THE INTIFADA: REVEALING THE CHASM By Alan Dowty and Michelle Gawerc*
The outbreak of a new Palestinian uprising (intifada) in September 2000 is analyzed by examining Palestinian perceptions and activities. This article discusses the causes of this development, analyzes Palestinian strategy, and talks of differing Palestinian and Israeli views on the course of the peace process. It also discusses the standpoints of leaders and of public opinion toward these events.
The outbreak of a new Palestinian uprising opinion polls, and other available sources. (intifada) at the end of September 2000, came Insofar as it deals with Palestinian media and as a seismic shock to most observers. Such other Palestinian sources, the views expressed widespread violent confrontations between include officially sanctioned views within the Palestinians and Israeli forces seemed like PA, different views within the leadership, and ghosts from the past, wildly incongruent when finally, grassroots perceptions and attitudes. 98 percent of the Palestinians in the West Since the Palestinian press is essentially Bank and Gaza strip (outside east Jerusalem) controlled by the PA, it expresses the message no longer lived under direct Israeli that the PA wishes to convey to its own occupation. Accordingly, this implausible public. It also includes, however, some event made sense only if it had been, at least messages to the PA from that public. Given in some degree, deliberately planned and this focus on Palestinian leadership attitudes, organized. inevitably less attention is paid to Israeli The question merits investigation, but perceptions (about which, in any event, there analysis should not stop there. There are is less debate). other questions that go beyond the issue of whether, and in what sense, the intifada was EXPECTATIONS OF RENEWED or was not deliberately provoked. Would VIOLENCE something like this have happened, sooner or In its first and most comprehensive later, in any event? Could or should it have statement regarding the causes of the intifada, been anticipated? Whatever the role of the made to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Palestinian Authority (PA) in instigating the Committee (the Mitchell Committee) at the intifada, what stance has it followed since end of December, the government of Israel then? How much control does the PA ascribed the violence of the previous three leadership, or Yasir Arafat personally, months “at its most basic” to “the failure, and actually exercise? Does the PA actually have indeed refusal, of the PLO and the Palestinian a strategy or game plan? Authority to comply with their essential But perhaps most importantly, we should responsibilities, pursuant to the various ask what the last year tells us about the chasm agreements concluded with Israel, to take that separates Israelis and Palestinians. In the such measures as are necessary to forestall understandable push to conclude peace, have acts of violence and terror against Israel and important basic differences in conceptions of Israelis.” The intifada was thus “part of a the peace process been overlooked or calculated policy of the Palestinian leadership understated? Since Palestinian attitudes are in respect of the conduct of its relations with the key issue, we focus on Palestinian Israel,” and preparations for it were evidenced perspectives before and during the intifada, as in such pre-intifada activities as an increase in conveyed in the Palestinian press, public hostile propaganda, the military training of
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Palestinian children in summer camps, the sides were living in different realities, with failure to confiscate illegal weapons, the Palestinians openly expressing a sense of release of known terrorists from detention, deep dissatisfaction that threatened to erupt at and the stockpiling of food and medical any time. In retrospect, there were numerous supplies.(1) In the first three months of the signs of a potential explosion that might be intifada, according to this report, there were set off by any random event. In the about 2700 live-fire attacks initiated by Palestinian submission to the Mitchell Palestinians against Israeli civilians, police, Commission, only about one page, or 5 and soldiers.(2) percent of the entire document, is devoted to Among Palestinians there were other the actual triggering event of the intifada indications of at least a general expectation or (entitled, “Why Did Barak Instigate the anticipation of renewed violence. In July the Crisis?”). The emphasis is on “the roots of the Fatah movement announced a general call-up current uprising” and condemnation of Israeli of boys under the age of 16 for weapons counter-measures taken after it began. training.(3) A group monitoring Palestinian Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount media reported in early August that was not the cause of the intifada; on this Palestinian television was contributing to an particular point Palestinian and Israeli “eve of war” atmosphere by repeated observers are in agreement. In a typical broadcasts of military parades and video clips Palestinian formulation, the intifada “was not of violence against Israeli soldiers.(4) In late just a reaction to a provocative incident.... It is September Arafat reportedly met with leaders a declared, unequivocal position by the of Tanzim, a paramilitary group within Fatah, Palestinian people on the bankruptcy of the to warn that clashes might be imminent.(5) At negotiating option and the full rejection of the around the same time the PLO Executive overall Israeli conduct.”(11) Committee issued a call “to exercise the Hasan Khadir, a Palestinian author familiar maximum degree of vigilance and to be with Israel, claims that to Palestinians it prepared for all eventualities.”(6) seemed that Israel was using the Oslo process Throughout the intifada, the involvement not in pursuit of a “two-state” solution to the of Palestinian security officers in the clashes conflict, but as a means of getting rid of has been reported and documented densely-populated Palestinian areas while extensively. Israeli Chief of Staff Shaul maintaining “an improved occupation.”(12) Mofaz testified to the Knesset Foreign Affairs The fragmentation of the West Bank and and Defense Committee that Palestinian Gaza into separated enclaves--”Bantustans” in security officers were responsible for 40 Palestinian parlance--was a major source of percent of the Israelis killed in the intifada.(7) grievance and frustration. Bypass roads, Israeli security sources noted the presence of many of them reserved for Jewish settlers, a top Palestinian security figure, Tawfiq and checkpoints around PA-controlled areas Dirawi, on the Temple Mount on the fateful meant that Palestinians had even less freedom day of September 29, lending further credence of movement than they had had before the to the view that “Arafat lit the fire, even if he Oslo agreements. So while Israelis felt that is now having trouble controlling the intensity occupation was all but over, since nearly all of the flames.”(8) The clearest claim of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians were now responsibility on the Palestinian side came under PA civil authority, the perception on from PA Communications Minister Imad Al- the other side was quite the opposite. Faluji, who asserted that “this intifada was The most explosive issue, however, was planned in advance, ever since President the continued expansion of Jewish settlements Arafat's return from the Camp David in the territories. Though no new settlements negotiations.”(9) Such later claims may were being established, the “natural growth” overstate the case.(10) of existing settlements evoked a furious Our survey of Palestinian sources over this response among Palestinians that reached a period, however, reveals a more complex crescendo in early September. Al-Quds picture, showing the extent to which the two claimed on September 13 that according to
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 39 The Intifada: Revealing the Chasm official figures from the Israel Ministry of position was not simply an opening Housing, there had been a 96 percent increase gambit.(19) At about the same time, the PA in construction starts in settlements during the Minister of Finance, Muhammad Zuhdi al- first half of 2000 compared to the first half of Nashashibi, explained that for Palestinians the 1999.(13) Throughout the month headlines in concept of compensation was not as a the Palestinian press focused attention substitute for return but in addition to it, as unremittingly on all new settlement payment for damage sustained by the refugees activities.(14) When the intifada began and their property during their absence.(20) settlements were singled out as targets of In this context, further postponement of choice; the director-general of the PA the declaration of a Palestinian state put the Information Ministry wrote that “the PA leadership on the defensive with its own settlements' fields and factories are a target public, whose high expectations it had for the rage of the Palestinian people.... We nurtured. Statehood had already been must continue to see them as targets for postponed once, at the end of the five-year burning and destruction; this is our legitimate transition period set in Oslo I. Another right...”(15) The anger against the settlers is postponement, beyond the second agreed typified by a columnist in the PA official target date of September 15, 2000, required newspaper: “The settlers are a dirty stain on elaborate explanations by the PA to its public, our land.... It is time to begin expelling them including a long and agonized article by by besieging them, cutting off their Bassam abu Sharif in Al-Quds on September electricity, and contaminating their water.… 10.(21) A number of “national and Islamic” They will become groups of rats gathering in movements, including Fatah, signed a their sewers before they are driven away into statement in favor of immediate statehood and Israel.”(16) demonstrated in support of it.(22) In June a Behind this was a pronounced sense of poll of West Bank and Gaza residents had frustration over the deadlock in final shown a significant 33.5 percent minority in settlement talks and the lack of prospects for favor of confrontation with Israel if no any breakthrough in the foreseeable future. agreement was reached by September, and by Even though they had rejected an Israeli offer September a 55 percent majority favored a that would have addressed most if not all of declaration of statehood even if it led to the above grievances--by eliminating all the confrontation with Israel.(23) settlements in the Gaza Strip and most of Again, it should be noted that a deal on the those on the West Bank--Palestinian basis of the Camp David proposal could have negotiators returned from the Camp David quickly led to a mutually accepted summit in July with a strong sense of a independent Palestinian state. Having rejected yawning chasm separating the two sides. this route, however, the Palestinian leadership Muhammad Dahlan, head of Preventive was all the more under pressure to show that Security in Gaza, labeled the Israeli position it was attaining results and successes. on Jerusalem as “no more than a kind of In short, by all indications there was by lunacy.”(17) late September a strong consensus among On the refugee issue, the stark differences Palestinians, public and leaders alike, that (as laid bare at Camp David only hardened in the one commentator put it) “coexistence between following weeks. Palestinian refugees the occupier Hebrew state and the Palestinian mobilized to block any agreement short of an people is impossible, even if there is a state, absolute right of return. A conference to without ending all manifestations of develop a “unified Arab strategic vision” on occupation, primarily settlement activity. If the issue was held in Amman in early there is insistence on this impossible September.(18) The PLO Central Committee, coexistence, the alternative is war.”(24) This on September 13, reaffirmed in the most impending explosion was also seen as a threat unqualified terms the claim of a right of all to Yasir Arafat and the PA leadership; if they refugees to return to their original homes in failed to represent this anger and frustration, Israel, and it was becoming clear that this they would also become a target of it. A
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Palestinian living in Canada had this message Muhammad Dahlan warned of “likely for the PA: “We gave you the opportunity to deterioration of the security situation” if restore the homeland and you have failed, so agreement were not reached, and added that let us confront this enemy in the capital and “the PA can confront the extremists in the cities of Palestine.”(25) ranks of our people, but it cannot confront all Even the Palestinian media operating our people.”(32) under the aegis of the PA reflected this On the following day, when Sharon's critique. A leader of the Popular Front for the intended visit was made known, Palestinian Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) wrote in Al- sources again issued numerous warnings. The Ayyam that “the PA structure and institutions PA Ministry of Information posted a are unqualified for work and for shouldering statement on its website that spoke of the burdens and responsibilities that are “devastating consequences that may arise.... demanded of them under the new political “(33) Al-Ayyam quoted Palestinian sources situation, particularly in light of the predicting “tragic consequences that will spill intifada.”(26) over to the entire region,” and reported a The PA's posture, therefore, was to Fatah call for mobilization to bar Sharon's welcome any explosion but try to channel it entry.(34) The PA newspaper editorialized away from itself and into “useful” directions; that “Sharon's visit will have unpredictable in essence, to ride the wave. Perhaps the best consequences” and that “the Jerusalem issue summary has been provided by Marwan al- will lead to an explosive and destructive Barghuti, the Fatah leader on the West Bank situation....”(35) Jibril Rajub, head of who became a central figure in the Preventive Security on the West Bank, who confrontation: “The explosion would have had previously told Israeli authorities that his happened anyway.... But Sharon provided a forces could handle the visit without any good excuse.”(27) trouble, now warned at the last minute that Palestinian figures provided numerous “riots will not be limited to Jerusalem, but warnings of impending crisis from the time of erupt everywhere in the territories” and that the Camp David collapse. During the Camp the PA would not try to calm the riots “since David talks, a “high-ranking security official” they would be the result of a blatant told the Israel Arab magazine Kul al-Arab provocation.”(36) that “the Palestinian people are in a state of The serious violence began on Friday, emergency against the failure of the Camp September 29, the day after Sharon's visit, David summit. If the situation explodes they when four Palestinian demonstrators were are ready for the next bloody battle against the killed on the Temple Mount and three died in Israeli occupation. The next intifada will be... confrontations elsewhere. From this point more violent than the first one....”(28) Shlomo Palestinian calls to continue and expand the Ben-Ami, then Israel's Foreign Minister, uprising were general and constant; the term recalls a conversation with Marwan al- “intifada” came into general use within two or Barghuti after Camp David in which he was three days. Calls for “resistance” came from told “Shlomo, if by September you don't individual figures and movements and from finish this, things won't be good.”(29) the PA-controlled media. School was In early September, Arafat warned the suspended on the third day, releasing students Palestinian Central Council of “five difficult for participation in demonstrations, and weeks ahead” and said that “we must be sporadic efforts by security officers to control prepared for the worst; our people can start all the crowds were gradually abandoned. Public over again.”(30) PA Planning and support for continuing the intifada has International Cooperation Minister Nabil remained high, registering 70 percent in Sha'th, said a few days later that the next six December and 80 percent in April.(37) weeks would be critical and that failure to Once the violence had begun, Israel's reach an agreement by the end of October countermeasures became an additional source would be “a disaster.”(31) Only two days of grievances among Palestinians. To the before Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount, previous fragmentation of the West Bank and
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 41 The Intifada: Revealing the Chasm Gaza was added the policy of closure and and is leading it.… The intifada expresses the hundreds of roadblocks that made movement [will] of the masses. It did not begin with an between towns almost impossible. Salim al- order and will not end with an order.”(43) The Za'nun, speaker of the Palestine National ambiguity of the intifada's organization is part Council, claims that Gaza had been divided of its strength, as it is difficult to blame the into 16 separate enclaves and the West Bank PA leadership for events in which its role is into 31 pieces.(38) As a result life has come kept unclear. In other words, “Arafat must be to a standstill. The loss in gross domestic assumed not to have deviated from his time- product is estimated at 50 percent. In a poll honored custom of not leaving fingerprints on conducted by the Development Studies the trigger of the Palestinian rifle.”(44) Program at Birzeit University in February, 27 In these circumstances the precise extent percent of families reported a loss of all of Arafat's control will not become clear until income and the remaining 73 percent all it is tested, and it will not be tested until reported a loss of some income, 42 percent Arafat has a strong motivation to end the had difficulties in access to health services, 60 confrontation, including some concrete percent suffered loss of access to education, political gain to show for it. In the meantime, and 75 percent said they had suffered he does not need to give orders, but simply psychological trauma.(39) allow others to act. Israeli government The question of Yasir Arafat's personal sources have made much of the involvement role may be of less importance than at first of PA officials in the violence, claiming that appears. Within the Israeli defense 70 percent of attacks in the first three months establishment debate has raged between those were carried out by members of Fatah or the (mostly in military intelligence) who argue security organizations.(45) The response of that Arafat controls the level of violence and Palestinian officials to such accusations is others (Shin Bet and the government stated succinctly by Muhammad Dahlan: “Let coordinator in the territories) who conclude them go to hell with their proofs. We will not that Arafat's hold on matters is shaky at disconnect ourselves from the people, and we best.(40) Both sides agree that Arafat has will always lead it.”(46) done little or nothing to put out the flames, One consequence of the Palestinian but they disagree on the reason. The weight division of labor in the intifada, however, has of evidence seems to favor those who see been a flow of power and authority from the Arafat's control--or at least his desire to seek “national” and “governmental” institutions of to take control of the situation--as limited. the PA back to the PLO and to the “fighting” First of all, there is the general pattern of movements both within and outside the PLO. Arafat's leadership historically. As Barry Some Palestinians have described this as a Rubin says, “Arafat never made a serious return to the atmosphere of the 1970s and effort to impose his will on a PLO splintered 1980s. Arafat is even praised for having left by ideologies, fiefdoms, and loyalties to this revolutionary infrastructure intact to fall different Arab states.”(41) Or in the words of back on, “perhaps due to calculations that Shlomo Ben-Ami, “Arafat is not a leader who have to do with what is happening now.”(47) faces the waves, but rather he rides them.”(42) TWO PARALLEL UNIVERSES Secondly, Palestinian leaders seem to see What the intifada has revealed, however, is this diffusion of responsibility as an not just a chasm between Israelis and advantage in the current intifada. The PA Palestinians on final status issues and on the leadership can keep its distance from realities in which both sides operate, but also controversial actions, while the Tanzim, or diametrically opposed conceptions of the Fatah generally, can claim credit for peace process itself. Surveys indicate that a supplying the muscle. Marwan al-Barghuti strong majority of both Israelis and has stated that “there is a division of labor, Palestinians continue to support “the peace each has its own role and mission. The Fatah process” in the abstract, even after months of movement is proud of launching the intifada clashes, but closer examination shows that
42 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Alan Dowty and Michelle Gawerc they associate quite different meanings to the sides.... Such a policy ignores the fact that the term. For Israelis, the peace process is a Palestinians are the victims of Israeli negotiating model. In this negotiation, each aggression and that the land the Israelis are side trades off assets that it considers less offering to 'give up' is Palestinian land valuable for more valued concessions from occupied by military force.”(51) The the other side, arriving at a balanced Palestinians therefore tend not to make agreement that is better for both than the point counteroffers in response to the proposals of of departure--though the relative advantage others. At Camp David, Clinton's National gained inevitably reflects the bargaining Security Advisor Sandy Berger reportedly leverage of the parties. Since the concessions lashed out at the Palestinians: “We gave you a made are mutually dependent, keeping the territorial proposal and you may reject it if bargain is essential; the agreement becomes a you wish, but you have to reply with a new point of reference that must be respected. methodical counter-proposal.”(52) But the This is the most common view of Palestinian view is that they do not have to international negotiation, and is the best make a counteroffer, as they have nothing left model for understanding--among other things- to give: “Rights, by definition, are neither -the conclusion of peace treaties between negotiable nor exchangeable.”(53) Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Shlomo Ben-Ami, in explaining the Camp Jordan. It is the preferred U.S. approach, as David failure, concluded that when Arafat when President William Clinton in December signed the 1993 Oslo agreement he thought urged Israel and the PA to “split the that he could get all of his demands, and that difference” on remaining final status issues. the Palestinians had already made all their A corollary of the negotiating model is that concessions.(54) What remained, in the negotiation and violent confrontations are Palestinian view, was not negotiation but mutually exclusive, if not contradictory. simply the implementation of principles set Violence, it is felt, undermines the down in existing agreements or, more atmosphere of trust necessary for successful importantly, in the relevant United Nations bargaining. Adherence of the Israeli public to resolutions and international legal this model is seen in survey data from instruments. Appeals to international law and December, in which 74 percent of to the implementation of “resolutions of respondents favored negotiations with international legitimacy” are omnipresent in Palestinians, 13 percent favored Palestinian media, reflecting the view that the confrontations, and only 5 percent thought it peace process is basically not about was possible to pursue both options negotiation but about the implementation of simultaneously.(48) recognized national rights.(55) Hence, Arafat The Palestinian conception of the peace was unwilling to accept anything less than process is quite different. Palestinian one hundred percent on Jerusalem or the analysts, in various formulations, resist the refugee issue at Camp David, suggesting that idea that negotiations should reflect the the two sides were not even close to reaching balance of forces between the two sides, or in an agreement. particular the “military imbalance of It could be argued that, to a great extent, power.”(49) Instead, “The Palestinian people Arafat locked himself into this perspective of view the peace process as a strategic road that negotiation, whether consciously or is supposed to regain the Palestinian people's unconsciously, by consistently promoting it to national and sovereign rights and secure the the Palestinian public and providing little return of their territories.”(50) room to move or adjust. One possible This strategic model does not assume explanation for this situation, many Israelis equal concessions on both sides. As one of the have concluded during the post-Camp David Palestinian Camp David negotiators crisis and conflict, is that Arafat's ultimate expressed it, “the American administration aim goes beyond a stable two-state solution requires 'flexibility' and 'concessions' in equal and seeks to lay the basis for a long-term measure from the Palestinian and Israeli effort to eliminate Israel entirely. In this view,
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 43 The Intifada: Revealing the Chasm he would reject any solution, no matter how an end in themselves.”(61) After the outbreak generally favorable, that might stand in the of the intifada, thousands of Palestinians, led way of this long-term strategy. by a number of prominent figures, petitioned At any rate, notwithstanding the real the PA to “liberate itself from all restrictions concern within the Palestinian community for imposed by the interim agreements which the final status issues--most notably Jerusalem prevent the building of the Palestinian state, and the refugees--it has been well- to immediately start building the state's documented and recently noted by Dennis institutions on the ground, and not to return to Ross that since the signing of the Oslo the same framework of bilateral negotiations accords, Arafat has done nothing to prepare with Israel which reached a deadlock at Camp the public for compromise on these key David.”(62) issues.(56) Rather, Arafat sold to the public So long as Israeli occupation continues, the maximalist negotiating positions and this according to this view, the Palestinian people perspective of negotiation, arguably molding have a natural right of resistance that Palestinian public opinion to be even more supersedes other legalities. In the words of a rigid than the leadership itself to these final member of the Fatah Central Committee, “it status issues and this concept of is the right of the Palestinian people to choose negotiation.(57) any form of resistance against the occupation” The corollary to this conception of the and furthermore “this right is guaranteed by peace process is that agreements reached in international law.”(63) It is hypocritical for the course of implementing these basic Israel to denounce Palestinian violence “as if principles are relative to that aim. If the occupation was a peaceful action.”(64) In agreements do not advance the achievement fact, argued a PA legal team in a memo for of Palestinian rights, or if Israel does not meet negotiators, “the lack of visible resistance to its obligations, then Palestinians cannot be Israeli occupation from the Palestinian side... held to the precise provisions of these has created the false impression that the agreements. In any event, the Interim 'process' of achieving peace could substitute Agreement governing the five-year period of for peace itself.”(65) The right of resistance transition expired with the end of this period also has considerable international support, as in May 1999, and Palestinians are bound to it seen in the reception of Israel's “White only to the extent that Israel observes its Paper,” detailing Palestinian violations of the provisions--many of which, in the Palestinian Oslo agreements in November 2000. In a view, it does not.(58) Consequently, a final rather remarkable statement reportedly made status agreement that fell short would not during an Israeli Cabinet meeting, Foreign necessarily be respected; a poll at the time of Minister Ben-Ami reported that he had Camp David indicated that only 42 percent of stopped dissemination of the document Palestinians believed that a majority of their because “the world doesn't get very excited community would abide by an agreement that when it's told that peoples which live under might be reached at the summit, while 38 conquest fail to honor agreements.”(66) percent believed that a majority would not Neither the Palestinian leadership nor the abide by such an agreement.(59) Palestinian public accepts the oft-repeated Prior to the intifada there were many calls Israeli premise that they must choose between among Palestinians to break out of the peace and terror.(67) Both negotiations and “confines” of the Oslo process. Ahmad the intifada are seen as legitimate methods for Quray' (Abu Ala) called for a series of steps achieving basic rights, and they can be used to “break the constraints” that had been simultaneously with no contradiction. In imposed on Palestinians during the Nabil Sha'th's words, “historically many transitional phase.(60) Mustafa Al-Barghuti people fought and negotiated at the same wrote that “Palestinians have options outside time.”(68) Another formulation is “putting the the Oslo negotiations” and reminded his force option on an equal footing with the readers that “negotiations are a strategy for peace option and placing force into the achieving human rights and a just peace, not service of peace.”(69) When asked in a poll
44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Alan Dowty and Michelle Gawerc whether they favored an intifada with “popular” (i.e., non-military) or military STRATEGY AND GOALS characteristics, 62 percent of Palestinian The declared goals and strategies of the respondents said they favored both.(70) intifada for Palestinians have evolved through Behind this thinking is a scenario in which its course. Insofar as the goal was declared at Israeli opposition is broken down step by step onset, the intifada was to persist until the end by a combination of the various pressures, of occupation and the establishment of an and past history is cited as evidence. In an independent Palestinian state. Arguably, no important speech delivered in March 2001 in more was involved, and yet no less. One of Beirut, PA Minister Faysal al-Husayni argued the many such voices, Col. Muhammad that in the first intifada Palestinians had Dahlan succinctly stated on October 10: “The succeeded in breaking important Israeli Palestinian side will not go back to the “taboos”--that there was no Palestinian negotiations unless Israel recognizes its people, that there would be no Palestinian withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza and state--and that in the second intifada they had Jerusalem.”(77) In line with this demand, succeeded in breaking taboos regarding with an additional precondition of Palestinian Jerusalem and the refugees.(71) In similar statehood, the Finance Minister al-Nashashibi language Oreib Rantawi wrote of “breaking declared, “The Aqsa Intifada will continue the invariable strands of the Israeli until the liberation of the Palestinian soil and consensus” and concluded that “Israeli the establishment of the independent state arrogance was broken several times, in with al-Quds al-Shareef [as its capital].”(78) Lebanon and in Palestine, and what seemed Al-Nashashibi also stressed that the impossible one day seems to be possible Palestinian leadership was committed to nowadays.”(72) Hani al-Masri has written providing the necessary support, and ensuring that “most of the sacred Israeli cows were the sustainability of the intifada, in order to slaughtered at Camp David... the guarantee its success. establishment of a Palestinian state with At a November 5, 2000, rally in Ramallah, Jerusalem as its capital and the approval of Information Minister Yasir Abd Rabbu the right of return are two realistic objectives defined the goals of the intifada less that can be achieved in the foreseeable expansively. Abd Rabbu demarcated three future.”(73) objectives, with a special emphasis on Confidence in the strategy of wearing internationalization. These aims included a down Israeli opposition is derived, in part, resumption of negotiations that would be from the Lebanese model. Palestinian sources based on withdrawal (rather than territorial refer constantly to Israeli withdrawal from trade-off); the enlargement of the southern Lebanon as a precedent. So long as international sponsorship of the negotiations it does not escalate to war, it is felt, attrition to include partners beyond that of the United can gradually force Israel to pull back.(74) States; and finally, an international presence Key to this is the assumption that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the “are prepared to make sacrifices in order to duration of the negotiations.(79) The theme of achieve independence; as for the Israeli internationalization--taking the form of “an people, it cannot tolerate the consequences of international conference” to broaden the continuing violence and bloodshed, from a sponsorship of the negotiations and also that psychological, economic, and social of an international presence to protect standpoint....”(75) In this framework even the Palestinians--became the main demand in the election of Ariel Sharon as prime minister of following period.(80) Some have speculated Israel can be cast in a positive light from the that Arafat wanted to achieve Palestinian perspective: Sharon is seen as “the internationalization by provoking a massive last arrow in Israel's quiver,” and when this Israeli response that would remind the arrow fails to reach its target “Israel will have international community of Kosovo, and thus only one way to go, the way toward trigger international intervention to force an peace.”(76) Israeli withdrawal.(81) Even more radically, it
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 45 The Intifada: Revealing the Chasm has also been speculated that Arafat was and the Galilee, and Jaffa, and the Triangle ready to bring about the collapse of the and the Negev, and the rest of our cities and Palestinian Authority itself in order to force villages…[Indeed] have no mercy on the international intervention.(82) Jews, no matter where they are, in any With the prospect for internationalization country. Fight them, wherever you are. fading over time--a result of consistent U.S. Wherever you meet them, kill them.”(86)And vetoes, combined with the inaction of Arab there were repeated extreme statements by the states, only limited interest in direct PA-appointed mufti of Jerusalem. In one of intervention within Europe, and a growing his many rousing sermons he stated “There is Palestinian disillusionment with Arab support, no room for compromising solutions with reaching a high of almost sixty percent-- regard to occupied Jerusalem. Israeli energy was channeled towards defining more citizenship is forbidden for Palestinians focused, achievable goals. Most notably, this according to Shari'a... those who have already translated to the freezing of settlements.(83) acquired it should give it up because it does Indeed, by March-April, the freezing of not honor them particularly since Israel's days settlements had become the main condition are numbered.”(87) for ending violence and returning to the Among establishment figures there was negotiations. On the popular level, less open reference to “pre-1967” issues. One settlements have always been a significant case was Faysal al-Husayni: speaking in issue for Palestinians, but nowadays, Beirut to a forum of Arab lawyers, Husayni reflective in Palestinian discourse, there is a stated: “We may lose or win [tactically] but much firmer stance toward a total evacuation our eyes will continue to aspire to the of settlements.(84) It could be said, as strategic goal, namely, to Palestine from the Palestinian academics Hammami and Tamari river to the sea.”(88) Also, PA Minister Abd poignantly argue, “What began as an uprising Rabbu hinted at an existing ambiguity for al-Aqsa and Palestinian control over regarding what will happen after the Jerusalem has increasingly become a battle establishment of a Palestinian state within the against the settlements.”(85) Yet in June and 1967 borders: “There is almost a consensus July 2001, the Palestinian leadership was among Palestinians that the direct goal is to either unwilling or unable to fulfill a ceasefire reach the establishment of an independent that, with U.S. support, would have led Palestinian state in the June 4, 1967 borders, quickly and directly to such a freeze. with Jerusalem as its capital… [but] regarding Meanwhile, the unexpected nature of the the future after that, it is best to leave the Intifada led many Israelis to believe that issue aside and not to discuss it.”(89) Palestinians were aiming for more than an end Further adding to the confusion and to the occupation. These perspectives were ambiguity, PNC Speaker Salim Za'anun often reinforced and/or confirmed by the announced at a press conference in Cairo the emphasis on the return of refugees to Israeli founding of the “Commission of National territory. Nonetheless, apart from some of the Independence” whose platform reaffirms the predictable sources--mainly Hamas, religious validity of the PLO Covenant with direct preachers, and some on the radical left--the reference to the articles calling for the Palestinian focus has usually, though less than destruction of Israel and “armed struggle as previously, been restricted to the 1967 lines. the only way to liberate Palestine.”(90) The Contributing to the confusion regarding commission's platform declares, “The the Palestinians' “true intentions,” in the establishers [of this organization] consider intifada, religious exhortations were often that the PLO Covenant remains in place broadcast live and could be heard on official inasmuch as the PNC has not until now met to PA television. One such sermon given on ratify the changes which were previously October 14, 2000 by Dr. Ahmad Abu suggested, particularly that a legal committee Halabiya, from his mosque in Gaza, was not formed to adopt the demanded proclaimed “Even if an agreement of Gaza is modifications.”(91) Attracting major attention signed--we shall not forget Haifa, and Acre, in the Arab press, this commission reportedly
46 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Alan Dowty and Michelle Gawerc includes many on the official leadership level But the second intifada took place with an and Arafat himself “gave his blessing to it Israeli government that had offered more than [the Commission] and any notes it any predecessor; it violated existing Israeli- distributes.”(92) Palestinian agreements; and it quickly On the other hand, others deny having any degenerated into military firefights rather than intention and/or aim of destroying Israel. One popular protest. The result, for most Israelis, such commentator, Hani al-Masri, argues that was to discredit the peace process itself. this is a dangerous falsity preoccupying Israel, According to a March poll by Mina Tzemach as it serves to justify violent Israeli measures of the Dahaf Institute, 37 percent of those against Palestinians.(93) From a different surveyed reported that they had become more angle, Dr. Mar'i Abd al-Rahman, a PLO hawkish as a result of the Intifada, against official, criticized the escalation of rhetoric only 13 percent who had become more which accompanied this intifada, extending dovish; a full 63 percent now believed that it beyond the political agenda adopted by the was impossible to achieve a peace treaty with PLO in 1988, and urged all to remember that the Palestinians.(97) If further proof were the goal is “the establishment of a Palestinian needed, the fall of Ehud Barak and the state on the land occupied in 1967, with election of Ariel Sharon--a far more hawkish Jerusalem as its capital.” In other words, he prime minister--should make the point. The declared, “We [Palestinians] recognized point is that if Israelis thought they had no Israel.”(94) Reflecting the chasms and the alternative and that further concessions would ambiguity within the Palestinian community, risk both their personal security and the the poll data itself shows a multi-faceted split. survival of their state and society, they would In December 2000, 47 percent of Palestinians refuse, be willing to fight long and hard. preferred the two-state solution, 20 percent Sophisticated Palestinian observers have the binational state solution, 16 percent other recognized the different impact that this solutions--usually implying a unitary intifada has had on the Israeli populace Palestinian or Islamic state--and 11 percent compared to the first. But even then, many believed that there is no solution. The figures claim there have been some gains in the for March 2001 were very similar.(95) Israeli public opinion. Some have argued that it has created a more promising atmosphere PALESTINIAN GAINS AND SECOND for the dismantling of settlements and for a THOUGHTS negotiated settlement giving them everything Notwithstanding the declared goals, this up to the 1967 borders.(98) On the popular intifada has had a different impact on Israeli grassroots level, there is a belief that this opinion from that of the first intifada. In the intifada, similar to the first intifada, has late 1980s, Israel had a government willing to succeeded (and will continue to succeed) in offer far less to the Palestinians, there was no achieving many gains for Palestinians. It is Israeli-Palestinian peace process, occupation recognized as having unified and motivated was in full swing, and Palestinian protest had the Palestinian people, while demonstrating to a generally populist character. The result was themselves, the world, and even as a pseudo- to discredit the status quo; Israeli opinion warning to their leaders, the public's moved significantly in a dovish direction, steadfastness in the struggle to achieve their laying the foundation for the peace process a national aims and aspirations. It is perceived short time later. For example, in Asher as having been successful at gaining Arab and Arian's surveys, the percentage of those international attention and sympathy, and willing to return territories increased from 43 furthermore, as having reinforced Arafat's percent in 1986 to 60 percent in 1993.(96) If popularity and prestige among Palestinians Israelis thought they had an acceptable and Arabs generally. alternative that would provide real peace and Perhaps most telling, the majority security--even if that route required extensive continues to cling to the belief that the concessions--they were willing to take that intifada will force Israelis into giving greater course. concessions and/or coming closer to meeting
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 47 The Intifada: Revealing the Chasm Palestinians' demands. In fact, according to a negotiations… and negotiations mean poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media reaching compromise solutions from which Communication Center, a striking 69 percent both sides gain but that do not give the two of Palestinians believe that the intifada will parties all what they want.”(105) increase the Israeli readiness to meet But these are the views of a small Palestinian demands, though only 26 percent minority. In the short run, the likelihood is of Israelis agree with this assessment for further escalation. The PA leadership has (compared to 53 percent who believe that it clearly calculated that it cannot or is not ready has done the opposite and has decreased the to move toward a meaningful deescalation, Israeli willingness).(99) and test its control of militants within its own Notwithstanding the perceived success of ranks, without a clear--and perhaps very this intifada, from the beginning there were substantial--political gain. calls to retain and/or restore the popular and Having spoken so openly and repeatedly in peaceful character reminiscent of the first favor of the proposition that Israeli intifada. In one such instance, Dr. Saleh concessions prove the Palestinians should Abdel Jawad argued that Palestinians are not maintain or even increase their demands, prepared for a military face-off and that the however, makes it even harder to persuade use of arms would constitute both political Israel to take such steps. In practice, this and military suicide.(100) Palestinian makes Israelis less inclined to make newspapers rejected this article and it only concessions, believing their past ones have became publicly available by being posted on been interpreted as signs of weakness and a web site. By early March 2001, there were desperation, thus unintentionally encouraging more voices against the militarization of the more Palestinian demands and even violence. intifada. For example, Hani Al-Masri argued Further, the current Israeli government is that Palestinian resistance could not be committed with equal determination to the compared to the Lebanese national and proposition that the violence must end Islamic resistance, as the intifada is hardening without any “reward” to the Palestinians. The Israeli opinion rather than softening it.(101) likelihood, therefore, is for a continued testing Even Marwan Al-Barguti called for emphasis of wills on both sides, not to the point of a on popular opposition rather than military general war (none of the states in the area force, although later he denied this was a new would welcome that) but to a level of strategy. (102) violence that would be a long-term test of the There is also broader criticism of the capacity of each to endure pain. intifada, to the extent that a few intellectuals Equally painful is that even a return to have called for a return to negotiations and a negotiations is clearly no magic solution. The halt to the intifada. For instance, Amin al- basic issues remain as they were before. We Mahdi, an Egyptian intellectual, distinguishes are in the tunnel at the end of the light. It will and elucidates the differences between the take far more time before we reach the light at first intifada to this latter uprising, belittles the end of the tunnel. the Lebanese analogy, and claims that the only solution is negotiations, as war just * Alan Dowty is Professor of Government and brings more Arab casualties and defeats.(103) International Studies, and Fellow of the Joan Another commentator, Isa al-Sh'aybi from Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Jordan, exclaims that the absence of at the University of Notre Dame. His latest moderation in the intifada has led to a critical book is The Jewish State: A Century Later, loss of Israeli public opinion, contradicting which has just been issued in paperback by both Palestinian needs and national the University of California Press. He has objectives.(104) Another commentator also published over 130 articles and reviews challenged the basic Palestinian conception of on the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy, and negotiations and/or in his words, the policy of other issues of international politics. “wanting to get everything or nothing.” Poignantly, he argues: “Peace is the result of
48 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Alan Dowty and Michelle Gawerc
Michelle Gawerc recently received an MA in plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of Peace Studies from the University of Notre violence at the first opportunity.” Dame. Prior to receiving this degree, she was 11. Taysir Qub'ah, “Protection and a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Haifa Continuation of the Blessed Intifadah is a Top engaged in research on the Israeli- Priority of All Palestinian Forces,” Al-Ayyam, Palestinian conflict and peace education, and October 6, 2000, FBIS-NES-2000-1006. For also worked as a consultant for UNESCO- similar statements on the need to examine the Washington. “root causes” of the uprising, see statements by Hanan Ashrawi (“Summary of Briefing: NOTES Briefing of Leaders of Palestinian Civil 1. Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, First Society Institutions for the Members of the Statement of the Government of Israel to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee,” Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, Palestine Media Center, March 23, 2001, December 28, 2000,
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 49 The Intifada: Revealing the Chasm 19. David Bedein, “The 'Right of Return': The 32. “PA;s Dahlan Warns of 'Security PLO Negotiating Position That Stalls the Deterioration' if Talks Fail,” Al-Ayyam, Process,” IRR, September 21, 2000. September 26, 2000, FBIS-NES-2000-0926. 20. Muhammed Amin, “PA Finance Minister 33. “Palestine Ministry of Information warns on Compensations, Aid, Debt, Resources, of the catastrophic consequences of Sharon's Other Issues,” Al-Dustur (Amman), visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque on Thursday,” September 20, 2000, FBIS-NES-2000-0920. September 27, 2000, 21. “Palestinian Writer Urges Statehood
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“'Process of Collapse' Underway in PA, Washington D.C., May 15, 2001; see also Report Security Chiefs,” Ha’aretz, February David Schenker, “Is a Jerusalem Deal Enough 16, 2001; Harel, “Force 17 Boss Said Head of For Peace,” Washington Institute for Near Terror Gang,” Ha’aretz, March 16, 2001. East Policy, July 24, 2000. 46. Imad Al-Ifranji, “PA's Protective Security 57. Schenker, ibid. Head Dahlan Interviewed,” Al-Ra’y 58. Ghassan Khatib, “Is Arafat in Control?” (Amman), November 23, 2000, FBIS-NES- Palestine Report, November 22, 2000. 2000-1124. 59.JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 38, July, 47. Abdallah Awad, “The Option of 2000, Escalation of Resistance,” Al-Ayyam, April 1,
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 51 The Intifada: Revealing the Chasm 74. The Lebanese analogy is examined 89. Al-Jazeera (Qatar), November 17, 2000, critically by Ze'ev Schiff, “Misreading MEMRI, Special Dispatch, No. 155, History Risks Catastrophe,” Ha’aretz, April November 22, 2000. 5, 2001. Not all Palestinian analysts agree on 90. Hay'at al Istiqlal al Watani (The the relevance of the Lebanese model; see Zvi Commission of National Independence) draft Barel, “A 'Looking Glass' Kind of Fascism,” platform. Clauses extracted from David Ha’aretz, January 22, 2001. Schenker, “Inside Palestinian Politics: 75. Yusuf Alsalem, Al-Hayat Al-Jedida, Preparing for Israel Under Sharon,” The August 13, 2000, IRR, August 31, 2000. Washington Institute for Near East Politics, 76. Hani Al-Masri, “The Authority's Peacewatch, No. 307, February 8, 2001. Alternatives,” Al-Ayyam, February 24, 2001, 91. Ibid. FBIS-NES-2001-0226. 92. Those reportedly involved in this new 77. “Dahlan Affirms Taking All Measures to initiative include: PA Security heads Jabril Protect the People from Barak's Threats,” Al- Rajoub and Amin al-Hindi, Fatah Tanzim Hayat al-Jadida, JMCC Daily Press leader Marwan Barghouthi, and PLO Political Summaries, October 10, 2000. Department Head Farouq Qaddumi, in 78. “Nashashibi: Aqsa Intifada Will Continue addition to the expected Hamas leaders Ismail Until the Expulsion of Occupation,” Al-Hayat Abu Shanab and Mahmoud al Zahar. For al-Jadida, JMCC Daily Press Summaries, Arafat's quote and more information on his October 10, 2000. response to the Commission see David 79. Hammami and Tamari, pp.21-22. Schenker, “Inside Palestinian Politics: 80. See in particular Al-Hayat al-Jadida, Preparing for Israel Under Sharon,” October 31, 2000, MEMRI, Special Dispatch Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No. 148, November 1, 2000; Al-Jazeera Peacewatch No. 307, February 8, 2001. (Qatar), November 17, 2000, MEMRI, 93. Hani Al-Masri, “A Reading of the Special Dispatch No. 155, November 22, Phenomenon of Khalil Abu-Ulbah,” Al- 2000; MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 153, Ayyam, February 17, 2001, FBIS-NES-2001- November 17, 2000. 0219. 81. Steve Rodan, “Arafat in Amman: No 94. Mar'I Abd Al-Rahman, “Palestinian Need to Stop the Fighting,” Middle East Criticism of Increasing Extremism in Official News Line, October 3, 2000, IRR, October 4, Palestinian Statements,” Al-Ittihad (Israel), 2000. December 4, 2000, MEMRI, Special Dispatch 82. Aluf Benn, “PA Economy to Top Powell's No. 163, December 12, 2000. Agenda Here,” Haaretz, February 22, 2001. 95. JMCC Poll No. 39, December, 2000; 83. The disillusionment with Arab support is JMCC Poll No. 40, April, 2001. in JMCC Poll No.40, April, 2001. 96. Arian, Security Threatened: Surveying 84. Amira Hass, “Palestinians Condition Israeli Opinion on Peace and War (Cambridge Talks on Halting Settlement Growth,” University Press, 1995), pp. 97-98, 274. For a Haaretz, April 3, 2001; Danny Rubinstein, summary of similar surveys see Alan Dowty, “Adding New Weight to an Old Demand,” The Jewish State: A Century Later Haaretz, April 5, 2001. (University of California Press, 1998), pp. 85. Hammami and Tamari, pp.20-21. 240-243. 86. “PA TV Broadcasts Call for Killing Jews 97. Sever Plotzker, “Shift in Israel: Attitudes and Americans,” MEMRI, Special Dispatch toward Peace,” Yediot Ahronot, March 30, No. 138, October 14, 2001. 2001, MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 204, 87. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, October 5, 2000, April 6, 2001. MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 134, October 98. Hammami and Tamari, p.22. 8, 2000. 99. JMCC Poll No. 39, December, 2000. 88. “Faysal Al-Husseini: Sharon Must Not 100. Saleh Abdel Jawad, “The Intifada's Get a Chance,” Al-Safir (Beirut), March 21, Military Lessons,” AMIN, October 25, 2000, 2001, MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 197, www.amin.org/en/eyejrs/0010/free4_261000. March 23, 2001. html
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101. Hani Al-Masri, “Popular Intifada or War?” Al-Ayyam, March 20, 2001, FBIS- NES2001-0320. 102. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, March 22, 2001, reprinted in Danny Rubinstein, “Analysis: Choosing Public Relations over Militant Operations,” Ha’aretz, March 23, 2001. 103. Amin Al-Mahdi, Al-Hayat (London), December 6, 2000, MEMRI, Special Dispatch No.169, December 29, 2000. 104. Isa Al-Shu'Aybi, “Where Does the Intifada Stand Now?” Al-Dustur (Amman), March 1, 2001, FBIS-NES-2001-0307. 105. Fahd Al-Fanik, “Everything or Nothing,” Al-Ra'y (Amman), February 28, 2001, FBIS- NES-2001-0228.
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