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Ntsb/Aar-85/05 PB85-910405 NATIQNAL . - L. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORi UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 663 BOEING 727-222; N7647U DENVER, COLORADO MAY 31, 1984 NTSBIAAR-85/05 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTENTS - SYNOPSIS . ..*......................... 1 1. -- FACTUAL INFORMATION ........................................... 1 ‘b’ 1. History of the Flight ................................................ 1 P.2 Injuries to Persons .................................................. 9 C’ j. 1.3 *Damage to Aircraft ................................................. 9 1.4 Other Damage ...................................................... 9 1.5 Personnel In for ma tion ............................................... 9 1.6 Aircraft Information ................................................ 9 1.7 Meteorological Information ........................................... 10 1.7.1 Doppler Radar In for mat ion ........................................... 11 1.7.2 Program for Regional Observing and Forecasting Services (PROFS) Data .. .12 1.7.3 .-Weather Analysis ................................................... 14 . 1.8 Aids to Navigation .................................................. 16 1.9 Communications .................................................... 16 1.10 -Aerodrome Information ........................... ..c .................16 - 1.10.1 ,Low Level Wind Shear Alert System ................................... 17 1.11 Flight Recorders .................................................... 17 1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information ..................................... 20 1.13. Medical and Pathological Information .................................. 22 1.14 Fire ............................................................... 22 1.15 Survival Aspects .................................................... 22 .J 1.16 Tests and Research .................................................. 22 1.16.1-Aircraft Takeoff Performance Analysis ................................ 22 1.17 Additional Information ............................................... 25 ’ 1.17.1 Air Traffic Control Procedures ....................................... 25 ‘.-I’ 1.17.2 ATC Handling of Aircraft ............................................ 29 ._ 1.17.3 Pilot Reports ....................................................... 32 _‘1.17.4 -,Company Wind Shear Training Program ................................ 34 li17.5 --’ Government and Industry Wind Shear Hazard Abatement Activities ....... .35 --A 1.17.6 -. Wind Shear Accident History ......................................... 36 1.18 New Investigative Techniques ......................................... 38 2. ANALYSIS ......................................................... 38 ‘.J 2.1 General ............................................................ 38 -L0 2.2 ............................................... 39 Environmental Factors -12.3 Airplane Takeoff Performance ........................................ 41 . -.J 2.4 Operational Fat tors ................................................. 42 ......................................... 45 .-: -2.5 Human Performance Factors 3. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 52 3.1 Findings ........................................................... 52 . Probable Cause ..................................................... 54 . RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 54 8 ii L P.Government Accession No. 3.Recipient’s Catalog No. * ElwigA~i-a5/05 PB85-910405 1. Title and Subtitle Amraft Accident Report - S.Report Date United Airlines Flight 663, Boeing 727-222, N7647U, March 21, 1985 Denver, Colorado, May 31, 1984 6.Performing Organization Code 1. Author(s) 8.Performing Organization Report No. 3. Performing Organization Name and Address 10.W~l~yni t No. National Transportation Safety Board ll.Contract or Grant No. Bureau of Accident Investigation Washington, D.C. 20594 13.Type of Report and Period Covered 12.Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Aircraft Accident Report May 31, 1984 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Washington, D. C. 20594 14.Sponsoring Agency Code 15.Supplementary Notes 16.Abstract On May 31, 1984, at 1334 m.d.t., United Airlines Flight 663, a Boeing 727, struck the localizer antenna 1,074 feet beyond the departure end of runway 35L during takeoff at Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado. The flight was en route to Las Vegas, Nevada, with 98 passengers and 7 crewmembers aboard. The flightcrew said they were not aware that the airplane had struck the antenna. When they were not able to pressurize the airplane after takeoff, the captain decided to return and land at Stapleton. The approach and landing on runway 26L was uneventful. There were no injuries, but the airplane sustained substantial airframe damage when it struck the antenna. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was an encounter with severe wind shear from microburst activity following the captain’s decision to take off under meteorological conditions conducive to severe wind shear. Factors which influenced his decisionmaking include: (1) the limitations of the low level wind shear alert system to provide readily usable shear information, and the incorrect terminology used by the controller in reporting this information; (2) the captain’s erroneous assessment of a wind shear report from a turboprop airplane and the fact that he did not receive a wind shear report from a departing airplane similar to his airplane because of congestion on the air traffic control radio frequency; (3) successful takeoffs made by several other air carrier airplanes in sequence; and (4) the captain’s previous experience operating successfully at Denver under wind shear conditions. 1. JCL1 atiw 18.Distribution Statement 17.Key Words takeoff%nlrlar climb; in-flight collision with object; wind shear; pilot iudpmt; flying This document is available technique; flight@rew coordination) cockpit resource through the National Technical training; flightcrew and cabin crew coordinatidn; Information Service, wind_sb_ear alert svstem (I&WAS); air trRf& Springfield, Virginia 22161 control procews; weathe rj q&j-l -‘, lg.Security Classification 20 Security Classification 21.No. of Pages 22.Price ’ (of this page) , (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 76 NTSB Form 1765.2 (Rev. g/74) CONTENTS - SYNOPSIS ......................................................... 1 1. A FACTUAL INFORMATION ..........................................I. 1 ‘Lf 1. History of the Flight ................................................ 1 (7.2 Injuries to Persons .................................................. 9 ’ 1.3 -Damage to Aircraft ................................................. 9 1.4 Other Damage ...................................................... 9 1.5 Personnel Information ............................................... 9 1.6 Aircraft Information ................................................ 9 1.7 Meteorological Information ........................................... 10 1.7.1 Doppler Radar Information ........................................... 11 1.7.2 Program for Regional Observing and Forecasting Services (PROFS) Data .. .12 1.7.3 .-Weather Analysis ................................................... 14 1.8 Aids to Navigation .................................................. 16 1.9 Communications .................................................... 16 1,lO %erodrome Information .............................................. 16 - 1.10.1 . Low Level Wind Shear Alert System ................................... 17 1.11 Flight Recorders .................................................... 17 1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information ..................................... 20 1.13. Medical and Pathological Information .................................. 22 1.14 Fire ............................................................... 22 1.15 Survival Aspects .................................................... 22 u’ 1.16 Tests and Research .................................................. 22 1.16.1 --Aircraft Takeoff Performance Analysis ................................ 22 1.17 Additional Information ............................................... 25 ’ 1.17.1 Air Traffic Control Procedures ....................................... 25 ‘-,’ 1.17.2 ATC Handling of Aircraft ............................................ 29 - 1.17.3 Pilot Reports ....................................................... 32 “: 1.17.4 -Company Wind Shear Training Program ................................ 34 li17.5 -I Government and Industry Wind Shear Hazard Abatement Activities ....... .35 -~1.17.6 -- Wind Shear Accident History ......................................... 36 1.18 New Investigative Techniques ......................................... 38 2. ANALYSIS ......................................................... 38 ‘4 2.1 General ............................................................ 38 -.i0 2.2 ............................................... 39 Environ mental Fat tors -.:2.3 Airplane Takeoff Performance ........................................ 41 _ -J 2.4 Operational Factors ................................................. 42 .-.: 2.5 Human Performance Factors ......................................... 45 3. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 52 3.1 Findings ........................................................... 52 . Probable Cause ..................................................... 54 67. RECOMMENDATIONS ..............................................
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