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Rao Faizan Ali Rafi Ullah Syed Mudsasr Bilal Sharafat

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Rao Faizan Ali Rafi Ullah Syed Mudsasr Bilal Sharafat Rao faizan ali Sp09-bcs-082 Rafi ullah Sp09-bcs-78 Syed mudsasr bilal Sp09-bcs-094 Sharafat ali Sp09-bcs-90 Table of contents 1-background 2-operation 3-attack on lower dir 4-attack on buner 5-main operation activties 6-battle for mingora 7-alleged capture of sufi muhammad and other leaders 8-casualties 9-foreign involvment and aftermathes Operation Rah-e- Rast Background: A temporary ceasefire was called in the Malakand region on February 16, 2009. The prprovovinincicialal gogovevernrnmementnt agagrereeded to alalloloww ththee implementation of Sharia in the region once violence had stopped. Muhammad traveled to Swat to discuss peace with Fazlullah and his ffoolllloowweerrss,, wwhhoo aaggrreeeedd ttoo oobbsseerrvvee tthhee ceasefire. OOnn FFeebbrruuaarryy 2244,, 22000099 MMuusslliimm KhKhanan,, spspokokepeperersosonn of ththee TeTehrhrik-ik-i-i-TalTalibibanan PaPakikiststanan (T(TTPTP)) pupublbliciclyly anannonoununcecedd ththatat hihiss group would observe an indefinite ceasefire. TThhee AANNPP sseenntt tthhee bbiillll ttoo PPrreessiiddeenntt AAssifif AAlili Zardari, who delayed signing it into law until the "the writ of the government [had] been esestatablblisishehed.d. SoSoonon afafteterr thathatt the mimililitatantntss exexpanpandededd ththeieirr teterrrrititororyy inintoto ototheherr didiststririctctss and by mid-April they took Buner, Lower Dir and Shangla. With the Taliban takeover the militants came within 60 miles (97 km) of the capitcapitalal of PakisPakistan,tan, IslamabadIslamabad.. This raised the alaralarmm amoamongng weswesterternn coucountrntriesies,, parparticticulaularlyrly tthhee UUnniitteedd SSttaatteess,, tthhaatt a ccoollllaappssee ooff tthhee country and a Taliban takeover was playing out. And the government was highly criticized fforor mamakikingng ppeaeacece ddeealalss wiwitthh tthehe mmililititanantts.s. UUnnddeerr pprreessssuurree ffrroomm WWaasshhiinnggttoonn,, tthhee Pakistani government launched an operation in late April to retake all territory lost in the previous months. Operation: Attack on Lower Dir: OOppeerraattiioonn TTooaarr TTaannddeerr--II ((BBllaacckk TThuhundndererststororm-m-I)I) bebegagann in LoLowewerr DiDirr as ththee Frontier Corps (FC) killed 26 Taliban, including kekeyy cocommmmanandedersrs MaMaululananaa ShShahahidid anandd QaQariri Quraish. The operation was launched on April 26, after tthhee TTaalliibbaann,, iinn vviioollaattiioonn ooff tthhee ppeeaaccee aaggrreeeemmeenntt,, aattttacackkeedd sseeccuurriittyy ffoorrcceess aanndd government officials and closed roads for the movement of government and FC convoys. In some villages, the Taliban had looted shops and tortured villagers to gain their support, adding that a jirga had also been forced to back them. Officials said the forces were gaining ground aaggaiainnsstt tthhee TTalalibibaann anandd tthheeirir hhidideeoouuttss iinn KaKalklkotot,, IsIslalamm DaDarara anandd HoHoshshyayariri DaDarara wewerere tartargetgeted.ed. ParParamiamilitlitaryary trotroopsops and hehelicolicoptepterr gugunsnshihipsps bobombmbeded sususpspecectetedd TaTalilibabann babasesess dduurriinngg tthhee ooppeerraattiioonn.. EEiigghhtt ssoollddiieerrss aanndd around 50 militants were killed in two days of fifighghtitingng.. ThThee opopereratatioionn momoststlyly clcleaeareredd ththee Lower Dir district of Taliban forces by April 28. HoHowewevever,r, ththee mimililitataryry wawass ststililll fifighghtitingng wiwithth pockets of militant resistance in the coming weeks. Attack on Buner: The second phase of the operation started the same day as fighting in Lower Dir was ddyyiningg ddoowwnn.. TThhee PPaakkiissttanan AArrmmyy''ss ppuusshh ttoo rreettaakkee ccoonnttrrooll ooff BBuunneerr,, wwhhiicchh wwaass oonnllyy 100 kilometres (62 mi) away from the capital cciittyy IIssllaammaabbaadd,, ssttaarrtteedd.. PPaakkiissttaannii SSSSGG ccoommmmaannddooss sswwaarrmmeedd ddoowwnn rrooppeess ffrroomm hheelliiccoopptteerrss ttoo eenntteerr tthhee ttoowwnn ooff DDaaggggaarr,, which lies in the strategically important Buna valley to the northwest of Islamabad, killing nearly 50 militants [16]. Pakistan Army leaders hoped to trap about 500 militants in between the airdropped troops and a second force that is advancing on the ground towards Taliban positions at the valley's entrance. The fate of Taliban7755 ppoolliicce ine Bunerooffffiicceerrs thes ttaakkeenpreviousn hhoossttaagge nighte remained bbyy tthhee unclear. 18 were rescued the next day but the others were still prisoners. The operation in Daggar came on the third day of the Army's offensive to roll back the Taliban advance that had caused concern not just in Islamabad – wwhhiicchh iiss jjuusstt 6655 mmiilleess aawwaayy – bbuutt aallssoo iinn WaWashshiningtgtonon.. MaMajojorr GeGenenerarall AtAthaharr AbAbbabas,s, aa mmiilliittaarryy ssppookkeessmmaann,, ttoolldd rreeppoorrtteerrss iinn Rawalpindi that the Army and Frontier Corps paramilitary units launched the operation in BBuunneerr ddiissttrriicctt,, bbuuiillddiinngg oonn a sseevveerraall--ddaayy ooffffeennssiivvee iinn tthhee rreeggiioonn.. AAbbbbaass ssaaiidd aann esestitimamatetedd 454500 to 505000 TaTalilibabann araree bebelilieveveded active in Buner, many believed to be engaged in "criminal activities." TThhee UUSS hhadad bbeeeenn rrepepeaeattededlyly prpresessisingng tthehe PaPakiskistatann gogovevernrnmementnt to tatakeke acactitionon,, fefeararfufull ggrroouunndtthhatat tthhed eaannd mmiillitd itanmmiigghhtanttss t wweerreeevveenen ggaainuusseinineing gBBuunneer ttoooor mmuucchhaass aa bridgehead for an attack on the capital city. On May 2, another 10 soldiers were captured in Buner. The military confirmed that some 87 militants and four soldiers had been killed in fighting in the district between April 28 and May 4. The military also stated that its troops were confronted during the fighting with wave atattatackckss of susuicicididee cacar-r-bobombmberers.s. At leleasastt 27 suicide bombers were killed in the fighting. By May 5, troops started to push back the Taliban militants in Buner. Main Operation Activities: On May 5, the third phase of the operation ststarartetedd as trtroooopsps ststorormemedd ththee mimililitatantnt-h-heleldd valley of Swat. The name of this sub-operation of Black Thunderstorm has been referred to as OperaOperationtion Rah-eRah-e-Rast -Rast in Urdu . In more tthhanan a mmoonntthh ooff ffiigghhttiinngg,, bbyy JJuunnee 1155,, 110066 ssoollddiieerrss aanndd 11,,004400 mmiilliittaannttss wweerree kkiilllleedd.. Militant fighters were holed up in the emerald mines and in the main town of Swat district, MMiinnggoorraa.. TThhee mmiinneess wweerree sseeccuurreedd bbyy tthhee Army by May 7, but the militants were still holding their positions in Mingora and on a ssttrraatteeggiicc hhiillllttoopp oovveerrllooookkiinngg tthhee ttoowwnn.. Meanwhile, on May 7, in Lower Dir, which was previously declared clear of the Taliban by the military, militants overran a paramilitary fort kkiilllliinngg tthhrreeee ppaarraammiilliittaarryy ssoollddiieerrss aanndd capturing 10 policemen. On May 10, troops BaBabaatatttacbaackeked ind ShShana anglTaTalilibbanglaa andidist strittrarainrictct,inin,ing whwhicg ichcacamhmp isp jujustatst BBan eaeastanaistai from Swat. In the fighting at Banai Baba the military reported killing 150 militants for the loss of two soldiers. At the same time as the fifighghtitingng in ShShananglgla,a, sosomeme spspororadadicic fifighghtitingng was still continuing in Lower Dir where, over ffouourr ddayayss,, 101099 momorree mmililititanantsts wewerere kikilllleedd.. Also, further west, in the Mohmand agency, a ggrorouupp of 330000 mmililititananttss atattatackckeedd a mmililititararyy oouuttppoosstt,, iinn tthhee ffiigghhttiinngg tthhaatt eennssuueedd 2266 mimililittanantsts wewerere kikilllleded anandd 1144 sosoldldieiersrs wewerree wounded. On May 12, Pakistani commandos were inserted by helicopters into the Piochar area, a rear-support base for the militants, in tthhee nnoorrtthheerrnn ppaarrtt ooff tthhee SSwwaatt vvaalllleeyy ttoo conduct search-and-destroy operations. By May 15, the Army claimed that Buner was fifinanallylly cocompmpleletetelyly clcleaeareredd of TaTaliblibanan foforcrceses,, positionshohoweweveverr inararti tillllertheery hillsy bobomb wasmbarardm stilldmen entongoing.t of TaTaliliba Andbann it was reported that the Taliban were more dug in and in larger numbers in Buner than the military previously assumed. Meanwhile, the Pakistani military continued with their push up the Swat valley. As the military approached MiMinngogorra,a, ththee TaTallibibanan wwereree ddigiggginingg in foforr aa "b"bloloododyy ururbabann babattttlele"" agagainainstst ththee PaPakikiststananii ararmymy in a hohottlyly ddisispuputetedd cicityty in ththee nnorortth-h- wweesstteerrnn ppaarrtt ooff tthhee ccoouunnttrryy.. TThhee TTaalliibbaann bbeeggaann ccoonncceennttrraattiinngg ffoorrcceess iinn MMiinnggoorraa -- ddigiggginingg ttrrenenchcheses,, lalayiyinngg mimineness anandd ttakakiningg positions on rooftops. Stratfor, a private firm that describes itself as a gglolobbalal iintntelelliligegencncee cocompmpanany,y, mementntioionneded that it is not clear if the Pakistani military is ttrraaiinneedd aanndd eevveenn eeqquuiippppeedd ttoo ggoo iinnttoo aa ssiittuuaattiioonn lliikkee tthhaatt,, aaddddiinngg tthhaatt eevveenn tthhee UnUnititeded StStateatess mimilitlitararyy "w"wououldld hahaveve to ththininkk ttwwiiccee"" aabboouutt ssuucchh aann ooffffeennssiivvee.. PPakakiissttananii mmiilliittaarryy ssppookkeessmmaann MMaajjoorr
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