Friedrich Schlegel, Romanticism, and the Re‐Enchantment of Nature
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Athenaeum Fragments 18 Ideas 94 Index 111
This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Fri, 05 Jun 2020 21:35:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Philosophical Fragments Friedrich Schlegel Translated by Peter Firchow Foreword by Rodolphe Gasche University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Fri, 05 Jun 2020 21:35:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Copyright © 1991 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota Philosophical Fragments originally appeared in Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde and the Fragments. Copyright © 1971 by the University of Minnesota. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Published by the University of Minnesota Press 111 Third Avenue South, Suite 290, Minnesota, MN 55401-2520 http://www.upress.umn.edu Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Third printing 1998 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schlegel, Friedrich von, 1772-1829. [Aphorisms. English] Philosophical fragments / Friedrich Schlegel ; translated by Peter Firchow : foreword by Rodolphe Gasche. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8166-1901-8 1. Philosophy—Quotations, maxims, etc. I. Title. B3086.S53A6413 1991 193—dc20 90-19957 A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library The University of Minnesota is an equal-opportunity -
A. W. Schlegel and the Nineteenth-Century Damnatio of Euripides Ernst Behler
BEHLER, ERNST, A. W. Schlegel and the Nineteenth-Century "Damnatio" of Euripides , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 27:4 (1986:Winter) p.335 A. W. Schlegel and the Nineteenth-Century Damnatio of Euripides Ernst Behler N HIS 1802-04 Berlin lectures on aesthetics, August Wilhelm Schle I gel claimed that his younger brother Friedrich (in his essay On the Study of Greek Poetry U795]), had been the first in the modern age to discern the "immeasurable gulf" separating Euripides from Aeschylus and Sophocles, thereby reviving an attitude the Greeks themselves had assumed towards the poet. The elder Schlegel noted that certain contemporaries of Euripides felt the "deep decline" both in his tragic art and in the music of the time: Aristophanes, with his unrelenting satire, had been assigned by God as Euripides' "eternal scourge"; 1 Plato, in reproaching the poets for fostering the passionate state of mind through excessive emotionalism, actually pointed to Euripides (SK I 40). Schlegel believed that his younger brother's observation of the profound difference between Euripides and the two other Greek tragedians was an important intuition that required detailed critical and comparative analysis for sufficient development (SK II 359). By appropriating this task as his own, August Wilhelm Schlegel inaugurated a phenomenon that we may describe as the nineteenth-century damnatio of Euripides. The condemnation of Euripides by these early German romantics was no extravagant and isolated moment in their critical activity: it constituted a central event in the progressive formation of a new literary theory. Their pronouncements must be seen in the context of a larger movement, towards the end of the eighteenth century, that transformed the critical scene in Europe: the fall of the classicist doctrine and the rise of the new literary theory of romanticism. -
The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences'
H-Ideas Ungureanu on Josephson-Storm, 'The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences' Discussion published by Madeleine Elfenbein on Tuesday, October 16, 2018 Jason Ā. Josephson-Storm. The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2017. xiv + 411 pp. $96.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-226-40322-9; $32.00 (paper), ISBN 978-0-226-40336-6. Reviewed by James Ungureanu (University of Queensland) Published on H-Sci-Med-Tech (October, 2018) Commissioned by Daniel Liu (Universty of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Illinois Program for Research in the Humanities) Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=51225 Auguste Viatte, in his two-volume classic, Les sources occultes du Romantisme (1928), was perhaps the first modern scholar to emphasize the importance of occult, theosophical, and esoteric movements in Enlightenment thought. Paul Oskar Kristeller then expanded on Viatte’s thesis by pointing out that Renaissance humanism was also permeated with elements from esoteric writings. “Western Esotericism,” as it is now called by scholars, is a mixture of philosophy, religion, art, literature, music, and even science, whose representative figures sought to return to “ancient” foundational texts, “original” forms of religious practice, and a more “natural” religion. The academic study of Western Esotericism has become an important feature in modern religious studies. Scholars such as W. J. Hanegraaff, Kocku von Stuckrad, and Egil Asprem, to name only a few, all argue that this originalist attitude is a major undercurrent of modernity, a religious subculture abundantly present in mainstream theological, philosophical, and scientific discourse. -
The Concept of Bildung in Early German Romanticism
CHAPTER 6 The Concept of Bildung in Early German Romanticism 1. Social and Political Context In 1799 Friedrich Schlegel, the ringleader of the early romantic circle, stated, with uncommon and uncharacteristic clarity, his view of the summum bonum, the supreme value in life: “The highest good, and [the source of] ev- erything that is useful, is culture (Bildung).”1 Since the German word Bildung is virtually synonymous with education, Schlegel might as well have said that the highest good is education. That aphorism, and others like it, leave no doubt about the importance of education for the early German romantics. It is no exaggeration to say that Bildung, the education of humanity, was the central goal, the highest aspiration, of the early romantics. All the leading figures of that charmed circle—Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, W. D. Wackenroder, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), F. W. J. Schelling, Ludwig Tieck, and F. D. Schleiermacher—saw in education their hope for the redemption of humanity. The aim of their common journal, the Athenäum, was to unite all their efforts for the sake of one single overriding goal: Bildung.2 The importance, and indeed urgency, of Bildung in the early romantic agenda is comprehensible only in its social and political context. The young romantics were writing in the 1790s, the decade of the cataclysmic changes wrought by the Revolution in France. Like so many of their generation, the romantics were initially very enthusiastic about the Revolution. Tieck, Novalis, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hölderlin, and Friedrich Schlegel cele- brated the storming of the Bastille as the dawn of a new age. -
Friedrich Schlegel Und Das Hermeneutik-Konzept
Seminararbeit im Rahmen des Seminars Interkulturelle Philosophie (Hermeneutik) im SS 2005 bei a.o. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Franz Martin Wimmer Klaus Buschmann Friedrich Schlegel und das Hermeneutik – Konzept Schleiermachers Heil den wahren Philologen! Sie wirken Göttliches, denn sie verbreiten Kunstsinn über das ganze Gebiet der Gelehrsamkeit. Kein Gelehrter sollte bloß Handwerker sein. Schlegel: Ideen Klaus Buschmann Klaus Buschmann Friedrich Schlegel und das Hermeneutik-Konzept Schleiermachers Friedrich Schlegel und das Hermeneutik-Konzept Schleiermachers SE „Interkulturelle Philosophie“, Wien 2005 SE „Interkulturelle Philosophie“, Wien 2005 Das Auslegen ist Kunst. Schleiermacher: Hermeneutik „Die Philosophen welche nicht gegeneinander sind, verbindet gewöhnlich nur Sympathie nicht Symphilosophie.“1 Diesen für die Romantik typischen Satz notiert Friedrich Schlegel 1798 in seinen „Athenaeums – Fragmenten.“ Im Folgenden möchte ich die Praxis dieser „Symphilosophie“ anhand dreier signifikanter Beispiele der Überlegungen Schlegels und Schleiermachers zur Hermeneutik exemplarisch veranschaulichen und zwar anhand der zentralen Begriffe 1. Divination, 2. Hermeneutik, 3. Kritik und 4. der romantischen Ansicht, wonach der Hermeneut den Autor besser verstehe, als dieser sich selbst. Dabei geht es mir, in bescheidenem Rahmen, um die Überprüfung der These Hermann Patschs,2 welcher zur Zusammenarbeit Schlegels und Schleiermachers bemerkt: „Er [d.h. Schleiermacher, K.B.] – und nicht Schlegel – hat die Wissen-schaft vom Verstehen nachhaltig und bis zum heutigen Tage geprägt [.]. Aber die „Wende“ in der Geschichte der Hermeneutik vollzog Friedrich Schlegel.“3 Ad 1. Beginnen möchte ich meinen Vergleich mit einer Besprechung des be-rühmten 116. Athenäum – Fragments Friedrich Schlegels, welches primär eine Definition der literarischen Romantik liefert, in nuce aber auch für die Konstituierung der „romantischen“ Hermeneutik äußerst aufschlussreich ist: [.] Die romantische Dichtart ist noch im Werden; ja das ist ihr eigentliches Wesen, daß sie ewig nur werden, nie vollendet sein kann. -
GERMAN LITERARY FAIRY TALES, 1795-1848 by CLAUDIA MAREIKE
ROMANTICISM, ORIENTALISM, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: GERMAN LITERARY FAIRY TALES, 1795-1848 By CLAUDIA MAREIKE KATRIN SCHWABE A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2012 1 © 2012 Claudia Mareike Katrin Schwabe 2 To my beloved parents Dr. Roman and Cornelia Schwabe 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisory committee chair, Dr. Barbara Mennel, who supported this project with great encouragement, enthusiasm, guidance, solidarity, and outstanding academic scholarship. I am particularly grateful for her dedication and tireless efforts in editing my chapters during the various phases of this dissertation. I could not have asked for a better, more genuine mentor. I also want to express my gratitude to the other committee members, Dr. Will Hasty, Dr. Franz Futterknecht, and Dr. John Cech, for their thoughtful comments and suggestions, invaluable feedback, and for offering me new perspectives. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the abundant support and inspiration of my friends and colleagues Anna Rutz, Tim Fangmeyer, and Dr. Keith Bullivant. My heartfelt gratitude goes to my family, particularly my parents, Dr. Roman and Cornelia Schwabe, as well as to my brother Marius and his wife Marina Schwabe. Many thanks also to my dear friends for all their love and their emotional support throughout the years: Silke Noll, Alice Mantey, Lea Hüllen, and Tina Dolge. In addition, Paul and Deborah Watford deserve special mentioning who so graciously and welcomingly invited me into their home and family. Final thanks go to Stephen Geist and his parents who believed in me from the very start. -
UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara the Disenchantment of The
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara The Disenchantment of the World and Ontological Wonder A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Religious Studies by Martin Becker Lorca Committee in charge: Professor Thomas A. Carlson, Chair Professor Elliot R. Wolfson Professor Andrew Norris June 2019 The dissertation of Martin Becker Lorca is approved. ____________________________________________ Elliot R. Wolfson ____________________________________________ Andrew Norris ____________________________________________ Thomas A. Carlson, Committee Chair March 2019 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation could not have been finished without the help of family and friends, I would like them thank here: In thank my classmates at UCSB, Dusty Hoesly, Michael Kinsella, Matt Robertson and Sohaira Siddiqui, for their intellectual companionship and friendship. For making possible the practice of reflection as a communal enterprise, I thank my friends: Eva Braunstein, Chris Morales, Samantha Kang, Lucas Wright, and Tim Snediker, who gave life to the philosophical group at Santa Barbara. With deep gratitude, for his precious help in editing and in giving essential feedback, I thank my friend Garrett Baer, with whom, in our philosophical walks at Lake Los Carneros (Goleta)—embodying the old peripatetic tradition—let ourselves to philosophize freely and sincerely. For crucial help editing this work, I thank Garrett Baer, Ryan Kelley, Allice Haynes, Kali Handelman, Kevin Johnston, Alexander Cohen, and Arnulf Becker Lorca. Much of the interpretation of “the nothing” comes from long and deep conversations with Franco Bertossa and Ricardo Pulido. I thank them for raising the question of Being, the one that touches “to the point where our entire nature is so shaken that is will never again be the same” (Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 179). -
Schlegel’Swords, Rightly Used
Michel Chaouli Schlegel’sWords, Rightly Used Philological Disarmament “Poetry,” Friedrich Schlegelwrites in afragment, “can onlybecriticized by poetry” (Schlegel1991 [1797], 14– 15). Forawhile now,Ihave thought that the line says all one needs to know about poetic criticism, what it is and how to do it,and that it thereforerequires neither commentary nor critique.Itisclear as day, and yet, like so manyofthe best aphorisms,this is an enigmatic clarity,which maybewhy I keep returningtoit.¹ Ikeep failingtofind the right wayofhearing it and responding to it.IfIknew how,then it would stop comingback to me, and before long Icould forgetit. Criticism thinksofitself as memorializing awork, but if it is done right,then it is away of overcoming it,ofdigesting and metabolizing it,and thus of forgetting it. “Poetry can onlybecriticized by poetry.” It is aplain phrase, yetright away Ifeel the urge to poke and prod its every part.After all, can Ibesure what it means by the word poetry,ifpoetry is even the right translation of Poesie,orifthe first usageofthe worddenotes the sameasthe second?AsSchlegel usesthe term elsewhere, poetry is not restricted to agenre such as the lyric nor even to verbal artworks in general, but reaches for the essence of creative making itself, whatever form it might take. Does that hold here? Then there is the word only: am Itotake literallythe assertion that poetry can be criticized by poetry alone and by nothing else? Now Inotice the pas- sive voice and find myself asking by whom – by what unnamed agency – it can only be -
1 Schiller and the Young Coleridge
Notes 1 Schiller and the Young Coleridge 1. For the details of Schiller’s career and thought I am drawing on a number of works including Lesley Sharpe, Friedrich Schiller: Drama, Thought and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Walter Schafarschik, Friedrich Schiller (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1999); F. J. Lamport, German Classical Drama: Theatre, Humanity, and Nation, 1750–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and T. J. Reed, The Classical Centre: Goethe and Weimar, 1775–1832 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), and Schiller- Handbuch, ed. Helmut Koopmann (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1998). 2. Schiller later revised the essay and published it in his Shorter Works in Prose under the title ‘The Stage Considered as a Moral Institution’ (‘Die Schaubühne als eine moralische Anstalt betrachtet’). 3. See David Pugh, ‘“Die Künstler”: Schiller’s Philosophical Programme’, Oxford German Studies, 18/19 (1989–90), 13–22. 4. See J. M. Ellis, Schiller’s ‘Kalliasbriefe’ and the Study of his Aesthetic Theory (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1969). 5. See Paul Robinson Sweet, Wilhelm von Humboldt: a Biography, 2 vols (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1978–80) and W. H. Bruford, The Ger- man Tradition of Self-Cultivation: ‘Bildung’ from Humboldt to Thomas Mann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 1; also E. S. Shaffer, ‘Romantic Philosophy and the Organization of the Disciplines: the Found- ing of the Humboldt University of Berlin’, in Romanticism and the Sciences, ed. Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 38–54. 6. Norbert Oellers, Schiller: Geschichte seiner Wirkung bis zu Goethes Tod, 1805– 1832 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1967). -
The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, Or Max Weber’S Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought
The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought Duncan Kennedy* Introduction Max Weber began his sociology of law with a description of the then present of Western legal thought, along with a brief summary of its pre- vious stages. This appreciation begins with a summary description of the Western legal thought of Weber’s time, as it looks from our present one hundred years later, emphasizing the contrast between the mainstream of his time, now called Classical Legal Thought, and its critics in the “social current.” Part II presents Weber’s sociology of law, comparing and con- trasting his approach with that of the social current. The most striking thing about Weber’s sociology of law, from the perspective of legal the- ory a century after he wrote, is his ambivalent endorsement of legal for- malism. This entailed rejection of the social current’s critique, a critique that is close to universally accepted today. In Part III, I explain Weber’s attitude toward legal formalism as motivated by the internal require- ments of his theory of domination, in which, after the demise of all ear- lier modes of legitimation, the Iron Cage of modernity is held together by bureaucrats defined by their adherence to that mode of legal reasoning. Part IV argues that Weber’s approach was inconsistent with the irration- alist and decisionist strands in his own theory of modernity, a theory that helps in understanding the current situation of legal thought, if we take the un-Weberian step of applying it to legal formalism. -
About Modern Society and Culture
UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) The problem of disenchantment: scientific naturalism and esoteric discourse, 1900-1939 Asprem, E. Publication date 2013 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Asprem, E. (2013). The problem of disenchantment: scientific naturalism and esoteric discourse, 1900-1939. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:03 Oct 2021 1 The Intellectual Sacrifice You need to beware of the word Entzauberung as cautiously as you beware of the word secularization. Both describe processes where it is easy to have fanciful pictures of an earlier age, and as easy to have illusions of our own generation. We got rid of imps and demons but we pushed them into the subconscious and called them by different names. -
Two Meanings of Disenchantment: Sociological Condition Vs
Philosophy & Th eology 17, 1 & 2 51 TWO MEANINGS OF DISENCHANTMENT: SOCIOLOGICAL CONDITION VS. PHILOSOPHICAL ACT— REASSESSING MAX WEBER’S THESIS OF THE DISENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD Jeffrey E. Green Harvard University Abstract Although the primary meaning of Max Weber’s concept of dis- enchantment is as a sociological condition (the retreat of magic and myth from social life through processes of secularization and rationalization), as Weber himself makes clear in his address, “Sci- ence as a Vocation,” disenchantment can also be a philosophical act: an unusual form of moral discourse that derives new ethical direction out of the very untenability of a previously robust moral tradition. The philosophical variant of disenchantment is significant both because it contradicts numerous elements of the sociological version and because it suggests there are forms of cognition unique to moral philosophy (insofar as the derivation of a moral teaching from the very absence of one is foreign to both a religious and a scientific mindset). “Que sommes-nous donc sans le secours de ce qui n’existe pas?” —Paul Valéry For Anthony Kronman According to the biographical account of Max Weber written by his wife, the most fundamental animating concern underlying Weber’s vast body of research was the following dynamic: “He was moved, 52 Green: Two Meanings of Disenchantment above all, by the fact that on its earthly course an idea always and everywhere operates in opposition to its original meaning and thereby destroys itself” (Weber 1975, 337).1 This dialectic between an idea’s intended meaning and the effective truth of it actual implementation can be found in a variety of places within the Weberian corpus.