PARTIES in the AMERICAN ELECTORATE Gregory J. Wolf A

PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE Gregory J. Wolf A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science. Chapel Hill 2015 Approved by: James A. Stimson Frank R. Baumgartner Thomas M. Carsey Michael B. MacKuen Christopher Wlezien c 2015 Gregory J. Wolf ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT GREGORY J. WOLF: Parties in the American Electorate. (Under the direction of James Stimson) Political scientists know a lot about the opinion dynamics of the electorate as a whole, yet relatively little is known about the dynamics of mass parties. Much interesting distinct variation between the parties in the electorate is covered up through aggregation. This dissertation seeks to provide a better understanding of the American political system by incor- porating measures of partisan opinion liberalism into distinct theories and models of macro politics. The dissertation project is based on measures of partisan policy mood, which gauge the demand for more or less liberal policy relative to the status quo for Democrats, Republicans, and independents in the electorate from 1951 through 2012. In the first empirical chapter I discuss the collection of these data and the process of creating annual estimates of policy mood for Democrats, Republicans, and independents in the electorate. I also provide an in-depth analysis of the over-time differences between the symbolic and operational ideologies for these three groups. There are clear distinc- tions between the symbolic and operational ideologies of Republicans and independents in the electorate, but remarkable consistency between these two conceptions of ideology for Democrats. The second empirical chapter applies the thermostatic model of opinion change to Democrats and Republicans in the electorate. The theory predicts similar opinion dynamics for Democrats and Republicans over time. While the findings support the prediction of parallel publics, the mechanism through which Democrats and Republicans respond to change differs; Democrats are responsive to changes in public policy, whereas Republicans are responsive to party control of government. Importantly, it does not appear as though iii policy significantly contributes to mass party polarization. I wrap up this chapter with a discussion on how the perceptions of policy held by Democrats and Republicans in the electorate can lead to the inference of mass party polarization even when the preferences of both sets of partisans are congruent and stable. The third empirical chapter focuses on representation. I develop a micro theory of partisan representation based on a member of Congress’ electoral calculus to develop macro level expectations about policy responsiveness to partisan opinion. The findings indicate that policy is responsive to the opinion of the majority party’s mass partisans, while independents and mass partisans of the out-party do not see their preferences translated into public policy. The finding contradicts research on representation of the mass electorate, but adds to the growing literature on the representation of sub-aggregate groups and represen- tational inequality in the electorate. iv To my parents. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First, I would like to thank my advisor, Jim Stimson, for his encouragement, support, and, most of all, patience on this dissertation. Without Jim’s guidance and comments, of- ten humbling, this dissertation would not be possible. I would also like to thank Frank Baumgartner, Tom Carsey, Mike MacKuen, and Chris Wlezien for serving as committee members and their thoughtful comments on the project. Beyond the committee, I should also thank Peter Enns and Nate Kelly for their comments and encouragement, and David Barker for sparking my interest in political science when I was a freshman at the Univer- sity of Pittsburgh way back in the fall of 2003. I am also thankful to the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Tom Uhlman for their financial support throughout this entire process. I would also like to thank my friends and family who have been instrumental at various stages of this dissertation, either by providing feedback or helping to take my mind off of the project. This is especially true of three of my fellow cohort members, Derek Epp, Amanda Grigg, and John Lovett. A special thanks goes to Derek for putting up with me for five years while we shared a very nice apartment. My parents and siblings were always there for me, despite not really ever understanding what it was I was doing. Others I’d like to thank for reasons personal and/or professional include Will Winecoff, Alex Parets, Kevin Banda, Nick Howard, Harry Kane, Paul Simon, Warren Zevon, and Hilary Chi. Obrigado, rock on mates. vi LIST OF TABLES 2.1 Correlations of Between Thre GSS Spending Items by Party………………………...… 12 2.2 Correlations of Issue Series with Estimated Partisan Moods: First Dimension………… 15 4.1 Partisan Mood Responsiveness…………………………………………………............. 50 5.1 Policy Responsiveness to Opinion in the House………………………………………… 77 5.2 Policy Responsiveness to Opinion in the Senate………………………………………... 83 A.1 Policy Responsiveness to the Reelection Constituency………………………………… 96 A.2 VIFs for Table 5.1………………………………………………………………………. 99 A.3 VIFs for Table 5.2……………………………………………………………………... 100 A.4 Policy Responsiveness to Independent Mood………………………………………..… 102 A.5 Full ECM of Table 5.1……………………………………………………………….… 103 A.6 Full ECM of Table 5.2…………………………………………………………………. 104 A.7 Short Run Effects of Policy Responsiveness in the House…………………………….. 105 A.8 Short Run Effects of Policy Responsiveness in the Senate……………………………. 106 A.9 Koyck Estimation of Policy Responsiveness in the House…………………………….. 107 A.10 Koyck Estimation of Policy Responsiveness in the Senate……………………………. 108 x LIST OF FIGURES 2.1 Three GSS Series: Liberalism Index………………………………………………………. 11 2.2 Partisan Moods…………………………………………………………………………….. 16 3.1 Proportion of Symbolic Ideologies by Party Identification……………………………….. 22 3.2 Symbolic Ideology by Party Identification………………………………………………... 25 3.3 Operational Ideology by Party Identification…………………………………………...… 28 3.4 Operational and Symbolic Ideology………………………………………………………. 29 4.1 Hypothetical Partisan Distribution of Preferences……………………………………….... 36 4.2 Policy and Relative Preference Change from t to t+1…………………………………….. 37 4.3 Party Control and Relative Preferences Change from t to t+1……………………………. 43 4.4 Policy Liberalism and Presidential Partisanship………………………………………….. 47 5.1 Congressional Activity Liberalism………………………………………………………... 75 xi 1 INTRODUCTION “Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the indi- vidual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation.” ∼ Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) Party identification is defined as an attachment that citizens have to a political party (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). It is a lens through which citizens view the political world and shapes how they not only perceive the political environment, but how they navigate it (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Stokes 1966; Shively 1979; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; Bartels 2000, 2002; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Cohen 2003; Kam 2005; Berin- sky 2007; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norporth, and Weisberg 2008; Lenz 2012). In collecting political information, citizens tend to accept what is in agreement with their partisan pre- conceptions, and reject what is not (Zaller 1992). Further, the vast literature on motivated reasoning (e.g. Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009) suggests that partisanship highlights specific cues in information processing that biases political perceptions. These blue or red lenses might result in distinctive differences in sub-aggregate group opinion change between Democrats and Republicans in the electorate. In addition to shaping opinion, partisanship might affect how opinion changes, and in consequence how opinion is represented. Recently scholars have begun to uncover great disparities in the representation of sub-aggregate groups in the American electorate (e.g. Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; Kelly 2009; Enns and Wlezien 2011), and there is no reason to think that this may not extend to the representation of partisans wearing red or blue. Much interesting distinct variation between the parties in the electorate may be covered up through aggregation. The causes, dynamics, and consequences of changes in partisan opinion are important for understanding the political environment, especially in an era of party polarization. In this dissertation I seek to provide a better understanding of the American political system. First, I turn to a brief discussion partisanship and public opinion in the literature. 1.1 Partisanship and Public Opinion in the Literature The authors of The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) suggest that partisanship has perhaps the most important influence on citizens political attitudes and behavior in Ameri- can politics. In this seminal work these authors argue that partisanship is relatively stable, though it can be altered by contemporaneous events. Fiorina (1981) further argues that partisanship is a running tally, by which citizens update their partisanship through a con- tinuous evaluation of the parties based on current and past events and is more variable than

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