An Unauthorized Transfer of Nuclear Warheads Between Minot AFB
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UNCLASSIFIED tSeEiIlEtIDlA{& COMMAIIDER DIRECTED REPORT OF IITVESTIGATION PREPAREDBY MAJORGI,NERAL DOUGLASL. RAABERG IN!'ESTIGATING OFFICER CONCERNING AN UNAUTHORIZEDTRANSFER OF NUCLEARWARI{EADS BETWEENMINOT AFB, NORTH DAKOTA A}ID BARKSDALEAFB, LOUSIANA 30 AUGUST2OO7 YRESTzuCTEDDAT l4b, %s :nersvAct of 1954. FE€hf8lPra€lfar*r #EBFru. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED TABLE OF CONTENTS Tab A: AopointmentLetter Tab B: Authoritv and Scone Allegation.......... .7 Investigation...... ...........7 Tab C: Background 10 ExecutiveSummary ...l0 ................16 CruiseMissile ReposturingBackground .........l8 ...........l8 ACC RepositioningOrder (REPORD) l8 Pylon TransferPlan (RebasingSchedule) ...............20 ProductionMeetings.................... """""""""""'21 Analysis............ aa Analysis............ DoD A'7 LeadershipTraining............. ...............................5l lmmediateReinstatement........... ..,.....''.,......57 Recommendationsfor Consideration of Disciplinarv Action................................................... 58 TabF: WitnessIndex (MASKED)......................... ................................60 TabG: Evidence(Masked 1......... .....................6t TabH: TechnicalReviews........... ................63 ffiFEfl|FREIIiI* Pase2 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED f:t3l5iFi1FH*fra* ActionsRequired for SelectedMissile Capabilities Talking Paper (TO I B-52H-30-1) .......... 63 Tabl: AppointingAuthority Approval and Actions............... ..........................65 TabJ: AdministrativeDocuments ......................... ................67 Indexof AdministrativeDocuments........................ ..,........67 ToxicologyReports....................... {tr*trHtF{s. Pase3 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED TabA irteE.l'#lrFlil{R Page4 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED €EERfl#FT!E#M TabA: AppointmentLetter Pase5 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ffeft:iFiFftDti{t{* Tab B tE€R!E F#Fnri'itifr Paee6 of 67 urucLnsstFtED UNCLASSIFIED r-€ftg|#ruffiil- TabB: Authorityand Scope (u) /fftommanders havethe inherentauthority to conducta Commander-Directedlnvestigation to investigatematters under their command,unless preempted by higherauthorily. Pursuantto this authority,General Ronald E. Keys,ACC Commander,appointed Major GeneralDouglas L. Raabergon 3l August2007 to conductthe investigationinto the underlyingfacts and circumstancesthat led to the unauthorizedtransfer ofnuclear warheadsbetween Minot Air Force Base,North Dakota,and BarksdaleAir ForceBase, Louisiana on 30 August2007. The investigationshould include any deviationsfrom establishedsafety and transferprocedures, as well asa completereview of securityprocedures. (U) The InvestigatingOfficer (lO) investigatedthe following. Allegation g| Between29 and 30 August 2007,the 5th Bomb Wing permittedthe unauthorizedtransfer of (u) nuclearwarheads from Minot AFB to BarksdaleAFB in violation of AFI 9l -l I l, SafetyRules for USStrategic Bomber Aircraft, and Commander,Air CombatCommand's Cruise Missile RepositioningOrder, REPORD (DTG: 1414002Mar 07). SUBS:IANTIA:IED. Investigation (U) The purposeof this CommanderDirected Investigation is to reportthe factssurrounding the allegation,the root causesand assignreasonable accountability. The resultsin this reportare fully transparent.The testimonialdocumentation has been meticulously prepared to avoid impropriety. Additionally, I haveprovided the forensicsto facilitatecommand-level considerationfor disciplinaryactions. (U) As the InvestigatingOfficer, I haveorganized this reportinto threemajor categories.Each categoryis a phgle in the investigationthat includesa tier of individuals,a setof distinctevents and a menuofoversights that led to this incident. The phasesare: Docr cpeninqto wheelsuD: Thoseindividuals directly responsible for thechain-of-custody (u),...; €? io verifrcai;n-of:G-.-*.upon, b."ukdownsfrom the momentthe nuclearshelter was openedto the time the B-52 wasairbome. (U) Schedulineto dispatch:Those individuals who hada directhand inthe schedulingofthe TacticalFerry pylons(preparation and receipt),oversight of maintenanceactions and eventualdispatch ofthe weapons;this includesthe lack ofproper monitoringofthe pylons moving from the shelterto the aircraft. (U) Supervisionto leadershio:This is self-evident;however, it is a more refinedfocus of overall supervisionto wing-level leadershipat Minot AFB and BarksdaleAFB. (U) I conductedall witnesstestimonies. The testimoniesbegan on Monday of Labor Day weekend,3 September2007, at Minot AFB. I finishedthe last interviewon 27 September2007. F€RETirFfrDi{rR Page7 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED €f€r:frirma*. Exceptfor one day, my legal advisorand I spentnineteen (19) continualdays interviewing over seventy(70) witnesses. Oversight (U) The Secretaryofthe Air Forceasked the DoD InspectorGeneral to provide"oversight of investigative...activities" initiated by the Air Forcein responseto the incidentand to follow-up on recommendationsgenerated by thoseactivities. The Chairmanof the SenateArmed Services Committeerequested the SecretaryofDefense for this independentreview ofthe matter. (U) The investigationwas overseenby two DoD lnspectorGeneral Representatives to provide, "...on-sceneoversight to the investigation,directed by the Commander,Air Combat Command...to (also)----i-En-6tFc-.-----lprovide independent i nvestieation.,, f their Assistant InspectorGeneral for AdministrativeInvestigations appointment lefter. I--TEJI6ITOC-l5ignedmemo is addressedto the InspectorGeneral of the Air Force,AF/IG; the Air CombatCommand Staff JudgeAdvocate, ACC/SJA; and,the Minot AFB IG, 5 BW/IG. (Tab J9) They initially joined us on l8 September2007 at BarksdaleAFB and rejoinedus at Minot AFB throughthe remainderofthe investigationand preparationof this report. They haveread the contentsof this report. TECftElF||FRB#ffi Page8 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED s5eryry Tab C Page9 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ffirtrj1tP TabC: Background ExecutiveSummary (bxl)Acc (U) €t The unauthorizedtransfer ofthese nuclearwarheads was causedby a breakdownin training, discipline,supervision and leadership. (bx1)Acc (U) The chainof events,the testimonyof thoseinterviewed and the evidencepresented show an erosionof adherenceto rigid, Air Forcenuclear procedures. This reportwill showhow the intricatesystem of nuclearchecks and balanceswas eitherignored or disregarded. ,, ,,#l The repcn identifiesdeviations from establishedsafety, security and transferprocedures that \"i explainthe circutnstancesand detailsof the unauthorizedtransfer of nuclearweapons. Finally, t€eET#Ffffi Pase10 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED tr€ftEjF#lll'1|aL the reportidentifies those individuals whose actions contributed to this unauthodzedtransfer and whosedereliction may wanant disciplinaryaction. Background *Note all sourcescited in body of report. (bxl)Acc Page11 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ritrFFrD#i{R Door Open to WheelsUp (bxl)Acc €leftETrfFft:f*{R Page12 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ffirrllEtryaAr (bxl)Acc ,,(fihe n-SZn aircrewanived at the aircraftthe moming of 30 August 2007. The crew (u' consistedof the aircraftcommander, an instructorpilot; the copilot, and an instructorradat navigator. The B-52 InstructorRadar Navigator (lRN) is responsibleto the aircraftcommander for checkingthe weaponsprior to flight. The IRN is requiredto checkall missiles. The check includesverification of the payloadand confirmationof a SAFE status.However. the Instructor RadarNavigator only did a "spot check" on one missile,and only on the right pylon loadedwith nuclear-inertpayloads. If the IRN had accomplisheda full and completeweapon's preflight, the IRN shouldhave discovered the nuclearwarheads. (U) At no time during their flight did the radarnavigator apply electricalpower to the missiles. The radarnavigator electronically verified that the missileswere OFF (no power)and SAFE (not Armed) afterthe engineswere started.That was the lasttime the radarnavigator electronically accessedthe statusofthe missiles. ln short.the radarnavigator never turned the nowerback on. (bxl)Acc (U) To be clear,the aircrewcould havejettisoned a missileor missilesin the eventof an emergencythat requiredreduced weight to remainairbome. Also, if the emergencysituation had dictated,the crew could havejettisoned one or both ofthe pylonswith all the missilesattached. To accomplishanyjettison of a missileor missiles,the radarnavigator would haveapplied electricalpower only to the rack to which the missilewas attached.Additionally, to jettison the pylon from the aicraft, electricalpower would haveto be appliedto the pylon attachedto the aircraft'swing. In all jettison scenarios,the missileswould havefallen to the ground. (bx1)Acc (U) This incidentwas propagatedby nunerousfailures to follow stringentnuclear procedures. However,the catalystfor the failure beganin the schedulingprocess. It furtherbroke down becausethe supervisors;predominantly the Non-CommissionedOfficers and SeniorNon- CommissionedOfficers, did not do their.jobs. Pagel3 of 67 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ffiTET#FR#IT Schedulingto Dispatch (U) Our audit of the maintenancelogs showsthe warheadrebasing changes and original tactical ferry flow plan did not contributeto the mistakenremoval ofthe nuclearpylon, designated G2203. Note: A GZ-pylon is a pylon loadedwith AdvancedCruise Missiles (ACM). In military nomenclaturethe ACM is an AGM-129A. The catalystfor this failure beganin the schedulingprocess. It further brokedown becausethe supervisors;predominantly the NCOs and SNCOs,didn't do theirjob. They werethe propellantthat acceleratedthe