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FTCA Handbook Is a Revision of the Material Originally Published in July 1979 and Updated Periodically Since JACS-Z 1 November 1999 MEMORANDUM FOR CLAIMS JUDGE ADVOCATES/CLAIMS ATTORNEYS SUBJECT: Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Handbook 1. This edition of the FTCA Handbook is a revision of the material originally published in July 1979 and updated periodically since. The previous edition was last updated in September 1998. This edition contains significant cases through September 1999 pertaining to the filing and processing of administrative claims under the FTCA (Title 28, United States Code, Sections 2671-2680) and related claims statutes. 2. This Handbook provides case citations covering a myriad of issues. The citations are organized in a topical manner, paralleling the steps an attorney should take in analyzing a claim. Older citations have not been removed. Shepardizing is essential. 3. If any errors are noted, including the omission of relevant cases, please use the error sheet at the end of the Handbook to bring this to our attention. Users needing further information or clarification of this material should contact their Area Action Officer or Mr. Joseph H. Rouse, Deputy Chief, Tort Claims Division, DSN: 923-7009, extension 212; or commercial: (301) 677-7009, extension 212. JOHN H. NOLAN III Colonel, JA Commanding TABLE OF CONTENTS I. REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FILING A. Why is There a Requirement? 1. Effective Date of Requirement............................ 1 2. Administrative Filing Requirement Jurisdictional......... 1 3. Waiver of Administrative Filing Requirement.............. 1 4. Purposes of Requirement.................................. 2 5. Administrative Filing Location........................... 2 6. Not Necessary for Compulsory Counterclaim................ 2 7. Not Necessary for Third Party Practice................... 2 B. What Must be Filed? 1. Written Demand for Sum Certain........................... 2 2. Examples of Written Demand............................... 4 a. Complaint to Individuals ............................. 4 b. Continuing Injury .................................... 5 c. Incapacitating Injury ................................ 6 d. State Court Suit Not a Claim ......................... 6 e. Money Figure in Writing .............................. 7 f. Approximate or Present Amount ........................ 7 g. Agency Permission .................................... 8 h. Class Actions Administrative Filings ................. 8 i. Class Action Maintenance Prerequisites ............... 8 j. Specificity of Pleading in Class Action .............. 8 k. Tolling by Insurer’s Claim ........................... 9 l. Spouse’s Name on SF95 ................................ 9 m. Failure to Provide Specific Facts .................... 9 3. Documenting a Claim...................................... 9 a. Appropriate Documentation ............................ 9 b. Documentation Excused ............................... 10 (1) Feres Cases .................................... 10 (2) Statute of Limitation Cases .................... 10 (3) Exclusion Cases ................................ 11 4. Authority to Sign for Claimant.......................... 11 a. Authority and State Law ............................. 12 b. Appointment Held in Abeyance ........................ 12 5. Notifying Claimant of Improper Claim.................... 13 6. Amendments.............................................. 13 a. Valid Claims Only ................................... 13 b. Amendment Restarts Administrative Consideration Period ................................ 13 c. Amendments in Court ................................. 14 d. Presentation of Different Basis for Claim at Trial ............................................ 15 i e. Ad Damnum Amendments at Trial ....................... 16 (1) Offers by Claimant’s During Negotiation ........ 17 (2) SF 95 Demand Not Realistic ..................... 17 (3) Derivative Claims .............................. 18 C. Where Must the Claim be Filed? 1. Appropriate Agency...................................... 19 a. Legislative and Judicial Branches ................... 19 b. Mailbox not Appropriate Agency ...................... 19 c. Counterclaim Excluded ............................... 20 2. Multi-Agency Claim...................................... 20 a. Problems from Failure to Notify ..................... 20 b. Six Months .......................................... 20 c. Avoidance by Withdrawal ............................. 20 d. Claimant Must be Notified of Lead Agency ............ 20 3. Primary Agency.......................................... 20 4. Where Within Agency..................................... 20 D. When Must the Claim be Filed? 1. Within Two Years of Accrual............................. 21 a. Does Not Include Saturdays or Holidays .............. 21 b. Accrual Date Determined by Federal Law .............. 21 c. Is Limitation Jurisdictional or Includes Equitable Tolling? ......................... 21 2. Acknowledgment of Filing Date........................... 24 3. Disability of Claimant.................................. 24 a. Infancy ............................................. 24 b. Incompetency ........................................ 25 c. Alternative Remedies ................................ 25 4. Medical Malpractice..................................... 25 a. Discovery Rule ...................................... 26 b. Non-Medical Malpractice Cases ....................... 26 5. Court Decisions......................................... 26 a. Continuous Treatment ................................ 26 b. Credible Explanation ................................ 27 c. Undetermined Damages ................................ 27 d. Blameless Ignorance ................................. 27 e. Splitting a Cause of Action ......................... 28 f. Fraudulent Concealment .............................. 28 g. Emotional Injury .................................... 29 h. Trivial Injury ...................................... 29 i. Continuing Tort ..................................... 29 6. Kubrick Decision........................................ 30 a. Kubrick Followed .................................... 30 b. Kubrick not Followed ................................ 32 7. Effect of Death......................................... 35 8. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (SSCRA)......... 35 9. Damage to Land and Property............................. 36 10. Toxic Torts............................................. 37 11. False Arrest............................................ 38 12. Mistaken Filing under FTCA.............................. 38 ii 13. Bailment................................................ 38 14. Indemnity or Contribution............................... 38 15. Lack of Knowledge of U.S. Involvement................... 38 16. Professional Malpractice................................ 39 17. Westfall Act............................................ 39 18. Subrogated Claims....................................... 39 E. Who May File? 1. Injury Claim............................................ 39 2. Death Claim............................................. 39 3. Indemnity and Contribution Claim........................ 40 4. Assignees Barred........................................ 40 5. Volunteer Barred........................................ 41 6. Derivative Claim........................................ 41 7. Subrogated Claim........................................ 41 8. Intergovernmental Claim................................. 42 a. Not Reimbursable Except by Statute .................. 42 b. Army Damage to GSA Vehicle .......................... 42 9. FECA Bar................................................ 42 a. FECA Exclusive Remedy ............................... 42 b. Definition of Employee .............................. 43 c. Federal Employment Governed by Federal Law .......... 44 d. Derivative Claims ................................... 44 e. Bar Extends to LHWCA Covered Employees .............. 44 f. DOL Decision on FECA Determinative .................. 45 g. Subsequent Malpractice .............................. 45 h. Third Party Claims .................................. 46 i. Non-Enumerated Injuries ............................. 47 j. Prison Industry Injuries ............................ 49 k. Criminal Complaint .................................. 49 l. Constitutional Claims ............................... 49 m. State Tort Liability of Federal Employees ........... 49 n. State and Local Law Enforcement Officers ............ 49 o. Government Contractor Defense ....................... 50 10. Feres Bar............................................... 50 a. Feres Includes Reservists and National Guardsmen .... 50 b. Feres Extends to Derivative Claims .................. 52 c. Government Contractor Defense ....................... 52 d. AD Military Personnel ............................... 54 e. Adjustments of Military Status ...................... 55 f. Medical Malpractice on Service Members .............. 56 g. Off-Duty, On-Base Conduct ........................... 58 h. NCO Club ............................................ 59 i. Soldiers Employed by Contractors .................... 60 j. Base Recreational Areas ............................. 60 k. Proceeding Off Base ................................. 60 l. In Military Vehicle on Leave ........................ 61 m. Off Base, Off Duty Activity ......................... 61 n. Returning to Duty ................................... 61 o. Treatment of Veterans ............................... 62 p. Continuing Torts .................................... 62 q. Void Enlistments
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