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AFGHANISTAN Humanitarian Access Snapshot (April 2021)

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AFGHANISTAN Humanitarian Access Snapshot (April 2021) AFGHANISTAN Humanitarian Access Snapshot (April 2021) KEY ISSUES KEY FIGURES MONTHLY TREND During the April 2021reporting period, the HAG recorded 117 access impediments, a slight decrease compared to 148 IN APRIL 2021 IN 2021 Humanitarian incidents Previous -3 year average incidents recorded during March. Taliban continued to originate the most incidents (86) followed by community members (14) 200 total number of access 183 and ANSF, who affected seven incidents. Movement Restrictions constituted (56 per cent) of the access impediments, 117 620 180 followed by Military Operations and Kinetic Activity (18 per cent) and Violence/Threat Against Humanitarian Personnel/ incidents 160 Assets/ Facilities (14 per cent). The onset of Ramadan, accompanied with increased insecurity in Southern, Western and total incidents related to 140 Central regions has resulted in both a significant reduction in Interference incidents in April (ten) compared to March (45), as 25 106 health workers or facilities well as reduced humanitarian operations during the reporting period. Interestingly, there was only one Taliban levy request 120 incident recorded in April compared to seven in March, that may also be linked to reduced humanitarian programming due to 2 11 aid workers killed 100 80 insecurity and increased movement restrictions as outlined below. 57 Movement Restriction 3 27 aid workers injured 60 40 In April, the HAG recorded (66) movement restrictions, with Taliban initiating (49) while Community Members and ANSF authored (12) and (02) incidents respectively. In (36) instances Taliban established illegal checkpoints in Western provinces to 6 36 aid workers abducted 20 search for those affiliated with ANSF and GOA, while in Northern and North-eastern provinces Taliban established checkpoints 0 to collect taxes from commercial trucks. Similarly, Taliban attacks against ANSF positions and movements over main May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr highways resulted in temporary road closures, disrupting all road movements including humanitarian partners and assistance. Twelve restriction of movement incidents were triggered by Community associated events where peaceful civilian protests occurred. ACCESS CONSTRAINTS IMPACTED GROUP/AUTHORED BY Movement Restriction ANSF continued to disrupt movement of health organizations through its established checkpoints. In Maydan, Wardak 66 4736 37 All Humanitarian 64 province, an NGO ambulance was stopped cumulatively for around 90 minutes at two ANSF checkpoints while referring two 20 Military Operations and Kinetic Activity adult patients to an NGO Hospital in Kabul with war-related injuries. The NDS and ANP checkpoints separately attempted to 21 44 International NGO 29 Violence/Threats Against Humanitarian 46 verify the identity of the male patient to allow passage. The ambulance was released from the second checkpoint after Personnel/Assets/Facilities 16 NSAG - TB 31 86 relatives arrived with adequate identity documents. Interference in the implementation of National NGO 16 humanitarian activities 10 Military Operations and Kinetic Activity 14 20 29 Physical environment and lack of International 3 8 During April the HAG recorded at least (21) incidents of Military Operations and Kinetic Activity impacting humanitarian infrastructure Organization programs. More than half of these incidents were occurred in Maidan Wardak and Kandahar Provinces, with (17) perpetrated 13 Levy request 1 Community members 14 by Taliban and three by ANSF. Active clashes in the Central and southern regions have significantly impacted humanitarian ANSF Other 7 programs and discouraged humanitarian actors from continuing their operations. As a result of continued clashes in two6 ACG 4 3 districts in Maidan, Wardak Province at least (16) NGO-run educational classes were suspended and three health clinics GoA 2 NSAG-ISK 1 temporarily closed. Similarly, operations in six health facilities in Arghandab, Kandahar were suspended after access routes were contaminated with IEDs by the Taliban, preventing access by staff and patients. Violence/ Threat Against Humanitarian Personnel/ Assets/ Facilities Jawzjan Balkh Kunduz In April, the HAG registered (16) incidents of Violence/ Threats, compared to (29) in March. Taliban perpetrated the highest 3 Badakhshan 2 6 1 1 7 3 number (12), followed by ACG, NSAG-ISK, ANSF and Community members, each of whom instigated (one) incident. Takhar 5 Faryab Samangan Baghlan The Taliban continued to use violence through intimidation, detention and abduction of humanitarian workers. Reasons given 4 Sar-e-Pul 2 Badghis 2 Panjsher Nuristan Bamyan Parwan 7 Kapisa Knr. included alleged affiliation with the GOA, demands for NGO registration, lack of coordination with Taliban procedures and 1 1 Laghman 3 Kabul 6 Hirat Maidn. Wrdk. 13 5 pressure to accept their authority in areas of control. During the reporting period, two humanitarian workers were killed, six 1 6 1 Nngrhr. 7 Ghor 8 1 Lgr. 5 abducted and three detained. Separately, two humanitarian workers were injured in an incident involving Community Members 2 1 Daykundi 4 1 Paktya at a health facility. Ghazni Khost 4 Threats against female workers continued to be a major concern in Eastern regions of the country. In April, local authorities in Uruzgan 2 Number of incidents by province Farah 1 1 Asadabad District, Kunar informed NGO partners that Taliban had issued an order to target female health, NGO and 14 Paktika - + government employees. Zabul No Data 1 5 7 14 Hilmand 2 Intimidation of health workers by parties to the conflict continued during the reporting period. In Eastern Region the Taliban 1 Kandahar once again forced health personnel of an NGO to visit their area to treat wounded fighters. After initially denying the request to Nimroz # 7 Incidents related to health workers and facilities travel to areas of Taliban control, the NGO was issued a warning which obliged individual health workers to visit the area. 1 # Total incidents In addition to the 98 incidents reported in the March snapshot, the HAG received late reports of an additional 50 incidents in March. Disclaimers: The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Creation date: 12 May 2021 Data sources: Conflict/Access Constrains/Humanitarian Incidents (Various, as of 11 May 2021) . These numbers are expected to change as new information becomes available. Feedback: [email protected] Website: http://www.unocha.org/afghanistan http://afg.humanitarianresponse.info.
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