political and economic influence. Djibouti is one of the nineteen members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

(COMESA), which has 340 million consumers and great potential for Japan’s seeking for overseas market and trade. Djibouti’s ambassador to Japan Ahmed Aratia Ali described

Japan’s basing as an opportunity for Tokyo to play a larger international role and forge closer relations with African nations. He also added that Japanese businesses could benefit

201 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013, Tokyo, Japan, 2013, p246. 84 by using Djibouti as a gateway to access the African market.202 These increasing deepened economic ties, combined with Japan’s contribution to regional security and stability, also bolster Japan’s political influence over Africa. A senior official of the Foreign Minister said that Japan’s various security, economic, and political activities enabled by Djibouti base would help win broad support for its bid to become a permanent member of the UN

Security Council, which is one of the focuses of Abe’s foreign strategy because Japan needs the support of Africa’s 54 nations to realize reform of the council.203

Japan’s base in Djibouti can be regarded as a semi-hard military presence. It has comprehensive military and logistic functions for C3I and operations on different domains.

Although many observers pointed out that the standing deployment of JSDF forces, warships, and aircraft in the Horn of Africa has already made Japanese overseas facilities an indefinitely-termed base, Chief of Staff of MSDF Masahiko Sugimoto corrected this point by saying that Djibouti facilitate is not overseas bases for JSDF’s permanent deployment.204 In fact, it is a mission-oriented forward operation site with limited force deployment and expandable potential rather than a traditional major base that serves long- term wartime readiness. Such a base not only ensures necessary military and political function pursued by the Japanese government but also keep low-profile to avoid pressure and risk of being accused of violating post-war order or reviving imperial expansion.

Furthermore, Djibouti is an ideal destination for Japan’s basing. It is a small nation with a

202 Alex Martin, “First Overseas Base since World War II to Open in Djibouti,” Japanese Times, July 2, 2011. 203 Hajime Furukawa, “Djibouti Base in ‘National Interests’”, Yomiuri Shimbun (読売新聞), May 29, 2011. 204 Ra Mason, “Djibouti and Beyond”, p345. 85 stable domestic political environment and pragmatic attitudes towards foreign military presence on its soil.205 As a developing country with rare natural resources and a modern industrial basis, leasing base for foreign states is an important source of revenue for

Djibouti.

Hence, Japan’s overseas basing practice highlights the imperatives to contribute to global governance and promote economic interests. Through basing, Japan’s economic interests, especially its foreign trades, are safeguarded. Its military capabilities are improved by extensive anti-piracy, peacekeeping, and other humanitarian operations. More importantly, Japan succeeded to expand its political influence and soft power by shaping a good international image and deepening ties with regional countries.

5.2.3 China: The Dawn of a New Superpower?

China has long adhered to its diplomatic principles of “no military alliance, no joint military exercises, and no overseas military bases” set in Mao Zedong’s era. Its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of others also precludes its establishment of military bases in other foreign countries. However, its first joint military exercise with Kazakhstan in 2002 and the increasing frequency of such exercises with foreign states marked the shift of the orientation of its policy and the termination of the “three noes” principles. This further triggered the continuous appearance of rumors and speculations about the possibility of Chinese overseas basing. Some raised the question of Chinese external basing

205 Sun Degang and Chen Yongjun, “Japan’s Military Base in Djibouti and Its Implications” Global Review, Vol. 3, 2015, p155. 86 based on its enormous energy consumption that is a critical driver of rapid economic growth. They estimated that China would search for bases around the Indian Ocean or in proximity to the Persian Gulf.206 Other potential destinations of China’s basing mentioned in these discussions including Coco Islands of Myanmar, Gwadar port of Pakistan, and a deep-water harbor in Bangladesh.207

China’s involvement in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden triggered new speculations about potential Chinese military presence in the horn of the African region both among domestic elites, the public, and international observers. Although China has built its commercial relations with African countries over several decades, its first major security step in relation to the region came late. Since 2008, China has dispatched 35 naval task forces to the Gulf of Aden to conduct escort and anti-piracy missions. The statistics released by China’s latest Defense White Paper illustrates that over 100 naval vessels and

26,000 officers and sailors were committed to escort tasks over the past decade and have provided security protection for 6,600 Chinese and foreigners and rescued, assisted, and protected over 70 ships in disasters.208 To support these maritime missions, the People’s

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s resupply and refueling in the region relied on logistic support from the port of Djibouti during 2009-2013.209

Moreover, the importance of dedicated regional logistic sites was further highlighted

206 Harkavy, Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 148. 207 Ibid., 149. 208 “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, The State Council Information Office of PRC, June 2019 209 Nell Melvin, The Foreign Military Presence in The Horn of Africa Region, SIPRI Background Paper, April 2019, p 3. 87 by China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping missions and its overseas evacuation operations. In 2011, China first time used military assets, including one frigate and four

IL-76 airlifters and civilian approaches to evacuate 35,000 Chinese nationals and some foreigners from Libya.210 In 2015, the Chinese nationals evacuated from Yemen were taken by PLAN frigate to Djibouti, where they board civilian flights home. China participated in many peacekeeping operations under the UN framework. In December 2018,

2,506 peacekeepers from the PLA served in 7 UN missions, most of which are in Africa and the Middle East like Lebanon, Mali, Sudan, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.211

In August 2017, China established its first overseas base in Djibouti. The base is officially termed a logistic support facility and justified as supporting China’s commitments to international anti-piracy, peacekeeping, as well as protecting its growing overseas assets and increasing Chinese citizens abroad. This facility is located immediately south-west of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port and the PLA is reported to have exclusive access to a dedicated berth in the port.212 It covers 90 acres, consisting of paved areas and eight hangars for helicopters and UAVs, a 400-meter long runway, naval facilities, and barracks that are estimated to have the capacity to accommodate thousands of troops.213

210 “The First Time Military Power is Used for Evacuation: Libya 2011,” Xinhua News, August 15, 2017: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-08/15/c_1121487719.htm 211 “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, The State Council Information Office of PRC, June 2019 212 Ibid., p4. 213 Mike Yeo, “Satellite Imagery Offers Clues to China’s Intentions in Djibouti”, Defense News, November 8, 2017: https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2017/11/08/satellite-imagery-offers-clues-to-chinas-intentions-in- djibouti/ 88

Since the base opened, expansion has continued with the construction of a 450-meter pier that will enable PLAN to berth large warships.214 However, this base does not have the capacity to take off and land large fixed-wing aircraft due to the lack of a runway that is long enough. Currently, a group of PLAN marines, whose size is reported to be a company, with armor vehicles is stationed there and has conducted much live-fire training at the base and participated in several joint exercises with foreign militaries. The cost paid by China to annually lease these military facilities is about 20 million dollars.

Multiple imperatives are included in Chinese strategic planners’ consideration of pursuing overseas basing. Many western military observers perceive China’s seeking of overseas military bases as a part of PLA’s modernization agenda. Indeed, the establishment of China’s base in Djibouti seems to reconcile with the evolution of the PLAN’s doctrine from near sea defense to far sea protection. By providing resupplying and refueling convenience, the base equips PLAN with the capability to conduct multiple military operations other than war beyond its own territory. It also presents opportunities for China to cooperate on military and regional security with other major powers in the region or stationed there. But such military factors are not the primary incentive for China’s basing decision. China lacks the urgent demand, either to counter an adversary or deter a severe threat, for projecting vast large conventional military power in the region. Its interests in the Horn of Africa area do not require a strong influence backed by the presence of armed

214 Minnie Chan, “China Plan to Build Djibouti Facility to Allow Naval Flotilla to Dock at First Overseas Base”, South China Morning Post, September 27, 2017. 89 forces on others’ soil.

As mentioned above, participating in anti-piracy and UN peacekeeping missions, the global governance regarding security issues, is the official legitimacy of China’s overseas military base in Djibouti. Shouldering the responsibility of maintaining international peace and stability through multilateral mechanisms and international institutions is a long- standing focus of Chinese foreign policy because it will improve its international image and convince other actors of its intention of peaceful rise and that it can be a responsible stakeholder. Especially after Xi Jinping articulated China’s thinking and ambitions of forming a community of common destiny for the whole mankind, providing international public goods, no matter economic ones or security ones, plays an important role in realizing this vision. China has already been among the biggest contributors to such efforts as UN peacekeeping missions in terms of financial support and personnel dispatchment. 215

However, when it comes to serious planning of the use of force, funds and personnel are not enough. A stronghold is needed to manage logistics, host assets, and serve as the platform and launching pad. Overseas military facilities, therefore, serve a broad foreign policy purpose by providing an efficient instrument to organize military operations far from home. While the base itself is essentially a military asset, it translates military power to diffusing political reputation.

Overseas basing is an asset that has a strong symbolic meaning that illustrates China’s

215 Lucy Best, “What Motivates Chinese Peacekeeping”, Council on Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2020: https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-motivates-chinese-peacekeeping 90 achievement and status for domestic audiences. Some China watchers argue that the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party relies on the performance and outcomes of its policy and governance. Therefore, the ruling regime must always demonstrate some achievement to consolidate and renew its legitimacy. China once dominated the world in the ancient era with its naval footprints and economic influence covering all over the globe.

Recovering such a great nation is the dream of both Chinese people and the communist elites. One of the instruments related to military power it often employs to illustrate its success and inspire patriotism is the military parade that is held on the national day.

Overseas basing serves the same function. A survey that examines the data from Chinese social media and online forums shows that air-craft carriers and overseas military bases rank the top two of the most symbolic things China must possess to prove it is a real great power.216 After the PLAN obtained its first carrier, the expectation of the Chinese public for overseas basing increased. A poll conducted in 2009 suggests that the Chinese public has a positive attitude towards the construction of overseas bases and regards it as an important way to promote China’s international status.217 Appeal and advocacy of both the public and elites were taken into the consideration with other rationals about the utility of overseas posts and finally encouraged Chinese policy-makers’ basing decisions.

Establishing overseas bases is also a pragmatic move in the context of China’s

216 Gao Youbin, “Netizens Call for Overseas Base And Aircraft Carrier Formation to Maintain Distant Sea Rights and Interests”, Global Times, October 21, 2009. 217 Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici, Not an Idea We Have to Shun: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirement in the 21st Century, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2014, p53. 91 growing overseas economic interests and the increasing presence of Chinese citizens abroad. According to Senior Colonel Dai Xu, the criteria for locating overseas bases included not only the need of escorting commercial vessels and peacekeeping but also the long-term protection of China’s overseas interests. 218 Not only does China have substantial economic investments in countries of the region, but there are also approximately 500,000 Chinese citizens living and working in the Middle East and as many as one million citizens on the African continent.219 More importantly, after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), more and more Chinese nationals, assets, and projects will go abroad, including some areas with serious security threats like terrorisms, civil wars, and riots. As a result, China’s overseas basing should also be examined in the context of securing the Belt and Road Initiative. Through the base in Djibouti, the Chinese government also provides financial support and enlarge commercial cooperation with the country since it is a critical node on BRI’s maritime route. China’s construction of the

Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway, the Ethiopia-Djibouti Water Pipeline, and its investment in

Doraleh Port highlight the economic logic behind basing action.220

Additionally, China’s investment and construction of ports along the maritime corridors from the South China Sea to the Mediterranean draw much attention and arises the speculations of the next overseas footprints of the dragon. Pentagon predicted that the

218 Ibid., p11 219 Andrew Scobell and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “The Flag Lags but Following: The PLA and China’s Great Leap Outward,” in Philip C. Saunders ed, Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2019, p188 220 Anca-Elena Ursu and Willem van den Berg, China and the EU in the Horn of Africa: Competition and Cooperation? , Clingendael Institute, 2018, p6. 92

Djibouti base was just the first in a large network of Chinese military bases.221 Some

Indian strategists perceived the base as part of an increasing Chinese presence in the Indian

Ocean through the construction of military and commercial facilities and called it the String of Pearl.222 The initial focus of BRI is on investment in extensive infrastructure systems in areas with economic and commercial potential.223 China has developed transportation networks of roads, railways, and ports along BRI routes in Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and other countries. These facilities provide the physical basis for trade and sustaining the smooth development of BRI projects. Meanwhile, they can also support military activities by safeguarding sea lines of communication. According to media reports, at least eight deep-water ports and the Gwadar, Salalah, and Seychelles ports can be converted into naval bases. 224 The dual-use nature of these port generates considerable concern about a potential military network dominated by China. More recently, China’s lease of Haifa Port in Israel triggered anxiety of the U.S. 6th Fleet, and its plan to construct Pireas Port of

Greece was labeled by New York Times as “neo-colonialism without warships”.225 Other scholars use “port diplomacy” to analyze the role of infrastructure investment in China’s strategy.226

221 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017, p5. 222 Marantidou, Virginia. “Revisiting China’s ‘String of Pearls’ Strategy: Places ‘with Chinese Characteristics’ and Their Security Implications.” Pacific Forum CSIS. Issues & Insights 14, no. 7 (June 1, 2014): I–39. 223 The Belt and Road Initiative: Progress, Contribution, and Prospects, Office of the Leading Group for Promoting BRI of PRC, April 22, 2019. 224 Abhijiti Singh, “China: Getting Ready to Dominate the Indian Ocean?”, National Interest, January 27, 2015: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-getting-ready-dominate-the-indian-ocean-12130 225 Jason Horowitz and Liz Alderman, “Chastised by EU, a Resentful Greece Embraces China’s Cash and Interests”, The New York Times, August 26, 2017: https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20170828/greece-china-piraeus-alexis-tsipras/ 226 See Sun Degang, “China’s Seaport Diplomacy: Theory and Practice”, World Economics and Politics, Vol. 5, 2018, pp. 4-32; and Siyu Yang, “The Pearl Harbors: China’s Port Diplomacy”, HuffPost, June 23, 2015: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-pearl-harbors-chinas_b_7130474 93

Indeed, the development of support facilities for BRI projects is a natural reaction to the problematic and even hostile environment that China may face in protecting its own vital interests as well as other countries along the BRI routes against terrorism, piracy, armed rebellion, and other potential threats.227 With emerging violent incidents targeting

Chinese citizens abroad including the kill of Chinese companies’ managers in Mali and the attack on Chinese miners, it is notable that safety is vital for BRI development. Increased overseas investment and economic activities require practical military protection for

Chinese nationals, assets, and ships carrying its flag abroad. Without support facilities and appropriate protection, the implementation of BRI projects will face security risks. At this point, these ports are still planned to be used for civilian and commercial purposes. The logistic facilities like docks may provide resupplying for PLA and other actors like potential private security companies that safeguard China’s overseas bases but will not be constructed into traditional naval operation bases. Their expandable potential is limited to piers capable of accommodating warships and some basic installations like POL storage and its main function is to provide “far sea protection” rather than conducting war-related naval operations.228

In fact, if China really wants to seek an extensive network of traditional military bases, it may encounter intractable political problems. While China always criticizes other

227 Guifang Xue, “The Potential Dual Use of Support Facilities in the Belt and Road Initiative” in Nadege Rolland ed, Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads, The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2019, p52. 228 Cigui Liu, “Thoughts on Developing Maritime Partnership and Promoting the Construction of Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century” International Issues Studies, No. 4, 2014, pp. 1-8. 94 countries’ large bases as harming the interests of local people and an instrument to interfere in the internal affairs of host states, there will be no difference between these countries and

China if Beijing decides to pursue such bases. China hopes its bases that support anti-piracy operations and the BRI projects will improve its international image and status since they will provide security common goods and economic interests for many countries. Arbitrary basing practice will only impede these efforts and cause doubt on China’s real intent.

Moreover, domestic people will not blindly advocate too bold basing ambitions though they admire the pride raised by having overseas basing.

As can be seen, China’s basing practice involves three imperatives. First, Overseas bases are symbols of China’s power and status. But in China’s case, it is different from those status assertation acts aimed at convincing international actors. China’s base is more related to domestic audiences for the purposes of raising people’s pride, enhancing national cohesion, and consolidating the legitimacy of the ruling regime. Second, China’s overseas basing supports its involvement in global governance. Through participating in the anti- piracy operation, peacekeeping, and other MOOTW, the PLA takes the advantage of these out-of-area operations to polish its military capabilities. China’s international image and soft power are improved because it demonstrates that it is a responsible power that is willing to make efforts for the common well-being of international society. Third, overseas presence safeguards China’s growing overseas interests and its ambitious BRI, mustering economic power.

China’s overseas basing practice reflects the principle of choosing the right partners

95 and forms. For its base in Djibouti, it is almost certainly the most ideal one for two reasons.

On the one hand, Djibouti has a stable domestic political environment and needs China’s presence as a source of economic growth. On the other hand, it is less controversial because other states already have military installations there. It will be hard to accuse Beijing of creating confronting military alliance or threatening third countries.229 Both of them grant the endurance and stability of China’s access to the strategic location in the Horn of Africa.

For those dual-use ports that have the potential to function as naval bases, just like ERIs in

American typology, they serve both economic and security purposes with low cost and flexibility. What’s more, the host nations will benefit from China’s use of these ports, both by charging lease payment and through becoming a nod of a large integrated economic network. Although some speculations and concerns have rouse and went beyond base politics, it is hard to criticize China in the name of violating the interests of local people.

As a rising power that desires to promote its power while avoiding Thucydides Trap and security dilemma, China’s basing pattern enables it to have military presence without establishing traditional overseas bases that may invite controversies and reconcile with its commitment to peaceful rise.230

229 Andrew Scobell and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “The Flag Lags But Following: The PLA and China’s Great Leap Outward,” in Philip C. Saunders ed, Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2019, p188 230 Susanne Kamerling and Frans-Paul van der Putten, “An Overseas Naval Presence without Overseas Bases: China’s Counter-piracy Operation in the Gulf of Aden”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40, No, 4, 2011, p 119. 96

6. Conclusion and Looking Forward

The muster of power is perhaps the most important task imposed on the states by the international political system. In the context of anarchy, states ensure their security by endeavoring to increase their power. They will both muster various types of real power and enlarge perceived power. Overseas basing is such a practice of mustering power. The desire to increase power is essential and persistent, which lead to the endurance and proliferation of overseas bases after the Cold War amid increasing anti-base pressures.

During the Cold War, states adopted the traditional basing logic that centered on preparing for and waging war against competing bloc. On the military dimension, access to overseas military outposts solve the problems of LSG and bolster the projection of military power. They also promote military effectiveness, the ability to convert resources to fighting power, through their training, research, and technical functions. On the political dimension, basing strengthens alliance assurance by consolidating its commitment to defend allies should they are attacked. In some cases, bases can also be viewed as a political safety valve aimed at eliminating security risks within an alliance. To ensure both military and political functions work well, a hard military presence characterized by large, permanent bases is necessary. U.S. base clusters, which consist of groups of facilities, hundreds of thousands of permanently stationed personnel, and abundant equipment in

Japan demonstrate the resilience and endurance of basing that has both significant military and security implications. This base complex is not only the pillar of U.S. militaries’ command of the commons in the Western Pacific but also the symbol of U.S. security

97 guarantees to its regional allies. The continued tension in the Korean Peninsula and the rise of China prevent the importance of these bases from the recession. Therefore, even though these bases have faced up various backlashed since they were built, the United States will not give them up.

With the shift of international structure caused by the end of the Cold War and the diversification of military missions, new basing logic emerged and adopted by rising powers and second-tier powers. First, overseas basing supports states’ participation in global governance efforts like HADR and peacekeeping, which not only muster military capabilities but also promote soft power. Japan’s base in Djibouti is established in the name of anti-piracy efforts. By taking advantage of this chance, the fighting capabilities of JSDF are polished and Japan’s international reputation is enhanced. Second, pursuing overseas military presence can be regarded as an act of status assertation to demonstrate their capabilities and intention to secure their status, especially if a state’s international standings has been called into question. In the case of Turkey, overseas military bases are normative symbols of its great power status. Ankara’s expanding military footprint abroad corresponds to the dominating ideology to restore the glory and status enjoyed by the

Ottoman Empire. Third, overseas basing is an instrument to safeguard ambitious global or regional economic and political agenda. China’s “Port Diplomacy” grant it with potential bases for overseas operations to protect its growing overseas interests and ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.

In today’s rapidly changing world, the dynamics of powers basing practice will not be

98 static. The rise and fall of powers, the shift of relations among countries, and the advance of technology will create both challenges and opportunities to reshape the landscape of overseas military presence. For future research on topics associated with overseas basing, some questions may seize their attention and indeed deserve cautious analysis.

The first question is how the evolution of the structure of the international system will influence the practice of overseas basing. As discussed in this paper, the shift of international structure is a crucial cause for the emergence of new basing logic. While the multipolar system dominated by the United States as the single superpower may persist for a long turn, the rise of China has already provoked discussion about a potential bipolar system and the new Cold War. If it comes true in the future and two competing blocs centered on two superpowers appear again, the revive of traditional basing logic that mainly serves Cold War-style competition may be likely. However, it requires more in- depth investigation and it is also fair to ask is it possible that the rise of China may lead to a different international structure and then bring different basing patterns.

Emerging technologies may alter the current patterns of basing as well. These technologies have already raised many speculations about their potential to change the way to employ military power. But their impacts are uncertain. Some analysis contends that relatively small hypersonic weapons can pose threats against major powers’ forward- projected forces.231 The application of artificial intelligence technologies to the military

231 Richard H. Speier, George Nacouzi, Charrie Lee, and Richard M. Moore, Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), p. 18. 99 may build armies of none or bases of none, which consist of only unmanned systems and autonomous platforms, to avoid placing human operators at risk while maintaining military presence overseas.232 Ideas about Sea basing as a supplement or even alternative to land- based forward presence have emerged in serious policy analysis as an approach to eschew the threats posed by hostile ballistic missiles and political disputes with host states.233

These proposals may have some practical merits on the military tactical and operational levels. Some arguments are true when suggesting that sea basing and an army of none are attractive for countries that lack long-term alliances or only take military considerations.

But they are not applicable in terms of political assurance if traditional basing logic is followed. In fact, technological advances alone are never sufficient to change basing patterns. As some literature reveals, what matters is politics, organizations, and doctrines that indicate the way to manage military power. Thus, the impact of emerging technologies on basing dynamics should not be asserted until they are embedded in the new way of operations.

In February 2020, Philippine President Duterte announced the termination of the 1998

Visiting Force Agreement, which eliminating the legitimacy of U.S. military presence in some strategic locations in South East Asia. Reduction or withdrawal of U.S. troops in

German, Afghanistan, and South Korea was proposed by the Trump Administration.

232 For the discussion of the military application of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons, see Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, (W. W. Norton, 2018). 233 Rovert O. Work, “On Sea Basing” in Carnes Lord, ed. Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-First Century, (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2006), pp. 95-167; Sam J. Tangredi, “Sea Basing: Concept, Issues, and Recommandations,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (2011 Autumn), pp. 28-39. 100

Meanwhile, Russia signed military agreements with six African countries to build military bases and deploy military advisors on their soil. Turkey also took the chance of the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh clash to enlarge its presence in the Southern Caucasus. The closure of old bases, the adaptation of existing bases, and the advent of new bases will be witnessed in the future because basing dynamics are susceptible to the changes of the balance of power and many other factors else. However, overseas basing overall will remain a durable phenomenon of great power politics since the incentive created by international anarchy to increase power is constant. Therefore, the study of basing politics should not come to its end. Rising actors, changing structures, and emerging uncertainties will only invite more attention from both the academic and policy community to explore these issues.

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