SPACE SECURITY 2003 Published in Washington, DC © The Eisenhower Institute 2004 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of The Eisenhower Institute. ISBN 0-920231-36-5 Printed in Toronto by Northview Press Ltd. Table of Contents Introduction I Executive Summary III Indicator 01 Space Debris 1 Indicator 02 Space Resource Allocation: Radio Spectrum and Orbital Slots 17 Indicator 03 National Space Security Policies and Doctrines 33 Indicator 04 Legal, Normative, and Institutional Developments 49 Indicator 05 Space Access 67 Indicator 06 Civil Space Programs and Global Utilities 81 Indicator 07 Space Industry 99 Indicator 08 Surveillance of Space 115 Indicator 09 Space and Terrestrial Military Operations 135 Indicator 10 Space Systems Protection 147 Indicator 11 Space Systems Negation 157 Indicator 12 Space-Based Strike Weapons 169 ANNEX: Space Security 2003 - Research Methodology and Expert Participation 179 Space Security 2003 Introduction SPACE SECURITY 2003 Space is the only global commons that borders every community, providing an unprecedented potential nexus of social, economic, and military power. Space helps us monitor our weather and natural resources, produce food, communicate with each other, trade, and travel. Space is home to unprecedented achievements of international scientific cooperation. It generates tens of bil- lions of dollars in commercial revenues. Space is rapidly becoming part of our critical national and international infrastructure; it supports our medical systems, our public services, our police forces, our militaries. Space is also a global commons that is uniquely fragile, and its growing strategic importance raises concerns about the security of our space systems. How does the unique nature of the space environment shape the security of our access to and use of space? How can we most effective- ly balance today’s civil, commercial, and military space interests against our need for sustainable space use? Can space be secured for peaceful purposes‚ as defined by our collective obligations under the Outer Space Treaty? This research project attempted to address these important issues by asking a fundamental ques- tion: is it possible to define space security? The early answer appeared to be more of a maybe than a solid yes. While the space community was seeking what could broadly be called space security, it was unclear what this would mean in practical terms. To address this challenge, we worked closely with a range of space experts, between December 2003 and June 2004, to devel- op a working definition of space security and a methodology for providing an annual compre- hensive assessment of the status of space security. Our working definition of space security was designed with consistency with international law in mind and included two key elements: Secure and sustainable access to and use of space Freedom from space-based threats This volume reports on our efforts to assess the status of space security in 2003 in order to pilot test this working definition and the expert consultation process which generated this assessment. A description of this pilot test and its participants is provided in the Annex. While the focus of this report is upon space security in 2003, an early assessment of develop- ments in 2004 underscores the growing complexity and importance of the space security debate. While the X-Prize broke new ground for space tourism, the US debate on military counter-space operations doctrine continued to attract international attention. While much work remains to fully develop our research approach, we believe that this volume clearly demonstrates the value and viability of an evidence-based assessment of the status of space security. Much is at stake in space, and there is a clear need to broaden our knowledge of the dynamics of space security. Understanding these dynamics is the key to developing a clear vision of how civil, commercial, and military space actors can best achieve an objective they all Space Security 2003 I Introduction seem to share: secure and sustainable access to and use of space, as well as assurances that space will not become a source of direct military attack. We would like to express our gratitude to the many researchers and administrative assistants who supported this project. At the Eisenhower Institute: Dr. Roald Sagdeev; Mr. Ryan McFarland; Mr. Tyler Nottberg; Mr. Andrew Park; Ms. Olga Prygoda; and Ms. Suzanne Vogel. Through the International Security Research and Outreach Programme at Foreign Affairs Canada: Mr. Phillip Baines; Mr. Michel Bourbonnière; Mr. Simon Collard-Wexler; Ms. Jessy Cowan; Ms. Sarah Estabrooks; Dr. Nicole Evans; Mr. Maciek Hawrylak; Ms. Theresa Hitchens; Dr. Andrew Latham; Dr. William Marshall; Mr. Robert McDougall; Dr. David Mutimer; Mr. Robbie Schingler; Mr. Gabriel Stern; Dr. Lucy Stojak; and Mr. George Whitesides. More details on the experts consulted over the course of this project are included in the Annex. Susan Eisenhower, Thomas Graham Jr., Robert J. Lawson Space Security 2003 II Executive Summary Executive Summary The Space Environment The utility of the satellites for civil, commercial, and military applications depends upon three space environment related factors: secure access to an orbital slot for each satellite; secure access to a radio-frequency allocation to allow communication with each satellite; and security against space debris with the capability to damage or destroy satellites. Space-craft are particularly vul- nerable to space debris, and the accumulation of space debris grows each year. In highly valued geostationary orbits (GEO), space debris is essentially permanent due to the lack of atmosphere at 36,000km above the earth. Since space is considered, under the Outer Space Treaty, as open to everyone and belonging to no one, the allocation of the limited orbital slots and radio- frequency spectra have to be negotiated among space-faring nations. Space Debris There was little or no effect on space security in 2003 with respect to this indicator. Space debris remained a serious concern with regard to secure and sustainable access to space – particularly with respect to low earth and geostationary orbits. While the amount of space debris continued to increase in absolute terms during 2003, the rate of this increase declined. The UN Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee developed voluntary internation- al guidelines for space debris mitigation, which were expected to be endorsed by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 2004. While a largely positive development, compliance with these guidelines remained problematic as most mitigation measures are rela- tively expensive, which presented a challenge for commercial and emerging space actors. Space Resource There was little or no effect on space security Allocation in 2003 with respect to this indicator. The dramatic growth in demand for radio-frequency allocations and orbital slots in GEO con- tinued, largely related to competing commercial and military demands. However, significant steps were undertaken to address the growing pressures on these scarce resource by reforming procedures within the International Telecommunication Union for allocating radio-frequency and orbital slots. The US-EU dispute over Galileo radio-frequency allocation provided an example of the poten- tial for future conflicts over space resource allocations. Space Security 2003 III Executive Summary The Intentions of Space Security Actors Intentions of space security actors are relevant to space security because they provide important indicators of how they perceive the opportunities and challenges of the space environment, as well as possible threats to their secure access to and use of space. These intentions are often com- municated through national space security policies and doctrines, and at the international level, through each actor’s record of engagement with international law and international institutions relevant to space security issues. National Space Security Doctrines and Military Space security had been somewhat reduced Doctrines in 2003 with respect to this indicator. Despite a general trend of continuity in national space security policies and doctrines supportive of the peaceful and non-aggressive uses of outer space, 2003 provided indications of growing support for space weaponization on the part of some actors, raising concerns about the sustainability of space security over the long term. While official US military space doctrine emphasized reversible and non-destructive means of pursuing space control, longer-range US military planning documents recommended that the US seek offensive counter-space capabilities. The announcement of the US Missile Defence Agency’s intention to place a ‘test bed’ for space-based ballistic missile interceptors in orbit no earlier than 2012 represented a delay from previous estimates, but still raised concerns, as did the announcement that the Indian Air Force has started conceptual work on anti-satellite weapons. Although the Indian announcement was later officially retracted, concerns remained about their intentions, as well as those of other actors. For example, US defence officials assessed that China was likely working on anti- satellite weapons. Legal, Normative, There was little or no effect on space security and Institutional in 2003 with respect to this