Just & Unjust Targeted Killing & Drone Warfare

Just & Unjust Targeted Killing & Drone Warfare Michael Walzer Abstract: Targeted killing in the “war on terror” and in war generally is subject to familiar and severe moral constraints. The constraints hold across the board; they don’t change when drones are the weapon of choice. But the ease with which drones can be used, the relative absence of military risks and political costs, makes it especially tempting not only to use drones more and more, but also to relax the constrain- ing rules under which they are used. It seems clear that the rules have, in fact, been relaxed in the course of the American experience with drone warfare–by presidential decision and without public debate. This essay is an argument for the opening up of the decision process to democratic scrutiny and in defense of the familiar constraints. It is always a hard question whether new technolo- gies require the revision of old arguments. Targeted killing isn’t new, and I am going to repeat an old argument about it. But targeted killing with drones? Here the old argument, though it still makes sense, leaves me uneasy. First things first. Untargeted killing, random killing, the bomb in the supermarket, café, or bus station: we call that terrorism, and its condemnation is criti- cally important. No qualifications, no excuses: this is MICHAEL WALZER , a Fellow of wrongfulness of the first order. We need to be firm in the American Academy since 1971, is Professor Emeritus of Social Sci- rejecting all apologetic efforts on behalf of terrorists. ence at the Institute for Advanced But someone who takes aim at a particular person, a Study. He was for many years the political official, say, is engaged in a different activi- Coeditor of Dissent and a contrib- ty. He may be a “just” assassin, as in Albert Camus’s uting editor to The New Republic. He play by that name, though I don’t think that the jus- is the author of Just and Unjust Wars tice of the killing depends, as Camus argues, on the (1977), Spheres of Justice (1983), Thick killer’s willingness to accept death himself–obvious- and Thin: Moral Argument at Home 1 and Abroad (1994), and, most re- ly, Camus hadn’t heard of suicide bombers. Justice cently, The Paradox of Liberation: Sec- in assassinations depends on the character of the tar- ular Revolutions and Religious Counter- geted official, the character of the regime he or she revolutions (2015). serves, and the immediate political circumstances: © 2016 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00408 12 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00408 by guest on 24 September 2021 what else is there to do? There are often that they are the ones who will, in the Michael many other things that should be done, or end, negotiate the peace treaty, and that Walzer attempted, before sending in the assassins. is a moral as well as a legal argument, giv- But even if assassination is a wrongful en the value of peace. But some political act, as it usually is in history if not in litera- leaders, with whom we cannot imagine ne- ture, the wrongfulness is of a second order. gotiating, are legitimate targets: Hitler is By aiming carefully at a person thought to the obvious example. Killing Hitler would be guilty of something, by choosing weap- have been “extrajudicial” but entirely jus- ons that can be used with discrimination, tified. Tyrants do have to betargeted , how- the assassin indicates his rejection of indis- ever; blowing up the neighborhood where criminate killing and also his concern about they live is not a moral option. collateral damage. Someone in his organi- In wartime, military leaders are obvi- zation probably thought that it would be ously legitimate targets. A sniper sent to better to kill the official’s extended fami- a forward position to kill a visiting colonel ly or to put a bomb in the restaurant where or general is engaged in targeted killing, he and “his kind” regularly dine. A “just” but no one will accuse him of acting extra- assassin refuses to do that–or, at least, he judicially and therefore wrongly. We dis- doesn’t do it. Hence his act, if it is wrong, tinguish the military leaders of the state is not as wrong as terrorism is. from its political leaders. It is probably We should set clear limits on political best to think of insurgent organizations assassinations. In democracies, they can in the same way and to make the same never be justified; the killing of an Amer- distinction. If they have separated their ican president, even if you disagree radi- political cadre from their military cadre, cally with his tax policies, is easy to make as in the case of Sinn Fein and the Irish out as a criminal act. It is only the blood of Republican Army, it is only members of tyrants that waters the tree of liberty. And the second group who should be target- even with tyrants, a trial is preferable to ed (but only if they can’t be arrested). We an assassination whenever it is possible to may eventually decide, with whatever re- bring down the tyrannical regime without luctance, to negotiate with the first group. killing its leader. Postwar and postrevolu- I don’t believe that the same distinction is tionary trials of tyrannical leaders are of- morally required in the case of terrorist ten criticized as “show trials” or “victor’s organizations, which the ira was, though justice.” The trials are certainly meant to it may be prudent to make it, as the Brit- “show” something: they serve as an argu- ish did. ment against the old regime and in favor Individuals who plan, organize, recruit of the new one. But they can also be just if for, or participate in terrorist attacks are, the deposed leaders are accorded the same all of them, legitimate targets. It would be rights to which ordinary criminals are en- better to capture them and bring them to titled. We know what a fair trial looks like, trial, but that is often not a reasonable op- and a fair trial ranks far above assassination tion: the risks are too high; innocent by- as a practical and also a moral response to standers would be killed in the attempt; the tyranny.2 The trial of surviving Nazi lead- planning would take time and the terror- ers at Nuremburg is an example of “victor’s ist attacks are imminent or actual. In such justice” that gave the second word in that cases, the idea that we are at war with ter- phrase its due. rorists makes sense. More often the “war” The international laws of war bar the is police work, and targeted killing by the killing of political leaders on the grounds police is not permissible. 145 (4) Fall 2016 13 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00408 by guest on 24 September 2021 Just & A van carrying Al Qaeda militants in Af- Insurgents who are not terrorists, who Unjust ghanistan in 2002 was obviously a legiti- fight like soldiers, should be treated like Targeted Killing mate target: Afghanistan was a zone of war soldiers. If they are captured, they are en- & Drone where enemies could rightly be attacked. By titled to “benevolent quarantine for the Warfare contrast, in Philadelphia (the city of broth- duration of the war.” They are not crimi- erly love), the targeted killing of the same nals, to be imprisoned and brought to tri- militants in the same van would not be jus- al. But the targeted killing of insurgents in tified; they would have to be arrested, in- wartime is no different from the targeted dicted, provided with defense attorneys, killing of terrorists: all killing is subject to and brought to trial. Philadelphia is a zone the same moral constraints. It will have of peace where we don’t encounter enemies to meet strict standards of proportional- but rather criminals, whom we treat differ- ity and, given that the target is usually a ently even if they share the ideological com- single person, it will be difficult to justify mitments of our enemies. What then about injury to innocent bystanders. Remember Yemen, where we actually attacked a van the standard rule: collateral damage–that carrying Al Qaeda militants in 2002 (and is, the death or injury of noncombatants– where we have killed many times since, must not be disproportionate to the value not always hitting our target)?3 Yemen was of the military target. Even a high ranking not then a zone of war; nor was it a zone of insurgent or terrorist leader is not so im- peace where it was possible to capture crim- portant–especially since these leaders are inals and bring them to trial. Much of the quickly replaced–as to justify many civil- “war on terror” is being fought in places like ian deaths. I can’t say how many or, better, Yemen, and the engagements don’t seem how few might be justifiable in any par- to fit the zone of war or the zone of peace ticular case, but a historical example sug- model; they aren’t exactly armed conflict, gests the caution that is required. After the and they aren’t exactly law enforcement. I attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, think that we have to work by analogy here. the Clinton administration undertook a If the case can be made that Yemen is closer search for Osama Bin Laden, intending to Afghanistan than it is to Philadelphia, the to kill him and any members of his orga- attack on the van can be justified.

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