Conclusion

Immanuel Kant, in the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason,” describes the paradigmatic rational psychologistic account of personhood with all of its most salient features:

[S]ubstance, merely as object of inner sense, yields [geben] the concept of immateriality; as simple substance, that of incorruptibility. Its identity as intellectual substance yields personality; all three of these components together, spirituality. The relations of the substance to objects yields commerce with bodies; and as so related it therefore presents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter; that is, as soul (anima) and as the basis of animality; and animality as limited by spirituality presents immortality. (CPR A345/B403)

We can now see that Kant is describing accurately Leibniz’s account. We saw, first of all, that Leibniz, along with another famous rational psychologist, Descartes, holds that once a person, always a person. This might seem a less than interesting view, until we realize that neither Conway nor Locke, perhaps the most famous personal identity theorist of all, agree. We also saw that it is not clear in Leibniz whether I began as a non-person. We continued by arguing against several scholars that Leibniz consistently defends the view that we just are simple immaterial substances that endure through time. But not just any kind of substance; we saw that there is a psychological component to personhood: to be persons we must possess the attributes of memory, self-consciousness, intelligence, and rationality. We are, in Kant’s words, “intellectual substances.” We saw that although Leibniz appears to concede to Locke that if there existed thinking machines they would be moral agents and thus retain moral identity over time, this concession is only apparent. To do so would be to abandon certain of his most important metaphysical and theological principles. Yet Leibniz does concede something of significance to Locke: we ought to treat thinking machines as if they were moral agents. (Ironically, such knowledge of Leibniz’s theory gives us good reason to think that the third paralogism of pure reason as described by Kant is not Leibnizian. For Leibniz does not accept the major premise, which seems to express the proposition that if something is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times then it is a person. But, we have seen, this essentially Lockean proposition is not acceptable to Leibniz. Please see Appendix B for more.) Strictly speaking, Leibniz tells us, we are causally independent of one another, but we are also moral agents, participating and interacting in the same world and responsible for our deeds that affect the lives of others. Leibniz’s resolution of

118 Conclusion 119 these conflicting theses, as we saw, is to explain that it is through our bodies that we communicate, socialize, and reward and punish each other. Moreover, we also saw that moral agents require bodies. This state of “animality” persists also into the next life. Finally, we saw that Leibniz’s account of personhood figures prominently in his doctrine of meaningful immortality. Leibniz argues that the state of survival offered by Plato, Descartes, and Spinoza, among others, would be meaningless to us. They do not secure over time what matters in survival, namely, memory or the knowledge of what we have been. And, in Spinoza’s case, we do not even retain substantial identity which also rationally matters in survival, according to Leibniz. Appendix A

On Hume

Mental predicates require a subject. What would it mean to deny this proposition? For one, we might get Hume’s view: when we say that someone is the “same person,” we are actually saying that distinct perceptions (that is, mental events, according to Hume) bear either a causal relation or a close resemblance among themselves in such a way that they appear unified. Our idea of identity, hence, is really, part and parcel, our idea of unity. And, it is we ourselves who “impose” our own idea of identity upon ourselves, for it is we who alone have any access to the unity of our perceptions, that is, consciousness. We might imagine that a similar view is reflected in Leibniz’s own words. For example, Leibniz writes: “It is this continuity or interconnection [liaison] of perceptions which make someone really the same individual” (A vi, 6, 239/NE II, 27, §13).1 Not only does Leibniz’s notion of perception share something in common with Hume’s (both use ‘perception’ as their most general term for mental phenomena), but identity of individuals (here, Leibniz is speaking specifically of individual persons) is seen in terms of unity. But lest we be misled into thinking otherwise, there are significant differences between these two views. Suffice it to say that Leibnizian unity is not Humean unity. For Leibniz, this unity which identical individuals display among their perceptions is genuine in the sense that distinct perceptions which are related causally, lawfully, or phenomenologically derive from the same source, a power, nature, or faculty in the individual itself. Hence, strictly speaking this unity does not constitute the identity of the individual, rather it points to an identity. What unifies something metaphysically is the power itself (GP ii, 372/L 599, Letter to Des Bosses [30 April 1709]). Successive states belong to the same individual if and only if they are produced by the same power or individual nature. Hume, on the other hand, thinks that individual perceptions, whether related causally, lawfully, phenomenologically, or not at all, are distinct entities. They are not caused by one and the same individual nature; that is, the existence of causally related perceptions does not presuppose the existence of a diachronically identical thing (i.e., a subject) that has these perceptions. One might also get the impression that Locke agrees with Hume that mental predicates do not require a subject. Yes, Locke writes of “the same consciousness uniting those distant Actions into the same Person …” (E II, 27, §10). But, as with Leibniz, Locke tells us that it was a substance (or substances) that “contributed to [the] production” of those “distant Actions,” which include both physical and mental events. Locke seems to hold that what does the thinking for us is a substance of some kind.

120 Appendix 121

So neither Leibniz nor Locke allow subject-less mental predicates. I think this is precisely what explains why Leibniz and Locke are willing to consider substance as the condition of personal identity, or at least as the condition that gives rise to the unity of consciousness or perception. So even though Locke sometimes show impatience with the traditional metaphysical debate over the category of substance—substance-talk is for “Children” (E II, 23, §2)— nevertheless, he is seriously willing to consider whether substantial identity is relevant to personal identity or whether in general substance plays a role in judgments of personal identity. According to Leibniz, persons are not modes or relations of things. Leibniz would reason as follows, I think: (1) persons must necessarily have mental predicates ascribed to them; (2) mental predicates require a subject ; (3) only beings or things can genuinely be subjects; therefore, (4) persons are beings or things. Yet however Leibniz would argue for proposition 4, it seems clear that he accepts it. Leibniz says that each of us “continues to exist as really the same substance, the same physical I” (A vi, 6, 238/NE II, 27, §11) and in §14 calls a person “[a]n immaterial being or spirit.” Again, it is useful to contrast Hume’s view with the view I have attributed to Leibniz. According to Hume, persons belong to the world of imagination, not reality; a person “is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations” (T 207). This view seems at odds with proposition 4. Since the self is supposed to be an object which endures (although it may underlie change), any impression of self must always be the same, thinks Hume; however, “[t]here is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other. It cannot therefore, be from any of these perceptions, or from any other that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea” (T 251f). Or, this conclusion might be derived from another direction. Hume holds that all genuine metaphysical entities are epistemically available or observable distinct from perceptions. But selves are not epistemically available or observable in the above manner—“I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception” (T 252). Hence, selves are not genuine metaphysical entities. Hume writes that “were all my perceptions remov’d by death, and cou’d I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate … I shou’ be entirely annihilated. … If any one upon serious and unprejudic’d reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him” (T 252). Leibniz also thinks that persons are not conventional beings; objects that have no real essence or individual nature, as it were.2 In other words, according to Leibniz, ascriptivism regarding the self is false. Whether there are persons is not a matter that can be settled by establishing conventions or by merely stipulating them into existence. Though it is time we made an important distinction: this rejection of ascriptivism concerns natural persons, not artificial persons. Artificial persons are by definition conventional or stipulative beings. Blackstone makes the distinction clear: “Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; 122 Appendix artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government.”3 A current example of an artificial person is the Microsoft Corporation, a legal entity that has been on trial off and on for several years in the United States of America. An artificial person might also be understood as “the part or character which any one sustains in the world.” The character or part represented by an actor is that actor’s parasiti persona, his or her mask. This is the sense of artificial person that Hobbes gives: “[W]hen [the words or actions of one person] are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then he is a feigned or artificial person.”4 Sometimes, as the Andrews Latin Dictionary tells us, that mask is imposed upon the actor (personam, quam mihi tempus et res publica imposuit), and sometimes the actor chooses the mask that he or she will don (sua ipsa persona … praecipit). I think that neither sense of artificial person makes sense of Leibniz’s definition of person.5 Consider Leibniz’s words: “As regards ‘self’, it will be as well to distinguish it from the appearance of self and from consciousness. The ‘self’ makes real physical identity, and the appearance of self, when accompanied by truth, adds to it personal identity” (A vi, 6, 237/NE II, 27, §9). Given that selves are essentially persons, it therefore seems that for Leibniz persons are generated not by an individual’s appearances (from another’s point of view or one’s own), but by something that gives rise to or unifies the appearances. Again, it is the “continuity or interconnection of perceptions which make someone really the same individual” (A vi, 6, 239/NE II, 27, §13). Let us contrast once more Leibniz’s position against that of Hume’s. I understand Hume to be an ascriptivist. We judge correctly that two individuals are the same “person” not because there is a fact to the matter whether one individual is the same person as another, but because we mistakenly think that an “impression of unity” (i.e., a multiplicity of objects that bear a certain causal relationship, a close resemblance among themselves) conveys the idea of identity (T 254f). Thus, we imagine that two things are identical with one another. In fact, the idea of identity for most, if not all, objects of ordinary discourse, is incompatible with the idea of those objects undergoing any kind of change. But many objects of ordinary discourse, such as plants, animals, and artifacts, are not thought to remain “invariable and uninterrupted thro’ a suppos’d variation of time” (T 253). Hence, we are mistaken in believing in the identity over time of things which change. Hume thinks that this analysis applies equally to persons. Persons are really no different from any other kind of object of ordinary discourse when it comes to their identification, according to Hume.

The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects. (T 253)

Hume’s denial of genuine personal identity seems to include a denial that our pre-analytic concept of person presupposes that persons persist over time, that Appendix 123 they are enduring things. On the assumption that our idea of identity is actually an impression of unity—“[o]ne single object conveys the idea of unity, not that of identity” (T 159)—it is a mistake for us to ascribe identity over time to things which change. But that is our idea of identity, Hume asserts. So, in fact, our ordinary concept of person does not include the idea that persons endure over time. This, as we already saw, is utterly antithetical to Leibniz’s way of thinking.

NOTES

1 Also, see GP vii, 302/PM 136. 2 The terms ‘real essence’ and ‘individual nature’ are at this point being used very broadly. 3 William Blackstone, Commentary I. i. 123. 4 Hobbes, Leviathan I, XVI, 2. 5 There is an interesting commentary by Kenneth Winkler on the fact that two contemporaries of Locke’s—Edmund Law and Samuel Pufendorf—both attribute to Locke the denial of proposition 5. Winkler argues that their interpretation is wrong in his “Locke on Personal Identity,” 212-17. Appendix B

On Kant’s Paralogisms

The psychological paralogisms of the transcendental dialectic of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason exemplify arguments “in which there is a transcendental basis for inferring a formally invalid conclusion” (CPR A341/B399). Kant demonstrates how the transcendental basis of apperception—the “I think”—tempts us into making illegitimate inferences concerning the substantiality, simplicity, diachronic identity, and relations of the self or thinking I. Those who succumb to such temptation and so infer from the formal condition of apperception to a simple, enduring substance of apperception, Kant calls “rational psychologists.” We have seen that Leibniz agrees with the conclusions of rational psychology as articulated in the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason” (CPR A341-405/B399-432), but it is not so clear that Leibniz argues for these conclusions in the way that Kant understands. In this appendix, I will argue that the first three paralogisms do not accurately represent the manner in which Leibniz actually argues for the substantiality, simplicity, and diachronic identity of the self or I. (The fourth paralogism which concerns ideality seems on target.) Let’s consider the first three paralogisms in reverse order.

1. Third Paralogism The third paralogism begins: a person is defined as “that which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times” (CPR A361). Or is it? There’s the rarely considered question of whether the major premise of the third paralogism is supposed to express a bona fide definition of person at all. Patricia Kitcher certainly does not consider this question, for she simply writes: “The third paralogism defines a person as that which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times.”1 Henry Allison says that the third paralogism “affirms the numerical identity of the thinking subject, which Kant equates with its personality.”2 Allison offers an important qualification: “This identification is easily subject to misunderstanding. It should, therefore, be noted that Kant distinguishes between a moral and a psychological sense of personality .… The former is construed as the ‘freedom of a rational being under moral law,’ and the latter as ‘the capacity to be conscious of the identity of oneself in the various conditions of one’s existence.’ Clearly, the latter conception is the one at work in the paralogisms. The same conception is to be found in [Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View].”3 Indeed, Kant does write in the Anthropology that “[t]he fact that man can have the idea [representation] ‘I’ raises him infinitely above all the other beings living on earth. By this he is a person; and by virtue of

124 Appendix 125 his unity of consciousness through all the changes he may undergo, he is one and the same person.…” (I, i, §1). However, I’m hesitant to follow Kitcher and Allison in thinking that the third paralogism offers a full-blown definition, in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. For there is the matter of the ‘so fern’. Let me explain. Here is what the major premise says: “Was sich der numerischen Identität seiner Selbst in verschiedenen Zeiten bewußt ist, ist so fern eine Person" (CPR A361). Now the major premises of the other paralogisms do offer definitions, but they do not include ‘so fern’, thus suggesting that the major premise of the third asserts something less than a full definition. Now, ‘so fern’ can be a degree notion—even in Kant’s hands (for example, CPR A349)—but it would be odd to suggest that there are grades of being a person, especially since the third paralogism is supposed to represent the views of the “rational psychologists.” According to such thinkers as Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, and Mendelssohn, one cannot be less of a person, even after undergoing change, except of course in the non-metaphysical sense of developing a less admirable character or the like. Certain changes, such as the annihilation of one’s substance (that is, strictly speaking, the substance that one is identical with) would render one not a person at all; however, this is not a change of degree. But who then offers the third paralogism? Who indeed stands to lose from Kant’s criticism? So I recommend that ‘so fern’ rather means something like is already (that is, by that condition alone). In other words, we should think of the major premise as giving merely a sufficient condition for personhood. (By the way, if we took the major premise as giving a necessary condition, then the paralogism would be obviously invalid.) So let’s take the third paralogism from the beginning again. It goes like this. That which is aware of its numerical identity over time is already (that is, by that condition alone) a person. But the self or thinking I is aware of the numerical identity of itself at different times. Therefore, the self or thinking I is a person. According to Kant, one who asserts the third paralogism is trying to establish a particular metaphysical condition of the self or I, namely, unbroken continuity and permanence. How does this relate to the question of personhood? Well, among other qualities, persons are the kinds of things which do endure over time; for one thing, persons comprise the class of morally responsible agents and thus need to be re-identified at different times, least of all by the agent himself or herself. The rational psychologist infers that the self or thinking I must denote a unified, enduring object through change, on the mere basis of the representation of the I at different times. In other words, the rational psychologist moves from a condition or feature of apperception (that is, the thinker must always regard himself or herself as a continuant) to a feature of the apperceiver (that the thinker is in fact a real continuant), with nary an intervening step. But such an inference is illegitimate, Kant contends, since the fact that I am not aware of (nor can I be aware of) being a plurality of non-identical beings over time, tells me merely that I cannot be aware of experiences at different times as belonging to someone or something else, and not that I am really numerically identical over time. Nevertheless, the transcendental temptation to attribute real permanence to the 126 Appendix self simply on the basis of a feature of apperception is great. For it is so easy to conflate the indeterminate or empty claim that I cannot be aware of being different beings over time with the determinate claim that I am not, for example, a string of thinkers, but numerically identical over time. Does Leibniz argue for the “personality” of the I (that is, its unbroken, objective continuity over time) in a way akin to the third paralogism? I don’t think so. To show this, let’s concentrate on Leibniz’s understanding of person and its correlate personal identity. Kitcher alleges: “The major premise is put forward [by Kant] because it states a definition of ‘person’ employed by Leibniz and by Christian Wolff, as well as by Locke.”4 Kitcher appeals in part to Jonathan Bennett’s testimony that Lewis White Beck told him that “Wolff defined ‘person’ as a thing which ‘maintains a memory of itself’. Locke said that a person can ‘consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places’ … Leibniz endorses this [Bennett adds] not only in his replies to Locke but elsewhere as well.”5 But caution is needed here, notwithstanding any breakdown in the chain of authority. Most likely Locke does define person in the way described by the major premise (we will not worry about this question), yet it is highly doubtful that Leibniz and Wolff do. Let’s focus on Leibniz. To support their allegation, Kitcher and Bennett refer to the lengthy and difficult section of Leibniz’s Nouveaux essais, titled “On Identity and Diversity.” Responding to Locke’s claim that “as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person,” Leibniz says that “I also hold this opinion that consciousness or the sense of I proves [prouve] moral or personal identity” (A vi, 6, 236). Kitcher and Bennett take this to mean that Leibniz agrees with Locke’s definition of person. But I do not see Leibniz’s words here as tantamount to an agreement with Locke’s definition of person; rather, it seems to me that Leibniz is making an purely epistemological claim. Having an internal experience by way of self- consciousness or the sense of myself, I can know that I am one and the same person. Is not Leibniz, by making this epistemological claim, perchance committing himself to a Lockean definition of person, at least indirectly? Not at all, for in the same section Leibniz emphasizes: “So, not wishing to say that personal identity extends no further than memory, still less would I say that the ‘self’, or physical identity, depends upon it. (By the way, as pointed out earlier, the French here is ‘physique’ by which Leibniz means real, as he does in other places in the Nouveaux essais.) The existence of real personal identity is proved with as much certainty as any matter of fact can be, by present and immediate reflection; it is proved conclusively enough for ordinary purposes by our memories across intervals and by the concurring testimony of other people” (A vi, 6, 237). Note that all of this is perfectly compatible with the view that personal identity requires sameness of substance. And, this is made perfectly feasible by Leibniz’s presupposition that the evidence upon which we judge two persons to be one and the same is not that which constitutes personal identity. For simple, immaterial substances are just not the kinds of things that we clearly perceive qua simple, immaterial substances.6 Appendix 127

Nevertheless, according to Leibniz, there is a close relationship between consciousness and personal identity which is not merely evidentiary or epistemological in nature. He writes in two passages, both of which are also adduced by Bennett and Kitcher: “But the intelligent soul, knowing what it is— having the ability to utter the word ‘I’, a word so full of meaning—does not merely remain and subsist metaphysically, which it does to a greater degree than the others, but also remains the same morally and constitutes the same person. For it is memory or the knowledge of this self that renders it susceptible to punishment or reward” (GP iv, 459f). Also, Leibniz writes: “Since minds must keep their personality and moral qualities … it is necessary for them to retain in particular a kind of recollection, consciousness or power to know what they are …” (GP ii, 125; cf. Gr, 98f). But, strictly speaking, neither passage commits Leibniz to a definition of person. Rather, these passages point quite clearly to a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of personhood or personal identity; that is to say, memory or knowledge of the self. Leibniz is unwilling to claim, as Locke famously does, that personhood or personal identity consists wholly in sameness of consciousness. Why do I say this? Well, if he were to concede this point to Locke, then he would have to also concede to Locke the idea that thinking, conscious machines could be genuine persons. For, surprisingly enough, Leibniz does concede to Locke the logical possibility of a machine, a mere aggregate of matter (i.e., not a true substance at all), that is conscious (and which presumably also is conscious of its self-identity over time) (A vi, 6, 236f). Yet Leibniz is not willing to concede the further proposition that thinking, conscious machines could be persons, as we saw in Chapters 3 and 4. Let me summarize quickly. According to Leibniz, there are only two ways in which we can understand a machine to be conscious: either by association with a conscious soul or by the attachment of miraculous mental states (A vi, 6, 67 & 379). In either case, God is involved. But Leibniz thinks it is clear that the first way rules out, ironically, the possibility of genuinely conscious machines altogether. For there would not be a conscious machine as a result but a machine to which a conscious soul was appended. Leibniz explains: “If one says that God gives matter this new nature or the radical power to think—surely a self- maintained power—he would simply have given it a thinking soul, or else something that differs from a thinking soul only nominally. And since this radical power is not strictly speaking a modification of matter (for modifications are explicable by the natures they modify and this power is not so explicable), it would be independent of matter” (GP iii, 356). Thus, that which is essentially passive—matter—remains so. That which is conscious, even after God’s intervention, is not matter but a soul, an appendage to the machine. Lest there is some misunderstanding, it should be clear that what we have here is not a corporeal substance. Let’s consider the second way in which God can create a conscious machine. Would the attachment of miraculous mental states to a machine also result, ironically enough, in a non-conscious machine? It is tempting to say yes, for how can we properly attribute mental states to the machine since those mental states 128 Appendix arise from God and not from the power or nature of that machine? (This is just what it means to have a miraculous state, according to Leibniz.) But even if a machine could be the locus for conscious, mental states through miraculous intervention, this is not enough to establish that conscious machines could be persons. For, as Leibniz emphasizes on a number of occasions (GP iii, 68f; vi, 609; vii, 328f), there can be nothing in the machine to produce its conscious states and therefore nothing to explain the presence of such consciousness. But, for one thing, according to Leibniz, something cannot be a morally responsible agent unless it produces its own modifications of reflection and consciousness (among other things). And, of course, all persons are moral agents for Leibniz. Only genuine substances can produce such modifications, whereas for Leibniz machines are by definition mere aggregates of matter and thus not substances. In fact, I have argued in Chapters 3 and 4 that Leibniz never abandons his view that sameness of substance is necessary for personal identity. Hence, Leibniz would accept the major premise of the third paralogism only if it merely stipulates that consciousness of diachronic self-identity is a necessary condition for personhood or personal identity. But the major premise does not; rather, as we saw earlier, it only states that such consciousness is a sufficient condition. By the way, I should point out that it is much easier to show that Descartes, Wolff, and Mendelssohn would likewise reject the major premise of the third paralogism, for they too maintain that substantiality is a necessary (and possibly even sufficient) condition for personhood and correlatively sameness of substance necessary (and possibly sufficient) for personal identity.

2. Second Paralogism The second paralogism goes like this. A simple thing is defined as that “whose action can never regarded as the concurrence of many acting things” (CPR A351). (Fortunately, there is no ‘so fern’ here to complicate matters for us.) But the actions of the self or thinking I can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting things. For the unity of thought which must be met with in all cognition, including that of oneself, makes it impossible that states divided among various subjects could constitute a unified thought. Or, as expressed by William James: “Take a sentence of a dozen words, take twelve men, and to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence.”7 Therefore, the self or thinking I is really, and not merely logically, simple. The rational psychologist infers that the self or I must denote a metaphysically simple object, on the mere basis of the representation of the I. In other words, the rational psychologist moves from our experience of a unity in apperception (that is, a condition or feature of apperception) to the real unity of the apperceiver, with nary an intervening step. But such an inference is illegitimate, considering the fact that the representation I contains no trace of a manifold or variety and thus has either no content of any sort or at best indeterminate content. According to Kant, we really have nothing more to say of the self than merely that it is something (CPR A440). Yet, for all this Kant does admit that the transcendental temptation Appendix 129 to attribute real simplicity to the self is understandable since it is easy to confuse emptiness or indeterminacy with simplicity. Does Leibniz himself make this mistake? To answer this, it is useful to recognize that the second paralogism is probably an argument from ignorance. For it seems to rely on the assumption that “if a thought were identical with a state of a composite qua composite, elements of the thought would be identical with states or elements of the composite.”8 But some have pointed out that this assumption is contentious, since it fails to recognize the sophistication of the materialist’s conception of mind. So, inferring from James’ assumption to the claim that a thinker must be simple is rooted in ignorance. But I don’t think that Leibniz presents an argument from ignorance for the simplicity of the self (at least in his more careful moments). Rather, he relies on the claim—not at all accounted for in the second paralogism—that perception (which includes any and all mental states, conscious and unconscious) is inexplicable if attributed to any system of parts or components acting in concert. It follows then that consciousness cannot be distributed among a number of things. Leibniz seems to consider this claim to be perfectly analytic or definitional: in unpacking the concept of perception, we see that perception is “the transitory state which involves and represents a multitude in the unity” (GP vi, 608) or the expression or representation “in a single indivisible entity” (GP ii, 121). So, the perceiver itself (or himself or herself) must be a real unity.9 Something very interesting results. The second paralogism takes our consciousness of unity as evidence for the unity of the conscious self or I. (And therefore is prey to a charge of ignorance because the materialist might at some point be equipped to explain this unity.) Whereas, in Leibniz’s hands, consciousness of anything is evidence of the unity of the conscious self or I. For any conscious awareness, any experience of mentality, no matter how multitudinous and seemingly disunified, must be understood a priori as represented by a single indivisible or simple thing.

3. First Paralogism The first paralogism goes like this. A substance is defined as “what cannot exist otherwise than as subject” (CPR B411). (Again, there is no ‘so fern’ to hurdle.) But the self or thinking I cannot be thought otherwise than as subject; that is to say, it can never be deemed the predicate or determination of any other thing. Therefore, the self or thinking I exists only as subject, that is, as a real substance. The rational psychologist infers that the self or thinking I must denote a substance, on the representation of the I alone; the rational psychologist moves from a condition or feature of apperception (that is, the thinker must always regard himself or herself as subject) to a feature of the apperceiver (that the thinker is a real substance). But such an inference is illegitimate, since the fact (and it is a fact for Kant) that the I is always something of which things are predicated (and can never itself be predicated of anything), tells us merely that the I must occupy the subject-position in any judgment, and not anything about the real nature of the I. Yet, for all this Kant does admit that the transcendental temptation to attribute real 130 Appendix substantiality to the self is understandable since “everyone must necessarily regard himself as a substance and regard thoughts as being only accidents of his existence and modifications of his state” (CPR A349). Now, Leibniz certainly believes in the natural and real permanence of the self or I. He writes in a letter to Arnauld: “Substantial unity requires a … naturally indestructible being … something which cannot be found in shape or in motion … but which can be found in a soul or substantial form, after the example of what one calls I” (GP ii, 76). But does Leibniz argue for this claim in a way that mirrors the first paralogism? To answer this question, let us examine Leibniz’s own definition of substance. Consider the Discours de métaphysique §8, where Leibniz writes: “It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributed to a single subject and this subject is attributed to no other, it is called an individual substance…” (GP iv, 432). But Leibniz goes on to tell us in the same section that “such an explanation is merely nominal. We must therefore consider what it is to be attributed truly to a certain subject.” According to Leibniz, an explanation or definition is nominal “when it is still possible to doubt whether the thing defined is possible” (GP iv, 450). Leibniz thus gives his real definition of substance, and hence allows us to know the possibility of substance: “[T]he subject term must always include the predicate term in such a way that anyone who perfectly understands the concept of the subject will also know that the predicate applies to it. Given this, we can say it is the nature of an individual substance or complete being to have a concept so complete that it is sufficient to make us understand and deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which the concept is attributed” (GP iv, 432). Notwithstanding the obvious problem of whether Leibniz has indeed established the possibility of substances by merely asserting the complete concept theory of substance, there is something very interesting happening, here. Leibniz seems to infer from his conceptual containment theory (that is, the claim that the concept of the predicate is included in some way in the concept of the subject) to his theory of the independence or self-subsistence of substance (that is, the claim that nothing happens to an individual substance—nothing can be predicated of a subject—that is not already contained in its own concept). Nor is this the only place where such an inference occurs: see C 520f; GP ii, 56f; iv, 439.10 What we have here, I think, is a move that is remarkably close to what is happening in the first paralogism: Leibniz, on the basis of his complete concept theory of substance, infers from (i) something cannot be thought otherwise than as subject to the claim that (ii) it must exist only as subject. However, it seems to me that Leibniz’s mature, preferred view of the matter is at odds with the first paralogism. To see this, consider one of Leibniz’s favorite ways to characterize substance, that is to say, as naturally spontaneous or active. Leibniz writes that a substance is “a being capable of action” (GP vi, 598) or “whatever has within it active force” (GP iv, 470). But, interestingly, all indications are that sometime in the 1690s Leibniz no longer regards the relationship between (i) and (ii) as a simple inference validated by his complete concept theory. In fact, Leibniz will claim that it is precisely this spontaneity that enables us to know the possibility of Appendix 131 substance, and hence gives us a real definition of substance. However, the first paralogism makes no reference to this aspect of substance. Leibniz’s mature view is that “[w]hile causes are present in things, complete concepts are properly ideas in the mind of God. The complete concept of a monad, were it available to us, would allow us to deduce or infer the states of that substance. But, this a priori ground for inference is not the same as the cause of a change, and Leibniz is careful to avoid causal language when speaking of the value of individual concepts.”11 The cause of each (non-initial, non-miraculous) perception of a monad is to be located in its primitive active force, an internal power that is an attribute of the monad (GP iv, 486 & 507; A vi, 6, 65 & 210).12

4. Conclusion I hope that even with my rather hasty observations I have provided sufficient reason to suspect that Kant’s first three paralogisms do not accurately represent how Leibniz actually argues for the substantiality, simplicity and identity of the self or I. But let me suggest that it might be misguided to try to determine how Leibniz in fact argues for these categorical features of the self. For perhaps Leibniz doesn’t properly argue for these at all. Leibniz writes to Thomas Burnett that “[w]e have [an] idea of substance, which in my opinion comes from the fact that we, who are substances, have an internal sense of it in ourselves” (GP iii, 247; cf. GP iv, 452; iv, 559f; vi, 502 & 612; A vi, 6, 85f & 105). As we saw in Chapter 2, Margaret Wilson explains that “it seems to follow that (for any I) self-consciousness must be consciousness of a particular simple substance (the one that is me) and further that it must involve consciousness of the identity, simplicity, and substantiality of this entity ….”13 Wilson adds: “Leibniz seems also to want to claim that we can somehow know from direct experience of ourselves and our perceptions that we are indivisible and hence immaterial substances [GP ii, 112; vi, 502; A vi, 6, 51; cf., vi, 6, 110f].”14 One might argue that the paralogisms themselves represent an attempt to make explicit this move. But, again, I wonder if Leibniz strictly speaking argues for our substantiality and simplicity.

NOTES

1 Kitcher, “Apperception and Epistemic Responsibility,” 289. 2 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 285. 3 Allison, Kan’s Transcendental Idealism, 367, fn. 23. 4 Kitcher, “Kant’s Paralogisms,” 535. 5 Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic, 93. 6 GP iv, 477 & 570; vi, 617. See Adams, 287, fn. 27. 7 James, Collected Works I, 160. 132 Appendix

8 M. Wilson, “Leibniz and Materialism,” 511. James assumes this, doesn’t he? As do Samuel Clarke, Ralph Cudworth, and many others. For a good discussion of this subject, see Ben Mijuskovic, The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments. 9 See Paul Lodge and Bobro, “Stepping Back Inside Leibniz’s Mill,” 553-72. 10 See Adams, Leibniz, 315f. 11 See Bobro and Clatterbaugh, “Unpacking the Monad: Leibniz’s Theory of Causality,” 412. 12 See Roger Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, 67f and Bobro and Clatterbaugh, “Unpacking the Monad,” 409-26. 13 M. Wilson, “Leibniz: Self-Consciousness and Immortality,” 341. 14 M. Wilson, “Leibniz and Materialism,” 507f. Bibliography

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2. Other Historic Sources AT René Descartes. Oeuvres de Descartes. Edited by C. Adam and P. Tannery. Paris: L. Cerf, 1897-1913. Cited by volume and page. CC Anne Conway. The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Edited and translated by Allison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Cited by chapter and section. CPR Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996. E John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Cited by book, chapter, and section. Wk John Locke. The Works of John Locke. London, 1823, reprinted Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1963. Cited by volume and page. T David Hume. A Treatise on Human Nature. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Cited by page number. ST St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. 5 volumes. Madrid: Bibliotexa de Autores Christianos, 1955-58. Cited by part, question, and article.

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Conway, Anne, 4, 10, 14-15, 19, 82, —A— 95 Copleston, Frederick, 59 Adams, Robert, 44, 54, 57-9, 76, 78, Cover, Jan, 6 95-6, 99 Cudworth, Damaris, 52, 134 Allison, Henry, 56, 58, 76, 126-7, Curley, Edwin, 53, 59, 76, 79, 140 134 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 5, 26, 28, 37 —D— Arista, 102-05, 108, 116 Aristotle, 104 Deleuze, Gilles, 84, 96 Arnauld, Antoine, 25, 36, 43-4, 46, Des Bosses, Bartholomaeus, 122 51, 56, 65, 93, 97 Descartes, René, 1, 8, 9, 25, 30, 102, 105, 111, 115, 121 —B— Donagan, Alan, 115-16 Donne, John, 99 Barresi, John, 114 Duran, Jane, 10, 19 Baruzi, Jean, 97 Bayle, Pierre, 98 —F— Bennett, Jonathan, 26, 36, 56, 58, 128-9, 134 Fardella, Michel Angelo, 29, 44 Berkeley, George, 39, 41, 56 Fischer, John Martin, 118 Beson, Elizabeth, 115 Fleming, Noel, 96 Blackstone, William, 123, 125 Fludd, Robert, 63 Blumenfeld, David, 20 Foucher, Simon, 80 Boethius, 7, 28, 37 Fouke, Daniel, 20 Brennan, Andrew, 40, 56 Frankel, Lois, 78 Brown, Clifford, 48, 57, 59 Frankfurt, Harry, 19 Brown, Gregory, 78 Brown, Stuart, 30, 37, 58, 76, 135 —G— Burnett, Thomas, 29, 36, 58 Garber, Daniel, 81, 95 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 100, —C— 115 Carr, Herbert, 1, 6, 84-5, 96 Greenberg, Sean, 19 Chisholm, Roderick, 27, 36-7, 100, Grene, Marjorie, 115 105, 108, 116 Grua, Gaston, 1, 6, 76, 82, 95-6 Clatterbaugh, Kenneth, 59, 77, 95, 135 —H— Coburn, Robert, 112 Haksar, Vinit, 118 Hansch, Michael, 104

142 Index of Proper Names 143

Hart, Alan, 57 McCullough, Laurence, 6 Harvie, J. H., 115, 118 McRae, Robert, 23-4, 30, 32, 36-8, Hazlitt, William, 114 79, 96, 135 Hobbes, Thomas, 26, 31, 124-5 Mersenne, Martin, 115 Hume, David, 7, 31, 122-5 Meyer, R.W,. 6 Mijuskovic, Ben, 48, 59, 134 —I— Mittelstraß, Jürgen, 97 Ishiguro, Hidé, 97 Molinos, Miguel, 104 Mollat, G., 95 —J— More, Henry, 4 James, William, 39, 56, 130, 134 —N— Jaquelot, Isaac, 90 Jolley, Nicholas, 19, 33-6, 38, 42, 51, Naërt, Émilienne, 96, 115 53, 58-9, 64-5, 70-1, 75-9, 96 Nails, Debra, 115 Noonan, Harold, 6, 40-1, 56-7, 96 —K— Nozick, Robert, 114 Kant, Immanuel, 5, 36, 38, 94, 120, —P— 126-7, 131-4 Kitcher, Patricia, 127-8, 134 Parfit, Derek, 40-1, 56, 101, 114-15, Klopp, Otto, 20, 97 117-18 Kulstad, Mark, 26, 27, 30-2, 36-7, Parkinson, G. H. R., 77-8, 84, 96 77, 135 Paul, St., 10 Peirce, Charles, 101, 114 —L— Phemister, Pauline, 77-8 Philalethes, 2, 112 Lach, Donald, 118 Plato, 43, 102, 105, 111, 116, 121 Latzer, Michael, 78 Pruss, Alexander, 17 Law, Edmund, 125 Puccetti, Roland, 99 Lewis, David, 114 Pufendorf, Samuel, 125 Lewis, H. D., 115 Lloyd, Genevieve, 115 —Q— Locke, John, 1-5, 10-1, 22-3, 25, 27- 8, 30, 32-4, 38-42, 45, 48-53, 56- Quinton, Anthony, 106-7, 116 7, 60-7, 70-2, 74-5, 95, 108, 116, 120, 122-3 —R— Lodge, Paul, 6, 59, 76, 134 Reid, Thomas, 39, 41, 56 Loemker, Leroy, 97 Remnant, Peter, 58 Lowe, E. J., 37 Rescher, Nicholas, 15, 19 Rorty, Amélie, 36 —M— Rovane, Carol, 3, 19 Mahoney, James, 112 Russell, Bertrand, 57 Martin, Raymond, 114 Rutherford, Donald, 15, 20, 37, 59, Mates, Benson, 6, 53-5, 57, 59 78, 89, 94-8 McCann, Edwin, 6 144 Index of Proper Names

—S— —U— Sapontzis, Stephen, 98 Unger, Peter, 114, 116 Savile, Anthony, 16 Uzgalis, William, 38 Scheffler, Samuel, 22, 32-6, 38, 64, 65, 72, 76, 79, 98, 109-11, 118 —V— Shaffer, Jerome, 82, 95 Vailati, Ezio, 38, 42-3, 45, 51, 56-7, Shoemaker, Sydney, 100, 114, 118 64-5, 76, 79 Silesius, John Angelus, 104 Van Helmont, Francis Mercury, 13 Sleigh, Robert Jr., 30, 37, 59, 62, 67, 69, 70, 76-8, 83, 96 —W— Sophie Charlotte, 28, 30 Sosa, Ernest, 114 Weigel, Valentine, 104 Sotnak, Eric, 76 Weller, Cass, 53 Spinoza, Baruch, 103-05, 121 Wiggins, David, 7, 35, 114, 118 Stillingfleet, Edward, 4 Williams, Bernard, 36, 103-05, 112, Strawson, Peter, 99 114-16, 118 Suárez, Francisco, 28, 37, 48, 59 Wilson, Catherine, 36-7, 57, 64, 76, Swinburne, Richard, 105, 107, 115- 79, 82, 95-6, 98 16 Wilson, Margaret, 29-30, 37, 41-3, 45-7, 51, 54-6, 65, 71-2, 76-7, 79, —T— 95, 108, 116, 118, 134 Winkler, Kenneth, 125 Taylor, Charles, 98 Woolhouse, Roger, 97, 115, 135 Theophilus, 2, 112 Thiel, Udo, 57