Caso Navalny. Il “Putin Collettivo” E Il “Putin Immaginario”

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Caso Navalny. Il “Putin Collettivo” E Il “Putin Immaginario” Caso Navalny. Il “Putin collettivo” e il “Putin immaginario” The man with no name is now a prisoner with a number [Mark Galeotti – “Why Navalny is becoming a danger to Putin” The Spectator, 18 gennaio 2021] “A collective Putin”, una coalizione senza volto di tecnocrati e siloviki che sostituisce il presidente nell’esercizio delle funzioni quotidiane. Questa è la Russia che si affaccia al 2021, nel trentennale del crollo dell’Unione Sovietica, tra repressione interna, future elezioni, pandemia e nuove sfide geopolitiche rese ancora più pressanti dalla vittoria del presidente statunitense Joe Biden. ytali è una rivista indipendente. Vive del lavoro volontario e gratuito di giornalisti e collaboratori che quotidianamente s’impegnano per dare voce a un’informazione approfondita, plurale e libera da vincoli. Il sostegno dei lettori è il nostro unico strumento di autofinanziamento. Se anche tu vuoi contribuire con una donazione clicca QUI Un anno che si preannuncia cupo e che potrebbe essere ricordato per una crescente e sempre più sofisticata azione punitiva condotta su tutti coloro che sono ostili al regime. Secondo l’analista Tatiana Stanovaya, il presidente è ancora il garante della stabilità, ma è focalizzato più sulle questioni globali che sulla risoluzione dei problemi quotidiani. Nel 2020 Putin ha deciso di delegare aspetti cruciali della gestione dello stato, escludendo il referendum costituzionale, a differenti interlocutori: il governo è, dunque, responsabile dell’economia, i governatori regionali devono gestire la pandemia e all’Fsb (ex Kgb) è affidata la lotta all’opposizione. Questa entità, “the collective Putin”, avendo carta bianca, agisce in nome di un “Putin immaginario”, con l’approvazione tacita di Putin stesso. | 1 Caso Navalny. Il “Putin collettivo” e il “Putin immaginario” Alexei Navalny Lo stato, sempre secondo Stanovaya, si sta trasformando in una macchina repressiva che distrugge indiscriminatamente e senza rimorso, facendo affidamento sulla cosiddetta “Putin Majority”, ormai svanita. Secondo l’analista del Carnegie Moscow Center Andrei Kolesnikov, non solo è difficile rilevarne l’esistenza, ma questa “maggioranza” si è sgretolata in numerose minoranze i cui membri non hanno certo una mentalità democratica, ma sono, comunque, scontenti della situazione attuale. | 2 Caso Navalny. Il “Putin collettivo” e il “Putin immaginario” Proprio il difficile rapporto con l’opposizione “non-system”, già critico negli scorsi anni, è divenuto più che mai attuale in questi mesi. Dopo l’avvelenamento da novičok avvenuto il 20 agosto scorso, Alexei Navalny, che ha attribuito la responsabilità del gesto al Cremlino, ha deciso di rientrare il 17 gennaio dalla Germania (una mossa paragonata a quella di Lenin dell’aprile del 1917), ove è rimasto per 5 mesi per sottoporsi a cure mediche. In aeroporto è stato subito arrestato, condannato a 30 giorni di detenzione e trasferito nel penitenziario Matrosskaya Tishina (“Sailor’s Silence”), per violazione dei termini della libertà vigilata, in attesa della seconda udienza del 2 febbraio quando decideranno se commutare la pena sospesa in anni di carcere (tre anni e mezzo). La struttura è una delle prigioni più dure e famigerate del paese, secondo Politico. Navalny, in un post su Instagram, ha affermato di aver letto di questa prigione nei libri. “E ora sono qui. Vita russa”. Attualmente è in una cella situata al piano superiore in una sezione posta sotto la supervisione informale dei servizi di intelligence. Fin dall’era sovietica la prigione ha “accolto” prigionieri di alto profilo che le autorità volevano isolare dal mondo. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, che ha passato quattro anni lì, ha dichiarato che “all’inizio è difficile. E non è più facile neanche dopo. Puoi essere ucciso in qualsiasi momento.” Marina Litvinovich, membro della Moscow’s Public Monitoring Commission, ritiene che il motto del luogo sia “isolation from information.” Malgrado l’arresto, Navalny ha invitato i suoi concittadini a scendere in piazza il 23 gennaio per protestare contro il regime. E così è stato. Hanno risposto all’appello anche decine di figure influenti della società russa, tra cui attori, musicisti, giornalisti, scrittori, atleti e blogger. Le proteste appena concluse, considerate illegali dalle autorità, rappresentano una delle dimostrazioni antigovernative più rilevanti degli ultimi anni (almeno dal marzo del 2017): decine di migliaia di persone, al grido di “Putin is a thief!”, “We will not leave”, “Freedom to Navalny”, “Putin, go away”, sono scese in piazza in tutto il paese, malgrado il clima gelido e il dispiegamento massiccio di forze dell’ordine. Circa 4.000 persone (fonte: OVD-info) sono state arrestate in quasi cento città, tra cui anche la moglie di Navalny, Yulia. Il copione è sempre lo stesso: violenze, arresti e pestaggi brutali da parte della polizia ai danni di giovani e adulti, inclusi minorenni (tra cui un bambino di nove anni), di giornalisti e collaboratori di Navalny, alcuni dei quali, insieme ad altri cittadini, sono stati arrestati anche nei giorni antecedenti alle manifestazioni. Il tutto è documentato e postato sui social media. A San Pietroburgo una manifestante, Margarita Yudina, di 54 anni, dopo essere stata colpita allo stomaco da un ufficiale di polizia ed essere stata ricoverata in terapia intensiva, è divenuta il simbolo delle proteste ed è ora in cerca di giustizia, seppur le sue condizioni siano nuovamente peggiorate. | 3 Caso Navalny. Il “Putin collettivo” e il “Putin immaginario” “Se le dimostrazioni non dovessero avere un risultato immediato, cosa ormai chiara, ossia l’immediato rilascio di Navalny, queste azioni”, ha dichiarato Leonid Volkov, coordinatore della Fondazione Anticorruzione (Fbk) di Navalny, “saranno ripetute all’infinito.” Il team dell’oppositore intende, infatti, organizzare nuove proteste pacifiche il prossimo 31 gennaio, partendo da Lubyanka Square, a Mosca (sede del quartier generale dell’Fsb), e dall’area antistante agli uffici dell’amministrazione presidenziale di Putin. “Tutte le città della Russia. Per la libertà di Navalny. Per la libertà di tutti. Per la giustizia”, ha commentato Volkov su Twitter. Le azioni repressive intanto continuano: proprio il 27 gennaio la polizia ha effettuato alcuni raid nell’appartamento di Navalny e negli uffici della sua fondazione. Non sono mancate le minacce agli studenti da parte di università e college di molte città russe che | 4 Caso Navalny. Il “Putin collettivo” e il “Putin immaginario” hanno paventato la possibilità di ricorrere ad azioni disciplinari ed espulsioni in caso di partecipazione alle proteste, mentre il ministero dell’istruzione ha intimato ai parenti di non consentire ai propri figli di partecipare alle manifestazioni. Ai social media è stato richiesto di eliminare i video pro Navalny, minacciando sanzioni contro i social inadempienti e colpevoli di incoraggiare i minori ad agire illegalmente, partecipando alle proteste: su indicazione di Roskomnadzor, l’autorità di vigilanza per le telecomunicazioni, VKontakte ha cancellato il cinquanta per cento dei video e ha bloccato tutte le pagine dedicate, TikTok il trentotto per cento, YouTube il cinquanta per cento e Instagram il diciassette per cento. Telegram, invece, ha bloccato gli account di molti giornalisti indipendenti in quanto si sono lamentati di un canale che pubblicava i dati personali dei supporter di Navalny. Anche il copione delle tv di stato non cambia mai: accuse ai manifestanti di aver aggredito le forze dell’ordine in un’ondata di violenze pianificata in precedenza e pilotata, attacchi a Navalny dipinto come “individuo corrotto che vive nel lusso e mangia l’aragosta”, solo per citare alcuni punti. Il portavoce di Putin Dmitri Peskov ha minimizzato la portata della manifestazione, affermando che si tratta di una minoranza di cittadini, mentre, in realtà, sempre secondo Peskov, “molte persone votano per Putin”, come dimostra il risultato del referendum costituzionale. Intanto sono in fase di valutazione le tipologie di condanna a carico delle persone in detenzione da parte dei tribunali sia per punire chi ha protestato il 23 gennaio sia per “decapitare” la leadership del movimento. Il ministero dell’interno, ad esempio, ha già aperto un procedimento penale per coloro che hanno bloccato il traffico, decisione che potrebbe portare a condanne a un anno di carcere. | 5 Caso Navalny. Il “Putin collettivo” e il “Putin immaginario” Io / siamo Alexey Navalny [da Twitter Штаб Навального в Барнауле @teamnavalny_] Ma la censura non è venuta solo dal governo: secondo quanto riportato da The Moscow Times, l’ufficio moscovita della società di consulenza McKinsey & Company ha vietato al proprio staff di partecipare alle proteste, chiedendo di astenersi da qualsiasi tipo di attività politica, pubblica o privata, per essere in linea con le policy previste dalla società ed evitando di compromettere la reputazione della stessa “a favore della neutralità politica”. Il divieto è stato applicato anche ai post sui social media. McKinsey non solo ha rapporti professionali di lunga data con società legate al Cremlino, alcune delle quali sottoposte a sanzioni occidentali, ma collabora abitualmente con paesi autoritari, tra cui Arabia Saudita, Turchia e Cina. Un ulteriore elemento che ha rafforzato le proteste (ad oggi sono oltre novanta milioni le visualizzazioni) è la videoinchiesta realizzata dal team di Navalny e postata il 19 gennaio, in cui viene mostrato l’ormai noto “Putin’s Palace” sul Mar Nero (in Russia se ne parla dal 2010), una residenza da 1,35
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