UNCLASSIFIED tSeEiIlEtIDlA{&
COMMAIIDER DIRECTED REPORT OF IITVESTIGATION
PREPAREDBY
MAJORGI,NERAL DOUGLASL. RAABERG
IN!'ESTIGATING OFFICER
CONCERNING
AN UNAUTHORIZEDTRANSFER OF NUCLEARWARI{EADS
BETWEENMINOT AFB, NORTH DAKOTA
A}ID
BARKSDALEAFB, LOUSIANA
30 AUGUST2OO7
YRESTzuCTEDDAT
l4b, %s :nersvAct of 1954. FE€hf8lPra€lfar*r
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Tab A: AopointmentLetter Tab B: Authoritv and Scone Allegation...... 7 Investigation...... 7
Tab C: Background 10 ExecutiveSummary ...l0 ...... 16 CruiseMissile ReposturingBackground ...... l8 ...... l8 ACC RepositioningOrder (REPORD) l8 Pylon TransferPlan (RebasingSchedule) ...... 20 ProductionMeetings...... """""""""""'21
Analysis...... aa
Analysis......
DoD A'7
LeadershipTraining...... 5l
lmmediateReinstatement...... ,.....''.,...... 57 Recommendationsfor Consideration of Disciplinarv Action...... 58 TabF: WitnessIndex (MASKED)...... 60 TabG: Evidence(Masked 1...... 6t TabH: TechnicalReviews...... 63
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ActionsRequired for SelectedMissile Capabilities Talking Paper (TO I B-52H-30-1) ...... 63 Tabl: AppointingAuthority Approval and Actions...... 65 TabJ: AdministrativeDocuments ...... 67 Indexof AdministrativeDocuments...... ,...... 67 ToxicologyReports......
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TabA
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TabA: AppointmentLetter
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Tab B
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TabB: Authorityand Scope
(u) /fftommanders havethe inherentauthority to conducta Commander-Directedlnvestigation to investigatematters under their command,unless preempted by higherauthorily. Pursuantto this authority,General Ronald E. Keys,ACC Commander,appointed Major GeneralDouglas L. Raabergon 3l August2007 to conductthe investigationinto the underlyingfacts and circumstancesthat led to the unauthorizedtransfer ofnuclear warheadsbetween Minot Air Force Base,North Dakota,and BarksdaleAir ForceBase, Louisiana on 30 August2007. The investigationshould include any deviationsfrom establishedsafety and transferprocedures, as well asa completereview of securityprocedures.
(U) The InvestigatingOfficer (lO) investigatedthe following.
Allegation
g| Between29 and 30 August 2007,the 5th Bomb Wing permittedthe unauthorizedtransfer of (u) nuclearwarheads from Minot AFB to BarksdaleAFB in violation of AFI 9l -l I l, SafetyRules for USStrategic Bomber Aircraft, and Commander,Air CombatCommand's Cruise Missile RepositioningOrder, REPORD (DTG: 1414002Mar 07). SUBS:IANTIA:IED. Investigation
(U) The purposeof this CommanderDirected Investigation is to reportthe factssurrounding the allegation,the root causesand assignreasonable accountability. The resultsin this reportare fully transparent.The testimonialdocumentation has been meticulously prepared to avoid impropriety. Additionally, I haveprovided the forensicsto facilitatecommand-level considerationfor disciplinaryactions.
(U) As the InvestigatingOfficer, I haveorganized this reportinto threemajor categories.Each categoryis a phgle in the investigationthat includesa tier of individuals,a setof distinctevents and a menuofoversights that led to this incident. The phasesare:
Docr cpeninqto wheelsuD: Thoseindividuals directly responsible for thechain-of-custody (u),...; €? io verifrcai;n-of:G-.-*.upon, b."ukdownsfrom the momentthe nuclearshelter was openedto the time the B-52 wasairbome.
(U) Schedulineto dispatch:Those individuals who hada directhand inthe schedulingofthe TacticalFerry pylons(preparation and receipt),oversight of maintenanceactions and eventualdispatch ofthe weapons;this includesthe lack ofproper monitoringofthe pylons moving from the shelterto the aircraft.
(U) Supervisionto leadershio:This is self-evident;however, it is a more refinedfocus of overall supervisionto wing-level leadershipat Minot AFB and BarksdaleAFB.
(U) I conductedall witnesstestimonies. The testimoniesbegan on Monday of Labor Day weekend,3 September2007, at Minot AFB. I finishedthe last interviewon 27 September2007.
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Exceptfor one day, my legal advisorand I spentnineteen (19) continualdays interviewing over seventy(70) witnesses. Oversight
(U) The Secretaryofthe Air Forceasked the DoD InspectorGeneral to provide"oversight of investigative...activities" initiated by the Air Forcein responseto the incidentand to follow-up on recommendationsgenerated by thoseactivities. The Chairmanof the SenateArmed Services Committeerequested the SecretaryofDefense for this independentreview ofthe matter.
(U) The investigationwas overseenby two DoD lnspectorGeneral Representatives to provide, "...on-sceneoversight to the investigation,directed by the Commander,Air Combat Command...to (also)----i-En-6tFc-.-----lprovide independent i nvestieation.,, f their Assistant InspectorGeneral for AdministrativeInvestigations appointment lefter. I--TEJI6ITOC-l5ignedmemo is addressedto the InspectorGeneral of the Air Force,AF/IG; the Air CombatCommand Staff JudgeAdvocate, ACC/SJA; and,the Minot AFB IG, 5 BW/IG. (Tab J9) They initially joined us on l8 September2007 at BarksdaleAFB and rejoinedus at Minot AFB throughthe remainderofthe investigationand preparationof this report. They haveread the contentsof this report.
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Tab C
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TabC: Background
ExecutiveSummary
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(U) €t The unauthorizedtransfer ofthese nuclearwarheads was causedby a breakdownin training, discipline,supervision and leadership.
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(U) The chainof events,the testimonyof thoseinterviewed and the evidencepresented show an erosionof adherenceto rigid, Air Forcenuclear procedures. This reportwill showhow the intricatesystem of nuclearchecks and balanceswas eitherignored or disregarded.
,, ,,#l The repcn identifiesdeviations from establishedsafety, security and transferprocedures that \"i explainthe circutnstancesand detailsof the unauthorizedtransfer of nuclearweapons. Finally,
t€eET#Ffffi Pase10 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED tr€ftEjF#lll'1|aL the reportidentifies those individuals whose actions contributed to this unauthodzedtransfer and whosedereliction may wanant disciplinaryaction.
Background *Note all sourcescited in body of report.
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Door Open to WheelsUp
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,,(fihe n-SZn aircrewanived at the aircraftthe moming of 30 August 2007. The crew (u' consistedof the aircraftcommander, an instructorpilot; the copilot, and an instructorradat navigator. The B-52 InstructorRadar Navigator (lRN) is responsibleto the aircraftcommander for checkingthe weaponsprior to flight. The IRN is requiredto checkall missiles. The check includesverification of the payloadand confirmationof a SAFE status.However. the Instructor RadarNavigator only did a "spot check" on one missile,and only on the right pylon loadedwith nuclear-inertpayloads. If the IRN had accomplisheda full and completeweapon's preflight, the IRN shouldhave discovered the nuclearwarheads.
(U) At no time during their flight did the radarnavigator apply electricalpower to the missiles. The radarnavigator electronically verified that the missileswere OFF (no power)and SAFE (not Armed) afterthe engineswere started.That was the lasttime the radarnavigator electronically accessedthe statusofthe missiles. ln short.the radarnavigator never turned the nowerback on.
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(U) To be clear,the aircrewcould havejettisoned a missileor missilesin the eventof an emergencythat requiredreduced weight to remainairbome. Also, if the emergencysituation had dictated,the crew could havejettisoned one or both ofthe pylonswith all the missilesattached. To accomplishanyjettison of a missileor missiles,the radarnavigator would haveapplied electricalpower only to the rack to which the missilewas attached.Additionally, to jettison the pylon from the aicraft, electricalpower would haveto be appliedto the pylon attachedto the aircraft'swing. In all jettison scenarios,the missileswould havefallen to the ground.
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(U) This incidentwas propagatedby nunerousfailures to follow stringentnuclear procedures. However,the catalystfor the failure beganin the schedulingprocess. It furtherbroke down becausethe supervisors;predominantly the Non-CommissionedOfficers and SeniorNon- CommissionedOfficers, did not do their.jobs.
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Schedulingto Dispatch
(U) Our audit of the maintenancelogs showsthe warheadrebasing changes and original tactical ferry flow plan did not contributeto the mistakenremoval ofthe nuclearpylon, designated G2203. Note: A GZ-pylon is a pylon loadedwith AdvancedCruise Missiles (ACM). In military nomenclaturethe ACM is an AGM-129A. The catalystfor this failure beganin the schedulingprocess. It further brokedown becausethe supervisors;predominantly the NCOs and SNCOs,didn't do theirjob. They werethe propellantthat acceleratedthe wing's failure to mericulouslytrack daily scheduledmaintenance events. They did not accountfor key actions that would haveprepared the pylonsfor air shipmenton 30 Aug. Collectivetestimony shows a seriesofpersonnel changes or absencesof leadershipthroughout July and August. Exceptfor one TechnicalSergeant put in chargeofSpecial WeaponsHandling (those that move pylon packages)most ofthose put in chargeofthe schedulingor superintendentpositions were too new or incapableof doing theirjobs. They trustedeach other, but neververified the informationthey received.
(U) The schedulingprocess and products the 5th Munitions Squadronused is very complicated to describe.Testimony shows the squadron'sformal, signedand printed weekly schedulewas disregardedby every individual. Instead,they informally usedtheir'working slides' throughout the weekto preparefor schedulingand productionmeetings. They carriedover the 'working slides' from the WednesdayNCOIC schedulingmeeting to briefthe work statusat the Tuesday and Friday productionmeetings. For them,the 'working slides' werethe de facto schedule.
(U) Literally. . .from the Munitions SquadronCommander to the NCOIC and assistantNCOICs ofeach shopin the SpecialWeapons Flight; from the schedulingmeetings to the actualwork performed...theyall assumedthe otherwas doing theirjob. Ironically,none ofthem usedthe printedweekly-maintenance schedule as the overarchingdocument to track weekly maintenance events. Again, everywitness testified they cameto the SpecialWeapons Flight meetingswith blank notebooks.They reliedon a setof slidesproduced by a very young Plans& Scheduling Airman (one-striper)to guidetheir discussionfor the Tuesdayand Fridayproduction meetings, andthe Wednesdayscheduling meeting. This is wherea failure occuned. Someonechanged the schedule,but did not fully briefthe others. The informationwas carriedonto other slides,but not accuratelycarried to the printedmaintenance schedule. The squadroncommander, operationsoficer and Chiefswere not given soundinformation from the "shop chiefs."
(U) G2203 and anotherpylon, G2377,were identifiedon the 'working slides' for tacticalferry preparation;and, eventual B-52 air shipmenton 30 August. This was all accordingto the originalflow plan. A changeofpylons occurred between the informal slidesand the formal nrinted schedule. G2203 wasrenlaced c2358
preparation.These two pylonswere preparedfor shipmentthe following week. However,a week later,on 22 August,the line supewisorsused the same informationfrom the previousweek's 'working slides'to now reflectthe movementofGZ203 and,G2377 from the nuclearshelters to the bomber. G2358 fell off the formal printedschedule.
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Ironically,G2358 vanishedfrom the informal 'working slides.' The 5fr Bomb \'\/ing'sformal printedschedule; the Wing Commanderapproved 21-165 schedule, now showedG2203 and G2377 scheduledfor tacticalferry. Embeddedin the wing's formal scheduleis the 5'n Munitions Squadron'sweekly MaintenanceSummary for the week of Aug27'Sep 2 2007which directsG2203 andG2377 to be transportedto the flightline for tacticalferry. That is whythe tow crewswent and retrievedG2203 andG2377 from their respectiveshelters on Wednesday, 29 August. It was a scheduledevent. The Wing was caughtin their own faulty processand oversisht.
AF (bX3) G2203 always remainedon the informal working slidesand appearedon the "radarscope" when it was briefed for movementat 23 Augustproduction meeting and subsequentlypublished on the wing schedule.No one noticedthe changesoccurring on the schedules.
(U) ln short,the munitionssquadron produced a weekly maintenanceschedule...no one followed it, not eventhe commanderor operationsofficer. The productionmeetings were a looseknit confederationofshop chiefswho did not bring key documentsor a "bird's eye" view of what work hadto be accomplished.They relied on their corporatememory. They usedthe wrong slidesto followthe work.
Supervisionto Leadership
(U) In hindsight,one witnessdescribed this eventas lhe "periect storm" that could havebeen avoided. Little did that individualknow the waming systemsthat could haveprevented the unauthorizedtransfer ofnuclear warheadsfrom Minot AFB to BarksdaleAFB had beenturned off, ignoredor neverdesigned by the two air wing's supervisionor leadership.In fact, it was a breakdownin training,discipline, supervision and leadership.
(U) The chainreaction that supposedlystarted at Minot actuallystarted at Barksdale.There were two waming systemsthat failed,faltered or frustratedthe key personnelresponsible for assuring nuclearweapons security.. . Minot's maintenancescheduling-to-dispatch processes and Barksdale'soperational focus. Both were lost upon supervisionand leadership.
Facts
Fact: Six W80-l nuclearwarheads were inadvertentlytransferred from Minot AFB to BarksdaleAFB without properauthorization Fact: STRATCOM J-38confirmed that the codesfor the AdvancedCruise Missiles that were flown by the BarksdaleB-52 crew werenot compromised Fact: The missileswere neverelectronically accessed Fact: The B-52H crew could not havelaunched or armedthe AdvancedCruise Missiles they werecarrying Fact: The B-52H crew was capableofjettisoning the missile,missiles, or pylon in the eventof an emergency Fact: Personnelfailed to follow strict establishednuclear procedures
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. Fact: Numerousscheduling errors resulted in the actualtransfer ofnuclear warheads r Fact: Leadershipand supervisiondid not preventthis from happening Basiclnformation
(U) The BoeineB-52 "Stratofortress"aircraft is ofthe land basedheavy bombardment class designedfor long rangeflight at high speedand altitude. The aircrafthas provisions for ten crewmembers:a basiccrew of five, threeinstructors and two additionalcrewmembers. The basiccren'consists ofPilot, Co-pilot,Radar Navigator, Navigator and ElectronicWarfare Officer. A highly variableweapons load may be carriedon extemalpylons in combinationwith internalbomb bay weaponsloads. Aircraft safetyfeatures allow for thejettison of weapons loads,to includecruise missiles and pylons as a lastditch measure,in the eventofa seriousin- flight emergency.Missiles and pylonsare jettisoned in a "safe" mode.
(U) The AGM-I29 AdvancedCruise Missile, or ACM, is a subsonic,turbofan-engine powered, winged cruisemissile. This cruisemissile can delivera nuclearwarhead in an air-to-ground missionwith a very high degreeofaccuracy at long range. During captiveflight, the missile's flight surfaces(wings and fin) arefolded or retractedin a stowedposition. Displaysin the cockpitofthe B-52 allow the crew to constantlymonitor the statusofthe missile. After launch the missile'sflight surfacesare deployed and the engineprovides thrust within a few seconds. Computercontrolled navigation directs the missileto its target. A non-explosivetraining or ferry payload,or a W80-1 nuclearwarhead, may be installedin the missileweapon bay.
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AF (bX3)
(U) Sole-VouchingAuthorit], (SVA)r Nuclear Ll/eaponsMaintenance Procedures (AFI21- 204). The SVA is responsiblefor verifying that only authorizedindividuals enter a no-lonezone or exclusionarea where nuclear weapons are located. They establisha singleentry controlpoint to the no-lonezone. Local OperatingProcedures (Sole VouchingAuthority StorageStructure Procedures)requires the SVA to completethe StorageStructure Opening/Closlng checklist, ensureeveryone who entersthe no-lonezone receives a safetybriefing, line badgerequirements, and maintainan accuratecount ofpersonnel inside the no-lonezone.
AF(bxs)
(U) Tow Team: Consistsof two peoplewho performtow procedures(MHU-I96 trailer checklist),safety checks (Missile Safe Status Check), dnd operatethe tow vehicle. The tow team eitherperforms the Missile SafeStatus Cfteclr or ensuresthe checkwas accomplished.They also performthe pre-towprocedures, request transport authorization from munitionscontrol, and transportsthe trailer to its destination.
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Cruise Missile ReposturingBackground Drivers
ACCRepositioning Order (REPORD)
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(U) The wings were given greatflexibility to scheduletactical ferry missionsevery otherweek with altematingpoints of origin, The orderallows the wings maximumflexibility to schedule tacticalferry missionsaround other requirements. This REPORDalso required the wings to deliverto HeadquartersACC a Mission Risk AssessmentPlan covering all safetyconsiderations for the missions. Both bombwings wereaware ofthis tasking,participated in severalplanning meetings,and madeinputs to the REPORD.
(U) Air CombatCommand and Air ForceMateriel Commandevaluated two rebasingmethods; tacticalferry and groundshipment. Tactical ferry was selectedfor a numberofreasons:
. PBD-720will eliminateall AFSC2W2Xl (l3l) and2M0Xl (142)manpower authorizationseffective I July 2009. PBD-725is not achievablewithout them o Tacticalferry is a provenmethod for transportingAdvance Cruise Missiles and Air LaunchedCruise Missiles . The tacticalferry option required8-months to completeas opposed to 24-monthsfor groundshipment o Groundshipment requires an additional27,600 man-hours due to additionalhandling, and test requirements. r Tacticalferry saved$1.6M
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PylonTransfer Plan (Rebasing Schedule)
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AF (bX3)
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(U) The 5'nMunitions Squadron'sschedule is supposedto be a coordinateddocument that ties all work centerstogether. The schedulingprocess begins when eachwork center(with the key exceptionof WeaponsHandling) forwards its maintenancerequirements to the Missile Analysis sectionin SpecialWeapons Maintenance (SWM) Flight. Analysisthen compilesthe work center inputsas well as othermaintenance requirements and forwardsthe inputsto 5th Maintenance OperationsSquadron Plans and Scheduling (P&S). (Tab F40,p.2;TabF2l, p. 2; TabF 18,p. 3)
(U) On Wednesdays,the SWM Flight holdsa schedulingmeeting chaired by the Production Superintendent.This meetingis attendedby eachelement NCOIC and a 5'nMaintenance OperationsSquadron P&S scheduler(an Airman, E-2). (Tab Fa0) P&S displaysa draft schedule,derived from the inputsforwarded earlier by Analysisflight, on PowerPointslides and takesnotes on any changesmade by the sectionchiefs during tlre meeting. Thesenotes and changesare then usedto createthe weekly maintenanceschedule that includesthe job breakout. Thejob breakoutis a listing of specifictasks to be performedalong with their Job Control Number(JCN) and is often more detailedthan the slides.(Tab F40,p.2)
(U) On Thursdaymoming, the flight commandersmeet with the 5" Munitions Operations Officer (MOO) and P&S for the squadronscheduling meeting. Only the updatedP&S PowerPointslides are.briefed and not the accompanyingjobbreakout. At the end ofthe meeting, the MOO and eachflight representativesign the schedulecover sheetreflecting their approvalof the weekly schedule.It is importantto notethe completeschedule is not briefedor reviewedby the flight chiefs,squadron superintendent, or the MunitionsOps Officer. (Tab Ft2, p. 2; Tab F40.p. l)
Production Meetings
(U) The SWM Flight ProductionSuperintendent chairs the Tuesdayand Friday production meetings.The Tuesdaymeeting evaluales current production against the schedule.The Friday meetingcenters on the currentweek wrap-upand looksahead to the following week's operations.These production meetings are used as a venuefor the different flight sectionsto exchangeinformation pertaining to the maintenanceschedule. All SWM Flight sectionNCOICs attendthese meetings or senda representativein their absence.The ProductionSuperintendent polls eachrepresentative lor input andthen writes their input on the white boardin the SWM Flight supervisionoffice. AccordingtollEf-oiFddl noneof the sectionrepresentatives bring schedulesto thesemeetings; instead they takenotes in orderto takethe informationback to their respectivesections. (Tab F23, p.2; Tab F16, p.4-5)
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(U) The MaintenanceOperations Officer (MOO) receivesa daily statusbriefing from Munitions Controlpersonnel. The briefing consistsofslides with informationobtained from eachflight within the squadron.The purposeof the briefing is to give the MOO a snapshotof the maintenanceoccurring in the squadronat that momentin time. It providesno summaryof the work completedor scheduledto be doneand doesnot highlight bottlenecksor delaysin maintenanceproduction. The briefing capturescurrent maintenance but is ineffectiveas a tool for the MunitionsOps Officer to track maintenanceproductivity. (Tab Gl2, p. l-4)
Operations Scheduling
(U) Both 2 BW and 5 BW Plans& Programssections were notified ofthe Tac Ferry messageon l4 March 2007 andtasked their respectiveOperations Groups through Wing Schedulingto executethese missions. These missions were to be scheduledusins the routine ACCI 21-165 schedulingprocess. (Tab Gl7, p. I-2)
(U) €#f!Bl After receiptof the repositioningdirective, both wings beganto developflight procedureson how to implementthe tasking,incorporating operational risk management procedures.The wings were directedto submitthese procedures to HQ ACC/A3S. 5 BW developeda thoroughTac Ferryprogram which they sharedwith 2 BW, who thentailored it to their own specificoperations. As part ofthe program,5 BW providedbriefings to selected aircrews;they were pilot-centricin nature,explaining procedures, processes and risks involved with the transpoftationof cruisemissiles. Although thesemissions were not Higher HeadquartersDirected (HHD), the 5th OperationsGroup (5 OG) supervisiontreated Tac Ferry sortiesas HHD sorties. (Tab F4l, p. 2-3) The 2 BW did not providethe sametraining to their aircrewsand did not treatthese missions as HHDs. Selected2 BW aircrewswere requiredto review an informationbinder on their own during missionplanning and then briefthe 2nd OperationsGroup leadershipbefore mission execution. The 2 BW programneglected to emphasizenavigator responsibilities, including the importanceofa thoroughweapons preflight. (TabFl9, p. 2; TabF3, p.2)
(U) The 2ndOperations Group did not emphasizeto the flying squadronsthat CombatMission Ready-Nuclear(CMR-N) crewmemberswere requiredfor theseferry sorties. (Gl7, p. 1-2; Tab F55,p. 2) The taskedsquadron Director ofOperations (96 BS/DO)was awareofthe Tac Ferry requirements(minus the CMR-N tasking)and had ampletime to establishthe crew line-upfor thesesorties. The squadronscheduling process, which includesall flight commandersand the SQ/DOor designatedrepresentative, determined that theseferry sortiesneed only be filled by a minimumnumber of crewmembersnormally required by T.O. lB-52H-1. Thisprecluded two weaponsqualified navigators from accomplishingthe weaponspreflight. (Tab F27, p.2)
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InspectionHistory
PASTREPORTS...Since I 996...:
(U) I havecompleted a thoroughreview ofpast nuclear-relatedinspections of both wings. Holistically, thereare no remarkableitems in the reportsthat showa chartedcourse oferosion in nuclearoperations or adherenceto procedures.Yes, there are specificnon-compliance issues; evenunsatisfactory performance. However, they areisolated problems that don't appearto cascadeto the next inspectionnor this incident. Oftentimes,the deficiencyis correctedand recertifiedby the sameinspection team.
The inspectionteams were firm, fair and consistent.I will leaveit to otheraudits to confirm that statement.
Minot AFB...12 Major Inspections:
(U) Since1996, Minot's 5thBomb Wing hasSATISFACTORILY passedsix (6) NuclearSurety Inspections.NSls and JointNSls evaluatethe wing's "ability to managenuclear resources while complyingwith all nuclearsurety standards." They receivedan UNSATISFACTORY gradeon their 2003 JointNuclear Surety Inspection for an impropermissile upload inspection item. The 5 BW alsosupports their partner91" SpaceWing's NSl. In 2004,though the 91 SW passedits NSI, the 5 BW receivedan LINSATISFACTORYrating for support. The "host-unit(read 5 BW) providedan unserviceabletractor to transportnuclear resources on numerousoccasions."
(U) Over the last elevenyears the wing hasreceived an EXCELLENT or COMBAT READY rating on the four (4) NuclearOperational Readiness Inspections. Unlike an NSI which focuses on compliance,the NORI is a go-to-wartest; it "evaluatesthe wing's ability to generateand managenuclear resources and mobilizeto deploybomber reconstitution assets." These l2 inspectionshave been thorough.
(U) We did not discountthe preparatoryNuclear Surety StaffAssistance Visit Reports. They tendto be a little toughersince they arenot graded,yet providea setof observationsthat range from significantto repeatproblems. The Jan2006 andJun 2007 reportsdon't revealan impendingtrend.
(U) Finally, the wing's Quality Assuranceprogram dating back to Jan2007 wasthoroughly reviewed. Furtherlook back did not give us appreciableconcerns. However, I do notethat a weaponshandling crew oftwo (2) individualsdid fail a no-noticeevaluation oftheir nuclear storageaccess and Missile SafeStatus Check procedures. It so happensthat the NCO on the teamthat failed that 25 Jun07 spot inspectionis the sameStaff Sergeantwho actedin the same capacitythe day the nuclear-loadedpylon was accessedand transportedfrom the Weapon StorageArea. He was our first witness. He invokedhis Article 3 I rights beforegiving any testimony.(Tab F52, p. 1;TabGll,p. 1-2) Thatis theonly sliverofatrend thatwe've found.
(U) In my view, thereis no pronouncedevent or finding that pointsto a clearindication from the inspectionreports that Minot AFB was lax in its adherenceto nuclearprocedures. The OperationsGroup and the Minot B-52 crewswere well preparedfor the tacticalferry program. lEiFrtFit#irR Page23 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED lleHglBryajR
They met everymeasure with alacrity. Leadershippromptly submittedor accomplishedevery requirementoutlined in the COMACC-directRepositioning Order. Furthermore,they carrieda full complementof crew memberson eachmission they flew. The flight recordsshow that. It is very notablethat Minot AFB assignedthe right officer to build, coordinateand orchestratetheir tacticalferry program. He is a very nuclearexperienced radar navigator who facilitateda benchmarktactical ferry programfrom the beginning. He sharedit equallywith BarksdaleAFB whoseoverall programwas lackingor lacklusterat best.
BarksdaleAF8..,12 Major Inspectionsand more:
(U) Barksdale's2nd Bomb Wing history of nuclearinspection performance is lessthan sterling comparedto Minot AFB as evidencedin their recentUNSATISFACTORY rating during the 2005Nuclear Surety Inspection. The 2005NSI was alsoa combinedJoint NuclearSurety Inspection.They bustedin multiple areasfrom weaponsloading procedures, nuclear shelter entry & control deficienciesto the profoundfailure when B-52 crewmemberswithout Personnel Reliability Procedures(PRP) certification were allowedto handlenuclear-code documents. The seven(7) NSIs since 1996were satisfactoryexcept for this notedNSI and a MARGINAL grade in 1999. Ofnote, however,is the wing's inability to passa JointNuclearSurety Inspection. They failed in 2000 for nuclearsafety violations regarding equipment handling.
(U) Their three(3) nuclearoperational readiness inspections are unremarkable. The last inspectionoccurred in 2003. They receiveda SATISFACTORY. Their next NORI is scheduled for Apr 2008...it will be a combinedNORI andNSI.
(U) The trend isn't robust. Unlike Minot and Whiteman,the 2 BW appearsto haveunilaterally reducedthe numberof timesthey generateto nuclearstatus, albeit beforehaving submitted a Iuly 2007request to waive both generationsfor this year. Let me put it in simpleterms. This wing is requiredto generateat least40 bomberstwice a year;about 80 bombersorties for tie year. The wing commandercan, through a local exercise,generate his entirebomber fleet to war-planstatus or he can fully or partiallyparticipate in ajoint, STRATCOM generation.For example,STRATCOM recentlyconducted a large-scaleexercise, GLOBAL THUNDER, in earlyAugust. All bomberwings participated.Yet, Barksdaleonly sentthree (3) bombersand associatedcrews to Minot to participatein the deployedportion of GLOBAL THUNDER. They had previouslyrequested and were granteddeferment from fully generatingat home. They have yet to locally generatebombers in 2007! Also, our recordsshow that over the lastthree years the wing hasgenerated about sixty (60) sorties...farshort ofthe almosttwo hundred(200) bomber aircraftthey would minimally havebeen required to generateto nuclearwar status. I'm surethe reasonsare plenty to includePACOM TheaterSupport Plan commitments, but the otherbomber units havesimilar requirements.This leadsto otherobservations that will be coveredin the Sunervisionto Leadershiosection.
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TabD
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TabD: Facts,Analysis and Conclusions PhaseI - Door Openingto WheelsUp
Background
(U) The handlingteam is madeup of the following positions: A Lock; B Lock; SoleVouching Authority (SVA); Munitions Close-InSentry (MCIS), and two tow drivers. The A Lock is reouiredto be a noncommissionedofficer. The SVA is the shelter l----l fne SVA is responsiblefor conductingthe "openingchecklist" as discussedin the following paragraph.
(U) Whenhandling teams access a storageshelter, they arerequired to follow specific proceduresdefined on their openingchecklist. The openingchecklist requires the tearnto accompfish the MrssileSafe Status Checks on the missileswhen the first two peopleenter the sheltertogether (two-person policy). This is usuallyaccomplished by the A Lock and B Lock. Importantly,theirjob is to verify'thety'pe ofpayload eachmissile contains which requires shininga flashlightinto a small,diamond shaped window and readingthe label printedinside. They mustalso verify that all missilesare not leakingjet fuel, arenot damaged,that they indicate SAFE and that nothingprecludes further maintenance actions. Every time a shelteris opened, this MissileSafe Status Check mtst be completedon eachmissile before other actions can occur. Furthermore,the tow driver is requiredto verifu the payloadbefore hooking up the trailer to the pylon readyfor transport.
Facts
(U) On 29 August2007, the handlingteam was responsiblefor towing two Tac Ferry packages to the flightline. Basedupon informationfrom their supervisor,|@|, the handlingteam understoodthe pylons were G2377 and G2203. (TabF28, p.2; TabCl, p.5;Tab G5, p. 2) This handlingteam consisted offEiiofAdl the Sole Vouching Authoriry rsve r.lixoEt?l.A Lockil6i]Rtc 1{xolftld-ocka{Xeifhtow driver for G2377 andl9Q39$ tow driver for G2203.(Tab F28,p. 21
{EgRf,*iFF}'J& Page26 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED #etE[t'FlD#lF
(U) At 0820 hours,the tow teamopened Structure 1857 and stagedG2377 outsideofthe shelter.G2377 containedthe Tac Ferry placardsdescribed above. Structure1857 was closedat 0842hours. This sameteam then openedStructure 1854 at 0849hours. Accordingtoluifq-Id4, he directe@ and@lto do rheMissile Safe StatusChecks on G2203 while he an@R6iTilc lnllEftiospected- the remainingfour packagesinside the structure.(Tab F4, p.2) lulolned statedthat andE@l finishedtheir checksto includethe Missile SafeStatus Checks.l6Fiac?l did not se@ e$xo)Idil with a flashlightor checklistin handperforming the statuschecks on G2203so he askedltxo)-16dif 'G2203 was goodto go." Accordingtof (bx6)-Fddlresponded that it was. (Tab F4, p.2)6-li6r]d0then connectedthe tow vehicleto G2203 and,removed it from Structure1854 at 0912hours. G2203 wasnot markedwith the Tac Ferrv placard.
ony was contradictedby otherwitnesses. Specifically{@ testifiedthat conductedthe Mlssile Safe Status Checksinside structure 1854 and that he was not told to performany ofthe weaponinspections. (TabF32, p.2) ln fact, accordingto @1 trehad neverperformed these duties before as he wasnew to thejob. (Tab F32, p.2) Both@ andl6FiElinvoked their Article 3l rights and did not providea statement. Becausel@ was the first witnessto be interviewed,very little informationwas known at the time. He was contactedlater for additionaltestimony. Beforethis secondinterview could begin, however,he was advisedof his Article 3 I rights as he had becomea suspect.He initially waived his Article 3 I rights but shortly a.fterthe questioningbegan he invokedhis rights electingnot to provideadditional testimony. (Tab F4, p. 5)
(IJ) f---rb-)CfFCT------for G2377, testified that he did not conduct the Missile Safe Status Checkon G2377 beforehe connectedhis trailer. He admittedthis stepwas requiredin the technicalorder (TO), howeversince he was "under the impressionthat this packagefor surewas Tac Ferry," he did not do it. G2377 wasappropriately labeled with two "TAC Ferry" signs;one on eachside. As for the statuscheck of G2203,he did not seeanyone performing this taskor evencarrying a flashlight. (Tab F32, p.2) This point is critical asthese status checks absolutely requireshining a flashlightinto the payloadwindow.
Whilethe teamwas at the sheltersthat T:ff;l*.'i.ffi: shelter.{5]tsJ-dDtold her that the tow teamwould be thereafter they finishedtransporting pylons G2203 andG2377 .[6fFf;Tc7jt toldltsUc Page27 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED *:€IEflIFfrB#ItR (U) The routineprocedure is to positionthe two loadsof missilesin front ofthe left and right sideofthe noseofthe aircraftin preparationfor matingto thejet. Essentially,the trailer- mountedpylons only haveto be backedstraight up underthe left, right wings for uploading. The tow driversdrove the loadsout to aircraft 1010,parked on STUB 29, unhookedand left the loads in front of the B-52. The two tow crewsnever returned after droppingoff the trailerswith pylon- loadedmissiles. (Tab F48, p. 2) (U) It is alsonecessary to mendonthat throughoutthe structureopening and pre-tow procedures. loXeEl Gr4unitionsControl) neververified the statusof G2203 and,G2377 . Accordingto his ny, it is not commonpractice for munitionscontrollers to veriry $atus at the time of movement.Therefore, he grantedtransport permission for G2203 andG2377 to the flightline without conductingany verificationprocedures. (Tab F44,p.2) Had he donethe required verificationprocedures, he would haverecognized G2203 was carryingwarheads and only G2377 wasa Tac Ferry package.(Tab G25, p. 1-2,Tab G3) (U) A qualifiedweapons load crew had beendispatched to completethe next taskof attaching the pylon-matedmissiles to the aircraft. They arenot requiredinthe technicalmanuals to ever checkthe presenceof a payload. When all pylonsare attached, they compl€tea full missile syskms checkand then confirm eachand every missile is SAFE. Again, no payloadverification is requiredby the load crew. They are requiredto checkthe ARM-DISARM devicefor a SAFE indication(white "S" on a greenbackground) andlS-XTiTe0. accomplished this task on all missiles. (Tab F46, p.2) Currenttechnical data does not requireweapons load crewsto verify the missile for the presenceofa payloadprior to loading.(7.O. IB-52H-16 and lB-52H-16CL-1) (U) Early on the morningof 30 August,the crew of Doom 99 anived at their aircraftto prepare it for flight. ffi wasresponsible to thfftrdFAlgl f-.i5n6tArT-l for checkingthe weaponsbefore flight. [6X6El\r,as requiredto checkall missilesfor SAFE statusand verify the payload.lSl6Fldid a "spot check" of one missileon the right pylon that had the TacticalFerry payloads.l5lTdrAg0did not properlycheck the entireload. (Tab F2, p.2) The takeoff from Minot was uneventful. Analysis (U) Thereare firm reasonsto concludethat the 5'" Munitions Squadron'sWeapons Handling failed at the door. They i'ailedto performMissile Safe Status Checks immediately after opening structures1854 and 1857. Oncethe doorswere openedto the shelter,the teamwas requiredto do immediatestatus checks on all missilesbefore any othermaintenance could be performed. (Tab G22,p.2; Tab G3I , p. I -2) In considerationof all the testimonyconceming the eventsat both StuucturesI 854 and 1857,a clearpicture emerges where all membersof the handlingteam entersthe sheltersimultaneously. The tow driver in this picture immediatelybrings his tractor up to the pylon trailer and startshooking up the equipmenruf(bx6i7d-l go throughthe motionsof looking at the remainingpackages in the structure.According to SecurityForces CentralSecurity Control logs,Structure 1854 had beenopened only for twenty-twominutes, whenG2203 had been moved out. (TabG21,p.1-2)Perhaps, the sergeants checked the missiles for obviousdamage or fuel leaks;however, based upon the overall investigation,twenty-two set-+#Fft3*{n Pase28 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED si€itilrRrtilF minutesis simply not enoughtime to accomplisha completeMisslle SafeStans Checksof all five packagesstored inside. (U) This failure to verify the payloadG2203 is evenmore inexplicablein light of the fact that the entirehandling team failed to detectthat G2203 was not placardedor coned(the flightline surveillancecameras photographed both G2203 andG2377 as theywere beingtowed out of the weaponsstorage area and onto the flightline; GZ371 wasclearly marked *TAC FERRY PACKAGE'whereas C2203was not). (Tab G9, p. l-4) Absenceofthese markingsshould haveraised an immediatered flag to at leastthe two noncommissionedofficers on the teamdiGTdt ACC Tac Ferryprepped pylons are marked or placardwith two 8 %x 1l "TAC FERRY PACKAGE" signs;one on eachside of the pylon. Why no one lookedat GZ37^7 markedwith the standardtwo "TAC Ferry Package"signs; one on eachside, and then not notice G2203 was missingthese markings, is simply baffling. In sum,there is simply no rationalewhy the handlingteam would not have,at a minimum,conducted a statuscheck on the only pylon beingtowed out of Structure1854 and out to the flightline; especiallya pylon not markedfor Tac Ferry. (U) While certainmembers of this handlingteam aremore at fault tllan others"they all should be held accountable;specificall . Also, accountableis section. While the handlingteam was in the processof moving G2203,6'ifStrciDwastold by fiElolircclwhois very knowledgeablein her field, that G2203 had not beenprepped for Tac Ferry and was not readyto be rolled to the flightlinelbxc)Acq had a duty to follow-up with@@iAEt[before allowing the handlingteam to continuewith the operation. He shouldhave discussed the schedulethat he lookedat on the S Drive aswell asR5fr6lA6dlinformation withlErdfAm to confirm the statusof G2203. Aftnr interviewinglTaT6iTddlthere is no doubtthat if he had calledher with this information,she would havestopped the operationimmediately. (U) Whilel6itolFddmay havetried to minimizehis cirlpabilityduring his first interview, eventuallyevidence revealed that he, notliEii6i7Elwas in chargeof theoperation.l--l5l6i7td-l testifiedthatFti6jaE4 was in charge. (Tab F28, p. 2) Additionally, the evidencesupports IEIIE@, as the SoleVouching Authority (SVA) was in chargeofthe operation.As the SVA, it was his responsibilityto ensurethe Mrssle SafeStatus Checkswere accomplished on all missilesimmediately after the structureswere opened. (Tab G22,p.2; TabG3l, p. I -2) (U) Accordingto his own testimony,t6n6-Actl took chargeof the operation. (Tab F4, p. 2) The only evidencethatf6Fildtl assigned@and6@Dthe responsibiliryof conductingthe Missile SafeStatus Checks on G2203 isn6]rSFAgfl testimony. FxcTE4definitively denied he had beengiven this responsibility.It is importantto notethatt)lQlAcgwas new to thejob and testified thathe hadthe responsibility to physicallyget the dqors open but hadno rolein inspectingthe weaponsstored inside. During his testimonyJFX6)Ac$ came across as credible and forthright. gau nlz, p. 2) Evenassumin-g@l nuauifiild thisresponsibitity t<@ a"a@ it wasultimatelyll6ii6Ftdlresponsibility to ensurethe statuschecks had beenaccomplished before G2203 was movedout of the structure. -E€REiFliF*f|llll Pape29 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED r€t:flFttm (U) Regardlessof who was in chargeof the operation,li6iidffilis clearlyresponsible as the otler noncommissionedoflicer on scene.He alsohad a duty to ensurethe written checklisthad been followed. (Tab G23, p. 1-2)l-ttxolftc lprior duty performanceis alsosuspect. He previously receivedtwo lettersof reprimand;one for a securityviolation andthe otherwas for failure to follow properchecklist procedures. (TabGl0,p. l-6) Additionally,he was written up fora detectedsafety violation. (Tab Gl1, p. l-2) (U) Lastly ACC failed to oerform Missile Safe Status Cfrecfrsbefore towins C2203 andG2377 respectively.(Tab 23A) Somewitnesses discussed the practiceoftow driversnot performingthese checks during a "continuous"or "concurrent"operation as long as they verified that in fact thesestatus checks had beenperformed. (Tab C24; Tab Fl5, p.4) Thereis simply no credibleevidence that eithertow driver hadreceived this verificationofthe payloadbefore connecting to his trailer and towing the pylonsto the flightline. (U) Othermembers of 5 MUNS shouldhave also recognized G2203 had not beenprepped for Tac Ferry. In accordancewith AFI 21-204,Nuclear WeaponsMaintenance Procedures, paragraph1 .4.1 1, the "Munitions Control elementis the focal point for planning,coordinating, directingand controlling munitions/weaponsactivities." Additionally, Munitions Control is required to maintain the "operation/non-operationti stotus ond location of all assignednuclear weapons"(AFI 2l-204, para.1.4.11.2.6). In orderto effectivelydirect and controla weapon ffansportoperation, Munitions Control mustfirst validatethe operationalstatus of ths assetsto be moved. This validationcan be accomplishedby verifying weaponsstatus using MUNSCON or by checkingthe pylon's build-up sheet. (U) Thel------i5-xo-ed-1, failed to effectivelydirect and controlthe movementof G2203. First, he did not ensuref------iStGffcJ-l structureopening team, had a work order prior to coordinatingstructure opening with 5thSecurity Forces Squadron (AFI 2l-204, para. 1.4.11). More importantly.ltxiTcd did not verify the statusof the pylonsthat were moved. He had accessto a software-trackingprogram (MUNSCON) that could haveeasily told him that the pylonswere prepared for tacticalferry with nuclear-inertpayloads or still loadedwith nuclear warheads.luii6lF@1a6 a duty to verify the statusof thesepylons prior to grantingauthorization to transportthem from structures1854 and I 857to STUB-29(AFI 2l-204, para.1.4.11 .2.6). (U)lloii6lAEltestifiedthat he was not trained to verifythe status of TacFerry pylons during movernent.(TabF44, p.2) His supervisor testifiedthat he had nevertrained his controllersto verifl' weaponsstatus using MLTNSCON or by checking the pylon's build-up sheet.At this point in the interview,he was readhis Article 31 rights. He invokedthose rishts and did not providea statement. (U) Regrettably,the brea@the 2 BW aircrewtook possessionof the aircraft. failed to ensureall missilescontained Tac Ferry payloads.The IRN failed to follow the exteriorinspection checklistby checkingonly one missilepayload onGZ377 ratherthan all missilepayloads on bothpylons as required. (Tab Gl8, p. 2-4) {f,€nffH.Frf,iii* Pase30 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED (U) [3@ *titten testimonystates that only one weaponwas "spot checked"on the right pylon. (Tab F2, p. 2) When6n6iaE6wasquestioned about the checklistrequiring that all "missiles"be checked,the individualstated that they weretrained only to do a spot checkofthe weapons.According to the testimonyof 2 OG leadership,some members of the 96* Bomb Squadron believeda habit or a cultureof only "spot checking"had formedin the squadron.(Tab F55,p. 3) However,the majority ofthe witnessesinterviewed,r;rll. that evenifa spot check was permissible,it would requirea spotcheck ofboth pylons. a$reed (tI) Lastly,ffifailed to verify therewas an entry in the aircraftforms indicatingweapons preflight was compliedwith. (7.O. 1B-52H-30-1,Aircraft IleaponDelivery Manual, Page 2-8, NOTE). (TabG18,TabF19,p.3;TabG7) Thefailures of the crew were certainlysignificant as they werethe lastopportuniry to discoverthe enor before the weaponsleft Minot AFB. Conclusion (U) The Handlingteam removed G2203 andG2377 from lheir respectiveshelters and towed themto the flightline without verifying the payloadof eitherpylon. This failure to verify the payloadof G2203 is evenmore inexplicablein light ofthe fact that the pylon was missingthe standardplacard with a 8 % x I I "TAC FERRY PACI(AGE" sign. No teammember noticed that G2203was missingthe standard"TAC FERRY PACKAGE' signseven though G2377 was correctlyplacard. Their failuresas a teamand as individualsare the root causeofthe unauthorizedtransfer of nuclearwarheads. (U) Despitebeing responsible for the monitoringthe movementof thesepylons, the munitions controlcenter failed to verify their status.Ifthe seniorcontroller had accessedthe software- trackingprogram (MUNSCON) to verify its status,he would haveknown instantlyG2203 was carryingnuclear warheads before the pylon had beenuploaded onto the B-52. (U) The last line of defensefailed whenthe aircrew,and more specificallythe RadarNavigator, failed to follow technicalorder procedures. If the RadarNavigator had completedchecklist, the individualwould havediscovered the six warheadsloaded onto the B-52 aircraftand orevented their flisht acrossthe United States. Phasell - Schedulingto Dispatch Background (U) The 5thMunitions SquadronSpecial Weapons Maintenance (SWM) Flight is organizedinto multiple work centers: WeaponsHandling, Weapons Maintenance, Re-entr1, Vehicle Maintenance,Missile Maintenance,Verification and CheckoutEquipment Maintenance, and Flight Supportsections. Each section is responsiblefor a specificportion ofthe flight maintenancemission. For example,Weapons handling transports weapons/missiles from storage to the maintenancefacility. The weapons/missilesare then handedto weaponsmaintenance who disassemblesthe entirepackage. From theremissiles without warheadsare transferred to missile Page31 of67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ffi:t#Fr|;li|i maintenanceand the warheads,pylons and ejectorsare maintained by weaponsmaintenance. After severaldays, all the componentsare then assembledback into a packagedpylon by weaponsmaintenance and then transported by weaponshandling back to storage. AF (bX3) This keepstheir scheduleeven and stablethroughout the 24-monthcycle. The coordinatedschedule had 2 BW ALCM pylonspaired with 5 BW ACM pylonsto ensure scheduledmaintenance dates closely aligned. (Tab F16, p. 3-4;Tab F15, p. 3-4) (bxl)Acc (U) The 5s Munitions Sguadron'smaintenance schedule is a coordinateddocument that ties all work centerstogetJrer. The schedulingprocess begins when eachwork center(with the key exceptionof WeaponsHandling) forwards its maintenancerequirements to the Missile Analysis sectionin SpecialWeapons Maintenance Flight. Analysisthen compilesthe work centerinputs aswell as othermaintenance requirements and forwardsthe inputsto 5th Maintenance OperationsSquadron (5 MOS) Plansand Scheduling (P&S). (TabF40,p.2;Tab F1,p. 2; Tab Gls) (U) On Wednesdays,the SpecialWeapons Maintenance Flight holdsa schedulingmeeting chairedby the ProductionSuperintendent. This meetingis attendedby eachofthe element NCOICs and a 5 MOS P&S scheduler.P&S displaysa draft schedule,derived from the inputs forwardedearlier b1, Analysis, on PowerPointslides and takesnotes on any changesmade by the sectionchiefs during the meeting. (Tab G26A) Thesenotes and changesare then usedto create an updatedset of slidesreflecting the maintenanceschedule and job breakout.(Tab G26) The job breakoutis a listing of specifictasks to be performedalong with their Job ControlNumber (JCN),and is oftenmore detailed than the slides. (Tab G26;TabF40,p.2; Tab F1,p.2) (U) On Thursdaymorning the flight commandersmeet with the Munitions OperationsOfficer (MOO) and P&S for the squadronscheduling meeting. Only the updatedP&S PowerPointslides arebriefed and not the accompanyingjob breakout.At the end ofthe meeting,the MOO and eachflight representativesign a schedulecover sheetreflecting their approvalofthe schedule.It is importantto notethe completeschedule is not briefedor reviewedby the flight chiefs, squadronsuperintendent, and the MOO. (TabF12, p.2;TabF51,p.2) (U) The SpecialWeapons Maintenance Flight ProductionSuperintendent chairs the Tuesday and Friday SpecialWeapons Maintenance (SWM) Flight productionmeetings. The Tuesday meetingevaluates current production against the schedule.The Friday meetingcenters on the currentweek wrap-upand looksahead to the following week's operations.These production meetingsare used as a venuefor the differentflight sectionsto exchangeinformation pertaining {E€frEJ#FT;#IIR Pase32 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 3:ar5rffr* to the maintenanceschedule. All SpecialWeapons Maintenance Flight sectionNCOICs attends thesemeetings unless a representativeis sent,due to their absence.The Production Superintendentpolls eachrepresentative for input andthen writes their input on the white board in the SWM supervisionoffice. Accordingto the ProductionSuperintendent, none ofthe section representativesbring schedulesto thesemeetings; inslead they takenotes in orderto takethe informationback to their respectivesections. (Tab F16,p.4-5) (U) The MaintenanceOperations Officer (MOO) receivesa daily statusbriefing from Munitions Control personnel.The briefing consistsofslides with informationobtained from eachflight within the squadron.(Tab Cl2, p.l-4) The purposeof the briefing is to give the Muns Ops Officer a snapshotofthe maintenanceoccurring in the squadronat that momentin time. It providesno summaryofthe work completedor scheduledto be doneand doesnot highlight bottlenecksor delaysin maintenanceproduction. The briefing capturescurrent maintenance but is ineffectiveas a tool for the Muns OpsOfficer to track maintenanceproductivity. iTab G12, p.1-4) Facts (U ) Staningin mid July. sectionof the IntegratedMaintenance Facility (lMF), begansendinglSii6iiEtl in his placeto the Wednesday schedulingmeetings. (Tab Fl, p.2) At thesemeetings l6li6llEdsimply took notesand made changesbased on whatwas discussed at themeeting and on theguidance given b rarelyattended the schedulingmeeting and l----TtGjTcd--l was out of the areafor much of that month. At the sametimd who hadbeen in placefor over two years,put in his paperworkto retire andwas beginningto train a new productionsuperintendent. Testimony indicates the sectionNCOICs did not bring the scheduleor planningdocuments but rathertook noteson what wasbeing discussedfor the followingweek. (TabF1, p.2;TabF23,p.2; TabF5l, p.2) (bxl)Acc,(bx3) DoE Page33 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 4reEHHifltlF (U) On l5 August,the SWM Flight held its weekly scheduling meeting to developthe 20-26 Aug schedule.l-6n6iTdd1 11t" u.ting production superintendent, led the meeting. fiiiioildl NCbIC of WeaponsMaintenance, i"u. not in attendance.lEIoITddl5 u.ri.tunt,-liEi6iid6l-a. placedon swing shift (seeTab F34,p.2;Tab G6 for his failure to updatepayload schedule). k6n'djedc-ldirected@l to representhim but gaveher no direction. (Tab Fl, p. 2) on 16 August,the 5* Munitions Squadronheld its schedulingmeeting. Both G2203 andG2377 were reflectedon the slidewith the task: "Upload Package." No one caughtthe error on the slide; flight representativessigned the schedulecover sheet. (TabF12,p.2) (U) Sometimeafter the schedulecover sheetwas signed,Weapons Maintenance leadership directedmissile analysis to changethe scheduleand replaceG2203 with G2358. The preponderanceof the evidencer66vTdlux-e)-i?dlwas the one who gavethe directionand thereis no documentationor approvalofthe schedulechange. Schedulersupdated the "Job Breakout" (Tab G28) but not the slides. (Tab G29) (bx1)Acc (U) At the Tuesday,2l Augustproduction meeting, G2358 and G2377 were discussedand the SWM loe confirmsthat G2358 andG2377 were in the IMF. Although thel-llTlatd-l | (bx6)Acc lattended,he didn't know what was in the schedule.Hehadnot beenat the schedulingmeeting the weekprior and did not bring any scheduleto the meeting. (TabGl4, p. 5; TabFl, p. 2) (U) On 22 August,the 27 Aug-2Sep schedule was developedby SWM Flight. (Tab G28) G2203 andGZ37 7 were on the schedulingslides as the pylonsthat would be transportedto the flightline for Tac Ferry. (Tab C29,p.4) However,no one noticedth^t G2203 had not been preparedfor Tac Ferry and that G2358 had beenprepared instead. (Tab G 16,p. 13) The Munitions OpsOfficer signedthe schedulecover page approving the schedulingslides. Additionally,the'Job breakout"had no tasksfor WeaponsHandling to move any pylons. (Tab G28,p.6) This is a routineprocess for 5'nMunitions Squadron. (U) The lastproduction meeting ofthe week was held on Thursday,23 Aug becauseFriday was a Utilization (UTE) doun day. The meetingwas rushedbecause there was a scheduledpower outagein the IMF and supervisorswanted to finish beforeit occurred.At this meetingthe following week's maintenanceactions were reviewed. The slidesdepicted GZ?03 andG2377 were to be Tac-Ferried the following week. (Tab G29, p. 4) The l------16-t(6lic-i7dd------l B8ftHtrrYag Pase34 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED liEl-oAcCl took notesat the meetingand wrote down G2203 and,C2377 asthe onesto move. (Tab G5. p. a) Fll6FAddthentranscribed his notesto a whiteboardin WeaponsHandling and listed G2203 andG2377 as moving on 29 Aug. (Tab G8, p. 1-2) He alsobriefedl---i6ftiT6-1, and llb-t(q;d6'l(Tab F5, p.2) The ineffectiveproduction meeting procedures and lack of supervision ofthe schedulingprocess led directly to this enor. (Tab F16, p. 5) (U) The following week on 27 August,the newffi took leaveand a ru6s1;1u1sm) took over. However.l-ful:t-XetTddlhad not attendedthe previousweek's meeting. Additionally,luXo)ncQ(Missile Analysis)was pre- occupiedwith otherduties andliEiiot nrclMissile Analysis)f-i5'n=6rerJ-l (Tab Fl, p.2; TabF14, p.2; TabFl8, p. 2) (LD TSgl L, 5th Munitions SquadronWeapons Handling Assistant Noncommissioned Officer- in-Charge,failed to determinethe properpylons to transportto the flightline to supponthe Tac Ferrymission. (Tab F5, p.2;Tab G2,p. 1-4)(see also, AFI2l-204,Nuclear lVeapons MaintenanceProcedures, P aragraph 1.4.7.3) (U) Basedupon Quality Assurancereports dating back to 1 January2007, a review ofpersonnel recordsof WeaponsHandling personnel, and mostnotably verbal testimony, it was quite apparentthat the sectionwas in a stateofdisrepair during his tenure. Verbal testimonyindicates thatFnbi7Eilwas an ineffectiveleader who routinelychastised his personnel.(Tab F28, p. 2; Tab F51, p. 2-3) His subordinatesfrequently worked through lunch to completescheduled activitiesbut were not compensatedin any way. Rather,he would keepthem beyondnormal work hoursin an effort to asserthis dominanceas shopchief. He createda hostileworking environment.While his subordinatesworked well together,they clearlyfelt that they couldn't tum to 6-XTI7C4for help and advice. (Tab F28, p. 2) (U) Anothermissed opportunity to preventthis transferoccurred whenFxeiidil failed to ensure his sectionproduced an accurateschedule and track work orderprogress in the Weapons Maintenancesection. (Tab C 15) This failure allowed G2203to stayon the schedulefor Tac .--._rry delivery,when in fact it had neverbeen in the maintenancebay for Tac Ferry prep.F]tofrEl (bt6),$[lsofailed to ensurehis sectionincluded the pylon build-up sheetin the Build-up Pack- 2203 asper REPORDfrom ACC. (Tab Gl7, p. 1) Had the build-up sheetbeen included in the packageand reviewedproperly before being senton the Tac Ferry aircraftto BarksdaleAFB" Analysispersonnel would haveseen the serialnumbers indicating G2203 was loadedwith W80- I nuclearpayloads. (Tab G3) ru) nbx6)AccI wasthe f------]51{tt-6i7dc-l and failed to veri8, the propermaintenance was beingperformed. (Tab F23,p. 2) Had he ensuredthe maintenanceactions were completed, he would haveseen G2203 had neverbeen in the maintenancebay for Tac Ferry prep; even thoughit was scheduledfor deliveryto the flightline. This oversightallowed G2203 to remain on the schedulefor deliveryto the aircraft. Analysis Page35 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED (U) We now know that the catalystfor this failure beganin the schedulingprocess. It further broke down becausethe supervisors;predominantly the NCOs and SNCOs,did no do theirjob. They werethe propellantthat acceleratedthe wing's failure to meticulouslytrack daily scheduledmaintenance events. They did not accountfor key actionsthat would haveprepared the pylonsfor air shipment.I would simply summarizetheir failure astoo much trust and no verification. That is the key distinctionin this phaseofthe investigation. (U) The Munitions Squadronsupervision did not pay closeattention to the schedule components.From the schedulingmeetings to the actualwork performed,they all assumedthe otherwas doing theirjob. The irony is noneofthem usedthe weekly maintenanceschedule as the overarchingsource document to track weekly maintenanceevents. This was all supposedly donein the bi-weeklywork productionmeetings. ..another failure point. (U) Furthermore,it is clearthat officerswere not very involvedin the schedulingto dispatch process.In general,the munitionssquadron chain ofcommand is focusedupwards. They predominantlyleave the daily activitiescompletely in the handsofthe Chiefsand enlisted ieadership.Only the f-iE fdffgC-l is "muddyboots." 5'hMunitions Squadron's leadershipdid not know how looseand disconnectedmaintenance production relied on assumptionsofothers. What's worse,they failed to watchthe schedule.That's how the nuclear- loadedpylon was neverprepared for tacticalferry. In fact, anotherpylon hadbeen prepared for tactical ferry. ut (bx3)DoE AF (bX3) AF (bX3) ,r1g1qlAs a result,result.I had the original pylon pylor flow-plan audited. It is the plan that the two basesbaser orativelybuilt for executingthe pylon and missileexchanges. l------Ti6l6--l Both wingshave carried out thedirected changes. ffiTheirbreakdownwasintemallydriven,notaresultof a changein venue. The munitionssquadron produced a weekly maintenanceschedule...no one followed it. (U) The productionmeetings were a looseknit confederationof shopchiefs who did not bring kev documentsor a "bird's eve" view ofwhat work was and had to be on (bXl) mos€icACC €Eet-iHlFR!|#t{* Page36 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED r-€r5#F*Elnt{* (U) The munitionscontrol centerthat is responsiblefor 'monitoring' the movementofthese pylonsdid not verify the statusofthe pylonsthat weremoved. They too did notuse any written scheduleto confirm that day's activities. Also, they had a software-trackingprogram (MUNSCON) that could haveeasily told the controlleron duty that the pylonswere prepared for tacticalferry with nuclear-inertpayloads or still loadedwith nuclearwarheads. The software still showsthe pylon that was flown to BarksdaleAFB hasnuclear warheads installed in each missile. Conclusion (U) C2203 andG2377 wereon the schedulefor an "Upload Package"job profile. (Tab G26A, p. 5) Ajob profile is a standardizedgroup oftasks. This profile doesnot containall required tasksfor Tac Ferry preparation.The "Tac Ferry Prep"job profile was actuallyneeded in this case.This caused P&S to schedulethe wrongjob profile. (U) The squadron'ssigned and printed weekly schedulewas disregardedby every single individual. They took the 'working slides'from the weekly NCOIC schedulingmeeting to brief the work statusat the Tuesand Fri productionmeetings. Again, no officer leadershipwas present.The was incapableoffollowing the work activities...herelied on the shopchiefs to tell him, by exception,what was going on. The shopchiefs made changes to the "schedule"without knowledgeor approvalofthe key facilitators. That'show one pylon got preparedfor tacticalferry by the High Bay folks, yet the SpecialWeapons Handling shop chiefs folks had the nuclear-loadedpylon on their "schedule"to be transported. Phaselll - Supervision to Leadership (U) In hindsight,one witnessdescribed this eventas the "perfectstorm." (Tab F5) The NCO regretsthat this could havebeen avoided. Little did the individualknow the warning systems that could haveprevented the unauthorizedtransfer ofnuclear warheadsfrom Minot AFB to BarksdaleAFB had beentumed off, ignoredor neverdesigned by the two air wing's supervision and leadership.In fact, this incidentwas causedby a breakdownin training,discipline, supervisionand leadership.Beyond the nuclearprocedures that wereto be followed in the Area, the was treatedas if this was a nuclear-inertmovement. @ (U) The Air Forcehas valid nuolearprocedures. There is erosionwhich led to this incident. (U) The chainreaction supposedly started at Minot actuallystarted at Barksdale.There were two (2) warning systemsthat failed, falteredor frustratedthe key personnelresponsible for assuringnuclear weapons security--Minot's maintenance scheduling-to-dispatch processes and Barksdale'sooerational focus. Both were lost upon supervisionand leadership. $E€ltE FllFil;tlt Paee37 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECRET//FRD//MR (U) Minot's 5th Bomb Wing hasa very strongoperational "warning system." Its crew force would haveprevented the inadvertentflight of nuclearweapons. However, their maintenance schedulingfaltered due to a lack ofleadershipand supervision. (U) Holistically,Minot AFB had thoroughlyprepared for the tacticalferry programfrom maintenanceto operations.Testimony and detailedrecords show the 5th Bomb Wing's leadershiptook it very seriously.They respondedwith alacrityfrom the planningstages through the executionofthe missilereposturing program. The missilerebasing plan they built in collaborationwith Barksdale's2d Munitions did notchange iablv from the orisinalolan. (Tab G4 (bxl)Acc & (bx3) DoE AF (bX3) AF (ACM). In military nomenclaturethe ACM is an AGM-129A. The catalystfor this failure beganin the schedulingprocess. lt furtherbroke down becausethe supervisors;predominantly the NCOs and SNCOs,did not do theirjob. They did not accountfor key actionsthat would haveprepared the pylons for air shipmenton 30 August. Collectivetestimony shows a seriesof personnelchanges or absencesof leadershipthroughout July andAugust. Exceptfor one TechnicalSergeant put in chargeof SpecialWeapons Handling (those that move pylon packages)most ofthose put in chargeofthe schedulingor superintendentpositions were too new or incapableof doing theirjobs. They trustedeach other, but neververified the informationthey received. (U) Literally. . .from the Munitions SquadronCommander to the NCOIC and assistantNCOICS ofeach shopin the SpecialWeapons Flight; from the schedulingmeetings to the actualwork performed...theyall assumedthe otherwas doing theirjob. lronically, noneof them usedthe printedweekly-maintenance schedule as the overarchingdocument to track rveeklymaintenance events.Again, every.witness testified they cameto the SpecialWeapons Flight rneetingswith blank notebooks.They reliedon a setof slidesproduced by a very young Plans& Scheduling Airman (Amn W.) to guidetheir discussionfor the Tuesdayand Friday productionmeetings, and #€RFF#FnlBilffi Paqe38 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED sIIa.P.BT4FR'Ei{tR theWednesday scheduling meeting. (TabF40, G26A,p.5;G29,p.\ Thisis wherea failure occurred.Someone changed the schedule,butdid not fully briefthe others. The information was carriedonto other slides,but not accuratelycarried to the printedmaintenance schedule. (Tab G26, p.29)The squadroncommander, operations officer and chiefswere not given sound informationfrom the "shop chiefs." (U) Unbeknownstto the squadron,group and wing leaders;there were two peoplein the munitionssquadron who really knew what was occuningon a daily basiswith regardsto nuclear munltlonsmalntenance.,.a lfi6lTc0 (Tab F23) and who had strong knowledgeof what pylonswere being or had beenworked on. (Tab F 15) They actuallycould haveprevented this incidenthad they known what wastranspiring. (U) TheF-----'?EF6i-AE----] as he is called,did not attendthe most importantmeetings during the final weeks. His testimonyshows he was uncomfoftablewith his replacement'sability to do thejob. Yes, he had surfacedthat with leadership,but no actionwas takento find a suitable productionsuperintendent replacement. The T--mlelrm---] would havestopped this chain reactionbecause he intimatelyunderstood the flow plan,had given strict guidanceon the priority of effort and attendedall the meetingsthat kept the properwork flowing. This was hisjob and he wasvery good at it. Again, his testimonyshows his level ofcompetenceto be above reproach,He had worked diligently to train his replacement.Yet, he knew he eventuallyhad to handover the "keys to the car" to his replacement.(Tab F23) The[----luxol iF------l :Enggec--rdidn't havethe technicalunderstanding of thejob, nor showedit during his testimony. (F54) (U) Unlike the ProductionSuperintendent, the [---lox6iltd---'] doesn'tattend the meetings. Her NCOIC attendsthe meetingsand passesany changes.However, her role is significantin the chainof events. Whenthe assistantNCOIC ofthe SpecialWeapons Handling section called the "bay chief'to confirm what pylonswere moving the moming of 29 Aug, sheimmediately countermandedthe ANCOIC when he indicatedthey were retrievingG2203 for tacticalferry loading. Shewas adamantG2203 was neverprepared for tacticalferry shipment. (Tab F 15) The ANCOIC ofthe towing team listenedto her earnestplea and subsequentlycalled the tow- teamchief Unfortunately,he was immediatelyconvinced by that individualthe informationon their schedulingboard was correct;that G2203 was scheduledto be towed from Shelter1854. (Tab F5) Accordingto the bay chief, he nevercalled her back. The wrong pylon was retrieved becausethe schedulingprocess had wrongly identifiedG2203 for shipment.Someone had changedthe schedule. (U)ThepreponderanceoftheevidenceshowstheNCoICofffi had changedthe schedule.He changedthe orderofthe shipmentfrom G2203to anotherpylon basedon the earlierdue dateofthe on anotherovlon and that ovlon was G2358. G2358 wasready for shipmenthad never been carried through the schedulingproducts or meetings.lt was lost upon everyone.The NCOIC of WeaponsMaintenance is responsiblefor makingthe changeand not communicatingit to others. fft-.ltln#n Page39 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED €:€t{It|fFt'iliF (U) It is clearthe officerswere not very involvedin the schedulinsto dispatchprocess. In general,the munitionssquadron chain of commandwas focusedupwards. They predominantly left the daily activitiescompletely in the handsofthe Chiefsand enlistedleadership. Only the f-----lbx-6) A-c-d------was engaged.His testimonyshows he tried to removemore SNCOs andNCOs from theirjobs, but wasthwarted by the Chiefs. (Tab F5I ) In factf1olTFl was "muddy boots"and had the right instinctsto bring his concemsto the attentionofthe Operations Officer. He was ableto removetwo NCOs in his tenure. Nonetheless,the officersdid not know how looseand disconnectedmaintenance production relied on assumptionsof others. (U) The schedulingprocess and productsthe 5th Munitions Squadronused is too complicatedto describe.Testimony again shows the squadron'sformal, signedand printedweekly schedule was disregardedby every individual. Instead,they informally usedtheir 'working slides' throughoutthe week to brief both for schedulingand production. (Tab G26A, p. 5; Tab G29, p. 4) They carriedover the 'working slides' from the WednesdayNCOIC schedulingmseting to briefthe work statusat the Tuesdayand Friday productionmeetings. For them,the 'working slides'were the de facto schedule.(Tab F40; Tab F12) 'working (U) G2203 and anotherpylon, G2377, were identifiedon the slides' for tacticalferry preparation;and, eventual B-52 air shipmenton 30 Augustand was alsoaccording to the original flow plan. (Tab G30,p.2) The changeoccurred between the formal and informal "schedules." Whenprinted, the formal schedulereflected G2358 and G2377 for shipmenton 30 August. (Tab G26, p. 29) However,the line supervisorsused the 'working slides'to brief the movement of G2203,rather than G2358. (Tab 264, p. 5, Tab G29,p. 4) (U) In short,the munitionssquadron produced a weekly maintenanceschedule...no one followed it, not eventhe commanderor operationsofficer. (Tab Fl2, p. 2) The production meetingswere a looseknit confederationofshop chiefswho did not bring key documentsor a "bird's eye" view of what work had to be accomplished.They relied on their corporatememory. Thev usedthe wrons slidesto follow the work. (bxl)Acc (U) Whenthe crewsaccessed andtowed G2377 from Shelter1857, G2203 from Shelter1854 they were supposedlymonitored by the Munitions Control Center.Neither the NCOIC nor the controlleron duty usedany written scheduleto confirm that day's activities. Also, they had at their disposala software-trackingprogram (MUNSCON) which would haveimmediately notified the controlleron duty if one ofthe pylonsthe crew were moving was still loadedwith nuclearwarheads; the otherwithout. The supervisorand controllernever verified the statusof tt€R;rHFilB#fifr Pase40 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED tr€*t+#ru eitherpylon throughoutthe movementprocess. MIJIISCON would havetold them had they usedit asthey havebeen taught and directed. (U) Operationally,the 5 BW had assignedthe right planningofficer. He is a nuclear- experienced1s'tgrAculand he is ulro a T-iSFdlTdc-l He authored,facilitated and orchestrated an incredibleprogram for the entireB-52 community. (Tab G20,p. 1-| 0) For the aircrews,he designedthree key products. (U) The 5 BW tacticalferry plan was sound. lt gavethe aircrewsand leadershipthe right focus. The plan waswell written, coordinatedand sentto Air CombatCommand headquarters and their sisterwing. Therewere three major productsthat formedthe bulwarkofstability for the B-52 crews. First, he fashioneda trainingcourse for all crewsto receiveacademic and simulator training. He knew ferrying missilesaboard a B-52 was extraordinaryfor the youngercrew force. This training courseeven covered the nuancesofhow to checkeach missile and veri$' the variousnuclear-inert or nuclear-trainingpayloads were installed. Second,he authoreda pre- takeoff briefing. lt treatsthe ferry flight as a higher-headquartersdirected mission. It setsthe tonefor both the crew andtheir leadership.Third, he accomplishedwhat he was taskedto do...providean OperationalRisk Managementassessment of the wing's personalprogram and submitit to Air CombatCommand. He sharedall threeproducts equally with BarksdaleAFB. (U) Minot's Wing Commanderand MaintenanceGroup Commanderhave been in command sinceJune 2007. They werejust beginningto gain insightsas to the quality oftheir respective organizations.They both participatedin the early AugustGLOBAL THUNDER exercise.This is a STRATCOM-directednuclear exercise. This wastheir first opportunityto seethe nuclear generationcycle and assessthe wing andgroup's performance. Both had visitedthe Weapon StorageArea duringtheir immersionprogram as new commanders.Nothing remarkablestands out in their leadershipperforrnance. The MaintenanceGroup Commander was in the processof pushingfor more munitionsproducts in the wing's schedule.Finally, they treatedthe tactical ferry programwith inter€st,but nothingremarkable lrom the daily schedule.They werewell awareofthe foundationofthe programbetween the wings to includethe closeties betweenthe 5th Munitions Squadronand the 2d Munitions Squadronto build a meticulousflow plan for transferringAir Launchedand AdvancedCruise Missiles. The mechanicsof the programwere sound. (U) BarksdaleAFB's 2ndBomb Wing (2 BW) hasa strongmaintenance "warning system." Their maintenancecomplex would havereadily caughtthe samescheduling error. Conversely, their air crewswere not properlyprepared to fly this very importantmission. They are competentto fly pylon loadsof munitions,but their nuclearexperience is lacking. The supervisionand leadershipin the OperationsGroup had developeda tacticalferry program which was lackingor lackluster.This was evidentin the minimum crew compositionthey assignedto fly the mission. (U) The reality is the 2 BW hasa very strongmaintenance-scheduling process. The 2nd MaintenanceGroup Commanderassures that it is a modelfor planning,scheduling and accomplishingthe full line of aircraftand munitionsmaintenance actions. (Tab Gl3) Line workers,supervisors and leadersuse a commonschedule by which they accomplishtheir weekly {i:ielfi#iFRfrri{r{* Pase41 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED f;€tffi activities. In all, they haveu'ell-trained, disciplined maintainers from the supervisorsto the top leader. They havea focusofpurpose usinga commonscheduling process. On balance,they would haveeasily caught a schedulingenor. Their waming systemis intact. However,beyond the leadership,supervision and schedulingdiscipline there is atrophyin their ability to generate bombersto nuclearcaoabilitv. (bx1)Acc l€f,lD\ The calculushas changed. There has been a fundamentalshift over the pa (U) t'hreevears to rrearlyconvention-al-only operations., Much of it hasbeen by design.I--oXs) Doil | | The AdvancedCruise Missiles from Minot and the remaininsAir LaunchedCruise Missiles in their are scheduledfor further demilitarization,destruction or (U) However,on the operationsgroup side, they havefundamentally changed the calculusto conventionalweaponry at all levelsof leadershipto the coretraining focus. They areprepared to generate,but they will rely on key personnelto carry themthrough a war-preparationexercise or rely on existing,precisely written checklists.To emphasize,the nuclearskill setshave not been exercised.They are atrophied. It wasevident in the testimonyof everyoperations group memberwe interviewed.When referringto the tacticalferry programthey believeit is a, "Depot Maintenanceinput that only requiresthree (3) crewmembers...we're only ferrying 'carcasses' from point A to point Bl" That is a quote. They havetreated the programin the generalistsense. Page42 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ln their view, andthe views the B-52 aircrewwitnesses, they've flown heavierloads of bombsand missilesin lvar. (U) Very few admit they sawthe COMACC-directedRepositioning Order (REPORD)that came throughformal messagetraffic. (Tab G17,p. l-4) Rather,the tactical-ferryprogram pteparation wasgiven to a checkpilot. TheT 16f,5FACE-t"built a three-ringbinder of guidancewith apilot's eye on safetyof flight. The book was nevercoordinated within the wing nor fully vettedwitlr operationssquadron, group or wing leadership.In fact, someguidance in the book, which was primarily written for aircraftcommander consumption, was unattainable.The book was resident in the standardization,evaluation office. From what we can ascertain,the crewsdid review the flight parameterswith their deputygroup or groupcommander the day prior to the sortie...that was awell followed provision. However,that's not becauseit was directivein nature. It was understoodthe leadershipwanted oversight ofeach crew's readinessfor this mission.There was no formal presentation,just makecontact. (U) We askedlor a simulatorwith a FormalTraining Unit instructorcadre to review nuclear checklistprocedures and "switchology"to fully understandbasic nuclear, tactical-ferry and emergency(weapon, pylon) jettison procedures.The "schoolhouse" instructors did a magnificentjob. They alsorevealed the initial B-52 trainingcourse they teachhas, over time, reducedthe nuclearsyllabus in lieu of accomplishingconventional preparation. For example, the one academicblock of instructiontbr nuclearoperations is plannedfor 3-hours. It is not taughtin a classroom;rather, it is a computer-basedcourse. Also, the one flight devotedto nuclearprocedures has devolved to a simulator'ride'. Thereis a catch. They believenuclear training is really taughtafter a B-52 crew graduatesfrom the schoolhouse. lt is in the formal schoolhouse which someofthe disciplineof performinga full preflight ofevery weaponis lost uponthe crews. It hascarried over into the squadronswhere actual testimony of pilots and navigatorsreveals that someimplicitly believethe checklistcalls for "spot checking" or partially checkingor fully checkingthe weapons.To many,"It depends."The assumptionis the navigatorsare taught up front to accomplisha thoroughpreflight, weaponby weapon. Not true. The pervasiveassumption has trickled into their nucleartraining. Leadershipfailed to identily this issueof"spot checking"weapons as a problemthat neededa solution. (U) During the missionqualification phase in the bombersquadron, the crew is scheduledfor in- depthnuclear academics in the wing's nuclear"vault". The "vault" is a securewar-planning sectionin the wing's operationalsupport squadron- It is herethe crew is taughtor exposedto basicnuclear weapons design, how to decodedocuments and generatea nuclearbomber to meet STRATCOM's war plans. This haining takesabout two weeks. It is assumedin this phasethe crewshave been taught in general,in the schoolhouse, how to preflight weapons.The vault personneldo take the crewsout to the weapons-loadtrainer to seenuclear-training munitions. They generallydo not touchthe real thing,just mock trainingmissiles. This is wherethe crews havelost someof the ability to properlypreflight a missile. This is alsowhere the streamsof assumptionhave crossed. Final testimonialnote...the Barksdale AFB aircrewthat flew the AdvancedCruise Missiles from Minot AFB havenever ohvsicallv touched a realmissile...their TF€f,EN#FIEIXR Pas.e43 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED sLCLErm fingershave never put an imprint on an actualadvanced or air launchedmissile...neither the experiencedinstructor pilot, radarnavigator or inexperiencedcopilot. (U) The resultanthas been a furthererosion ofthe nuclearskill setsat this baseparticularly. Barksdaleholds the keysto evervaspect of B-52 training. It is evidentin the "schoolhouse" whereB-52 crewslearn the fundamentalsto the ultimateweapons school where the PhD's ofthe B-52 aretaught to be expertsin both conventionaland (supposedly)nuclear weapons, tactics and procedures.The nuclearacademia has eroded. They areconventional only. The B-52 Weapons InstructorCoursg does not teachits premier"weaponeers" the fundamentalsoftheir nuclear tradecraft. ln testimony,we askedevery singleWeapon School graduate from colonelto captainabout their trainingat Barksdaleand Nellis AFB. . .theolder graduatesdistinctly remembertraining on nuclearweapons, no differentlythan conventionalweapons. The most recentDistinguished Graduate from weaponschool, the instructorpilot on 'Doom 99' which transportedthe nuclearwarheads aboard her B-52, did not receivespecific nuclear weapons instructionin Class07-A. Again, sheadmitted she had neverphysically touched a nuclear weapon. Thereare deeply rooted changes in trainingwhich haveevolved over the years. The Air Forceand Air CombatCommand will needto furtherstudy the training s1'llabiin a more comprehensivestudy. The calculushas changed; the contrastis evident. (U) Thereis a conrast betweenthe hvo B-52 wings. (U) BarksdaleAFB 2 BW's schedulingprocesses are very sharp,especially in the maintenance complex. The Operationsand MaintenanceGroup leadershipregularll' pesls to 'level the bubbles'and untie any GordianKnots. It's commendable.Combined, the maintenance leadership,scheduling processes and wing commanderoversight would have invariablycaught the schedulinganomalies that causedthis incidentto occurat Minot. The operationsleadership nevercaught the two unqualified,non-combat mission ready for nuclear(CMR-N) crew members.In fact, they had disregardedthe requirementin the REPORDto be basic-missionor combat-missionready in nuclearprocedures to conducttactical ferry, 6p"ru11onr. This is true eventhoush EEllEEladmits that he did readthe messaseand had expressedhis concemthar the CMR-N requirementwas too restrictive. He had beenthe r-n'rTrdcc------at which time he had steppedin as thefiDidjEFlpending the arrival of thef-----15'irorAef:--J After expressinghis concemaboutthe CMR-N requirementto his staff,he failed to ensurecompliance with the REPORDor to forward his concernto ACC. (U) The lP on Doom 99 was not CMR-N; a requirementfor this mission. (Tab F19,p. 2; Tab Gl7, p. 3) We havefound another2 BW aircrewmember flew without nuclearqualification. To rcpeat,the opentional chainof commandnever read or followed the COMACC REPORD messagenor was awareof the guidancein the tacticalferry book. The thin marginof nuclear emphasison the 2 BW operationalside would not and did not, in our view, give rise to any ability to catcha mistakeat the aircraftin the tacticalferry program...that'swhy the Barksdale crew missedthe nuclear-loadedpylon. ,, ,,1p,t The 2 BrIJ hesunwittingly abrogatedits nuclearimperative. Except for two senior0-6 \u ) leaders.the wing by in largeis incapableof performingthe nuclearmission it is assigned.Future inspectionswill haveto bearthat out. The second-ordereffect is worse. Becausethe wing is tRFitrFR.H*tr Pase44 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 5Etgg5ry responsiblefor the entiretraining spectrum,this de-emphasisis now permeatedwithin at least the younger,emerging B-52 crew force. (U) The chainreaction which startedat Minot actuallystarted at Barksdale;ifanything, it ended with a BarksdaleB-52 crew. More than evcr,the completepicture shows there was a breakdown in discioline,supervision and leadership.The fourth ingredientthat haseroded is trainins. (U) In sum,two fault wavesoccurted and causedthis "perfectstorm." Therewas no visible warning of this coming. It occurredat the wing level and below. rr E-4f \','c ha',cthorcughly investigatedupwards the entirechain of commandfrom the Air Force- \"level directionto Air CombatCommand Commander's order to repositionthe missiles to the 8th Air ForceCommander responsible in his capacityas TaskForce 204 Commander.TF 204 is STRATCOM's assignednuclear bomber and reconnaissancetask force. The 5'hBomb Wing's maintenancepersonnel and 2ndBomb Wing's aircrewwho facilitatedthe unauthorizedtransfer of nuclearwarheads from Minot AFB to BarksdaleAFB areclearlv at fault and shouldbe held accountableby their commanders. ffits#iF***{*. Pase45 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED €a€Hifl.FHr#atafu lTtIADtr, a T-t FFlfHFnl:H* Page46 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 3rF{-nralg TabE: Recommendations DoD (U) I haveone overarchingrecommendation. The Air Forceshould request a comprehensive inter-agencystudy ofnuclear standardsoutlined in top level,current guidance (DTRA, DOE, OSD, STRATCOM) and comparethose standards to the respectiveforce provider'sstandards (USAF, USN). Thoughthere was a clearfailure to secureand preventan unauthorizedtransfer ofnuclear warheads,it would be mutuallybeneficial for othersto assistus in reviewingany seamsin the nuclearstandards. Air Force /l t\ffi Suspcrrdany furtherB-52 tacticalferry operationsfor this remainingAir Launched '-' Cruise\4issi!e arrd Advanced Cruise Missile reposturing program; unless movements are directedby the CDR USTRATCOM for operationalrequirements and furtherapproved by SECDEF. (U) Initiate a thoroughreview oftactical feny optionsto assureeach respective MAJCOM (i.e., ACC, AFSPC,AMC, USAFE, etc.)adheres to one rigid standardof trainingand execution similarto the PrimaryNuclear Airlift Program(PNAF). (bx1)Acc (U) Direct all nuclearunits to separatenuclear from nuclear-training,nuclear-testing and nuclear-inertpayloads. If able,put them in separateshelters. Separate shelters would diminish the samehuman error that causedthis incident. Ifunable to separatelyshelter, then establish clearguidance to mark, delineateand separatethe dissimilarpayloads. Regardless, treat all shelterswith the samenuclear surety, safety and reliability procedures.Leave nothing to chance. Maintainthe samenuclear shelter protection of sealingdoors and completelyblocking the doors from floor to ceiling with MassiveModular Blocks; per existingprocedures. . (LD AFI 9l-l0l , Air ForceNuclear WeaponsSurety Program, does not permit the storageof conventionaland nuclearordnance in the sameshelter. That's why ConventionalAir LaunchedCruise Missiles (CALCM) cannot be shelteredwith ALCMs. o (U) Thereis no CJCSguidance that we areaware of that addressesthe storageof nuclear weapons.CJCSI 3150.04,Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Logistics Management and ffrHltalHfl Page47 of 67 UNCLASSIFlED UNCLASSIFIED *r5anlfla'.t Nuclear WeaponsReports Under the Joint Reporting Structure, is not restrictive regardinghow servicesstore nuclear or nuclear-inertmunitions. r (U) The Air Forcepermits mixed storageon nuclearand nuclear-inertweapons. This was evendone in StrategicAir Commanddays. SAC regularlymixed loadsin storagein preparationfor testing,training and tacticalferry missions.Previously, SAC regulations and now AFI 21-204does permit mixed storageas long asthe unit "delineates"the separateloads. (U) ChangeAFI2I-204, Nuclear WeaponsMaintenance Procedures, which guide our units on the proceduresfor labelingor delineatingnuclear-inert loads; in this case,tactical ferry packages. The instructiondirects in pangraph4.1 .2 to, "ldentify non-operationalweapons (i.e., placard or rope-off_)to preventinadvertent use...make identification readily visible and do not removeuntil statusis changed..."The procedures identifying (i.e., 'placarding') a nuclear-inertload should be the same. Likewise,change AFI 9l-lll, SafetyRules USStrategic Bomber Aircraft. 'Nuclear for Chapter6 on Identification"is equallyvague. It directsunits to, "Developprocedures to...distinguishnuclear bombs from test or trainingshapes... identify containers that contain nuclearwarheads." r (U) lt was readily apparentthat the wing's interpretationled to a simpleset of 8 % X I I inch piecesofpaper tapedon the sideofthe pylon. The papersigns indicated "TAC FERRY PACKAGE" or "TAC FERRY LOAD." (U) They were neverconsistent as to placementon the pylon, the numberofpaper placardsor proceduresfor who shouldand shouldnot removethem prior to flight. In essence,there wasn't a "REMOVE BEFOREFLIGHT" red streameror well design€d placardthat showedthis to be a tactical-ferryprepared load. (U) Adopt a singleplacard that "shouts"to all personnel...and, not easilyremoved without a work order. (bxl)Acc o (U) Perhaps,an automatedtracking system for the future might be beneficial. If for anything,it canact asa real-timeGPS tracking tool for leadershipat all levels. (U) Review,then changeour manualsand checklists to preciselytell eachcrew how to verify every item on the "Bill ofLading" and confirmthat the "Bill ofLading" matchesthe load. Pase48 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED tl€Hfrlmt (bxl)Acc (U) Ironically,there is an AF FORM 504,Weapons Custody Transfer Document, (Aircraft) that is availableon the AF FORM web site. It is a 1978form. (U) The AF FORM 504 is not usedthat we areaware of. This shouldbe revisedto the samestandard as the AF FORM 514.or adoptthe 514 asthe transferdocument for all nucleartransfers. (U) Establisha Blue-Ribbonpanel to review all nucleartraining procedures. This evaluation shouldbe comprehensiveand donein coordinationwith DoD, COCOM and inter-agencysupport ifnecessary.It shouldfocus on the full spectrumofnuclear proceduresfrom operationsto maintenance. o (U) For example,aircrews genemlly do not havea firm graspof their nuclearweapons as equallyas they do their conventionalmunitions. The USAF WeaponsSchool cuniculum appearsnot to emphasizenuclear weapons. Weapons School graduates should be the first line of defense...theones who shouldteach nuclear weapons and tactics to their fighter, bomberand missilecrews. Testimonyof the B-52 crew revealedthat they had neverphysically touched or beennear a real nuclearweapon except for generations. They had nevertouched an ACM or ALCM. Beyonda curriculareview, the panelshould take a very hard look at the trainingapproach stading at the centersofexcellence and proceedthrough our formal training units. (bx1)Acc, (bx3) DoE o (U) Any review may requirethe AF,{G and AF/SE for oversight. (bxr)Acc €l€RE|r#Fm;* Pase49 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED rECFili|tH (bx1)Acc r (U) Regardless,from "boom" to ballastpayloads, the nuclearhandling procedures shouldbe the samefor trainingtesting and actualoperalions. . (U) Treateverything nuclear with the samenuclear surety, safety and reliability. In short,train the way we fight. (U) Considerre-implementing a no-noticeNuclear Surety Inspection regime that triumphsthe Air Force'sfocus on24171365nuclear preparedness posture. This is a toughmeasure in our currentenvironment. o (U) Therefbre,review the scope,scale and durationof NuclearSurety Inspections and NuclearOperational Readiness Inspections. . (U) Most units adequatelyprepare and standpoised when the NSI or NORI team arrives. They havetrained, the'? Team" to meetthe insFectors and the "B Team" to be in the shadowswhen possible.All nuclearqualified and certifiedpersonnel from the youngestAirman to the Wing Commanderought to be subjectto a no-noticeinspection. Command and Control Procedures (U) Initiate a reviewof Air Forceguidance on installation-levelnuclear command and control proceduresfrom schedulingmonthly, weekly to daily maintenance(and operations) requirements to the actualoversight for accomplishingthose requirements. So far, the Air Forceand DoD instructionsgoveming command and controlofnuclear weaponsappear to properlyguide the unit. However,we found both Minot and BarksdaleAFBs adoptedtheir own techniquesand in somecases, procedures for executingthe instructions.The Air Forcedoes not havea standard commandand control procedurefor nuclearoperations within the WeaponStorage Areas. o (U) Specifycontrol procedures for NuclearMunitions schedulingin AFI 21-204. Detatl how the squadronmunitions schedule will be developedand approved. r (U) Specifya rigid processfor changingthe schedule,make it similar to the change processused for the wing flying schedule(AFI 21-165) and require the munitions squadroncommander and the maintehancegroup commander to approvechanges. o (U) Use one document,to createand managethe maintenanceschedule. The schedule shouldinclude everv maintenance task and JCN on the spreadsheet(use dift'erent tabs for schedule,spare missiles, training, etc.). r (U) Establishsecurity controls in the schedulingprocess to limit thosewith authorityto makechanges. This preservesthe int€grity of the informationand ensuresMissile AnalysisSection is the focal point of informationwithin the SpecialWeapons MaintenanceFlisht. ffiEF#Filr#T Pase50 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED €f;€*:+riFnrl*{* (Lt) Requirethe nuclearmunitions maintenance schedule be part of the wing maintenanceand operationsplan andto be briefedto the wing commanderin the same detailas the flying schedule. (U) Track Munitions schedulingdeviations and briefthem to the squadroncommander and groupcommander weekly. (U) Specifythe minimum requirementsfor daily munitionsproduction meetings. Show work scheduled,work complete,and any productiondelays. Developminimum requirementsfor daily munitionsupdates and detailminimum itemsthat must be revieweddaily by the MunitionsOperations Officer andMunitions Squadron Superintendent. (U) Requirea "Geiger-counter"or similar radiation-detectionchecks on any missile beingtransported out of the WeaponsStorage Area. LeadershipTraining (U) Our future seniorwing leadersare lessinclined to havenuclear experience. They needhelp. From the squadronto wing commanders,there is a contrivedview ofhow nuclearoperations needto be executed.In somecases, wing leadershipdisregarded the importanceof conducting regularlyscheduled nuclear exercises and other preparation for their nuclearcommitments. I proposefor considerationa way ofre-capturingthe missionfocus starting with the leadership. (U) I recommendthat commandersat all levelsattend a ioint-oriented,nuclear-certified course for thosein the directchain ofnuclear weaponsoperations; regardless ofwhether they are directly or indirectlyresponsible for an operationalnuclear stockpile. Unlike Admiral Hyman Rickover'snuclear submarine force, where "boomers" had the legendoftechnical prowess,the Air Forceneeds to simply ingrainthe fundamentalsin our force,their leadersand their training. (U) Leadersneed mentors. Therefore, I would recommendthe establishmentofa senior-mentor programthat providesdirect training to thoseput in the positionof responsibilityof our nuclear operations....fighter, bomber, ICBM and space.These "grey-beards" should be a part ofthe joint nucleartraining course. o (U) Recommendthat the Air Forceestablish a short,poignant course at Maxwell AIB Air Universityfor a commanderthat addressesthe doctrinal,procedural and operational ansof allthings nuclear. . (U) Usethe existingAir ForceSenior Mentors to teachour nuclear-certifiedleaders. sirafffliFfrF#;k Pase51 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED EaI5l-H Commander'sCustody of NuclearWeapons (U) Seniorleadership ownership of nuclearweapons is 4q; "inherent." We shouldmake ownershipa part of commandfor the Munitions SquadronCommander and the Wing Commander. r 1U)Nuclear iles areowned the lieutenants.I don't intendthat to be a it's a fact. (U) I satwith him to carefullyaudit his signedappointment letter, inventory and actual written "contract." Additionally, I reviewedhis pastsix-month's stockpile verifications to includethe 'quarantined'hard drives from the Defenselntegration and Managementof NuclearData Services(DIAMONDS) computerprogram that he keepsto provethe voracityof the verification process. (U) The MASO indicatedthat he is the only one who is held to accountfor the nuclear warheads.Cornmanders are not. (U) Give the Munitions SquadronCommander and the Wing Commanderownership of the unit's nuclearstockpile; the sameway a youngofficer acceptshis dutiesas a MASO. It will changethe calculusif both commandersin the direct commandofthe nuclearweapons have to accept'custody' oftheir ordnance.This hasnever been done in the Air Force. o (U) The MASO wastrained at SheppardAFB. Accordingto his testimony.he did not get trainedon an actualDIAMONDS computersystem; perhaps, a classificationissue. Regardless,the two respectivecommanders ought to receivesome training on how to acceptcustody ofthe nuclearmunitions. o (U) The nuclearcourse for commandersshould include a block of instructionon nuclear weaponsaccountability and custody. o (U) Similarto the way the commandechelon certifies a new commanderfor PRPprior to the changeofcommand; I recommendthe chainof commandalso have a formal nuclear weaponsmunitions and mission handover prior to taking the flag of command responsibility. r (U) In short,formally documentand dissolvethe outgoingcommander's custody and inauguratetJ,te new commander'scustody. The MASO shouldbe held accountableto both commandersfor all changesto their aligned"contract." This will force inherent ownershioand custodvofthe nuclearstockoile at all echelonsofcommand. €f€ftEi*iFft;t|.;Fl Pase52 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED €-€*Er#Fn!EHn Air ExpeditionaryForce Alignment (U) Assignnuclear units to AEF duty. This is a difficult issue,but one for consideration.lf thereis a nuclearfocus problem, then it may be worthwhileto formally assigna unit to an AEF vulnerabilityperiod. That would be the unit's specifiedtask during the AEF cycle. The implied task is the unit will havea full 120-dayworkup to full combatcapability prior to assumingthe AEF duty for STRATCOM. Whenthe unit completesits in-garrisonassigned cycle, it caneasily preparefor otherAEF requirements. o (U) The AEF constructbefier fits a dual-DOCbomber wing's scheduling. r (U) Consolidatinga wing's commitmentson a planningorder will alsogive the commanderslittle latitudebut to preparefor the nuclearmission set. It may comewith a costfor Iimiting a unit's availabilityfor conventionaloperations, COCOM Theater SupportPlans and otherpotential engagements. However, this will put rigor in the system. It will give the wing someflexibility to preparefor otherrequirements. Additional Air Force-Level Recommendations (U) Requisitiona DefenseIntegration and Managementof NuclearData Services (DIAMONDS) terminalfor the NuclearMunitions Officer Coursein AETC. Expandtraining on the dutiesof the MunitionsAccounting Systems Officer (MASO). (U) Changethe appointingofficial for the MASO to be the installationcommander. Require the MASO to be certifiedby the wing commanderprior to assuminghis duties. ChangeAFI21-204 to requireMASO to brief the Wing Commanderwhen they assumecommand and the resultsof eachinventory. (U) Changethe weaponsloading technical orders and checkliststhat will requirethe load crew to accomplisha Missile SafeStatus Check prior to commencinga load and aftercompleting the missilesystem checkout. (U) Reassignthe maintenancescheduler back into the nuclearmunitions squadron. The Plans and Schedulingpersonnel in the MaintenanceOperations Squadron appear to be disconnected from the detailedscheduling requirements for nuclearoperations. This will assurecontinuity of effort andplanning. (U) Establishone softwaresystem for munitionscontrol and standardizeit acrossthe Air Force. Wings usevarious software programs similar to the MUNSCON softwareused at Minot. (U) Requiremandatory Quality Assuranceevaluations for munitionscontrollers. The periodic evaluationshould be an over-the-shoulderobservation ofthe controller'sduty in the courseof their dailv activitiesand resnonsibilities. SEETTIHXiH Page 53 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Egn!Efi|5Hlila* (U) Emphasizemunitions scheduling processes as a lbcus item ofan NSI. Reviewschedule developmentand productionas well as changetracking and schedulingeffectiveness. (Ll) Standardizedthe dutiesof munitionscontrollers. Develop a MAJCOM standardtraining and certificationplan for MunitionsControl Centercontrollers. (U) SubmitAF Form 847 to changeT.O. lB-52H-30-4,Aircrew WeaponDelivery Manual, pg 2-4,2"r patagraphunder TACTICAL FERRYto read: "...accomplishall normalprocedures from BeforeExterior Inspection through step lb ofAfter EngineStart and all Prelanding Proceduresand After LandingProcedures." (U) SubmitAF Form847 to ACCI l0-450V2,para 3.5.3., modifoing 2ndto last sentence to read: "Requirementsinclude. ..command and controlprocedures, EWO communicationstraining, actualweapons prefl ight, tactics," (U) SubmitAF Form 847 to addto AFI 11-28-52V1,RAP taskingmessage, pg 10,Para 59 'Nuclear FunctionalTrainins": Subjeci/EventCode Frequency ReferenceDirective Grounding Affect CMR NuclearWeapons Annual ACCI l0-450V2 1.Yo Yes Preflisht (U) SubmitAF Form 847 addingthe following NOTE afterexisting NOTE on pg 2-8 to T.O. lB-52H-30-1reading: "Regardless of missilepayload, two weaponsqualified personnel must preflight all missilesprior to aircraftacceptance and annotatecompletion of missilepreflight to includepayload type verificationand statusin AFTO 781." (U) TaskAir CombatCommand to re-evaluateB-52 nucleartraining requirements and currencies.Delineate which organizationis responsiblefor nucleartraining requirements (FTU vs. gainingunit). Minot AFB (U) Incorporatethe SpecialWeapons Handling Section's schedule requirements into the Special WeaponsMaintenance Flight overall schedulingprocess. Currently, the weaponshandlers do their ownjob controlnumbers based on the flight's schedule.They shouldbe driven by and integralto the flight's schedulingprocess. (U) Developminimum training for munitionscontrollers and specifytheir dutiesin detail. Formallycertifu munitionscontrollers for their duties. (U) Re-trainall Munitions Controlpersonnel on their responsibilitiesto track,control, identifii and verifu the statusofnuclear and nuclear-inertassets. (U) Completelyrevise the Munitions Squadronmorning status briefing. Showwork scheduled, work complete,and any productiondelays. Ensurethat theseitems are reviewed daily by the MunitionsOperations Officer and Munitions SquadronSuperintendent. IIaEiFfBralar{R Page54 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED fE€Ea**.ftr1'ilajt (U) Decertifyand train all SpecialWeapons Handling personnel on all their dutiesrelative to weaponstransport. Retrain, qualify and certify eachindividual. (U) Retrainall Munitions Control Centerpersonnel to promptly updateand document firefighting line numbersfollowing any changein statusor locationoflnuclear munitions. (U) Immediatelydevelop a processto coordinateall schedulechanges through all sectionsin the MunitionsSquadron. (U) Immediatelyensure section supervisors bring schedulesto the sectionproduction meetings and eliminatethe useofnote booksas the vehiclefor controllingwork. (U) Ensurethe productionsuperintendent uses the scheduleas his basisfor trackingand controllingmaintenance. (U) Limit thosewith authorityto makechanges to any munitions,maintenance or flight schedule.The wing shouldadhere to Air Forceprocedures for schedulechanges. (LI) Includepayload-identification training in munitionstraining lesson plans. Ensureall munitionspersomel are trained. BarksdaleAFB (U) ReviewB-52 FTU syllabusto ensurenuclear mission training is accomplished. (U) ReviewB-52 WeaponsSchool course syllabus to ensureadequate instruction is providedto WeaponsSchool students preparing them to be nuclearweapons subject matter expefts. (LI) Barksdaleleadership must makeevery attemptto developrobust nuclear mission exercise scenariosand ensureat leasttwo nuclearexercises per year in accordancewith ACCI l0-450 Vol 5 Strotegic CommittedAircraft Exercises. (U) Developa weaponspreflight training programto ensureTech Orderprocedures and applicableinstructions are understood, standardized, practiced, and certified. Specialemphasis mustbe placedon nuclearmunitions. Person n el Reli abiI ity Prog ra m PersonalReliability Program(PRP) Source:DO D 52 I 0.4 2 - R_A FMAN I 0-3 902 NUCLEAR WLAPONSPERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGMM (PRP) (U) The PersonnelReliability Programexists because. .."Nuclear weapons require special considerationbecause oftheir policy implicationsand military importance,their destructive €EeilErF;Fi;rtlrlt Page55 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ABASF#FRE#FIR power,and the political consequencesofan accident,loss of a weapon,or an unauthorizedact. The safety,security, control" and effectivenessofnuclear weaponsare of paramountimportance to the securityofthe United States." (U) PRP intent is . . ."to selectand maintainonly the mostreliable people to performduties associatedwith nuclearweapons." PRP is not intendedto act asa quality controltool to decertify/disqualifyindividuals solely for assignmentpurposes or risk avoidance.Denial of eligibility or the revocationof certificationfor assignmentto PRPpositions is neithera punitive measurenor tlle basisfor disciplinaryaction. Failureof an individualto be certifiedfor assignmentto PRPduties does not necessarilyreflect unfavorably on the individual's suitability for assignmentto other duties. (U) DL.l8. Decertification:An actionbased on the receiptofadverse information leading to removalfrom the PRPofan individualwho hasbeen screened. determined reliable. and certified capableof performingduties involving nuclearweapons. There are two types: (U) DL. I 8.1. TemporaryDecertification: An actiontaken when the certifying official has informationthat could be expectedto affectan individual'sjob perlormanceor reliability and suspensionis not appropriate. (U) DL.18.2. PermanentDecertification: An actiontaken when the certifyingofficial has determinedan individual no longermeets the reliability standardsspecified in this Regulation. When the permanentdecertification is approvedby the reviewingofficial, the individual will be removed(Added) (AF) (unlessreinstated as defined by proceduresin this Regulationand Supplement)from positionsrequiring PRP certification and the actionshall be madea matterof permanentrecord. (U) Specificallyin makingthe following PRPrecommendations the following guidancewas considered: (U) C5.1.4.Negligence or Delinquencyin Performanceof Duty. lf the certifying official's review ofthe PRP candidate'sor certifiedmember's job or duty history revealsa lack of dependability,flexibility, goodattitude or goodjudgment,the membershould not be certified,or shouldbe decertified. ln determiningreliability, the certifyingofficial mustevaluate all aspects of an individual'sactions. ru) C5.1.7.Poor Attitude orLackof Motivation.Poor attitude or lackof motivationas evidencedby aberrantattitude or irrationalbehavior, inappropriate behavior or mood may be groundsfor decertification. (U) C5.1.9. Lossof Confidence.If for any reasonthe certifying official losestrust or confidencein a member'sability to performPRP duties, the certifyingofficial shall decertifythe member. (U) Over 90 individualsfrom the 2ndand 5'hBomb Wings weresuspended from PRPduties until their roles in the incidentcould be determined.Durins the courseofthe CDI it becameevident l;lR:?#Fi;#n Paee56 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED #ef|f#Fr#H that many individualsshould be consideredfor permanen!or at leasttemporary, PRP decertificationwhile many otherscan be returnedto full PRPduty status. PermanentDecertification Basedon the findingsof this CDI the followingare recommendedto be PRPPermanentlv Decertified: -MASKED- Maskedinformation consisted of personnelnames; therefore, would havebeen exempt under exemption (b)(6) TemporaryDeceriiiicaiion Basedon the findings of this CDI the following are recommendedto be PRP Temporarilv Decertifred: _MASKED_Masked informationconsisted of personnelnames; therefore,would have been exemptunder exemption (b)(6) lmmediateReinstatement Basedon the findings of this CDI the following are recommendedto be reinstated in PRP: f,'^^r'^r'^'^'*^tion personnel _MASKED- rvrcrD^('u|| I||../rr rd consistedof names;therefore, would havebeen exempt under exemption (b)(6) IECRFHFIFIi* Pase57 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED JiH:*iFfEtitlF Recommendationsfor Considerationof DisciplinaryAction (U) During the investigation,it was apparentthe unauthorizedtransfer of nuclearweapons would not haveoccurred if thoseinvolved had performedtheir assignedduties. During August 2007, severalmilitary membersfailed to live up to the standardsexpected of Airmen. Degreeof culpabilityamong this list of Airmen obviouslywill vary. The purposeof this paragraphis not to list everyonewho failed. The tablebelow lists thosewhose culpability ostensibly rises to the level of a violationof the Uniform Codeof Military Justice.These individuals are suspectedof derelictionof duty for their failure to follow standardprocedures and shouldbe consideredfor someq?e of disciplinaryaction. informationconsisted of personnelnames; therefore, would _ MASKED_ Masked havebeen exemptunder exemption (bX6) t5'etfiF#FRfHn! Pase58 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ffiftFH.Fit#itF (U) Commandersat all levelscan directremoval ofpersonnel directly undertheir chainof commandwhen the Commanderhas lost confidenceoftheir subordinate commanders/supervisors.Some ofthese actionsmay havealready occurred but it is the recommendationof this CDI to removethe following individualsfrom Command/Supervisory Positions: _MASKED _ Masked informationconsisted of personnelnames; therefore,would have been exempt under exemption(bX6) Removalfrom Instructor/EvaluatorOrders consisted personnelnames; - MASKED - Maskedinformation of therefore,would havebeen exempt under exemption (b)(6) E€REIIIFR''ilR Page59 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED {irn-Hl3|H TabF Tab F: Witness lndex ffifrFifFfrElliR Page60 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ffiT:T#FftH{l. Tab G TabG: Evidence -ER;ttFRtrilfr Page6l of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED t.erg&D,la{R TabH s€{rEiHeq4aJp- Page62 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ffifrB#tF*E#Xr TabH: TechnicalReviews Actions Required for Selected Missile Capabilities Talking Paper (TO 1B-52H-30-1) (U) The following narrativeexplains what aircrewactions are required to carry out certain missilecapabilities onboard the B-52, to includemissile communication, jettison (both required by the Tac Ferry Program),payload identification, pre-arming, and launching. (U) During Tac-Ferrymissions the missilesdo not havepower applied and arein an OFF/SAFE or dormantstate. The crew had limited optionsavailable to "communicate"with the missiles. Theycouldjettison a singlemissile from the pylons, all missilesfrom the pylons, orjettison the entirepylon with all missilesattached. The crew did not havethe optionto pre-armthe ACM and thereforecould not launchthe missileat any time. (U) In orderfor an aircrewto establish missionaccomplished all ofthesesteps. (U) After the computeris poweredand loaded,the RN must turn on the Missile Interface Unit (MIU) on eachpylon in orderto enabledirect communication,assignment and monitoringfor all the missiles. One MIU is associatedwith eachmissileJoaded pylon and it actslike a computer routerthat enablesthe primary OAS computerto talk to the circuitry of eachmissile. It sends continuousmissile/warhead status updat €sfrom eachmissile back to the OAS. €f;€t|friFmi|ilfr Page63 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED {i{iro TabI ff*E#IFlg*JHft Page64 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED I UNCLASSIFIED 3H*rl}in Tabl; AppointingAuthority Approval and Actions DEPARTMENTOF THEAIR FORCE HEADQUARTERSAIR CO'/IBATCOIIIIIANO (ACC} LANGLEYAIR FORCEBASE. VIRGINIA MEMORANDUMFORRDCORD FROM: ACC/CC SUBJECT: AppointingAuthorityApproval I reviewed the commander directed investigationcompleted by Major General DouglasL. Raaberg and the accompanyinglegal review concerningthe facts and circumstances surrounding the unauthorized transfer of nuclear warheadson 30 August 07. I approve the findings and conclusionsof the Investigating Officer. JOHN D.W. CORLEY General,USAF Commander sfiB-rr{tElv& Pase65 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED €rSrr:|F*H (PERSONNELDATA REDACTED) Tab J aiFgtF.Ft|Filrffi Page66 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ff5IJlH TabJ: AdministrativeDocuments Index of Administrative Documents J1 AccessTo IMF or W80 lgloos MASKED tn RemovalFrom CommandLetter '1 J3 PrivacyAct Statements J(3.1) through J(3.63) Documents through63 J4 CSAFHand-Off Policy J(4.1 ) throughJ(4.15) Documents1 throughl5 J5 96 BS FlyingSchedule Strawman J6 AircraftCommander Lefter of Certification(Letter of Xs) Addendumto AppointmentLetter J8 Affidavit- Placardingprocedure statement MASKED '17, J9 DoDlG OversightMemorandum, September 2007 Toxicology Reports Barksdaleand Minot personnelinvolved in this incidentwere administered toxicology test. Accordingto the DoD Armed ForcesInstitute ofPathology, all 77 reportswere negative. s€r-fttpilv& Page67 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED