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(PC 06-3336) David F. Miller Et Al. : V. : Metropolita

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(PC 06-3336) David F. Miller Et Al. : V. : Metropolita Supreme Court No. 2013-60-Appeal. No. 2013-61-Appeal. No. 2013-62-Appeal. (PC 06-3336) David F. Miller et al. : v. : Metropolitan Property and Casualty : Insurance Co. et al. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Tel. 222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court No. 2013-60-Appeal. No. 2013-61-Appeal. No. 2013-62-Appeal. (PC 06-3336) David F. Miller et al. : v. : Metropolitan Property and Casualty : Insurance Co. et al. Present: Suttell, C.J., Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. O P I N I O N Justice Flaherty, for the Court. This opinion addresses three appeals that have arisen from a labyrinth of litigation brought by the plaintiffs, David F. Miller and Miller’s Auto Body, Inc. (MAB), against the defendants, Amica Mutual Insurance Company, Amica Property and Casualty Insurance Company (collectively Amica), Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Metropolitan), and Allstate Insurance Company, Inc. (Allstate).1 All three appeals were argued before the Supreme Court on December 3, 2014. After hearing the arguments and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that a release that Miller executed before he initiated suit bars all his claims against the defendants. As a 1 The three appeals concern only one plaintiff, Miller, in his personal capacity, and two defendants, Amica and Metropolitan. Miller’s Auto Body, Inc. was dismissed as a plaintiff by order dated April 27, 2010. Allstate Insurance Company was granted summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims, in orders effective April 27, 2010, and September 7, 2010. Although plaintiff included Allstate in his notices of appeal, no argument has been made specific to Allstate, and Allstate never filed a brief with this Court. - 1 - result, and for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the judgment of the Superior Court. I Travel The plaintiffs, Miller and MAB, alleged in their complaint that they were subjected to an improper, nefarious, and malicious investigation into suspected insurance fraud that the defendants believed was taking place at plaintiffs’ Cumberland auto-body shop. Miller alleged that he was suspected of perpetrating insurance fraud by using “improper estimate and repair methods,” eventually precipitating an investigation by the Rhode Island State Police (State Police). On January 16, 2002, Miller was arrested at his place of business; he was subsequently charged in Sixth Division District Court with four counts of insurance fraud, two counts of obtaining money under false pretenses, and two counts of attempting to obtain money under false pretenses. After the District Court complaint was dismissed for lack of a prosecution, the Rhode Island Attorney General (Attorney General) renewed the charges by means of a criminal information in Providence County Superior Court. Eventually, the criminal information was dismissed by the Attorney General pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 However, the dismissal, dated March 28, 2005, was not without cost; it was accompanied by, and conditioned on, an agreement between Miller and the Attorney General. The agreement required that Miller relinquish or transfer his auto-body license, pay restitution to the insurance carriers, and execute a general liability release in favor of the Attorney General, the State Police, and, particular to our analysis, Amica, Metropolitan, and 2 Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure states, “[t]he attorney for the State may file a dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant.” - 2 - Allstate. By its terms, the document specified that Miller released those parties “from any and all manner of actions, causes of action, debts, dues, claims and demands, both in law and equity arising from the facts alleged in [the Attorney General’s prosecution of Miller] which said David F. Miller ever had, now has, or in the future may have.”3 Fifteen months after the execution of the release, plaintiffs filed a complaint against those same three insurance companies in Superior Court. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged eight counts: tortious interference with contractual relations (count 1); tortious interference with prospective contractual relations (count 2); malicious prosecution (count 3); abuse of process (count 4);4 continued tortious interference with contractual relations (count 5); continued tortious interference with prospective contractual 3 The release provided in full: “KNOW ALL MEN, THAT I, DAVID F. MILLER for valuable consideration to be paid by David F. Miller hereby release and forever quit-claim unto the Rhode Island Attorney General’s Office, Metropolitan Insurance Company; Amica Insurance Company; Allstate Insurance Company and the Rhode Island State Police, and any and all other persons and firms, their heirs, executors and administrators, from any and all manner of actions, causes of action, debts, dues, claims and demands, both in law and equity arising from the facts alleged in that certain Rhode Island Superior Court criminal case #P2-02- 3211A which said David F. Miller ever had, now has, or in the future may have. Payor hereby makes no admission of liability but makes this settlement in an attempt to avoid litigation. “IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this 29th day of March 2005.” 4 The tort of abuse of process requires that a plaintiff prove two elements: “(1) the defendant instituted proceedings or process against the plaintiff and (2) the defendant used these proceedings for an ulterior or wrongful purpose that the proceedings were not designed to accomplish.” Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 353 (R.I. 2002) (citing Nagy v. McBurney, 120 R.I. 925, 934, 392 A.2d 365, 370 (1978)). The type of process required is a judicial action; an investigation is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of “proceedings or process.” Id. at 353- 54. “Abuse of process, as distinguished from malicious prosecution, ‘arises when a legal proceeding, although set in motion in proper form, becomes perverted to accomplish an ulterior or a wrongful purpose for which it was not designed.’” Id. at 353 (quoting Clyne v. Doyle, 740 A.2d 781, 783 (R.I. 1999)). - 3 - relations (count 6); violation of the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act (mistakenly labeled count 6), and a separately pled action for punitive damages (mislabeled count 7).5 In answers dated July 28, 2006, and July 31, 2006, Metropolitan and Amica, respectively, raised the general release signed by Miller as an affirmative defense to all counts of the complaint. II Facts In July 2001, plaintiffs were placed under an umbrella of suspicion by the State Police, who were examining plaintiffs’ insurance claims practices. The State Police had received complaints from several insurance companies, alleging that Miller and MAB were “in the practice of enhancing damage to vehicles as well as billing for damage not sustained to vehicles brought to [MAB] for repair.” To enhance its investigation, the State Police devised an undercover “sting” that made use of vehicles that were furnished by defendants Amica and Metropolitan. The two carriers also provided ersatz, or pretext, policies of insurance for those vehicles. Miller was certainly no newcomer to the auto-body business; his affidavit provided that he had spent over twenty-five years performing auto-body maintenance and repairs, during which time he was an officer in the Auto Body Association of Rhode Island and had served as chairman of the Rhode Island Auto Body Licensing Board. Miller also swore by affidavit that he owned and operated MAB, a Rhode Island corporation with its principal place of business in Cumberland, and was its sole shareholder. It is undisputed that, while the State Police investigation was ongoing, MAB was operating even though its charter had been revoked by the 5 The seventh count in plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, alleging violations of the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act, G.L. 1956 § 6-13.1-2, was mistakenly labeled as a second “Count VI,” and the subsequent eighth count for punitive damages was labeled incorrectly as “Count VII.” For convenience’s sake, the counts will be referred to by name. - 4 - Secretary of State.6 Miller later testified at trial that he was not aware that the charter had lapsed, and when he became aware of the problem, he was unable to renew the charter because the corporation was in arrears for taxes to the state. As of the time of trial in 2012, the charter of MAB had in fact never been renewed. It is also undisputed that Miller continued to operate the business in the same manner as he had prior to the charter revocation. In particular, Miller swore that he “continued to operate the business, repair vehicles, contract with customers * * * and conduct all other operations that [he] had done prior to the issuance of the revocation.” On January 16, 2002, after the State Police had completed its investigation, Miller was arrested and charged. Ultimately, in March 2005, the Attorney General filed a Rule 48(a) dismissal of the criminal charges against Miller, stating in its filing that its decision was “due to evidentiary and proof issues.” As previously noted, the Attorney General’s dismissal of the pending criminal charges was not without qualification; it was contingent upon Miller’s compliance with the three conditions mentioned above. Those conditions were: (1) Miller’s payment of restitution to the insurance companies;7 (2) Miller’s agreement to relinquish or transfer the Department of Business Regulation (DBR) auto-body license;8 and (3) Miller’s execution of a general liability release.
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