RICE UNIVERSITY

UNITY OF COMMAND: THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

GENERALS GRANT AND MEADE IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1864-1865

by

Arthur Vernon Grant, Jr.

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

Thesis Director's Signature:

Houston, May, 1974 Abstract

Unity of Command: The Command Relationship Between Generals Grant and Meade in the Campaigns of 1864-1865 Arthur Vernon Grant, Jr,, William Marsh Rice University

Napoleon once wrote, "Nothing is more important in war than unity of command; thus, when war is waged against a single power, there must be one army, acting on one line, and led by one chief."* For three years, the eastern armies of the had been unsuccessful in defeating their opponents. But in March 1864, the President appointed Lieu¬

tenant General Ulysses S. Grant to command the armies of the United States. A general who had served only in the western

theater of the war, Grant went east to assume command. Soon after his arrival in Washington, Grant changed the entire nature of the eastern campaign. Complex problems faced the new General-in-Chief. Not only did he have to formulate grand strategy, he also had to decide where the main effort was to be made. This would enable him to establish the location of his field headquarters and insure that the key theater received the greatest command emphasis. In addition, the leaders of his principàl armies had to be interviewed and perhaps be replaced by more com¬ petent officers. After a brief review of the strategic situation, Grant decided to remain in the East. His decision surprised William

*Napoleon's maxims, in Jomini, Clausewitz, and Schlieffin (USMA, 1969), 71. T, Sherman, Grant's replacement in the West, but it did not surprise George G. Meade, the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac. Meade had commanded the army for almost a year and he knew the importance of the eastern theater. But Grant's decision changed Meade's command prerogatives. Although Meade frequently had felt harassed by the de¬ mands of the War Department, at least he had been an independ¬ ent commander. The arrival of the General-Î$-Chief, however, altered Meade's autonomy. No longer did the Army of the Potomac only move according to Meade's wishes. Now there were two generals traveling with the army and its unity of purpose was in jeopardy. Since Grant was commander of all of the armies of the

United States, his presence completely overshadowed Meade's. Journalists extolled Grant's virtues while Meade hovered somewhere in the background. Still, the Army of the Potomac belonged to Meade and he did his best to keep control of his army. But Grant also was certain of the eastern army's role in the overall strategic plan. A collision between the two commanders easily could have resulted from their divergent views. But both Grant and Meade realized the importance of maintaining a unified effort. Each worked hard to insure that victory did not become lost because of their personal differences. They put aside everything to guarantee that the war whuld be pursued by "one army, acting on one line, and led by one chief." Acknowledgements

With the guidance and thoughtful assistance of Dr. Frank E. Vandiver, this thesis was made possible. Although a staunch proponent of ”the other persuasion,” Dr. Vandiver insured that the command of the Army of the Potomac received

its due. His help is sincerely appreciated. Mr. Michael P. Musick of the National Archives also deserves a note of spe¬ cial thanks. He gave up much of his valuable time to insure

that I saw the material critical to an understanding of the period.

XI• • Table of Contents

Chapter Page

I. "We are the Boys of Potomac's Ranks" 1

II. "On ’s Bloody Soil" 29

III. Waiting for Something to Break 67

IV. "We've Got the Finest Generals in the Army of the Free" 107

Notes 132

Bibliography 156

iii Ulysses S. Grant Commanding General, Armies of the United States

George G. Meade Commanding General, Army of the Potomac CHAPTER I

"We are the Boys of Potomac's Ranks"

---Union marching song 2 The Generals To the Secretary of the Navy» it "seemed rowdy and un¬ seemly." Standing upon a sofa in the East Room of the White House, the newly appointed General-in-Chief of the Army, Ulysses S, Grant, acknowledged the cheers of the small crowd of admirers. Slightly embarrassed by all of the attention, Grant had come to the White House simply to meet the Presi¬ dent. But he arrived in the midst of a reception and it was nearly an hour before he could escape and meet with the Presi¬ dent and the Secretary of War in one of the drawing rooms. To Grant, it was probably just one more example of the dis- 1 comfiture of Washington politics. Grant was commissioned a Lieutenant General on 2 March 1864. Congress revived the rank in a bill that passed both Houses by 29 February. Hurriedly, Grant was ordered to Wash¬ ington on 3 March to fill the appointment and assume command of the Army. Although the country had stopped dreaming of the appearance of a Napoleon who would crush the Rebellion in one lightning campaign, Grant still seemed to be the best hope for victory. His continuous successes in the West had earmarked him as a man of rising importance. His reception at the White House on 8 March clearly showed that his reputa- 2 tion preceded him. U.S. Grant was the man of the hour. Filling the position of General-in-Chief was not easy. Grant’s immediate predecessor, Major General Henry W. Halleck, complained that it was not understood by most of the country. Being an advisor to the President and to the Secretary of War, the General-in-Chief could only obey their orders and carry 3 out their decisions; at least that is what Halleck believed. But Grant was not Halleck and perhaps he would add a new di¬ mension to the position. Grant promptly set out to discover 3 what the job entailed. On 10 March, General Grant visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station in Virginia. The Army of the Potomac had been marching on the Confederate capital since 1861. Somewhere between Washington and Rich¬ mond, however, it always seemed to be stopped by General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Grant went to Brandy Station to meet the commander of the Army of the Potomac and to find out what needed to be done to organize a 4 successful campaign. Major General George G. Meade was the commander of the Army of the Potomac. Meade was appointed its commander prior to the in the previous semmer. Tall, thin, with an abrupt manner, Meade was irascible. Nevertheless, he was the victor at Gettysburg and continuédto command the Army of the Potomac for nine months. Until November 1863, Meade in the East and Grant in the West were in contention for the foremost honors in the war. But since then, Meade's per¬ formance fell short of expectations and he felt that his job was in jeopardy. Thus, when Grant, the hero of Vicksburg, met Meade, the hero of Gettysburg, the Union command structure 5 was indefinite. Arriving by train at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, Grant met Meade at the railroad station. An honor guard of the 114th 4 Infantry stood in a driving rainstorm and the two generals went to Meade's headquarters. The atmosphere was strained but every respect was shown to the new General-in- 6 Chief. Taking the initiative, Meade immediately put Grant on the defensive. Meade said that perhaps Grant would prefer to have one of his own Western commanders as the head of the Army of the Potomac. Sherman would be a good choice. In the 7 past, he and Grant had worked well together. Taken aback by Meade's unselfish attitude, Grant said nothing about relieving Meade. Instead, they talked about the past campaigns of the Army and they discussed future operations. It seemed that a "good feeling" existed between 8 them and the initial tension rapidly disappeared. To Grant, the matter was settled. Meade was to remain the commander of the Army of the Potomac. Appointing a west¬ ern man to the command of the Army of the Potomac would have placed the new commander in an unfortunate position. The re¬ moval of an eastern man from command might have caused Grant's motives to be misunderstood and morale would have suffered accordingly. Grant knew about the intrigues and cliques that were a part of the Army of the Potomac. In fact, he had turned down the command of the Army in 1863 be¬ cause he wanted to avoid the jealousies and plots that were rampant. A western man, alien to the eastern army, would have found it difficult to coalesce the warring factions into 9 an efficient machine by the time the spring campaign arrived. 5 Disruption in the eastern command system would have resulted from the change in commanders. Not only would the Army of the Potomac have a new General-in-Chief overseeing its operations, it also would have a new commander. Undoubt¬ edly, the new commander would have brought his own staff. They would have been unaccustomed to the systems and organi¬ zation of the east. Staff functions as well as command func¬ tions would have been damaged by the change. In addition, these conditions would have occurred during the critical opening stages of the campaign of 1864. Disruption also would have occurred in thfe western command structure. Grant’s departure already had altered the western chain of command. If Sherman also left and assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, the West would have lost its::two most important personages. But by leaving the west¬ ern command system relatively intact, Grant permitted Sherman to continue the successes in the West. Grant’s decision to retain Meade avoided serious disruption in both the western and eastern armies. Although strong outside influences urged 10 Meade’s removal, Gfcant and Meade were obligated to work together. Working with Meade was not easy. Because of his harsh manner, he was disliked by many of his subordinates. He was particularly intolerant of subordinates who failed to follow his orders. Though disliked, Meade was respected highly. In turn, he respected his troops and referred to them as ”my 11 people.” He understood them.

On one occasion, Meade was approached by an officer who had been a surgeon prior to the war. He wanted several of 6 Meade’s soldiers reprimanded for calling him "Old Pills." Meade snorted, "Well, what of that? How can I prevent it? Why,I hear that, when I rode out the other day, some of the men called me a 'damned old gogglçr-eyed snapping turtle,' 12 and I can't event stop that!" Clearly, Meade was not too troubled by the vicissitudes of his popularity with the troops. Although the Postmaster General of the United States was his Military Academy classmate, Meade had few powerful political frièdds. A conservative, he chose to remain out of politics. Political friends could influence a general's career but Meade preferred to be recognized on the merits of 13 his own accomplishments. Unfortunately, George G. Meade intensely disliked the press. Many political careers were started in the Civil War and a friendly press meant popularity with the hometown readers. But Meade was not interested in such matters. In fact, unless it was in an official capacity, he refused to speak to anyone connected with thepress. Again, he probably felt that military success would be reflected naturally in the newspapers. Nevertheless, his personal dislike for the 14 press would be troublesome in the future. Althoujgft a British reporter compared Meade's physical appearance to that of the Duke of Wellington, he was not an imposing figure. Abbrown full beard streaked with gray and a slouched felt hat with the brim turned down gave him an 15 almost Tyrolese appearance. 7 Some people considered him to be an intellectual who was pleasing to talk to when his mind was free of other matters* When he was engaged in something that interested him, however, he was silent and almost completely indifferent 16 to those around him. Several admirers of Meade though that he was modest. But to his close friends, he appeared as a.’xman who loved appreciation and demanded recognition for his achievements. Officially, he also was quick to demand ackowledgement of his military capabilities* When he was notified of his promo¬ tion to Major General of Volunteers in early 1863, Meade fired off a letter to the Secretary of War. He asked that the date of his promotion be set at 14 September 1862 when he distin¬ guished himself at the . Although the request was denied, Meade insured that the Secretary of 17 War was aware of his past deeds. After the Battle of Gettysburg, Meade received much criticism for his reluctance to attack the enemy. During the Confederate retreat after the battle, Meade did not attack Lee north of the . With Lee trapped against the river, perhaps Meade could have destroyed the Army of Northern Virginia and ended the war. But Meade didn't attack and Lee escaped. Instead of a fiery oonqueror of the enemy, Meade appeared to Lincoln like "an old woman trying to shoo 18 her geese across a creek." In October south of the , Meade found that he was outflanked by Lee. He beat a hasty retreat to 8 Centreville. Although inflicting damage on Lee's pursuing forces at Bristoe Station, it looked like Meade had been out- 19 maneuvered by a better general. In November, Meade took the offensive and moved south of the Rapidan River. Encountering Lee in prepared positions along Mine Run, Meade prepared to attack. After the bombard¬ ment of the Confederates had commenced, Meade received a note from the commander who was to lead the assault. Major General Gouverneur K, Warren informed Meade that success was impossible and recommended that the attack be canceled. With his troops poorly disposed for an attack on another front and any hope of surprise completely lost* Meade with- 20 drew back across the Rapidan. Meade appeared to lack "self-confidence and tenacity of purpose." With a commander over him, Meade was "all right, 21 but when he himself was the commander he began to hesitate." While Meade was retreating to Centreville in October however, Grant had been appointed head of the Military of the Mississippi, When Meade's army started on the abortive Mine Run expedition, Grant's army smashed the Confederates at Missionary Ridge, There was a clear contrast between the 22 two generaââ. Grant was rough but dignified in appearance. He was taciturn and sometimes seemed embarrassed when he spoke. His words were well chosen, however, and there was never any doubt about what he intended to say. His grammar was bad and he couldn't spell very well. But as one of Meade's aides 9 observed: "...he has such an easy and straightforward way that you almost think that he must be right and you wrong, 23 in these little matters of elegance." One of Grant*s aides noted that Lincoln and Grant possessed many similarities. Each was of humble origin, and had been compelled to learn the first lessons of life in the severe school of adversity. Each had risen from the people, possessed an abiding confidence intthem, and always retained a deep hold upon their affections.... In a great crisis of their country's history both had entered the public service from the same estate. Both were conspicuous for the possession of that most uncommon of all virtues, common sense. Both despised the arts of the demagogue, and shrank,from; posing for effect, or indulging in mock heroics, 4 U.S. Grant usually wore an expression that made him look like he was ready to drive his head through a brick wall. The high-crowned felt hat that he wore twas neither cocked to one side nor pulled down over his eyes; he wore it straight and hard on his head. When he rode, he sat firmly in the saddlp and without pretense. Many people who saw him were impressed by his look of determination. Two privates in the Fifth Wisconsin saw Grant ride past them one day. One of them asked, "Well, what do you think?" The other looked at Grant for a moment and remarked, 25 "He looks as if he meant it." Battles in the East usually had been larger in scope and heavier in casualties than the western battles Grant had fought. But he stood firm under battle pressure in the West. He never hurried his speech and he seemed always to be in con¬ trol of the situation. Frequently, in order to understand 10 the situation more clearly, he rode to the most critical part of the battlefield. Ignoring the danger around him, patient and unexcited he gave his orders and then returned to head¬ quarters. His "coàlness and deliberation...made a marked impression upon those who had been brought into contact with 26 him." When dealing with his officers, Grant was never im¬ pulsive. He made them feel at ease by his unceremonious manner and quiet speech. His closest subordinates—Rawlins, Sherman, and Sheridan--were referred to by their last names. Nearly all of the Other commanders were called "General." When addressing the commander of the Army of the Potomac, 27 Grant invariably said, "General Meade."

On the morning of 11 March 1864, Grant and Meade left

Brandy Station for Washington. Meade had to appear before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War and Grant wanted to return to the West to talk with Sherman. As the

General-in-Chief, it was important that he meet with his principal commanders--Meade and Sherman--before making any 28 major decisions about the future. An important question confronted Grant: should his headquarters be in the East or in the West? After learning of his appoifttmBli£,Grant wrote to Sherman on 4 March: "...I shall accept no appointment which will require me to make 29 that city [Washington] my headquarters." On 10 March, Sher¬ man wrote to Grant: "For God’s sake and for your country’s 30 sake, come out of Washington!" Grant apparently felt that 11 his headquarters should be kept in the West; but after meeting with Meade, he began to waver. It was a matter that he wanted 31 to discuss with Sherman before he made a final decision. On 17 March, Sherman and Grant met in Nashville.

After a brief introduction, Sherman came straight to the point: "At the East, you must begin new campaigns in an un¬ familiar field, with troops and officers whom you have not tried, whom you never led to victory. They cannot feel to¬ wards you as we do. Near Washington, besides, you will be 32 beset, and, it may be, fettered by scheming politicians."

But there wer^othe^éonsiderations. The Army of the Potomac confronted the Confederate capital and the fall of Richmond could be decisive to the outcome of the war. In addition, the best Confederate army and the best Confederate general were in the East. It would be difficult to defeat them. Also, if the scheming politicians could fetter Graflt, then they might shackle Meade. After all, he would be simply another subordinate far away from his commander. Furthermore, orders transmitted to Meade from the West would have to pass through Washington. Orders which filtered throughtthe Wash*

ington bureaucracy sometimes were changed. It was a dif- 33 ficult decision to make. In his earlier meeting with Meade, Grant mentioned that when he was in the East, he would stay with the Army of the

Potomac. Having successfully evaded a formal dinner at the White House on the eleventh, Grant already was tired of the 34 "show business." Thus, he announced his decision: for the 12 time being, his headquarters would be with the Army of the

Potomac, The orderswas published: "I assume command’of the armies of the United States, headquarters in the field, and until further orders, [I] will be with the Army of the 35 Potomac,” Grant and Sherman discussed other matters and Grant mentioned that the Army of the Potomac was a "splendid” unit. Several officers in the east, however, had expressed doubts that Grant could continue hi^fetring of victories when he moved against "Bobby Lee,” Although the challenge may not have played a part in Grant's decision to remain in the east, 36 the other officers with him took note. On 18 March, Grant formally relinquished command of the Military Division of the Mississippi to Sherman. The two generals left Nashville by train on the following day. They stopped briefly in Cincinnati and in the Burnett House, they wenttover their maps and plans for the final time. Grant then went east, Sherman went west, and the spring campaign 37 rapidly approached.

The Army of the Potomac While Grant was conferring with Sherman, Meade was reorganizing the Army of the Potomac. On 4 March, he recom¬ mended that the five corps in the Army of the Potomac be con¬ solidated and reduced to three. Since three of the five corps commanders were temporary, the consolidation would enable

Meade to get rid of some unwanted officers. The reduced number of corps also would shorten his span of control. This would 13 facilitate coordinating the efforts of all of the corps in battle. On 23 March, the First and Third Corps designations were eliminated and the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were retained as the major infantry units intthe Army of the 38 Potomac. Meade also was busy reassuring his wife. Apparently, she felt that Grant was doing an injustice to her husband by making his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac. Grants presence detracted from Meade's importance. Meade, on March 22, wrote his wife that Grant's" only place is in the field. One [reason].».in coming here is to avoid Washington § its entourage. I shall not prejudge him, but on the contrary have every confidence in his fairness, until circumstances that'll induce me to change my opinion. I intend to give him my heartiest co-operation, and so far as I am able, do just the sam^gwhen he is present, that I would do were he absent. 8 Meade did not harbor any illusions about his relationship with Grant. Two days previously, he wrote to his wife that Grant had the powers to relieve him and he knew Grant would exercise it if it would bring decisive results. Clearly, Meade was realistic about his optimism; even though he was still in command, the command structure could be altered 40 easily. On 24 March, Grant went to Culpeper, Virginia. Based on a recommendation by Meade, Grant decided to establish his headquarters there. He arrived without much fanfare and the soldiers also showed little enthusiasm. Many of them felt that he couldn't do anything more than his predecessors 41 had done before him. 14 Grant's arrival also was noted by the Northern press. Unfortunately for Meade, the accounts were a foretaste of many stories that followed. Even though Meade had recommended

Culpeper to Grant, the newspapers pointed out that the Gen¬ eral-in-Chief had established his headquarters eight miles 42 nearer the enemy than Meade's headquarters were located.

Meade didn't discuss the story with the General-in- Chief, Instead, he told Grant that he was happy that Head¬ quarters in the Field were with the Army of the Potomac. His army was capable of defeating Lee's army and he was confident of victory. In turn, Grant expressed confidence in Meade.

Acting quickly on all of Meade's recommendations, Grant con¬ vinced Meade that the Army of the Potomac still belonged to him. Grant's presence with the Army increased its strength.

Grant would deal with Washington and Meade would command his 43 army.

In addition to the three corps with the Army of the Potomac, a fourth corps was brought east. The Ninth Corps under Major General Ambrose E. Burnside was positioned at

Annapolis, Marjt^and. Annapolis had been the point of de¬ barkation for many previous sea-born operations. It was a logical staging area for a strategic reserve. Its presence 44 near the Army of the Potomac, however, posed a problem.

Burnside was a former commander of the Army of the

Potomac. He was held responsible for the Union disaster at Fredericksburg and relieved of his command. Although he was one of the few generals to admit that he was incapable of 15 handling the army before he had the opportunity to prove it, Burnside was too valuable to release from military service. He was given command of the Ninth Corps and sent to the West. His return to the East however, meant that one of his former corps commanders, George G. Meade, could become his commanding officer. The Ninth Corps was retained as a separate command 45 under the direct control of the General-in-Chief. Grant's attention now turned to the impending Northern operations. The maintenance of pressure on many fronts was an essential aspect of his strategy. Grant later wrote that: From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had...until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicalbe against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force... against first one and then another of our armies.... Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition...there should be nothing left to him but...submission.... 0 The left wing of the encircling Union forces consisted of the Army of the James under Major General Benjamin F, Butler. The center consisted of the Army of the Potomac and the right wing was under Sherman. The combinedlefforts of these three 47 armies formed the nucleus of Grant's strategy. Grant felt that the Army of the Potomac would be exerting pressure at the decisive point. A determined drive on the Confederate capital could center the outcome of the War on Richmond. Its loss might be the end of the Southern cause. Grant later wrote that he knew: "everything else would go if 48 it went.” 16 Opening a route to Richmond however, would be diffi¬ cult. The countryside was traversed by many narrow, deep streams that could be crossed only at bridges and established fords. Movement also was restricted by the heavy timber and secondary growth. The few existing roads quickly turned to deep mud after a light rainstorm. Not only the movement of troops but also the movement of supplies was extremely diffi¬ cult under the conditions found in northern Virginia. The final strategy would have to make allowances for these 49 severe terrain restrictions. Essentially, there were three strategic options avail¬ able to the Army of the Potomac* The first possibility was a direct frontal assault on the Army of Northern Virginia. The second choice was a movement westward around the Con¬ federate left flank. The third option was around the Con¬ federate right flank closer to the Chesapeake Bay and its numerous tributaries. Each had distinct advantages and dis¬ advantages but the third route appeared to hôld the greatest promise. Close to the water, the long logistical tail which suppèrted the Army of the Potomac could operate more effi- 50 ciently. It took Grant almost a month to make the decision. On 31 March, Meade and Grant went to Washington to¬ gether. On the trip, Grant again reassured Meade of his con¬ fidence in him. In addition, Grant mentioned that he'd heard that Horace Greeley was demanding Meade's removal. Grant scoffed that when he needed the help of a political edi¬ tor in selecting generals, he's definitely call on Greeley. 51 The requirement did not occur. 17 Grant also received some letters from Count Adam

Gurowski urging that Meade be removed. After informing Meade of the letters, Grant again stated that his decision would not be altered by outside influences. Meade would command 52 the Army in the coming campaign. Grant's presence with the Armÿvof the Potomac created some resentment within the Army. News reports of Grant living on pork and beans and being greeted by wild shows of soldierly enthusiasm were particularly objectionable. It was all "bosh”, as one commander, wrote. The public would expect too much from Grant. When his advance eventually stalled in front of Richmond, public morale would suffer. 53 As for Grant, it "would ruin him." With Grant the focus of attention, Meade lost a lot of the recognition that he was entitled to by his position and ability. The overall responsibility rested with Grant, however, and it was virtually impossible for him not to look constantly over Meade's shoulder. Also, Grant was new and different and the press attention was understandable. Grant's notoriety almost completely eclipsed Meade's presence but they continued to work closely together. In fact, they met almost 54 daily during April.

On 9 April, Grant sent the anticipated plan for the spring campaign to Meade. It was clearly designed to have all of the armies moving "together and towards one common center." In the West, Sherman was to move against Joe Johnston's army. To the south, Generals Banks and Steele were to move 18 on Mobile, Alabama. In the East, a three pronged attack would isolate Richmond, reduce the City, and destroy Lee's army. Major General Franz Sigél was directéd to conduct his movements west of Richmond. A cavalry column under his con¬ trol was instructed to move southward through West Virginia and cut Confederate communications with that area. Another column, principally composed of infantry, was ordered to move toward the south and sever Confederate conuriUnications just west of Richmond. If possible, either column wad directed to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad and cut all Con¬ federate railroad contact to the south and southwest. Major General , commander of the Army of the James, was instructed to conduct his operations south¬ east of Richmond. He was ordered to move south of the James River and approach the Confederate capital from the rear. At the same time, the Army of the Potomac was to move against Lee's army. Meade's instructions clearly showed Grant's intentions: "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also." To assist Meade in bringing the maximum military pressure against Lee, Burn¬ side was directed to use the Ninth Corps to protect Meade's 55 line of communications. Making Lee's army the objective of the Army of the Po¬ tomac was not a new concept. With a keen insight into the value of a fortified city, Lincoln had explained this to Hal- leck in a letter he wrote in the previous September: To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to fight the enemy ilowly back into his intrenchments at Richmond, 19 20 and then to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgement is so clear against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made, if the general in command should desire to make it....Since then [1862] I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where his is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city.57 Although Lincoln understood that frontal assaults against Lee's army would be fruitless, he also^knew that the Army of Northern Virginia was the proper objective for Meade. Unfortunately, "there is no good reason to believe that the Army of Northern Virginia could have been destroyed within 58 an acceptable time by any other means than*««hammer blows...." Halleck reiterated Lincoln's strategic concept to Grant in a letter he wrote in February: "In the first place, I have never considered Richmond as the necessary objective 59 point of the Army of the Potomac; that point is Lee's army." The Union high command seemed unified in the belief that Lee's army must be destroyed. Meade had made a similar comment to one of his aides earlier in the year: "There is but one way to put down this rebellion, namely, to destroy the military power of the 60 rebels." In the coming campaign, the Army of the Potomac would expend all of its efforts against the Army of Northern Virginia. Keeping Lee out of Richmond was a more difficult task. Although it was clear that Lee's flânk had to be turned, it 21 was not clear which flank would bring the greatest chance for success. In the plan of 9 April, Grant told Meade that

they would have €o discuss the problem; then, perhaps, a decision could be reached. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the James River would be an essential supply route. The navy 61 received a hint that ironclads might be needed on the River. When Grant issued his order on 9 April, Meade already was trying to explain an order he distributed on 7 April. In preparation for the spring campaign, Meade issued his order to alert his army. Among other things, the order stated that

all sutlers would be required to leave the army by 16 April, When sutlers were told to move to the rear of the army, it usually meant that a movement was imminent. As soon as the

Secretary of War heard about the order, he instructed Halleck to contact Grant: General Patrick [the Provost Marshal General of the Army of the Potomac] has here for publication an order that all sutlers leave the Army of the Potomac by the 16th, Will not this give notice of your intended movements? The Secretary of War has stopped it till we learn whether it has your sanction. Grant immediately replied, "The order for publication

for the removal of sutlers was without my knowledge and has 63 not my approval.” Meade realized that a problem had developed and he quickly told his corps commanders to prevent the order from getting into the hands of the press. Apparently, the admini¬

stration of the Army of the Potomac was not entirely in his 64 hands• 22 Later in the month, Meade again was in trouble with the Secretary of War. Two distinguished visitors had toured the Army. During their visit, they met with Meade and dis¬ cussed the strength of his army, Meade explained that the to¬ tal number of men in the Army of the Potomac and the total number of men who saw action were entirely different. There were a lot of non-combatants who were required to support the troops actually in combat. When the two visitors returned home, they released to the press a pessimistic report of the number of troops that Meade could put in the field, Not only did the report create "considerable gloom in the public mind," 65 it also subjected Meade to "unfavorable criticism." Meade was penitent. Meade also was trying to console his wife. She? in¬ formed him of several of the uncomplimentary stories that ap? peared in the newspapers. He tried to assuage her anger by being complimentary about Grant. In addition, he told her that in the eyes of the press, Grant overshadowed every¬ one else. This prevented Meade from receiving a lot of the public's attention. "Neither Grant nor his friends nor the 65 Administration are parties to this scheme." In fact, Meade continued, the press was not trying to be uncomplimentary to him. Instead, it simply was trying to emphasize that Grant was the "hero of the hour." But: He has not given an orddr, or in the slightest degree interfered with the administration of this army since he arrived, and I doubt if he knows much more about it now than he did before coming here. It is undoubt¬ edly true, he will go with it, when it moves, and will 23 in a measure control its movements and should success attend its operations.,.my share of the credit will be his.,..Moreover whilst I have no doubt he will give me all the credit I am entitled to, tiïê press and perhaps the public will lose sight of me in him. Nevertheless, he is so much more active than his pre¬ decessors, and agreed so well with me in his views, I cannot but be rejoiced at his arrival because I believe success to be the more probable,07

A week later, Meade wrote to his wife and said that shè misunderstood him; he did not enjoy being a subordinate com¬ mander* He was reconciled to the situation however, and 68 Grant was "more agreeable than any other General I know of," Finally, three days later, he rebuked his wife. She advised him to resign and he rejected the idea with the terse com¬ ment: "This would not only be wrong but would be fatal to 69 my reputation," George G. Meade would command the Army of the Potomac intits final campaign. While Meade was preparing his wife for his loss of prestige, he was preparing his army for battle. The weather during April was poor. Fortunately, it was to Meade’s ad¬ vantage. Poor weather meant that the army couldn't move un¬

til the roads dried out. It also meant that the Confederates couldn't seize the initiative; they were hampered equally by 70 the wet weather. Time for training was available.

Individual proficiency with the rifle-musket was given

a high priority in training. Meade believed that there were men in his army who had been in numerous actions and had never fired their muskets. In addition, after previous bat¬ tles, some muskets were found with their barrels almost com¬ pletely filled with unfired cartridges. Hoping to avoid 24 similar circumstances in the future, Meade ordered each man to fire an additional ten rounds of ammunition under the supervision of a company officer. Perhaps in the process, 71 some additional skill in marksmanship might also be gained.

Other personnel problems existed. Many men would be eligible to leave the service soon after the campaign began.

Their original enlistment agreements would expire and this could mean that entire regiments would leave together. At the same time, men about to leave the service might be un¬ reliable in combat. Obviously, the thought of home would be an incentive for insubordination in the face of a danger- 72 ous énemy.

Some regiments already had changed. High casualties caused seasoned veterans to be replaced by raw recruits.

Wounds and sickness also took thier toll and the result was predictable: regiments with good reputations could not be relied upon to exhibit their former elan. Plans would have 73 to be qualified in order to allow for these conditions. It was decided that moving around Lee’s right flank would be the most opportune method for the Army of the Po¬

tomac's advance. Meade directed his chief of staff, Major

General A.A. Humphreys, to prepare two plans for the move¬ ment. One route brought the Army close to Lee's fa£.nk. The other route was farther to the east and brought the Army

closer to sea-born supplies. Although the first route finally 7 4 was chosen, Meade kept his plans flexible. 25 Preparations also were made for the later stages of the movement* Should Lee fall back into Richmond, siege materials would be required. Likewise, some method of crossing the

James River would be needed. Therefore, siege equipment and heavy artillery at Washington and Fort Monroe were earmarked for Meade’s army. Transportation for pontoon bridging material also wa&sidentifieÜ. The chief engineer of the Army of the

Potomac, General H.W. Benham, was assigned to insure that it 75 would be available when needed. In General Order Number Twenty, Meade established the maximum amount of transportation that could be used to carry personal equipment, ammunition, and rations. He wanted his army streamlined for rapid movement. ’’All excels of trans¬ portation and camp and garrison equipage...will be immediately 76 turned into the quartermaster’s department,” he directed.

Another order issued the same day prescribed ammunition and ration allowances for each soldier. One hundred fifty founds of small-arms ammunition per man were to be "kept on hand ready for issue," Remembering his earlier difficulties with the Secretary of War, Meade added a warning!

Corps and other independent commanders will issue the most stringent instructions to prevent this order being made public or placed where newspaper correspondents can have access to it. Any officer convicted of allowing it to-pass out of his hands will be severely punished.''

Meade told Grant of the progress of the armÿ^s pre¬ parations. Not only was the General-in-Chief aware of the con¬ dition of the Army of the Potomac, he also learned about the 26 thoroughness of its commander in Meade's detailed report. Meade sent his report so "that you [Grant] may be fully advised of the steps I have taken, and that my attention may be called to the fact in case I have done more or less 78 than is expected and required of me." Grant made preparations for the campaign; in the east, too. There were many soldiers in the Washington defense network who would be more useful at the front. On 16 April, he wired Halleck: "Order all troops that can be spared from the defenses of Washington, either from new troops arriving or from those already there to report...for assignment to 79 ." It was time for Grant to look at the troops. Reviewing the Sixth Corps, Grant told Meade that he was "highly pleased t« The "organizations and systems" of the Army of the Potomac reflected great credit on its commander. Elated, Meade 80 couldn't resist bragging to his wife. While Grant was reviewing the troops, the soldiers were reviewing him. To them, he appeared to be a man of deter¬ mination. Although possessing "natural qualities of a high order," he seemed preoccupied at times. Forgetting to return the salutes of passing officers, he seemed to be thinking of something else. One regimental commander wrote: "No doubt 81 he was thinking of the greate [sic] work before him.,,." Other soldièrs were thinking about the great work be¬ fore them. On 20 April, General Patrick knew that the move¬ ment would be coming soon. When the sick were sent to the 27 rear on the twenty-first, a brigade commander in the Fifth Corps guessed that the move was imminent. On the twenty-

fourth, a regimental commander in the Second Corps felt that "we may leave here at any hour." By the twenty-sixth, the weather and roads were favorable and the commander of the Sixth Corps was "in daily expectation of orders for moving." 82 On the twenty-seventh, Grant set the date for the move.

Informing Halleck that the movement would begin on 4 May, Grant outlined the Army of the Potomac's line of march.

He hoped that the Army could go for twenty or twenty-five days without further supplies. Just in case the advance stalled however, he told Halleck to have rations and forage ready to move by water. In any event, it seemed likely that

Meade's and Butler's armies eventually would }oin together and 83 operate against Lee's forces in the vicinity of Richmond.

Maintaining secrecy for as long as possible, the orders for the movement of the Army of the Potomac were issued on 2 May. At midnight on 3 May, the Army would leave its pre¬ sent positions. Although the four thousand supply wagons would form a long tail, it was hoped that the early move would give the initiative to the Union forces. Not only did the Rapidan River have to be crossed, but also the Wilderness 84 neéded to be traversed. To be caught in the heavy timber and rough terrain of

the Wilderness would be risky. The immense advantage of men and material of the Northern forces would be neutralized by

the dense undergrowth. But with luck and hard marching, it 28 might be cleared before a general engagement occurred with 85 the Confederates, On 3 May, Grant gathered his personal staff for a final briefing: ”1 shall not give ray attention so much to Rich¬ mond as to Lee's army, and I want all commanders to feel that hostile armies, and not cities, are to be their objective 86 points," He added that while emergencies might arise and he would be forced to issue orders direclty to the maneuvering troops, communications would be issued through General Meade, In addition, Grant would establish his headquarters near Meade's headquarters and thus insure the close coordination of their 87 efforts. Promptly at midnight on the third, Major General Philip H, Sheridan and two divisions of cavalry started moving to the south. Close behind, the infantry columns headed for the five bridges across the Rapidan. The Wilderness and the Army 88 of Northern Virginia were just across the river. CHAPTER II

"On Virginia's Bloody Soil" Yankee ballad 30

The Wilderness Perhaps Meade’s plan was too ambitious* The Army of the Potomac did not clear the Wilderness by the evening of 4 May. Instead, each of the three corps stopped within its tangled surroundings and waited while the army’s supply wagons crossed the river. The Army of Northern Virginia was located to the west of the Union crossing sites. Any Northern movement farther to the south could expose the wagons to capture. It was imperative that the army’s supply line 1 remain intact. General Grant and his staff began their move early in the morning of 4 May. They accompanied the Sixth Corps across the Rapidan. Grant established his headquarters in a de¬ serted house on the southern bank of the river and he watched Meade's troops crossing the bridges. The scene provided by the proud marching to Richmond evoked many flippant remarks about Lee's army by some of Grant's staff officers. Other members of his staff were not as foolish in prejudging 2 an untested opponent. Grant knew that the route would be difficult. While the General-in-Chief watched elements of the Sixth Corps crossing the river, a newspaper correspondent asked him how long it would take to get to Richmond. "I will agree to be there in about four days," Grant replied. "But," he quickly added, "if he |Lee] objects, the trip will undoubtedly be 3 prolonged." Rapid success by Meade's army would prevent a serious delay. 31

Meade established his headquarters near Grant's. To avoid any confusion about his location, Meade flew a new headquarters flag in front of his tent. A golden eagle en- ! closed in a silver wreath on a purplish-red banner marked the site of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, The men in 4 Meade's army would know where to go to receive their orders.

As the soldiers ate their evening meal, they discussed the day's movements. They could tell that Grant was trying to place them between Lee and Richmond. They had not seen the enemy since they had crossed therriver in the morning. 5 Perhaps Lee already had been outmaneuvered.

But there were not any illusions at army headquarters. Lee was definitely nearby. Although the strength of Lee's army was overestimated greatly, Grant and Meade were in fine spirits. They still believed that the preponderence of 6 strength rested with the Northern forces.

Late in April, Meade estimated that his army would be opposed by 90,000 Confederates. On 30 April, the morning report showed that the Army of the Potomac had an effective fighting strength of 99,438, Although the Ninth Corps was not part of his army, Meade could rely on it for support. Burnside's troops would increase the total strength to almost 118,800 officers and enlisted men. Since the Confederate strength was actually only 61,025 officers and men, the Yan- 7 kees had a distinct advantage in manpower. If Meade's supplies were capturec^iowever, his military strength would be useless. There could not be any rapier-like 32

Meade’s Planned Troop Locations for the Evening of 5 May thrusts until all of the wagons crossed the river. With this in mind, Meade issued conservative instructions for the Army's moves on 5 May. Preceded by a cavalry screen, the Fifth and Sixth Corps were to move west toward the enemy. The Second Corps, pre¬ sently located to the east of the other two corps, was or¬ dered to move southwest for about seven miles. Thus, by‘the evening of S May, the three corps would form a continuous line

facing westward in the direction of the Army of Northern Vir¬ ginia. By that time, the supplies would be completely across 8 the river. 33 At five o'clock in the morning, Meade's plan was put into motion. The fifth of May could be the critical point in the opening stages of the campaign. If the Confederates at¬ tacked, it meajit that the Army of the Potomac had been snared 9 in the Wilderness. General Lee knew the advantages of fighting a stronger opponent in the Wilderness. Exactly one year ago, he had beaten the Army of the Potomac under General Hooker in the same place* This time, Meade's army was moving south across the Aripy of Northern Virginia's front. It appeared to be an excellent opportunity to stride the flank of the advancing 10 Yankees. Meade moved his headquarters in order to control the advancing forces better. Grant remained behind at the Rapidan River. Burnside had been ordered forward and Grant wanted to give him directions when the Ninth Corps reached the crossing site. While riding to the Fifth Corps headquarters, Meade received a dispatch from General Warren. Warren's lead elements had encountered some Confederate infantry on the Old Orange Turnpike. Hurrying forward, Meade found Warren 11 directinghhis columns. Immediately, Meade told Warren to attack with his en¬ tire corps. If a major portion of the Confederate army was on his front, Warren would soon find out. The situation needed to be developed further. Meade also sent instructions to Hancock's Second Corps. Informing Hancock that the enemy had been found, Meade direct¬ ed that the Second Corps halt its advance. If a major portion 34 of Lee's army had been met, then it was important that the 12 Union forces not become too separated. With the immediate situation under control, Meade in¬ formed the General-in-Chief of Warren's encounter. Sending Hyde of Sedgwick's staff to Grant, Meade explained his actions; The enemy have appeared in force on the orange pike and are now reported forming line of battle in front of Griffins Div., 5 Corps -- I have directed General Warren to attack them at once with his whole force-- Until this movement of the enemy is developed, the march of the corps must be suspended. 3 Hyde found Grant at the river still’.waiting for Burnside's 14 arrival, Concurring with Meade's actions, Grant emphasized that; "If an opportunity presents itself for pitching into a part 15 of Lee's army, do so without giving time for disposition." But the General-in-Chief was growing impatient. Fifteen minutes after Grant received Meade's dispatch, there was still no sign of Burnside. Part of the Ninth Corps had arrived, so Grant left Burnside instructions: "Close up rapidly as pos 16 sible with the Sixth Corps." Grant hurried forward to meet Meade and determine how the battle had progressed. Meeting Meade about a mile behind the Fifth Corps, Grant learned that apparently Lee intended to bring on a general engagement. Grant and Meade rode forward a short distance and they decided to establish their headquarters on a knoll overlooking the key road junction behind Warren's corps. Keeping their headquarters close together could prevent a 35 17 duplication of effort. There already had been a problem with the command ar¬ rangement. Meade had left one of his divisions at the Rapi- dan to protect the crossing sites. When the Ninth Corps ar¬ rived at the river, Meade's division then was directed to guard the roads that led from the enemy's positions around the Union right flank. But Grant had ordered Meade's divi¬ sion forward to rejoin its parent corps. The division com¬ mander did not know where to go. Meade acquiesced in favor of the General-in-Chief. In¬ forming Grant of the need to protect the roads around the flank,

Meade suggested that portions of the Ninth Corps be used for the task. In addition, Meade's division commander needed instructions. He "is awaiting your action on this suggestion," 18 Meade wrote. Grant already had found it necessary to bypass Meade and issue instructions to some of the subordinate com¬ manders in Meade's army. Hopefully, there would not be any confusion among the commanders who were engaged with the enemy. Warren's initial assault had been very successful. The

Confederates had run before the furious attack. Driven for almost a mile, they finally regrouped and stopped the Union advance. But the fighting had been very confused on both 19 sides.

Fighting in woods was not new. The Wilderness, however, possessed distinct characteristics that influenced the fighting.

Heavy'timber and dense undergrowth made it exceedingly difficult 36 to keep the advancing lines of men straight. Visibility was extremely limited and the heavy smoke created by the musket volleys concealed the assailants. The roll of musketry "shut 20 out all other sounds." The opposing lines were very close to each other and an ambush was the prevailing form of attack. One Yankee private described it as a "blind and bloody hunt 21 to the death, in bewildering thickets, rather than a battle." Victory might rest rwith the commander.«who had the best con¬ trol over the movements of his men. But good generalship was decided in even more basic terms. The lines had to be kept straight and the gaps be¬ tween units had to be kept closed.. When a man fell, another man had to be put in his place. That was "the extent of good 22 generalship in this fearful and hellish wilderness." Once witnessed, fighting in the Wilderness was not forgotten. Meade had fought in the Wilderness before. He commanded a corps in the Battle of Chancellorsville in the previous May. But Grant had not seen the unique characteristics of the re¬ gion and he rode forward to observe their affect on the battle. Meeting Warren on the Orange Turnpike, Grant quickly saw that overwhelming numbers of men would be required to reach any kind of a decision. Returning to his headquarters, Grant ordered elements of Burnside’s Ninth Corps forward to join the battle. The narrow roads would restrict Burnside's movement and it would take time for his command to be brought into position. In the interim, Grant sat on the ground, smoked his pipe, and 37 whittled on a piece of wood. It was a battle that the corps 23 commanders would have to fight. On the left, Meade was tightening up the line. He ordered Hancock to move his Second Corps northwest and con¬ nect with the left of Warren*s corps. Until Hancock arrived, a temporary arrangement had to be made. Meade shifted a divi¬ sion from the Sixth Corps around to the Union left. The con¬ fusion among units created by the Wilderness was aggravated by Meade's instructions which mixed units from different corps. But Hancock’s corps began to arrive at two o’clock. Although he was directed to attack immediately, Hancock needed an additional two hours to organize his command. The perplexing tangle of the Wilderness was no better on the left. Tempers 24 flared as the men were moved into position. Tempers at army headquarters also were short. Early in the afternoon, one of Warren's division commanders, Briga¬ dier General , stalked up to Meade. Angrily, he told Meade how he had driven the Confederates back in the early morning assault. But his flanks were unsupported and his attack stalled. Condemning the division commander who had been on his right, Griffin also implied censure of Warren. He then left abruptly. Grant overheard Griffin^s angry tirade. Walking over to Meade, Grant said, "Who is this General Gregg? You ought 25 to arrest him!" "His name's Griffin, not Gregg," Meade replied, "and that's only his way of talking." He then leaned forward and 38 buttoned up Grant’s uniform coat ’’for all the world like a 26 kindly father getting his son ready for school." In the heat of the Wilderness day, Meade was a calming influence on the rapidly developing events. Finally, late in the afternoon, two more Northern at¬ tacks were attempted. At four o’clock General Getty’s division attacked on the Union left but it made little progress. On the right, two Yankee brigades attacked at five o’clock and they met an intrenched enemy who offered stiff resistance. 27 Exhausted, the two armies settled down for the night. Late in the evening, Meade returned fromna visit to

Warren’s corps. He walked over to Grant’s headquarters and they discussed their plans for the next day. Grant instructed Meade to have his army attack all along the line at 4:30 in 28 the morning. But events of the previous day had been so confused that Meade requested that the attack be delayed until six o'clock. By that time, his corps commanders should be organ¬ ized well enough to mount a coordinated attack. Grant felt that the Confederates might seized the initiative before six and directed Meade to begin the attacks at five. Meade agreed 29 and returned to his headquarters to issue the orders.

Lee's plans were not as simple but they seemed to offer a greater opportunity for success. He would have an addi¬ tional corps available to him on the following day and he di¬ rected that it try to envelop the Yankee left. If the Union left were extended too far for the flank to be turned, then Lee 39 decided he would try the opposite flank. Perhaps he could drive a wedge between the Yankee right and the river. Suc¬ cess on that flank would sever the Union supply lines and surely would spell disaster for Meade's army. Lee issued 30 his orders.

Soon after daybreak, Meade and Grant resumed their posi¬ tion on the hill near their headquarters. Calmly, they waited

for the sounds which would signal that the attack had begun. Precisely at five o'clock, the sound of heavy musketry rolled 31 back from the front. Hancock.4s Second Corps initially met with success. The Confederates on Hancock's immediate front broke and ran and the Yankees followed in close pursuit. The Confederate re¬ sistance stiffened and a little after six, the Yankees struck elements of a fresh Rebel corps. Before long the advance 32 stopped and the front stabilized. Hancock informed Meade that he had struck new Confed¬

erate troops, Meade offered a division of the Ninth Corps to Hancock and Burnside's soldiers set out to renew the 33 strength of Hancock's attack. Burnside's other units still were not in position. Expected since the previous after¬ noon, the Ninth Corps had been slow. Burnside again was told

to get his men into position and to attack the enemy on Han- cotk's right. Six hours later, Burnside finally assaulted. Meade was angry but there was little he could do about the 34 problem. The Ninth Corps did not belong to him. 40 By the time Burnside was ready to attack, disaster al¬ ready had struck the Second Corps. The same troops that had stopped Hancock's attack also had pushed the Second Corps back a short distance. A little after eleven o’clock they attacked again and Hancock's front started to cave in under 35 the pressure. When the officer bringing the news of the developing debacle on the left reached headquarters, Grant and Meade were seated on the ground leaning against the same tree. After hearing the report, they looked at each other and Grant re- 36 marked, "I don't believe it." Fortunately, he was right.

Confederate units had become mixed during their attack. The Wilderness hindered each side equally. One Wisconsin infantrymanhhad surrendered to the advancing Confederate skirmish line. While being escorted to the rear, he and his guard walked back into the Union lines and the Confederate surrendered to his captive. Confusion hampered the Con- 37 federates more disastrously on this day. While reorganizing his corps for another assault on

Hancock, General made a reconnaissance around Hancock’s flank. It seemed to be exposed and to Longstreet's delight, it was. But while riding back into his own lines with the glad tidings, Longstreet was mistaken for a Yankee and seriously wounded by his own soldiers. His loss further delayed the Confederate attack. When it was made later in 38 the afternoon, it was easily checked. 41 Although the Union left had been secured, the initiative still rested with the Confederates. The second part of Lee's plan was attempted: an attack on the Yankee right flank. Confederate General John Gordon led an assault on Sedgwick's Sixth Corps. Initial dispatches reaching Meade were bad. It was reported that Sedgwick's entire line had given way, Meade and Grant quickly consulted each other and alerted Warren that there was trouble on his right flank; the Sixth Corps was in retreat. Warren readied his troops and sent additional sol¬ diers to Meade. Immediately they were hurried up the road leading to the Sixth Corps. ^Expecting to find retreating soldiers, they found nothing. Soon, some of Meade's staff officers returned from the endangered portion of the line and reported that Sedgwick and his corps were safe. The attack had been stopped. Darkness ended the second day of 39 fighting in the Wilderness. As Grant and Meade reviewed the day^-s activities, they realized that there was not much to show for their efforts. After the orders were sent out during the day, there had been little for them to do. Most of the time, they either sat or lay on the ground and waited for reports from the front. They studied their maps and they discussed the chances for success. But the Wilderness was not a good battleground. There just wasn't enough room to maneuver. Grant, however, had learned a lesson. He remarked to Meade that in the West, the enemy would have retreated after this kind of battle. Rob¬ ert E. Lee definitely was a different type of general than 40 Grant was accustomed to facing. 42 Information about the army had to be sent to Washington. Grant had severed his direct communications with the War De¬ partment when the army moved on the fourth. He asked a war cor¬ respondent enroute to Washington to deliver a message to the President: "Tell him from me that, whatever happens, there 41 will be no turning back."

On to Richmond On the following morning, skirmishers moved forward and found that the Confederates had withdrawn into their trenches. Convinced that attacking an entrenched enemy was a costly business, Grant hoped that Lee would come out of his works and give battle. But the Southerners remained in their 42 protected positions. Grant decided to try a new approach, Meade was directed to prepare his army for a night march around the Confederate right flank. Giving Meade de¬ tailed instructions on how to move the three corps, Grant added a note of warning: "All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move 43 off quietly." Perhaps Lee might be cut off from Richmond by a surprise move. But the quiet that prevailed over the Union lines al¬ ready had alerted Lee that something was afoot, Meade’s army had not been hurt badly on the previous day. All of Lee’s assaults had been stymied. It was assumed that the Yankees 44 were going to begin another move. 43 Other Northern movements in Lee's rear were progressing satisfactorily. Grant received news from Washington that Sherman was advancing against Johnston's army, Butler sent word that he had landed at City Point near Richmond, The enemy seemed to have been surprised by his advance. Grant's strategy had passed through a successful first stage; all 45 armies were moving in harmony. Events in the Wilderness therefore were not very dis¬ appointing, The Confederacy possessed generals that were too able and soldiers that were too experienced for a quick victory to be achieved. Persistent attacks on all fronts, however, would bring final destruction to the South, Grant assured Meade that his army had performed "magnificently," Meade 46 was in good spirits as his army began its night march. Warren's and Sedgwick's men withdrew from their posi¬ tions and passed behind Hancock's corps. In front of the moving column, Grant and Meade rode with their staffs. Es¬ corted by a cavalry detachment, the generals were astonished, by the reaction of the troops. The word had passed that the army was moving on to Richmond. In the past, battles similar to the Wilderness had meant that the army withdrew and re¬ fitted for a new offensive. But this time there was no with¬ drawal. Instead of running like a beaten dog back across the Rapidan River, the Army of the Potomac moved forward like a victorious legion. The troops were ecstatic. Brandishing burning pine knots, they cheered Grant and Meade as they rode past, A new chapter was being written in the army's 47 history. 44 Unfortunately, the joy was short-lived. Grant and Meade were riding fast arid they lost the road that they were fol¬ lowing, Cutting back through the inarching column, they passed beyond the picket line. Hurriedly, they counter¬ marched and the column became more tangled. As the men inter¬ mingled, some of the generals’ cavalry escort spotted fresh horses being ridden by a new regiment. In the confusion, tired horses were exchanged forcibly for new ones. More turmoil followed as the unhorsed riders tried to find their mounts. The Provost Marshal thoughtthat it was "one of the 48 most,..disgraceful rides I ever took.” Valuable time was lost as the infantry waited for the road to clear. Finally at eleven o'clock, the headquarters escort moved off the road and let the soldiers pass. The 49 race to get between Lee and Richmond was off to a poor start* Spottsylvania Court House was the key location. It occupied a cross roads that was formed partly by roads leading around Lee’s flank. The Po River flowed between Lee and Spottsylvania and possession of the bridge over the river was critical. If the Yankees held it, then Spottsylvania would belong to Meade’s forces. When Meade arrived at Todd's Tavern for the night, he found that the Cavalry Corps had not received their instruc¬ tions from Sheridan. Meade directed one division to push on to Spottsylvania and the other division was told to watch the flank facing the enemy. Unfortunately, the Po River Bridge was left unguarded. Lee's lead corps used the bridge and 50 reached Spottsylvania first. 45 On the morning of 8 May, Grant and Meade established their headquarters at Piney Branch Church. The orders for the day were to dislodge the Confederates from Spottsylvania. Grant felt that the Rebel line might be cracked by a concen¬ trated effort. But as the day wore on, the battle became a 51 story of bloodshed and futility. A little after noon, a hot debate took place between

Meade and Sheridan. Meade told his cavalry commander that the Confederates reached Spottsylvania first because the cav¬ alry had hindered the infantry's advance. Sheridan replied that since Meade insisted on issuing orders directly to the cavalry divisions, he might as well issue them all of their orders. Sheridan wasn't going to give another order to the Cavalry Corps. "I could whip [the Confederate cavalry under] 52 Stuart if you would only let me,” he fumed. Angrily, Meade stormed off to see the General-in-Chief. Relating his argument with Sheridan, Meade mentioned the cav¬ alry commander's final comment. "Did Sheridan say that?” Grant asked. "Well he generally knows what he is talking 53 about. Let him start right out and do it." Although Grant seemed to be supporting Sheridan's position, Meade issued the order within the hour and Sheridan's command rode out the next morning. His raid would result in the death of General 54 Stuart.

Late in the afternoon, Meade and Grant visited the front. Sitting on their horses, they were surrounded by sol¬ diers lying on the ground trying to avoid the whizzing bullets. 46 Grant felt unhappy about the lack of progress and thoughtthat his presence at the front might change the character of the battle* Meade thought that his courage was being tested by • Grant and he remained conspicuous. Determined to stay under fire longer than Grant, Meade instructed one of his aides to escort the General-in-Chief to their new headquarters. Grant accepted the offer and Meade decided that he had won the bluff. Returning to headquarters later in the day, Meade 55 had supper with the Sixth Corps commander. Some decisions had been made at headquarters. To Grant, there were now few alternatives. Meade and Butler must join fr t forces in the vicinity of Richmond, Naturally, Lee would have to be punished whenever possible. But Grant had not been ablê"to inflict the heavy blow on Lee’s army" that he had expected. He could not catch Lee outside of his trenches and the wagons had to be protected by a sizeable force. A juncture with the Army of the James was Grant's solution. "My exact route to the James River I have not yet definitely marked 56 out," Grant wired Halleck. But getting past Lee was now the primary objective. Lee's moves on the following day confused Grant. It appeared that Lee was trying to get between Meade's army and Fredericksburg. Once again Grant felt that the supply line was vulnerable. "My movements are terribley embarrassed by 57 our immense wagon train," he complained. But Lee also might be trying to take the inside road to Richmond and prevent Meade from advancing farther south. Either move would block 47 58 the road to Richmond. It was a blow to Grant's new strategy. A worse blow struck the Union chain of command. The Sixth Corps commander was in the trenches adjusting his lines. Grant rode up and explained the role of Sedgwick's troops in an impending attack. After Grant's departure, Sedg¬ wick went back to the lines and found his men hastily dodging the fire of some Confederate sharpshooters. Laughingly, Sedg¬ wick teased his men for their caution; the range was too great for the fire to be effective. He then fell dead with a bul- 59 let in his brain. When Meade heard that his Sixth Corps commander had fallen, he ordered Major General Horatioi*. G. Wright to assume command of the corps. Sedgwick's body was taken to Meade's headquarters and placed on a makeshift bier. His loss was a 60 sad occasion. Sedgwick would be missed. Grant decided that Lee's moves on the ninth meant that a portion of the Confederate line must have been weakened. The troops that had been shifted to the Confederate right must hnve come form some ôthbrrportion of theline. Hoping to take advantage of the shifting Rebel troops, Grant ordered an attack on the Confederate left. Hancock positioned his corps for the attack. A close review of the opposing lines convinced him however, that the Confederates had not weakened that portion of their line. His 61 attack was canceled. General Wright reported some enemy troops moving in the direction of Hancock's corps. After receiving Wright’s report 48 Meade concluded that the Confederates now were weakening their right to strengthen their left. He ordered Wright to attack 62 and notified Grant of the change in the Confederate positions. Grant concurred with Meade’s decision but ordered the at¬ tack to be made all along the Union line. Unfortunately, no portion of the enemy line had been significantly weakened. From the rear of Warren's position, Grant and Meade watched the assaults. Masked partially by the underbrush, the ad¬ vancing troops could not be seen but it soon became obvious that the attacks had failed. Disappointed, Meade and Grant returned to headquarters and went into consultation; the 63 Confederate line must be broken somehow. In the center of the Confederate line there was a large salient that pointed toward the Northern lines* Nick¬ named the "Mule Shoe," the salient had been pierced by a brigade of the Sixth Corps on the tenth. Without any support on its flanks, however, the brigade had been forced back just before nightfall. Determined to try again, Grant ordered Meade to prepare an attack for the twelfth. An entire day was set aside to prepare for the assault. Grant instructed Meade to move the Second Corps into position opposite the apex of the salient. He also instructed Meade to send his wagons to the rear and get resupplied. Hope was in the air again. Grant wrote Halleck: "I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and propose to fight it out on this line if 64 it takes all summer." 49

With the General-in-Chief directing him how to use his corps, Meade now directed his corps commanders how to use their divisions. Plagued by Grant's detailed instructions, 65 Meade was "cross as a bear." Although bè left his chief of staff unofficially in charge of the army for a short time, Meade got over his "nervous Dyspepsia" and resumed command. He felt compelled to alter Grant's instructions to meet the existing situation. Major General Humphreys later wrote that Meade's troop dispositions "met in the best possible 66 manner the requirements of the day." Meade and Grant rode out to confer with each of the corps commanders. It was important that the attack be swift and violent.

The previously successful assault on the tenth had been par¬ ticularly sudden. Advancing from a wood line, the Yankees had not bothered to stop and fire. Instead they surged into the Confederate trenches and overwhelmed the defenders before effective fire could beldirected into their ranks. If the same tactics could be duplicated on Thursday, the attack might be successful.

Promptly at 4:20 a.m. the Union artillery opened fire. Springing to the attack, the infantry swarmed over the Con¬ federate defenses. The Rebels had been caught in the process of moving their artillery and the result was almost disastrous. The center of the line caved in and there were blue coats everywherei Two generals, two thousand soldiers, and twenty guns were swiftlynrounded up and sent to the Yankee rear. Un¬ fortunately, as the attackers pressed on, they struck a second 67 line of defense and everything came to a quick halt. 50 Perhaps pressure could be brought to bear against the

Confederate line somewhere else. The initial success might

result in complete victory. Warren was ordered to attack but he could not get an assault organized. Repeatedly, he was instructed to attack and relieve the pressure on other sections of the line. But the orders appeared to fall on deaf ears. Finally, Meade wrote Grant: "Warren seems

reluctant to assault. I have ordered him at all hazards to do so and if his attack should be repulsed to draw in the right 68 and send his troops as fast as possible to Wright and Hancock." Quickly Grant replied: "If Warren fails to attack

promptly, send Humphreys to command his corps, and relieve 69 him." Meade hurried to Hancock*s headquarters and left Hum¬

phreys in charge of reinforcing the attacks. Grant also was

out urging the troops forward. All four corps were supposed

to be trying to push back the Confederate line. Warren did not seem to be able to get an assault going however, and his units were sent to reinforce other parts of the line. But

it was to no avail. Momentum had been lost. The attacks 70 faltered. By midnight the lines were quiet. Although the day had not been entirely successful, Meade had reason to be proud. Some of his accomplishments were being recognized. The Secretary of War wrote Meade: "This

Department congratulates you and your heroic army, and re¬ turns its cordial thanks for their gallant achievements during

the last seven days, and hopes that the valor and skill thus 51 far manifested will be crowned with the fruits of ultimate 71 and decisive victory." It was always pleasant to receive praise for trying to complete a difficult job. On the following day, the praise got even louder.

Laudatory comments were supplemented by a soldier*é proof of outstanding performance: recommendation for promotion. Grant wrote to the Secretary of War: General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by pro¬ motion to the rank of Major Generals in the reg¬ ular army, the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time, without seeing both.72 After being shown Grant's letter, Meade told the General-in- 73 Chief that he "was obliged to him for his good opinion."

Indeed, the situation was looking much brighter. Meade did not know it, but he was receiving criticism from an unexpected source. Grant's staff urged the Lieu¬ tenant General to relieve Meade. They though that Meade's presence added an unnecessary level to the chain of command.

In fact, they said that Meade's position made the command structure extremely cumbersome. Grant's reply clearly shows that he knew Meade's value to the entire war effort. Grant told his staff:

I am fully aware that some embarrassments arise from the present organization, but there is more weight on the other side of the question, I am commanding all the armies, and I cannot neglect others by giving my time exclusively to the Army of the Potomac, which would involve performing all the detailed duties of an army commander, 52

directing its administration, enforcing discipline, reviewing its court-martial proceedings, etc. I have Burnside's, Butler's, and Sigel's armies to look after in Virginia, to say nothing of our West¬ ern armies, and 1 may make Sheridan's cavalry a separate command; Besides, Meade has served a long time with the Army of the Potomac, knows its subordinate officers thoroughly, and led it to a memorable victory at Gettysburg. I have just come from the West, and if I removed a deserving East¬ ern man from the position of army command, my mo¬ tives might be misunderstood, and the effect bad upon the spirits of the troops. General Meade and I are in close contact on the field; he is capable and perfectly subordinate, and by attend¬ ing to the details he relieves me of much unnec¬ essary work, and gives me more time to think and to mature my general plans. I will always-see that he gets full credit for what he does.'4 Meade was performing a valuable service and Grant knew it. If he could keep Meade happy, Grant realized that his own freedom of action would be improved greatly. Keeping the proud Meade happy in his subordinate position might be dif¬ ficult, however.

Fortunately at this time, Grant received some help from the press. On the fifteenth, had an edi¬ torial that pleased Meade. The Times hoped that it would not be necessary

to remind a grateful community of the great and important part which the Commanding General [of the Army of the Potomac] has borne in.this series of victories. The nation, it may be safely reckoned, will not readily forget, either, the noble and un¬ pretentious service of Gen. Meade at a time when the army which he now commands had been put on the de¬ fensive by an insolent and all but.victorious enemy [before the Battle of Gettysburg].75

Meade's faithful service was acknowledged by an appreciative public. 53

But he still was not satisfied with being a junior part¬ ner. Before seeing the Times editorial, Meade complained to hid wife: "I see that the papers have counted me out entire¬ ly,” He added that: “All I ask now is that my life may be spared 5 that I may be returned to you to live in peace § 76 quiet.” Grant's assessment of Meade's importance stood in clear contrast to Meade's assessment of his own role: the Army of the Potomac was directed by Grant, commanded by Meade, and led by its corps commanders. Meade's son was on his father's staff and he thought that Grant's popularity was "perfectly disgusting.'? Captain Meade noted with sarcasm,"If Grant is running this Army I wish he would use his own staff officers. 77 I notice we are all kept running continuously." On the sur¬ face, Grant's and Meade's relationship ran smoothly but there were ominous undertones of discontent. Luckily, they never arose to provide a serious problem

Looking for Lee's Right Flank

It was impossible to avoid the effects of hard cam¬ paigning. The units already were feeling the strain of con¬ tinuous fighting and several days were set aside to consoli¬ date and strengthen the army's position. Reviewing the Northern losses, Grant regretted that so many men had become casualties. "Well General," Meade replied, "we can't do these 78 little tricks without losses." The brief respite was ter¬ minated by another Union attack on the eighteenth. 54 Hancock moved his men into the position where his as¬ sault had been stopped in the Mule Shoe on the twelfth. After a short advance, he found that the Confederates were prepared f

He told Meade to send the Second Corps alone toward Richmond. The Confederates might think that the corps was isolated and move out of their trenches to strike Hancobk's men. The remaining three Union corps then could smash Lee before he had a chance-to fortify his positions. It sounded a great deal like Meade's successful action at Bristoe Sta¬ tion in October 1863. Orders were issued to give the plan a 80 try.

But Lee surmised that Meade was going to move his whole army around the Federal left. Lee sent one of his corps against the Union right flank to find out if the Yankees already had departed. The attack fell on Hancock's men before they had started their move. Thinking that his right flank was being turned, Grant ordered his original plan canceled. The armies blundered around and nothing decisive occurred. It was a 55 81 fitting conclusion to another inconclusive battle. Fighting in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania had convinced Grant that the Army of the Potomac contained too much artillery. Artillery was the king of battle but it strained the supply system. Each artillery piece required two six-horse teams to pull it and its basic load of ammuni¬ tion. Furnishing forage for all of the horses was a bur¬ den. In addition, artillery occupied a large section of the road during marches. This meant that if the artillery could not be maneuvered in the thick woods and used in battle, it not only was useless, it was à hindrance. Determined to cut this supply tail and shorten his march columns, Grant ordered over one hundred pieces of artillery to be sent back to Wash¬ ington. The army's next move now might be swift enough to 82 get between Lee and Richmond. Moving off on the evening of 20 Mayv the Army of the Potomac tried another slip to the left. A three-day march brought the army to the North Anna River. Once again, how¬ ever, Lee had anticipated the move and his army opposed the Union crossings of the river. But the two wings of Meade's army forced their way across the river and the Army of ’the 83 Potomac found itself in an unfavorable position. Along opposite banks of the river, the center of each army faced one another. The wings of the Confederate force had been forced back from the river and thus Meade's army was cut into three parts. The left wing was on the south side of the river, the center was on the north side, and the 56 right wing was on the south* In order to move troops from one flank to the other, Meade's forces had to cross the river twice, Lee, on the other hand, could shift his troops easily and avoid the delays that a river crossing entailed. After declaring that "everything looks exceedingly favorable 84 for us," Grant decided that the Northern position was hopeless. His hopes for a promotion for Meade also were set back. Halleck wired Grant that there were congressional obstacles to Grant's earlier recommendation for the promotion of Meade and Sherman. Some politicians felt that they would break down the strong "West Point influence" in the army by opposing the promotions. It appeared that Meade might become a victim 85 of a political squabble. Earlier on the twenty-third, Meade and Grant had ridden with the army toward the North Anna River. Meade did not want the army to cross the river. He probably realized the 1 danger that could arise from an army split into thirds. But Grant ordered the crossings and Meade undoubtedly felt that his importance was declining. Grant was riding rather rapid¬ ly and finally Meade lost his temper. He urged his horse for¬ ward and set off "at a rate that soon raised a cloud of dust and left the Lieutenant-General far behind; whereat George G. was much pleased, and his aides much the contrary, as they 86 had to scramble after." Meade's mood obviously was becoming explosive. The next day it turned into rage. While the entire headquarters party was sitting in the Mt. Carmel church, a dispatch arrived from Sherman. Charles 57 Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War, was present and he de¬ cided to read Sherman's message aloud. In essence, Sherman said that the Western army was doing quite well and that if only Grant could inspire the Army of the Potomac, success would crown their efforts. Meade's eyes bulged. "Sir!" he erupted, "I consider that dispatch an insult to the army I command and to me personally. The Army of the Potomac does not require General Grant's inspiration or anybody's else to make it fight." He was still seething at supper and mumbled about the "armed rabble" in 87 the west* Additional responsibility was given to Meade that night. The retention of the Ninth Corps as a separate command had been a clumsy arrangement. While Meade and Burnside cooperated readily, Meade still did not have complete control over all of the forces facing Lee north of Richmond, In Special Orders Number twenty-five, the Ninth Corps was assigned to the Army of the Potomac. Perhaps Meade's anger would be appeased if 88 his authority was increased. Looking to the left once more, Grant decided to shift the Army of the Potomac. Lee's right flank still seemed to be the most opportune route for the army's movements. Grant established Hanover Town as the next objective. It was going to be another race to see which army could get the closest to Richmond in the least time. Grant was optimistic about 89 the chance for success. 58 In a letter written on 28 May, Grant told Halleck that "Lee's army is really whipped." Adding that "our success over Lee's army is already insure4" Grant expressed an attitude similar to that cherished by other men in the Army of the Po- 90 tomac. One regimental commander wrote to his wife that the campaign could last a long time. It might even last as long 91 as "twenty days or more."

But Meade had faced Lee's army before and he was not clinging to any false hopes. He told one of his aides, "I 92 am afraid the rebellion cannot be crushed this summer."

Lee's force was still fighting as hard as when the campaign opened on the fifth. Although the Confederates had been un¬ able to seize the initiative, they had been able to forestall all of the Union efforts to cut them off from Richmond. Upon reaching Hanover Town on 27 May, however, the road appeared to be open for the Army of the Potomac. Continuing the march to the left, the army again was showing signs of weariness. One division in the Second

Corps temporarily lost an entire brigade during a short halt.

After giving his men a rest during the march, the division commander had ordered his soldiers to push forward. Several miles later, he received word that one of his brigades was missing. Urgent inquiries to the rear were answered by the appearance of the brigade marching rapidly to the front. Dur¬ ing the halt, the entire brigade had fallen asleep and no one realized their plight until the division was far ahead. Sheep¬ ishly, the men rejoined the ranks. Renewed efforts brought 93 the army to the Totopotomy River. 59 Intrenched on the far side of the river, the Army of Northern Virginia watched the Yankkes approaching. There had been hard marching on both sides and Lee had won the race again. With his troops located in good defensive positions, 94 Lee waited for Grant’s next move. Heavy skirmishing convinced Grant that Lee’s position was unassailable. It was time to move to the left again. But Grant had sent for some assistance that might tip the balance in favor of the Union forces. On 30 May, Grant notified Meade that help would arrive soon: "Gen. Smith will debark his force at the White House [Virginia] to-night, and start up the 95 south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour...in the morning." An entire Union corps was being added to the Army of the Po¬ tomac . Brigadier General William F. Smith commanded the Eight¬ eenth Corps--one of the two principal commands in Butler’s Army of the James. Smith was a general that Grant had brought east with him when he assumed command of all of the armies. Although finding Smith obstinate at times, Grant felt that "Baldy" Smith was one of the more able generals. At one time, Grant even had felt that Smith might be an effective commander of the Army of thh Potomac. But Grant had decided to place Smith in command of a corps under Butler. The Army of the James might be able to maintain momentum against the enemy if one of its corps commanders was an experienced, competent 96 general. 60 Butler's initial advance up the James River on 5 May had met little enemy opposition. Moving his troops by water to

City Point and Bermuda Hundred southeast of Richmond, Butler seemed to have gained the advantage through surprise. Once 97 ashore, however, the entire tenor of his operation changed. Instead of pressing his advantage, Butler began build¬ ing a defensive network to protect his beachhead. If But¬

ler had moved forward promptly, it seems that he could have

seized eitheijpetersburg or the railroad link between Peters¬ burg and Richmond. The loss of either site would have cut

Richmond's principal lifeline to the south. But Butler dug his defenses and Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard gathered

his forces to oppose the advance of the Army of the James.

Butler moved out of his "impregnable" defenses on 12 May and began an advance that should have taken place a week

previously. Moving slowly towards Richmond, Butler finally ran into Beauregard's force--now happily waiting in good

defensive positions. While Butler was trying to decide whether or not to attack, Beauregard struck on 16 May. The Yankees' ran back to their fine defenses at Bermuda Hundred, The

threat imposed by the Army of the James disappeared into the 98 quiet safety of Butler's trenches.

Not having direct communications with Butler, Grant was unsure of the situation along the James River. By 21 May,

he suspected that something was wrong. He wired Halleck that 99 he feared that there was "some difficulty" with Butler's force. On the twenty-second, Grant was sure that Butler's army would 61 be more effective somewhere else. On the twenty-fourth, two general officers sent to investigate the situation of the

Army of the James recommeiided that 20,000 men be transferred

to the Army of the Potomac. On 28 May, "Baldy" Smith received 100 orders to move to the aid of Meade's army. Arriving by boat at White House on 30 May, Smith began unloading histtroops on the limited dock facilities. By

the next afternoon most of his force was ashore and he start¬ ed to march for New Castle Ferry--the destination prescribed for him by Grant on 28 May, On 1 June, Smith arrived at New

Castle ready to place his troops in line with the Sixth Corps. 101 But his force was all alone.

Grant's order had been a bad mistake. The Army of the Potomac was not at New Castle. Instead, its four corps were gathering at Cold Harbor preparing to attack the newly ar¬ rived Confederates. Realizing that there must be some mis¬ take, Smith asked for further instructions and was told to move rapidly for Cold Harbor. In addition, he was placed un- 102 der the command of General Meade. Meade’s army had made another flanking movement from its positions along the Totopotomy River. A crossroads at

Cold Harbor brought a collision between the Union and Con¬ federate cavalry and both sides rushed reinforcements to the 103 point of contact. While Smith's corps was hurrying forward on the first, the Confederates launched an infantry attack against the in¬ trenched Yankee cavalry. Wright's Sixth Corps appeared in 62 time to insure that the Rebel attack failed and the remaining

Union corps rapidly arrived to form a line of battle. Once Smith*s corps was in position on the right of the Sixth Corps, the two corps were directed to attack the Confederate pôsi- 104 tions.

Grant and Meade rode along the lines and it appeared that a successful attack could be* made. The Confederates hastily were throwing up earthworks and a quick attack might win the day. At noon they stopped at Wright’s headquarters and wentn over the details of the assault. As soon as Smith’s corps was ready, the offensive would begin. At 6 p.m., Smith 105 was ready.

Swiftly, the two Union corps fell on the waiting Con¬ federates. The Rebel line was driven back, stretched, and briefly broken, But the impetus was gone from the attack and the defenders gradually stabilized the front. A Southern disaster was averted. The brief respite provided by the tardi¬ ness of Smith's corps permitted the Confederates to construct defenses just strong enough to stall the offensive. Smith's erroneous orders were a costly mistake. A determined thrust earlier in the day undoubtedly would have been more effective. But the first of June ended with the two armies facing each 106 other and waiting. Meade was in good spirits. The Confederate position seemed vulnerable. Add a little more weight to the attack and Cold Harbor might become the scene of a great triumph. He told Grant that Hancock's corps should be moved up to support 63 Wright and Smith. Warren also should join the assault on the following day. "I think the attack should be renewed as soon 107 as Hancock is within supporting/distance,” he wrote. Grant concurred with Meade’s recommendation but it took Hancock’s men some hard marching to get into position. The weather was hot, the roads dusty, and Hancock had difficulty moving in the dark. Finally in position at 7:30 a.m., the Second Corps was exhausted. Hoping that a brief rest would renew the spirits of the Second Corps, Meade ordered the at¬ tack to begin late in the afternoon of 2 June. But Grant though about it and at 2 p.m,, he told Meade to postpone the attack until the next morning. All final preparations should be made today and ”a good nights rest given the men prepara¬ tory to an assault at, say 4:30 A.M. in the morning,” Grant 108 directed. It is strange that no one seemed to be in a hurry in the Northern command structure. For the past twenty-eight days, Lee had availed himself of every opportunity to intrench his troops. Every assault on an intrenched enemy had re¬ sulted in the same conclusion: a swift repulse. The third of June was no exception. It rained during the night and cooled things off. Early in the morning, the soldiers were making final preparations for the assault. Many were writing their names on little slips of paper and pinning them to their jackets. When they were killed, it would be virtually the only means of identi¬ fication. The soldiers’ premonition of heavy losses was not 64 109 heeded by the commanders. Promptly at 4:30 the blue ranks stepped out onto the ground that separated the two armies. Moving forward, the lines were broken up by small ravines and swamps. They pressed forward and reformed their ranks and suddenly the horizon lit up with a sheet of flame. The roll of musketry swept from flank to flank. The Confederates poured a murder¬ ous fire into the attackers* Thick smoke partially obscured the Rebel lines. The loud thunder of musket volleys drowned out all other sounds. Whole ranks of men were swept aside while the lucky ones dropped to the ground and tried to scratch out some protection with their coffee cups. In the South¬ ern trenches, the men were "in fine spirits, laughing and talking as they fired," but on the field to their front, men were looking for holes to crawl into. A Confederate general 110 wrote that: "It was not war; it was murder." Initial reports reaching Meade were sketchy. Grant had left Meade in complete control of the battle. Anxiously awaiting the reports of his commanders, Meade kept Grant in¬ formed of the developing battle. At seven, Meade told Grant that the Sixth Corps had made "some progress" but the Eight¬ eenth Corps had lost its momentum and was retreating. The Second Corps was going to try another attack. Perhaps a bit uneasy, Meade asked for further guidance: "I should be glad to have your views as to the continuance of these attacks if 111 unsuccessful." 65 Grant’s answer was immediate: "The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive, but when one does succeed, push it vigorously, and if necessary, pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can 112 be taken." Information flowing from the corps commanders was hazy and contradictory. At first, it appeared that the Second Corps had been successful and was preparing to attack again. Further inquiry revealed however, that Hancock considered "that the assault failed long since." But if another corps 113 attacked successfully, Hancock would try again. Wright reported that he could not move because the Second and Eight¬ eenth Corps wouldn’t move. "The reason why General Smith thinks that I am not moving with him is that he is behind me," 114 Wright complained. Smith’s complaint was that Wright's at¬ tack was not protecting the Eighteenth Corps from the enemy’s fire. The simple truth rapidly became apparent: there was not any combination of attacks that would avoid the enemy's muskets and artillery. At eleven o'clock, Grant rode out to 115 the lines to talk with the corps commanders. It was clear that the fighting at Cold Harbor was over. Each corps commander told Grant that success was not possible. Nothing had been accomplished in the morning except that the opposing lines were closer together. After hearing the opin¬ ion of each'".commander, Grant wrote Meade: "The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an as¬ sault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of further 66 advance for the present. Hold our most advanced positions 116 and strengthen them.” At l!30, Meade directed each corps commander to stop all further offensive operations. He instructed them to start using aiege techniques and move against the enemy's positions by regular approaches. He and Grant again were looking to the left and thinking that there must be a better 117 way to get to Richmond. CHAPTER III

Waiting for Something to Break 68

Elbowing Left "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold 1 Harbor was ever made," Grant wrote later. Federal losses were high and there were no results to justify the casualties. Some of the officers in the Army of the Potomac were dis¬ gruntled by the waste of manpower. But it was difficult to identify the culprit responsible for ordering the attacks. Was it Grant or Meade? The Fifth Corps artillery commander re fleeted that: "The orders come to us from Meade, but I cannot think it is his [érror], having the opinion I have of his abi- 2 lity as a general." To the soldiers in the ranks, it made no difference. Both Grant and Meade were giving them instructions and both were held responsible. In the past some commanders had been cheered loudly when they appeared among the troops. At this stage- of the campaign, all enthusiasm had ceased. Grant and Meade received some "feeble applause" as they rode along the 3 lines but there was not much to cheer about any more. Meade felt that his philosophy had been proved correct by the results of the campaign: an intrenched enemy should not be assaulted. He remembered the criticism that he had received as result of his failure to attack an intrenched foe at Williamsport and Mine Run. He hoped that the present campaign vindicated his earlier decisions. "I feel a satis¬ faction in knowing that my record is clear," he wrote his wife A soft spot in the enemy’s defenses must be found before a 4 successful attack could be launched. 69 As a result of the attacks on the third, the opposing lines were extremely close together. A simple exchange of pickets evoked heavy fire and the army had to be quite care¬ ful with its movements. On the evening of 4 June, Grant de¬ cided that he would annoy the enemy by having the artillery fire at midnight. "It will have the effect to wake up the whole of the enemy's camp and keep them on the watch until daylight," Grant told Meade*

Meade agreed but thought that the idea was rather silly. After all, if the artillery kept the enemy awake, it also would keep the Yankees awake. In addition, "it will inter¬ fere with the approaches I have ordered to be made to-night." Chastened, Grant discarded the idea. "It was only a desire to retaliate for annoyances that made me suggest opening our batteries to-night. If it is going to interfere with any operations you need not direct it," he answered. 5 Meade continued with his original plan. Meade's personal war with newspaper correspondents reached a new level of intensity on 8 June. A reporter for the Phila¬ delphia» Inqui rert Edward Cropsey, released a story on the second which alluded to a "secret" conversation between Grant and Meade: History will record, but newspapers cannot, that on one eventful night during the present campaign, Grant's presence saved the army and the nation too; not that Gen. Meade was on the point of com¬ mitting a blunder unwittingly, but his devotion to his country made him loth to risk her last army on what he deemed a chance. Grant assumed the responsibility, and we are still On to Rich¬ mond .6 70 In the Wilderness, Meade had recommended turning back across the RapidanI Meade was disgusted thoroughly with the press. The innuendo was totally incorrect. He decided to make an exam¬ ple of Cropsey that would serve as a ’’warning to his Tribe." On the seventh, Meade issued orders that Cropsey was to be arrested, paraded through the lines with a placard marked ïlibeler of the press" hanging on his chest, sent from the army, and not permitted to return. The order was given to the Provost Marshal for execution. General Patrick followed the order to the letter and added some variations of his own. Insuring that Meade's order was given the widest dissemination in the army, Patrick also insured that Cropsey's expulsion from the army was wit¬ nessed widely. Cropsey was mounted backwards on a mule, led by a drum corps playing the "Rogue's March", and paraded throughout the camp so that everyone could read the sign, "Libeler of the Press." Naturally, the reaction to the affair 8 was mixéd. One officer in the Army of the Potomac rejoiced "to see one of the rascals shown up, for they make more trouble than their heads are worth, with their lying accounts of af- 9 fairs in the army." Reaction by the press, of course, was different. At first, the correspondents had a tacit agree¬ ment that Meade would be ignored in the news reports. Later, in Washington, the correspondents had a meeting and it was agreed that Meade would not be mentioned in the news unless 71 it was in connection with a Northern defeat. The correspondents took every opportunity to ignore Meade. Orders that were issued by Meade and quoted in the newspapers had his sig¬ nature omitted. "From that time till the next spring, Gen. Meade was quite as much unknown, by any correspondence from 10 the army, as any dead hero of anitquity." Meade had earned the animosity of virtually every correspondent. On the same day that Cropsey was drummed out of the army, Meade felt that his expertise was being overlooked by

Grant. Grant’s chief of staff was sure that Grant felt that the best man was in command of the Army of the Potomac. But Meade decided that Grant did not like the way he was leading the army. It appeared that Grant slowly was eroding Meade's authority. To Meade, this was quite evident when Grant wanted to build a line of earthworks which would protect the army's rear when it made its move from Cold Harbor. The General- in-Chief sent his own engineer, General J.G, Barnard, to determine the best location for the defensive line. Grant then instructed Meade to send one of the Army of the Poto¬ mac's engineers so that Barnard could show him where the 11 works needed tobbuiltt Meade was unhappy with Grant's plan. When General Gibbon visited Meade at his headquarters that evening, he found Meade "laboring under great excitement." Without consulting Meade, Grant was going to have a line of works built by Meade's men! The sooner the army moved away from 12 Cold Harbor the happier Meade would be. 72

Cold Harbor was less than ten miles to the northeast of Richmond, Between Cold Harbor and Richmond, Lee's army occupied a central position that would be difficult to turn.

The Chicahominy River crossed the southern flanks of the two armies. The countryside was dotted with numerous swamps. Grant had run out of room to maneuver around Lee’s flank. The restrictive terrain made it obvious that Richmond no longer was a realistic objective. Another method of cutting Lee’s supply line had to be found. To the south of Richmond, the city of Petersburg rested on the Appomattox River, Supplies bound for Richmond usually had to pass by rail through Petersburg. If Petersburg was captured, then the flow of supplies to Lee's army nottheast 13 of Richmond would be curtailed seriously. Earlier in June, Grant had sent Sheridan and the cav¬ alry on an expedition to stop the flow of supplies coming from northwest of Richmond, Sheridan's objective was Char¬ lottesville and the railroad link between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley. If the Confederate supply line to that fertile area could be severed, then Lee's army would have serious supply difficulties. Sheridan also was directed to try to join with General David Hunter’s force in the Valley. After their juncture, the combined forces would march back to Petersburg and join the Army of the Potomac. If Grant cotild not defeat Lee, at least he could seize Lee's supplies 14 and wait for Lee to make an imprudent move. 73 Grant knew that this was going to be a slow and tedious method of defeating Lee. But he felt that if Lee would not fight outside of his trenches, then it was the only way to bring, victory. Confident of success, Grant ordered Meade to build another line of trenches to protect the Army of the Po- 15 tomac’s next move.

Grant sent one of his aides, Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock, to determine the best route to the south side of the James

River. By moving south of the river, however, the Army of the Potomac would be exposing Butler's army to some danger. If Lee understood Grant's intentions, he could concentrate his entire force against Butler's command and perhaps destroy it. Smith's corps was ordered to be ready to reinforce Butler if the Army of the James became threatened.

Warren's corps was directed to occupy an intermediate position along the route of march. This would prevent Lee from attacking the columns moving to the James. The Second and Sixth Corps were to march to the river and cross on -a pontoon bridge that was to be constructed at Windmill Point, Meade decided to establish his supply depot at City Point, located at the junction of the James and Appomattox rivers.

With his supply base in a central location, Meade could mount a major assault in many different directions. But again, it would be a race against Lee. If Lee could be given the slip, the Army of the Potomac should have a clear route into Peters- 16 burg. 74 75 On the night of 12 June, Meade's army left its positions at Cold Harbor. Smith’s Corps was released from the army and it moved to rejoin the Army of the James. Refreshed by a five-day rest, the remaining four corps quickly movedto Charles City Court House on the north side of the river. As usual, Grant and Meade traveled together with the army. At the James River, the bridge was still under construction and the Second Corps crossed on ferry boats. By the evening of the fourteenth, most of the Second Corps was across the river and the pontoon bridge had been completed. Hancock's corps was readÿv'to move forward while the remainder of the army 18 crossed the bridge. Hancock's move to Petersburg was the result of an al¬ most completevbreak down in the command structure. On the fourteenth, Grant went to Bermuda Hundred and instructed Butler to conduct an assault on Petersburg while the Army of the Potomac was crossing the James. Since Butler's force was north of the Appomattox and Petersburg was south of the river, it meant splitting Butler's command. Accordingly, Butler sent Smith's Eighteenth Corps—just returned from the Army of the Potomac--agaxnst the city and he kept the re¬ mainder of the Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred. Grant believed that when Meade’s army crossed the river it would support Smith's assault. Since Meade had not had time to establish a supply base south of the James River, Grant also directed Butler to supply Meade's lead elements with rations. A rapid assault on Petersburg by Smith's corps, 76 and a corps from the Army o£ the Potomac, might capture the city before the Confederates had time to react. Informed by Grant of the plan, Meade instructed Han¬ cock to remain at Windmill Point and wait for the rations from Butler. Upon receipt of his supplies, Hancock was to move to a point near Petersburg where the Yankees "now have 19 a work," By 4 a.m. on the fifteenth, Hancock had not received the promised supplies. Since his move was not to be started until he received the rations, Hancock waited and notified Meade*s adjutant general that the supplies had not arrived.

Again at 6î30, Hancock sent word that the rations had not been delivered and at nine o'clock, he was tired of waiting and ordered his troops forward. Hancock had been provided a map that showed !the des¬ tination of his march. Unfortunately* the map was incorrect. It showed Hancock's objective to be within the Confederate lines. Late in the afternoon, while Hancock was trying to find out where he was supposed to go, a messenger arrived from Grant; Hancock was directed to move as rapidly as pos¬ sible to help General Smith, Within minutes a second mes¬ sage arrived; General Smith requested that Hancock move for¬ ward quickly and assist the Eighteenth Corps' assault on Petersburg. For the first time that day, Hancock learned that his men were expected to participate in an attack. Han- 20 cock hurried toward Petersburg. 77 Smith’s attacks had been successful. When he first moved his troops into position, the Confederate artillery drove his men back. But after a careful examination of the ground, Smith reorganized his forces. Early in the evening of the fifteenth, he carried the outer works of Petersburg's defenses. Headlines in The New York Times proclaimed: "Peters¬ burg Captured. The Fortifications Stormed by General Smith. 21 Both Lines Carried." Indeed, it appeared that except for some demoralized militia, there was nothing between Smith and Petersburg. All of the hard campaigning had paid off.

Petersburg would fall and Richmond was doomed. But Smith decided that he had captured the most important points in the enemy’s works and he called off the attacks for the night.

When Hancock's troops began arriving late in the evening, Smith simply requested that they replace his own troops in the line. If the Confederates counterattacked, they would meet Hancock's fresh divisions. The Yankèeà settled down for 22 the night. Lack of command supervision on the fifteenth had been obvious. Neither Grant nor Meade were at the decisive point.

In fact, it was not clear who was in charge. Smith belonged to the Army of the James and Grant had assigned responsibility for the initial operation to Butler. After he finally learned that he was to support Smith's attack, Hancock still did not know who was in charge. Hancock was senior to Smith and the overall responsibility might be his. But Hancock did not 78 have any idea what was happening. In addition, Hancock be¬ longed to Meade. When Hancock arrived on the field, not only did the responsibility theoretically pass to him, it also passed to Hancock’s commander, Meade. To further confuse the issue, Butler was providing the supplies--which, inciden¬ tally, never arrived. Essentially, these gross oversights meant that an extremely important attack was in the hands of a junior corps commander who was not sure what enemy force opposed him and what friendly force was available to him. The result was that Petersburg would not fall for nine more 23 months• Since his troops had relieved most of Smith's corps during the night, Hancock was organizing an assault to be conducted on the morning of the sixteenth. The lapse in the command system must have been recognized finally, because Grant officially placed Hancock in charge of the attacks. Meade also was hurrying to the front and he met Grant who was returning from the location of Smith’s successful opera- 24 tions. "Well," Grant told Meade, "Smith has taken a line of works there, stronger than anything we have seen this cam¬ paign! If it is a possible thing, I want an assault made at 25 six o'clock this evening," Grant continued to City Point, the site of his new headquarters, and Meade rode to the front. The Petersburg operations were now his. Hancock had captured several more redans from the enemy in the morning and the Ninth Corps was beginning to arrive. 79 But it was unable to get into position in time to participate in the six o'clock assault. Hancock's corps attacked alone and capturedanother small portion of the enemy's line. Dur¬ ing the night, the Ninth Corps moved into position and the 26 Fifth and Sixth Corps continued to march toward Petersburg. On the seventeenth, the enemy "was vigorously pressed." The Ninth and Second Corps pushed the Rebels hard but suf¬ ficient firepower still was not available* A brief success by one of Burnside's divisions was eventually driven back. It was another day of frustration but more troops were ar- 27 riving and the eighteenth might be the turning point. But help also was arriving on the Confederate side. Ever since the Army of the Potomac began moving on the twelfth, Lee had not been sure what Meade's intentions were. A movement south of the James River was a strong possibility but Lee could not afford to overreact. If he moved to the south of the James and found that the Yankees were attacking farther north, Richmond would fall easily. Lee spent several days anxiously awaiting the development of the situation. Finally convinced that the Union move against Petersburg was not a feint, he rushedtthe Army of Northern Virginia to meet 28 the attacks. The race wascclose but Lee won again. In order to try to coordinate the efforts of Butler's and Meade’s armies, Grant established his headquarters at City Point. With his headquarters at the intersection of the James and Appomattox rivers, Grant could move easily to either Meade's or Butler's headquarters. In addition, Grant 80 had a telegraphic link with each general and communications passed freely among the three headquarters. For the first

time since the campaign began on 5 May, Meade did not have the General-in-Chief close at hand whenever he made a deci¬ sion. Grant was now eight miles away and Meade was in charge of the operations against Petersburg. Meade inaugurated his new freedom by ordering attacks all along the line on the 29 eighteenth. By the evening èf 17 June, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth

Corps were in position in front of Petersburg, The Ninth Corps had conducted some local attacks late in the day.

Meade thought the Ninth’s limited successes could be exploit¬ ed by a coordinated assault against Petersburg on the follow¬

ing morning. Meade was certain that if the three corps attacked simultaneously, the enemy could be driven back across the Appomattox River. Meade directed his three corps commanders to "make all needful arrangements" to insure 30 that the assaults would commence in unison at 4 a.m. As the blue ranks ifioved forward early in the morning, they found that the trenches to their front had been aban¬ doned, When Meade learned that the enemy’s works were empty, he ordered the army to continue the advance. But coordination between the units had been lost. With his hoped for a coor¬ dinated assault destroyed, Meade’s frustration increased. His

second full day in the field without Grant turned into a day of disappointment, accusation, and anger. 81 A small incident with Warren started Meade off in an irritable mood. In order to strengthen the Fifth Corps Meade sent a cavalry regiment from his provost guard to assist War¬ ren. Soon after the cavalry's arrival» a second cavalry regiment arrived and Warren returned Meade's provost guard. When Meade's regiment returned to headquarters* Meade lost his temper. He instructed the colonel to take his regiment back to the Fifth Corps and tell Warren that General Meade commanded the army and knew what to do with his troops. The cavalry rode to Warren's headquarters and for the next two days, it 31 sat around and waited for Meade's anger to cool.

Meade's real problem was the coordination of his corps. The three commanders could not get together and attack simul¬ taneously. Each waited for the other and despite Meade's protests, the Army of the Potomac was dormant. At a little after two, Meade could not wait any longer. He instructed the Second Corps commander to: "Select your own point of attack, but do not lose any time in examination [of the 32 grouxid]." To Warren and Burnside, Meade was extremely terse: What additional orders to attack you require I cannot imagine. My orders have been explicit and are now repeated, that you each immediately assault the enemy with all your force, and if there is any further delay the responsibility and consequences will rest with you.33 To the division commander in the Eighteenth Corps who was supporting the attack--Brigadier General John H. Martindale, Meade sent a similar directive:

Finding it impossible to effect co-operation by appointing an hour for attack, I have sent an 82 order to each corps commander to each attack at once at all hazards and without reference to each other. I have to request you will do the same and not wait any longer for those on your left. * Meade was losing control rapidly. Part of the problem was in the ranks. Assaults all along the line had become a way of life--and death--and the troops knew the consequencesof attacking intrenchments. The lessons of Spottsylvania ând Cold Harbor had not been lost on them. "The very sight of a bank of fresh earth now 35 brings them to a dead halt," one commander noted. Under these conditions it is not surprising that there was a lack of enthusiasm in the assaults. Generally, however, the men were were "well behavéd and yet they could not carry the 36 lines." By 7 p.m. it was obvious that the enemy’s defenses could not be broken. Meade was disappointed. After dark, he told one of his aides, "I should have taken Petersburg. I had reason to calculate on success. The enemy had no defenses but what they had thrown up in a few hours; and I had 60,000 men to 37 their 25,000," But Grant had càlled off the attacks and 38 Meade rendered a report of the day’s operations. Grant was satisfied with Meade’s performance. He told Meade that all has been done that could be done, and that the assaults to-day were called for by all the appearances and information that could be ob¬ tained, Now we will rest the men and use the spade for theirgprotection until a new vein can be struck. y The Army of the Potomac had run out of room and could no 83 longer maneuver against the Army of Northern Virginia, Forty- four days of marching and fighting had brought the two armies to the vicinity of the Confederate capital and Lee's princi¬ pal supply base. Now it was time for the men to fortify their positions and to find some cover in the muddy trenches. Mobile war was no longer possible.

The Siege Reducing a city by siege was a slow and painstaking task, A rapid decision could not be reached with this style of war¬ fare. But it was a relatively safe method of destroying an enemy capable of waging effective defensive tactics. The overwhelming numbers in Meade's and Butler's armies made the outcome virtually inevitable, Nevertheless, the outcome would be decided only after the passage of much time and 40 great labor. Both sides constructed enormous works to protect their positions. It was essential that the Yankees not be let in to the city and the Confederates not be let out of their defenses. Redoubts, redans, demi-lines, and batteries were connected by a system of trenches and rifle pits. Abatis and chevaux-de-frise protected the front of each opponent's works. Musket and artillery fire was planned so that it interlaced and formed a curtain through which no man could pass safely. Forts were constructed attobvious weak points and the sol¬ diers constantly were vigilant for the slightest movement in the enemy's lines. It was a monotonous, dull, and debili- 41 tating job that sapped the men's strength in the heat of summer. 84

Richmond’s Life Lines--The Capital’s Railroad Connections With the South 85

Lines of Circumvallation and Contravallation: Richmond and Petersburg 86 With Grant’s headquarters at City Point, Meade again enjoyed the prerogatives of an independent commander. Each day at 4 a.m., he went out to inspect the lines and he rarely returned to his headquarters before midnight. Siege artil¬ lery was arriving from the depots in Washington and Meade wanted to insure that it was properly placed. Some of the field artillery that Grant had sent back to Washington was being returned to the army. In addition, the deadly fire of mortars was added to Meade's arsenal. Earlier experiences had shown mortars to be effective in this style of operation and every opportunity was being taken to use the techniques previously learned. While the artillery kept up a steady, 42 annoying fire the army advanced by regular approaches. Carrying sufficient supplies to the attackers could be a problem in a siege. But it was solved by the construc¬ tion of a railroad from the supply depot at City Point to

the army's trenches in front of Petersburg. By 7 July, trains 43 were running regulàrly. Although the central location of City Point made it an ideal supply point, it also became a source of irritation to Meade. When Grant was appointed lieutenant general in March, he was given a staff of fourteen officers. With the excep¬ tion of an assistant quartermaster, Grant's staff consisted of aides, secretaries, and assistant adjutants-general. Halleek had been retained as Chief of Staff of the Army under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Gen¬

eral-in-Chief. Halleck's position evolved to that of a chief 87 co-ordinator of the War Department bureaus. He also was the principal liaison between Grant, in the field, and the War Department in Washington. Since Iialleck relieved Grant of many of the administrative burdens normally associated with the position of General-in-Chief, Grant was able to travel with the Army of the Potomac. He let Halleck worry about the mundane administrative dutiès that his position could 44 have included. Grant*s personal staff in the field did not relieve Meade’s staff of any of the logistical and administrative requirements of the Army of the Potomac. Instead, Meade's staff continued to perform their duties in the same manner as they had in the past. Grant was able to give priority to Meade's logistical requests, however, by providing a di¬ rect link to Halleck. In addition, Meade's requests were supplemented by the force that only aMieutenant general could provide. But with the exception of two or three eng- neer officers, Grant's staff did not perform a vital service 45 to the support of the Army of the Potomac. When Grant's headquarters and the principal supply depot were established at City Point, the requirements changed. There was a need for a permanent administrative and logistical staff at City Point. Acting on Meade’s recom¬ mendation, Grant placed the Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier General Rufus Ingalls, on his staff and changed Ingalls' role to the chief quartermaster of the armies in front of Richmond. A slow process of borrowing 46 Meade's staff officers now began. 88

Normally, Meade acquiesced in favor of Grant's requests for additional staff. When Grant tried to take the Provost Marshal of the Army of the Potomac however, Meade fought hard to keep General Patrick. As pleasantly as possible, Meade re¬ minded Grant that General Patrick's proper place was in the field with the Army of the Potomac;

I trust it may not be considered necessary for him [General Patrick] to remove his Head Quarters from here, [to] there. I consider it essential that the Provost Marshal General of this Army, whose duties are so intimately connected with its police and discipline should be permanently at these Head Quarters, and with the telegraph and deputies I 47 see no reason for the separation of Genl. Patrick. Meade was not as cordial with General Patrick.

Meade told Patrick that he was not angry with him. He simply was unhappy that his staff was leaving and he vowed that he would not have a "partnership" with Grant. Additional¬ ly, Meade told Patrick, the Provost Marshal's special Bureau of Information could not go to City Point with him. Meade would break up the organization before he would let that 48 happen. Ignoring Meade's obvious disgruntlement, Patrick moved

to City Point. But after two days of scathing orders from Meade, Patrick gave up. He returned to Meade's headquarters and the issue was settled; for the time being, Meade kept his 49 Provost Marshal.

Never intending to undermine Meade's staff, Grant had started a precedent. The march from Meade's headquarters to

Grant's staff had begun. By the time the siege ended in April

1865, Grant had taken Meade's chief quartermaster, assistant 89 quartermaster, chief commissary officer, provost marshal, assistant provost marshal, and assistant surgeon. The crisis had passed however, and Meade never again questioned the re¬ moval of his staff officers. It was more important that he maintain a harmonious relationship with Grant, than to quibble 50 over the assignment of staff members. Since the army was settled into the daily routine of siege operations, Meade had an opportunity to evaluate his commanders. The Fifth Corps commander was given particular attention and Meade contemplated relieving Warren from command, Warren*s last minute failure to attack at Mine Run in 1863 had ruined an entire campaign. At Spottsylvania, Warren had been slow in organizing an attack. Even the General-in-

Chief had noticed Warren's reluctance to attack and had recom¬ mended to Meade that Warren be relieved. Meade had overlooked

Grant's recommendation but on 17 June, Warren again had been slow in organizing an assault, Warren's sluggish pace prob¬ ably had given the Confederates sufficient time to consolidate their new positions in front of Petersburg. With some reluc¬ tance, Meade prepared a letter to Grant's chief of staff 51 recommending that Warren be relieved. Before sending the letter to Grant's headquarters,

Meade discussed the situation with Warren. Commenting on all of Warren's failures, Meade outlined his plan to have Warren relieved from command of the Fifth Corps. Meade realized that it would ruin Warren's career. Hoping that the discussion with the Fifth Corps commander would prevent a future recur¬ rence of the problem, Meade did not send the letter. But the 90 52 generals were analyzing their principal subordinates.

Grant’s big problem was Butler. Butler was senior to

Meade and whenever Grant went to Washington, Butler was in command of the armies in front of Richmond and Petersburg.

In Butler, Grant found ”a want of knowledge” on how to execute his orders properly. In other words, Butler could not handle troops in the field. But,Grant told Halleck: "General But¬

ler has always been prompt in his obedience to orders from me and clear in his understanding of them.” Grant hoped that 53 Halleck could find Butler another job somewhere else. Halleck was not as confident as Grant about Butler's capability to command an army in another area. Halledk felt

that Butler would be trouble no matter where he served because "of his total unfitness to command in the field." The Chief of Staff suggested an alternate plan: place Smith in com¬ mand of the troops in the field and have Butler exercise de- 54 partmental CQmmand from Fort Monroe.

Grant liked the idea. It avoided a confrontation with Butler and it retained the powerful political general in a nominal command. He asked Halleck to have the War Depart- 55 ment issue the appropriate brders. On 7 July, the War Department issued General Orders, No. 225: The troops of the Department of North Carolina and Virginia serving with the Army of the Poto¬ mac in the field, under Major-General Smith will constitute the Eighteenth Army Corps, and Maj. Gen. William F. Smith is assigned to the command of the corps. Maj. Gen. B.F. Butler will command the remainder of the troops in that department, having his headquarters at Fort Monroe.So 91 It was not what Grant had in mind. Upon receipt of the order, Grant realized that an imbroglio had been created. The chain of command had not been streamlined. Instead, Halleek's order created an addi¬ tional army--those troops remaining under Butler's control-- and gave Smith command of a reinforced corps under the direct control of Grant. Although it was a courteous method of re¬ moving Butler from the field, it also was not what Grant desired. On 10 July he notified Halleck that he was sus- 57 pending the order. Grant also began to realize that he had not chosen the right man to command Butler's troops in the field. Smith became involved in one of the political intrigues that period¬ ically swept through the Army of the Potomac. Grant decided that Smith was trying to get a larger command at the expense of his superiors. In a letter to Grant on 2 July, Smith described Butler "as helpless as a child on the field of battle and as visionary as an opium eater in 58 council." On the ninth, Smith had a conversation with Grant in which he severely criticized Meade for the attacks at Cold Harbor. It seemed that Smith did not like any of the super- 59 iors under whom he had served in the recent past. Reflecting on his conversation with Smith, Grant de¬ cided that Smith not only was criticizing Meade for Cold Harbor, he also was criticizing Grant for the attacks. It was impossible to retain a general in command who did not like any of his superiors. After all, who could Smith serve under 92 if he thought that Butler, Meade, and Grant were incompetent? On 19 July, Grant relieved Smith from command of the Eight¬ eenth Corps. Grant’s chief of staff confided to his wife that Smith had to go ’’because of his spirit of criticism of all military movements and men, and his failure to get along with any one he is placed under, and his disposition to scat- 60 ter seeds of discontent throughout the army." Grant’s prob¬ lems with his subordinates were overshadowed however, by events in the Shenandoah Valley. As part of Grant's original plan for the spring cam¬ paign, Major General Franz Sigel had moved south through the Shenandoah. But on 15 May, he lost heavily at the and retreated northward. Dissatisfied with Sigel's performance, Grant relieved him and appointed Major General 61 David Hunter to command the forces in the Valley.' Hunter had better success. He defeated a Confederate force at Piedmont and captured the town of Staunton. Moving southward, Hunter embarked on a raiding expedition designed to prevent Lee from using the Valley as a source of supplies. On 7 June, Sheridan and 9,000 cavalry left Meade's army in front of Cold Harbor and rode toward Hunter’s force. To the Confederates in Richmond, it looked like the Valley was going to be lost forever. In an effort to stop Hunter and regain the fertile plain of the Shenandoah, Lee sent the Second Corps under Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early to the Valley on 13 June. Although it would be risky for Lee to reduce his own forces 93 so close to Richmond, it was essential that something be done about the Valley. Incorporated in the risk, however, was the realization that if Early was victorious, he might cause a serious diversion to Grant’s efforts in front of Richmond. The Shenandoah Valley was pointed like an arrow toward Washing¬ ton and the North. After defeating Hunter, Early could march on the Yankee capital. Grant undoubtedly would be unable to ignore the threat and he would be forced to send help from Meade's or Butler's armies. The plan went almost with- 62 out a flaw. Early’s appearance in front of Washington created great consternation. Grant was forced to send the Sixth Corps to help defend the city. Grant also hoped however, that a large force could be organized and used to prevent Early from retreating across the Potomac. If Early could be trapped,

Lee's diversionary attack would turn into a debacle.

But Early was operating in an area where four military departments existed. Interference from the War Department and the red tape involved in coordinating the forces from four departments were insurmountable problems. Early easily slipped back across the Potomac. Although the threat to the 63 capital had ended, Eatly's force remained a potential danger. Grant hoped to ameliorate the situation by creating a new military division. On 25 July, he recommended to Lincoln that the four departments of the Susquehanna, the Middle, West Virginia, and Washington be consolidated under one com¬ mander- -george G. Meade. "With General Meade in command of 94 such a [military] division, I would have every confidence that all the troops within the military division would be used to the very best advantage from a personal examination of the ground, and [Meade] would adopt means of getting the earliest information of any advance of the enemy, and would 64 prepare to meet it," Grant concluded. Meade had heard a rumor earlier in the month that he was being considered for a command somewhere in Pennsylvania. He had laughed at the rumor > then but now he thoughtfully considered the possibilities. It would mean an independent command and it would be away from the monotonous siege at Petersburg. His hopes were dashed however, when he learned 65 that Sheridan had been appointed to the command. Meade went to see the General-in-Chief about the ap¬ pointment* Although expressing indifference to the job, Meade obviously was interested. Grant said that the Presi¬ dent had decided not to allow Meade to be appointed. Ràther than a promotion, it would look like Meade had been relieved from command of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln would not let that happen and Sheridan, a compromise candidate, re¬ ceived the position. In the Valley, Sheridan won new laurels, while at Petersburg, Meade continued the slow process of re- 65 ducing the city by siege.

The Crater Many inventors in the North thought that modern tech¬ nology could bring a quick end to the siege. Grant*s head¬ quarters received numerous suggestions, notable only because 95 they represented some original ideas. One engineer made a proposal that promised quick success. His idea was simple.

The besiegers should construct a wall around Richmond that was higher than the tallest building in the city. The enclo¬ sure could be filled with water pumped from the James River.

Accompanying his plan with detailed drawings and elaborate calculations, the inventor promised that Grant could "drown 67 out the garrison and people like rats in a cage." Indomitable Ben Butler also had some ideas for a quick victory. When Grant and Meade visited his headquarters one day, Butler proudly displayed his inventions. First, he pro¬ posed that fire engines be used to squirt water on the enemy's earthworks and wash them away. If that didn't work, a garden sprayer filled with Greek fire would burn the Rebels out of their holes. He saved the pièce de resistance for last. A large auger could bore a hole five feet in diameter under the enemy's trenches and into Richmond I One of Meade's aides drily commented that the Army of the James probably would "pop up in somebody's basement, while the family are 68 at breakfast." Building a tunnel under the Confederate positions held other possibilities. Grant's principal intentions in the siege were to extend his lines to the right and left. Lee's lines would have to be lengthened to meet the encricling works and eventually his lines would be stretched too thin to withstand an attack. Once a hole was punched in Lee's lines, Petersburg and Richmond would be easy prey. A lieutenant 96 colonel in the 48th Pennsylvania Volunteers, Henry Pleasants, had a better idea for penetrating Lee’s lines. Why not dig a tunnel under the defender's works, fill it with gunpowder, and blow a hole in the enemy's defenses? Pleasants approached his corps commander with the plan.

General Burnside thought that it was a good idea. As an added advantage, Pleasants and most of his regiment were coal miners. They could do the work themselves. On 25 June, they started to work and on 4 July, Meade informed Grant of their plan.

There was a great.deal of skepticism about the idea. Headquarters sent engineers to examine the areaJand they reported that the plan did not have much chance of success. The portion of the enemy's works designated to be blown up was covered by enfilading fire from other parts of the enemy's lines. To the rear of the Confederate front, a hill overlooked the lines* Undoubtedly, the enemy had taken ad¬ vantage of the terrain and constructed a second line of de¬ fense on the ridge. Also, the Confederates had an idea that the mine was being constructed. Periodically, Rebije pickets would call across the lines and laughingly ask how the tunnel 70 was progressing. Clearly, it was going to be adifficult task. Overcoming all obstacles they encountered, the men of the 48th Pennsylvania completed the construction of 23 July.

Grant did not want the mine used immediately and the gunpowder was set aside to be used later. The mine still was consid¬ ered a last resort. Grant asked Meade for his analysis of 97 an operation that would exploit the detonation of the mine. Meade sent Grant some recommendations on 24 July,

There was no doubt that the mine would be exploded suc¬ cessfully, But the ridge behind the enemy’s front was a puzzle, Meade examined the ground and he could not detect any enemy positions on the hill. The Confederates were not stupid however, so they must have works on the crest that were too well disguised to be seen from the Union lines, Meade concluded that the mine’s explosion and exploitive attack easily would force the Rebels out of their first line of de¬ fense. He did not feel that the second line could be carried by an assault, ”At the same time, I do not consider it hope¬ less and am prepared to make the attempt, if it is deemed of 71 importance to do so," Meade wrote Grant, Grant told Meade to go ahead and have the mine charged with gunpowder. He did not set a time for the charge to be exploded; there was another plan that he wanted to try first.

Hancock’s Second Corps and two divisions of cavalry were sent north across the James River. Grant hoped that they might surprise the Confederates north of Richmond. After some limited successes, Hancock's attack stalled. But the attack had an interesting effect. It appeared that the enemy was rushing reinforcements from Petersburg, north to the location of Hancock's assault. It was an opportune time for the mine 72 to be exploded on the Petersburg front. Grant wanted Hancock's corps to dash back to Petersburg and support the attack after Burnside's mine exploded. Meade 98 did not feel that Hancock would have enough time. He suggested that the mine be detonated on the twenty-ninth. After fur¬ ther consideration, Grant chose the thirtieth as the proper time. "The details for the assault I leave for you to make 73 out," he told Meade, Meade already had visited Burnside’s headquarters and discussed some of the details, Burnside was going to use his colored troops to lead the assault after the mine exploded. ♦ Meade would not permit it. He was not sure that the blacks were the best troops for the operation because "they had 74 never been under fire." Although Burnside argued against using different troops, Meade was adament; the assault would 75 be led by white troops. Several attempts at deception were tried. It was hoped that the Confederates still believed the major Union effort was north of the James River. To reinforce this misconception,

Sheridan covered the bridge across the James with hay; he quietly crossed a cavalry division to the south side on the night of the twenty-eighth. After daylight the next morning, they marched northward across the bridge. Hopefully, the Con¬ federates would think that the Yankees were moving to rein¬ force the northern attacks.

Meade talked with each of Burnside's division commanders on the twenty-ninth. He emphasized that the ridge behind the Confederate trenches could be the1! key to the entire oper¬ ation. The division commanders must make every effort to seize the crest before the enemy had time to react. The 99 surprise of the exploding mine and the ferocity of the assault should provide the soldiers with sufficient time to gain the hill* Meade returned to his headquarters to draw up the 76 final orders. Itcwas a simple plan. Burnside would make the main attack. Hancock’s corps would relieve Ord'3 men from their

front line duties. Warren’s Fifth Corps and Ord’s Eighteenth Corps would support the Ninth Corps' flanks. As soon as the mine exploded, every available artillery piece would

open fire and cover the advance of the troops. Burnside was directed to prepare his parapets and clear the abatis so that the troops could advance unobstructed toward the Con¬ federate lines. Meade concluded his order with a call for cooperation: "Promptitude, rapidity of execution and cordial

co-operation are essential to success and the Cmdg. Genl. is confident that this indication of his expectations will en- 77 sure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops," Af¬ ter obtaining Grant's approval of the order, Meade went to 78 bed "not sanguine of success."

Early on the morning of 30 July, Grant and Meade met

at Ninth Corps headquarters. Burnside had gone forward to his front lines. The mine, scheduled to go off at 3:30 a.m., was silent. With some trepidation, a soldier crawled into

the tunnel and found that the fuse had gone out. After lighting the fuse, he hurried to the rear and the mine ex¬ ploded at 4:45. The had begun. 100

It was a "dull sounding explosion, like a heavy gun, 79 far away.” The sky was filled with men, cannon, and the debris of a violent explosion* One Confederate soldier later remarked that he was very unpopular with his regiment as a result of the explosion. For some reason he was blown up¬ ward while everyone else already was falling back to the earth. As he passed some of his friends, he heard someone yellî "Straggler!" He landed near a hôle fifty feet wide, one hundred twenty feet long, and twenty-five feet deep.

Opposite the Ninth Corps, the center of the Confederate line 80 had vanished.

Instead of a tidal wave of blue coats sweeping for¬ ward to exploit the breakthrough, the Ninth Corps advanced in driblets. Surprised by the force of the explosion, the men had hesitated momentarily, and then had moved through the tangled abatis on their front. The Yankee positions 81 had not been prepared for the assault; it was a poor start. When the advancing troops reached the crater, they stopped. Some soldiers went into the hole and started to dig up the Rebel guns buried by the explosion. Others helped some of the Confederate wounded but most began milling around in confusion. The hill in the rear of the crater was empty and silent; the Confederates did not have a second line of defense !

Without orders, however, the troops remained around the crater. When the Confederates recovered from their initial shock, they began firing at the blue mob in their midst. The 101 crater became a shelter for the Yankees and any hope for suc¬ cess disappeared into the hole in the ground. Someone needed 82 to take charge. Behind the Union lines, it was clear that something had gone wrong. Burnside and all of his division commanders, safely within their own lines, tried to get the assault re¬ started. Farther to the rear, Meade and Grant tried to find out what was happening. Dispatches were rushed back and forth but scraps of paper usually don't incite men to great acts of heroism. Above brigade level, the command structure was paralyzed. Below brigade level, it did not exist.

In the confusion, Meade and Burnside exchanged notes

that infuriated each. Meade wanted to know why Burnside's troops would not advance out of the crater. If it was a case

of disobedience of orders, then Meade wanted to know the rea¬ son. "I wish to know the truth, and desire an immediate 83 answer," Meade bitingly wrote.

Burnside's pride was piqued. It was not disobedience of orders and: "Were it not insubordiante I would say that the latter remark of your note was unofficerlike and ungen- 84 tlemanly," Burnside forcefully answered. While the generals argued, the Confederates counter¬ attacked. Disorganized and demoralized the Yankees beat a hasty retreat through a withering fire. The Battle of the

Crater had ended but^he dispute had just started. On 1 August Grant wired Meade: "Have you any estimate

of your losses in the miserable failure of Saturday? I think 102 there will have to be an investigation of the matter. So fair an opportunity will probably never occur again for 85 carrying fortifications."

Meade's answer was to the point: "I am compelled from a sense of duty to ask the Lieût.Genl. Cm'd'g, that Maj. Genl.

A.E. Burnside, Cm'd'g 9th Corps, be relieved from duty with this army." Charging Burnside with disobedience of orders and conduct prejudicial to good order ancjfailitary discipline,

Meade outlined the Ninth Corps commander's faults in the bat¬ tle. Contrary to orders, Burnside had failed to advise Meade

"of every step in the progress of the operation and of every¬ thing important" that had occurred. Saving the best for last,

Meade stated that Burnside had accused his commander of "un¬ officerlike and ungentlemanly" conduct. Meade saw it as a 86 clear travesty of military discipline.

Rumors ran rampant. One rumor went through the Ninth

Corps that Meade was being held responsible; he had used the battle at the crater to crush Burnside instedd of the Rebel¬ lion. But in the Fifth Corps it was felt that any blame placed on Meade could also be placed on Grant. Without affix¬ ing any guilt or innocence, Grant put Burnside on a leave of absence and John G. Parke assumed command of the Ninth Corps.

Burnside's departure later caused Meade a great deal of 87 trouble.

The Winter Months

Of increasing importance to Meade was the status of his promotion. Late in August he learned that Sherman had 103 been promoted and he had not. Meade went to see the General-

in-Chief about the problem. Grant explained that he had not pushed for Meade’s pro¬ motion because if he had, Meade would outrank Sherman. He mentioned, however, that Meade was a strong candidate for the head of the newly created Middle Division. Unfortunately,

Sheridan’s Army of the Shenandoah had suffered a temporary setback and if Meade was appointed immediately, it would

appear to be a disapproval of Sheridan’s conduct. Grant did not want the public to believe that there had been a loss of faith in Sheridan. When Meade assumed command of the Mid¬

dle Division, Grant said, Meade's promotion would follow

soon after. Satisfied, Meade did not pursue the subject 88 further. But Meade was not appointed and late in October, attacks on him by the press began anew. He appealed to Grant for aid. Grant offered to show Meade all of the dispatches that he had written to Washington since the campaign began. This would prove that Grant had been satisfied with’Meade’s per¬ formance. Meade declined the offer and asked only that Grant

support him in the press. Cheerfully, Grant said that he 89 would be glad to give Meade all of the help he needed. Convinced that Grant had confidence in him, Meade was

troubled by his failure to be promoted. He knew that Grant would have left him alone in front of Richmond and Petersburg, if only Butler was not present* Without Butler, "Grant would leave matters here to me 8 be at this moment in 104 90 Tennessee,” Meade wrote his wife. Still, Meade's promotion was not forthcoming. In January, matters reached a climax. Meade received a letter from Senator Henry Wilson, Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Wilson told Meade that there had been opposition in the Senate to Meade's promotion. "We shall get your case up [in front of the Senate] in a day or two and I have no doubt of the result," Wilson reassured 91 Meade. But Meade had learned part of the problem. Senator William Sprague of Rhode Island had written Meade a friendly note. He told Meade that Burnside's departure was the basis 92 of much of the opposition. Helpless, Meade turned to Grant. In two quick letters, Grant settled the problem. He wrote Senator Wilson that: "Gen. Meade was appointed at my solicitation after a campaign the most protracted, and cover¬ ing more severely contested battles than any of which we have any account in history." Grant added that he regretted 93 that Meade's promotion had been overlooked. Grant also turned to his friend Congressman Elihu B. Washburne of Illi¬ nois. "I defy any man to name a commander who would do more than he [Meade] has done with the same chances," Grant wrote. "I am satisfied, with a full knowledge of the man, what he has done, and the circumstances attending all his military acts, all objections his promotion] would be re¬ moved." Grant asked Washburne to "put in a word with some 94 of the Senators" and support Meade's cause. 105 On 2 February, Grant proudly sent Meade a wire: "I am happy to state to you that I am just in receipt of [a] des¬ patch from Washington announcing your confirmation as Major 95 General in the regular army by a heavy majority»" After a long period of expectation, Meade finally had been promoted. Fighting continued in the trenches throughout the win¬ ter. Although the troops officially never went into winter quarters, most either had constructed crude huts or had bur¬ rowed into the ground for protection from the weather and the enemy. On a bluff overlooking the river at City Point,

Grant lived in a hut. Whenever an offensive took place, he rode to the front and joined Meade or Butler to oversee the operation. But the strangulation of Richmond and Petersburg was a slow process. Grant’s hut evoked a few sarcastic re¬ marks. One paper had a drawing of a hut with smoke curling out of the chimney. Underneath the picture, the caption read: "Grant fought it out on this line, though it took him 96 all summer, and has now sent for his stove."

Morale had been affected by the protracted operations. One division commander's analysis was simple: the troops 97 were "fought out,y Pay also was a problem because it was not always on time. Living? in the trenches was not cheap; pay checks disappeared quickly into the sutler’s till. But supplies flowed unhindered to the front. In the first eight months of 1864, the cavalry twice had been remounted completely. 98 It was debilitating work and the soldiers' attitudes hardened. 106 ’’Nothing short of their total, uncompromising and uncon- 99 ditional surrender will please me now,” one soldier wrote. Others felt the same way and a series of small actions in

late September and early October restored some of the men’s confidence. The fearful slaughter of the summer months was 100 being forgotten in the drudgery around Petersburg. In November, the Second Corps commander was relieved

\ from command by the Secretary of War. It was not the result of political intrigues or military incompetence. Instead, it was hoped that Hancock could travel throughout the North and recruit some of the veterans whose enlistments had ex¬ pired earlier. They would make good soldiers and after a taste of civilian life, they might be ready to return to the army as part of a Veterans’ Corps. It seemed like a good

idea and Hancock set out to see if it would work. Meade’s

chief of staff, Major General Andrew A. Humphreys, assumed 101 command of Hancock's old corps.

Grant's attention turned to the other theaters during the winter. Sherman took and marched to the sea.

Lincoln received a Christmas present, Savannah, Georgia, from

Grant’s western lieutenant. Moving northward, Sherman con¬ tinued to disembowel the Confederacy. Major General John M. Schofield was busy on the North Carolina coast and operations were opened in east Tennessee. The Shenandoah Valley was finished as a Confederate bread basket. The Army of the Poto¬ mac kept picking away at Petersburg. With the approach of 102 spring, victory seemed close at hand. CHAPTER IV

"We've Got the Finest Generals in the Army of the Free" ---Yahkee marching song 107 Breakthrough As in the previous spring, the rains delayed the open¬ ing of the campaign* Heavy downpours had fallen throughout most of the winter and the roads were bottomless rivers of mud. The constant use of the same routes by the besiegers aggravated the problem. Until the rains stopped and the roads dried out, large scale movement was impossible. Grant learned that Sheridan was moving from the Shenan¬ doah Valley to join the armies in front of Richmond and Petersburg. Sheridan's approach had been a slight surprise to Grant. He had directed the cavalry commander to move out of the Valley, proceed southward, and join Sherman's army in the Carolinas. When Sheridan reached the James River near Lynchburg however, he found that he could not cross. The Confederates had destroyed the bridges and the river was swollen by the heavy rains. Sheridan decided that his best move would be to join Grant's forces and he notified the Gen¬ eral- infcChief of the change in plans. Grant did not question Sheridan's judgment and the cavalry joined the army in front 1 of Petersburg on 27 March. In mid-March, excess personal baggage wa^sent to the rear. The troops understood the meaning of the shipment: a major move was imminent. But Grant did not want to force Lee out of Richmond too quickly. On 19 March, Grant wrote his father: "I am anxious to have Lee hold on where he is a short time longer so that I can get him in a position where 2 he must lose a great portion of his army." Grant was convinced 108 that Lee would try to move south and join Joe Johnston's army in North Carolina. More time was needed so that the left of the Army of the Potomac could be extended to the west. This would cut off Lee from any good routes leading south. On the twenty-fourth, Grant issued the order designed to 3 keep Lee's and Johnston's armies separated forever. Two corps from the Army of the Potomac were to leave the trenches of Petersburg and move west to Dinwiddie Court House on 29 March. Major General E.O.C. Ord and three divi¬ sions were to follow close behind. Sheridan, under the direct control of the General-in-Chief, was directed to move his cav¬ alry west of Richmond and Petersburg. He was to cut the last two railroads leading into the cities. Effectively sealed off from his supplies and partially blocked from moving south, Lee would be forced to flee west.

Grant still hoped that Lee would leave his trenches and attack the Northern forces. The two corps from the Army of the Potomac were bait. Hopefully, Lee would strip his trenches and move most of his force out to fight the moving columns of Yankees. With minimum strength in the Confederate trenches, the defenses should be cracked easily by an assault. Grant told the corps and division commanders not to wait for orders; as soon as it became evident that the defenses had 4 been weakened, attack.

But Lee already had decided to attack. On the day after Grant issued his order, the Confederates struck Fort Stedman on the Ninth Corps front. It was/a^desparate gamble that

failed. 109 Lee's lines were stretched too thin. By attacking a weak point in the Federal lines, Lee hoped to force Grant to shorten his lines. A permanent rupture in the Yankee de¬ fenses would mean that Meade's left was cut off from its supplies. It would have to be withdrawn. The plan was based on the assumption that Meade simply would withdraw his left and not counterattack to restore his line. The assumption 5 was faulty. Meade was at City Point visiting Grant's headquarters when the attack occurred. But it did not make any difference. Parke, the commander of the Ninth Corps, easily contained the assault. With some help from Warren's Fifth Corps, Parke's men threw the Confederates back. After learning that over 2,300 Confederate prisoners had been capture, Meade commented, 6 "I wish they would try it every day." It had been the Con¬ federates' turn to learn Meade's dictum: never attack forti¬ fications.

Three days later, Meade was back at City Point to meet the President and General Sherman. Lincoln was spending several days at the front. Sherman had come north for a quiet meeting with the President and the General-in-Chief. Meade was not present for the strategy discussions held by the high command but he had a chance to talk with his com- 7 rades-in-arms. The final blow was being readied.

Several days of dry weather provided a fitting pro¬ logue to the final operation. On the morning of the twenty- ninth, Warren's Fifth Corps, Humphreys' Second Corps, elements 110 of Ord's Army of the James, and Sheridan's cavalry began moving to the left. Grant had three independent commanders-- Meade, Ord, and Sheridan--who moved with the columns. If Lee fled, they would provide a flexible command structure. Each could lead a column to pursue, flank, and cut off Lee's re¬ treating force. In the evening after the first day's march, it began to rain. It rained hard and the roads again turned to mud. Re¬ peating the procedures of the previous spring, Grant estab¬ lished his headquarters near Meade's. They discussed sus¬ pending: the operation until the rains stopped. The teams of horses and artillery were bogged down in the quagmire. In order to make any progress, the army had to corduroy the roads. It was beginning to look bad for a swift march de¬ signed to trap Lee in Richmond, Sheridan arrived at head¬ quarters however, and stroiigly urged Grant to continue with the operation. After much deliberation, it was decided to 8 continue the marché On the morning of the thirty-first, Warren's lead divi¬ sion was attacked by elements taken from the Confederate right flank* With his corps stretched out along the roads, Warren was unable to react. His lead division retreated through the division behind it and both units fled. Finally, a line was formed around Warren's rear division and the Rebel assault was halted. Meade rode to Humphreys headquarters and ordered the Second Corps to move up on Warren's right and support a counterattack-by the Fifth Corps. By 3:40 p.m., Warren was m able to report that the Confederates had been pushed back in¬ to their original positions. The movement to the left con¬ tinued. Sheridan's units were the farthest to the west. He had moved his cavalry to an important crossroads known as Five

Forks. Sheridan's men were dismounted to defend the posi¬ tion. Attacked by Confederate infantry, the Yankees were forced slowly eastward toward the main body of the army.

Nearing Dinwiddie Court House late in the day, Sheridan's force appeared to be in danger of being flanked. Since the

Fifth Corps was closest to Sheridan, Meade ordered Warren to 10 send a brigade to keep communications with the cavalry intact.

On hearing of Sheridan's dilemma, Grant told Meade to send one of Warren's divisions to assist Sheridan. Meade suggested that Warren's entire corps be moved to support the cavalry. Grant wrote Meade: "Let Warren move in the way you propose and urge him not to stop for anything. Let Griffin [one of Warren's division commanders] go on âs he was first 11 directed [to help Sheridan]." As an afterthought, Grant told Meade to place Warren under Sheridan's command "until 12 the emergency for which they are sent is over." Although warned that speed was essential, Warren care¬ fully organized his columns. His advance also was briefly halted by a bridge along his route that had been destroyed.

After rebuilding the structure, the Fifth Corps moved forward and joined Sheridan's force on the morning of 1 April, HZ Sheridan had been expecting Warren's men since the pre¬ vious night. Grant had assured Sheridan that reinforcements would arrive by twelve o'clock. That deadline had not been met. At noon, one of Grant's aides met Sheridan: "General Grant directs me to say to you that if, in your judgment, the Fifth Corps would do better under one of its division com¬ manders, you are authorized to relieve General Warren and 13 order him to report to General Grant at his headquarters." Remembering Warren's tardiness on other fields, the General- in-Chief was not going to permit a repeat performancein the 14 final act of the war. As in all battles, the fighting at Five Forks seemed confused. There were reports of divisions going the wrong way and opportunities being lost. But by the end of the day, the result was clear: a great victory had been achieved by the Union forces. Battle flags, cannons, and a?vast number of Rebel soldiers were captured. Warren, however, had lost 15 his job. After the battle was over, Warren sent an aide to Sheri¬ dan to report the Fifth Corps' success. Upon meeting Sheridan, the aide was surprised by the General's reaction: "Tell Gen¬ eral Warrejj,I say, by God, he was not at the front. That's 16 all I've got to say to himl" Handing the aide an order for Warren, Sheridan turned away brusquely. At his headquarters, Warren read Sheridans's dispatch in dismay: "Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Army Corps, is relieved from duty, and will report at once for 113 orders to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding Armies of the 17 United States." Warren was stunned but he departed for Grant's headquarters. Major General Charles Griffin assumed command 18 of the Fifth Corps. Warren's problem was a side issue. The news of Sheri¬ dan's victory reached Grant and Meade at Dabney's Mill. Grant looked at Meade and said, "Very well, then I want 19 Wright and Parke to assault tomorrow morning at four o'clock." Meade returned to his headquarters and ordered the Sixth and Ninth Corps commanders to assault the enemy at Petersburg. Sheridan's encounter with a large Confederate force probably meant that the Petersburg lines had been weakened. It was time for a violent breakthrough of the enemy's defenses. When Grant received a copy of Meade's orders, he had second thoughts about assaulting the trenches. The General- in-Chief directed Meade to open fire with all of his artil¬ lery. If Wright and Parke detected any signs of weakness in the enemy’s defenses, then they were to attack. But enthusiasm had gripped the corps commanders and Meade sent Grant Wright's answer to the attack order: "The corps will go in solid, and I am sure will make the fur fly... If the corps does half as well as I expect we will have broken 20 through the rebel lines fifteen minutes from the word 'go'." A glance at Wright's dispatch convinced Grant that the time had come: "I like the way Wright talks; it argues suc- 21 cess. I heartily approve." The final assault on Petersburg would begin at 4 a.m. 114 At the sound of a signal gun fired from one of the forts, the blue columns moved forward in the early morning darkness. The Sixth and Ninth Corps swept aside the enemy's first line of defense but Parke’s troops met heavier resistance in a sec¬ ond line. Wright did not meet a second line and he continued to advance. Meade ordered Pàrke's reserves to support the Sixth Corps' success and he told Humphreys to push forward. It was all over in a short time--the majority of Wright's casualties occurred within the first fifteen minutes. The Sixth Corps was moving to meet the Second Corps, Ord's corps was supporting the attacks of the Sixth Corps, and the Ninth Corps was continuing the pressureoon its front. The enemy's 22 position at Petersburg was untenable. Grant rode forward to join the Sixth Corps. Meade was moving with the Second Corps, insuring that a coordinated ef¬ fort wad being made on the left. The generals met briefly and parted to oversee the assault. At a little after eleven o'clock, they met again at a house on the outskirts of Peters¬ burg. They congratulated each other and discussed the; next 23 move,2 Meade suggested that ’(Sheridan should move east on the roads which were parallel to the southern bank of the Appo¬ mattox River. This would trap all of the Confederates who were south of the river. Grant thought/that "Sheridan might even be able to get across the river and catch the Confed¬ erates fleeing Richmond. There was no doubt that flight was Lee's only recourse. But Sheridan could not comply with US either the order or the suggestion and Lee escaped. Richmond 24 and Petersburg, however, had fallen.

25 Pursuit Grant and Meade spent the night of 2 April in the Rit¬ chie House near Petersburg, Carefully, they went over the plans for the pursuit of Lee's forces. In the morning they rode into the city that they had been trying to capture for the last nine months. Their entrance undoubtedly was anti- climactic, The Army of the Potomac spent the day organizing and preparing for the hard marching that was to follow soon.

Meade issued his orders to the corps commanders and he and 26 Grant met at Sutherland Station where they spent the night.

At 4 a.m., Meade left to coordinate the movement of his column. Essentially, the pursuit was being conducted along two roads that were parallel to the Appomattox River. In the van of the northern column, Sheridan moved with his cav¬ alry and the Fifth Corps. Behind them, Meade rode with the

Second and Sixth Corps. Along the southern route, Ord's units and Parke's Ninth Corps maintained a rapid pace. In order to move south, Lee would have to avoid both columns. His most likely route of escape was along the Richmond and Danville Railroad and Grant moved’the armies so that the road 27 would be blocked.

Meade was having difficulty keeping up with his army. He had caught a cold in the rains at the start of the cam¬ paign. By the fourth, he had developed a fever. He became so sick that he finally decided to ride in an ambulance. But 116 he still maintained control o£ his units* Whenever he heard heavy firing at the front, he got out of the ambulance and rode forward on his horse. Orders were issued from either his ambulance or his horse. On the evening of 4 April, he enjoined his corps commanders to continue their march at 3 a.m., "regardless of every consideration but the one of 29 finishing the war."

Beginning their move early, the Second and Sixth Corps pushed hard to reach the railroad. Sheridan and the Fifth Corps already were in position along the tracks. They anx¬ iously awaited the arrival of Meade's units. If the Confed¬ erates attacked promptly, they might have been able to break through Sheridan's force. At 2 p.m. Meade reached Sheridan's headquarters. His two corps were following close behind. Be¬ cause he was ill, Meade asked Sheridan to position the Army of the Potomac. The Second and Sixth Corps were placed on the flanks of the Fifth Corps, facing Amelia Court House to the northeast. Meade planned to attack the Confederates at 30 six the next morning.

Enroute to the Court Hou$e in the morning, Meade real¬ ized that the Confederates had departed. Learning that the route along the Richmond and Danville Railroad was blocked,

Lee had turned his column to the west. Later, the Confeder¬ ates again turned south. But it was too late. Ord and Parke prevented any movement to the south and Sheridan, Wrighfc, and Humphreys were pushing the Confederate rear. In contrast to the previous spring, Lee was losing the race. 117 Some confusion in the Confederate ranks had caused their column to become split. The supply wagons had been diverted to a different route and unknowingly, the rear guard mistaken¬ ly followed the trains. In close pursuit, Humphreys moved af¬ ter the wayward elements. Sheridan and Wright, on the trail of the main body, moved in for the kill. Along the Sayler's Creek, the fight was quick, Sheri¬ dan attacked from the south and Wright moved in from the east. A brief couhterattack by the Confederates was swiftly re¬ pulsed and it was all over, Sheridan estimated that he had captured six generals and between nine and ten thousand prisoners. Lee’s son, Custis, was among the prisoners. Upon learning of the disaster to his army, Lee knew that his 31 fighting strength had been cut in half. On the seventh, Lee understood that his only hope for escape was north of the Appomattox River. With the river behind him, Lee could move his army to Lynchburg where he could rest and feed his weary troops. Ittwas essential that the bridges over the Appomattox be destroyed. Only then could Lee gain the necessary time to outrun the pursuing Yankees. Humphreys and Wright were following the fleeing Con¬ federates. Farther south, Sheridan, Ord, and Griffin were moving parallel to Lee's column. As some Confederate skir¬ mishers tried to burn the only bridge that remained over the

Appomattox, Humphreys' staff arrived. By a narrow margin, the Second Corps saved the bridge and Lee lost his last 32 chance for a respite. 118 After sending Humphreys’ Corps across the Appomattox, Meade sent a despatch to Wright urging him to cross farther upstream at Farmville. But when the Sixth Corps reached the river, they found that the bridge had been destroyed. The heaviest responsibility shifted back to Humphreys who tried to destroy the Confederate rear guard. As night fell however, Humphreys still had not been able to defeat his 33 opponent. The defense was too strong for one corps to break.

Grant established his headquarters in Farmville that evening. As the news of the day's activities arrived, Grant realized that the end was near. He received a dispatch from

Sheridan that told of eight Confederate trains waiting for Lee's army near Appomattox Depot. Obviously, these were the supplies that Lee was trying to reach. Sheridan indicated that he would capture them before too long. Grant sent Lee a short note:

The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Array of Northern Virginia in the struggle, I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the C.S. Army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.34

Grant sent the message with Brigadier General Seth Williams At about 8:30, Williams reached Humphreys’ headquarters on the north side of the Appomattox. Passing through the lines under a flag of truce, Williams returned within an hour. He rode to Grant's headquarters and handed Grant, Lee's reply: 119 I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Array of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposi¬ tion, ask the_terms you will offer on condition of surrender. ü The war was not over yet. All day on the eighth, the Second Corps pushed the rear of the fetreating Confederates. From the south, Sheridan, Ord, and Griffin approached Appomattox Court House. One of

Sheridan's division commanders, Major General George A. Cus¬ ter, captured the supply trains at Appomattox Depot. The ring was closing around Lee's army.

Meade crossed the river in the morning and joined Hum¬ phreys’ column. It seemed the most likely location for the decisive action to take place. The Second Corps was pursuing the enemy's main body. When he met Humphreys, Meade learned that Grant had requested Lee’s surrender the previous evening. A second letter had been sent forward in the morning. Elated, Meade rode past some burning Confederate supply wagons. He knew that the final blow would be delivered very soon.

Grant and his staff rode up and the General-in-Chief referred to Meade as "Old Fellow." A brief synopsis of the recent exchange of notes revealed that initial attempts at negotiations had failed. Grant and Meade rode with Humphreys’ troops for the remainder of the day. That night, they stopped at the Clifton House in Curdsville and General Meade provided Grant and his staff with dinner. The General-in-Chief had 36 outrun his baggage. 120 Early in the morning of the ninth, both generals were

ill. Grant had a severe headache and Meade's fever had

started up again. After a cup of coffee, Grant rode south

to join Sheridan's forces and Meade got in his ambulance to ride to the front. After a short ride, Meade joined elements of the Sixth Corps. They were following the Second Corps and every man was marching as fast as possible. The imminence of victory

had seized the army with renewed strength. Reports that Lynchburg was in Union hands seemed to ease Meade's illness. He got out of his ambulance and on horseback, hurried forward to join Humphreys.

Soon after reaching Humphreys, Meade received a communi¬

cation from Lee. It was addressed to Grant but in the inter¬ est of time, Meade opened the letter. The impasse had been

4 broken, Lee wanted to talk: "I now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yester- 37 day.”

Meade forwarded Lee’s letter to Grant. In an accom¬ panying letter Meade advised Grant to talk to Lee: "Whilst I fully agree with you in the only terms as stated in your letter to be granted, I think it would be well for you to 38 see General Lee, as he may accept them after an interview.” Meade also advised Lee that Grant was no longer in the vicini¬ ty of the Second Corps and that a duplicate request for an 39 interview should be sent through Sheridan's lines. 121 Although Grant had agreed to an interview with Lee,

Meade did not realize that a meeting was going to take place until a white flag appeared in the Confederate lines. Hum¬ phreys suspected that the Rebels were trying to gain addi¬

tional time to retreat. He told his staff, "Receive the 40 message but push on the skirmishers." But another staff officer rode up and said that Lee had requested a cease fire. Ord, on Lee's southern flank, already h’ad approved a similar request. Meade was not convinced of the sincerity of the appeal and he told Humphreys, "I have no sort of authority to grant such suspension. General Lee has already refused the terms of General Grant. Advance your skirmishers, Humphreys, and bring up your troops. We will 41 pitch into them at oncel" Out of the Confederate lines rode a member of Sheridan's staff--General Forsyth. He urged Meade to hold his fire at

least until Grant had an opportunity to meet with Lee. Meade wanted Lee to understand that a lack of sincerity in his talks with Grant would result in a large scale assault on the Army of Northern Virginia. He wrote Lee: I have no authority to suspend hostilities unless it is with the distinct understanding that you are prepared to accept the terms indicated in the let¬ ter of Lieutenant General Grant sent to you yester- day.. ..Under these circumstances, to enable General Forsyth to return and report my action, I agree to a suspension of hostilities till 2 p.m. this day and shall be glad to prolong it on being advised by you that you agree to General Grant's terms.42

At 2 p.m. there was no answer and Meade told Humphreys to start his troops forward. 122 Before the Second Corps had advanced very far, they saw two officers coining out of the enemy’s lines: one Union and one Confederate, It was an order from Grant: "Agreement having been made for the surrender of the Army of Northern 43 Virginia hostilities will not be resumed," Jubilant, Meade rode among his troops and announced Lee's surrender, Meade's son wrote: "such yelling and cheering I never heard, it is the grandest day of my life, and I would not have missed it 44 for the world," For the Army of the Potomac, the war was over.

Epilogue Although Meade was not present at the signing of the surrender, he was with his troops in the front lines. They had been his army for almost two years and undoubtedly he was proud to share the moment of triumph with them. His meeting with Lee occurred on the next day. Meade rode into the Confederate lines to talk with Lee. They met near Lee's headquarters and Meade's reaction probably indicated his attitude toward the surrender--the war was over and he was glad, Af first, Lee did not recognize Meade but when he found out who the Yankee general was, Lee exclaimed, "But what are you doing with all that gray in your beard?" Meade quickly answered, "You have to answer for most of 45 it I" It had been a long hard campaign and it was finished at last. Meade's absence at the surrender meeting provides an interesting insight into his relationship with Grant. At a 123 glance, Meade*s absence could be interpreted as an affront. Ord, Sheridan, and Custer were among those present when the General-in-Chief wrote the surrender terms. The commander of the Army of the Potomac was miles away from the meeting. Meade's nonattendence however, was the result of his own actions. Ord, Sheridan, and Custer were with Grant when Lee a- greed to the meeting. They went to the meeting with Grant at their own invitation; it is easy to imagine the headstrong Sheridan and the impetuous Custer begging the General-in-Chief to take them along for the momentous occasion, Meade also had the opportunity to join Grant for the meeting when he opened Lee's letter to Grant and learned that Lee wanted to talk. When Forsyth reported that Grant and Lee were about to meet, Meade again had the chance to go* But the thought never seemed to have occured to him. Instead, Meade felt that his place was with the army. He wanted to insure that continuous pressure was exerted against the enemy. Clearly, Meade was more intent on victory than on moments of personal glory. Upon hearing of Lee's capitulation, Meade did not ride out to exchange congratulations with Grant. He rode through the army and congratulated his men. In the years following the surrender, there is no indication by Meade that he felt that he should have been present when Lee agreed to Grant's terms.

Meade’s silence is strong testimony that he did not feel slighted. 124 Since their first meeting in March 1864, Grant and Meade carefully tried not to offend each other. Once Grant had de¬ cided not to assume command of the Army of the Potomac, he realized that he must support his principal lieutenant. Grant's decision to allow the Army of the Potomac to remain in the hands of a competent subordinate was similar to a de¬ cision he had made earlier in the West. In that theater, Grant headed the Military Division of the Mississippi and Sherman was his principal army commander. From that experience, Grant probably learned the value of remaining aloof from the daily administrative duties inherent tô a field army command. By remaining remote, Grant could concentrate his efforts on other subjects that needed his attention. It permitted him to leave one army and to move to anothe area of operations without entirely disrupting the command structure. This system of command used in the West convinced Grant that it was the most effective method of controlling multiple armies. When Grant came East, the Army of the Potomac was going to be under the control of a trusted subordinate, Grant had considered placing a Western man in command of the Army of the Potomac. Apparently acting on Grant's re¬ commendation in 1863, Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana had suggested to the Secretary of Ware that either Wil¬ liam T. Sherman or William F, Smith be placed in command of the eastern army. The plan was never carried out. But it is clear that some consideration had been given to the idea that 46 western men were better suited to command than eastern men. 125 After Grant was appcmted a lieutenant general however, the idea never seemed to recur. Grant realized the disrup¬ tive influence of putting a western general in command of the eastern army. A change in commanders of the Army of the Po¬ tomac would have damaged both the eastern and western armies. When Meade offered to resign during his initial meeting with Grant, the General-in-Chief was unprepared for the pro¬ posal. Grant's astonishment was reflected by his quick reas¬ surances that such an idea had not occurred to him. Perhaps Grant was trying to give the impression that his visit to the Army of the Potomac was not really an inspection. In any event Grant avoided a personal confrontation with Meade--a delicate situation since this was the first time that the two generals had ever met. After having reassured Meade that the command of the Army was not in question, Grant perhaps had committed himself sooner than he had wanted. After all, it would have been hasty for Grant to make a decision before meeting Meade. Once committed, Grant adhered to his decision, even when strong outside influences urged Meade's removal. Grant's de¬ termination, so often commented upon, once again appeared in his faithful support Of Meade. By travelling with the Army of the Potomac, Grant might have been indicating a lack of confidence in Meade's abilities. But there were many considerations that resulted in Grant's décision. Grant knew that the operations in the West had doomed the Confederacy to eventual destruction. It also was obvious, however, that Richmond and the Army of Northern 126 Virginia were symbols of Confederate political and military strength. Richmond would have to fall and the Army of North¬ ern Virginia would have to be defeated before it was acknowl¬ edged generally that the Confederacy did not exist. The fail¬ ure to accomplish either objective in the first three years of war influenced Grant's belief that the General-in-Chief needed to be in the East.

On the other hand, it is not clear that Grant ever con¬ sciously decided to remain permanently in the East. His 17 March 1864 order shows that he had decided to establish his headquarters only temporarily with the Army of the Potomac: I assume command of the armies of the United States, headquarters in the field, and until further orders [I] will be with the Army of the Potomac. There will be an office:-, head¬ quarters in Washington, to which all communi¬ cations will be sent except those from the ar¬ my where headquarters tin the field] are at the date of their address. From this order, it is tobvious that Grant visualized the of¬ fice of the Commanding General, Armies of the United States, to consist of two sections. The first was Grant and his per¬ sonal staff. They would constitute "headquarters in the field" and would travel wherever they were needed. The second part was "headquarters in Washington" which would consist of the staff elements normally supervised by the General-in-Chief and the War Department. That is why Grant instructed his ar¬ my commanders/to send all of their communications to Washing¬ ton; in the field, Grant did not have the administrative and logistical personnel who could handle properly the require¬ ments of the field armies. Grant also indicated in his 127 17 March order that headquarters in the field would be with the Army of the Potomac ’’until further orders." Clearly, Grant had not decided to remain permanently in the East. Grant's continued presence in the East was simply another result of his stubborn determination. After he became em¬ broiled in the campaign against Lee, Grant did not consider moving to another theater. When Thomas failed to attack Hood in front of Nashville in December, Grant departed for Tennessee. He did not take his staff with him however, and thus his absence only was to be temporary. Determined to see the defeat of Lee successfully concluded, Grant kept his headquarters in the East. It is difficult to generalize about Meade's role in the command system. It is obvious that he commanded the most important eastern army. Sometimes, however, he appeared to be more of an assistant commander than the commander of a major field force. But both Grant and Meade realized the need to keep the Army of the Potomac in independent command and each tried to preserve the prerogatives of the other's position. At times, Grant tended to issue excessively detailed instruc¬ tions to Meade* Meade, on the other hand, often did the same when dealing with his subordinates; he would direct the corps commanders how to move their divisions. It is a problem that faces virtually every subordinate commander who has a superior accompanying him on an operation. The senior officer is responsible for everything that happens within his juris¬ diction. It is natural for him to want his subordiante to 128 take every precaution to insure success* Almost inevitably,

it leads to excessive control of the subordinate’s units* But Grant reâlized this and after periods of issuing instructions in minute detail, he would allow Meade to exercise greater 48 initiative in the use of the Army of the Potomac. Grant relied heavily on Meade's advice. Meade knew his army and he knew the eastern theater of operations. Meade's

hand in the strategic movement of the Army of the Potomac also is obvious. After talking with Meade, Grant decided to

turn the Confederate right flank in the campaign of 1864. Meade had wanted to conduct a similar operation in 1863 but

he was not permitted to make the attempt. The War Department felt that Meade’s move to the left would uncover Washington

and permit the Confederates to dash in and capture the North¬ ern capital* But Grant's decision was not questioned and

the moves to the left began as soon as the army crossed the

Rapidan River. Undoubtedly Meade strongly had urged Grant to 49 make the moves to th^Left. Since Meade's and Grant's headquarters were normally located together when the army moved, it is difficult to de¬

termine whose ideas were being executed. But it is clear that

once a battle commenced, Meade issued the orders that developed the situation. Grant tended to remain aloof from the detailed

movements of the army in the face of the enemy. Grant's pre¬ sence in the field, however, was obvious.

Grant removed from Meade much of the responsibility for the heavy losses. In most cases, Meade’s reluctance to 129 attack an intrenched enemy was obvious. Grant, on the other hand, always insured/that his lieutenant continued to press the enemy. Since the newspapers paid attention to Grant,

Meade, though losing notoriety, also lost the onus for the losses incurred during an attack. This permitted Meade to order attacks that he might not have directed if Grant had 50 been absent. Grant also added a new dimension to the eastern com¬ mand structure by emphasizing the replacement of ineffective commanders. The Army of the Potomac had not been imbued with the spirit of speed and deception. Its past campaigns had been marked by slow, deliberate moves designed more to pre¬ vent disaster, than to snatch a quick victory from the enemy.

Generals who were slow to follow their orders were not disci¬ plined. Instead, they were tolerated as a necessary evil. But after Grant arrived, every corps commander was subjected to close scrutiny. By the time that the siege was lifted, every corps commander in the Army of the Potomac had been replaced.

After four years of intense fighting, the chain of command 51 finally consisted of decisive and resolute commanders. A unified command structure is an important ingredient of a successful army. Occasionally, there was a duplication of effort between Grant and Meade. But as a rule, they tried to augment each other's span of control. In the Wilderness, Grant remained behind to hurry forwafd Burnside's troops and Meade rode with the army to direct its movements. When the army was engaged heavily with the enemy, Meade and Grant rode 130 to the front together to watch the army's movements. If dif¬ ferent parts of the line were threatened, they would separate and supervise the endangered sections; Grant always insured that his instructions to the corps commanders passed through Meade. These important traits, established in the Wilder¬ ness, were duplicated on otheifbattlefields throughout the entire campaign. But there were notable failings in the system. It ap¬ pears that the shortcomings were based more on iiiiadequately defined subordinate relationships than on problems between

Grant and Meade. Not only had modern technology changed the nature of warfare, it also had emphasized the need for a clear definition of a subordinate's responsibilities. Gone were the days when a junior commander could collect some troops and rush to the critical point of the battlefield and save the day. The rifle, the repeating carbine, the rifled artillery piece, thettelegraph, and the trench required that commanders be given tactical areas of operational responsibi¬ lity. The ludicrous command arrangement in front of Peters¬ burg on 15 June 1864 was a lesson that was not learned. It was repeated at the Crater, when every general hoped that another general would save the situation. Again in the final pursuit, subordinate command responsibilities were defined 52 inadequately.

When Grant's plan was issued on 24 March 1865, it ap¬ peared that responsibilities had been fixed; Meade, Sheridan, and Ord were independent commanders operating under the Generâl- 131 in-Chief. Once the move began, however, the command system fell apart. Sheridan had command of the Fifth Corps at Five Forks. He continued to direct Griffin’s Corps until they met Meade at the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Meade began issuing orders to the Fifth Corps and Sheridan acquiesced to Meade’s decisions. The Sixth Corps then began following Sheridan’s cavalry column but Wright continued to take his orders from Meade* Grant, on the other hand, assured Sheri¬ dan that the Sixth Corps would be available if it was needed. But the arrangement was extremely informal. It is surprising that the system worked as well as it did at Sayler's Creek on 6 April, paced by a stronger foe, it is doubtful that the chain of command would have worked as smoothly as it ap¬ peared, The final pursuit was a confusing maze of criss¬ crossing columns under the general supervision of Grant, and direct supervision of commanders who issue Orders to troops 53 that they hoped were theirs. Although the Confederacy was in the final stages of de¬ feat, it is remarkable that the system was successful. The reasonllies in the personalities of the commanders. Meade and Grant, though never personally close, enjoyed an harmoni¬ ous relationship built on mutual trust and confidence. Horace Porter’s description of Lincoln and Grant applies equally to

Grant and Meade: ’’they lived to teach the world that it is time to abandon the patch of ambition when it becomes so nar- 54 row that two cannot walk it abreast.” Ulysses S. Grant and

George G. Meade formed an effective team that culminated in victory over a skilled and clever opponent. 132

Notes for Chapter I

*Edgar T. Welles (ed.), The Diary of , I, 538-539; Horace Porter, Campaigning WithTrarit, ’Kf^TT» A furious debate raged in the Senate on whether Grant should be named in the bill reviving the rank of lieutenant general. It was decided finally not to identify Grant as Congress's recommendation for the rank; it was felt that this would im¬ pinge on the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief. The law finally read that the officer "commissioned as lieutenant general, shall be authorized, under the direction of the President,kto command the armies of the United States." See Congressional Globe, 38 Congress, 1 Session, part 1, 586-594, 789->98, inë wording of Grant’s appointment order was precise and in keeping with the law: "Lieut. Gen. U.S. Grant is as¬ signed to the command éf the armies of the United States." See War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Rec¬ ords or The Union and lionfecTerate Armies (lier eat ter cited as O.K«), AAAiI, patt a. ad. Grant always addressed his corres¬ pondence as coming from Headquarters, Armies of the United States and signed it as Lieutenant General, Commanding. His title properly would be Commanding General, Armies of the United States, As a matter of convenience however, he fre¬ quently was referred to as the General-in-Chief--the title used to describe his predecessors. See O.R., XI, part 3, 314.

^Shelby Foote, The Civil War, II, 963; William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of tne Potomac, 404.

^Stephen E. Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln’s Chief of Staff, 158; 0.R», XXXII, part 2, 4Wl

4William H. Powell, The Fifth Army Corps, 589.

^George R. Agassiz (ed.), Meade's Headquarters 1863- 1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman ±rom tne Wilderness to' Appomattox, 3T9^ Isaac K. FennypacKer, General Meade, 2b0.

^Adam Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, II, 15-16; David S. Sparks (ed.j, inside TTncoIn's Army: The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick^ 347; Bruce (Jatton, A“STTill- ness aTTAppomattox, JO. *” 7 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, II, , 117 g Porter, Campaigning With Grant, 29; Meade to Mrs. Meade * 10 March 1864, m Historical society of Pennsylvania, George G. Meade Collection (hereafter cited as Meade Collection), Box 6; Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant, II, 16; Carl and Ellen Stoeckel (.eds.j, correspondence of , Major General, II, 177. * 133 g Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 115; Catton.Grant Takes Command, 330, In October 1864, General Grenville Dodge visited the Army of the Potomac and he was surprised to discover "a feeling there that was a stranger to us in the West--a feeling, the existence of which seemed to me to bode no good," Officers were criticizing one another and also criticizing the General- in-Chief, See Grenville Dodge, Personal Recollections of Pres¬ ident . General Ulysses S, Grant and General William T, Sherman. 76. *°The radical Republican editor Horace Greeley was an outspoken critic of Meade. Immediatley after Grant assumed command as General-in-Chief, Greeley visitéd Washington and demanded Meade's removal. See Freeman Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg. 229, 11 Charles A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War. 189; Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 370; Grant, Memoirs. II, 538; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 29, 12Ibid«. 247-248. 13 Warren W. Hass1er, Jr., Commanders of the Army of the Potomac. 161; George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of Of¬ ficers ‘and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy. 471-472, 14 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lymnari.359. ^Pennypacker, General Meade. 2-3; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 28.

*^Dana, Recollections of the Civil War. 189-190, 17 Pennypacker, General Meade. 7; Meade to Stanton, 29 January 1863, in National Archives, Record Group 94 (here¬ after cited as NA, RG ), Appointments, Commissions and Personal File 11-85, 18 T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals. 271. 19 Hassler, Commanders of the Army of the Potomac. 190. For an excellent account of the action at Bristoe Station, see DdCuglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants. Ill, 239- 242. 20 Hassler, Commanders of the Army of the Potomac. 191; Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants. Ill, 276, 21 Dana, Recollections of the Civil War. 189-190, 22E.B. Long, The Civil War Day by Day. 423. 437-438. 23 Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 20-21; Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 156. 134 24 • Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 19-20. 25 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 81-84; Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox. 39. ? Hassler, Commanders of the Army of the Potomac. 208- 210; Porter, Campaigning WiTïï Grant. 63; Badeau, Military

History of U.S. Grant. II-t 107-108. 27 Philip II. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P.H, Sheridan. II, 126; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 331. 28 Sparks (ed,), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 347. It was alleged that Meade intended to withdraw from Gettysburg during the battle. On 11 March, Meade presented to the Committee copies of his orders and maps that were used during the battle. Meade felt that the orders clearly showed that he intended to fight the Confederates when he found their location; they also proved he never intended to withdraw from Gettysburg once the battle had commenced. See Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War at the Second Ses¬ sion Thirty- eighth Congress. I, 347-358. On his way through Washington, Grant met with the Cabinet. Although he displayed "latent power", Grant was unimpressive. See Welles (ed«), Diary of Gideon Welles. I, 539-540. 29 Foote, The Civil War. II, 964. 30 William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sher¬ man. I, 428,

^Gramt, Memoirs. II, 116. 32 Badeau, Military History of U.S, Grant. II, 20-23, TT Ibid.. 12, 81; Bruce Catton, Grant Tàkes Command. 362. For an example of a similar problem which occurred later, see Grant, Memoirs. II, 327,

3^Meade to Mrs. Meade, 14 March 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6; Porter.Campaigning With Grant. 22.

350.R.. XXXII, part 3, 83. T A Dodge, Personal Recollections. 69-70, 37 Sherman, Memoirs. II, 5; Badeau, Miliatary History of U.S, Grant. II, 24-26; Dodge, Personal Recollections. 71. TO O.R.. XXXIII, 638*639; Andrew A, Humphreys, The Vir¬ ginia Campaign of 164 and *65. 3. The old First Corps was redesignated the Fourth Division, Fifth Corps, and the old Third Corps was Redesignated the Fourth Division, Second Corps, See Frederick H. Dyer, A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion. 284, 293. 135 Meade to Mrs. Meade, 22 March 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 40 Ibid.t Meade to Mrs. Meade, 20 March 1864, 41 Allan Nevins (ed.), A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charleses, Wainwright. 336; Stoeckel (ed.), Correspondence of John Sedgwick. II, 178-179. 42 Catton, Grant Takes Command. 140; (ed.), The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade. II, 187. 43 Letter from Grant's Chief of Staff, Brigadier John A, Rawlins, to Mrs. Rawlins, 25 March 1864, quoted in James H. Wilson, The Life of John A, Rawlins. 405; Meade to Mrs. Meade, 27 March 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6, ^^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 42-43, 45 Meade (ed.), Life and Letters. I, 325; Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg. 234-235. 46 U. S. Grant, Report of Lieutenant-General U.S. Grant. of the Armies of the United States--1864-*65. 4; Badeau, Mili¬ tary History oT~U,S. Grant. II, 10, 47 Grant, Memoirs. II, 127. 48Ibid,. 461. 49 Ibid.. 126-127. 50Ibid.. 137. 51 Sparks, The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 353; Meade to Mrs. Meade, 2 April 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 52 "Count Adam Gurowski (1805-1866) , former Polish revolu¬ tionary, had been a translator in the State Department, 1861- 1862, The second volume of his Diary, published in March 1864, was critical of many high officials in the government and the Army,..," See John D. Hayes (ed.), Samuel Francis DuPont: A Selection From His Civil War Letters. 326; Meade to Mrs. Meade, 6 April 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 53 Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 340. S^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 49. 88Grant to Meade, 9 April 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 3 • 8^Catton, Grant Takes Command. 171. 57O.R.. XXIX, part 2, 207-208. 136 CO Russell F» Weigley, The American Way of War. 152, 59O.R.. XXIX, part 2, 41. 6 0 Agassiz (ed,), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 79-80, 6*O.R.. XXXIII, 828; Welles (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles. II, 6; O.R.. XXXIII, 821. 62 Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 356- 357; O.R.. XXXIII, 816-817, 820-821. 63Ibid. 64Ibid.. 822. 65 Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 361; O.R.« XXXIII, 950 961. 6 6 °Meade to Mrs. Meade, 13 April 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 67_i.Ibid. , . 6 8 Ibid.. Meade to Mrs. Meade, 21 April 1864. 69 Ibid.. Meade to Mrs. Meade, 26 April 1864, ^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 87. 71O.R.. XXXIII, 907-908. 72 Nevins, Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 344. 73 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 283. 74Ibid.. 12. 73O.R.. XXXIII, 889; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 9. 76O.R.. XXXIII, 919-920. 77Ibid.. 921-922. 78Ibid. I 889-890. 79Ibid.. 879. 80 Meade to Mrs. Meade, 18 April 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 81Ibid.. Meade to Mrs, Meade, 24 April 1864; James I. Robertson, Jr., The Civil War Letters of General Robert Mc¬ Allister. 408. 137 82 Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick, 360; Nevins (ed.), Journals' of Tôlonei Wainwright. 342: Robert- son (ed,), Letters of General McAllister. 408; Stoeckel (ed.), Correspondence of John Sedgwick. II, 181-182; Grant, Memoirs.II 140. 830,R.. XXXIII, 1017. 84 , Personal Recollections of the Civil War. 211. 85 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 11. 86 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 37. 87Ibid.. 38. 88 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 18-19.

Notes for Chapter II ^0«R, .XXXVI. part 1, 189; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 20. 2 Grant.Memoirs. II, 190; Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 87. 3 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 43-44. A/ Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 87; Clarence C. Buel and Robert U. Johnson feds'.-). Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. IV, 97. SD.G. Crotty, Four Years Campaigning in the Army of the Potomac. 126 6 Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 367. 7 Handwritten note by Meade, dated April 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 3; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign, 14, 17; Freeman, Lee*5 Lieutenants. Ill, 345; Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861-65.111. g Orders signed by Meade dated 6 p.m. 4 Mdyyl864, in NA, RG 108, Box 85; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 20, g Ibid.. 21, 56; Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wain- wright. 349. ^8Buel and Johnson (eds.), Battles and Leaders. IV, 122, **Grant, Memoirs. II, 193. 138 12 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign, 23. *^Meade to Grant 7:30 a.m., 5 May 1864 in NA, RG 108, Box 84. •^Thomas W. Hyde, Following the Greek Cross. 182-183. 1SO.R.. XXXVI, part 2, 403. 16Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 104-105. 17 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 49. 18O.R.. XXXVI, part 2, 404. 19 Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants. Ill, 350. ^William H. Powell, The Fifth Army Corps. 610. ^Henry Steele Commager (ed.), The Blue and the Gray. 979. 22 Crotty, Four Years Campaigning. 128-129. ^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 108-109; Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 91, 24 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 31; Grant, Memoirs. II, 194. 25 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 91. 2 fi Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox. 66. 27 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 32, 35. 28 James R. Gilmore (ed.), Letters of a. War Correspondent by Charles A. Page. 50-51; Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Hyman. 95. 29 Grant, Memoirs. II, 195; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 54. 30 Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants. Ill, 352. 31 Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 368-369; Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants. Ill, 355. 32 O.R.. XXXVI, part 2, 440; Freeman, Lee's Lieutenaftts. Ill, 356-359. 33 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 39. 34 Ibid.. 41; Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 352. 139 35 Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants. Ill, 362. 36 Golmore (ed.), Letters of a War Correspondent. 55. 37 Commager (ed.), The Blue and the Gray. 977. 38 Buel and Johnson (eds.), Battles and Leaders. IV, 126. 39 0«R«. XXXVI, part 2 438; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 50-51; Gilmore (ed«), Letters of a War Correspondent. 57. 40 Wilson, Life of John A. Rawlins. 212; Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg. 239; Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant, II, Ü9-120; Agassiz {ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 102, 41 Dana, Recollections of the Civil War. 188; Henry E. Wing, When Lincoln Kissed Me. 13. 42 Grant, Memoirs. II, 203; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 52. 43 0«R.. XXXVI, part 2, 481; Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg. 232; Grant's decision to move to his left toward Fredericks¬ burg was the same route that Meade had requestêd earlier and had been denied by the War Department. See Ibid.. 233.

^Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants. Ill, 375.

^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 133. 46 Ibid.. 131; Captain Meade to his mother, 7 May 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 3. ^Grant, Memoirs. II, 211; Porter.Campaigning With Grant. 78. 48 William B. Rawle et. al., History of the Third Pennsyl¬ vania Cavalry. 421-422; Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 369-370. 49 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 58. ^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 139. Badeau says that Meade later realized his mistake and told Badeau that he would have had the bridge covered if he had known the country better. See Ibid.. 146. Grant, Memoirs. II, 213. Humphreys feels that Lee would have reached Spottsylvania first, regardless of any measures that the Yankees might have taken. See Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 67-71. 51 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 83; Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg. 243, Hyde, Following the Greek Cross. 191. ^Sheridan, Memoirs. I, 368-369, 140 53 Porter, Campaigning With Grant, 84-85,

■^Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 105; Gibbon, Personal Recollections. 217,

560,R,, XXXVI, part 2, 526, 57Ibid,. 561. ^Grant, Memoirs, II, 218. 59 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 89-90, ^°Agassiz (ed,), Letters of Colonel Lymna. 108; Buel and Johnson (eds.), Battles anT~Leaders. IV, 175.

^*Catton, Grant Takes Command. 218-219. ^^Meade to Grant, ?:30, 10 May 1864 in NA, RG 108, Box 84.

^Grant, Memoirs. II, 222; O.R.. XXXVI, part 1, 191; Badeau, Military History of U.S, Grant. II, 162; Agassiz (ed«), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 110, 64 Grant to Meade, 11 May 1864, in Library of Congress, Presidents* Papers Series, The Ulysses S. Grant Papers (here¬ after cited as Grant Papers), series 5, volume 45, 122, 119; O.R.. XXXVI, part 2, 627. ^Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 372; Meade to Hancock, 11 May 1864, in NA Rg 393, letters sent, book 5. ^Hyde, Following the Greek Cross. 199-200; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 90-92; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 100. ^7Badeau, Military History of U.S, Grant. II, 173-174; Freeman, Lee*s Lieutenants. Ill, 400-404. A °O.R.. XXXVI, part 2, 654. Warren was1 (having similar problems with his division commanders. He had to give re¬ peated orders to Griffin, Cutler, and Crawford to attack at once: "Don’t mind the consequences." See Ibid,. 668-671.

^Grant once had a high opinion of Warren. After send¬ ing the order to Meade that Warren should be relieved if he failed to comply with his instructions, Grant told his staff: "I feel sorry to be obliged to send such an order in regard to Warren. He is an officer for whom I had conceived a very high regard. His quickness of perception, personal gallantry, and soldierly bearing pleased me, and a few days ago I should 141

have been inclined to place him in command of the Army of the Potomac in case Meade had been killed; but I began to feel, after his want of vigor in assaulting on the 8th, that he was not as efficient as I had believed, and his delay in attacking and the feeble character of his assaults to-day confirm me in my apprehensions." See Porter, Campaigning With Grant, 108.

7 ®O.R,, XXXVI, part 2, 655; Badeau( Military History of U.S. Grant, II, 179, 182; Meade to Grant, 12 May 1864, in ÏÏ3Î, TÏÏTT08;" ~B~o~x 84.

71O.R.. XXXVI, part 2, 654. 72 Grant to Stanton, 13 May 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 3.

7^Meade to Mrs. Meade, 15 May 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 74 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 115.

75Editorial, The Nêw York Times, 15 May 1864. 76 Meade to Mrs. Meade, L5 May 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 77 Ibid.. 19 May 1864; Captain Meade to his mother, 16 May 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 3.

7§Robertson (ed«), Letters of General McAllistet. 424- 425; U.S. Grant, Report of Lieutenant-General U.S, Grant, of The Armies of the United States--1864-*65. 13: Dana, Recol¬ lections of the Civil War. 199. 79 Sparks (ed«), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 374; Meade to Mrs. Meade, 19 May 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 80 Grant to Meade, 18 May 1864t in Grant Papers, volume 45, series 5, 143; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 119. 81 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 127; Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants. Ill, 439-441,

§?Grant, Memoirs, II, 241. 83 Grant, Report of U.S. Grant. 13. 84 O.R.. XXXVI, part 3, 114. After a careful analysis, one of Meade’s biographers feels that "the inception and exe¬ cution of this movement appear to have been almost entirely Lieutenant-General Grant’s." See Pennypacker, General Meade.301. 85 O.R.. XXXVI, part 3, 115. 142 O i °°Sparks (ed,), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick, 377; Agassiz (ed*), LëTTefs of TTôlonei Lyman « 122. A camp rumor was circulating that Grant was unhappy that Lee always seemed to be able to get in front of Meade and had criticized Meade for it. Meade told Grant, so the rumor went, to handle the army himself and the result was the poor situation along the North Anna River. Grant then told Meade he could have his army back. See Rawle, History of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry. 429-430. 87 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 126, 8 8 O.R.« XXXVI, part 3, 169. All of the worry about Burn¬ side’s feeling apparently was unwarranted. The morning after the order was issued, Burnside walked up to Grant and said, "The order is excellent, I am glad it has been made.” See Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 261. 89 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 160, 90O.R.. XXXVI, part 3, 206.

9*Robertson (ed.), Letters of General McAllister. 428, 92 Agassiz, Letters of Colonel Lyman. 118. QT Gibbon, Personal Recollections. 225-226. 94 Buel and Johnson (eds.), Battles and Leaders. IV, 138, 95 Grant to Meade, 30 May 1864, in Grant Papers, series 5, volume 45, 168, 96 William F. Smith, From Chattanooga to Petersburg Under Generals Grant and Butler. 16; O.R,. XXXVI, part 3, 458. Grant did not expect Butler to be an effective commander. Butler was one of those generals who periodically plagued the Union army. Possessing great political weight, Butler was given a command in the army. He proved to’>be incompetent as a field commander but in the interest of maintaining political harmony, Lincoln would not relieve Butler. When Halleck notified Grant that he was having problems with promotions for Meade and Sherman, Butler's name arose as one of those being advanced to break up the West Point influence in the army.? See O.R.. XXXVI. part 3, 115 and Catton, Grant Takes Command. 246-247. 9 7 Elbridge J. Copp, Reminiscences of the War of the Re¬ bellion 1861-1865, 347. q 8 " Ibid.. 371; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 247.

990VR.. XXXVI, part 3, 43. 143 100 Ibid,« 77. The inspectors were Brigadier Generals M.C. Meigs and J.G. Barnard, For their report, see Ibid. 178, Johnson and Buel (eds.), Battles and Leaders. IV, 221-223, ^^Srnith, Chattanooga to Petersburg. 22; O.R,. XXXVI, part 3, 2 8 5 « 102 Ibid., part 1, 999; Ibid., part 3, 466. 103 Sheridan, Memoirs. I, 407; Gilmore (ed,), Letters of a War Correspondent. 82. 104 Agassiz (ed,), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 137; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 174, 105 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 165,

''^Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants. Ill, 507. 10 7 Captain Meade to his mother, 1 June 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 3; Maade to Grant, 1 June 1864, in NA, RG 108, Box 84. 108 Grant, Memoirs. II, 268; Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 140; Grant to Meade, 2 June 1864, in NA, RG 108, Letters sent, volume 1, 174, 109 Sparks (ed,), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 380; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 174-175. 110 Catton, Grant Tfikes Command. 263-264; Buel and Johnson (eds.), Battles and Leaders. IV, 141.

■^*Meade to Mrs. Meade, 4 June 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6; Meade to Grant, 7 a.m., 3 June 1864, in NA, RG 108, Box 84, 112 Grant to Meade, 7 a.m., 3 June 1864, in NA, RG 108, Letters Sent, volume 1, 175. 113 O.R.. XXXVI, part 3, 530-531. 114Ibid.. 545.

115Ibid.. 553. 116 Grant, Memoirs. II, 272; Grant to Meade, 12:30 p.m,, 3 June 1864, in NA, RG108, Letters Sent, volume 1, 175, 117 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 187. 144 Notes for Chapter III *Grant, Memo/rs, II, 276. 2 Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 406, Approximately 7,000 Fédérais were killed or wounded at Cold Harbor on 3 June* See Livermore, Numbers and Losses. 114-115. 3 Augustus Meyers, Ten Years in the Ranks U.S. Army. 320. 4 Meade to Mrs. Meade, 5 June 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 5 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 190; O.R.. XXXVI, part 3, 570; Meade to Grant, 4 June 1864, 8:30 p.m., in NA, RG 393, Letters Sënt, book 5. 6 The New York Times. 10 June 1864, 1. 7 Sparks (ed.i. The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 381; O.R.. XXXVI, part“3,670. 8 \ Benjamin P. Thomas (ed.), Three Years With Grant as Recalled by War Correspondent Sylvanus Cadwallader. 207. 9 . Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 409. *^Ibid.. 410; Thomas (ed.), Three Years With Grant. 209, Meade later admitted to Cadwallader that he had overreacted to Cropsey's report. Meade said that "he was now satisfied that one of the greatest mistakes of his life, was degrading him [Cropsey] in the manner he did." See Ibid.. 257-258, In Septermber, Cropsey requestéd a pass from Meade to return to the army. Without comment, Meade issued the pass. See Meade to Mrs. Meade, 16 September 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6, To a citizen of Boston, Massachusetts, Grant wrote; "Gen. Meade on no occation [sic] advised or counsiled [sic] pulling back towards, much less across, the Rapidan....SucK“rumors as you speak of are entirely idle and without the shadow of foundation." See Grant to Isaac P. Clark, no date, in Meade Collection, Box 3.

**John A. Rawlins to Mrs. Rawlins, 8 June 1864, in Wilson, Life of Rawlins. 229; O.R,. XXXVI, part 3 695. 12 Gibbon, Personal Recollections. 239. 13 Grant, Memoirs. II, 279; Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 333. 14 O.R.. XXXVI, part 3, 599; Sheridan, Memoirs. I, 414- 415*

^Grant to Mrs. Grant, 6 June 1864, in Grant Papers, series 1 A; Grant, Memoirs, II, 284. 145 ^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant « II, 342; Grant to Meade, 11 June 1864, in Grant Papers, series 5, volume 45, 186; Meade to Grant, 10 June 1864, in NA, RG 393, Letters Sent, book 5. 17 Catton, Grant Takes Command» 275. 18O.R.. XXXVI, part 1, 195; Ibid.. XL, parti, 167; Nevins (ed«), Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 413; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 203, The Confederates were calling Grant's turning movements, "elbowings," As the Yankees left Cold Harbor, a Confederate picket called out, "Where is Grant going to elbow us again?" See Robertson Ced.1. Letters of General McAllister. 441. 19 Grant, Memoirs. II, 293-295; O.R.. XL, parti, 303. 20 Ibid.. 303-304. 2*The New York Times. 18 June 1864, 1. 22 Smith, Chattanooga to Petersburg. 23; Badeau, Military History of U.S« Grant. II, 359-361; O.R.. XL, part 1, 705. 23 Hancock felt that he was being blamed for the failure to take Petersburg and he demanded a court of inquiry. Grant said that it was not necessary because Hancock and Meade were blameless. See Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 377-379.> / « 24 Grant, Memoirs. II, 296; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign, O^Rj., XL, part 1, 305. 25 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 163-164. O.R.. XL, part 1, 168, 27 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 218-219; O.R.. XL, part 1, 168. 2 8 Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants. Ill, 532-537; Clifford Dowdey, Lee's Last Campaign. 328-330. ^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 365; Meade to Mrs. Meade, 17 June 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 30 O.R.. XL, part 2, 120; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 221. 31 Ibid.. 221-222. Rawle, History of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry. 441-442. 32O.R..XL. part 2, 167. 33Ibid.. 179. 146

34Ibid.. 205. 35 Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 425. 3 6 Meade to Grant, 6:30 p.m., 18 June 1864, in NA, RG 393, Letters Sent, book 5. 37 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 170, 224; For once Meade underestimated. the Confederate's strength. Meade had approximately 63,797 troops and the Confederates had 41,499. See Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War. 115-116, Since the campaign began on 5 May, the four corps comprising the Army of the Potomac had lost 54,561 in killed, wounded, or missing. Sut they also received 48,265 men as replacements during the same period. See Statement of Casualties for Army of Potomac, June 1864* in NA, RG 108, Box 85 and O.R.. XXXVI, part 3, 665. 38 Grant to Meade, 6:50 p.m,, 18 June 1864, in Grant Papers, series 5, volume 45, 203; Meade to Grant, 9:50 p.m., 18 June 1864, in NA, RG 393, Letters Sent, book 5. 39 Grant to Meade, Grant Papers, series 5, volume 45, 204.

40For a very clear and concise discussion of siege tech¬ niques practiced in the Civil War, see Warren Ripley, Artil¬ lery and Ammunition of theCivil War, 250-253, 41 Regis De Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Po¬ tomac . 626; Gibbon, Personal Recollections. 247; Meade to Mrs. Meade, 25 June 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6. 42 Frank Râuscher, Music on the March 1862-*65 With the Army of the Potomac. 193; Porter, Campaigning witîT Grant. 225, 231: Humphreys. Virginia Campaign. 247: O.R.. XL. part 1. 159- 160.

4^Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War. 171. 44 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 31-34; O.R.. XXXII, part 3, 58; Ambrose, Halleck. 164, 45 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 128-129. 46 Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 386; O.R.. XXXVI, part 3, 795; Wilson feels that Grant should have organized a General Staff. If Grant had, "he could have ended the war within six months instead of taking nearly a year for it as he did.Y See Wilson, Life of Rawlins. 197. ^Meade to Grant, 11:00 a.m., 6 July 1864, in NA, RG 393, Letters Sent, book 5. 147 Sparks (ed.)» The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick, 392-394. 49 Ibid.. 395, 476. Eventually, Patrick moved his head¬ quarters to City Point. On 1 October 1864, he went to City Point because his health would not permit him to remain in the trenches with the army. See Ibid.. 426, 50 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 231-232. 51 Meade to Rawlins, 21 June 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 3. 52 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 251-252; Dana, Recol¬ lections of the Civil War. 226. 53 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals. 322; O.R., XL, part 2, 558-559, 54 Ibid.. 598. 88Ibid,. part 3, 31.

56Ibid.. 69. S^Ibid.. 122-123. For a complete account of Butler’s role in the affair, see Catton, Grant Takes Command. 330-335.

58O.R.. XL, part 2, 595. 59 Johnson and Buel (eds,). Battles and Leaders. IV. 229.

Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 401-402; O.R,. XL, part 3, 334; Wilson, Life of Rawlins. 247, After being relieved from command, Smith trieT"to show that Grant was drinking, possibly to the detriment of the war effort. In a letter to Senator Foote of Vermont (Smith's home state), Smith wrote: "I have not referred to the state of things existing at headquarters when I left, and to the fact that General Grant was then in the habit of getting liquor in a surreptitious manner, because it was not rele¬ vant to my case; but if you think, at any time, the matter may bè of importance to the country, I will give it to you.” See Smith, Chattanooga to Petersburg. 178-179. The story Smith had to tell had been told too many times before. Nothing ever developed from his accusations. Butler eventually was relieved from command on 7 January 1865. His farcical opera¬ tion against Fort Fisher in December 1864 was the final act in a long history of inept generalship. See David D. Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War. 267-272* for an account of Butler's Fort Fisher expedition. Butler's defense can be found in’*Benjamin F. Butler, Butler's Book. 827-832, With the Presidential election over, Butler's political influence no longer was critical. For an analysis of the 148 events leading up to Butler's removal, See Catton, Grant Takes Command, 401-403,

^*Grant, Report of U.S, Grant, 19-20, 62 For a complete discussion of the events leading up to Early's expedition to the Valley, see Frank E, Vandiver, Jubal's Raid, r-19. ^Humphreys, Virginia Campaign, 246; Grant, Memoirs. II, 305; Catton, Grant Takes Command. 313-314.

640.R.. XXXVII, part 2, 433, ^Meade (ed.), Life and Letters of General Meade. II, 212; Richard O'Connor, Sheridan the Inevitable. 190-191,

^6Meade to Mrs, Meade, 3 August 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 6; Sparks (ed«), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 409-410; Cleaves, Meade of Gettvsbrug. 285, 67 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 372. 6 8 °Agassiz (ed,), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 284, 69 Grant, Memoirs. II, 307^308; O.R.. XL, part 2, 619-620. 70 Badeau, Military History of U.S, Grant. II, 466-467; OTR.. XL, part 1, 285; Nevins (ed.)» Journals of Colonel Wain- wright. 439. 71 Grant, Memoirs. II, 308; O.R,. XL, part 3, 424-425, 72 Ibid.. 438; Grant, Report of U.SS Grant. 24-25,

73Meade to Grant, 12:00, 28 July 1864, in NA, RG 108, Box 84; O.R,. LX, part 3, 590-591, 74Ibid,. part 1, 46, 60. 75 Apparently disgusted, Burnside directed his three re¬ maining division commanders to cast lots to see who would lead the assault; James H. Ledlie "won" the contest. See O.R,. XL, part 1, 61. Burnside's black division had been selected be¬ cause it had not fuffered from the continuous campaigning. In addition, General Ferrero, the division Commander, had re¬ hearsed his troops for the operation. See Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 252,

°Shefidan, Memoirs. I, 450; Humphreys, Virginia Cam¬ paign. 254. 77 Meade to his corps commanders, 29 July 1864, in NA, RG 108, Box 85. It is impossible to determine if this warning 149 was directed to anyone in particular. On the twenty-seventh, however, General Patrick noted the jealousy that existed be¬ tween the corps commanders and also the ’’bad blood" between Meade and Burnside. See Sparks (ed.), The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Pdtrick. 404. 78 Grant, Memoirs. II, 311; Meade (ed.), Life and Letters of General Meade. II, 217. 79 Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 478; Agas¬ siz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 198-200, 80 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 270. 81 Grant, Memoirs. II 313-314; Burnside thought that the removal of the abatis would alert the enemy that an attack was imminent. See Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wain- wright. 449, 8^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. II, 483-484; O.R.. XL, part 3, 660. 83Ibid. 84Ibid. 85 Grant to Meade, 1 August 1864, in NA, RG 108, Letters Sent 110 March - 31 December 1864). 8 6 Meade to Rawlins, 3 August 1864, in NA, RG 108, Bott84$ Meade to Burnside, 3 August 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 3. 8 7 David Lane, A Soldier’s Diary. 185; Nevins (ed.), Jour¬ nals of Colonel Wainwright. 448; Grant to Meade, 13 August 1864, in NA, RG 108, Letters Sent (10 March - 31 December 1864). The commander of the lead division at the crater, Jantes H. Ledlie, was relieved from command and finally mustered out of the service. See Grant to Meade, 8 December 1864, in NA, RG 108, Box 85. A formal court of inquiry was appointed to investigate the disastrous operation. Headed by the Second Corps commander, Winfield S, Hancock, the court convened on 6 August 1864. After hearing seventeen days of testimony, the court concluded that there was: "The want of a competent common head at the scene of the assault." Grant and Meade did not receive any direct blame but the court decided that "explicit orders should have been given assigning one of¬ ficer to the command of all the troops intended to engage in the assault when the commanding general was not present in person to witness the operations.“ See O.R.. XL, part 1, 42-129. A different interpretation is offered by Colonel Pleasants* cousin. He maintains that the failure was largely the result of Meade*s effort to hinder the mine's construc¬ tion. Grant, in turn, was "overawed and compromised by the suave and clever aristocrat who commanded the Army of the 150 Potomac." See Henry Pleasants, Jr. and George H. Straley, Inferno at Petersburg. 153-168. 88 Meade to Mrs. Meade, 24 August 1864, in Meade Collec¬ tion, Box 6, Grant's desire to have Sherman senior to Meade probably was based on Sherman's great successes in the West. While the Army of the Potomac had been hammering its way to Richmond, Sherman had been marching on Atlanta. At the time of Meade's conversation with Grant, Sherman was closing the ring around Atlanta. See Bruce Eatton, This Hallowed Ground. 338-347. 89 Grant to Meade, 24 October 1864, in Meade Collection, Box 3; Meade to Mrs. Meade, 29 October 1864, in Meade Col¬ lection, Box 6. 90 Meade to Mrs. Meade, 6 December 1864, in Meade Col¬ lection, Box 6. Grant was concerned by General George H. Thomas' delays in attacking Confederate General John B. Hood at Nashville. Grant almost had relieved Thomas for the de¬ lays. On 14 December, Grant left City Point to go west to take charge of the operations around Nashville. But as he stepped from the boat at Washington, Grant learned that Thomas had won a great victory. See Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. Ill, 249, 262. 91 Senator Wilson to Meade, 23 January 1865, in Meade Collection, Box 3. 92 Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg. 304, 93 Grant to Wilson, 23 January 1865, in Meade Collection, Box 3. 94 Grant to Washburne, 23 January 1865, in Meade Collec¬ tion, Box 3. 95 Grant to Meade, 2 February 1865, in Meade Collection, Box 3, Meade's elation over his promotion was cut short later in the month. His oldest son, Sergeant, died of tuberculosis on 21 February. Meade rushed home for the funeral but was recalled immediately to the Petersburg front. See Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg. 303, 96 Gibbon, Personal Recollections. 275-276; Lane, Soldier's Diary. 221; Powell, The Fifth Army Corps. 748; Badeau, Military History of U.S, Grant. Ill, 135-136; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 330. 97 Gibbon, Personal Recollections. 259. 98 Meyers, Ten Years in the Rànks. 336; Robertson (ed.), Letters of General McAllister. 479; Russell F. Weigley, Quar¬ termaster General of the Union Army. 296. t 151 go Robert Tilney, M^r Life in the Army, 133, l^Nevins (ed,), Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 471. For a thorough discussion of these actions, see Richard J, Sommers, "Grant's Fifth Offensive at Petersburg, a Study in Strategy, Tactics and Generalship," 1-1454, *01A. R* Hancock, Reminiscences of Han¬ cock. 106; Grant, Memoirs. II, 343, Hancock's recruiting drive met with only limited success. There was too much com¬ petition from the states for the recruitment of veterans. In February, Hancock realized that it was a hopeless venture and he returned to thé army and assumed command of the Middle De¬ partment. See Glenn Tucker, Hancock the Superb. 264-266. *^Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. Ill, 379; Grant, Memoirs. II. 344-399.

Notes for Chapter IV ^Grant, Memoirs. II. 427; Sheridan. Memoirs. II. 119- 120, 124-125. 2 Sparks, The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. 480 ; Jesse G. Cramer (ed.)« Letters of Ulysses S. Grant to His Father and His Youngest Sister. 1857-78. 106-107. 3 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 316. 4 Grant to Meade, 24 March 1865, in Meade Collection, Box 3. ^Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants. Ill, 645. ^Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 504; O.R..XLVI. part 3, 117; Grant, Memoirs. II, 432-433. 7 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 327. Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman discussed the terms of surrender for the Confederate forces. It was at this meeting that Sherman re¬ ceived the impression that he could deal with more than the simple surrender of a Confederate army. See Catton, Grant Takes Command. 437-439.

O Grant, Memoirs. II, 439; Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. Ill, 455; Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Ly¬ man. 329-330; Sheridan, Memoirs. II, 145. 9 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 331-332; O.R.. XLVI, part 3, 362-363; Grant, Report of U.S. Grant. 67. 10O.R.. XLVI, part 3, 338, 340, 363. 152 Ibid,, 340-342, On the night of 31 March, Grant’s and Meade’s headquarters were approximately two miles apart. See Porter, Campaigning With Grant, 430, 120,R,, XLVI, part 3, 342. 13 Ibid,, 381; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 435, *^Grant, Memoirs. II, 445, Humphreys provides some in¬ sight into why Grant told Sheridan that Warren was expendable. A Captain E.R. Warner of the 3rd U,S. Artillery had stopped at the old Fifth Corps headquarters on the morning of 1 April. Warner met Warren’s adjutant-general, OolonelLLôcke, who was asleep when Warner arrived. Warner asked him where the Fifth Corps was located and Warner was told that it had been delayed by a destroyed bridge. Locke, asleep since the Fifth had de¬ parted, did not know that the bridge had been rebuilt and the Corps already had reached Sheridan, When Warner returnéd to army headquarters, Grant’s chief of staff asked him if he knew where Warren’s Corps was located. Warner repeated the story of the delay caused by the destroyed bridge. Since it was 10 a,m. when Rawlins heard this story, Warren's delay appeared to be excessive. Two hours later, Sheridan recieved Grant's message concerning Warren. See Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 356.

^Freeman estimates that 5,244 Confederates were taken prisoner. See Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants. Ill, 671, Confed¬ erate morale had changed over the winter. Some prisoners "joked with our men along the line and I repeatedly heard them say, ’:We are coming back into the Union, boys, we are coming back into the Union.*" See Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wainwright« 512,

■^Emerson G. Taylor, Gouverneur Kemble Warren. 222, 170.R.. XLVI, part 3, 420. 18 Warren spent most of the rest of his life trying to vindicate his actions at Five Forks. A formal court of in¬ quiry was granted in 1881 and Warren’s performance as the battle was examined in detail--as well as the motives of both Grant and Sheridan (Meade had died nine years previously). In its findings, the court found little fault with Warren's actions. See Taylor, Gouverneur Kemble Warren. 224-226, 241- 247. 19 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 333.

2Q0.R.. XLVI, part 3, 397-399, 407, 423. 21Ibid., 399. 22 George T, Stevens, Three Years in the Sixth Corps. 434; O.R.. XLVI, part 3, 452-456; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 365. 153 23 Grant, Memoirs, II, 449; Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman, .*55-339. 24 O.R«. XLVI, part 3, 488, 458; Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant. 527. 25 Grant's pursuit of Lee followed Clausewitz's dictum: "the most effectual form of pursuit is, the parallel march to the immediate object of the retreat." See Rapoport (ed.), Clausewitz on War. 356.

fk °Gilmore (ed.) , Letters of a. War Correspondent. 301- 302; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 449; Grant, Memoirs. II, 454. 2 7 Agassiz (edl), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 343-345; O.R.. XLVI, part 3, 514; Grant, Memoirs. II, 454-456. 28 * Nevins (ed.), Journals of Colonel Wainwright. 511. 29 Major Meade to his mother, 5 April 1865, in Meade Col¬ lection, Box 3; Stanton P. Allen, Down in Dixie. 458-459; Oj. R«. XLVI, part 3, 549, The rivalry between Sheridan and Meade continued to grow. Ever since Sheridanls operation against Stuart in the previous May, Meade had eyed Sheridan's actions with some disdain. When Sheridan had been appointed to the command of the Middle Division, the antagonism blossomed. Sheridan’s absence from the army during the winter did not lessen the rivalry. Now that Meade and Sheridan were equal commanders under Grant, Meade kept throwing barbs at the cavalry commander. On 4 April when he learned that Sheri¬ dan's cavalry had reached the Richmond and Danville Rail¬ road, Meade complained to Grant that the only thing holding back his column was Sheridan's cavalry and the stragglers from the Fifth Corps (under Sheridan's control). Grant tried to mollify Meade by telling him that the Army of the Potomac was doing fine: "I do not see that greater efforts can be made than you are making to get up with the enemy." See O.R.. XLVI, part 3, 549, 575. 30 Sheridan, Memoirs. II, 176. 31 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 348-351; Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants. Ill, 707; Sheridan, Memoirs. II, 185-186. Sheridan was mistaken in his Memoirs. He states that he did not waste his time by following Meade's plan to attack Amelia Court House. A dispatch to one of his division commanders clearly shows the cavalry at the Court House on 6 April. See O.R.f XLVI, part 3, 610, 32 Catton, Grant Takes Command. 455; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 387. 33 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 351-352. 154 34 Grant, Memoirs « II, 478; O.R.» XLVI, part 3, 619, 633. 35 Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 391; O.R.. XLVI, part 3, 619. 3 6 Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 353-354; Hum¬ phreys, Virginia Campaign. 392; Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 462; Thomas ted.)T~tnree Years With Grant. 317; O.R,. XLVI, part 3, 653. 37 Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 464-465; Humphreys, Virginia Campaign. 394; O.R.. XLVI, part 3, 664. 38 Ibid.. 667-668. 39 Although Meade's letter to Lee has not been found, Lee's next dispatch to Grant indicates the contents of Meade's note. See Ibid.. 665. 40 Agassiz (ed,), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 356. 41 Ibid.« 357. Since he had recommended that Grant meet with Lee Meade probably did not have a sinister intention of pulverizing an alreay defeated foe. Rather, he wanted to bring the maximum pressure against Lee to induce him;to talk, Meade still wasnnot certain that Lee had agreed to meet Grant for the purpose of surrendering the Army of Northern Virginia. 42 O.R.« XLVI, part 3, 666. 43 Ibid.. 668. For a description of the surrender con¬ ference, see Porter, Campaigning With Grant. 470-484. A description of the surrender as seen by a member of Lee's staff, is in Commager (ed.), The Blue and the Gray. 1138- 1141. 44 Major Meade to his mother, 9 April 1865, in Meade Col¬ lection, Box 3; Agassiz (ed.), Letters of Colonel Lyman. 358. 45 . Ibid.. 359-361.

46O.R.. XXXI, part 3, 458. 47O.R.. XXXII, part 3, 83. 48 At the conclusion of the operations along the North Anna, Grant gave Meade control of the Ninth Corps. At Cold Harbor, augmented Meade's force with Smith's corps and left the battle to Meade. After issuing detailed instructions for the move to Petersburg, Grant left the army in Meade's hands for the conduct of the battles in front of the city. Grant wanted Meade to command the army. 155 49 Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg, 233. ^It is interesting to note that in the final attack that broke the Petersburg lines, Grant was urging caution; the normally circumspect Meade was ordering the’>hammer blows to be made. ^Hancofck was reassigned to form a Veterans' Corps. Sedgwidk, of course, had been killed. Smith had been re¬ placed by Ord, Burnside by Parke, and Warren by Griffin. Grant also fired two army commanders--Sigèl and Butler. 52 J.F.C. Fuller presents an excellent analysis of hte change in tactics caused by a changing technology. "The 1864-1865 campaign in Virginia was the first of the modern campaigns; it initiated a tactical epoch, and did not even resemble wars of ten years before its date. It was not a campaign of bayonets but of bullets....It was the bullet which created the trench and the rifle-pit; which killed the bayonet; which rendered useless the sword; which chased away guns and horsemen; which from May 5, 1864, to April 9, 1865, held the contending forces in 'constant close contact, with rare intervals of brief comparative repose,' and which prevented the rapid decisions of the battles of preceding centuries." See J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S« Grant, 359-361. —— 53 For example, on 5 April there were two pursuing col¬ umns. Sheridan was in the van of the northern route with his cavalry. Behind him, Griffin moved with the Fifth Corps, Although the Fifth Corps had been placed under the operational control of Sheridan for the Battle of Five Forks, Sheridan still-wasedirecting Griffins’ movements. Behind Griffin, Meade moved with the Second and Sixth Corps. Along the southern route, Ord moved with three divisions taken from different corps (Ord did not know what to call his head¬ quarters so he headed all of his communications, "Ord's Headquarters”), Parke, commanding the Ninth Corps, moved be¬ hind Ord but was operating under Meade's orders. After 6 April, the situation became more confused. 54 Porter, Campaigning With Grant, 20. 156

BIBLIOGRAPHY I« Primary Sources

At Unpublished Works: Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Presidents' Papers Series. The Ulysses S. Grant Papers.

National Archives, Washington, D.C. Records of the Appointments, Commissions, and Personal Branch, War Department. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Records of the Army of the Potomac. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Records of the Headquar¬ ters of the Army. Pennsylvania, Historical Society of, , Pennsyl¬ vania. The George G, Meade Collection.

B. Published Works: Agsssiz, George R. (ed.). Meade's Headquarters 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomaftox. Boston, 1922.

Allen, Stanton P. Down in Dixie: Life in a Cavalry Regiment in the War Days. Boston, 1893. Badeau, Adam. Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, from April 1861, to April' lfeyr New York/"1885. Buel, Clarence C. and Robert U, Johnson (eds.). Battled and Leaders of the Civil War. New York, 1956. Butler, Benjamin F, Butler's Book. Boston, 1892.

Commager, Henry Steele (ed.). The Blue and the Gray/ . Indian¬ apolis, 1950. Copp, Elbridge J. Reminiscences of the War of the Rebellion 1861-1865. Nashua, N.H.’," 'lVTl~ Cramer, Jesse Grant (ed,). Letters of Ulysses S. Grant to his Father and his Youngest Sister 1857-78. “New York, 1912.

Crotty, D.G. Four Years Campaigning in the Army of the Poto- mac. Grand Rapids, 1874. Dana, Charles A. Recollections of the Civil War. New York, 1898. 157

an< araes n— * ** H* Wilson. The Life of Ulysses S. Grant, General of the Armies of thé'TTnited STates, Chicago, 1868. Dodge, Grenville M. Personal Recollections of President Abra¬ ham Lincoln, General Ulysses £>, Grant and General William TT~snerman. Council Biuits, Iowa, lylTT” Gibbon, John. Personal Recollections of the Civil War. New York, 192?: Gilmore, James R. (ed.), Letters of a War Correspondent by Charles A. Page. Boston, JL8W. Grant, Ulysses S, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. New York, 188SS

• Report of Lieutenant-General U.S. Grant of the Armies ot the "United states. New York, 1866. Hancock, A.R. Reminiscences of . New York, 1887: Hayes, John D, (ed.). Samuel Francis DuPont: A Selection From His Civil War Letters. Ithaca, 19697 Humphreys, Andrew A, The Virginia Campaign of '64 and *65. New York, 1908,

Hyde, Thomas W. Following the Greek Cross or. Memories of the Sixth Army Corps. New York, 1894.

Lane, David. A Soldier^ Diary; The Story of a Volunteer, n.p., 1905.

Marshall, Jessie A, (ed.). Private and Official Correspondence of Gen, Beniamin F. Butler, Norwood, Mass., 1917.

Meade, George (ed,). The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade. New York, 1913, Meyers, Augustus. Ten Years in the Ranks U.S. Army. New York, 1914. Nevins, Allan (ed.). A Diary of Battle; The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S, Wainwright. New York, 1962. New York Times. May - July 1864,

Porter, David D, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War. New York, 1885. Porter, Horace. Campaigning With Grant. Bloomington, 1961. Powell, William H, The Fifth Army Corps (Army of the Potomac*). New York, 1896, 158 Rauscher, Frank. Music on the March 1862-'65 With the Army of the Potomac; lT7th Regt. P.V.. Collis * Zouaves. Philadelphia» 1892. Rawle, William B., William E, Miller, James W. McCorkell, Andrew J. Speese, and John C. Hunterson, History of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry. Philadelphia, 1905. Robertson, James I. Jr. (ed.). The Civil War Letters of General Robert McAllister. New Brunswick, 1965,

Sheridan, Philip H, Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan, New York, 1888.

Sherman, William T. Memoirs of General William T. Sherman. New York, 1887.

Smith, William F, From Chattanooga to Petersburg Under Gen¬ erals Grant and Butler. Boston, 1893.

Sparks, David S.(ed.), Inside Lincoln*s Army; The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick. Provost Marshal General. Army of: the ‘Potomac, New York, 1964,

Stevens, George T. Three Years in the Sixth Corps. Albany. 1866.

Stewart, A.M. Camp. March, and Battlefield: or. Three Years and a Half with the Army of the Potomac. Philadelphla• 18657 Stoeckel, Carl and Ellen (eds*). Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major General. DeVinne Press, 1902. Swinton, William. Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. New York, 1866,

. The War for the Union. New York, 1864, Thomas, Benjamin P. (ed.). Three Years With Grant as Recalled by War Correspondent Sylvanus Cadwallader. New York, 1955, Tilney, Robert, Mjr Life in the Army: Three Years and a. Half With the Fifth Army Corps Army of the Potomac 1862-1865. Philadelphia,1912,

Trobriand, de, Regis. Four Years With the Army of the Potomac. Boston, 1889, U.S. Congress. Congressional Globe.

. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War at the Second Session Thirty-Eighth Congress. Washington, 1865, 159 Walker, Francis A, History o£ the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac. TJêwTorK , 1891.

War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, D.C., 1880-1901.

Welles, Edgar T, (ed.). The Diary of Gideon Welles. Boston and New York, 1911. Wilson, James H. The Life of John A. Rawlins. New York, 1916. Wing, Henry E. When.Lincoln Kissed Me: A Story of the Wilder ness Campaign. New York. 1913. ““

II. Secondary Sources A. Unpublished Works:

Sommers, Richard J, "Grant’s Fifth Offensive at Petersburg, a Study in Strategy, Tactics and Generalship: The Battle of Chaffin's Bluff, the Battle of Poplar Spring Church, the First Battle of the Darbytown Road, the Second Battle of the Squirrel Level Road, the Second Battle of the Darbytown Road." Ph.D, dissertation, Rice University, 1970. B. Published Works:

Ambrose, Stephen E. Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff. Baton Rouge, 1962. Bache, Richard M. Life of General George Gordon Meade. Phila¬ delphia, 1897. Gatton, Bruce. A Stillness at Appomattox. Garden City, 1953, . Grant Takes Command. Boston, 1969,

. Never Call Retreat. New York, 1971. . This Hallowed Ground, New York, 1956, . U.S. Grant and the American Military Tradition. Boston, 1954. Cleaves, Freeman. Meade of Gettysburg. Norman, Oklahoma, 1960, Cullum, George W. Biographical Register of Officers and Grad¬ uates of the U.S. Military Academy. New York, 1869. Dowdey, Clifford. Lee's Last Campaign: The Story of Lee and His Men Against Grant. Boston, 1960. 160 Dyer, Frederick H. A Compendium of the Mar sxL the Rebel! inn.. New York, 1959.

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative: Fredericksburg to Meridian. New York, 1963. Fox, William F, Regimental Losses in the . Albany, 1893,

Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenants : A Study in Command. New York, 1942-1944.

« R.E. Lee: A Biography. New York, 1934-1935. Fuller, J.F.C, Grant and Lee. Bloomington, 1957.

. The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant. Bloomington, ÏTOTT Hassler, Warren W. Jr. Commanders of the Army of the Potomac. Baton Rouge, 1962.

Hodgkins, William H, The Battle of Fort Stedman, Boston, 1889. King, Horatio C, The Army of the Potomac Sketch. The Phantom Column Poem, n.p., n.d,

Livermore, Thomas L. Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861-65. Boston and New York, 1900.

Long, E.B. The Civil War Day by Day. Garden City, 1971,

McClellan, Carswell, The Personal Memoirs and Military His¬ tory of U.S. Grant versus the Record of the Army of the Potomac. New York, 1887,

Miers, Earl S. The Last Campaign. Philadelphia and ;New York, 1972.

O'Connor, Richard. Sheridan the Inevitable. New York, 1953. Pennypacker, Isaac R. General Meade. New York, 1901. Pleasants, Henry and George H. Straley, Inferno at Peters¬ burg. Philadelphia, 1961.

Rapoport. Anatol fed*’). Carl von Clausewitz on War. . 1968. Ripley, Warren. Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War. New York, 1970. Schaff, Morris. . Boston, 1910, 161 Shannon, Fred A. The Organization and Administration of the Union Army. TFETl-lSôS. Cleveland, 1928. Starr, Louis M. Bohemian Brigade: Civil War Newsmen in Ac¬ tion. New York, 1954. Stine, J.H. History of the Army of the Potomac. Philadelphia,

Taylor, Emerson Gifford. Gouverneur Kemble Warren: The Life and Letters of an American Soldier 1830-1882. New York, 1932. Tucker, Glenn. Hancock the Superb. New York, 1960. Vandiver, Frank E. Jubal's Raid: General Early's Famous At¬ tack on Washington in 1864. New York, 1960. . Their Tattered Flags: The Epic of the Confeder¬ acy. New York, 1970. Weber, Thomas. The Northern Railroads in the Civil War. New York, 1952. Weigley, Russell F, Quartermaster General of the Union Army; A Biography of M.C. Meigs. New York, 1959. . The American Way of War. New York, 1973, Wiley, Bell I. The Life of Billy Yank. New York, 1952, Williams, Kenneth P. Lincoln Finds a. General. New York, 1959. Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York, 1952,