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Le Télégramme Qui Força L'amérique À Entrer Dans La Première Guerre

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Le Télégramme Qui Força L'amérique À Entrer Dans La Première Guerre « Si vous n’écrivez pas votre propre histoire, personne ne l’écrira pour vous » Jean-Paul SIFFRE Le télégramme qui força l’Amérique à entrer dans la Première Guerre mondiale Lorsqu’en 1914 la guerre est neutre. Elle fait néanmoins un mauvais déclarée en Europe, les Etats-Unis sont calcul. Car, agacés par le blocus déterminés à rester un pays neutre, et ce, naval anglais de leurs côtes, les jusqu’à ce que la découverte d’un télé- Allemands déclenchent une guerre sous- gramme leur force la main. marine et coulent des bâtiments dans les eaux alliées, y compris des bâtiments La chose a été très compliquée. Le battant pavillon neutre comme celui des Japon, la Grande-Bretagne, une invasion Etats-Unis. mexicaine imminente et un diplomate allemand maladroit mais honnête ont Le président des Etats-Unis Woodrow figuré dans le dossier. Wilson n’a aucun goût pour la guerre, pas plus que les Américains ne sont de grands Depuis l’annexion américaine du supporters des Anglais. Bon nombre Texas en 1845 et la guerre américano- voient la Première Guerre mondiale mexicaine qui s’en suivit de 1846 à 1848 comme un problème européen et laissent ainsi que l’annexion du Nouveau-Mexique les Continentaux en première ligne. et de l’Arizona, les relations américano- mexicaines n’ont jamais été bonnes. De Le président Wilson reste « l’arme au ce fait, en 1914, la petite armée pied » malgré les torpillages de plus en américaine est déployée le long de la plus nombreux de navires marchands frontière américano-mexicaine et la plupart américains en route vers le Royaume-Uni. des citoyens américains voient, dans le En plus, des saboteurs allemands ont fait Mexique, un danger pour leur sécurité exploser des entrepôts de denrées prêtes nationale plus grand que l’Allemagne. à partir vers l’Angleterre et financé des grèves d’ouvriers afin de gêner la Alors que la Grande-Bretagne et la production de matériels pour l’Europe. France demandent aux Etats-Unis de se joindre au conflit en Europe, l’Allemagne, Mais un évènement important survient elle, travaille à ce que l’Amérique reste en 1915 lorsqu’un sous-marin allemand 1 torpille le RMS Lusitania, faisant 1 153 Les Britanniques jubilent. Si le victimes dont 114 ressortissants naufrage du Lusitania n’a pas été suffisant américains. Le sentiment populaire pour faire entrer les Etats-Unis dans la américain change et le peuple demande guerre, le télégramme de Zimmermann vengeance. Wilson refuse toujours de sera probablement décisif. franchir le pas. Alors réalisant qu’ils sont Cependant, il y a un problème. Si les allés trop loin, les Allemands décident de Anglais préviennent les Américains, ils ne changer de tactique et d’exploiter les seront pas crus et les Américains tensions américano-mexicaines. comprendront que leurs messages sont écoutés, ce qui est très gênant. Ils ne L’Allemagne défie déjà le blocus peuvent pas non plus se permettre de américain de son voisin du sud en vendant dévoiler aux Allemands que leurs codes des armes et d’autres marchandises au sont cassés. Mexique. Et surtout elle met au point un nouveau plan. Pour élaborer ce plan, En fait, Winston Churchill, Premier Arthur Zimmermann, secrétaire d’état aux Lord de l’Amirauté en 1914 (ministre de la Affaires Etrangères de l’Empire allemand, Marine) a mis en place un système envoie un message codé le 16 janvier d’écoute au sein de l’Amirauté. Ce 1917 à Heinrich Von Eckart, ambassadeur système est dénommé Room 40 car il se d’Allemagne au Mexique. Il précise que situe dans la pièce 40 du bâtiment. l’Allemagne aidera le Mexique en matériels et le soutiendra pour reconquérir Nigel de Grey est l’homme en charge les territoires américains comme le Texas. de l’unité de décryptage de l’Amirauté, Room 40. Il décide de laisser le message Cependant le cheminement de ce « sous le coude ». Les Allemands télégramme ne sera pas aisé. En effet, au s’excusent envers les Américains et jurent début de la Première Guerre mondiale, de ne plus attaquer de bâtiments battant l’Angleterre a coupé les câbles pavillon américain. De Grey suspecte les internationaux allemands, empêchant les Allemands de ne pas tenir leur parole et il communications transatlantiques directes. aura raison. Aussi, dans une tentative de négocier la Le 1er février, l’Allemagne annonce paix, le président Wilson a permis l’emploi, qu’elle va reprendre la guerre sous-marine par les Allemands, du câble diplomatique contre les bateaux naviguant dans les américain de façon limitée pourvu qu'il soit eaux alliées. Les Américains répliquent utilisé à des fins pacifiques et que le deux jours plus tard en cessant les contenu soit non codé. relations diplomatiques avec l’Allemagne. Mais Wilson refuse toujours de faire entrer Le câble est donc envoyé depuis les Etats-Unis dans la guerre. l’ambassade américaine au Danemark, passe par un relais en Angleterre et arrive Pour envoyer le « télégramme finalement à Washington. En désaccord Zimmermann » de Washington à Mexico, avec les conventions internationales, les l’ambassadeur d’Allemagne à Washington Britanniques contrôlent le câble ; ils emploie les services de la société Western espionnent donc aussi bien les Américains Union. Les Anglais tiennent leur alibi. Ils que les Allemands. Pour une raison déclarent avoir soudoyé un employé de la inconnue, l’ambassade US au Danemark Western Union qui leur a donné une copie permet à Zimmermann de transmettre le codée. Reste le problème des codes : ils message codé cette fois à l’ambassade déclarent avoir également acheté une allemande à Washington qui l’envoie à personne de l’ambassade d’Allemagne à l’ambassadeur allemand à Mexico, Mexico qui cédé a les codes en vigueur. Heinrich von Eckardt. Cependant, ce Une fois, le télégramme décodé et dernier n’est pas le premier à le lire. Ce traduit, il arrive sur le bureau d’Edward sont les Anglais qui, ayant ont obtenu les Bell, secrétaire de l’ambassade codes des Russes, seront en mesure de américaine à Londres. Il sera le premier à décoder le télégramme en question. le lire le 19 février 1917. 2 Le président Wilson recevra le Lors d’une conférence de presse télégramme Zimmermann le 21 février. tenue le 3 mars, il sera demandé à Zimmermann s’il a vraiment envoyé ce Les Mexicains doutaient bien que les télégramme. Sa réponse sera : Je ne peux Allemands puissent leur offrir une telle le nier, c’est vrai. Finalement, à court aide, compte tenu du fait que ces derniers d’arguments, le président Wilson étaient déjà en guerre. Ils savaient demandera au Congrès de déclarer la également que les territoires perdus ne guerre à l’Empire allemand. Ce sera reviendraient pas aisément dans leur voté le 6 avril 1917 par 82 voix pour et 6 giron. Les voisins du Mexique n’étaient voix contre. pas non plus très en faveur car ils commerçaient énormément avec les Là encore, la gestion du télégramme Etats-Unis. dit de Zimmermann a permis, grâce aux écoutes et donc la Guerre Electronique, C’est alors que le 28 février, la presse manipulée par les écoutes de la Room 40, américaine publie l’histoire du télégramme de décider les Américains à entrer dans la Zimmermann, faisant monter la colère du Première Guerre mondiale et d’amener les peuple américain, qui demande, cette fois, Alliés à la victoire finale. d’entrer en guerre contre l’Empire allemand d’autant que deux nouveaux Pierre-Alain Antoine bateaux viennent d’être coulés par les Sources Patrick Beesly, Room 40 : British Naval sous-marins allemands. Intelligence. 1914-1918.Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch. New-York, 1982 et Wikipedia Comité Historique de Guerrelec Rubrique Historique N°32 – Septembre 2017 3 .
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