DOCSLIB.ORG

Curriculum Vitae Marina A

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Curriculum Vitae Marina A Curriculum Vitae Marina A. L. Oshana June 2016 Work address Department of Philosophy 1241 Social Science and Humanities One Shields Avenue University of California Davis, CA 95616-8673 Phone: (530) 752-0607 Fax: (530) 752-8964 email: [email protected] Education 1993 Ph.D., Philosophy, University of California, Davis. 1988 M.A., Philosophy, UC Davis. 1987 M.A., Philosophy, summa cum laude, San Francisco State University. 1983 B.A., Philosophy, summa cum laude, San Francisco State University. Employment history 2009-present Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis. 2003–2009 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida. 2001-2003 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University. 1998-2001 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University. Fall, 1996 Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University. 1994–1998 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, California State University, Sacramento. 1993-1994 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, California State University, San Bernardino. Area of Specialization: Ethics; Moral Psychology Areas of Competence: Philosophy of Law; Feminist Analytic Philosophy; Political Philosophy 1 Research Books The Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility, Marina Oshana, Katrina Hutchinson and Catriona Mackenzie, eds. (under contract with Oxford University Press, USA). Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Marina A. L. Oshana (New York: Routledge, December 2014). The Importance of How We See Ourselves: Self-Identity and Responsible Agency, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, Lexington Books, October 2010). Reviewed in Analysis, Volume 72, Issue 1 (January 2012), 198-200. First published online: November 25, 2011. Personal Autonomy in Society, (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, September 2006). Reviewed in The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 45, No.2 (May 2011), 233-38; Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 35, No. 1 (January 2009), 148- 155; Metapsychology (Jan 29, 2008); In-Spire Journal of Law, Politics and Societies (Vol. 3, No. 2 - 2008); Hypatia, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2008), 202-206; Contemporary Political Theory, 6 (2007), 492–496. Refereed papers “Trust and Autonomous Agency,” in Res Philosophica, Vol. 91, No. 3, July 2014, pp. 431–447. “Autonomy and the Partial-Birth Abortion Act,” Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring 2011, pp. 46–60. “Moral Taint,” Metaphilosophy, special issue on Genocide’s Aftermath: Responsibility and Repair, vol. 37, nos. 3/4, July 2006. Reprinted in Genocide’s Aftermath (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 2007). “Autonomy and the Question of Authenticity,” Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 33, No. 3, July 2007. “Moral Accountability,” Philosophical Topics, special issue on Agency, vol. 32, nos. 1/2, Spring and Fall 2004, pp. 255-74. [Published in 2006.] “How Much Should We Value Autonomy?” Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 20, No. 2, (2003). 2 “The Misguided Marriage of Autonomy and Responsibility,” Journal of Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 3, (2002), pp. 261-280. “The Autonomy Bogeyman,” Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 2, (June 2001), pp. 209-226. “Wanton Responsibility,” Journal of Ethics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1998, pp. 261-276. “Personal Autonomy and Society,” Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 29, No. 1, Spring, 1998, pp. 81-102. Reprinted in Autonomie, ed. Monika Betzler, (Paderborn, Germany: Mentis Verlag). “Ascriptions of Responsibility,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 34, No. 1, January, 1997, pp. 71-83. Reprinted in John Martin Fischer, ed., Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy (Routledge, June 2005). Reprinted in Carl Wellman, ed., and Lawrence C. Becker, series ed., Rights and Duties (Ethical Investigations), (Routledge, June, 2002). “Autonomy Naturalized,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume IX on Naturalism, Winter 1994, pp. 76-94. Invited referred papers “Through the Looking Glass,” for inclusion in Philosophy and the Mixed Race Experience, ed. Tina Fernandes Botts, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, January 2016). “A Feminist Approach to Moral Responsibility,” in the Routledge Companion to Free Will, ed. Meghan Griffiths, Neil Levy, and Kevin Timpe (New York: Routledge, June 2016). “Memory, Self-Understanding, and Agency,” in The Philosophy of Autobiography, ed. Christopher Cowley (University of Chicago Press, October 2015). “Is Social-Relational Autonomy a Plausible Ideal?” in Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Marina A. L. Oshana (New York: Routledge, Dec. 2014). “A Commitment to Autonomy is a Commitment to Feminism” in Autonomy, Oppression and Gender, eds. Mark Piper and Andrea Veltman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 3 “Secondhand (Moral) Responsibility in Law,” in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, ed. Justin Caouette and Ishtiyaque Haji (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). “Self-Identity and Moral Agency,” in Autonomy and the Self, eds. Michael Kühler and Nadja Jelinek. Philosophical Studies Series, Vol. 118, Springer (December 2012). “Responsibility: Philosophical Perspectives,” International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Oxford: Elsevier Press, 2002. Revised for 2nd edition, Vol 20. September 2012, pp. 587–591. “Being in Absentia,” in Florida Philosophical Review: The Journal of the Florida Philosophical Association, Volume X, No. 1 (Summer 2010), 1-7. “Autonomy and Free Agency,” in Personal Autonomy, edited by James Stacey Taylor, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). “Autonomy and Self-Identity,” in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, co-edited by John Christman and Joel Anderson, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). In progress “Ascriptions of responsibility given commonplace relations of power” in Marina Oshana, Katrina Hutchinson, and Catriona Mackenzie, eds., The Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. “Relational Responsibility,” for inclusion in the Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism, edited by Pieranna Garavaso. Reviews Sarah Conly, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism, in Ethics (vol. 124, no. 2). January 2014. John Martin Fischer, Our Stories, in the Journal of Value Inquiry (2012). Ben Colburn, Autonomy and Liberalism, in Analysis (2011) Vol. 71, No. 2: 399-402. Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, in The Journal of Value Inquiry (2005) Vol. 39, No. 3-4: 499-505. Presentations 4 Past: Comments on Douglas MacLean, “A Plea for Humanism,” at the ninth conference on Moral Theory and Practice, Beaune, France, 25-27 June 2015. “What Would a Feminist Theory of Responsibility Look Like?” Workshop on Moral Responsibility: Non-Metaphysical Perspectives, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, November 20 - 21, 2014. “Trust and Autonomous Agency,” University of St. Louis, Res Philosophica Speaker Series, May 2014. “Trust and Autonomous Agency,” Society for Analytical Feminism, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Diego, April 16-20, 2014. “Occupying Autonomously,” Workshop in Ethics, Language, and Metaethics, Federal University of Amazonas, Manaus, Brazil, March 18, 2014. “Trust and Autonomous Agency,” Chiron 2014 Workshop on Normativity in Language, Ethics and Cognition, University of the Valley of the Sinos River (UNISINOS), Porto Alegre, Brazil, March 14, 2014. “Occupying Autonomously,” Workshop in Political Philosophy and Metaethics, Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil, March 10, 2014. “Trust and Autonomous Agency,” 10th Symposium on Ethics and Political Philosophy, Itatiaia National Park, Brazil, March 7, 2014 “Is Substantive Autonomy a Plausible Ideal?,” Pomona College, September 19, 2013. “Trust, Autonomous Agents, and Health Care,” keynote speaker, conference on Autonomy and Trust in Modern Medicine, Göttingen University, Germany, February 14- 15, 2013. “Is a Commitment to Autonomy a Commitment to Feminism?” Symposium on New Essays on Autonomy and Feminism, McGill University, Montréal, September 28-30, 2012. “Is a Commitment to Autonomy a Commitment to Feminism?” Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, June 25, 2012. “Memory, self-understanding, and agency.” 5th Colloquium on Ethics and Applied Ethics, Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil, June 19, 2012. 5 “Relational Autonomy.” Unisinos (University of the Sinos Valley; Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos), Sao Leopoldo, Brazil, June 15, 2012. “Is Substantive Autonomy a Plausible Ideal?” Conference on Self-Government and Social Transformation, University of California, Davis, March 1-2, 2012. “A Commitment to Autonomy is a Commitment to Feminism.” Center for Practical and Professional Ethics, California State University, Sacramento. February 21, 2012. “Occupying Autonomously.” Workshop on ‘Autonomy, Collectives, and Responsibility,’ sponsored by the research group on Philosophy and Public Affairs, Amsterdam University, February 2-3, 2012. “Is Substantive Autonomy a Plausible Ideal?” Practical Philosophy Colloquium, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Utrecht, February 7, 2012. “Is Substantive Autonomy a Plausible Ideal?” Social and Political Thought Workshop, Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, October 28, 2011. “Memory, self-understanding, and agency.” Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, October 13, 2011. “Memory, self-understanding, and agency.” Seventh conference on Moral Theory and Practice, Riquewihr, France, June 30, 2011.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Shame and Philosophy
    The University of Notre Dame Australia ResearchOnline@ND Philosophy Papers and Journal Articles School of Philosophy 2010 Shame and philosophy Richard P. Hamilton University of Notre Dame Australia, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/phil_article Part of the Philosophy Commons This book review in a scholarly journal was originally published as: Hamilton, R. P. (2010). Shame and philosophy. Res Publica, 16 (4), 431-439. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-010-9120-4 This book review in a scholarly journal is posted on ResearchOnline@ND at https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/ phil_article/14. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Res Publica DOI 10.1007/s11158-010-9120-4 12 3 Shaming Philosophy 4 Richard Paul Hamilton 5 6 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 7 8 Michael L. Morgan (2008), On Shame. London: RoutledgePROOF (Thinking In Action). 9 Philip Hutchinson (2008), Philosophy and Shame: An Investigation in the 10 Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 11 Shame is a ubiquitous and highly intriguing feature of human experience. It can 12 motivate but it can also paralyse. It is something which one can legitimately demand 13 of another, but is not usually experienced as a choice. Perpetrators of atrocities can 14 remain defiantly immune to shame while their victims are racked by it. It would be 15 hard to understand any society or culture without understanding the characteristic 16 occasions upon which shame is expected and where it is mitigated. Yet, one can 17 survey much of the literature in social and political theory over the last century and 18 find barely a footnote to this omnipresent emotional experience.
    [Show full text]
  • Chad Van Schoelandt
    CHAD VAN SCHOELANDT Tulane University Department of Philosophy, New Orleans, LA [email protected] Employment 2015-present Assistant Professor, Tulane University, Department of Philosophy 2016-present Affiliated Fellow, George Mason University, F. A. HayeK Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Areas of Specialization Social and Political Philosophy Ethics Agency and Responsibility Philosophy, Politics & Economics Areas of Competence Applied Ethics (esp. Business, Environmental, Bio/Medical) History of Modern Philosophy Moral Psychology Education Ph.D., University of Arizona, Philosophy, 2015 M.A., University of Wisconsin - MilwauKee, Philosophy, 2010 B.A. (High Honors), University of California, Davis, Philosophy (political science minor), 2006 Publications Articles “Moral Accountability and Social Norms” Social Philosophy & Policy, Vol. 35, Issue 1, Spring 2018 “Consensus on What? Convergence for What? Four Models of Political Liberalism” (with Gerald Gaus) Ethics, Vol. 128, Issue 1, 2017: pp. 145-72 “Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public Reason” Philosophical Studies, 172, 2015: pp. 1031-1050 “MarKets, Community, and Pluralism” The Philosophical Quarterly, Discussion, 64(254), 2014: pp. 144-151 "Political Liberalism, Ethos Justice, and Gender Equality" (with Blain Neufeld) Law and Philosophy 33(1), 2014: pp. 75-104 Chad Van Schoelandt CV Page 2 of 4 Book Chapters “A Public Reason Approach to Religious Exemption” Philosophy and Public Policy, Andrew I. Cohen (ed.), Rowman and Littlefield International,
    [Show full text]
  • Anca Gheaus Curriculum Vitae
    Anca Gheaus curriculum vitae Curriculum Vitae WORK ADDRESS HOME ADDRESS Law, University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona Wiesenstrasse 16 [email protected] 80993 München EMPLOYMENT________________________________________________________________ 2020 – Assistant Professor, Central European University, Vienna 2016 – 2020 Ramon y Cajal Researcher, University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona 2014 – 2016 Researcher, Philosophy Department, Umeå University 2012 – 2016 De Velling Willis Fellow, Philosophy Department, University of Sheffield 2009 – 2011 Postdoctoral researcher, Philosophy Department, Erasmus University Rotterdam 2008 – 2009 Marie Curie Researcher, Equality Studies Centre, University College Dublin 2008 Researcher, Centre de Recherche en Etique Economique, Université Catholique de Lille 2004 – 2005 Fellow, New Europe College, Bucharest 2003 – 2005 Visiting lecturer, National School of Political and Administrative Science, Bucharest 2003 – 2004 Lecturer, Invisible College, Bucharest PUBLICATIONS________________________________________________________________ Books Child-Centred Childrearing, under contract with Oxford University Press Debating Surrogacy, under contract with Oxford University Press (with C. Straehle) Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children, Routledge, 2018, edited (with G. Calder and J. De Wispelaere) Journal special issues Special issue of Moral Philosophy and Politics on children’s rights, forthcoming 2020 (with S. Hohl) Special issue of the Journal of Applied Philosophy 35(S1) on “The Nature and Value of Childhood”, 2018 Special issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics 43(3), on “The Ethics of Health Incentive Programs”, 2017 (with V. Wild) Reference works The Ethics of Parenting, Routledge Encyclopedia Online, DOI 10.4324/9780415249126-L156-1, Routledge, 2020 Personal Relationship Goods, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/personal-relationship-goods/, Fall 2018 Gender policies in the workplace and the family, in A.
    [Show full text]
  • MARTIN HÄGGLUND Website
    MARTIN HÄGGLUND Website: www.martinhagglund.se APPOINTMENTS Birgit Baldwin Professor of Comparative Literature and Humanities, 2021- Chair of Comparative Literature, Yale University, 2015- Professor of Comparative Literature and Humanities, Yale University, 2014- Tenured Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and Humanities, Yale University, 2012-2014 Junior Fellow, Society of Fellows, Harvard University, 2009-2012 DEGREES Ph.D. Comparative Literature, Cornell University, 2011 M.A. Comparative Literature, emphasis in Critical Theory, SUNY Buffalo, 2005 B.A. General and Comparative Literature, Stockholm University, Sweden, 2001 PUBLICATIONS Books This Life: Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom, Penguin Random House: Pantheon 2019: 465 pages. UK and Australia edition published by Profile Books. *Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Chinese, Korean, Macedonian, Swedish, Thai, and Turkish translations. *Winner of the René Wellek Prize. *Named a Best Book of the Year by The Guardian, The Millions, NRC, and The Sydney Morning Herald. Reviews: The New Yorker, The Guardian, The New Republic, New York Magazine, The Boston Globe, New Statesman, Times Higher Education (book of the week), Jacobin (two reviews), Booklist (starred review), Los Angeles Review of Books, Evening Standard, Boston Review, Psychology Today, Marx & Philosophy Review of Books, Dissent, USA Today, The Believer, The Arts Desk, Sydney Review of Books, The Humanist, The Nation, New Rambler Review, The Point, Church Life Journal, Kirkus Reviews, Public Books, Opulens Magasin, Humanisten, Wall Street Journal, Counterpunch, Spirituality & Health, Dagens Nyheter, Expressen, Arbetaren, De Groene Amsterdammer, Brink, Sophia, Areo Magazine, Spiked, Die Welt, Review 31, Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy, Reason and Meaning, The Philosopher, boundary 2, Critical Inquiry, Radical Philosophy. Journal issues on the book: Los Angeles Review of Books (symposium with 6 essays on the book and a 3-part response by the author).
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Dr. Shane Montgomery Ewegen Associate Professor of Philosophy
    Dr. Shane Montgomery Ewegen Associate Professor of Philosophy Trinity College 300 Summit Street Hartford, CT 06106 [email protected] AOS: 20th Century German Philosophy; Ancient Philosophy; Continental Philosophy AOC: History of Philosophy Education: Ph.D., Boston College, Philosophy—December 2011 M.A., Boston College, Philosophy—May 2007 B.A., University of Colorado at Denver, Philosophy—May 2004 Languages: Ancient Greek (reading); German (reading) Teaching Positions Held: Trinity College (Hartford, CT) – Associate Professor of Philosophy (Fall 2018 – present) Trinity College (Hartford, CT) – Assistant Professor of Philosophy (Fall 2013 – 2018) Stonehill College (Easton, MA) – Visiting Assistant Professor (2012 – 2013) Boston College (Chestnut Hill, MA) – Teaching Fellow (Fall 2008 – Fall 2011) Publications: Books: Author: The Way of the Platonic Socrates. 2020. Bloomington: Indiana University Press Plato’s Cratylus: The Comedy of Language. 2013. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Edited: John Sallis. On Beauty and Measure: Plato’s ‘Symposium’ and ‘Statesman.’ Edited by S. Montgomery Ewegen. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1 Articles: “Fighting Fire with Fire: Thinking Physis at the Inception,” in Research in Phenomenology 51:3 (2021). Forthcoming. “A Man of No Substance: The Philosopher in Plato’s Gorgias,” in Volume 33 of The Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy (2018) “The Thing and I: Thinking Things in Heidegger’s Country Path Conversations” in Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual
    [Show full text]
  • Is Semicompatibilism Unstable?
    Is Semicompatibilism Unstable? Taylor W. Cyr University of California, Riverside BIBLID [0873-626X (2017) 45; pp. 245–264] DOI: 10.1515/disp-2017-0006 Abstract Recently, John Maier has developed a unified account of various agen- tive modalities (such as general abilities, potentialities, and skills). Ac- cording to him, however, adopting the account provides an alternative framework for thinking about free will and moral responsibility, one that reveals an unacceptable instability in semicompatibilism (the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism even if the freedom to do otherwise is not). In this paper, I argue that Maier is mistaken about the implications of his account and sketch a semicompatibilist proposal that can, without countenancing any instability, accept Maier’s unified account of the agentive modalities. Keywords Ability, John Martin Fischer, John Maier, option, semicompatibilism. 1 Introduction Semicompatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism even if the abil- ity (or freedom) to do otherwise is not. According to John Martin Fischer, who both introduced the term semicompatibilism and has la- bored much in defense of the view, one appealing feature of the view is that it does not leave our status as morally responsible agents—and thus our being appropriate candidates for the reactive attitudes (such as resentment and gratitude), and perhaps even our being persons, in some sense—to depend on whether or not our world is causally deterministic.1 As Fischer puts it, semicompatibilism maintains ‘that our basic status as distinctively free and morally responsible agents 1 See Fischer 1994 for more on semicompatibilism and what is at stake in debates about freedom and moral responsibility.
    [Show full text]
  • Moderate Reasons-Responsiveness, Moral Responsibility, and Manipulation
    This is the penultimate version of an essay published in Freedom and Determinism, Ed. Joe Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and David Shier (MIT Press) 2004. Moderate Reasons-Responsiveness, Moral Responsibility, and Manipulation Todd R. Long, California Polytechnic State University I may be a bird in a cage, but at least it’s your cage.—Old 97’s Frankfurt-type examples have proven to be quite helpful in our thinking about the relation between freedom and moral responsibility. Harry Frankfurt designed his own examples to show that an agent can be morally responsible even if that agent could not have done otherwise.1 Following Frankfurt’s lead, many philosophers have developed their own Frankfurt-type examples to extend our understanding and sometimes to exercise our intuitions about the limits of moral responsibility and freedom.2 In this essay, I join this enterprise by providing a novel Frankfurt-type example designed to reveal the limits of moral responsibility, given a new theory of responsibility developed by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza. Although I am sympathetic to the mechanism-based theory of moral responsibility that Fischer and Ravizza (hereafter, “F&R”) argue for in Responsibility and Control, I believe there is trouble for the way in which they apply their theory to Frankfurt-type examples. I will show that F&R’s theory handles my test cases appropriately, but accepting my conclusion requires us (and them) to deny the seemingly plausible intuition that certain cases of rather severe external manipulation rule out moral responsibility. In what follows I first summarize F&R’s notion of guidance control with an eye toward explaining their preferred notion of reasons-responsiveness (namely, “moderate reasons- responsiveness”).
    [Show full text]
  • Dec. 2016 CURRICULUM VITAE RUTH ABBEY Educational Background Phd in Political Science, Mcgill University, 1995. Di
    Updated – Dec. 2016 CURRICULUM VITAE RUTH ABBEY Educational Background PhD in Political Science, McGill University, 1995. Dissertation: Descent & Dissent: Nietzsche's Reading of Two French Moralists. Supervisor: Charles Taylor. MA in Political Science, McGill University, 1989 Research paper: John Dewey: A Fresh Look BA, Monash University, 1984. First class honours in Political Science and a Major in English. Thesis title: The Liberation of the senses in Karl Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 Career Current Position Professor, Dept. of Political Science, University of Notre Dame Previous Positions 2005-2013 Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, University of Notre Dame 2008-2009 Faculty Fellow Murphy Institute for Ethics and Public Affairs Tulane University, New Orleans 2002-2005 Senior Lecturer Department of Politics & International Relations University of Kent at Canterbury 2000-2002 Lecturer in Political Theory, Department of Politics and International Relations, UKC 2000 Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Australia 1999-2000 Member of the School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey 2 1999 Acting Director, Politics & Law Program, College of Law, University of Notre Dame, Australia Honorary Research Fellow, Department of Political Science, University of Western Australia. 1997 Visiting Scholar, Faculty of Social & Political Sciences, Cambridge University (Michaelmas Term) 1996-1997 Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science, University of Western Australia
    [Show full text]
  • Ontologizing the Public Realm: Arendt and the Political
    123 Ontologizing the Public Realm – Arendt and the Political Cecilia Sjöholm Within the tradition of German philosophy, the idea of a public realm has incarnated the possibilities of emancipation and enligh- tenment. To Immanuel Kant, the public sphere opened up in the eighteenth century represents a victory of reason over private interests. To Jürgen Habermas, the debates that are undertaken within the public sphere represent a promise of democracy. In this latter interpretation, the possibilities for communication are con- ditioned by the public realm, and the possibilities of democracy are conditioned by the communication taking place in the public realm; the goal of democracy is to make it possible, for as many people as possible, to participate in public debates. To Habermas as for Kant, the public sphere represents the possibilities of eman- cipation; we participate in open discussion and debate with a kind of unaffected enthusiasm where we are able to transcend our pri- vate interests, thereby participating in the realm of freedom opened up by the modern discovery of normativity. In a similar way, Hannah Arendt idealised the polis of ancient Greece as a retrospective vision of political freedom. But to Arendt, the political impact of the public realm is less about the trajectory of modernity, the realization of reason or normative language. It is, rather, an ontologized vision of how our concepts of reality and truth arise. Rather than defining human reality as a product of The Human, Arendt’s describes it as the product of CECILIA SJÖHOLM plurality. Through the gathering of perspectives which are realized in and through public realm, in its historical versions as given in the polis, the res publica and so on, what Arendt calls reality comes into being.
    [Show full text]
  • Amy Mullin Rev
    Amy Mullin rev. June 2019 Biographical Information Citizenship: Canadian and U.S. Office address: Department of Philosophy, Maanjiwe nandamowinanan 6170, University of Toronto Mississauga, 3359 Mississauga Rd. N., Mississauga, ON, L5L 1C6 Internet: [email protected] Degrees AB Magna Cum Laude, Harvard College, 1985 Ph.D. Yale University, 1990 Thesis Topic: The Divided Self Thesis Supervisor: Karsten Harries Employment 2011 – 2015 Vice Principal Academic and Dean, University of Toronto Mississauga 2010 -11 Interim Vice Principal Academic and Dean, University of Toronto Mississauga 2006 – current, Professor, University of Toronto Mississauga 1995 - 2006 Associate Professor, University of Toronto Mississauga 1990 – current, Member, Graduate Faculty, University of Toronto 1990 - 1995: Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Mississauga Professional Affiliations and Activities Program Committee, American Society of Aesthetics, for Toronto conference 2018 Adjudication Committee - SSHRC – Aid to Small Universities, 2014 Executive Committee, Society for Analytic Feminism, 2009- 2011 Steering Committee, Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, 2006-2011 Board of Editorial Consultants, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2002-2007 Coordinator, Canadian Society of Women in Philosophy, 1998- 2000 Vice-Coordinator, Canadian Society of Women in Philosophy, 1997-1998 Member, Board of Directors, Canadian Philosophical Association, 1994-96 Referee, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, 2017 – present Referee, Childhood, 2017 - present Referee, Res
    [Show full text]
  • Zoltan Miklosi Department of Political Science Central European University
    ZOLTAN MIKLOSI DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY Phone: (+43) 1 25230 7911 Quellenstrasse 51 [email protected] Vienna, 1100 EDUCATION PhD ELTE University, Philosophy November 2005 Dissertation: “Rational Second Nature” New School for Social Research (visiting doctoral student) 2000-2002 BA ELTE University, History and English June 1996 HONORS AND AWARDS Visiting Fellowship University of Oxford, Department of Politics March 2019 (Short-term Erasmus Mobility exchange) Finalist for the Marc Sanders Prize in Political Philosophy 2016 (Selected by the editors of the Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy) Laurance S. Rockefeller Faculty Fellow Princeton University, University Center for Human Values 2014-15 Reiner Schürmann Memorial Scholarship New School for Social Research (Awarded annually to an outstanding student in the Department of Philosophy) 2002-03 Transregional Center for Democratic Studies Fellowship New School for Social Research 2001-2002 Fulbright Fellowship for doctoral students New School for Social Research, Department of Philosophy 2000-02 ACADEMIC POSITIONS • Head of Department, Department of Political Science, CEU 2017- • Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, CEU 2016- 1 • Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, CEU 2009- 16 • Parental leave 2008 • Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Hungarian National Science Fund 2005- 07 • Visiting Faculty, Department of Political Science, CEU 2006-07 • Visiting Faculty, Nationalism Studies Program, CEU 2004-05 • Lecturer, Education
    [Show full text]
  • Responsibility, History and Manipulation Author(S): John Martin Fischer Source: the Journal of Ethics, Vol
    Responsibility, History and Manipulation Author(s): John Martin Fischer Source: The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 4, Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views (Dec., 2000), pp. 385-391 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115664 . Accessed: 24/02/2011 13:14 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Ethics. http://www.jstor.org JOHNMARTIN FISCHER RESPONSIBILITY, HISTORY AND MANIPULATION I'd like to thank Michael [McKenna] for all the hard work he did in putting this conference together.
    [Show full text]