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Pakistan – Karachi – Muslim Fundamentalists – TNSM – NWFP Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: PAK30065 Country: Pakistan Date: 12 April 2006 Keywords: Pakistan – Karachi – Muslim Fundamentalists – TNSM – NWFP This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Questions 1. Please provide me background information and if possible a list of “Islamic extremist political parties” that operate in the NWFP. 2. Were TNSM members fighting in Afghanistan from 2000 to 2004? 3. Did this affect their activities in the NWFP? 4. Is there any evidence to suggest that when TNSM’s members returned from Afghanistan they became more active domestically? 5. In its April 2005 report, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, the International Crisis Group (ICG) states that “the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi…has lost considerable ground to its rival Islamist organisations as a result of the U.S.-led campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban”. Please provide further information on this claim. 6. Recent reports indicate that the TNSM has resurfaced and re-organised under a new name and leader. Can you provide details of its new name and leader? 7. Are there any recent reports of the activities of the TNSM or the new organisation in the NWFP? 8. Are there any reports that suggest that the TNSM operates in Karachi? RESPONSE 1. Please provide me background information and if possible a list of “Islamic extremist political parties” that operate in the NWFP. A myriad of Islamic political parties operate in the North West Frontier Province, (NWFP). According to a March 2006 International Crisis Group report, “Pakistan has 58 religious political parties and 24 known militant groups. The religious political parties also have militant wings or maintain links with local and regional jihadi networks” (‘Pakistan: Political impact of the Earthquake’ 2006, International Crisis Group Asia briefing No. 46, p.9 15 March 2006 – Attachment 1). An article in Al-Ahram Weekly Online describes the complexity of the current relationships of the North-West Frontier Province’s religious groups and their supporters: (This)…section of Pakistani society has gone further, rejecting outright the government’s attempts to justify itself and choosing instead to vocally oppose Islamabad’s cooperation with the US. They are, in President Musharraf’s own words, “the extremist minority” – Pakistan’s religious groups and their supporters. On the streets, Islamist groups have both led opposition to the government and supplied the vast majority of protesters. Of Pakistan’s myriad religious parties, two groups – Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) and Jama’at-I-Islami (JI) – have been especially active. Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) membership is split between two distinct factions: the Punjab-based JUI(F), led by Fazal-ur-Rehman, and the smaller JUI(S), led by Sami-ul-Haq and based in the North Western Frontier Province which borders Afghanistan. Both factions, but especially Maulana Sami-ul-Haq’s, claim that the Taliban emerged from their madrassas. The JUI has a strong following in the NWFP and Balochistan. It is a Deobandi organisation – the same Sunni sect followed by the Taliban and most Afghan Pashtuns. The other prominent religious party is Jama’at-I-Islami (JI), headed by Qazi Hussein Ahmed. The JI has a following throughout Pakistan. It claims to be non- sectarian: in practice, however, it is close to Saudi Arabian Wahabism. The JI is the most organised of the religious parties and has a disciplined membership that it can mobilise at will. Smaller parties and groups are also involved. One of these is Azam Tariq’s Sipah-e- Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) – an extreme, anti-Shi’i group which has its roots in southern Punjab. Another is Maulana Sufi Muhammad’s Tehreek-I-Nifaz-I- Shariah Muhammadi (TNSM), which has a strong following in pockets of the NWFP. Each of these groups has responded individually to the current situation, but there has also been a collective response in the form of the Pakistan Afghanistan Defence Council (PADC) – an umbrella group comprising some 25 religious parties including JI, both JUI factions, SSP and TNSM. Its leading figures are Maulana Sami-ul-Haq and retired General Hamid Gul. Gul was once head of the Pakistani army’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the major agency in Islamabad’s Afghan policy (Malek, I. 2001, ‘Islamists rise to the challenge’, Al-Ahram Weekly Online website, 1-7 November http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/558/2war.htm – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 2). At present the ruling coalition of the NWFP is the Mutahida (also spelt Muttahia) Majlis e Amal, (MMA), a group of six Islamic political parties, including the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat-i-Islami: The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), major partners in the six-party ruling MMA alliance in NWFP and Balochistan, are two of the most prominent religious parties. Both have been involved with regional jihads, in Kashmir and Afghanistan, conducted at the military’s behest. The JI’s subsidiaries include the Hizbul Mujahidin, one of the most prominent jihadi organisations in Kashmir. Key al-Qaeda figures, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, have been apprehended at the homes of JI religious leaders and activists. The JUI was and remains a supporter of the Taliban, many of whom graduated from its madrasas. The JUI-Fazlur Rehman also draws its recruits from Jamiatul-Ansar (the renamed jihadi Harkatul Mujahidin, another prominent jihadi organisation in Kashmir), which maintains bases in the NWFP. These two religious parties, which may be considered the chief patrons of the jihad in Pakistan, are involved in earthquake relief through their welfare wings, the JUI through Al Khair Trust and the JI through Al Khidmat Foundation (‘Pakistan: Political impact of the Earthquake’ 2006, International Crisis Group Asia briefing No. 46, 15 March 2006 – Attachment 1). Country information from the same International Crisis Group report highlights the complications in differentiating between Islamist organisations and states that there is great difficulty in distinguishing between political and jihadi strains of Islamism in Pakistan. As the report elaborates: For most analytical purposes Islamist groups around the world can be usefully divided: missionary groups that have no political agenda, organisations with a political agenda that eschew violence, and jihadi outfits that advance their political agenda through violent means. These distinctions are frequently not clear-cut in Pakistan, where, aside from some missionary groups that have no political agenda, many of the country’s Islamic political movements, including its Islamic political parties, have generally maintained close links with jihadi organisations or even have jihadi wings (‘Pakistan: Political impact of the Earthquake’ 2006, International Crisis Group Asia briefing No. 46, 15 March 2006 – Attachment 1). According to a 2005 report by the International Crisis Group, the MMA evolved from the Pak-Afghan Defence Council, established in October 2001 by 26 religious parties as well as some smaller groups. The two largest parties of the MMA are the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. According to International Crisis Group, the alliance: …were united in their opposition to Pakistan’s role in the U.S led military campaign in Afghanistan. Failing to galvanise much popular support, the council disbanded shortly after the fall of the Taliban. Six of its major parties then formed the MMA in January 2002 to contest general elections in October. Its two largest components are the JUI-F and the JI… …While the military’s manoeuvres helped it become the second largest party in the National Assembly, internal disputes have made the MMA an unstable coalition whose smaller components, including the JUI-S, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, Jamiat Ahle and the Shia party, Islami Tehrik Pakistan, are increasingly resentful of JUI-F and JI dominance. The JI is equally resentful of the JUI-F’s control of the NWFP and Balochistan governments (‘Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan’ 2005, International Crisis Group, 28 September – Attachment 3). The International Crisis Group profiles the Jamaat-i-Islami in the following manner: In many ways the JI is the main architect of official Islam in Pakistan. The party’s founder, Abul A’ala Maududi, was South Asia’s most prominent Islamic scholar, whose influence is visible in revivalist movements across the Muslim world. It has wide international contacts, with chapters in Bangladesh and India and ties to the Ikhwanul Muslimeen, the Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt. Although the JI’s popular support is limited, it gains clout from close ties to the military, first established in the 1960s with the Ayub regime, then strengthened during the Yahya Khan interregnum, when the JI’s front organistaions, such as Al Badar and Al-Shams, and its student wing, Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT), targeted Bengali dissidents on behalf of the military. During the 1970s, the JI was a key component of the Pakistan national Alliance, whose agitation gave General Zia the pretext to overthrow Bhutto’s PPP government and then became his surrogate party in domestic politics and its closest partner in the U.S.-sponsored jihad in Afghanistan… …Its constituency remains largely urban, and includes Western-educated intellectuals and social scientists with affiliations to JI-run research organisations such as the Islamabad–based Institute of Policy Studies (‘Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan’ 2005, International Crisis Group, 28 September – Attachment 3). The International Crisis Group profiles the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam in the following manner: Divided into two factions, led by Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) and Samiul Haq (JUI-S), the JUI represents a more puritanical streak of political Islam, with roots in the Deobandi movement under the British Raj, and its political offshoot, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH).
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